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Conflict Prevention/Rehabilitation

The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security is closely tied to the concept of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation, also known as the “conflict cycle.” It addresses this cycle through a network of field operations as well as the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center, which provides policy advice, support, and analysis to the Secretary General, Chairmanship, participating States, and field operations. The CPC acts as an OSCE-wide early warning focal point, facilitates negotiation, mediation, and other conflict prevention and resolution efforts, and supports regional co-operation initiatives.

Over the past two decades, Helsinki Commission efforts have focused on assisting the countries of the Western Balkans to recover from the violent and divisive conflict of the 1990s. Commissioners have also taken a special interest in frozen conflicts as well as in promoting reconcilation and recovery in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement.

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  • OSCE Holds First Annual Security Review Conference

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe organized a two-day Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) on June 25 and 26, 2003, in Vienna, Austria. The U.S. proposal to hold this conference was approved in December 2002 by the OSCE's Foreign Ministers' meeting in Porto, Portugal. The conference's goal was to provide increased emphasis and profile to hard security questions from agreements in conventional arms control and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) to police-related activities and combating terrorism. In this sense, the ASRC differs from OSCE's Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting held under the auspices of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, which more narrowly focuses on CSBM implementation. The meeting consisted of opening and closing plenary sessions, and four working groups devoted to a) preventing and combating terrorism; b) comprehensive security; c) security risks and challenges across the OSCE region; and d) conflict prevention and crisis management. U.S. Priorities for the Implementation Review Leading up to the conference, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairs Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) urged the U.S. Department of State to conduct a thorough implementation review which focused on the need for the participating States to comply with their security-related OSCE commitments. Russian military operations in Chechnya and the Caucasus, democratic political control over the military, security forces and intelligence services, so-called "frozen conflicts" like those in Moldova and the Caucasus, combating terrorism, money laundering and non-proliferation were subjects of particular concern noted by the co-chairs. Conference keynote speaker Adam Rotfeld, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, stressed that the biggest threat to the OSCE was the support by criminal and dictatorial regimes for terrorists. The organization needed to give particular focus on the Caucasus and Central Asian countries in an effort to meet this threat by building institutions and establishing the rule of law. It was also suggested that OSCE look beyond its traditional areas and include the partners countries in its activities, wherever possible. Greece, speaking for the EU, noted the OSCE's value to provide early warning, post-conflict rehabilitation, and conflict management. The EU urged that very high priority be given to human trafficking, termed "the piracy of today." Germany stressed the need to strengthen the police and border management in troubled regions. Ambassador Cofer Black, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism, urged the OSCE to focus on concrete and achievable steps to fight the financing of terrorism and press all 55 participating States to become parties to the 12 UN Conventions on Terrorism. Black recommended that the OSCE be used to strengthen travel and document security with a goal of including bio-metric data (based on the physical composure of an individual's hand or retina) in the travel documents of individuals from all participating States and sharing information on lost and stolen passports. Several delegations cited the need to do more to restrict illicit weapons trade and cited the Bishkek and Bucharest documents as blueprints for practical action. The need to limit the availability of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) was cited by several delegations. The United States noted that, in preparing for the December OSCE Maastricht Ministerial, particular focus should be given to the priorities cited in the 2003 G-8 Action Plan which includes steps to control proliferation of MANPADS, increased security of sea transport and more effective travel documentation. These priorities were stressed by the new OSCE Special Representative for Counter Terrorism, Brian Wu, who suggested that the area of biological weaponry might need particular attention and asked if more emphasis might be placed on non-banking sources when looking into the financing of terrorism. In the working session on conflict prevention and crisis management, delegations acknowledged OSCE's lack of a "big stick" and the need to work closely with organizations and governments who had such instruments. Nevertheless, the OSCE has a good "tool box" for a variety of actions and is using it for actions such as the destruction of arms stockpiles in Georgia, police training in Kosovo, and facilitating the withdrawal of Russian troops and arms from Moldova. The Representative on Freedom of the Media noted the importance of monitoring hate speech, creating public awareness of arms trafficking and protecting journalists in conflict areas. Most delegations agreed that the OSCE had neither the mandate nor the resources to be a peacekeeping organization, but Russia emphasized it did not share this view and recommended that possibilities for joint action be discussed by OSCE with NATO and the EU. Macedonia hailed the success of the OSCE Mission in helping to manage its internal conflict. The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the work of the Forum on Security Cooperation on small arms and light weapons are positively assessed as a contribution to the larger effort of arms control and conflict risk reduction in Europe. Limits on how much further some of these efforts could be developed, however, were questioned, and there was resistance to actual revision of some of the agreements already reached. In the past year, the OSCE has begun to look at new security risks and challenges across the region. Organized crime, including arms trafficking, was frequently highlighted as something which needed additional cooperative efforts to combat. Among the most important developments are OSCE efforts to assist countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus to improve their police services, drawing on experience gained in southeastern Europe. Throughout the meeting there was a pronounced tendency to be long on generalities and short on specifics. For example, it was noted that only 38 percent of the 55 participating States have become parties to all 12 United Nations conventions and protocols on combating terrorism, a clear OSCE commitment, yet the countries which have not were never named nor asked to explain their implementation records. Indeed, one OSCE insider concluded that the discussion on implementation of commitments to combat terrorism was not much advanced from the discussion which surrounded the earlier negotiation of those commitments. An Ambassador went as far as to remark during a plenary session that some previous statements were little more than "preemptive self-justification." Critics of the ASRC, however, should keep in mind this was the first review conference of its kind. Certainly the implementation review meetings for the human and economic dimensions of the OSCE have had to evolve and adapt over the years. For the security dimension though, calling participating States to account for instances of non-compliance has not similarly developed. As U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Stephan M. Minikes asserted in his closing statement, "This first Annual Security Review Conference has accomplished what we realistically expected it would. We must recognize that this is the first time that this conference has been held. There will be matters to work out over time. But the fact that we have made a start is very significant and together with our partners from other European and Euro-Atlantic security organizations there is much to do to follow up." Looking Ahead There are several ways in which the ASRC could be improved next year. The Annual Security Review Conference could go beyond its sole focus on OSCE tools and issues and devote specific time to actions taken by the participating States themselves. The benefit of such a review would justify the conference being lengthened by at least one day. As Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton testified at a Helsinki Commission hearing in May, "Heretofore, we have not seen the OSCE as being as much a possible vehicle to help get the kind of [non-proliferation] compliance we want. And that's why I think it's worth exploring." Perhaps more critical to the dialogue would be the opening of the ASRC to a wider audience. The OSCE's other review meetings are already open, not just to observation by those outside government but to participation by NGOs as well. In a letter to the State Department, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairmen Rep. Smith and Senator Campbell urged greater openness and transparency. They were told, however, that for the first ASRC non-inclusion of non-governmental organizations was intended to promote greater dialogue and a more critical review. Only national delegations, OSCE institutions and other European-based international organizations were invited to participate in the inaugural conference. The modalities for the conference did state that "security-related scientific institutes or 'think tanks' of international standing would be considered to be invited as keynote speakers or otherwise be represented as members of national delegations." However, the effort to do so seemed fairly limited and the "greater dialogue" and "more critical review" was not fully realized. The OSCE could do much more to draw on the wealth of expertise among security-related institutions in the United States and elsewhere. If some view the kind of NGO participation seen at other implementation meetings as not conducive to a productive meeting on security issues, at least greater use of public members on national delegations and greater use of expert analysis and insight could be pursued. Short of participation, allowing public observation would permit others a chance to see more clearly how the OSCE and its participating States address security in Europe, and opportunities to engage one-on-one with government officials in the corridors and side events. The State Department has indicated a willingness to look at possible NGO inclusion for future ASRC meetings. Finally, the development of the ASRC should be considered in the broader context of maintaining the balance among the dimensions of the OSCE which has been one of its traditional strengths. Giving balancing to the OSCE's activities was the primary justification for the ASRC. But the level of activity ultimately needs to be based on the need to promote balanced progress in the actual implementation of OSCE commitments. One very positive aspect of the review conference was the deferral of other OSCE activity in Vienna during the meeting which permitted delegates to focus their attention exclusively toward the ASRC. In the past, this has not been the case for human dimension and economic review meetings, which have had to compete with a plethora of meetings, diminishing the focus and participation of some delegations. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Missing Persons in Southeast Europe

    Rep. Chris Smith (NJ-04) and Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell heard from people who had lost relatives in the former Yugoslavia (i.e. Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia) during the years of conflict in that region. This hearing specifically focused on Serbians who lost relatives in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. The panelists – Olgica Bozanic, Verica Tomanovic, Cedomir Maric, and Gordana Jaksic – represented not only themselves and their own families, but also organizations consisting of hundreds of families of the missing.

