in the news
U.S. Congress Committee Calls for More Action on Property RestitutionWednesday, May 26, 2010
The head of the Helsinki Commission at the United States Congress, Senator Ben Cardin, has criticized Poland for delaying the process of dealing with the restitution of Jewish property confiscated during and after WW II. Representative of the Obama administration, Stuart Eizenstat also expressed hope that the problem will be solved soon. Speaking during the session of the Helsinki Commission in Washington, Senator Ben Cardin indicated Poland and Lithuania as the two countries which have done least to solve the problem. "Successive Polish governments promised that the issue of compensation will be dealt with. None has done anything about it,” he said. In March 2001, the Polish parliament approved a law for the restitution of private property, though the right to file a claim was limited to those with Polish citizenship as of December 31, 1999. The law was subsequently vetoed by the President of Poland. The Terezin Declaration, a nonbinding set of guiding principles aimed at faster, more open and transparent restitution of art, private and communal property taken by force or under duress during the Holocaust, was approved at the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference in June last year. Poland was a signature to the non-binding agreement. Senator Cardin added he was aware that due to the relocation of borders and massive resettlements of people following the war, property restitution in Poland is a complicated issue. “Solving of the problem is difficult but not impossible” he added. Former US Ambassador to the EU Stuart Eizenstat, the country’s delegate to the Prague Conference on the return of assets looted during World War Two also addressed the Commission, Tuesday. He said that the reprivatization law currently being prepared in Poland is defective as it does not include the restitution of properties located in Warsaw. Poles themselves were the victims of Nazism and communism so the restitution issue is difficult, he remarked, at the same time expressing hope that the legislative work will be corrected. Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced back in 2008 that legislation which aimed to tackle the issue had been prepared but the global finance crisis meant that plans had to be shelved due to increasing public debt. “The escalation of demands does not help in the creation of a political climate needed to pass an anti-discrimination, re-privatisation law,” declared Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski, commenting last year on the appeal from Jewish organizations for the return property confiscated under Nazi occupation in Poland from heirless victims during the Holocaust.
Mitigating Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the OSCE RegionTuesday, May 04, 2010
This hearing, presided over by Sen. Benjamin Cardin, discussed the Helsinki Process’s role in mitigating inter-ethnic conflict in the OSCE region. The hearing discussed the situation in Kyrgyzstan, ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, the still-lingering effects of the 1944 mass deportation of Crimean minorities, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Witnesses at the hearing included Heidi Tagliavani, Ambassador and Under Secretary of State for Switzerland and head of the European Union investigation of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict; Peter Semneby, Special Representative for the South Caucasus for the European Union; and Mr. Soren Jessen-Petersen, former Special Representative for Kosovo for the United Nations.
2009 OSCE Mediterranean Conference in Cairo is a SucessWednesday, April 21, 2010
By Alex Johnson, Policy Advisor and Marlene Kaufmann, General Counsel In December 2009, Commission staff attended the 2009 OSCE Mediterranean Conference on “The Mediterranean Partners and the OSCE: Cooperation Toward Enhanced Security and Stability” in Cairo, Egypt. This conference brought together 33 of the 56 OSCE participating States, four of the Asian Partners for Cooperation (Australia, South Korea, Japan, and Thailand), and representation from all of the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation. The Palestinian National Authority attended at the invitation of the host government. The conference featured three sessions focusing on the politico-military aspects of security in the OSCE area, implications of the current financial crisis on migration, and prospects for OSCE Mediterranean Cooperation. These sessions featured presentations from Mediterranean Partner OSCE delegations, academics, international organizations, and relevant ministry representatives. Participation in this conference was at a high level with the majority of the participating States and all of the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation represented by their Ambassadors to the OSCE. Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in attendance included a Vice-President and officers of two of the Assembly’s General Committees. Discussion in all of the sessions was lively with active participation by the Ambassadors, particularly those representing the Mediterranean Partners, as well as other public and private sector participants. A number of themes emerged across the sessions including agreement that the partnership between the OSCE participating States and their Mediterranean Partners has strengthened. The establishment of the Partnership Fund and the Athens’ Ministerial invitation to the Partners to contribute to the Corfu Process are largely attributed with bolstering the strength of the Partnership. Findings included a future activity emphasis on specific areas of cooperation by setting both short and long-term goals and providing a mechanism to assess effectiveness. In addition, the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership should undertake its work in coordination with other regional organizations and institutions, through which the possibility of expanding the Partnership could be considered. Session 1: Politico-military aspects of security in the OSCE area and the Mediterranean The session’s moderators were Ambassador Ian Cliff, Head of the delegation of the United Kingdom to the OSCE and Ambassador Taous Feroukhi, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the OSCE. Panelists included Mr. Pascal Heyman, Deputy Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center, Ambassador Gyorgy Molnar, Head of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the OSCE, and Dr. Mostafa Elwy Saif, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Cairo University and Member of the Shura Council. Ambassador Cliff opened the discussion by pointing out that the OSCE had developed expertise on crisis prevention and conflict resolution, particularly regarding protracted conflicts. He believes there has recently been some incremental progress. Pascal Heyman emphasized that the OSCE has developed a unique conflict prevention and resolution expertise through constant political dialogue, dedicated crisis management mechanisms such as fact-finding missions, the Conflict Prevention Center, confidence and security building measures and the establishment of field operations. While these are effective tools, Heyman maintained that workable and lasting conflict resolution depends ultimately on the political will of the participating States and the parties in a conflict. Ambassador Molnar spoke to the destabilizing consequences of transnational or multi-dimensional threats to security in the OSCE space. He noted that participating States are attempting to address these threats through the Maastricht Strategy and decisions adopted at both the Madrid and Athens Ministerials regarding transnational threats, combating terrorism, and promoting effective law enforcement and police training programs. Dr. Saif presented a detailed review of Egypt’s political and military security concerns and concluded that the primary challenges to his country’s security stem from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions, water shortages, the political situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Ambassador Feroukhi said that the absence of a dedicated institutional forum in the Mediterranean region hampered the development of effective security mechanisms but felt that the development of confidence-building measures – particularly involving civil society and academic communities – should be encouraged as a first step. She also agreed that a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and better protection of the environment were vital for the stability and security of the Mediterranean region. All delegations who participated in the discussion welcomed the Athens Ministerial decision to invite input from the Partners for Cooperation on furthering the Corfu Process. A number of delegations raised the possibility of enlarging the Mediterranean Partnership to include the Palestinian National Authority, while others pointed out the difficulties of doing so, due to the fact that the OSCE is a state-based organization. The Partnership Fund was hailed as an effective tool to enhance the Mediterranean Partnership and it should continue to be used to sustain a culture of cooperation, including the possible creation of a clearing house on water issues within the OSCE. It was also stressed that the OSCE should coordinate its activities with relevant international and regional organizations. The moderators stated the following conclusions emanating from the discussion: The confidence and security building measures as well as early warning mechanisms developed in the framework of the OSCE could serve as a model and help to foster cooperation and confidence in the Mediterranean region; the participation of the Partners in the Corfu process should enhance the Mediterranean Partnership; and, the Partnership should move forward based on concrete, achievable objectives with possible long-term goals of establishing a Mediterranean conflict prevention center and developing regional codes of conduct to enhance dialogue and cooperation. Session 2: Implications of the current economic and financial crisis on migration The second session was moderated by Mr. Daman Bergant, Head of the OSCE Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, and panelists included Ambassador Omar Zniber, Head of the Delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco to the OSCE, and Ms. Rebecca Bardach, Director of the Center for International Migration and Integration of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Mr. Bergant began the session by explaining that the global economic and financial crisis has an impact on migration and development. He outlined several topics to guide the discussion including the development of cooperative migration policies between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners; dialogue on how to prevent and combat illegal migration; international and regional cooperation on preventing trafficking in human beings, including trafficking for forced labor; protecting the human rights of migrants, including through combating hate crimes; and, the role of migrants in promoting tolerance and non-discrimination. Ambassador Zniber spoke to the impact of the current economic crisis on both migrants and development. He pointed out that the impact of the crisis makes migrants even more vulnerable and they face increased discrimination and further marginalization in society. Decreasing remittances, said the Ambassador – 10 to 15% in 2009 according to the World Bank – are a destabilizing factor, impacting countries of origin like Morocco which are particularly dependent on revenues from abroad. The Ambassador welcomed the Athens Ministerial Council Decision on migration management and urged that the OSCE continue its work in this area, in particular, by facilitating dialogue, exchanging best practices and fighting discrimination against migrants. Specifically, he recommended that the OSCE and its Mediterranean Partners establish a working group on migration management and related security aspects; develop a multi-dimensional and long-term approach on migration management; promote regional cooperation and partnerships between all responsible parties including countries of origin, transit and destination, civil society and the private sector; create reintegration and training programs; and, protect the human rights of migrants and their families. Ms. Bardach gave a comprehensive review of migration issues impacting Israel. She explained that only in the last two decades has Israel seen a significant increase in migration flows across its borders. This is presenting challenges to the government in managing migration and dealing with large numbers of refugees, asylum seekers, and labor migrants, in addition to human smuggling and trafficking. While Israeli efforts to combat trafficking for sexual exploitation have resulted in marked progress, she said, efforts to combat labor trafficking are still in their infancy. Based on this experience, Ms. Bardach suggested that the OSCE should develop policies to address irregular recruitment practices and raise awareness about such practices; develop cooperation on both the regional and bilateral level to increase information sharing, strengthen border controls and address the humanitarian needs of migrants; develop culturally sensitive tools for law enforcement officials; and, improve the reception and registration of refugees, including assisted voluntary return. During the discussion following the panel presentations, a number of delegations echoed the view that the OSCE and its Mediterranean Partners should serve as a broad regional platform for a coordinated dialogue on migration, and should develop a comprehensive strategy to prevent cross-border trafficking that includes the private sector. The contributors in this session demonstrated the need for better data collection and sharing regarding migration in the Euro-Mediterranean context. This goal was identified as a potential priority for the Partnership Fund. Proposals distributed by the Moroccan and Egyptian delegations have both cited the importance of developing research institutions, which could serve to further the goal of better data collection and expertise sharing. Session 3: Prospects for OSCE Mediterranean Cooperation The third session Chaired by Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Head of the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the OSCE and Chair of the OSCE Permanent Council, focused on a review of achievements to date in improving dialogue and cooperation between the participating States and the Mediterranean Partners, and developing effective follow-up on recommendations of previous seminars and ministerial declarations referencing the Partners. Featured speakers were Ambassador Makram Queisi, Permanent Representative of Jordan to the OSCE, and Mr. Agustin Nunez, Deputy Head of Mission of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the OSCE. Ambassador Queisi presented four areas in which he felt cooperation could improve the relationship between the OSCE and the Mediterranean region – environmental aspects of security such as soil erosion, desertification and water management including the possible creation of an environmental data collection center in the region; enhanced border security to combat terrorism and trafficking including cooperation with the Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Jordan; combating discrimination against Muslims; and developing nuclear non-proliferation strategies for the region. The Ambassador also stated his view that Partner status should be granted to the Palestinian National Authority as a confidence building measure. Mr. Nunez reviewed the development of the participating State’s cooperation with their Mediterranean Partners including increased participation by Mediterranean Partners in OSCE activities and recent examples of concrete cooperation on issues such as countering terrorism, promoting tolerance and freedom of the media, and enhancing border management. He emphasized the importance of having a strategic vision for the Partnership and commended the proposal by the Kazakh Chair of the Mediterranean Contact Group that three priority areas should be identified for developing projects to be financed by the Partnership Fund. Mr. Nunez concurred with Ambassador Queisi’s view that the Partnership should be enlarged to include the Palestinian National Authority and noted that Spain had circulated two food-for-thought papers on this topic in 2008. Following the presentations, active debate among the delegations ensued and focused primarily on the current status of the Partnership and its achievements to date, proposals for additional areas of cooperation, procedural improvements and the issue of possible enlargement of the Partnership. Enhanced cooperation in the areas of promoting tolerance and non-discrimination, freedom of the media, gender, combating trafficking in human beings, energy security, security aspects of climate change, water management and fighting corruption, drug trafficking and terrorism was discussed. It was suggested that working groups should be established to examine these issues and make recommendations for action. Participants also called for the establishment of a system for effective follow-up on recommendations and agreed proposals, as well as enhanced coordination with other regional institutions and organizations. The participants actively discussed the question of enlarging the Mediterranean Partnership with some participants supporting the granting of Partner status to the Palestinian National Authority as a confidence building measure conducive to dialogue and peace in the region. Debate over this particular consideration illuminated the need for an expeditious response to the request of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to become an OSCE Mediterranean Partner for Cooperation. It is apparent that a number of participating States and partners recognize the value of their participation in Mediterranean Dimension activities. Yet, disagreement arises when considering the implications of recognizing a territory as a full-fledged partner. Some participating States see the case of the PNA as unique in that there is already international agreement on the existence of a future Palestinian State. Other participating States believe that affording a territory official status sets a precedent for other territories seeking recognition in the OSCE region. A number of these leaders believe that a future Palestinian State should be granted partner status after formal international recognition. Thus, it will be unlikely that consensus on partnership with the PNA will be reached at this time and the OSCE Chair-in-Office should issue a formal response acknowledging this. The question of PNA participation will continue to mire productive dialogue on other opportunities for cooperation until a decisive response is issued by the OSCE Chair-in-Office. Alternatives for their participation should however be explored. Some possibilities include establishment of an alternative status of “observer” or other title within the framework of the Partners for Cooperation to allow for a transitional process of full recognition as a Partner. In addition, some sort of agreement should be established on recommended countries outside of the Mediterranean Partnership for invitations to OSCE Mediterranean Dimension activities. Conclusion: Future Considerations for Annual Conference Administration A tremendous success of the 2009 Mediterranean Conference was the engagement of the Ambassadors from the Mediterranean Partners in the agenda. Each panel featured a Mediterranean Partner Ambassador, which helped balance the contributions during the discussion. Previous conferences did not adequately balance the opportunities for contributions between the Mediterranean Partners and the OSCE participating States. In the most grievous of incidences, panelists and participating States at the 2008 Mediterranean Conference in Amman, Jordan took so much time during the discussion that contributions from representatives of the Partners were significantly curtailed. It only makes sense that the contributions of the Partners be prioritized when the purpose of the conference is enhancing cooperation with their respective countries. Meaningful participation by the Partners remains the only way to sustain the future of the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension. A recurring challenge of the annual Mediterranean conference is a lack of willingness to host the event among the Mediterranean Partners. The venue question remains an issue that paralyzes cooperation among the Mediterranean Partners and has the potential to diminish the productivity of the conference each year. The venue question stems from a number of factors. Not only is the conference capital-intensive for the hosting State, political considerations regarding the participants in the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension keep Partners like Algeria and Tunisia from taking a leadership role in hosting the event. Thus, active Partners like Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Israel bear the burden of hosting the conference most frequently. Ownership of the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension through hosting the conference and originating initiatives remains an ideal that the partnership should aspire to. However, it is not unprecedented that participating States would host the conference. Previous Mediterranean seminars were hosted by Greece (2002), Croatia (2001), Slovenia (2000), and Malta (1998), prior to the elevation of the event to a “conference” by the Greek chairmanship of the OSCE in 2008. Participating States have offered to host the upcoming 2010 conference. Proceeding with an established venue earlier in the year may provide for more time for substantive topic development. Such a deviation from Mediterranean Partner ownership of the event should be seen as an exception until a more appropriate mechanism for rotating the responsibility of hosting the conference is devised. The 2009 Mediterranean Conference was well executed by the Egyptian government, especially considering the short time between their final commitment to do so and the date of the event. However, NGO participation was notably missing. The 2008 OSCE Mediterranean Conference in Amman featured a session for NGOs from throughout the Mediterranean region on the day prior to the conference and subsequently included a robust NGO presence during the conference proceedings. OSCE Participating States led by the United States made extra-budgetary contributions to the OSCE Partnership Fund to help facilitate a robust NGO presence. International organization representatives that were invited to present on the session panels in the 2009 Cairo conference were among the few non-governmental participants present. It is true that participating States lack the wherewithal to contribute annually to facilitate an NGO presence especially given global fiscal challenges. However, exploring partnerships with appropriate foundations, endowments, and institutions involved in Euro-Mediterranean engagement may result in a consistent and strong NGO presence at events within the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension.
