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Sanctioning Human Rights Abusers and Kleptocrats under the Global Magnitsky Act
A How-To Guide
Thursday, May 24, 2018

The Global Magnitsky Act enables the United States to sanction the world’s worst human rights abusers and most corrupt oligarchs and foreign officials, freezing their U.S. assets and preventing them from traveling to the United States. Sanctioned individuals become financial pariahs and the international financial system wants nothing to do with them.

Before proceeding, ask yourself: is Global Magnitsky right for my case? The language of the Global Magnitsky Act as passed by Congress was ex-panded by Executive Order 13818, which is now the implementing authority for Global Magnitsky sanctions. EO 13818 stipulates that sanctions may be considered for individuals who are engaging or have engaged in “serious human rights abuse” against any person, or are engaging or have en-gaged in “corruption.” Individuals who, by virtue of their rank, have ordered others to engage or have facilitated these acts also are liable to be sanctioned.

Keep in mind that prior to the EO’s expansion of the language, human rights sanctions were limited to “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” as codified in 22 USC § 2304(d)(1). The original language also stipulates that any victim must be working “to expose illegal activity car-ried out by government officials” or to “obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.” As for sanctions for corruption, it identifies “acts of significant corruption” as sanctionable offenses. This is generally thought to be a stricter standard than the EO’s term “corruption.” It may be worthwhile to aim for this higher standard to make the tightest case possible for sanctions.

As a rule, reach out to other NGOs and individuals working in the human rights and anti-corruption field, especially those who are advocating for their own Global Magnitsky sanctions. Doing so at the beginning of the process will enable you to build strong relationships, develop a robust network, and speak with a stronger voice.

Download the full guide to learn more.

Contributor: Paul Massaro, Policy Advisor

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  • Reform and Human Rights - The Gorbachev Record

    Based on the Commission's continuing, professional contacts with a wide range of experts on Soviet affairs in this country and abroad, this report is a sober, factual survey of Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts during his first three years as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party to promote significant reforms in the politics, economy and society of his country. The report is designed to contribute to that consistent pressure, for in describing how much has changed or seems to be in the process of changing, it also documents how many fundamental rights of Soviet citizens to freedom of expression, of belief, of movement and of national character remain restricted and unprotected. There has been much to applaud in the three years of Gorbachev's rule, especially compared to the repressive actions of his predecessors. The release of many political prisoners from camps and psychiatric prison-hospitals, the rise in the numbers of Soviet citizens permitted to emigrate and to travel, the increasing candor of the official Soviet press and the increasing tolerance shown to unofficial groups and unorthodox points of view are all welcome first steps in the right direction. They are, however, no more than first steps. And as our reportdocuments, they were taken slowly and could be retracted almost overnight. Until the rule of law establishes a decent balance between the power of the Soviet state and the human dignity of individual Soviet citizens, the latter will always be at risk.

  • Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE - Phase III and IV

    The main activity of the Vienna Meeting throughout Phases III and IV was the presentation and negotiation of proposals for inclu sion in the concluding document of the meeting. The number (more than 160), complexity and controversial nature of many of these propos­als led to the extension of the Vienna Meeting well beyond its target closing date of July 31. These factors, along with other ele­ments such as continuing major shortcomings in the implementa­ tion of existing commitments, are largely responsible for the con­tinuation of the Vienna Meeting into 1988. The slow pace of progress already evident in Phase II continued through the next phase. Each side defended its own proposals but showed little disposition to begin the process of compromise which could lead to the conclusion of the meeting. The main procedural development during this phase was the appointment of coordina­tors from the neutral and non-aligned states to guide the work of the drafting groups. This development provided greater order and structure for the proceedings but did little to advance the drafting work or to induce compromises. Other major developments during this phase were the introduc­tion of the long-awaited Western proposal on military security and the tabling of a comprehensive compromise proposed in Basket III by two neutral delegations, Austria and Switzerland. Both propos­als were put forth at the very end of the phase and thus did not have much impact until the next phase. The Western (NATO) proposal on military security questions was designed as a response to the Eastern proposal which envisioned two main objectives: another round of negotiations on confidence­ and security-building measures (CSBMs) to build upon the success­ful Stockholm meeting and the initiation of negotiations on conven­tional disarmament, both within the same CSCE forum. The West­ern response to this proposal was delayed primarily because of United States and French differences over the connection between the conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE process, the French arguing that the negotiations should be an integral part of the process and the U.S. insisting that they be independent. The issue was resolved by agreement that the negotiations would be "within the framework of the CSCE," but should remain autono­mous.