  • Helsinki Commission Examines Plight of Internally Displaced Persons

    By Knox Thames CSCE Counsel The United States Helsinki Commission held a hearing June 10, 2003, focusing on the plight of an estimated three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Caucasus region and southeastern Anatolia. The region has become a temporary dwelling place to the single largest body of displaced persons in the region covered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Testifying at the hearing were Dr. Francis Deng, United Nations Secretary General's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons; Ms. Roberta Cohen, Co-Director of the Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement; Dr. Maureen Lynch, Director of Research for Refugees International; and Mr. Jonathan Sugden, Researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division at Human Rights Watch. Mr. Gabriel Trujillo, Mission Head for Doctors Without Borders of the Russian Federation was scheduled to testify, but encountered unexpected delays in Moscow. Mr. Nicolas de Torrente, Executive Director of Doctors Without Borders, U.S.A. graciously delivered Mr. Trujillo's opening statement. Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) opened the hearing, describing how protracted conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the North Caucasus of the Russian Federation have diminished the prospects of displaced persons safely returning home. He noted that few individuals have been allowed to return to southeastern Turkey, despite the lifting of the last state of emergency in late 2002. "We must address this problem now as thousands and thousands of individuals are suffering," said Smith. "More must be done to find just, realistic and durable solutions." Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) stated in written remarks, "As an American Indian, I am particularly sensitive to the plight of men, women and children who have been uprooted from their homes. Whether due to conflict, natural disaster or other causes, the displaced cling to the hope they will one day be able to return home." Campbell added that with millions waiting to return, "it is the responsibility of individual participating States and the international community to meet the needs of these individuals while working to create the conditions necessary for their return in safety and dignity." Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) emphasized the need for the hearing to both ascertain the precise situation of IDPs in the region and to bring greater attention to their needs. He expressed hope that the hearing would provide information and ideas on how the State Department and the U.S. Congress could play a role in assisting the internally displaced. Commissioner Rep. Joseph R. Pitts (R-PA) called the condition of IDPs in the region "urgent," as they suffer not only from a lack of food, medical aid, and education, but also from the inability to return home. "Some fear government action against them. Others fear rebel action. Others fear both," Pitts noted. Dr. Deng is the author of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which recognized international norms for the rights of the displaced and the corresponding duties of states in protecting those rights. He provided an overview of the situation in the region, characterizing IDPs as having the same needs as refugees, "but worse." Since IDPs do not leave their country, they remain more or less within the conflict zone, faced with the same threats that caused their flight. While their home governments bear primary responsibility for their safety and security, Deng noted in many cases IDPs become in effect political hostages. By not resettling the displaced and allowing free integration, the government uses them as bargaining chips in the political conflict. When the government fails to act, the displaced often fall into a "vacuum of responsibility," Deng observed, noting that the world cannot sit and watch and do nothing. Ms. Cohen offered a series of recommendations for the OSCE on issues pertaining to IDPs. "The OSCE, more than most regional organizations, has tremendous potential for dealing with the problem of internal displacement in the European region," stated Cohen. "It also has the responsibility to do so." Although recognizing that in recent years the OSCE has expanded its involvement with problems of internal displacement, Cohen noted that these steps have been largely ad hoc and too small. She recommended that the OSCE systematically integrate internal displacement into its activities, particularly within the Caucasus region and southeastern Anatolia, using the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as a framework. Cohen specifically urged OSCE bodies to ensure the right of IDPs to vote. In addition, Cohen identified the OSCE/ODIHR migration unit as the potential focal point for activities within the organization and contended that, if these recommendations are carried out, it would positively impact the situation in the Caucasus and Turkey. Russian Federation Gabriel Trujillo's prepared statement outlined the results of a Doctors Without Borders' survey conducted in February 2003 that polled over 16,000 displaced Chechens housed in camps in neighboring Ingushetia. When questioned about returning to Chechnya, an overwhelming majority of respondents said they were too afraid for their safety to return. Notably, individuals interviewed did not consider the availability of humanitarian aid available in Ingushetia as a reason to stay. The ongoing violence has kept UNHCR from certifying Chechnya as a safe return destination. International aid agencies, including Doctors Without Borders, are choosing to limit or suspend their operations out of concern for the safety of aid workers. Mr. de Torrente pointed to recent abductions, including Doctors Without Borders volunteer Arjan Erkel still missing from nearby Daghestan after ten months, as exemplifying the security situation in the region. "If present security conditions in Chechnya and the neighboring republics are not adequate for humanitarian workers to carry out assistance activities," asked de Torrente, "why would they be considered adequate for civilian Chechens to return and resume their normal lives?" Despite this lack of security, the UN estimates that more than 38,000 IDPs from Ingushetia returned to Chechnya last year. Respondents to the survey said people are left with little choice. They report that officials have threatened to cut off assistance in Ingushetia and block future aid in Chechnya for those refusing to leave immediately. Also, Russian troops reportedly are stationed near IDP camps and authorities limit assistance from international agencies, all to pressure IDPs to return to Chechnya. De Torrente concluded, "The results of the survey are a clear indication that the basic rights of displaced people to seek safe refuge, to be protected and assisted properly in a time of conflict, and only to return home voluntarily as guaranteed by international humanitarian law are not being respected." Turkey Mr. Sugden described the situation in southeastern Turkey, where approximately 400,000 to one million people, mostly of Kurdish heritage, fled their villages during the conflict with the PKK. Relative peace returned to the region by 2001, yet the majority of Turkey's displaced have been unable to return home. Sugden noted that often local authorities will not permit villages to be re-inhabited, while in other cases the gendarmes or village guards block resettlement, often by threat or use of violence. While the Government of Turkey has policies and programs aimed at returning the displaced to their homes, Sugden asserted, they have "consistently been underfunded and ill-conceived, falling far short of established international standards." Because of this, the international community has been reluctant to get involved. "Instead of helping villagers to get international assistance, the government, with its flawed plans, is actually standing in their path," he remarked. Sugden noted that the implementation of a fair and effective return program for the displaced populations in Turkey would also serve the country's goal of EU membership. He urged the Helsinki Commission to use its leverage in encouraging Turkey "as a matter of urgent priority" to convene a planning forum with the goal of creating a return program meeting international standards. Azerbaijan and Georgia Dr. Lynch estimated that in the South Caucasus there are currently some 250,000 displaced individuals from the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts in Georgia and over 572,000 displaced from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan. Although political solutions would provide the best opportunity for these groups to return home, the frozen nature of the conflicts makes that a remote possibility. In addition, Lynch asserted that the Georgian and Azeri Governments have failed to provide alternative integration opportunities, thereby maintaining the displaced as "political pawns." In Azerbaijan, only about ten percent of IDPs live in camps. The rest have settled in abandoned hotels, railway cars, or underground dugouts, all of which represent serious health hazards from air and water quality to the risk of structural collapse. The lucky few provided with government-funded housing find themselves located far from jobs and on unirrigated land unsuitable for farming. Nevertheless, Dr. Lynch maintains that Azerbaijan is full of potential; it is an oil-rich country with a highly literate population. "The answer to Azerbaijan's trouble is not found only in resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict," he asserted, "Azerbaijan must protect itself from corruption and use all of its resources to look to the future." In Georgia, the living conditions for IDPs are just as harsh, but with the added difficulty of only sporadic food aid. There is also a severe lack of even basic healthcare accessible to IDPs and virtually no psychosocial assistance. What healthcare is available is often too expensive for the displaced, resulting in many IDPs dying from curable ailments. Dr. Lynch declared that both Azerbaijan and Georgia must develop long-term solutions for their displaced populations, but they must also allow relief aid to arrive unhindered. In particular, Georgia must lift the import tax it imposed on humanitarian goods, which is currently blocking effective aid distribution, and both countries must work to create economic opportunities for IDPs. She further urged governments to be transparent in their plans, thereby encouraging continued participation of the international community. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Displaced Persons Facing Serious Obstacles in Russia

    Mr. Speaker, today I want to bring to the attention of colleagues two situations concerning internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Russian Federation. I recently chaired a Helsinki Commission hearing to assess the plight of IDPs, including those in the Caucasus region.   The first involves IDPs from Chechnya who, according to reliable sources, continue to be pressured by Russian authorities to return to the war-torn capital city of Grozny, despite continuing violence there and a lack of many basic services. According to the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002, approximately 140,000 persons remained internally displaced within Chechnya, with 110,000 more displaced in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Despite international attention, including a letter initiated last fall by the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, the Russian Government continues to pressure IDPs to return, and in some cases limits the ability of NGOs to provide assistance.   My concern for the safety of Chechen IDPs is well founded, as authorities in the past year closed three IDP camps, two near the village of Znamenskoye in northern Chechnya and the Aki-Yurt camp in Ingushetia, effectively forcing the residents back to Grozny. Reports of violence and human rights violations by both Russian military units and Chechen rebels in Chechnya are disturbing. The ongoing chaos in that war-torn region has kept UNHCR from certifying Chechnya as a safe return destination, which is supported by the fact that many international aid agencies have limited or suspended their operations out of concern for the safety of aid workers.   Despite this lack of security, the United Nations estimates that more than 38,000 IDPs from Ingushetia returned to Chechnya last year, with many complaining of government coercion. While no camp has been closed since December 2002, Doctors Without Borders reports that government officials threaten to cut off assistance in Ingushetia and block future aid in Chechnya for those refusing to leave immediately. The stationing of Russian troops near IDP camps and the limiting of assistance from international agencies to camp residents represent pressure tactics to “encourage” the return of IDPs to Chechnya.   Clearly, the Russian Government is not respecting the fundamental right of individuals to seek safe refuge. As a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation has committed to facilitate sustainable solutions to the plight of IDPs and the voluntary return of such individuals in dignity and safety. I urge President Putin to intervene to ensure that Russian policy and practice are consistent with these OSCE commitments and that no IDPs be effectively forced to return to their homes in Chechnya until the conditions have been created for their return. To do otherwise would place the lives of tens of thousands of innocent Russian citizens at risk.   The second situation I want to briefly highlight concerns the plight of Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar Krai region of the Russian Federation. Also known as Ahiska Turks or Meskhetians, Meskhetian Turks were forced to relocate twice within the past 50 years, first from Soviet Georgia in November 1944 to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan. In 1989, approximately 90,000 Meskhetian Turks fled ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan to all parts of the Soviet Union, with the largest concentration today found in Krasnodar Krai. Numbering approximately 13,000, these displaced individuals find themselves in a virtual no man's land, denied citizenship and permanent residency permits, as well as many other fundamental rights.   Due to loopholes in the Russian citizenship law and the improper application of this law by Krasnodar Krai authorities, Meskhetian Turks must register as “guests” every 45 days, may not legally register the purchase of a house or car, and their marriages and deaths are not officially recorded. Most are denied education above high school, as well. The Krasnodar regional legislature enacted a series of laws in 2002 in an attempt to pressure the Meskhetian Turks to leave. Corresponding with the expiration of the temporary registration held by most Krasnodar Meskhetian Turks, the laws reportedly cancelled leases on land or denied lease renewals for the 2002 crop season. Furthermore, chauvinistic local authorities have not intervened to prevent local Cossack paramilitary units from repeatedly victimizing Krasnodar Meskhetian Turks through public harassment, robbery, and vandalism. In late May, a mob of around 50 people attacked Meskhetian Turks and other non-Russian-looking individuals in two villages, injuring 30 people and hospitalizing six.   By not granting citizenship or providing permanent residency status, current Russian policy enables the discriminatory practices subjugating the rights of Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai to continue. Mr. Speaker, President Putin cited the problems of citizenship and stateless persons in his annual State of the Federation address earlier this year. The Russian President pointed out the complexities and uncertainties faced by stateless persons in Russia. I urge him and Members of the State Duma to rectify the status of Meskhetian Turks and other stateless persons. Meanwhile, the Kremlin should intervene to ensure that Krasnodar Krai officials desist in their discriminatory treatment of the Meskhetian Turks until their status is normalized, as well as guarantee the prosecution of violent criminals.  

  • Helsinki Commission Members Press Belgrade to Apprend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor   On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

  • Helsinki Commissioners Press Belgrade to Apprehend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Kristin Poore contributed to this article.