Ethnic and Racial Profiling in the OSCE RegionMonday, March 22, 2010
In this briefing, held by Commissioners Alcee L. Hastings and Benjamin L. Cardin, the topic of discussion was combatting ethnic and racial profiling. To this end, years ago, Hastings and Cardin began such efforts for the OSCE. Consequently, the OSCE established a tolerance unit that publishes an annual hate crimes report, has three personal representatives to address these issues, and has developed numerous initiatives to address prejudice and discrimination. Likewise, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities has convened experts to discuss the issue of multiethnic policing. In spite of substantial progress made, there continues to be a lot of work to be done to address ethnic and racial profiling. In fact, the Commission, U.S. Government, and organizations like the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and Human Rights First have, quite recently, called for a response to the profiling of Roma, Muslims, persons of African descent or blacks, and other groups in Europe and the U.S.
Transparency and Sunshine WeekWednesday, March 17, 2010
At the U.S. Helsinki Commission we monitor 56 countries, including the United States, to ensure compliance with human rights and other commitments made under the Helsinki Final Act. A major part of that compliance rests on governments being open and acting transparently--the same focus that is at the heart of the American Society of Newspaper Editors' Sunshine Week. Practicing open governance is not something countries, States, and cities should do because they have to comply with some international agreement or public records law; rather, being transparent should be an organic part of providing a democratic government and empowering citizens. When President Obama began his Presidency he called for unprecedented transparency. In his Open Government Directive, he outlined a clear plan for government to become more transparent, participatory, and collaborative. The logic is clear--only through transparency can people gain the knowledge needed to participate and hold their governments accountable. And only if the people participate can government collaborate with them to glean the best ideas. This directive was bold and action-oriented, but sadly we have not seen the U.S. bureaucracy react with the same swiftness with which this directive was made. Most agencies, in fact, have not made concrete changes to comply with the directive, according to a government-wide audit released earlier this week by the National Security Archive based at the George Washington University. It seems for all the White House is doing disclosing its visitors log, broadcasting policy meetings, increasing interactivity through town hall meetings and YouTube interviews--a lot of work remains at the agencies. Most glaring to me are the delays and in some cases outright denials of Freedom of Information Act requests. I was surprised to learn in the National Security Archive audit that some requests have been pending for 18 years when the law very clearly calls for responses within 20 business days when possible. Most baffling from the audit may be what files still remain locked in government vaults. For example, today--more than 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall--the Pentagon still has not responded to a request for records detailing the military's reaction in 1961 to the building of the wall. When it comes to diplomacy, this President and Secretary of State Clinton deserve great praise for the work they have done around the world to strengthen dialogue and improve U.S. relationships abroad. This successful record, however, is slightly tarnished by the Department of State's efforts on open governance. The Department more than doubled the number of denials it issued to people filing Freedom of Information Act requests last year--the largest increase of any agency except for the Social Security Administration, which tripled its denials. Fourteen months is a short time to change a bureaucracy charged with managing countless records. But a handful of agencies have already shown it is possible and committed to open government changes. On top of other positive reforms, the Departments of Agriculture and Justice, the Small Business Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget all increased how much information they released and decreased how many requests they denied last year. These agencies have embraced the spirit of transparency ushered in by President Obama, and as we mark Sunshine Week, I hope others will follow suit with their own innovative ways to increase transparency and spur citizen involvement. And once agencies adopt these practices, I hope they stick with them--not because they fulfill any Presidential directive but because they give us a better democracy.
Helsinki Commission Applauds U.S. Human Rights ReportsThursday, March 11, 2010
U.S. Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD), Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation (U.S. Helsinki Commission) and Co-Chairman Congressman Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL) hailed today’s release of the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as a key tool to monitor and track progress on universal freedoms. “The State Department reports on human rights provide a valuable reference point for assessing human rights trends in countries throughout the world, including those in the expansive OSCE region stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” Chairman Cardin said. This year’s reports have increased significance as 2010 is the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of other international human rights agreements. “In a year commemorating landmark human rights documents of the Helsinki Final Act, the Copenhagen Document, and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, today’s State Department reports remind us that many of the promises countries made in those historic documents still have not been met with meaningful action,” Co-Chairman Hastings said. “These reports on human rights around the world are a critical tool, and they’ll provide a fact-base to inform our foreign policy in the year ahead,” said Michael Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights and Labor. Posner, who serves as the State Department Commissioner on the U.S. Helsinki Commission, unveiled the reports with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a news conference this morning. As leaders of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, the Co-Chairmen have consistently voiced concerns about the pattern of rights violations cited in several of the OSCE participating States. “In Belarus, the political space for opposition remains tightly controlled and independent media face continual harassment,” said Cardin, who travelled to Minsk in July 2009. “The overall situation in Russia remains disturbing with the murder of a leading human right advocate, harassment of Jehovah’s Witnesses and forceful break up of public demonstrations. I urge Kazakhstan, as the current chair of the OSCE, to lead by example through concrete actions, starting with the release of activist Yevgeny Zhovtis.” The Co-Chairmen welcomed Assistant Secretary Posner to the Commission Feb. 25.Posner’s activity with the Commission and the State Department’s annual human rights reports mandated by Congress are examples of legislative-executive branch cooperation to keep a spotlight on human rights abuses.
Tribute to Miklos HarasztiThursday, February 04, 2010
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, in my capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I am pleased to commend Miklos Haraszti, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, for his years of dedicated service in the cause of advancing freedom of expression and media. An accomplished writer and journalist as well as a courageous human rights activist in his native Hungary for decades prior to the end of the Cold War, he was elected to parliament in the early 1990s. Since his appointment to his current position in 2004, Mr. Haraszti has been an outspoken champion for beleaguered journalists throughout the OSCE region. Mr. Haraszti's periodic reports have proven invaluable in tracking trends regarding laws, policies and practices governing freedom of expression and media in the participating states. He has been vigilant in monitoring and reporting on issues arising from the adoption of "extremism'' laws in a growing number of OSCE countries. The Representative on Freedom of the Media has likewise been a strong voice in calling for decriminalization of defamation and a critic of attempts by some regimes to restrict the Internet and new media technologies. Most importantly, he has responded to specific urgent situations and cases, including instances involving the harassment, physical attacks, and even murder of journalists. He has never shied away from naming names, he has never played favorites, and he has been a voice for those whom governments would like to silence. Next month Mr. Haraszti will conclude his service as the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. You can write a great mandate for a high-level official, but if you don't appoint the right person to the job, you won't get results. Mr. Haraszti has been the right person for the right job and we have been very fortunate that he has given 6 years to serve the greater good in the OSCE region. The OSCE participating States will be hard pressed to find an individual to match his professionalism, passion, and integrity. I join my colleagues at the Helsinki Commission in expressing our deep appreciation to Miklos Haraszti, a tireless advocate for freedom of expression and media, for his service and we wish him the best in his future pursuits.
Kazakhstan’s Vision of a More Effective OSCETuesday, February 02, 2010
Madam Speaker, I rise today to recognize Kazakhstan's new role as chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE. The decision by the OSCE participating states to appoint Kazakhstan as its chair for 2010 marks the first time that a former Soviet state will take on this leadership role. The decision was not without controversy, and I would like to acknowledge the efforts made over the past two decades to establish democracy and a market economy. I look forward to full implementation of the promises of reform made by Kazakhstan at the 2007 OSCE Madrid Ministerial. In a January 2010 video address, President Nazarbayev told the OSCE Permanent Council that, "Kazakhstan as the holder of the OSCE Chairmanship is firmly committed to the fundamental principles and values of the OSCE.'' I welcome and applaud this statement as well as Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev's Permanent Council statement that, "further steps in the area of democratization in Kazakhstan will be fully in line with the goals and tasks that we have set ourselves during our Chairmanship.'' This month, Kazakhstan Secretary of State-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev has officially assumed his role as chairman-in-office of the OSCE and I believe he will dedicate his efforts toward realizing Kazakhstan's vision and goals for the OSCE this year. I know Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev's objective is to make the organization even more valid, useful, and effective. I commend Kazakhstan's effective preparation for the chairmanship, and welcome the deepening cooperation between Kazakhstan and the U.S. to make the chairmanship a success. On January 14, Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev outlined his country's plan for executing Kazakhstan's strategic vision. In light of increased threats to international security, including illicit drug trafficking and terrorism, Kazakhstan will focus on preventing conflicts that result in tragedy and disaster. It is important that the United States support these efforts. I also support Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev's intention to continue to focus on the OSCE's human dimension. One area of focus for Kazakhstan as chairmanship of the OSCE will be to address issues pertinent to the developing situation in Afghanistan. In fact, Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev has stated that a principal goal is to help the Afghan people leave behind their militaristic world and develop a lasting peaceful and productive society. To achieve this Kazakhstan has donated $50 million to a new program which will provide vocational training to 1,000 Afghanis at Kazakh universities. Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev also intends to develop cooperative projects that strengthen the border and improve law enforcement practices, and I support increasing OSCE involvement in this regard. Beyond the global peril of Afghanistan is the issue of nuclear disarmament. As a former Soviet state, Kazakhstan should be applauded for its decision to eradicate its inherited nuclear arsenal and for its example and leadership in nuclear nonproliferation. With the mantle of OSCE leadership, Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev will work with the OSCE to achieve increased global security. I commend Kazakhstan for prioritizing the fight against the deplorable and growing concern of human trafficking, particularly that of children. Trafficking has become a major international concern that warrants the attention and cooperation of the OSCE states to develop effective solutions to eliminate such practices. Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev has also expressed the need for increased tolerance and equality, especially with regard to religion, race, and gender. Various conferences and meetings are already in place to discuss the implementation of previous decisions concerning these areas. I plan to attend at least one of the conferences. And I will encourage colleagues to attend as well. Finally, as many of my colleagues would agree, energy security remains a critical global concern. Kazakhstan, with its significant oil, gas and mining potential, plays a key role as a reliable energy supplier. The past two years has seen significant challenges to energy supply and distribution in the OSCE region and there is much that the OSCE could be doing to help mediate differences and encourage greater transparency in this area. I am confident that Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev will bring to bear his country's experience and expertise in energy issues to create greater capacity for energy security both politically and institutionally in the OSCE. I look forward to helping and following the progress of the OSCE under the leadership of Kazakhstan. The priorities outlined by Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev demonstrate the challenges ahead for the OSCE. I wish Chairman-in-Office Saudabayev and the entire Republic of Kazakhstan well as the OSCE chairmanship. It is my hope that by the close of 2010, we will see Kazakhstan's OSCE leadership manifested through positive outcomes. U.S. OFFICIAL ON COMMENCEMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN'S OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP (By Robert O. Blake, Jr., Jan. 20, 2010) As Kazakhstan begins to serve as the Chairman-In-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe this yea, it is charting a course for a bright and promising future. It is a future in which the United States and Kazakhstan together seek peace, security, economic development and prosperity. We seek democratic values and human rights that unite free nations in trust and in respect. We seek a region in which relations are good between neighbors, between Russia and China and Afghanistan and all others in the region and of course with the United States. Kazakhstan has been a leader in international security since its earliest days of independence. After the end of the Cold War, the world applauded as Kazakhstan renounced its nuclear weapons, closed the nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, and freely transferred over half a ton of weapons-grade uranium to secure sites outside the country under Project Sapphire. This past December, we marked the sixteenth anniversary of the landmark Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in Kazakhstan and we continue to work in partnership with Kazakhstan to advance our common non-proliferation goals. In April President Obama will welcome President Nazarbayev and other world leaders to the Global Nuclear Security Summit he will host. Since its independence, Kazakhstan has also set an example in the region with economic reforms that have attracted investment and created jobs. The Government of Kazakhstan is also making wise choices to develop multiple energy export routes and to diversify its economy to ensure that its vast oil wealth can become a source for social mobility, not social stagnation. As Kazakhstan's economy continues to recover from the global economic downturn, it should again be an engine for growth within Central Asia. Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would benefit immensely from Kazakhstan) investment and energy supplies to stimulate growth and create jobs. And Afghanistan needs the full partnership of Kazakhstan to overcome the destitution that extremists, warlords, and civil war have compounded over several decades. Kazakhstan is providing vital logistical support to the International Security Assistance Force through the Northern Distribution Network. We welcome Astana's decision to invest in Afghanistan's next generation of leaders by generously allocating $50 million to fund scholarships for a thousand Afghan students to study In Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship is highly symbolic. The OSCE had long prided itself for stretching from Vancouver to Vladisvostok. Now, for the very first time, a major international organization is headed by a new country east of Vienna. It is a recognition that the OSCE draws its strength not only from Europe and the United States, but also from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. The challenges facing the OSCE and the international community are real but our strength comes from facing those challenges collectively and with a common purpose. The United States looks forward to working with Kazakhstan this year to meet these challenges and achieve the goal of modernizing and strengthening the OSCE, for the benefit of all participating States. Kazakhstan has successfully navigated the early stages of statehood. It has achieved a position of leadership on international security and economic development. And now, Kazakhstan, as the OSCE Chairman-in-Office has an unprecedented opportunity to lead Central Asia towards a future of democracy and to advance its own reform agenda to unleash the creative energy of its people. With continued reform, Kazakhstan can become the nexus of Eurasia in the 21st century, the point where all roads cross. For thousands of years, along the ancient Silk Road, the communities of Central Asia facilitated the global exchange of ideas, and trade, and culture. In the process, they made historic contributions to our collective human heritage. Today, as Kazakhstan assumes the OSCE mantle, it is poised and ready to break a fresh path for a new Silk Road, a great crossroads of reform linking the provinces of northern Russia to the ports of South Asia, the republics of Western Europe to the democracies of East Asia. A strong and prosperous and democratic Kazakhstan can energize the global transmission of learning, trade and freedom across the steppes of Central Asia. Kazakhstan has a glorious past and can seize a hopeful future. The United States will continue to be Kazakhstan's steadfast partner.