  • The Miroslav Medvid Incident - Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Part 2)

    This report results from an investigation directed by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe into the attempted defection of Miroslav Medvid and other similar incidents of involuntary repatriation of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals, with recommendations for any appropriate changes in US law. This investigation began in July 1986, with research into available public source background material. By September 1986, fieldwork commenced, consisting primarily of witness interviews, records reviews, and search for other evidentiary materials. More than 200 interviews and 100 informal contacts were conducted by CSCE investigators. A few investigative initiatives were hampered by foreign government and Executive Branch decisions to deny access to certain witnesses and records. However, the effect of the omissions was minimized by the preponderance of other available evidence on the issues. This report presents a narrative story of The Medvid Incident, followed by the factual and legal issues raised by the events (Part I). The second section examines other incidents of repatriation cases, including case studies and analyses, and a statistical examination of deserting crewmen and apprehensions.

  • The Miroslav Medvid Incident - Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Part 1)

    This report results from an investigation directed by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe into the attempted defection of Miroslav Medvid and other similar incidents of involuntary repatriation of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals, with recommendations for any appropriate changes in US law. This investigation began in July 1986, with research into available public source background material. By September 1986, fieldwork commenced, consisting primarily of witness interviews, records reviews, and search for other evidentiary materials. More than 200 interviews and 100 informal contacts were conducted by CSCE investigators. A few investigative initiatives were hampered by foreign government and Executive Branch decisions to deny access to certain witnesses and records. However, the effect of the omissions was minimized by the preponderance of other available evidence on the issues. This report presents a narrative story of The Medvid Incident, followed by the factual and legal issues raised by the events (Part I). The second section examines other incidents of repatriation cases, including case studies and analyses, and a statistical examination of deserting crewmen and apprehensions.

  • The Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE - Compilation of Speeches (Jan-Apr 1987)

    On November 4, 1986, the 35 signatory nations to the Helsinki  Final  Act convened in Vienna for the third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the six weeks that followed the opening of the Conference, there was a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, along with discussion about the next phases of review of the Helsinki process. The United States delegation to the Vienna Review Meeting made significant contributions in detailing the human rights abuses of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries in their many speeches in both the plenary sessions and in various subsidiary working groups.

  • National Minorities in Eastern Europe, Part I: The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria

    This hearing, chaired by Commissioners Steny Hoyer and Dennis DeConcini, focused on the Bulgarian government’s attempts to forcibly assimilate the sizable Turkish minority in their country. The assimilation campaign began in 1984, and was the most egregious example of the Bulgarian government’s denial of rights to its citizens.  This hearing was the first in a series of hearings in 1987 on national minorities in Eastern Europe.  Witnesses included Ambassador Richard Schifter, Halil Ibisoglu, and Thomas Caufield Goltz.

  • The Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE - Compilation of Speeches, Nov-Dec 1986

    On November 4, 1986, the 35 signatory nations to the Helsinki  Final  Act convened in Vienna for the third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the six weeks that followed the opening of the Conference, there was a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document, along with discussion about the next phases of review of the Helsinki process. The United States delegation to the Vienna Review Meeting made significant contributions in detailing the human rights abuses of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries in their many speeches in both the plenary sessions and in various subsidiary working groups.  

  • List of Organizations Involved in Exchange Programs with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

    The Commission developed this report to help in­terested persons and organizations participate in exchange pro­grams with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe: Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It lists organizations which conduct exchange programs and other contacts with these countries. The parties to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe declared their intention to expand cooperation in security, economic, humanitarian, information, culture, and education affairs and to respect and put into practice certain basic principles, including those of human rights. The Final Act was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, by 35 heads of state or govern­ment, including the United States, Canada, and every state in Europe except Albania. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsin­ki Commission) was created as an independent government agency in 1976 to monitor compliance with the Final Act and to encourage U.S. governmental and private programs to expand East-West eco­nomic and cultural cooperation and exchange of people and ideas. In the Final Act, the signatories express the view that cultural exchanges and development of relations in education and science contribute to the strengthening of peace, better mutual under­ standing, and enrichment of the human personality. In the Com­ mission's view, exchange programs with the Soviet bloc countries break down barriers and lessen distrust. They help Americans learn about the views and goals of these societies. Such programs help expose the peoples of these countries to the values and goals of our pluralistic society. Critical to such programs is that Americans are given the opportunity to tell the Soviets and their allies on a personal level about their concern for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