  • Certification of Assistance to Serbia

    Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Department of State last week made its determination to certify compliance by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with the terms of section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7). This section conditions certain bilateral assistance to Serbia on progress in three areas, although by far the most critical being cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.   I agree with the Department’s assessment that progress has been made, especially since March. In particular, I welcomed action earlier this month by the Serbian authorities to apprehend Veselin Svjilancanin, indicted by the Tribunal for the 1991 massacre near Vukovar in Croatia. Although there was resistance, this action was a success and signaled what is perhaps a new determination by Belgrade to transfer all remaining indictees. Having been in Vukovar, along with my good friend and colleague Mr. Wolf, just before the city fell to Serb forces, I am glad to see all three indicted by the Tribunal for this crime will be tried in The Hague.   Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that the Department’s determination was the wrong one to make. While progress has been made, it remains insufficient. Still at large and believed to have been in Serbia are several other persons, including Ratko Mladic and others, Ljubisa Beara, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Vinko Pandurevic and Drago Nikolic, indicted by the Tribunal for their connection to the1995 Srebrenica massacre in which thousands of innocent people were executed.   I am concerned, deeply concerned, that these individuals will continue to evade justice while officials in Belgrade may get the impression they have done enough. Clearly, they have not. Mr. Speaker, I would urge Serbian authorities to take the action necessary to remove "cooperation with the Tribunal" as an outstanding issue in our bilateral relationship. In doing so, they will also continue to help Serbia emerge from Slobodan Milosevic’s legacy of nationalist hatred.   In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I also urge the State Department to use remaining levers to encourage not just better, but full, cooperation with the Tribunal, which Secretary Powell had assured Mr. Cardin and myself in correspondence was a position we all shared. The crimes which occurred were too severe and too horrendous to allow those responsible to escape justice.

  • The Critical Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Chechnya

    This briefing followed a defeat, by a vote of 15-21 at the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, of a U.S.–supported resolution expressing “deep concern” about reported human rights violation in Chechnya.  The developments in Chechnya since the outbreak of the war in 1994 were briefly surveyed, while the focus of discussion was largely on the human dimension of the situation and the dangers faced by average Chechen civilians. Witnesses testifying at the hearing – including Eliza Moussaeva, Director of the Ingushetia Office of the Memorial Human Rights Center; Bela Tsugaeva, Information Manager of World Vision; and Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for the Europe and Eurasia division of Amnesty International – addressed the dismal state of human rights in Chechnya and the issue of international assistance, which was less effective than it could have been due to government accountability issues. The lack of infrastructure and security guarantees was additional topics of discussion.

  • President Shevardnadze’s Statement Welcomed, but Action also Needed

    Today I want to acknowledge and welcome the March 14th statement of the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, pledging his commitment to religious freedom for all Georgians and promising the punishment of individuals complicit in mob attacks on religious minorities. (I am submitting the statement for the RECORD below.) President Shevardnadze made this pledge during an ecumenical service in Tbilisi’s Evangelist-Baptist Cathedral Church, attended by leaders of the Georgian Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Baptist churches and many individuals from the diplomatic community. The U.S. Ambassador to Georgia, Richard Miles, also attended and addressed the gathering. Reportedly, so many people came that hundreds had to listen via loudspeakers in the churchyard.   The service was initially planned for late January, but defrocked priest Basil Mkalavishvili and his crowd of thugs assaulted worshipers and clergy an hour before it was scheduled to begin -- as they have been doing with impunity since 1999. Individuals were beaten as they tried to leave, with rocks and stones being reportedly thrown. While President Shevardnadze quickly condemned that attack, ordering the Interior Minister, the Prosecutor General, State Chancellery Head, and the Security Council Secretary to investigate and punish the perpetrators, no arrests or prosecutions followed.   Despite Georgia’s appalling record on religious tolerance for the last few years, I hope President Shevardnadze’s speech at the Baptist church signals a new determination to arrest and aggressively prosecute the mob leaders and their henchmen. He promised that “as the President of Georgia and a believer, I shall not restrict myself only to a mere expression of resentment. I do promise that the President and the Authorities of Georgia will do their utmost to grant every person freedom of expression of faith.” Driving home the point further, Mr. Shevardnadze declared, “the state will exert its pressure on whoever comes in defiance of this principle. You may stand assured that the aggressors will be brought to justice.”   As Co-Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, over the past three years I have watched with increasing alarm the escalation of mob violence. On September 24th I chaired a Commission hearing focused on this disturbing pattern. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have borne the brunt of attacks, along with Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists and Catholics. Most disheartening has been the government's indifference; victims throughout the country have filed approximately 800 criminal complaints, without one criminal conviction.   Despite a series of statements by President Shevardnadze, Georgia's Minister of Interior and Prosecutor General appear unwilling to effectively enforce the rule of law, refusing to arrest mob leaders like Mkalavishvili and Paata Bluashvili and not attempting serious prosecutions. For example, the trial of Mkalavishvili has dragged on for more than a year, without a single piece of evidence considered yet. I would hope the provision of adequate and visible security, which took months to organize, will continue and that the prosecutor will begin his case shortly. Also, the inauguration of trial proceedings against Bluashvili in Rustavi is positive; I trust the delays and shenanigans seen in Mkalavishvili’s trial will not be repeated there. I also urge the Government of Georgia to arrest and detain Mkalavishvili, Bluashvili and other indicted persons who continue to perpetrate violent criminal acts against religious minorities.   Undoubtedly, President Shevardnadze’s presence at the March 14th service and his statement illustrate his personal commitment to religious tolerance and basic law and order. Yet, while I appreciate his gesture, it is time for real action. If the attacks are allowed to continue, it will only become more difficult to rein in this mob violence. If presidential orders are repeatedly ignored, it will only further weaken the government’s ability to enforce the rule of law. And, of course, we must not forget the plight of minority religious communities that continue to live in a state of siege, without any real protection from their government. Ironically, it appears that minorities’ religious communities are freer to profess and practice their faith in regions of Georgia not under the control of President Shevardnadze’s government.   In closing, I urge President Shevardnadze to fulfill his most recent commitment to punish the aggressors, thereby restoring Georgia’s international reputation and upholding its international commitments as a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. I and other Members of Congress are acutely interested in seeing whether the Government of Georgia will actually arrest the perpetrators of violence and vigorously prosecute them.   Speech of the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, at the Evangelist-Baptist Cathedral Church   “Representatives of all Religions and Nations have to Raise Prayers for Peace Together” Tbilisi, Georgia March 14, 2003   My dear friends, Christians, Dear Ambassadors!   I am here to give utterance to my contentment and admiration, which derives from seeing you, all Christians, or, to be more precise, representatives of all Christian folds, assembled here, under the same roof of this temple, in the capital of Georgia famed as the Virgin’s lot.   I am happy to be a witness to this occurrence. I am happy because you are together, because we are together. But all of us have our own faith.   I am an Orthodox believer, but we are all Christians. It is what we should always bear in mind and keep intact this wholeness and unity.   Georgia is one of those countries on the planet whose roots go back the farthest in history. Tolerance has become particularly entrenched in its history and nature since the days we embraced Christianity.   Christ granted that we be together. And more than this: Georgia is a multinational country, where Muslims and followers of other confessions have dwelt along with Christians in the course of centuries.   We live presently in a world of stark contradictions. It remains anybody’s guess when a bomb may blast. You probably understand what I mean. Therefore, we should pray for peace, and these prayers should be raised by all of us: Christians, Muslims, representatives of every religion, confession and nation.   But prayers alone will not keep us together. We have also to struggle, in order that, through our benevolence, faith, love and respect to one another, we may put up resistance to the eradicating processes of which I already made a mention.   As was customary with my great ancestors, I go to an Orthodox church. But nor do I keep distance from synagogues, mosques or churches of different Christian confessions.   I feel respect for all who have confident belief in kindness and its victory.   I am happy to see, along with Georgian citizens, the attendance of the distinguished ambassadors and diplomats accredited in Georgia, who have come this evening to share our happiness.   I cannot but express a deep sense of regret, even resentment at the gross infringement of our unity, mutual respect and freedom of faith by some of the aggressors.   As the President of Georgia and a believer, I shall not restrict myself only to a mere expression of resentment. I do promise that the President and the Authorities of Georgia will do their utmost to grant every person freedom of expression of faith.   The state will exert its pressure on whoever comes in defiance of this principle. You may stand assured that the aggressors will be brought to justice.   I would like to greet you once more and wish you happiness and advancement of goals. So as with Georgia, a multinational country of various religious confessions, my wishes are for joy, happiness and prosperity.

  • The Referendum in Chechnya

    Mr. Speaker, last Sunday, while the world's eyes were focused on the momentous events taking place in Iraq, a constitutional referendum was held in the war-torn region of Chechnya. The referendum was held as part of the Russian Government's attempt to “normalize” the situation in that tortured part of Russia's North Caucasus.   For the last ten years, Chechnya has been the scene of a bloody war between armed Chechen rebels and Russian military forces. Hostilities were precipitated in late 1994 when, in the wake of Chechnya's attempt to secede from the Russian Federation, Russian military forces launched a full-scale assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny. There was a restive peace from 1996 until the summer of 1999, when the armed clashes erupted anew. The roots of this conflict go back to Tsarist conquests in the 19th century and Stalin's brutal deportation of the Chechen people to Central Asia during World War II. Unfortunately, certain radical Islamic militant elements linked to international terrorism have become involved on the Chechen side, though the State Department has stressed that not all Chechens are terrorists.   Despite Moscow's repeated claims that heavy-handed Russian tactics in Chechnya are part of the war against global terrorism, the situation is far more complex. Many Chechens have taken up arms against what they believe is a repressive colonial power and wish to see Chechnya as an independent state that will be able to make the critical choice regarding the future of its people. As is so frequently the case, the civilian population has suffered terribly from the war. While both sides are guilty of violations of international humanitarian law, the Russian military and special operations units have been responsible for numerous and well-documented instances of gratuitous, brutal and mass violence against the civilian population.   During my years in the leadership of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commission has conducted eight hearings and briefings on Chechnya. Witnesses, including a nurse who was present in a Chechen town where some of the worst atrocities by Russian forces took place, have described the appalling fate of the civilian population.   According to the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001, “The indiscriminate use of force by government troops in the Chechen conflict resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons, the majority of whom sought refuge in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Attempts by government forces to regain control over Chechnya were accompanied by the indiscriminate use of air power and artillery. There were numerous reports of attacks by government forces on civilian targets, including the bombing of schools and residential areas.” The report continues: “Command and control among military and special police units often appeared to be weak, and a climate of lawlessness, corruption, and impunity flourished, which fostered individual acts by government forces of violence and looting against civilians.” Among the examples of such lawlessness and impunity in the Country Reports were “...reports of mass graves and 'dumping grounds' for victims allegedly executed by Russian forces in Chechnya” and “cleansing” operations directed against guerrillas but resulting in deaths and the disappearance of non-combatants.   The State Department points out that Chechen forces also committed serious abuses: “According to unconfirmed reports, rebels killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In several cases, elderly Russian civilians were killed for no apparent reason other than their ethnicity.”   Against this unsettling backdrop, with an estimated 100,000 internally displaced persons living in refugee camps in neighboring Ingushetia, and under the guns of approximately 80,000 Russian soldiers in Chechnya, the Chechen people have reportedly voted overwhelmingly for the proposed new constitution. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that a genuine assessment of the public will would have been determined under such circumstances. I would ask the same question I asked in a Helsinki Commission press release over a month ago: “Are we supposed to believe that this referendum will stabilize Chechnya while armed conflict between the Russian military and Chechen fighters continue to produce death and destruction?'”   The well-respected Russian human rights group, Memorial, has charged that Chechens were pressured to vote with the threat of losing their pensions or humanitarian aid. A joint assessment mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe stated that “no group has been able to campaign officially against the referendum in the mass media or distribute literature arguing against the referendum,” although some opposition opinions were voiced in the media. Incidentally, in the concluding communique of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, the Russian Government agreed that all sides should seek a political solution to the conflict, and avail themselves of the assistance of the OSCE. This commitment was seriously undermined when the Russian government evicted the OSCE Assistance Mission to Chechnya at the end of last year.   Mr. Speaker, the Bush Administration has stated that “...we hope [the referendum] can be the basis for a political solution to that tragic conflict.” I find that rather optimistic. The Russian Government might better instruct its military to stop terrorizing the civilian population, prosecute human rights violators and rebuild Chechnya. Then perhaps it would not have to hold referenda in Chechnya under armed guard.