in the news
OSCE Welcomes Kazakhstan as Chair, but Raises Its Record on RightsTuesday, February 02, 2010
The U.S. arm of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has welcomed Kazakhstan as the new chair of the organization but cautioned the former Soviet republic that it must improve its own rights record if it wants to be effective in its new role. At a hearing in Washington today, Helsinki Commission co-chair Representative Alcee Hastings (Democrat-Florida) said he had spearheaded U.S. support of Kazakhstan's appointment as the new rotating chair at the organization's ministerial meeting in Madrid in 2007. Kazakhstan, a vast, oil-rich Central Asian nation, is being closely scrutinized by the West now that it has assumed the 2010 rotating chairmanship on promises to usher in democratic reforms itself.
in the news
Kazakhstan: Foreign Minister's Arrival in Washington Highlights Democratization vs. Security DebateMonday, February 01, 2010
Kazakhstan’s foreign minister, Kanat Saudabayev, is in Washington from February 1-4. He is expected to seek US backing for two prestige events: a summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Kazakhstan; and a one-on-one meeting between US President Barack Obama and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev. In January, Kazakhstan took over the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. Some human rights advocates in Washington argue that Kazakhstani officials have not fulfilled reform commitments made in connection with their country’s selection as OSCE chair, and add that now is a good opportunity to press for stronger movement for those reforms. Three US senators (John Kerry, Robert Casey, and Benjamin Cardin) sent a letter to Saudabayev on January 19, calling on Kazakhstan authorities to carry out a procedural review of the case involving Yevgeny Zhovtis, a human rights activist in Kazakhstan who was convicted last year of vehicular manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison.
Greek Chairmanship Moves the OSCE Back Toward Its Hallmark ValuesWednesday, January 13, 2010
By Winsome Packer, Helsinki Commission Representative to the US Mission to the OSCE and Douglas Davidson, Senior State Department Advisor What a difference a year can make. The 2008 Ministerial meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Helsinki was marked by lingering animosity and distrust exacerbated by the Russia-Georgia war a few months before. The OSCE’s 2009 Ministerial in Athens, by contrast, proceeded much more smoothly, setting the stage for the return to more positive and productive political dialogue among the Organization’s participating States. This was a welcome change, for in recent years discord and inertia have steadily eroded the cooperation and consensus that were once the hallmarks of the OSCE. Recognizing this, in their meeting in Helsinki in December of 2008, the 56 foreign ministers or their representatives had agreed on the need for the OSCE to seek ways to overcome distrust and paralysis. In the course of 2009 the Greek Chairmanship then initiated what came to be called the Corfu Process, which was named after the venue for a midsummer informal meeting of foreign ministers, with the aim of doing just that. Part of this process was also to focus on European security, and not least on a key component of existing European security architecture, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), with which the Russian Federation suspended compliance two years ago. For their Ministerial Council meeting in December of 2009, the Greeks set as their priorities the approval of a political declaration – something that hadn’t been achieved in a number of years – together with a separate political declaration on the Corfu Process and an operational decision on the continuation of that process during the 2010 Kazakh Chairmanship. By the time delegations reached Athens there were, in addition to six other human dimension draft decisions prepared by the Greeks, a plethora of additional draft decisions submitted by the participating States in all three dimensions. Of these, the Ministers agreed on decisions that addressed such fundamental and persistent problems as hate crimes, tolerance and nondiscrimination, nonproliferation, terrorism, and the “protracted conflict” in Nagorno-Karabakh. Among these approved decisions was also one on countering transnational threats jointly sponsored by the United States and Russia, the first such collaboration between the two nations in several years. Russia also distributed a draft European Security Treaty on the eve of the Ministerial, though it did so bilaterally and outside the official confines of the OSCE. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Lavrov seems to have expected that it would be discussed during the Ministerial Council. In the event, however, it was not. The participating States indicated instead a willingness to study and discuss the proposal within the Corfu Process. Some other significant decisions did not make it through either. Among them, for the eighth year in a row, was the overall political declaration. It failed to achieve consensus mainly because of disagreements between the NATO allies and the Russian Federation over language on the CFE. When the imminent demise of the political declaration became apparent, attempts immediately began to find a place for the paragraph it had contained on a summit in 2010, the highest priority for the incoming OSCE Chair, Kazakhstan. In the end this paragraph, in slightly modified form, wound up in the Corfu Process declaration, with language personally hammered out by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, who led the U.S. delegation, with Kazakh Foreign Minister Saudabayev. In the final minutes of the meeting, Uzbekistan demanded that the phrase “We note positively” revert to the original “We note with interest,” but otherwise allowed the rest of the revised and more forward-leaning language on the summit to go through. Earlier the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, in his remarks to the Ministerial Council, had argued strongly for a summit. Deputy Secretary Steinberg’s enthusiasm was, despite his helpful intervention, reportedly more tempered. A decision on freedom of the media, a U.S. priority, was not adopted in the end either, owing to last-minute objections from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This decision had been the subject of much horse-trading, and the U.S. went into the final session believing it had a deal with the Russian Federation: In return for American assent to a decision on the 65th Anniversary of the Second World War, they would back the media decision, which was already at a state reduced enough to cause some anxiety among media freedom experts. In the end, however, the Russians could not persuade Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to go along. Turkmenistan argued that proper consultations had not been held with their delegation to enlist their support. Even so, the U.S. lifted its blockage of the World War II decision, which was, in essence, a response to the resolution approved during the 2009 annual Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Vilnius referencing Nazism and communism and was an important priority for the Russian delegation. Attempts to issue statements or decisions on Moldova and Georgia also foundered, though the ministers at least managed a declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh, one hammered out by the Minsk Group. Another decision on trafficking in human beings also failed to achieve consensus. Russia, along with its allies, had also pressed hard for a decision to reopen the Vienna Document of 1999 for “updating”, but it failed in the face of opposition from western allies. A draft decision on climate change also failed, largely because of Russian opposition, as did a decision on democratic lawmaking, in which the Parliamentary Assembly had pressed for reference to the institutions to be consulted in developing a best practice guide. Other draft decisions such as one on the greening of the OSCE were referred to the Permanent Council for action It remains to be seen whether they will fare any better in that venue in 2010.
Corruption: A Problem that Spans the OSCE Region and DimensionsWednesday, December 30, 2009
By Troy C. Ware, with contributions from Shelly Han In July 2008, Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission) and other Members of Congress traveled to Astana, Kazakhstan for the seventeenth Annual Session of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). The session’s theme was “Transparency in the OSCE.” At the outset of the trip, Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, then Chairman of the Commission, remarked that while he supported the candidacy of Kazakhstan for the Chairmanship of the OSCE it was “imperative that the government undertake concrete reforms on human rights and democratization.”1 A number of nongovernmental organizations have cited the high level of corruption in Kazakhstan as one impediment to democratic reform. Kazakhstan is by no means alone. Recognizing the existence of corruption throughout the OSCE region, Helsinki Commissioners have consistently addressed the problem by raising it through hearings, legislation, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Hearings in 2006 identified corruption as a hindrance to fulfilling human rights commitments and economic development in South-Central Europe (Helsinki Commission June 2006 Hearing). The role of corruption as a force in restricting freedom of the media in Azerbaijan was highlighted in a 2007 hearing (Helsinki Commission August 2007 Hearing). This report will draw attention to recent initiatives undertaken by the Helsinki Commission that have shown corruption undermines human rights, fundamental freedoms and overall security. Wherever found, corruption not only stunts democratic reform, but also weakens the security and economic condition of states. Although corruption manifests itself in various ways, this report can practically only discuss a few. For example, prominent manifestations within the three OSCE dimensions discussed include parliamentary corruption, diversion of funding from infrastructure and human trafficking. Understandably, countries will not solve a widespread and pervasive problem with a singular approach. Additionally, this report will discuss the importance of capacity building initiatives that focus on prevention as a critical element in an anti-corruption campaign. This is an element that must be included alongside the high profile anti-corruption prosecutions governments may be inclined to conduct. A number of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations produce regular surveys or reports on corruption. The 2008 survey of corruption by Transparency International (TI), an international nongovernmental organization that promotes anti-corruption policies worldwide, ranked twelve OSCE participating States in the bottom half of 180 countries surveyed. The least corrupt countries were assigned the highest ranking. Kazakhstan ranked 145, which was still ahead of the OSCE countries of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.2 Experts point out that since TI uses a survey, its findings may lag behind reality, reflecting only perceptions based on increased reporting resulting from government enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Others point out that surveys place too much emphasis on bribery although forms of corruption vary greatly from country to country.3 Nonetheless, other barometers, such as evaluations of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), which measures anti-corruption policy reform and capacity through a multi-year expert evaluation process, suggest that some OSCE participating States are only partially implementing standards set by the group. Corruption, which was explicitly highlighted in the Parliamentary Assembly’s concluding document, the Astana Declaration,4 is a multidimensional blight that undermines human, economic, environmental, and security dimension policy goals throughout the OSCE region. Human Dimension Genuine democracy and rule of law cannot exist if the passage, implementation and judgment of the law favor the highest bidder. Moreover, the rule of law requires more than elections and a neutral and impartial judiciary; it requires that individuals receive the unbiased and dispassionate benefits of the law from all public servants. Larry Diamond wrote in the March/April 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs that, “[f]or a country to be a democracy, it must have more than regular, multiparty elections under a civilian constitutional order.” He points out that when regular elections are accompanied by corrupt police and bureaucracies, many people are “citizens only in name” and in their disillusionment gravitate toward authoritarian leadership.5 Observers frequently focus attention on removing graft from courts and elections. However, corruption in other spheres of society, such as among lower level public servants, contributes to the notion of corruption as an acceptable behavior often having the most immediate adverse effect on the average person. Government employees of modest rank are capable of denying basic fundamental freedoms such as equal protection of the law, enjoyment of property, the right of minorities to exercise human rights and freedoms, and the independence of legal practitioners.6 Those who advocate for the victims of corruption, even within the judicial systems, often cannot do so without repercussions. Furthermore, when parliaments become sanctuaries for persons engaged in corruption the protection conveys a message that corruption will be tolerated elsewhere in society. Parliamentary Immunity In a 2006 brief, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) defined parliamentary immunity as “a system in which members of a legislature are granted partial immunity from prosecution from civil and/or criminal offenses.” USAID further states that parliamentary immunity’s purpose is to “reduce the possibility of pressuring a member to change his or her official behavior [with] the threat of prosecution.”7 Unrestrained parliamentary immunity impedes the investigation and prosecution of corruption, makes parliamentary acquiescence and perpetuation of corruption possible, fosters a culture of corruption among other government officials and security officials, and disproportionately affects minority populations. According to Development Alternative Incorporated (DAI), a development consulting company, developing democracies tend to favor the broadest scope of immunity which allows corrupt activities almost with impunity. Although rare, a parliament may vote to lift immunity from one of its members, as was the case in Armenia in 2006 when immunity was removed for a parliament member who allegedly failed to pay taxes and instigated a gun fight.8 While parliamentary immunity can protect the independence of legislatures, frequently it is a shield for illicit activity. A 2007 USAID report, Corruption Assessment: Ukraine, found that “legislators have amassed fortunes through business interests and other means . . . with little transparency or accountability.” Moreover the report found that broad immunity created a powerful incentive to seek public office and introduced “illicit funding” into the political process.9 Even if prosecuting agencies investigate the activities of legislators, the individuals are rarely prosecuted because the parliament will not lift immunity. ArmeniaNow, an NGO publication, found that in the first fifteen years of Armenian independence, immunity was waived in only five instances.10 Although democratic attributes exist ostensibly in most OSCE participating States, features such as elections may ironically serve to conceal the self-serving rule that results from corruption. Parliamentary corruption can lead to a cycle in which the parliament cannot effectively exercise an oversight role because its members have a personal stake in the illicit activity. The Bulgarian parliament’s resistance to closing duty-free vendors along its borders is an example of the controlling power of corruption according to Bulgaria’s Center for the Study of Democracy. Since 1992, duty-free fuel, cigarette and alcohol vendors have operated at Bulgaria’s borders.11 These operations, allegedly tied to organized crime, deprived the state of significant tax revenue and could undercut prices of competitors subject to duties. As a condition of joining the European Union, Bulgaria was required to raise excise duties up to a standard set by the EU. Furthermore, in 2003 the Minister of Finance signed a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund to close all duty-free shops.12 In response to the increased tax, the illegal trade in duty-free goods increased. In 2004, the Finance Minister extended a license for the shops to continue until 2009 despite international commitments to the contrary. In 2006, the Bulgarian Parliament, instead of closing the shops, passed a law that allowed the shops to shift to the non-EU borders with Serbia, Turkey, and Macedonia.13 Finally, in early 2008, the Parliament passed a law to close the duty-free shops.14 Previously, the Center for the Study of Democracy asserted that “national level illegal proceeds from duty-free trade [had] been deployed to capture the state” and the vendors had used “political corruption to secure perpetual monopoly business positions.”15 Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Benjamin L. Cardin has raised the issue of unbridled parliamentary immunity on many occasions. In a hearing in June 2006 on Human Rights, Democracy, and Integration in South Central Europe, Senator Cardin made a commitment to push the Parliamentary Assembly to adopt initiatives calling for changes to parliamentary immunity laws. At the July 2006 OSCE Annual Session Cardin authored a resolution on parliamentary immunity, which passed, urging the OSCE participating States to “[p]rovide clear, balanced, transparent, and enforceable procedures for waiving parliamentary immunities in cases of criminal acts or ethical violations.” In 2007, Cardin raised the issue of how parliamentary immunity can serve as cover for corruption in a Helsinki Commission hearing on Energy and Democracy (Helsinki Commission July 2007 Hearing). He has also urged nations such as Ukraine to consider changing their parliamentary immunity laws.16 Petty Corruption Like water flowing downhill, if corruption exists at the higher levels of government and society, it will permeate the performance of public servants at every level. During a 2008 Helsinki Commission hearing on Kazakhstan’s accession to the OSCE Chairmanship, Martha Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace identified corruption that is “rampant in daily life” in Kazakhstan