  • Stockholm Meeting of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

    In this hearing, which Rep. Steny H. Hoyer presided over, took place on the heels of the Stockholm Meeting of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Concerning the conference, Chairman D’Amato stated, “This package of confidence- and security-building measures is designed to bring about greater openness with respect to European security and reduce the risk of war.” One of the main aspects of this “package” was the first inclusion of provisions for onsite inspection in an East-West agreement. The conference had large implications for the Helsinki process. For instance, one named concern was that security could overshadow human rights. The witness (Ambassador Barry) did say, though, that the conference could, if properly implemented, reduce the risk of war in Europe, contribute to greater security and openness, and lead to improved East-West relations. 

  • The Miroslav Medvid Incident

    On October 24, 1985, Soviet Seaman Miroslav Medvid jumped from the Marshal Konev (a Soviet grain freighter) while it was docked in New Orleans, LA, and reportedly attempted to request political asylum in the United States. He was interviewed by U.S. Border Patrol agents on that same night and then ordered returned to his ship. U.S. officials from the INS and State Department subsequently boarded the ship, obtained an agreement from Soviet officials that Medvid would be re-interviewed concerning his desire for political asylum, and proceeded to question him over a period of 2 days. Mr. Medvid consistently held that he did not want political asylum during this second interview process, and was finally returned to his ship on October 29, 1985.  The Medvid case has raised many questions concerning the manner in which U.S. Government officials handled the incident and concerning U.S. asylum policy toward Communist-bloc nations in general. The Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy held a series of hearings and conducted a staff investigation on the matter. This report addresses the facts developed through that hearing and investigation process. This report is divided into 6 sections: (1) a brief summary of the events from the time of Medvid's desertion to his final return to the Soviet ship; (2) a summary of the hearings that the immigration subcommittee held on November 5, 1985, November 7, 1985, February 5, 1986, and March 7, 1986; (3) a review and discussion of the major issues and points of controversy concerning the incident; (4) a description of the roles played by the individuals who had the most contact with Medvid, and their perspectives on the case; (5) a review of the adequacy. of present INS asylum procedures; and (6) conclusions drawn by the subcommittee based on the hearing and investigation process.

  • Soviet Violations of the Helsinki Accords in Afghanistan

    The Helsinki Commission held its second hearing on Soviet aggression in Afghanistan six years after Soviet invasion in 1979. The witnesses shed light on the deliberate destruction of the people, culture, and way of life in Afghanistan for the Commissioners present, and considered ways to move forward.

  • Transcripts: Restrictions on Artistic Freedoms in the Soviet Union, October 29, 1985; and the Budapest Cultural Forum, December 11, 1985

    * Public Hearing on Restrictions on Artistic Freedom in the Soviet Union The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 210, Cannon House Office Building, at 10 a.m., Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, cochairman, presiding. In attendance: Commissioners and Senators John Heinz, Gordon J. Humphrey, and Dennis DeConcini; Commissioners and Representatives Dante B. Fascell, Don Ritter, and Christopher H. Smith. Also in attendance: Michael R. Hathaway, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, general counsel of the Commission. This hearing concerned restrictions on creative freedom in the Soviet Union.   Public Hearing on the Budapest Cultural Forum The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 538, of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 11 a.m., Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, cochairman, presiding. In attendance: Senator Malcolm Wallop, Commissioner. Also in attendance: Michael R. Hathaway, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, general counsel of the Commission. In this hearing, the Helsinki Commission heard testimony on the most recent international meeting in the Helsinki process, the Budapest Cultural Forum.

  • THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS MEETING AND THE FUTURE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS

    The commissioners gave testimony on the importance of the 35-nation conference which addressed "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief," The discussion centered on inconsistencies between the rhetoric of the United States on the subject of human rights and its actions.  The focus of human rights covered the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and also Afghanistan. In response to human rights violations- recognizing the framework provided by the Helsinki accords- the witnesses discussed constructive measures to concentrate on human rights violations that could be corrected with relative ease and without effecting systemic change within the Soviet Union or the other states in the Soviet sphere.