  • Belarus Democracy Act 2003

    Mr. President, as Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have closely monitored developments in the Republic of Belarus and informed my Senate colleagues of disturbing trends in that nation. I have met with members of the fledgling democratic opposition who, at great personal risk, dare to speak out against the repressive regime led by Alexander Lukashenka. I have met with the courageous wives whose husbands disappeared because they stood up to the regime and would not be silent. Against the backdrop of this climate of fear, the powers of the state have been brought to bear against independent journalists, trade unionists, and other voices of dissent. Increasingly, Belarus has been driven into self-imposed isolation under Lukashenka devoid of legitimate leadership or accountability. A little over a year ago I addressed the Senate to voice concern over reported arms deals between the regime and rouge states, including Iraq. It appears that such sales have taken on greater importance as the Belarusian economy spirals downward. Mr. President, while some might be tempted to dismiss Belarus as an anomaly, the stakes are too high and the costs too great to ignore. Accordingly, today, I am introducing the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003, which is designed to help put an end to repression and human rights violations in Belarus and to promote Belarus’ entry into a democratic Euro-Atlantic community of nations. As a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Belarus has accepted a series of norms in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As Europe’s last dictator, Lukashenka continues to brashly trample the fundamental rights of his own people and their culture. As I alluded to earlier, independent media, non-governmental organizations, trade unions and the democratic opposition have had to operate under extremely difficult conditions, often facing serious mistreatment and an orchestrated campaign of harassment. Despite the repressions there are courageous individuals who support democracy have not been silenced. Two weeks ago, for example, Alexander Yarashuk, the leader of the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, called on Lukashenka to immediately cease backing Saddam. Moreover, just last week, on March 12, thousands gathered peacefully in a central Minsk square to protest deteriorating economic and social conditions in Belarus. Four of the rally’s organizers – Andrei Sannikov, Ludmila Gryaznova, Dmitry Bondarenko and Leonid Malakhov – were given 15 day jail sentences for “participation in unauthorized mass actions.” Despite calls for change within Belarus, and considerable prodding from the international community, Lukashenka has shown no desire to deviate from his path of authoritarianism and personal profit at the expense of his own people. A few months ago, Lukashenka, who effectively controls the Belarusian parliament, signed into laws a new, repressive religion law. Local elections held earlier this month followed the pattern of Belarus’ 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections – they were a joke. Control of election commissions, denials of registration for opposition candidates, “early voting” and outright falsifications were the norm. Mr. President, the Belarus Democracy Act of 2003 would authorize additional assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for NGOs, independent media, including radio and television broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. It also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, which have been notably absent in Belarus. This bill would also deny high-ranking officials of the Lukashenka regime entry into the United States. Additionally, strategic exports to the Belarusian Government would be prohibited, as well as U.S. Government financing, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance for humanitarian needs. The bill would also require reports from the President concerning the sale of delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states, including Iraq and North Korea. I am very pleased that the Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Biden, is an original cosponsor of this measure. His support will ensure that we proceed on a bipartisan basis as we work to ensure the timely adoption and implementation of this legislation. Mr. President, the goal of the Belarus Democracy Act is to assist Belarus in becoming a genuine European state, in which respect for human rights and democracy is the norm and in which the long-suffering Belarusian people are able to overcome the legacy of dictatorship – past and present. Adoption and implementation of the Belarus Democracy Act will offer a ray of hope that the current period of political, economic and social stagnation will indeed end. The people of Belarus deserve a chance for a brighter future free of repression and fear. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Belarus Democracy Act be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 700 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Belarus Democracy Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States supports the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the Republic of Belarus consistent with its commitments as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2) The United States has a vital interest in the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus and its integration into the European community of democracies. (3) The last parliamentary election in Belarus deemed to be free and fair by the international community was conducted in 1995 from which emerged the 13th Supreme Soviet whose democratically and constitutionally derived authorities and powers have been usurped by the authoritarian regime of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenka. (4) In November 1996, Lukashenka orchestrated an illegal and unconstitutional referendum that enabled him to impose a new constitution, abolish the duly-elected parliament, the 13th Supreme Soviet, install a largely powerless National Assembly, and extend his term of office to 2001. (5) In May 1999, democratic forces in Belarus challenged Lukashenka's unconstitutional extension of his presidential term by staging alternative presidential elections which were met with repression. (6) Democratic forces in Belarus have organized peaceful demonstrations against the Lukashenka regime in cities and towns throughout Belarus which led to beatings, mass arrests, and extended incarcerations. (7) Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, and Yuri Zakharenka, who have been leaders and supporters of the democratic forces in Belarus, and Dmitry Zavadsky, a journalist known for his critical reporting in Belarus, have disappeared and are presumed dead. (8) Former Belarus Government officials have come forward with credible allegations and evidence that top officials of the Lukashenka regime were involved in the disappearances. (9) The Lukashenka regime systematically harasses and represses the independent media and independent trade unions, imprisons independent journalists, and actively suppresses freedom of speech and expression. (10) The Lukashenka regime harasses the autocephalic Belarusian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the Hindu Lights of Kalyasa community, evangelical Protestant churches (such as Baptist and Pentecostal groups), and other minority religious groups. (11) The Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organizations, passed by the National Assembly and signed by Lukashenka on October 31, 2002, establishes one of the most repressive legal regimes in the OSCE region, severely limiting religious freedom and placing excessively burdensome government controls on religious practice. (12) The United States, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have not recognized the National Assembly. (13) The parliamentary elections of October 15, 2000, conducted in the absence of a democratic election law, were illegitimate, unconstitutional, and plagued by violent human rights abuses committed by the Lukashenka regime, and have been determined by the OSCE to be nondemocratic. (14) The presidential election of September 9, 2001, was determined by the OSCE and other observers to be fundamentally unfair, to have failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections formulated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, and to have featured significant and abusive misconduct by the Lukashenka regime, including-- (A) the harassment, arrest, and imprisonment of opposition members; (B) the denial of equal and fair access by opposition candidates to state-controlled media; (C) the seizure of equipment and property of independent nongovernmental organizations and press organizations, and the harassment of their staff and management; (D) voting and vote counting procedures that were not transparent; and (E) a campaign of intimidation directed against opposition activists, domestic election observation organizations, and opposition and independent media, and a libelous media campaign against international observers. SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN BELARUS. (a) PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.--Assistance under this section shall be available for the following purposes: (1) To assist the people of the Republic of Belarus in regaining their freedom and to enable them to join the European community of democracies. (2) To encourage free and fair presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Belarus, conducted in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards and under the supervision of internationally recognized observers. (3) To assist in restoring and strengthening institutions of democratic governance in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION FOR ASSISTANCE.--To carry out the purposes set forth in subsection (a), the President is authorized to furnish assistance and other support for the activities described in subsection (c), to be provided primarily for indigenous groups in Belarus that are committed to the support of democratic processes in Belarus. (c) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.--Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (b) include-- (1) the observation of elections and the promotion of free and fair electoral processes; (2) the development of democratic political parties; (3) radio and television broadcasting to and within Belarus; (4) the development of nongovernmental organizations promoting democracy and supporting human rights; (5) the development of independent media working within Belarus and from locations outside Belarus, and supported by non-state-controlled printing facilities; (6) international exchanges and advanced professional training programs for leaders and members of the democratic forces in matters central to the development of civil society; and (7) other activities consistent with the purposes of this Act. (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this section $40,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 4. RADIO BROADCASTING TO BELARUS. (a) PURPOSE.--It is the purpose of this section to authorize increased support for United States Government and surrogate radio broadcasting to the Republic of Belarus that will facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in Belarus. (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated, there is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each fiscal year for Voice of America and RFE/RL, Incorporated for radio broadcasting to the people of Belarus in languages spoken in Belarus. (c) REPORT ON RADIO BROADCASTING TO AND IN BELARUS.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how funds appropriated and allocated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations under subsection (b) and section 3(d) will be used to provide AM and FM broadcasting that covers the territory of Belarus and delivers independent and uncensored programming. SEC. 5. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS. (a) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.--The sanctions described in subsections (c) and (d), and any sanction imposed under subsection (e) or (f), shall apply with respect to the Republic of Belarus until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Belarus has made significant progress in meeting the conditions described in subsection (b). (b) CONDITIONS.--The conditions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The release of individuals in Belarus who have been jailed based on political or religious beliefs. (2) The withdrawal of politically motivated legal charges against all opposition figures and independent journalists in Belarus. (3) A full accounting of the disappearances of opposition leaders and journalists in Belarus, including Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky, and the prosecution of the individuals who are responsible for their disappearances. (4) The cessation of all forms of harassment and repression against the independent media, independent trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations (including their leadership and members), and the political opposition in Belarus. (5) The implementation of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus consistent with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) standards on democratic elections and in cooperation with relevant OSCE institutions. (c) PROHIBITION ON STRATEGIC EXPORTS TO BELARUS.-- (1) PROHIBITION.--No computers, computer software, goods, or technology intended to manufacture or service computers, or any other related goods or technology, may be exported to Belarus for use by the Government of Belarus, or by its military, police, prison system, or national security agencies. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to the export of goods or technology for democracy-building or humanitarian purposes. (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the issuance of licenses to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft of United States origin or to ensure the safety of ocean-going maritime traffic in international waters. (d) PROHIBITION ON LOANS AND INVESTMENT.-- (1) UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCING.--No loan, credit guarantee, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance may be extended by any agency of the United States Government (including the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to the Government of Belarus, except with respect to the provision of humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. (2) TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.--No funds available to the Trade and Development Agency may be available for activities of the Agency in or for Belarus. (e) DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN BELARUS OFFICIALS.-- (1) DENIAL OF ENTRY.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the President should use the authority under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) to deny the entry into the United States of any alien who-- (A) holds a position in the senior leadership of the Government of Belarus; or (B) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person described in subparagraph (A). (2) SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS DEFINED.--In this subsection, the term ``senior leadership of the Government of Belarus'' includes-- (A) the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, government ministers, Chairmen of State Committees, and members of the Presidential Administration of Belarus; (B) any official of the Government of Belarus who is personally and substantially involved in the suppression of freedom in Belarus, including judges and prosecutors; and (C) any other individual determined by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) to be personally and substantially involved in the formulation or execution of the policies of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus that are in contradiction of internationally recognized human rights standards. (f) MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.--It is the sense of Congress that, in addition to the sanctions provided for in subsections (c) and (d), the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to which the United States is a member to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any extension by those institutions of any financial assistance (including any technical assistance or grant) of any kind to the Government of Belarus, except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs. (g) WAIVER.--The President may waive the application of any sanction described in this section with respect to Belarus if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national interests of the United States to do so. SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION. It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to seek to coordinate with other countries, particularly European countries, a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to further the purposes of this Act, including, as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus that are similar to measures provided for in this Act. SEC. 7. ANNUAL REPORTS. (a) REPORTS.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes, with respect to the preceding 12-month period, the following: (1) The sale or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from the Republic of Belarus to any country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. (2) An identification of each country described in paragraph (1) and a detailed description of the weapons or weapons-related technologies involved in the sale. (3) An identification of the goods, services, credits, or other consideration received by Belarus in exchange for the weapons or weapons-related technologies. (4) The personal assets and wealth of Aleksandr Lukashenka and other senior leadership of the Government of Belarus. (b) FORM.--A report transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. SEC. 8. DECLARATION OF POLICY. Congress hereby-- (1) expresses its support to those in the Republic of Belarus seeking-- (A) to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of Belarus; and (B) to promote the integration of Belarus into the European community of democracies; (2) expresses its grave concern about the disappearances of Victor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky; (3) calls upon the Lukashenka regime in Belarus to cease its persecution of political opponents or independent journalists and to release those individuals who have been imprisoned for opposing his regime or for exercising their right to freedom of speech; (4) calls upon the Lukashenka regime to end the pattern of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of relevant human dimension commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to respect the basic freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association, language, culture, and religion or belief; (5) calls upon the Government of the Russian Federation to use its influence to encourage democratic development in Belarus so that Belarus can become a democratic, prosperous, sovereign, and independent state that is integrated into Europe; (6) calls upon the Government of Belarus to resolve the continuing constitutional and political crisis in Belarus through-- (A) free, fair, and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus, as called for by the OSCE; (B) respect for human rights in Belarus; (C) an end to the current climate of fear in Belarus; (D) meaningful access by the opposition to state media in Belarus; (E) modification of the electoral code of Belarus in keeping with OSCE commitments; (F) engagement in genuine talks with the opposition in Belarus; and (G) modifications of the constitution of Belarus to allow for genuine authority for the parliament; and (7) commends the democratic opposition in Belarus for their commitment to freedom, their courage in the face of the repression of the Lukashenka regime, and the emergence of a pluralist civil society in Belarus--the foundation for the development of democratic political structures. SEC. 9. DEFINITION. In this Act, the term "appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