and present at all levels of government (Helsinki Commission July 2008 Hearing).17 Endemic corruption within the government bureaucracy has an immediate effect in terms of confidence in government and cost to the people of any country. A 2009 report stated that among European Union countries, 17 percent of Greeks and thirty percent of Lithuanians had admitted to paying a bribe to obtain service from a public administrative body.18 In many countries, widespread corruption has led to a level of acceptance. GfK Research, an international marketing and research company, conducted a study in 2006 which reported that 61 percent of Romanians, 58 percent of Bosnians, and 56 percent of Czechs regarded bribes as a normal part of life.19 Frequently, national health care service is provided only to those willing to pay extra to medical personnel. In Romania, $225 paid by Alina Lungu to her doctor was apparently not enough to prevent him from leaving the pregnant women alone for an hour during labor and her baby from being born blind, deaf, and with brain damage due to the umbilical cord being wrapped around him.20 Global Integrity, a nonprofit organization that monitors governance and corruption worldwide, provides an account of a Latvian girl experiencing stomach pain who was allowed to sit in a hospital for several days without pain-killers or treatment until her father paid money to the doctor.21 A survey in Bulgaria showed that the amount of Bulgarians identifying the health sector as the most corrupt in comparison to others such as customs, police, and judiciary increased from 20 percent in 2002 to 39 percent in 2007.22 According to 2007 reporting, Bulgarians experienced corruption in almost every type of health service including referrals, surgery, birth delivery, and emergency care. The problem is very widespread in hospital care.23 Some conclude that health workers take extra payments from patients for services already covered by health insurance and administrators overstate costs in hospital care due to insufficient hospital financing and financing regulations that encourage overspending.24 fficials regularly abuse their authority in the enforcement of traffic laws and in the area of travel. Vladimir Voinovich, a prominent Russian author, points out that to become a public official or policeman you must pay off your boss and that payment is financed through taking bribes.25 Even when officials wish to behave honestly, providing “a stream of payments to patrons” becomes a matter of survival.26 In Uzbekistan, permission from the local government is required to move to another city and according to the 2008 Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in Uzbekistan, local authorities commonly issue the required documents only in return for a bribe. The report also states that police “arbitrarily detained people to extort bribes” on a regular basis.27 The 2008 report on Human Rights Practices in Azerbaijan noted that police officers regularly impose arbitrary fines on citizens and seek protection money.28 The report on Poland recognized that corruption among police was widespread.29 In many countries, drinking and driving has become commonplace because police can be bribed to look the other way. The Effect of Corruption on Minorities More often than not, police corruption disproportionally affects minority groups. In a Helsinki Commission briefing in 2004, Leonid Raihman of the Open Society Institute described the plight of Roma in Russia who are trapped in a cycle of poverty exacerbated by bribes extracted by the Russian police (Helsinki Commission September 2004 Briefing). Often detained on charges of not possessing proper personal documents or a false accusation of committing a crime, Roma will hire an attorney whose sole function is to negotiate the price of the bribe for their release. According to Raihman, the situation is analogous to that of a hostage whose freedom is being negotiated. This can sometimes lead to families selling their car, life savings or home. He noted that the worst case scenario results in homelessness.30 Regulations that require people to register their official place of residence or obtain an internal passport provide fertile soil for minority exploitation through corruption. According to the 2007 Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in Russia, “darker skinned persons from the Caucasus or Central Asia” were regularly singled out to see if they possessed an internal passport and had registered with local authorities.31 Typically, if allowed to register, a person must pay a bribe. Retaliation against Lawyers The legal profession, in addition to an independent judiciary, is an essential part of a functioning democracy. Still, government officials have used retaliatory criminal prosecution and coercive measures to discourage lawyers from representing clients in cases that expose corruption. An example from Russia is that of the attorneys representing Hermitage Capital and its executives.32 Lawyers from four independent law firms representing Hermitage have apparently been subject to unlawful office searches, illegal summonses demanding that they testify as witnesses in the same cases where they are representing clients, and that they falsify testimony against clients. Lawyers who failed to comply were subjected to criminal charges. Several of the lawyers have fled Russia.33 Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer with Firestone Duncan, a firm which represented Hermitage Capital, was arrested in November 2008 in connection with his investigation of government corruption. Magnitsky died in custody this November in a case that highlighted the difficulty of standing up to corruption and poor Russian prison conditions. As the dismissal of the head of the tax agency which Magnitsky was investigating suggests, the death is still reverberating at the Kremlin.34 However, it remains to be seen if long-term actions to protect lawyers exposing corruption will be undertaken. Persons familiar with the Russian legal system say little importance is placed on the attorney-client privilege.35 Allegedly, companies like the 2X2 television network, charged with committing crimes against the state by broadcasting content including the Simpsons and South Park encounter difficulties finding legal representation.36 Government attacks on lawyers and their clients who expose corruption represent a serious threat to the rule of law. When lawyers are intimidated and afraid to represent clients, citizens are defenseless against corruption. A primary reason for this is that courts present many complexities that non-attorneys may find difficult to overcome. The U. S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama explained the challenge faced by a non-attorney representing himself in saying that the non-attorney often cannot recognize if the “indictment is good or bad,” is “unfamiliar with the rules of evidence,” and “lacks the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense.”37 It is imperative that lawyers are protected from government interference and political persecution so that they may effectively represent and protect their clients’ interests. The Economic Dimension Studies suggest corruption retards economic development and generally results in a lower standard of living. The OSCE Best-Practice Guide for a Positive Business and Investment Climate, asserts that “corruption is clearly a major indicator of the health of a business and investment climate” and that the “wealthiest OSCE countries are generally the countries judged to be least corrupt by international observers.”38 Corruption adversely affects economic growth by slowing infrastructure development, increasing costs for businesses, and preventing competitive business outcomes. Moreover, the responsibility of wealthier OSCE participating States cannot be disregarded. Multinational corporations from developed nations, largely through acquiescent behavior, may promote corruption in countries where it is most prevalent. Cost to Business and the Overall Economy Bribes pose a significant cost for businesses in many OSCE countries. The Best Practice Guide notes that in former Soviet countries a higher percentage of business revenue is dedicated to paying bribes than in Western Europe.39 The guide reported that in some countries businesses pay up to four percent of their total costs in bribes.40 Whether through customs, licenses, or permits, the opportunity for graft exists where there are excessive bureaucracies or regulations. The CATO Institute’s report, The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe, identifies building permits as “an especially attractive source of extra income.”41 According to a World Bank report, building a general storage two-story warehouse in Moscow requires 54 procedures and 704 days.42 This interaction with numerous agencies and government officials increases the opportunity for bribes. Bribes ultimately distort market outcomes because the most competitive companies are not rewarded for their efforts and therefore some companies choose not to compete at all. For example, government contracting is one area where bribes undermine competition and the public good. J. Welby Leaman, an advisor to the U.S. Treasury Department wrote in the Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal, “public officials’ solicitation of their ‘cut’ impoverish government programs.”43 The CATO Institute report cites the case of Dell Corporation losing a computer contract with the Czech parliament. Dell’s bid reportedly met all technical specifications, was the lowest cost and offered to pay a penalty fee for late delivery. Nonetheless, the contract was awarded to a Czech firm that asked for twice as much as Dell.44 Leaman also notes that if a firm cannot pass on a bribe’s cost to the customer, that firm may choose not to compete, which robs the economy of “additional investment and competition.”45 Diversion of Wealth from Natural Resources While a number of OSCE participating States are fortunate to possess large reserves of oil and natural gas, in many instances the wealth produced by these resources does not benefit the citizens of the states, but only the few who control the resources. The Helsinki Commission held hearings in 2007 spotlighting this misappropriation and betrayal of public trust. Simon Taylor of Global Witness identified the problem’s crux in many countries noting that in Turkmenistan, a country of approximately five million people, “ percent of [the] population lives below the poverty line despite two billion dollars in annual gas revenues.”46 Remarkably, in Kazakhstan, the economy grew only 0.3 percent between 2000 and 2005 despite its exportation of 1.2 million barrels of oil a day. Taylor also framed the diversion of profits for personal use as a matter of energy security resulting in unreliable supply and higher prices (Helsinki Commission July 2007 Hearing).47 Following the hearings, then-Commission Chairman Alcee L. Hastings introduced an amendment to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (H.R. 3221), which became law, making it U.S. policy to support the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and for the U.S. Secretary of State to report annually on U.S. efforts to promote transparency in extractive industry payments.48 The 2009 report notes United States contributions to the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund, senior level State Department encouragement to developing economies to join EITI, embassy officer engagement with government officials in developing economies, and U.S. Treasury Department collaboration with development banks.49 In 2008, then-Co-Chairman Cardin sponsored an amendment to the Statement of the July 2008 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session that among other things, “encourages governments from oil and gas producing countries to introduce regulations that require all companies operating in their territories to make public information relevant to revenue transparency.” The amendment was approved by the OSCE parliamentarians and adopted as part of the Astana Declaration.50 If the economies of oil and natural gas rich OSCE participating States are to reach their full potential, transparency and accountability must exist between extractive industries and national government. Infrastructure In addition to the price of bribes, a business is disadvantaged to compete in a market with less infrastructure due to corruption. Ukraine exemplifies an OSCE country that stands to gain from economic growth if road projects are funded, efficient and transparent. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness report on Ukraine notes that the poor state of Ukraine’s roads is hindered by road construction processes that provide many opportunities for corruption.51 This situation impedes not only new road construction, but also repair of existing roads and bridge construction. The State Motor Road Service of Ukraine reported that Ukraine loses the equivalent of one billion U.S. dollars annually due to poor road conditions.52 While new road projects are underway, including a new ring road around Kyiv, current legislation does not allow for a competitive private bidding process, without which the road system will continue to rank 120th out of 134 countries ranked by the World Economic Forum in quality of roads. Ukraine is not alone, Moldova ranked 133rd out of 134 countries.53 Not surprisingly, business leaders in Moldova ranked corruption as the second most problematic business obstacle in that country behind access to financing.54 Fraudulent Appropriation of Private Property A pattern of takeovers of private companies and the government-directed persecution of their executives and lawyers is reportedly becoming the norm in Russia. A prime example was the illegal takeover of companies belonging to the Hermitage Fund, a joint venture between Hermitage Capital Management and HSBC Bank. The takeover was allegedly achieved through brazen abuses of power by law enforcement authorities and interference by government officials with Russian courts. William Browder, the founder of Hermitage, and Jamison Firestone, his attorney, recently met with Helsinki Commission staff to discuss their case. Browder’s visa was revoked in 2005 for what he believes was his work in exposing corruption in state controlled companies with close links to the Kremlin. He then appealed to high-level Russian officials, Browder said, including an impromptu conversation with then-First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the Davos annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. After these appeals, Browder alleges he received a phone call from a senior law enforcement officer apparently offering to restore his visa for a price. When this offer was rejected, the Russian Interior Ministry raided the offices of Hermitage and Firestone (see Human Dimension – Retaliation against Lawyers). Corporate seals, charters, and certificates of registration for the Hermitage Fund companies as well as documents belonging to numerous other clients were confiscated during the raids. Following the raids, the corporate documents taken by the Interior Ministry in the office raids were used to wipe HSBC off the share registry of the Hermitage Fund companies. The same documents were used to forge back dated contracts and to file lawsuits against the Hermitage companies alleging significant liabilities. Although Hermitage and HSBC were not aware of these cases, various judges awarded $973 million in damages in legal proceedings that were concluded in a matter of minutes. These same fraudulent liabilities were used by the perpetrators to seek a retroactive tax refund of $230 million in profit taxes that Hermitage had paid to the Russian government in 2006. At the time of the refund, HSBC and Hermitage had already filed six criminal complaints with the heads of Russian law enforcement authorities documenting the involvement of senior government officials in this fraud. Despite these detailed complaints, the fraudulent tax refund was promptly approved and paid to the perpetrators in a matter of days in sharp contrast to the lengthy process normally associated with such a refund. In response to the complaints Russian authorities created an investigative committee staffed by the very officials implicated in the complaints. Moreover, a number of spurious retaliatory criminal cases have been lodged against Browder, his colleagues, and four lawyers from four separate law firms. In the meantime, Mr. Browder and a senior colleague, Ivan Cherkasov, have been placed on the Russian Federal Search List and face the possibility of becoming the subjects of an Interpol Red Notice. Because of the coordinated nature of actions taken by state officials in this scheme together with the official reaction to the Hermitage complaints, Browder suspects high level political interference.55 A country where property can be seized without due process is one where investment is likely to be depressed for fear of arbitrary loss. Regulation of Multinationals While the OSCE participating States of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union often receive the most criticism for failing to curtail corruption, West European countries also face problems with corruption. One notable case is the recent investigation of defense contractor BAE Systems, a British firm, for alleged bribery in arms sales to Saudi Arabia and separate probes into wrongdoing in arms transactions with Chile, the Czech Republic, Romania, South Africa, Tanzania, and Qatar. The British newspaper, The Telegraph, reported that an alleged six billion pounds (approximately nine billion dollars) were paid to various Saudi officials. Citing a threat to cease intelligence sharing by Saudi Arabia, the British government terminated the investigation.56 In response to the termination of the investigation, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), issued a report criticizing the British government for not considering alternatives to discontinuing the investigation. Moreover, the report criticized the U.K. for not enacting legislation to meet the country’s obligation under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.57 While other companies are under investigation, and some like Siemens A.G. have paid record-setting fines, the case of BAE systems stands out because of the record of the U.K. in holding its multinationals to account for overseas bribery. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 2006, Ben Heinemann and Fritz Heimann argue that an area of “emphasis must be the implementation of enforcement and prevention measures by developed nations, where bribery of foreign officials can be more readily exposed and prosecuted.” Unfortunately, their article points out that as of 2006, only France, South Korea, Spain and the United States have brought more than one prosecution.58 In July 2008, the House of Lords upheld the decision of the British government to end the investigation of BAE systems and the government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown has taken no steps to reopen the case. It should be noted that under the pioneer Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which predates the OECD Convention, the United States has steadily increased investigations and prosecutions.59 The FCPA has three major provisions. Its best known provision prohibits U.S. Corporations and individuals from using an instrumentality of interstate commerce to bribe a foreign official, political party or candidate.60The two other primary provisions require corporations to maintain records which accurately reflect transactions and to maintain “internal accounting controls” to provide assurance transactions61 are executed with management’s authorization.62 Observers note that U.S. courts are limiting exceptions to the law and extending its scope while the Department of Justice is joining FCPA charges with charges under other federal laws.63 Reportedly, as of May 2009, the Department of Justice was pursuing 120 investigations of possible FCPA violations.64Recent prosecutions have resulted in favorable court decisions for authorities. In 2004, in a broad interpretation of the law’s application, a Fifth Circuit Court ruling rejected the claim that Congress meant to limit the FCPA only to bribes relating to contracts. The court held that the legislative history implies that the law applies broadly even to payments that indirectly assist in obtaining or retaining business.65 A recent lower court narrowed an exception for lawful payments under the laws of the foreign country. In a situation where a person was relieved of liability after reporting the bribe, the court wrote there “is no immunity from prosecution under the FCPA . . . because a provision in the foreign law “relieves” a person of criminal responsibility.”66 The aggressive enforcement environment and the government’s willingness to consider company-implemented compliance programs in deciding whether to prosecute has a positive consequence of incentivizing other companies to establish such programs. What remains to be seen is to what extent nations with mature economies will hold multinational corporations to account during times of economic hardship. Although only a handful of countries have brought prosecutions, it should be noted that many investigations result in settlements which require fines. In the case of Siemens A.G., the company settled to pay more than $1.6 billion in fines to both German and U.S. authorities.67 If mature economies do not hold multinational corporations accountable, they are in effect promoting corrupt behavior and being duplicitous in criticizing corrupt practices elsewhere. The Security Dimension One account from the book The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade is the story of Stefa from Moldova who traveled to Romania looking for work. Stefa met a man who introduced himself as an agent marketing positions as maids. Regrettably, nothing could have been further from the truth. This man placed Stefa and other girls in a crowded apartment where they were paraded naked and auctioned like cattle. Natasha was eventually sold and smuggled to Italy where she was sexually assaulted and forced to work as a prostitute.68 Stefa’s story is a common one that is usually facilitated by corruption. Heinemann and Heimann write “one ignores corrupt states that are failed or failing at one’s peril, because they are incubators of terrorism, the narcotics trade, money laundering, human trafficking, and other global crime.”69 In addition to these illicit activities, many recent reports tie corruption to the proliferation of small arms trafficking and sales. Terrorism Many observers believe that terrorists appear to have taken advantage of corruption to conduct attacks. It was reported that one of two female suicide bombers from Chechnya who brought down two Russian passenger aircrafts in August 2004 paid a $34 bribe to board a plane for which she did not have a ticket. Shortly after, flight 1047 and another flight boarded by the second suicide bomber, flight 1303, blew up in mid-air after departing Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport. Prominent Russian author Vladimir Voinovich, wrote on the Pakistani online newspaper The Daily Times that the terrorists who took control of the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow in 2002 were reportedly stopped fifty times by authorities while traveling to Moscow, but solely for the purpose of soliciting a bribe.70 An article inCrime & Justice International alleged that officials identified 100 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) police personnel who were complicit in the travel of the Chechen fighters to Moscow.71 Corruption facilitates terrorism by decreasing border security and increasing money laundering. Kimberley Thachuk writes in the SAIS Review that “[c]riminal and terrorist groups depend on unimpeded cross-border movements, and so border guards, customs officers, and immigration personnel are notable targets of corruption.”72 In the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, corruption among border guards was identified as a risk in the OSCE region, particularly Albania, Armenia, Kosovo, and Moldova.73 The targeting of border guards by criminal elements extends even to the United States. Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reestablished its internal affairs unit amid increased corruption investigations. It had been disbanded in 2003. In the spring of 2008, there were 200 open cases against U.S. law enforcement officers on the border. This corruption has involved smuggling of guns, drugs, and people.74 Corruption ultimately undermines the effectiveness of security forces to fight terrorism. Kimberly Thachuk notes that “such corruption spreads, as does an attendant loss of morale and respect for the command structure.”75 This deterioration in professionalism and morale could not come at a worse time. A July 2008 article in Forbes magazine on European crime claimed a 24 percent increase in terrorist attacks from 2006 to 2007.76 Arms Sales As evidenced by prior testimony before the Helsinki Commission, corruption is a factor in many illicit arms sales worldwide. In June 2003, Roman Kupchinsky, then a Senior Analyst with Crime and Corruption Watch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, pointed out that sales from former Soviet states frequently involve a marriage of security forces and organized crime (Helsinki Commission June 2003 Hearing).77 This means individuals, not the government, are making the sales. Moreover, although OSCE participating States have agreed through the Forum for Security Cooperation to not issue export licenses for arms without an authenticated end-user certificate, these certificates are often forged. Accordingly, the buyer may not be the actual recipient of the weapons. United Nations arms embargoes notwithstanding, individuals and companies from numerous countries are involved in the manufacture, transit, diversion from legal use, and fraudulent company registration for illicit arms trafficking to countries or non-state actor groups under embargo according to Control Arms, a group of concerned non-governmental organizations. The list of countries included Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.78 These illegal sales, which fuel conflict in the developing world, are estimated to be worth one billion dollars a year according to Rachel Stohl, an analyst at the World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information. She noted in an article published for the SAIS Review that “[a]rms brokers are able to operate because they can circumvent national arms controls and international embargoes” frequently through corrupt practices.79 Human Trafficking The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by [involuntary means] for the purpose of exploitation.”80 Victor Malarek, author of The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade, makes clear that corruption is the lynchpin of the trade in women and girls. Even when countries enact laws and policies to prevent trafficking, corruption threatens to render them ineffective. Mohamed Mattar writes in the Loyola and Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review that there are indications that exit requirements such as exit visas for trafficked victims are being obtained through bribes.81 Furthermore, Malarek asserts that besides former Soviet states corruption also exists in destination countries in which officials are complicit in allowing the illicit trade. Specifically, the book draws attention to corruption among border guards and police in Greece that enables the trafficking.82 Human trafficking for sexual and labor exploitation has wreaked havoc on Moldova. Moldova is an extremely susceptible source country because of poverty and associated corruption. The breadth of the problem is detailed in an article by William Finnegan in the May 2008 issue of The New Yorker. In large measure due to its economic plight, over 25 percent of Moldova’s workforce has migrated out of the country. A third of all children are missing a parent due to migration. Much of the population views emigration as the only hope to living a better life. Such conditions create a setting abundant with potential victims for traffickers. Finnegan asserts local authorities are generally not helpful unless you are a trafficker. He quotes a local prosecutor as saying “[t]he most powerful pimps in Moldova are all former cops.”83 In 2008 the U.S. Department of State initially ranked Moldova as a Tier 3 country meaning that it had failed to comply with minimum standards and failed to make significant efforts to eliminate human trafficking as outlined in U.S. law.84 In October 2008, the President upgraded Moldova to Tier 2 status because it had reopened investigations into official complicity and drafted a code of conduct for public officials.85 Although less reporting occurs on the breakaway republic of Transnistria than Moldova, the situation there appears alarming. Finnegan discovered that law enforcement officials are uncooperative with NGOs working on behalf of trafficked victims and corruption deters relatives of trafficked victims from contacting the police.86 Finnegan’s article makes clear that destination countries share a significant responsibility for human trafficking.87 Whether through deliberate corruption or turning a blind eye, doctors, police, border guards, accountants, lawyers, travel agencies or hotels in destination countries enable trafficking and exacerbate the problem in source countries. Every Western European country and the United States and Canada are destinations for trafficked persons. In its report, the Department of State claims that more than half of commercial sex workers in France were trafficking victims. The Department also recognizes Turkey as a significant destination country. Trafficked women and girls from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan find themselves in Turkey. The report notes that many police in Turkey are complicit in trafficking. The United States is not immune, the recent increase in corruption investigations against Customs and Border Protection officers are in part for taking bribes to allow the passage of human beings.88 OSCE Field Missions and Prevention Efforts89 While it is necessary to sound the alarm and call attention to corruption’s presence across the three OSCE dimensions, it is equally necessary to assess OSCE and non-OSCE efforts in the region to counter corruption. The last two decades have seen a consensus at the international level concerning norms and necessary anti-corruption action at the national level. This consensus is manifested in the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Despite international achievements, some would say that national level progress in decreasing corruption is at a standstill or being rolled back in some OSCE participating States. Broadly conceived, implementation is stalling. To understand why it is helpful to think of implementation occurring in two phases. The first phase consists of the passing of national laws implementing international commitments. The second phase, which is just as important, consists of institutions with independent and trained persons complying with and impartially executing the anti-corruption laws. This second phase has proven most problematic for many countries because the actions required to build capacity require a long term commitment and the dedication of resources and do not often attract media attention. Additionally, the notion that the nature of corruption differs from country to country should be embraced.90 The Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) leads OSCE efforts in combating corruption. Through field missions, handbooks, and coordination with other international organizations, the OCEEA has promoted implementation of international anti-corruption agreements, efficient management of public resources and implementation of the Arhus Convention allowing greater access to information on the environment. Work to implement the UNCAC has paid off, with only thirteen OSCE participating States not having ratified the convention; and of those thirteen, only six have not yet signed the convention. However, this underscores the reality that ratification does not equate to true implementation of and compliance with the convention. This report cites corrupt activities within many OSCE participating States that have ratified the convention. With respect to this corrupt activity, OSCE field missions can be effective institutions for promoting substantive compliance with the convention. An official with one international organization stressed that the hard part in decreasing corruption is the taking of preventative measures. OSCE field missions routinely undertake and promote some of these measures which include identifying and resolving conflicts, training government officials, and engaging civil society. OSCE field missions commonly provide anti-corruption assistance to local governments. However, in a manner befitting the nature of the problem, field missions conduct distinctive work appropriate to their assigned country. For example, in Georgia the mission assisted, before being closed down this year, in establishing an Inspector General’s office to review the finances of government ministries. Advocacy and legal advice centers are operated by the mission in Azerbaijan to provide legal advice on complaints and to educate the public and government authorities. In 2008, the centers in Azerbaijan provided assistance in response to 2,500 complaints. Additionally, mobile workshops reached 2,360 people with awareness campaigns and frequently provided on the spot legal advice.91 Similar centers provide aid in Armenia. The use of existing advocacy and legal advice centers is not high among people in Kazakhstan. This lower use may exemplify the benefit of an approach that carefully addresses the needs of people and nature of corruption in a given country. Centers that target audiences other than the general public have been successful. In Tajikistan, Resource Centers for Small and Agribusiness and Centers for Promotion of Cross-Border Trade reportedly draw many patrons. It has also been reported that due to these centers, businesspeople have resisted illegal government inspections. Good Governance Centers in Georgia that assisted municipalities received high marks, and in addition to the government, were sometimes used by the general public. Prevention efforts directed at government employees at all levels are essential. Second round GRECO evaluation reports released in 2007 and 2008 identified a number of countries - some with field missions, such as Azerbaijan, and others without, such as Greece - that had not taken appropriate steps to protect government employees who are whistleblowers. In the case of Greece, sufficient protections for career advancement were not in place and employees typically could only report corruption to their immediate supervisor.92 Because the follow-on Addendum to the Compliance Reports are not public, it is unclear if adequate protections and measures to assist reporting has improved. Education coupled with preventative programs that build upon training are initiatives that field missions are well suited to provide through the various types of centers. The OSCE mission in Ukraine has initiated a public-private dialogue that addresses accountability in local government. Fostering a dialogue between government, private sector, and civil society is important because in many countries these groups mistrust one another. In Georgia, the OSCE is supporting the efforts of Transparency International to ensure that a broad range of voices from civil society and the business community are heard by the Task Force on Fighting Corruption as it develops a new Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan. These initiatives recognize that not only will implementation vary from country to country, but that implementation measures will differ at different levels of government and require input from all facets of society. Field missions are conducting varying efforts to promote a similar dialogue between government and civil society in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Recent meetings between Helsinki Commission staff and members of civil society and officials from international organizations suggest it may be misguided to keep a primary focus on national level authorities prosecuting alleged corrupt acts. One NGO member recently remarked that there are enough national level laws and that what is needed is impartial enforcement and an unbiased judiciary. In Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National Integrity, Daniel Kaufmann referred to this as the “Tackling-the-symptom bias” which “instead of identifying the root cause, involves thinking that the solution is to catch and jail a target number of criminals . . . or to pass another anti-corruption law in the country.”93 Kaufmann describes what may be the best case scenario. The worst case scenario expressed by both members of the NGO community and international organizations to the Helsinki Commission is that prosecution is used to target political opposition and journalists. Amplifying the problem are enforcement agencies that may lack the capacity to conduct an even-handed investigation. An official from Bosnia-Herzegovnia recently said that the country “has adopted three strategic plans and ratified numerous international conventions on corruption,” but there is no implementation and the commitments go unmet.94 Public GRECO compliance reports from its second round of evaluations conclude that Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Romania have