  • GAO Report: Helsinki Commission: The First 8 Years

    This report, which describes and evaluates the work of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is in response to Chairman Fascell's request.  The report's conclusions: We believe that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has helped, through its hearings and reports, to focus public attention and to inform public opinion and has made itself a principal Western source of information on Soviet and East European violations of the Final Act; helped resolve numerous family reunification cases for Eastern victims of Communist repression; played a key role in planning and conducting U.S. Helsinki diplomacy.; and effectively promoted a strong U.S. human rights policy in the East-West dialogue about cooperation, detente, and international security. The Commission has put considerably less emphasis on implementing its second mandate--to monitor and encourage governmental and private programs aimed at expanding East-West economic and cultural cooperation. The Commission's unusual organizational arrangement has worked well, although there were some initial difficulties, and as some observers have pointed out, more orthodox arrangements could also have worked well. Commission-participation in the international conferences has enhanced its ability to carry out its mandate to monitor and report on implementation of the Helsinki accords, and it has increased the ability of the Commission's congressional members to influence U.S. policy in the Helsinki process. Yet it has invited criticism on constitutional grounds relating to the separation of powers because it has, in practice, given executive functions to staff personnel who report to members of Congress. No one we consulted has suggested that this arrangement should be changed with respect to the Helsinki Commission. Some, however, have cautioned against suggestions that such an arrangement might be applied to other areas of U.S. foreign relations.

  • Documents of the Soviet Groups to Establish Trust Between the US and the USSR

    Appeal To The Governments and People of The USSR and The USA: The USSR and the USA have the means to kill in such proportions that would end the history of mankind. A balance of terror cannot be a reliable guarantee of safety in the world. Only trust between peoples can create a firm assurance of the future. Today, when elementary trust between the two nations has been completely lost, the problem of trust has ceased to be simply a question of bilateral relations. This is the question: Will mankind be wiped out by its own destructive capabilities or will it survive? This problem demands immediate action today. It is, however, very obvious that political leaders of both sides are incapable of coming to any sort of agreement about significant arms limitations in the near future . ... to say nothing of genuine disarmament. Due to their political interests and circumstances, politicians find it difficult to be objective on disarmament issues  Recognizing this, we do not wish to accuse one side or the other of not wishing to promote the peace process, nor certainly of any aggressive designs for the future. We are convinced of their genuine desire for peace and curtailment of the nuclear threat. However, the search for the path to disarmament has become difficult. We all share an equal responsibility for the future. The active peace movement among citizens of many countries proves that this is understood by millions of people. But our common desire for peace must not be blind It must be perceived and expressed in concrete terms. It must be presented in the context of actual conditions. The world is concerned about its future. Everyone understands that there must be dialogue if the threat is to be removed. The prevailing principles of conducting bilateral dialogue must be changed immediately. We are convinced that the time has come for the public not only to confront decision makers with the issue of disarmament, but to participate in the decision making process with the politicians. We are in favor of quatrapartite dialogue - for dialogue in which average Soviet and American citizens are included on an equal footing with political figures. We favor consistent and, ultimately complete destruction of stockpiles of. nuclear weapons and other forms of mass destruction, and for limitations of conventional weapons. We view the present program for the search for peace as the following: 1. As a first step to abolish the nuclear threat, we appeal to everyone who does not desire the death of his neighbor to submit his own specific proposals on bilateral limitations and cutbacks of weaponry, and, most of all, for the establishment of trust. We call for each such proposal to be forwarded simultaneously to the governments of both countries and to representatives of independent public peace groups. We hope espeially that our call will be heeded by the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, whose governments bear the main responsibility for maintaining the safety of the world. 2. We call upon the citizens of both countries to create combined international public groups, based on the principles of independence. Their functions would include: the receipt and analysis of individual proposals on disarmament and promoting trust between nations: the selection of the most interesting and realistic proposals: bringing these proposals to the attention of the respective populations about the possible consequences of the use of nuclear arms, and about all issues concerning disarmament. 3. We appeal to the scientific community, particularly to independent international scientific organizations involved in the campaign for peace, to work on scientific problems directly connected with the preservation of peace. For instance, at the present stage, it is extremely important to develop a unified mathematical method for evaluating the weaponry of the opposing sides. We call upon scientists to create independent research groups to scientifically analyze citizen proposals. 4. We call upon political leaders and the media of both countries to refrain from mutual accustions about intentions to use nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes. We are convinced that such accusations only inflame distrust between the sides and thus make any constructive dialogue impossible. 5. We view as necessary guarantees of the establishment of trust that the USSR and the USA must create conditions for the open exchange of opinions and to inform the publics of both nations on all issues on the process of disarmament. We appeal to the governments of the USSR and the USA to create a special international bulletin (with a governmental guarnatees of distribution in both countries), in which both sides would conduct a dialogue, hold discussions, and would make public reports on the following issues, among others: a. An analysis of disarmament negotiations and the documents of the negotiations b. An exchange of opinions and proposals on possible ways to limit arms, and on disarmament c. An exchange of proposals on the establishment of trust d. An exchange of information on the possible consequences of using nuclear arms. Such a bulletin would provide an opportunity for independent citizens' peace groups to participate in general discussions, publish uncensored materials, especially proposals on disarmament and trust and information on (various) peace movements and the steps they have taken. We appeal to the governments and public opinion of the USSR and the USA since we are convinced that everyone who understands that the future needs to be defended must have a genuine opportunity to defend it! Moscow; June 4, 1982 Batovrin, Sergei Blok, V.R. Fleishgakker, Maria I. Khronopulo, Yu. G. Fleishgakker, V.N. Rozenoer, S.A. Sobkov, I.N. Ostrovskaya, L.A. Krochik, G.M. Kalyuzhny, B.I. (and seventy-four signatures in support) (the appeal is open for signatures.)