  • Commemorating 60th Anniversary of Historic Rescue of 50,000 Bulgarian Jews from the Holocaust

    Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, during the Holocaust, the Jews of Europe were subjected to persecution and, ultimately, targeted for total genocide--not only by foreign occupiers, but also at the hands of erstwhile friends and even their own governments. In the face of this atrocity, Bulgaria stands out for protecting its indigenous Jewish population from the evil machinery of the Holocaust. Despite official allied status with Nazi Germany, Bulgarian leaders, religious figures, intellectuals and average citizens resisted pressure from the Nazis to deport Bulgarian Jews to certain death in the concentration camps of Eastern Europe. Thanks to the compassion and courage of broad sectors of Bulgarian society, approximately 50,000 Jews survived the Holocaust. Once an ally of Nazi Germany in March 1941, the Bulgarian Government and Parliament came under pressure from the Nazi regime and enacted legislation severely curtailing the rights of the Jewish population. In February 1943, a secret meeting between, Hitler's envoy to Bulgaria, and Bulgaria's Commissar on Jewish Affairs, established a timetable for exporting to Germany the Jews in Aegean Thrace and Macedonia, territories then under Bulgarian administration, and deportation of Jews from Bulgarian cities. The deportations were to begin on March 9, 1943. Trains and boats to be used in the deportations were in place, and assembly points in Poland had already been selected when word of the plans was leaked. Almost immediately, 43 members of the Bulgarian Parliament led by Deputy Speaker Dimiter Peshev signed a petition to condemn this action. This, coupled with widespread public outcry from active citizens, political and professional organizations, intellectuals, and prominent leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, led the Minster of the Interior to stay the deportation orders. Later that month, Peshev again took a bold step in drafting a letter, signed by members of the ruling coalition, which condemned the possible deportation of Jews, calling this an ``inadmissible act'' with ``grave moral consequences.'' In May 1943, the plan for deportation of the Bulgarian Jews was finally aborted. King Boris III resisted Nazi pressure to advance the plan, arguing that the Jews were an essential component of the workforce. While some 20,000 Jews from Sofia were then sent to work camps in the countryside for the remainder of the war and subjected to squalid conditions, they nevertheless survived. Tragically, there was no such reversal of fate for the estimated 11,000 Jews from Aegean Thrace and Macedonia, who did not have the protection afforded by Bulgarian citizenship. Already driven from their homes in March 1943, these individuals were transported through Bulgarian territory to the Nazi death camps. Madam Speaker, this month marks the 60th anniversary of Bulgarian resistance to the Holocaust. The people deserve our commendation for their selfless efforts to preserve such a threatened religious community, and in fact, the number of Jews living in Bulgaria actually increased during the Holocaust. Bulgaria's record of tolerance was distorted by 40 years of communist misrule which culminated in the 1984-89 forcible assimilation campaign against its largest minority, the Turks. One of the first initiatives of the government following the fall of communism in November 1989 was the reversal of this brutal campaign. A return to the wholesale suppression of minority groups as exemplified by the forcible assimilation campaign is inconceivable today, and Bulgaria is a democracy that promotes respect for fundamental rights. Last year, Bulgaria's Ambassador to the United States, Elena Poptodorova, testified before the Helsinki Commission regarding the ongoing efforts of her government to promote tolerance, consistent with Bulgaria's historical traditions. I have been particularly encouraged by Bulgaria's initiatives, in cooperation with leading non-governmental organizations, to promote the integration of Roma and non-Roma in schools. This work deserves the full support of the Bulgarian Government. I am disappointed, however, that the Bulgarian Government has not yet adopted and implemented comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, even though it pledged to do so in early 1999 in a platform of action on Roma issues, and committed to do so in the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit document. Four years have come and gone since Bulgaria made those pledges, and it is past time for those pledges to be honored. I am hopeful the Bulgarian Government will do more to combat violence motivated by racial or religious intolerance. Two cases of such violence, against Romani Pentecostals in Pazardjik, appear to have received only superficial attention from the authorities. Madam Speaker, I also was disappointed to learn of the recent passage of a new religion law in Bulgaria. Several drafts of a religion law had laid relatively dormant until the last months of 2002, when the process was expedited. As a result, it is my understanding that minority faith communities were excluded from the drafting process and assurances to have the Council of Europe review the text again were ignored. The law is prejudiced against certain religious groups and falls well short of Bulgaria's OSCE commitments. The law also jeopardizes the legal status of the Orthodox synod not favored by the Government and its property holdings, as well as threatens fines for using the name of an existing religious organization without permission. New religious communities seeking to gain legal personality are now required to go through intrusive doctrinal reviews and cumbersome registration procedures, and co-religionists from abroad have been denied visas based on poorly written provisions. Bulgaria's leadership on these various issues would be welcomed, especially in light of their plans to serve as Chair-in-Office of the OSCE in 2004. The United States is particularly appreciative of Bulgaria's firm stand against terrorism at this time, and we look forward to continued strong relations between our countries. The proud heritage stemming from the days of the Holocaust serves as a good reminder of the importance of taking stands which are right and true. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that this Congress is able to recognize that heritage and historical fact.