only partially implemented measures to fully train investigators, prosecutors and judges to handle corruption cases.95Again, because the follow-on addendum to the reports are not public it is unclear if training has improved in these participating States. In 2005, the President of Kyrgyzstan signed a decree establishing the National Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic for Preventing Corruption. Reportedly, in that first year, the agency opted not to put into practice a number of recommendations of an outside expert sponsored by an international organization to provide support. Later, the agency disagreed with international organizations on the use of funds offered by those organizations. Reportedly, $300,000 were made available for capacity building, but the leadership of the agency was adamant that the money be used to increase salaries. Today the agency has seven computers for 49 staff and no Internet access, Helsinki Commission staff was told. Concerns also exist that a strong parliamentary immunity is a necessity when many governments are focused on prosecution of political opponents. The NGO member added that this prosecution is often targeted at politicians in a minority party highlighting the continued need for parliamentary immunity laws even if they allow some offenders and wrongdoers to evade prosecution. This view of targeted prosecutions has been echoed by workers with international organizations that have communicated with the Helsinki Commission on this subject. With the above in mind, it should be noted that the resolution authored by Chairman Cardin, and adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly in 2006, incorporates preventative measures by calling for the publishing of “rigorous standards of ethics and official conduct” and establishing “efficient mechanisms for public disclosure of financial information and potential conflicts of interest.”96 The goals set out in that resolution constitute a starting point that must be reinforced with other measures that over time build a common ethos of public integrity and service throughout government. It should also be noted that the OSCE has worked in tandem with the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) in participating States such as Kyrgyzstan to train parliamentarians in roles of oversight and budget control. Finally, Chairman Cardin’s resolution recommending that the Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) develop best practices for parliamentarians to use echoed the 2005 OSCE PA’s Washington Declaration. That document praised the work of GOPAC and recommended that the OSCE “with other parliamentary associations and [GOPAC develop] a programme of peer support, education and anti-corruption initiatives.”97 The OSCE has also worked with GOPAC in running workshops and supporting local GOPAC chapters particularly in Southeast Europe. This is an effort that should receive continued support. The importance of capacity building within parliaments cannot be forgotten when confronting corruption. Conclusion: The Related Nature of Corruption Across the OSCE Dimensions No account of corruption in any dimension can be viewed in isolation. If corruption thwarts a competitive business environment or is endemic among public servants then the conditions are set for an underworld of crime to flourish. Once seedlings of graft take root, they grow rapidly. Soon the institutions of democracy that require the nutrients of transparency and accountability are choked by what people may have once considered the harmless taking of small amounts of money or property. In the aggregate, petty corruption emboldens grand corruption and vice versa. Eventually, a government cannot perform the basic tasks expected of it. It cannot defend individual rights enshrined in national law, protect the engagement of commerce, or provide for the security of its people. In many instances, elites restrict political access and limit economic competition. This is what Larry Diamond refers to as a “predatory state.” Moreover, Diamond asserts when people no longer advance “through productive activity and honest risk taking” but only through operating outside the law, the predatory state becomes a “predatory society.”98 While observers may disagree whether some OSCE participating States have reached such an extreme point, all states are always somewhere on the continuum between a functional electoral democracy and a predatory society. To combat corruption the OSCE, through existing field mission mandates, should continue to focus adequate attention to building capacity to identify and address corruption and promotion of a culture of integrity and anti-corruption among civil servants and civil society. All participating States should implement commitments under international treaties such as the UNCAC. However, ratifying the UNCAC and passing national laws targeting corruption is not enough. While prosecutions serve a deterrence function, they must be balanced by relatively low profile well-planned prevention programs that are sustained by sufficient resources. In order to identify and address the circumstances that foster corruption, collaboration must increase between governments, NGOs, corporations and small and medium size enterprises to develop specific strategies. OSCE countries should consider supporting neighbors by building upon the model of field missions. Corruption is a problem not likely to end soon, but is an area where progress may be made if small successes are reinforced with adequate resources. Work is needed to live up to the ideals recorded in the Parliamentary Assembly’s Astana Declaration and the earlier Istanbul Declaration of the 1999 OSCE Summit, in which OSCE participating States recognized corruption as a threat to “shared values” and pledged “to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and the conditions that foster it.” The OSCE countries need to muster the political will, individually and collectively, to conduct a smarter fight against corruption – a threat to security, property, and fundamental freedoms throughout the expansive OSCE region. Footnotes 1 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev Hints that Democratization will Take Back Seat on OSCE Agenda,” Eurasia Insight, July 9, 2008,http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070908.shtml (accessed June 1, 2009) 2 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index: Persistently high corruption in low-income countries amounts to an “ongoing humanitarian disaster” (Berlin: Transparency International, 2008). 3 Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge, 2005), 19-21. 4 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Astana Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Seventeenth Annual Session, 2008, 7, 28, and 45. 5 Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State,” Foreign Affairs87, no. 2 (2008): 39, and 42-44. 6 The participating States committed to support and advance these rights and freedoms, in addition to others, in the 1990 Copenhagen Document. “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,” June 29, 1990. 7 United States Agency for International Development, Parliamentary Immunity Brief: A Summary of Case Studies of Armenia, Ukraine and Guatemala, August 2006, 1-2. 8 Carmen Lane, Parliamentary Immunity and Democracy Development (Washington D.C.: DAI, 2007) 1-3. 9 United States Agency for International Development, Corruption Assessment Ukraine, Final Report February, 2006, 49 10 Gayane Mkrtchyan, “Not Above the Law?: Parliament Lifts Immunity, MP Hakobyan Must Face Prosecution,” ArmeniaNow.com, October 13, 2006, http://www.armenianow.com/?action=viewArticle&AID=1768 11 Center for the Study of Democracy, Effective Policies targeting the Corruption – Organized crime Nexus in Bulgaria: Closing Down Duty-Free Outlets, Brief, December 2007, 3. 12 Ibid., 5. 13 Ibid., 3. 14 Elena Koinova, “Changes to Duty-Free Trade Act passed in Parliament,” The Sofia Echo, March 28, 2008, http://sofiaecho.com/2008/03/21/659426_changes-to-duty-free-trade-act-passed-in-parliament 15 Center for the Study of Democracy, Effective Policies targeting the Corruption, 3. 16 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Energy and Democracy: Oil and Water?, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2007 (Prepared statement of Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, not unofficial transcript), https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/energy-and-democracy-oil-and-water (accessed June 22, 2009) 17 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Promises to Keep: Kazakhstan’s 2010 OSCE Chairmanship, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, (Prepared statement of Martha Olcott not unofficial transcript), https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/promises-keep-kazakhstan-s-2010-osce-chairmanship (accessed June 8, 2009). 18 Transparency International, 2009 Global Corruption Barometer Report, (Berlin: May, 2007) 32. 19 GfK Research, Corruption Climate in Europe, August 9, 2006, available athttp://www.gfk.hr/press1_en/corruption2.htm (accessed June 17, 2009). 20 Dan Bilefsky, “Medical Care in Romania Comes at an Extra Cost,” The New York Times, March 9, 2009. 21 Global Integrity, Global Integrity Scorecard: Latvia, 2007, 1-2. 22 Konstantin Pashev, Center for the Study of Democracy, Corruption in the Healthcare Sector in Bulgaria (Sofia, Bulgaria: 2007) 17. 23 Ibid, 17. 24 Ibid, 35. 25 Vladimir Voinovich, “Drunk on Corruption,” Daily Times, January 3, 2003,http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_3-1-2003_pg3_4 (accessed June 18, 2009). 26 Michael Johnston, “Poverty and Corruption,” Forbes, January 22, 2009. 27 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Uzbekistan, February 25, 2009,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119143.htm. 28 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Azerbaijan, February 25, 2009,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119068.htm. 29 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Poland, February 25, 2009,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119098.htm. 30 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Romani Minority in Russia, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, 8 (Prepared statement of Leonid Raihman found in official transcript). 31 U.S. Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia, March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100581.htm. 32 The account of how Hermitage Capital was seized corruptly through a series of non-transparent proceedings is told in the section addressing the Economic Dimension. 33 Jamison Firestone, conversation with Helsinki Commission staff, April 14, 2009. 34 Carl Mortished, “Kremlin sacking linked to Sergei Magnitsky case,” TimesOnline, December 16, 2009,http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article6957931.ece (accessed December 22, 2009). 35 Lynda Edwards, “Russia Claws at the Rule of Law,” ABA Journal 95 (2009): 41. 36 Ibid., 42. 37 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 38 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Best-Practice Guide for a Positive Business and Investment Climate, 2006, 30. 39 Ibid. 40 OSCE, Best-Practice Guide 30-31. 41 Marian L. Tupy, CATO Institute, The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe: Big Government, Corruption, and the Threat to Liberalism, November 8, 2006, 14. 42 The World Bank, Doing Business 2009: Country Profile for Russian Federation, 2008, 12. 43 J. Welby Leaman, “It’s Not Always Nice to Play Nice: Collusion, Competition, and Development,”Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal 20, no. 2 (2007): 291. 44 Tupy, Rise of Populist Parties, 9. 45 Leaman, “It’s Not Always Nice to Play Nice,” 291. 46 CSCE, Energy and Democracy, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2007 (Prepared statement of Simon Taylor not unofficial transcript) (accessed June 12, 2009). 47 Ibid. 48 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Public Law 110-140, 110th Cong., 1st sess. (December 19, 2007). 49 .S. Department of State, Report on Progress Made in Promoting Transparency in Extractive Industries Resource Payments, June 24, 2009. On file with United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 50 Parliamentary Assembly, Astana Declaration, 28. 51 Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz and Thierry Geiger, eds., World Economic Forum, The Ukraine Competitiveness Report: Towards Sustained Growth and Prosperity, 2008, 56. 52 Hanouz and Geiger, eds., The Ukraine Competitiveness Report, 56. 53 Michael Porter and Klaus Schwab eds., World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009, 385. 54 Ibid., 242. 55 William Browder, conversation with Helsinki Commission staff, April 14, 2009. William Browder did testify at a Helsinki Commission hearing just as this report was being completed in June 2009. During his testimony he provided a website (http://www.compromat.ru/main/vragi/raderykak.htm) that provided a price list for a range of activities attacking a corporate entity in Russia from erasing a company’s registration data to a complete takeover. 56 Jon Swaine, “BAE Systems executive ‘questioned over alleged bribery,’” The Telegraph, October 23, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/badot/3245563/BAE-Systems-executive-questioned-over-alleged-European-bribery.html (accessed June 15, 2009). 57 Organizations for Economic Co-operating and Development, United Kingdom: Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International business Transactions, October 17 2008, 4. 58 Ben W. Heineman, Jr., and Fritz Heimann, “The Long War Against Corruption,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (May/June 2006), 77, 82. 59 Control Risks, Corruption, Compliance and Change: Responding to Greater Scrutiny in Challenging Times (London: 2009) 3. 60 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1. 61 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 62 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 63 Gail P. Granoff and Brian Mich, 2008 FCPA Review, January 28, 2009 (Presentation at International Quality & Productivity Center FCPA Conference). 64 Dionne Searcey, “U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes,” The Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2009. 65 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004). 66 United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y 2008). 67 Cary O’Reilly and Karin Matussek, “Siemens to Pay $1.6 Billion to Settle Bribery Cases,” The Washington Post, December 16, 2008. 68 Victor Malarek, The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), 112-113. 69 Heineman and Heimann, “The Long War,” 79. 70 Voinovich, “Drunk on Corruption”. 71 Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Corruption, Crime and Murder Undermine Counter-terrorist Efforts,”Crime & Justice International 21, no. 87 (July/August 2005), 8. 72 Kimberly Thachuk, “Corruption and International Security,” SAIS Review XXV, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2005), 147. 73 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, Europe and Eurasia Overview, April 2009. 74 Randal Archibold and Andrew Becker, “Border Agents, Lured by the Other Side,” The New York Times, May 27, 2008. 75 Thachuk, “Corruption,” 147. 76 Parmy Olson, “Europe’s Crime Capitals,” Forbes, July 15, 2008,http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/15/europe-capitals-crime-forbeslife-cx_po_0715crime.html 77 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Arming Rogue Regimes: The Role of OSCE Participating States, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, 40 (Prepared statement of Roman Kupchinsky found in official transcript). 78 Control Arms, UN Arms Embargoes: An Overview of the Last Ten Years, Briefing Note, March 16, 2006, 2. 79 Rachel Stohl, “Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms,” SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 2005), 64. 80 “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,” Article 3 (a), United Nations, (2000). 81 Mohamed Y. Mattar, “State Responsibilities in Combating Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia,”Loyola and Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 27 (Spring 2005), 161 (see footnote 76). 82 Malarek, The Natashas, 140-141. 83 William Finnegan, “The Counter Traffickers: Rescuing Victims of the Global Sex Trade,” The New Yorker, 2, 6, 7-8, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/05/05/080505fa_fact_finnegan (accessed June 8, 2009). 84 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2008, 184. 85 U.S. Department of State Senior Coordinator for Public Outreach, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, email to author, December 10, 2008; Embassy of the United States, Moldova, “Moldova Moved up to Tier 2 in Trafficking in Persons,” press release, October 10, 2008,http://moldova.usembassy.gov/pr102908.html. 86 Finnegan, “The Counter Traffickers,” 10. 87 Ibid., 9, 11. 88 Rick Jervis, “Arrests of Border Agents on The Rise,” USA Today, April 23, 2009. 89 This section of report is based upon meetings and discussions with a variety of international governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations who to the extent possible are not identified. Any opinions expressed or conclusions drawn do not necessarily reflect the official views of any of these organizations. 90 Johnson, Syndromes of Corruption, 186. 91 Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, March 25, 2009, email to author providing numbers of complaints and people contacted. 92 Group of States against Corruption, Second Evaluation Round: Compliance Report on Greece, February 15, 2008, 9. 93 Daniel Kaufmann, “Anticorruption Strategies: Starting Afresh? Unconventional Lessons from Comparative Analysis,” in Curbing Corruption: Towards a Model for Building National Integrity, ed. Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundeh (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 1999), 37. 94 Miroslav Ajder, “Corruption Claims Hold Back Bosnia: Allegations of Fraud in Government Contracts and Privatization are Pitting the Government Against Monitors and Scaring off Foreign Investors,” BusinessWeek, March 17, 2009. 95 These compliance reports may be found at the GRECO web page,http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports(round2)_en.asp (accessed June 15, 2009). 96 Resolution on Limiting Immunity for Parliamentarians in order to Strengthen Good Governance, Public Integrity and Rule of Law in the OSCE Region, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 15th sess., Brussels Declaration (July 7, 2006). 97 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Washington, DC Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Fourteenth Annual Session, 2005, 35. 98 Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” 43.