  • Chairmanship of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

    This hearing was convened to discuss H.R. 4504, a bill introduced by the committee chairman, the Honorable Dante Fascell, of Florida.  This legislation provided for several changes in the administration of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. First, it stipulated that the Chairman of the Commission could not also be the chairman of another sitting committee. Second, it provided for rotation between the House and the Senate for chairman of the Commission to ensure that it meets the needs of both houses of Congress. Third, it established the position of co-chairman, which had previously been an informal arrangement. Representatives of several organizations, including the National Conference of Soveit Jewry, the Helsinki Watch, and the Joint Baltic American National Committee, spoke in favor of the legislation. The bill was ultimately passed in a vote by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on International Operations.

  • Forced Labor in the Soviet Union

    The subject of our hearing is forced labor in the Soviet Union. We have long been interested in the subject at the Commission, as many others have. The Commission issued staff reports on the subject as early as August 1980. There is no exact statistics exist in the West on the central question of the total number of Soviets engaged in various types of forced labor. The generally accepted minimum number is 3 or 4 million people-including about 10 000 political prisoners-performing forced labor in places of imprisonment and on penal labor brigades. The robust discussion provided by experts will make clear the vast extent of Soviet reliance on forced labor.

  • Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union

    This joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations was held in response to a request from the American Psychiatric Association to generate an opportunity for discussion about the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. This human rights violation was a common weapon of punishment utilized by the Soviet Union against its citizens. The hearing was held in the context of the Soviet Union withdrawing from the international association that represents psychiatry because it knew it would not be able to abide by the expected standards. Experts in the field of psychiatry presented testimony as this hearing on examined this issue as of the Soviet government in suppressing individuals who voice opposing opinions. The uniqueness of the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union as a widespread and systemic issue was addressed.

  • Update on Raoul Wallenberg

    This hearing focused on the disappearance of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, distinguished diplomat who risked his life to help grant protection to Jewish refugees in Hungary during Nazis occupation. Wallenberg’s whereabouts became unknown when the Soviets liberated Hungary. Despite Soviet declarations that Mr. Wallenberg died in 1947, many witnesses have contested this claim and have reported that he is in fact in Soviet prison. The Commissioners and the witnesses discussed the U.S. response and what further actions may be needed.

  • Soviet Jewry: H. Con. Res. 63

    This joint hearing by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe examined the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union. Moscow's heightened campaign of hatred against its own citizens, in flagrant disregard of international law, was identified as a factor in whether the United States should enter into any further agreements with the Soviet Union, especially ones which involve United States security. Witnesses testifying at this hearing expressed their concerns about the continued persecution and harassment of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union. The repressive policies instituted by the Soviet regime to destroy Jewish culture, despite its commitment to the human rights terms agreed upon during the Helsinki Final Act, were outlined.

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