  • Speech Regarding Normalized Trade Relations with Serbia Montenegro

    Mr. Speaker, a decade ago we began witnesses to genocide in Europe. By stirring up nationalism, harassing opposition and intimidating the population as a whole to go along with his plans, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic led Serbia into a war of aggression against its neighbors within the former Yugoslavia. Millions were displaced, hundreds of thousands killed and tens of thousands raped or tortured, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In response, largely at the urging of the U.S. Congress, sanctions were put into place and, ultimately, military intervention was employed to stop Milosevic.   In 2000, the voters of Serbia removed Milosevic from power. In place of his regime, an opposition consisting of genuine reformers and true democrats along with a fair share of Serbian nationalists took control of government. Since that time, the ruling opposition fell into polarized camps, making recovery and reform difficult. This situation also created a challenge in U.S. foreign policy. On the one hand, the United States wants to encourage Belgrade and facilitate reform. On the other, the United States must ensure that the legacy of Slobodan Milosevic has been fully shed, a prerequisite for recovery throughout southeastern Europe.   The Miscellaneous Tariff Bill, H.R. 1047, considered yesterday contains a provision granting the President the authority to restore normalized trade relations for Serbia and Montenegro. I support this provision; normalized trade relations should be restored. Whatever problems might remain, the fact is that there has been progress since Milosevic was removed from power, and Serbia and Montenegro should not be placed on the same list of states not granted normalized trade relations as Cuba, North Korea or Laos. Other countries with far worse records, including Belarus and the Central Asian states, at least receive the benefits of normalized trade relations on a conditional basis which Serbia and Montenegro is denied.   By fixing this, I hope Belgrade recognizes that we want reforms to succeed and recovery and reform take place. Belgrade also needs to know, Mr. Speaker, that restoring NTR does not mean satisfaction with Belgrade's performance to date. While there has been progress, that progress has been too slow, and some issues remain unresolved. Chief among these issues is Belgrade continued resistance to full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, located in The Hague. It is especially outrageous that persons responsible for the crimes committed at Vukovar and Srebrenica continue to be at large and perhaps even protected by Yugoslav or Serbian authorities.   While trade relations may not be conditioned on further progress, U.S. bilateral assistance to Serbia is. If there is not a major improvement in Belgrade's cooperation with The Hague by June 15, assistance to Serbia will stop. The Administration must certify progress before assistance continues past that date, and the State Department has made clear that a precondition for certification is the apprehension and transfer of Ratko Mladic, indicted for the massacre of thousands at Srebrenica, and Veselin Sljivancanin and Miroslav Radic, indicted for their role in the massacre of about 200 individuals taken from a hospital in Vukovar, Croatia.   As co-chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I urge Belgrade not only to meet their international obligations relating to ICTY not just to the point of obtaining certification for another year. Cooperation should be full. Only then can the conditionality on assistance be removed for good.

  • Trade Relations with Serbia and Montenegro

    Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring attention to this body of one provision that is in this bill that deals with extending normal trade relations to Serbia and Montenegro. When this issue was before the Committee on Ways and Means, I offered an amendment that was adopted by the committee that placed conditionality on the normal trade relations based upon cooperation by Serbia and Montenegro with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.   Mr. Speaker, it is important to move forward in our relations with Serbia, but it is also important to remember the past. There were war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia where individuals were murdered, mass murders, dislocation of people, solely because of their ethnic background. There are individuals who is have been indicted by the war crimes tribunal that have not been turned over to the Hague. General Mladic and Karadzic were involved in mass murders of innocent people, they were lined up and murdered, and yet they still remain free, even though they are indicted. We need full cooperation with the tribunal, including the turning over of documents and the availability of witnesses.   Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that we were able to reach an understanding where the conditionality on this legislation could be removed by additional commitments made by the government of Serbia-Montenegro.   I will make part of the record a letter that I have received. I would like to quote very quickly part of that letter, where the Foreign Minister says, “I would like to assure you that there is a strong and clear political will of the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro to cooperate with International Criminal Tribunal. Obviously, the most pressing concern is the issue of the arrest and transfer to The Hague of the indicted individuals, in particular General Mladic and those indicted for the crimes at Vukovar. You may rest assure that the resolution of this issue figures high on the agenda of all office holders in Serbia and Montenegro. Furthermore, the institutions of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, which will be formed in the coming days, will have the opportunity to further contribute to perfecting the cooperation of the ICTY in this regard.”   Mr. Speaker, I would also bring to your attention a letter I received from Secretary of State Powell, where he points out that the FY 2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act once again conditions U.S. assistance to the Republic of Serbia. These conditions have been useful in maintaining pressure on Belgrade to comply with its obligations to the ICTU. I can assure you that the Department of State will continue to use every available tool to achieve cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal by the governments of Serbia and Montenegro.   Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Chairman Smith) of the Helsinki Commission, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), who has been extremely helpful in this issue, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey) from the Committee on Appropriations, the staff at the Helsinki committee, the Coalition for International Justice, and Ambassador Prosper, who is our Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, for their cooperation in order to be able to work out further cooperation with the tribunal.   I also want to thank the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) for their patience. I know that we have been working on this for a long time, and I appreciate very much giving us the opportunity to work this out.   Congress has played a critical role on advancing human rights, whether it was Jackson-Vanik or the conditionality of foreign aid to governments to make sure that they comply with human rights issues. We have played an active role. We need to continue to play that role. I am proud of the role that this body has played in advancing human rights issues, including compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal.   Mr. Speaker, I include for the record the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro.   Serbia and Monetenegro Minister for Foriegn Affairs   Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin  House of Representatives, Washington, DC.   Dear M. Cardin: I appreciate very much your continuing interest in the issues related to Serbia and Montenegro and its relations with the United States. I still remember fondly our last telephone conversation in which we had the opportunity to discuss these matters.   At the moment, one of the most pressing issues in this regard remains extending Normal Trade Relations Treatment (NTR) to Serbia and Montenegro, which is part of the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act 2003. Extending NTR treatment would provide substantial support to continuing economic reforms in my country which, in turn, would help the consolidation of our democracy.   I am fully aware of your genuine and well-intentioned concerns with regard to the cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). I would like to assure you that there is strong and clear political will of the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro to cooperate with the ICTY.   Obviously, the most pressing concern is the issue of arrest and transfer to The Hague of the indicted individuals, in particular Gen. Mladic and those indicted for the crimes in Vukovar. You may rest assured that the resolution of this issue figures high on the agenda of all office holders in Serbia and Montenegro. Furthermore, the institutions of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, which will be formed in the coming days, will have the opportunity to further contribute to perfecting the cooperation with the ICTY in this regard.   At the same time, it should be noted that there has been a substantial progress in other aspects of our cooperation with the ICTY, i.e., in providing documents and access to witnesses. Serbia and Montenegro has provided effective assistance to the ICTY in relation to locating, interviewing and testimony of witnesses. In this respect, we have so far fully responded to almost 90% of the requests for assistance. In particular, we have provided waivers for more than 100 officials of the former government to testify about classified matters before the ICTY. These include top officials such as two former presidents of the FRY, heads of military and police security services, as well as many high-ranking military and police officers.   As regards the documents requested by the ICTY, we have presented thousands of pages of documentation, including confidential records of the Supreme Defense Council, which is the commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav Army. I would like to assure you that we are determined to cooperate even more effectively with the ICTY in relation to documents and witnesses, and most notably, with regard to the transfer of indictees. Further promotion of democracy and economic prosperity of my country would only create a more favorable climate for such cooperation. In this regard, extending NTR treatment would be a welcome signal that Serbia and Montenegro have the support of the United States and would bring tangible benefits to our economy and people.   I am confident that you will take this information into account while assessing the level of cooperation with the ICTY, and as a result support the initiative to extend NTR treatment to Serbia and Montenegro.   Sincerely,   GORAN SVILANOVIC.   NON-PAPER   Serbia and Montenegro believes that all individuals responsible for international crimes should be brought to justice, either before international courts, such as the ICTY, or before national courts. In particular, as a UN Member, Serbia and Montenegro recognizes its obligation to cooperate with the JCTY. Consequently, the FRY has adopted the Law on Co-operation with the ICTY on 11 April 2002, which regulates the legal framework for cooperation.   Fifteen indictees who were on the territory of the FRY were brought into the custody of the ICTY. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia arrested and surrended 6 indictees, including Slobodan Milosevic, former president of the FRY and Serbia. The others are Milomir Stakic, former Chief of the Crisis Staff of Prijedor Municipality, Republika Sprska (RS), and four combatants of the RS Army: Drazen Erdemovic, Predrag Banovic, Nenad Benovic i Ranko Cesic.   At the same time, 10 indictees have been encouraged to voluntarily surrender to the ICTY and they eventually did so. These are:   1. Dragoljub Ojdanic, General, former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army and former Federal Minister of Defence.   2. Nikola Sainovic, former Deputy-Prime Minister of the FRY.   3. Mile Mrksjc, Major-General, Yugoslav Army.   4. Pavle Strugar, Lieutenant-General, Yugoslav Army.   5. Miodrag Jokic, Vice-Admiral, Yugoslav Army.   6. Milan Martic, former Serb leader in Croatia.   7. Blagoie Simic, Head of the Bosanski Samac, RS, Crisis Staff.   8. Momcilo Gruban, Deputy Commander of the Omarska camp, RS.   9. Milan Milutinovic, former President of the Republic of Serbia.   10. Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party.   National courts have issued arrest warrants for additional 17 accused whose arrest has been sought by the ICTY. One indictee (Vlajko Stojiljkovic, former Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia committed suicide.   Serbia and Montenegro has provided effective assistance to the Prosecutor and the ICTY with relation to locating, interviewing and testifying of suspects and witnesses. In that respect, Serbia and Montenegro has, so far, answered to 76 different requests and provided information for as many as 150 suspects and witnesses. Out of 126 witnesses for whom the waivers were requested, Serbia and Montenegro has granted 108 (86%), while others are in procedure.   In the Milosevic case, the FRY and Serbia government decided to allow more than 87 of the former and current state officials and employees to testify with relation to the Kosovo indictment, even about the matters that constitute military and state secrets.   Zoran Lilic, the former President of the FRY, has been given waiver to testify in the Milosevic case on the matters defined after consultations between the Prosecutor and the FRY and related to the events covered by the Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo indictments.   Dobrica Cosic, former President of the FRY, as well as Nebojsa Pavkovic, former Chief of the General staff of the Yugoslav Army have also been given waiver to testify in the Milosevic case and related to the events covered by the Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo indictments.   Regarding documents that have been sought by the ICTY Prosecutor (127), the FRY has answered, so far, to 65 requests, to 9 partially and 53 are currently processed. The documents transmitted to the Prosecution include:   Confidential military documents of the Supreme Defense Council, the Commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav Army;   Certain confidential regulations of the Yugoslav Army;   All available official records related to the Racak massacre, in relation to the Kosovo indictment against Milosevic;   All available personal information about Ratko Mladic, the former Commander of the Army;   Of Republika Srpska;   Information on all investigations and judicial proceedings initiated against members of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs for crimes committed in Kosovo and Metohija;   Official records of the Yugoslav National Bank relating to a company allegedly involved in trading arms during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina;   The authorities of Serbia and Montenegro have continued to investigate mass graves near Batajnica. This is done in the presence of the ICTY investigators on site, and the evidence obtained is regularly transferred to the ICTY Prosecutor.   There have been investigations and judicial proceedings before Yugoslav courts for violations of international humanitarian law:   There is a number of criminal proceedings before military courts against individuals indicted for crimes in Kosovo and Metohija in 1999. The judicial proceeding against Sasa Cvjetan and Dejan Demirovit, members of the special corps “Scorpions,” have also been initiated before the Court in Belgrade, for the crimes committed in Kosovo. In the District court in Prokuplje, Serbia, Ivan Nikolic, a reserve soldier with the Yugoslav Army, was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment for the killing of two Kosovo-Albanian civilians.   Criminal proceeding before the Belgrade District Court are currently under way for the abduction of Bosniacs from the village of Sjeverin in 1992 (Case of Dragoljub Dragicevic and others).   In another case, Nebojsa Ranisavljevic was convicted to 15 years of imprisonment for his role in the notorious case of abduction of Muslim passengers from the train in Supci station in 1993.  