Did the OSCE Actually Begin in 1724?Friday, December 18, 2009
By Douglas Davidson, Senior State Department Advisor “The OSCE’s founding father was born in 1724.” So stated Miklos Haraszti as he began a speech to a group of diplomats assembled in the Ratsaal of Vienna’s Hofburg conference center in late October. His opening sentence startled many of the dozy denizens of this room into something approaching wakefulness, for this was scarcely the usual thing said about an organization whose formal foundations were laid down barely thirty years ago in the Helsinki Final Act. Clearly, this was not going to be your typical diplomatic intervention. Mr. Haraszti, who is nearing the end of his distinguished tenure as the OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of the Media, was referring, to Immanuel Kant. His talk, however, was not about German philosophy. Instead he was tackling the topic of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its “Corfu Process.” How he intended to make the link between an 18th century man who never ventured more than a hundred kilometers from his home in Konigsberg and the world’s largest regional security organization was not immediately evident. Believe it or not, such a link exists. To find it, however, probably requires a brief explanation of the Corfu Process itself. Last June, meeting informally on the island of Corfu under the aegis of the Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE, the organization’s foreign ministers “agreed on the need for an open, sustained, wide-ranging and inclusive dialogue on security and concurred that the OSCE is a natural forum to anchor this dialogue, because it is the only regional Organization bringing together all States from Vancouver to Vladivostok on an equal basis.” This, in the manner of the OSCE, then led inevitably, and perhaps inexorably, to a “process,” which by the autumn of this year had taken the form of a weekly series of meetings devoted to discussing the different aspects of European security. These discussions then led to a declaration and a decision during the organization’s annual ministerial meeting in Athens on December 1 and 2 that among other things confirmed the intention of the organization’s participating States to continue these discussions and this process into 2010 and perhaps beyond. The Corfu Process, as this perhaps suggests, is nothing if not ambitious. In introducing the concept earlier this year, the then-Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis said, “The purpose of the meeting is to consider the future of European security. Through what we call the Corfu process, we will begin a dialogue that will enable us to build a more secure, more stable and stronger Europe.” Such a dialogue seems to enjoy support from many quarters, including the United States, if only as a means to revitalize the OSCE and its once-central role in European security. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Philip H. Gordon, told the Helsinki Commission in a recent hearing that, “The Corfu process inaugurated by the Greek OSCE chair in office to take a fresh look at the OSCE itself and European security more generally is at the center of the revitalization effort. We hope OSCE participating states will not only renew their commitment to the OSCE’s core values at Athens but also begin to chart its future in engaging new and old security challenges.” It is in fact precisely the OSCE’s core values and especially its comprehensive concept of European security that distinguish it from the myriad of other acronymical organizations that span the European continent. In practical terms, this concept means that the OSCE seeks to mesh the political-military, the economic and environmental, and the human aspects of security into a seamless whole. In recent years, however, some widening tears have begun to appear in that fragile fabric. Mr. Haraszti was speaking on a day devoted to “Common Challenges in the Human Dimension.” (The OSCE, whose parlance sometimes resembles that of science fiction, uses the term “dimension” to denote what at Helsinki were called, more humbly, “baskets.”) More specifically, the topics of the day were: “human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic institutions and the rule of law, and tolerance and non-discrimination.” These issues have not been subject to universal agreement in recent years. As Mr. Haraszti himself noted, a certain “disillusionment” with the OSCE’s human rights commitments has manifested itself in some of the organization’s participating States as time has passed. But, Mr. Haraszti argued, there is “no security without human rights.” He framed his argument and his intervention around Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace.” In this essay Kant puts forward three “Definitive Articles of Perpetual Peace,” the second of which states: “The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.” Kant then amplifies: “Every state, for the sake of its own security, may—and ought to—demand that its neighbor should submit itself to conditions similar to those of the civil society where the right of every individual is guaranteed.” The OSCE is thus the embodiment of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” It stands against the notion that human rights are purely internal matters. Instead, as Mr. Haraszti noted, with the OSCE basic human rights are both internalized and internationalized. Of course, as he also noted, a perpetual peace is not a perfect peace. We do not, after all, live in a friction-free world. But security grounded in Kant’s vision of a federation of free constitutional republics in which each individual enjoys the same rights as any other certainly seems a sound basis for a European peace that, if not perpetual, is at least likely to endure for a long time to come.
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Embassy Row: Swiss "Intolerance"Wednesday, December 02, 2009
The leaders of a congressional human rights panel criticized Swiss voters for approving a resolution to ban the further construction of mosque minarets and warned that the prohibition violates European religious freedom standards. "If this ban on religious expression is allowed to stand, Switzerland will clearly be out of step with its OSCE commitments of freedom of religion and belief," Rep. Alcee L. Hastings said this week, referring to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The 56-nation OSCE is a major human rights alliance throughout Europe and Eurasia. Mr. Hastings, Florida Democrat, is the co-chairman of the congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. "I hope the Swiss courts will overturn this referendum and that the Swiss government will double its efforts to implement anti-discrimination laws and have an open and honest dialogue about religious and ethnic tolerance," Mr. Hastings added. Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin, the commission chairman, expressed worries that the referendum will send the message that Swiss are an intolerant people. "The Swiss vote to ban minarets is worrying for a number of reasons, including the fact that the Swiss people have seen fit to limit the religious practice of one particular group," the Maryland Democrat said. "I trust the Swiss government will work swiftly to be sure that the Swiss are not viewed as an intolerant people." Swiss citizens endorsed the referendum Sunday with 57.5 percent of the vote. The referendum bans the further construction of minarets, the mosque towers used to broadcast daily calls to prayer, but it does not restrict the construction of further mosques. In Switzerland, Ulrich Schuler, the architect of the referendum endorsed by the Swiss People's Party, told reporters that the ban was necessary because minarets are symbols of radical Islamic demands to impose Muslim laws in the majority Christian country.
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Embassy Row: Wall FalloutFriday, November 06, 2009
A Democratic congressman this week used a celebration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall to criticize President Obama for failing to nominate a U.S. ambassador to a key European human rights panel. Rep. Alcee L. Hastings of Florida urged Mr. Obama to find time to fill the ambassadorship to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). "I'm disappointed that the administration has still not yet nominated an ambassador to one of the pre-eminent human rights organizations," said Mr. Hastings, co-chairman of the congressional version of the OSCE, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. "For a president who so strongly supports international engagement and reinvigorating multilateral institutions, I expected better." Mr. Hastings added that he hopes Mr. Obama will nominate an ambassador to the 56-nation OSCE before the end of the year. Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin, chairman of the congressional panel, called on the United States "to renew its commitment to human rights, not as a personal belief of any political leader or simply an administration policy but as a moral obligation of our country to uphold international law and universal principles." The Maryland Democrat joined other panel members, including the ranking Republican, Sen. Sam Brownback of Kansas, for the commemoration of the fall of the Wall at the Newseum, which displays the largest section of the Wall outside of Germany. Ambassadors Klaus Scharioth of Germany and Cosmin Vierita of Romania also attended the event, along with House Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer, Maryland Democrat, who chaired the congressional commission in 1989 when Germany tore down the Berlin Wall.
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U.S. Diplomats Rap Astana's Democratization PerformanceThursday, October 29, 2009
As Kazakhstan prepares to assume the chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, US diplomats are exerting pressure on Astana to enact promised reforms. Kazakhstan’s laws on media, elections and political parties continue to "fall short of OSCE standards," Philip Gordon, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, asserted in written testimony submitted for a hearing October 28 of the US Helsinki Commission. Gordon also pointed out in his testimony that "Kazakhstan has not held an election that the OSCE has deemed fully to have met OSCE commitments and international standards." Both Gordon and Michael Posner, the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, called attention to the case of Yevgeny Zhovtis, a human rights activist convicted in September for vehicular manslaughter. The trial was allegedly marred by procedural violations. Even so, a Kazakhstani judge rejected an appeal of the conviction. The US Helsinki Commission’s chair, Sen. Benjamin Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, said the Obama administration and the State Department has given short shrift to human rights, adding that the issue of the OSCE summit in Kazakhstan presented an opportunity for the United States to take a strong stand on human rights.
Advancing U.S. Interests in the OSCE RegionWednesday, October 28, 2009
The hearing examined U.S. policy toward the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the largest regional security organization in the world, ahead of a meeting of foreign ministers to be held in Athens in early December. Greece held the chairmanship of the 56-nation OSCE focused on enhancing security, promoting economic cooperation, and advancing democracy and human rights in 2009. Kazakhstan assumes the chairmanship in January, 2010. The Commission will examine timely issues, including: security arrangements in Europe, simmering tensions in the Caucasus region, relations with Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union, developments in the Balkans, OSCE engagement on Afghanistan and developments in Central Asia. The hearing will also assess ongoing efforts to combat anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance and backsliding on fundamental freedoms.
Promoting Tolerance and Understanding in the OSCE Region: The Role of the Personal RepresentativesWednesday, October 14, 2009
This hearing discussed the role of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Witnesses commended the CSCE on its role in furthering tolerance in OSCE member states, particularly its push for member states to face the issue of the rise of anti-Semitism, and its promotion of resolutions and organization of special presentations at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Meetings.
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Ukraine Lauded for Nixing Hotel Near Babi YarTuesday, October 06, 2009
Two U.S. lawmakers hailed Ukraine for halting the construction of a hotel near the site of a Nazi massacre. Sen. Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) and Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.) co-chair the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, an agency charged with monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other commitments. "The city authorities of Kiev deserve credit for their rapid response to concerns from human rights and Jewish groups on this issue," Cardin, who last visited the memorial park in 2007, said last week. "I applaud their swift action to overturn the city council's insensitive decision and respect the memory of the victims at Babi Yar." The hotel was to be built close to the site of Babi Yar, a ravine near Kiev, where more than 33,000 people were murdered over a two-day period from Sept. 29, 1941. Half were children. Cardin also commended Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko for his pledge "to protect as a sacred spot the site of the Nazi massacre." Between September 1941 and 1943, some 150,000 people were executed by Nazi troops in wooded areas on the outskirts of Kiev. Most were Jews, but the total also included ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, Poles and Roma, or gypsies.