  • Commission Hearing Surveys State of Ethnic Relations in Kosovo

    By Bob Hand, CSCE Staff Advisor The Helsinki Commission held a hearing June 19, 2002 on the prospects for ethnic harmony in Kosovo amidst recent reports of ongoing human rights abuses against minority groups. Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) chaired the hearing. Commissioner Senator George V. Voinovich (R-OH) also participated. "Vandalizing or bombing churches is not just wrong, it is beneath the dignity of any Albanian who suffered under the Milosevic regime," Smith said, stressing that "revenge is not justice." He condemned the inexcusable acts of repression brought upon Albanians during the former Yugoslav President's rule. Co-Chairman Smith appealed for cooperation among all parties involved and called for fostering a climate of tolerance. Leaders within Kosovo, within minority communities, and in the Yugoslav Government have a crucial role to play, Smith noted. Senator Voinovich expressed alarm over the human rights situation in Kosovo. He cited a joint report from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on continuing areas of concern. Quoting from the report, Voinovich said, "I could not agree more with a statement made in that report: ‘Only when Kosovo's minorities feel confident in their long-term future and when all of Kosovo's displaced persons are able to exercise the choice to return to their homes, feeling assured of their safety and confident in their ability to assess institutions and participate in social, economic and political life in Kosovo on a nondiscriminatory basis will it be possible to say that the situation of minorities in Kosovo is successful.'" Based on his observations during a trip to Kosovo earlier this year, Voinovich underscored the continuing need for U.S. engagement. He concluded that the situation in the divided city of Mitrovica, where ethnically-motivated attacks persist, and along the Kosovo-Macedonian border need to be resolved through cooperation and discussion. Testifying before the Commission were Dr. Alush Gashi, representing President Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosova in the Kosovo Parliament; Rada Trajkovic, leader of the Kosovo Serb "Return" Coalition within the Parliament; Valerie Percival, the Kosovo Field Representative for the International Crisis Group (ICG); and Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia Nebojsa Covic. Dr. Gashi expressed gratitude for the United States' leadership and promised to work with the international community to ensure that all Kosovars have equal national and human rights. He noted that Serbs currently participate in all levels of government and institutions. Further integration, however, is hindered by a Serb population that has so far refused to distance itself from Belgrade's brutal assault on Kosovar Albanians, which included numerous atrocities and 650 mass graves not yet exhumed. "The reality is that Kosovar-Albanians cannot get from Belgrade even the dead bodies of their members of families, and at this same time we are asking them to welcome live Serbs," Dr. Gashi testified in an emotional plea. Dr. Gashi acknowledged the right of Serbs to return to their homes in Kosovo. He also voiced strong opposition to "Belgrade's interference in [the] United Nations mission administration [UNMIK] in Kosovo." Dr. Trajkovic addressed a primary concern of the Kosovo Serb population, describing the fundamental unresolved issue as "the wish of the Albanians that Kosovo be exclusively their state and the wish of the Serbs that Kosovo remains part of their state." Dr. Trajkovic detailed a situation whereby the Albanian majority seeks the "Albanization and not multi-nationalization" of Kosovo. In this way, Kosovar Albanians dominate the hospitals, the universities, the media, and even the transportation sector, creating a highly segregated and polarized society. Islamic extremists, who go unpunished, are attempting to "wipe out the foundations of a civilization" by destroying churches, headstones, and cultural monuments, Trajkovic added. Ms. Percival discussed the ICG's recently released report on Kosovo, noting that Mitrovica is a "frequent flashpoint for confrontation and a source of instability." Attacks and reprisals are commonplace. Offering a multi-track plan of action, Percival recommended that the international community take four specific steps: pressure Belgrade to end its policy of incitement and continued support for parallel institutions; encourage the rule of law; establish a specially administered area in the north where Kosovar Serbs live; and promote UNMIK's transparency. Deputy Prime Minister Covic defended the right of Serbs in Kosovo to be free from "inexcusable persecution". "In Kosovo and Metohija, whatever the final solution might be, our desire is to have a strong and successful multi-ethnic society," Covic asserted. Covic said ethnic Serbs continue to flee Kosovo, in response to worrisome figures on the number of killings of Serbs, attacks, and missing persons. Kosovar leaders have shunned a bi-lingual society, inter-ethnic tolerance, unbiased police and an independent judiciary in favor of extremism, Covic maintained. Co-Chairman Smith, concerned about reports of pervasive criminality in Kosovo, raised the issues of missing persons, human trafficking, and perpetuation of parallel institutions. Ms. Percival said that UNMIK, in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), continues to exhume bodies from mass graves and is making efforts to account for missing persons. Though UNMIK established a trafficking and prostitution unit, the witness protection program is very weak. Mr. Covic responded that Yugoslav authorities are working hard to identify remains and find missing persons, noting the wide disparity between estimates of missing Albanians and Serbs. He added that Yugoslavia takes the issue of human trafficking very seriously and that anti-trafficking legislation is pending in Belgrade. Dr. Gashi labeled Yugoslav support for parallel institutions as an attempt to sabotage UNMIK's institutions. To calm the psychological insecurity, the Serbs have to demonstrate the will to work with us, Gashi testified. Mr. Covic stressed that parallel institutions were not created by the current Yugoslav authorities and once the Serbs' basic human rights in Kosovo are met, there will be no need for parallel institutions. Dr. Gashi reiterated his commitment to equal rights, an open civil society, and cooperation. In response to concerns raised, he indicated that a strong consensus exists among Kosovars opposing the destruction of Serb property and violence against Orthodox nuns and lay people in Kosovo. In light of the OSCE/UNCHR report, all witnesses agreed to its generally accurate portrayal of the situation and reasonable recommendations. Urging all parties to move forward, Senator Voinovich pressed for more information on allegations that Belgrade is "meddling" in the governance of Kosovo. Commissioners Smith and Voinovich pledged to continue their support for U.S. and international engagement to help resolve pressing issues in Kosovo. Any perpetrator of a human rights violation in Kosovo needs to be held accountable, Smith concluded. The hearing came to a close after Co-Chairman Smith recognized Daniel Serwer of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) for a few closing remarks. Serwer stressed the need to support the creation of an infrastructure in which the next Kosovo parliament can effectively operate. USIP had recently hosted in Virginia a session on inter-ethnic cooperation among Kosovo parliamentarians. Thirty of the participants attended the hearing. An un-official transcript of the hearing and written statements submitted by Members and witnesses are located on the Helsinki Commission's Web site, http://www.csce.gov. The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives, and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission intern Derek Politzer contributed to this article.

  • Introduction of Belarus Democracy Act

    Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today the Belarus Democracy Act of 2002, which is intended to help promote democratic development, human rights and the rule of law in the Republic of Belarus, as well as encourage the consolidation and strengthening of Belarus’ sovereignty and independence. When measured against other European countries, the state of human rights in Belarus is abysmal – it has the worst record of any European state. Through an illegitimate 1996 referendum, Alexander Lukashenka usurped power, while suppressing the duly-elected legislature and the judiciary. His regime has blatantly and repeatedly violated basic freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association and religion. The fledgling democratic opposition, non-governmental organizations and independent media have all faced harassment. There are credible allegations of Lukashenka regime involvement in the disappearances – in 1999 and 2000 – of opposition members and a journalist. There is growing evidence that Belarus is a leading supplier of lethal military equipment to rogue states. A draft bill is making its way in the Belarusian legislature that would restrict non-traditional religious groups. Several days ago, on June 24, two leading journalists were sentenced to two and 2 ½ years, respectively, of “restricted freedom” for allegedly slandering the Belarusian President. Despite efforts by Members of Congress, the Helsinki Commission which I co-chair, the State Department, various American NGOs, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other European organizations, the regime of Alexander Lukashenka continues its hold onto power with impunity and to the detriment of the Belarusian people. One of the primary purposes of this bill is to demonstrate U.S. support for those struggling to promote democracy and respect for human rights in Belarus despite the formidable pressures they face from the anti-democratic regime. The bill authorizes increases in assistance for democracy-building activities such as support for non-governmental organizations, independent media – including radio and television broadcasting to Belarus, and international exchanges. The bill also encourages free and fair parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner consistent with international standards – in sharp contrast to recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Belarus which most assuredly did not meet democratic standards. As a result of these elections, Belarus has the distinction of lacking legitimate presidential and parliamentary leadership, which contributes to that country’s self-imposed isolation. In addition, this bill would impose sanctions against the Lukashenka regime, and deny high-ranking officials of the regime entry into the United States. Strategic exports to the Belarusian Government would be prohibited, as well as U.S. Government financing, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The U.S. Executive Directors of the international financial institutions would be encouraged to vote against financial assistance to the Government of Belarus except for loans and assistance that serve humanitarian needs. The bill would require reports from the President concerning the sale or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies from Belarus to rogue states. Mr. Speaker, finally, it is my hope that this bill will help put an end to the pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of OSCE commitments by the Lukashenka regime and will serve as a catalyst to facilitate Belarus’ integration into democratic Europe in which democratic principles and human rights are respected and the rule of law prevails.

  • International Cooperation In The War On Terrorism

    Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Rep. Chris Smith, and witnesses discussed the OSCE’s efforts to coordinate counter-terrorism activities among its 55 member states, along with the level that these states are fulfilling their commitments to comply in the fight against terrorist activities and organizations. More specifically, the hearing focused on the financial and diplomatic dimensions of the war on terrorism, along with the European Union’s role in its efforts to fight terrorism in the OSCE region and the world over. This hearing took place with the recent U.S.-EU counter terrorism cooperation summit in mind.

  • Cyprus Talks Focus of Commission Briefing

    By Chadwick R. Gore CSCE Staff Advisor The Helsinki Commission held a briefing on March 26 regarding possible outcomes of ongoing direct talks between Republic of Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The two leaders have been central figures in developments on the divided island nation for over a quarter century. Panelist Ian Lesser said the time is ripe for the two sides to settle this conflict. Lesser, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, attributed the resumption of talks last December to the force of European Union membership. “The issue about European membership for Cyprus, but also in the broader sense European prospects for Turkey and the Europeanization of Greek policy over the last decade…has proved a key context for this [round of talks] to move forward,” Lesser stated. Panelist Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, agreed with Lesser and laid out another catalyst for the talks. “I think what spurs the [talks] today certainly is the issue of the EU and whether or not Cyprus goes in; and in many ways, the Turkish threat, which they haven’t repeated recently but nevertheless hangs over the proceedings, of whether or not to annex the section of the island which the troops occupy,” Bandow said. Central issues which Clerides and Denktash will have to resolve during these talks come from both sides of the Green Line, the dividing line agreed to under the terms of the current United Nations-monitored cease fire. Turkish Cypriots are concerned for their safety on an island that is overwhelmingly Greek. The status of Turkish immigrants under a new form of government is an issue in which both sides take interest. According to Bandow, the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, mainly of Greek ethnicity, are primarily concerned with “reimbursement for lost property, the right to travel throughout the island, the ability to go back to historic homelands, the notion of having a unified island again; where, in fact, Cyprus exists as a nation in which people are free within that island.” If indeed an agreement is reached between the two parties, the positive outcomes would extend beyond the island’s borders. Colonel Stephen R. Norton (U.S. Army, Ret.), a senior Policy Advisor at the Western Policy Center, expounded on the benefits of a solution. “First, it reduces the potential for conflict in the region. It strengthens NATO’s southern flank at a time when the alliance is deeply engaged in Balkan peacekeeping and the war on terrorism. It improves bilateral relations between NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. It enhances Turkey’s reputation with the European community and helps with its EU accession process – a very important item. It decreases long standing anti-Americanism in Greece. And, finally, it serves as an example where you have Christian and Muslim populations working out their problems together.” Asked how the United States, specifically, can deter another conflict on Cyprus, panelist Philip H. Gordon of the Brookings Institute and the Center on the United States and France, answered, “…every single party involved in this – Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Greece, Turkey, EU and us – are worse off if this is not resolved by December and there’s a crisis.” If the solution is to be long lasting, the Cypriots must reach it themselves, Bandow concluded. Despite positive remarks about the situation, none of the four panelists were overly optimistic about the outcome of the current round of talks. Hesitant to set a deadline for an agreement, Gordon editorialized his thoughts, saying, “I think we need to be absolutely prepared for breakdowns in the talks, continued haggling between the two sides, literally up to the last minute, which is probably the EU’s Copenhagen Summit in December.” The Helsinki Commission also held a briefing on Tuesday, December 4, 2001 to explore the renewal of talks on Cyprus between Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The briefing featured United States Special Coordinator for Cyprus Ambassador Thomas G. Weston.

  • Anti-Terrorism Conference Held in Bishkek

    By Janice Helwig Policy Advisor The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – together with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) – organized the Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia from December 13-14, 2001 to discuss ways in which the Central Asian countries can contribute to the global fight against terrorism. The conference was a step in implementing the OSCE Action Plan for Combating Terrorism, adopted by the OSCE participating States at the Bucharest Ministerial Meeting earlier in December. The meeting culminated with the adoption of a political declaration and an action program outlining areas where international assistance is particularly needed. (All documents are available on the OSCE website at www.osce.org) The conference also gave State authorities a chance to share experiences and ideas with each other; Spain and the United Kingdom, in particular, discussed lessons they had learned in combating terrorism in their countries. OSCE States had the opportunity to exchange views with countries not normally included in OSCE meetings, such as Pakistan, Iran, India, and China. The goal of the conference was to progress from discussion to action by identifying concrete areas for international assistance to Central Asia in fighting terrorism. The success of the conference depends on whether OSCE States and international organizations follow up on the areas identified and come forward with projects and funding. Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev opened the meeting, and Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Imanaliev also participated. In addition to OSCE participating States, then Chairman-in-Office Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana attended the conference, as did representatives from several OSCE Institutions – including High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekeus, Director of ODIHR Gerard Stoudmann, OSCE Secretary General Jan Kubis, and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Vice-President Ahmet Tan. In addition to UNODCCP, several other international organizations participated, including the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). President Akaev stressed the importance of international support for a neutral Afghanistan that will no longer be a haven for extremism, drugs, or terrorism. Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states had been pointing out the potential for violence, terrorism, and extremism to spill over from Afghanistan for several years, he noted, but the international community had taken no preventive steps. International efforts to combat terrorism now need to be more proactive. Poverty must be addressed throughout the region in order to minimize the possibility of its being exploited by terrorists to gain followers. All Central Asian states asked for technical and financial assistance, particularly to fight drug trafficking and organized crime, which are often sources of funding for terrorist organizations. The U.S. delegation was co-headed by Stephan M. Minikes, U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, and Steven Monblatt, Deputy Coordinator in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism. Other members of the delegation included representatives from the State Department’s Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and of International and Law Enforcement Affairs, as well as a representative of the CSCE. Ambassador Minikes summed up the U.S. position in his closing statement, “We must ensure that our societies are ones in which terrorists cannot thrive, that our societies are ones in which human rights are respected, and in which rule of law, freedom of expression, tolerance, and democracy strengthen stability. As so many noted in Bishkek, societies of inclusion, with economic opportunities for all, pluralistic debate, a political commitment to conflict resolution, and where integration does not mean losing one's identity, are those where extremists have the least chance of generating sympathy and support from the moderate majority.” Other OSCE States discussed the importance of a concerted international effort against terrorism that includes fostering human rights, the rule of law, and economic development. The delegations of the United Kingdom and Spain shared their experiences fighting terrorism. The UK underscored that, based on lessons learned in Northern Ireland, respect for rule of law and human rights must be the basis for any approach to fighting terrorism; otherwise, authorities lose the moral high ground and the support of moderates. In addition, free political debate is essential to provide a peaceful alternative for dissenting views and prevent terrorists from gaining the support of those who share their views but not their methods. ODIHR Director Stoudmann stressed the need for caution as new procedures and legislation are put in place to combat terrorism; government authorities should not, above all, use terrorism as an excuse to rid themselves of opposition or dissent, he suggested. He offered ODIHR’s services in reviewing draft anti-terrorism legislation to ensure that international standards are upheld. In the political declaration, states participating in the conference pledged to work together against terrorism in full conformity with their OSCE commitments and fully respect human rights and the rule of law. They rejected the identification of terrorism with any particular religion or culture. They also noted that, as a neighbor to Afghanistan, the Central Asian region has been exposed to specific challenges and threats to security and therefore needs particular assistance in combating terrorism. The program of action outlined the following priorities for concrete programs: Promoting ratification and implementation of international conventions related to combating terrorism; Enhancing cooperation between both national and international agencies involved in combating terrorism and in fighting crime; Adopting national anti-money laundering legislation and create corresponding structures; Increasing cooperation in the protection of human rights and in strengthening rule of law and democratic institutions; Assisting judicial systems through training and strengthening independence; Fostering political dialogue, including through political parties, civil society, and free media; Addressing economic problems, including through programs to attract investment; Assisting Central Asian states in controlling their borders, particularly with regard to drug trafficking; and Encouraging joint training and operational activities among the countries of Central Asia.

  • U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus Briefs Commission as Talks Renew in Nicosia

    By Chadwick R. Gore, CSCE Staff Advisor U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus Ambassador Thomas G. Weston participated in a Commission public briefing in Washington on December 4 just hours after Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot Leader Rauf Denktash resumed contacts in Nicosia, Cyprus. The briefing was moderated in the Cannon House Office Building by Commission Chief of Staff Ron McNamara who opened the discussion by noting that the Cyprus conflict predates the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and that Cyprus was an original signatory. McNamara underscored the human dimension of the longstanding conflict. Weston reviewed the outcome of the talks that had transpired that morning between Clerides and Denktash at the residence of the U.N. Chief of Mission in the presence of Mr. Alvaro de Soto, the Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary General on Cyprus. They agreed that the Secretary General, in the exercise of his mission of good offices, would invite the two leaders to direct talks to be held in Cyprus starting in mid-January 2002 on United Nations premises with no preconditions and with all issues on the table. They are to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement is achieved, and nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed. Ambassador Weston viewed this as a major step forward in the stagnant Cypriot peace process noting that Clerides would dine at the home of Denktash that evening, an unprecedented event. "Efforts to settle the Cyprus problem have been going on for a long, long time," Weston remarked, describing the process’ evolution since 1999 and its subsequent breakdown, concluding, “I think what you're seeing here is a culmination of a long effort rather than something which just came out of the blue.” “I should make very clear,” said the Ambassador, “that the suggestion for direct talks did come from the Turkish Cypriot leader [and] that needs to be acknowledged. …It's important to remember who actually suggested it and give credit where credit is due.” Weston made clear, “The efforts of all others who have been pushing in this direction, including Greece and Turkey, but all others, are also to be strongly commended. …The efforts of the U.N. Secretary General, his direct involvement in this process repeatedly over the last two-and-a-half years, and the excellent work done by his Special Advisor in getting us to this point—all are to be commended.” While the resumption of talks was of interest, what could be expected to be the outcome was the real focus of the briefing. “What can we expect to come from the process is obviously the key,” said Weston. “I think the fact that these two leaders have agreed to go to direct talks under these circumstances, with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and with a commitment to continue to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement is achieved, are very dramatic indications of a willingness on the part of both leaders to actually try and get a comprehensive settlement in the short period of time we have available before Cyprus secedes to the European Union. “I do not believe that this should be underestimated in any way in terms of what it indicates about the willingness of these two leaders to move forward.” Ambassador Weston was not prepared to predict whether these resumed contacts would lead to a comprehensive settlement in time to permit a unified Cyprus in the European Union at an early date. On the other hand, he was much more hopeful that that could be achieved. “It is incumbent on all of us interested in a just and durable settlement of the Cyprus problem to redouble our efforts in support of this effort to get a comprehensive settlement in a brief period of time,” Weston concluded. A career Foreign Service Officer since 1969, Weston has served as the special coordinator for Cyprus since August of 1999. Ambassador Weston has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs responsible for multilateral diplomacy with Europe including the U.S. participation in NATO, the OSCE, and the OECD as well as U.S. relations with European Union and the Council of Europe. He has also served as Chargé and Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to the European Communities. A Helsinki Commission delegation visited Cyprus in January of 1998 to assess developments in the security, economic and human dimensions. Members of the delegation held a series of meetings with officials, international peacekeepers, and private citizens.

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