U.S. Helsinki Commission Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner EngagementMonday, October 05, 2009
By Alex T. Johnson, Policy Advisor, U.S. Helsinki Commission Marlene Kaufmann, General Counsel, U.S. Helsinki Commission Troy C. Ware, Policy Advisor (CBCF Fellow), U.S. Helsinki Commission Christian Sy, Legislative Assistant, Office of Congressman Alcee L. Hastings United States Representative Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), Co-Chairman of the United States Helsinki Commission (CSCE) and Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), recently convened the “CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement,” July 22 and 23 at the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. The seminar hosted more than 50 participants from the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Members of the United States Congress, U.S. government officials, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, and special guests. Delegations of the Mediterranean Partner States consisted of parliamentarians and representatives from their Washington-based diplomatic corps. Special guests included representatives of Greece, the current Chair-in-Office of the OSCE, and delegates from Kazakhstan which will chair the OSCE in 2010, staff representation of the OSCE and OSCE PA International Secretariats, as well as representation of the Swedish Presidency of the European Union. Congressman Hastings opened the seminar with words of welcome for the Mediterranean Partners and special guests, and challenged them to use the event for a frank discussion and exchange of ideas on how to strengthen the OSCE’s partnership with its Mediterranean neighbors. He also chaired each session of the two-day event. Presentations were also given on the first day by OSCE PA President João Soares of Portugal, OSCE PA President Emeritus Göran Lennmarker of Sweden, OSCE PA Vice President Jerry Grafstein of Canada, Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General Paul Fritch, and Barry Pavel of the National Security Council. Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and U.S. House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer hosted the delegation for a reception to conclude the first day of proceedings. The second day’s sessions included presentations by Dalia Mogahed of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund, OSCE Personal Representative on Mediterranean Affairs Sotiris Roussos and additional contributions by OSCE PA President João Soares. Opening Session The opening session consisted of a panel discussion which began with remarks from Representative Alcee L. Hastings and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission and OSCE PA Vice President. OSCE PA President João Soares, OSCE PA President Emeritus Göran Lennmarker, and OSCE PA Vice President Jerry Grafstein delivered keynote presentations for this panel. In sum, the presentations established a framework for the proceedings of the seminar by characterizing the historical developments of Mediterranean Partner engagement in the OSCE and identifying key priorities for enhanced engagement with the partners. Representative Hastings stressed the importance of convening the seminar, specifically to return due prominence and functionality to the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension, which he has long advocated in the OSCE PA and during his recent tenure as its president. Hastings noted that similar goals have been recently prioritized by other multilateral institutions. Senator Cardin noted the considerable work of Helsinki Commissioners in the realm of OSCE Mediterranean Partner engagement through Congressional delegation visits to both current and potential partners as well as hearings in Washington. Cardin also emphasized what he sees as an opportunity to strengthen the OSCE’s relationship with its Partners for Cooperation by the addition of new regional partners in both the Mediterranean and in Asia, namely Lebanon, Syria, and Pakistan. President Soares commended the emergence of several formal documents and proposals for empowering the partnership submitted by the Mediterranean Partners. Soares’ remarks centered around the importance of the OSCE as the most qualified international organization to address challenges within the OSCE region and its partners, proven through its successes in Central Asia and the Caucuses. He also emphasized the importance of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly which perpetuates that spirit of dialogue embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, whose principles he asserted will help achieve the goals of the countries of the Mediterranean region. President Emeritus Lennmarker explored how the OSCE, as a key mechanism through which Europe engages its own persisting challenges, could serve as a powerful model for mitigating the tremendous economic, human, and political costs of conflicts in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. The President Emeritus cautioned against protectionism in the region and offered the enhancement of the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension as a vehicle to promote prosperity. The Opening Session concluded with remarks by Vice President Grafstein who urged the creation of regional trade agreements to spur economic growth and promote political stability in the region. Working Meeting on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement OSCE Mediterranean Partner States continue to be actively engaged in the activities of the OSCE and send strong delegations to ministerial level gatherings and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly events. Mediterranean Partners also send delegations to OSCE election monitoring missions and participate in technical exchanges to build capacity. Recent years have seen an increase in opportunities for engagement by the Mediterranean Partners, but there are still a number of challenges to overcome. The working meeting of the seminar sought to explore methods to improve participation by the Mediterranean Partners and expand engagement in OSCE activities. Topics of discussion included prioritizing implementation of OSCE agreements related to the Mediterranean Partner States, identifying uses for the OSCE Partnership Fund, and procedures to increase engagement in the executive structures of the OSCE. Guiding questions for the discussion included: How can we prioritize implementation of the OSCE agreements and initiatives related to Mediterranean Partner States? What should be the priorities for the OSCE Partnership Fund? How can Mediterranean Partner States become more engaged in the executive structures of the OSCE and other tangible partnerships? Paul Fritch of the OSCE Secretariat guided the working meeting by describing the mandate of the OSCE Partners for Cooperation and characterizing the current level of engagement by the Partner States. He identified key considerations and challenges that should be addressed, as well as the successes of Mediterranean Partner Engagement with the OSCE on matters of tolerance, anti-terrorism cooperation, and migration management. Participants made the following recommendations: The Mediterranean Partners must translate their valued relationship with the OSCE into engagement across the entire span of work in all three dimensions of the OSCE – political-security, economic, and human – building on their successful contributions in anti-terrorism cooperation, migration management, and tolerance. The OSCE Partnership Fund should continue to be utilized to inspire ownership of the process of partnership. Specifically, the Fund should foster civil society engagement in the activities of the Mediterranean Partners and be used to promote Partner participation in all activities of the OSCE. The OSCE must build synergy with other regional cooperation mechanisms such as NATO, the European Union, and others, as well as promote cooperative initiatives affiliated with these institutions. The OSCE must clearly negotiate its role and articulate its contributions to the States engaged in the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation. Currently, extensively overlapping mandates with other international initiatives inhibits the potential for tangible achievements of the Partnership. Expectations of engagement from Mediterranean Partners States must be clearly defined, especially the role of parliamentarians. Appropriate measures should then be taken to facilitate further engagement. Inversely, the OSCE must clearly define what it gains from the engagement of the Mediterranean Partners States. Efforts should be made to promote appropriate diplomatic exchanges with the OSCE through a formalized mechanism, internship, or fellowship to offer training to the diplomatic corps and civil service of Mediterranean Partner States regarding the principles of the Helsinki Process, the organization and functions of the OSCE and the potential to use OSCE institutions and mechanisms to promote economic development and political stability. Opportunities for support and consultation from the various institutions and offices of the OSCE should continue to be explored. Such partnerships should include (but are not limited to) engagement with the Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, ODHIR, Strategic Police Matters Unit, Gender Unit, Office of the Coordinator for Environmental and Economic Activities, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Office of the Special Representative on the Freedom of the Media. Increased Mediterranean Partner engagement in the Environmental and Economic Dimension of the OSCE should be further explored, particularly with respect to water security and water management, as well as trade enhancement. Mechanisms to promote regional food security should also be examined. Cooperation among the Mediterranean Partners must be strengthened prior to consideration of additional States for entry as partners of the OSCE; specifically, the Partnership could be utilized for the implementation of confidence building mechanisms. Efforts should be made to galvanize the potential of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership as a forum to expand political will for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Session 1: Expert Seminar on Security in the Mediterranean The engagement of OSCE Mediterranean Partners in the activities of the OSCE has largely emphasized opportunities for cooperation and capacity development on hard and soft security matters. The most recent 2008 OSCE Mediterranean Conference in Amman emphasized the importance of increased public diplomacy efforts, further cooperation with civil society in counter-terrorism efforts, and enhanced cooperation with other regional cooperation mechanisms. Barry Pavel of the National Security Council engaged participants on the regional security priorities of the Obama Administration and the outlook for regional initiatives. Points for this discussion included: What developing transnational trends (environmental, economic, demographic, energy/resource scarcity) are of most concern to Mediterranean Partner States from a broad security perspective? What particular challenges and opportunities arise from the blurring between clearly foreign and domestic policy security issues? How can engagement with other regional cooperation mechanisms, such as NATO and the European Union, increase the security of the Mediterranean Partner States? Key recommendations and themes emanating from this session included: President Barack Obama’s Cairo speech was recognized as a noteworthy start to the United States’ relations with the countries of the Middle East. However, quick action is required for the momentum to be maintained. The speech expressed many concerns shared by people in the Arab world. More specifically, the time frame for peace talks is critical for a number of reasons. In January, 2010 the term of the current Palestinian Authority Chairman ends. Moreover, experience has shown that the first year of an American presidency is the time for action. Afterwards, other items on the President’s agenda will demand more attention. Food security, the financial crisis, immigration, and development are priority issues for the region that must not be neglected. Answers must be sought as to why people are risking their lives to leave their countries. The Obama Administration should not reverse course on free trade with the region. Prior U.S. leadership in free trade compelled other nations to engage the Middle East in trade. The OSCE should be used to assist in the peace process and economic development for the region. The U.S. must appoint an ambassador to the OSCE quickly. Europe has a critical role to play. Economic engagement must be stepped up and protectionist urges resisted. The rise of Islamophobia is also a problem Europe must address to promote mutual understanding and security in the Mediterranean Region and beyond. Session 2: Expert Seminar on Current Issues in the Mediterranean: “Youth of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners: Assets, Challenges, and the Way Forward” Youth throughout the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States are often seen as a demographic time bomb, making up a 40-60% of their nation’s population. This session of the seminar emphasized the solidarity of the Mediterranean Partners in addressing the current demographic needs. Dalia Mogahed of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies helped the participants conceptualize the young men and women of the region as its greatest resource and defined strategies for harnessing their energy to promote prosperity. Questions addressed in this session: What are the main assets of this group on which to build? What challenges do they face in contributing to their society? What recommendations does the research suggest will best unleash their potential? Key recommendations and themes emanating from this session included: Conduct studies throughout the OSCE Mediterranean Partner region to further investigate issues relevant to youth and identify challenges and country-specific solutions to providing a quality education, requisite job training, essential computer skills, access to capital for entrepreneurship, student exchanges, and opportunities for dialogue with government leaders while ensuring freedom and democracy. Strengthen the relationships between OSCE Mediterranean Partner States, the Arab League, and organizations that conduct these studies, e.g. the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies and the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in Alexandria, Egypt, and share findings and recommendations in the Arab League’s Annual Report. Address the inadequacies of the education system in each of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States and make comprehensive reforms to ensure that all graduates have the education necessary to attain jobs that maximize their potential, utilize their assets, allow them to contribute to their societies, and help realize their personal and professional goals. Increase access to job training while reevaluating its role in respect to education. Consult and engage youth in the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States about issues important to them, especially concerning conflict, through youth councils and provide them with opportunities for continuing dialogues with government leaders. Listen to the concerns and recommendations of other countries within the OSCE and around the world concerning issues of mutual interest and share innovative ideas. Consider declaring 2010 a “world year” and hold a youth conference under the auspices of the United Nations to affirm global values. Invest in programs together with the private and public sectors to provide cell phones, computers, and Internet access to communities and schools to increase computer literacy and close the digital divide. Bring computers, computer skills, Internet connectivity, job training, and jobs to rural areas in the Mediterranean. Reduce government and market corruption, as well as nepotism in each of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States. Simplify the bureaucratic process for entrepreneurship and increase access to capital. Address different levels of freedom and democracy in each of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States. Continue to collect accurate and useful data that reflects the needs and desires of youth in the OSCE Mediterranean Partner States in order to drive effective policy development by governments and practical engagement with the private sector. Promote student exchange programs for students of all ages to foster understanding, solidarity, and the sharing of ideas between the youth of the OSCE Mediterranean Partner states and the world. Session 3: Expert Seminar on Current Issues in the OSCE Region In recent years, OSCE Mediterranean Partner States have had an opportunity to contribute to ministerial documents and proposals on reform of the OSCE. However, appropriate venues for the Mediterranean Partners to offer their perspectives on challenges, conflicts, and priorities within the OSCE region remain infrequent. Topics explored in this session included: What experiences in security cooperation among the Mediterranean Partners inform current initiatives in the OSCE region? What partnerships and exchanges within the OSCE and beyond can be prioritized to offer expertise from Mediterranean Partners to confront challenges within the OSCE region? Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund of the United States facilitated this session to provide an opportunity for Mediterranean Partner delegations to offer their expertise and experience to assist in confronting challenges within the OSCE region. He specifically characterized shared challenges in security between the OSCE region (consistency of capitalization) and Mediterranean Partners, as well as the outlook for their combined geopolitical region. This outlook consisted of future challenges in maritime security, migration, resource conflicts, cascading nuclear and arms proliferation, as well as environmental degradation. The discussion evolved into further exploration of mechanisms for cooperation between the Mediterranean Partners and the OSCE participating States, building on the themes of the Working Meeting on the first day of the seminar. Key recommendations from this session included: Capacity development for institutions facilitating cooperation must be prioritized. Frequent opportunities for dialogue exist within the multiplicity of “Mediterranean” frameworks affiliated with the European Union, NATO, and other international organizations. Capacity development for institutions affiliated with these international organizations should focus on avoiding a duplication of efforts and extensive competition over resources. New institutions for cooperation do not need to be developed. Existing institutions must be utilized in a more rational and effective manner throughout the OSCE region. Increased commercial activity and resource exchanges among the OSCE participating States and with their Mediterranean Partners would promote regional stability. The participating States of the OSCE should recognize the unique expertise of the Mediterranean Partners in thwarting challenges to maritime security and generate alliances and technical exchanges to address piracy and other security concerns. Concluding Session Participants in the CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement synthesized their perceptions of the seminar during the final session of the seminar. Conclusions offered by the participants included: The success of cooperative initiatives between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners will require greater leadership and agenda development from the Mediterranean Partners. Distinguishing appropriate and distinct roles for the various regional cooperation mechanisms in the Mediterranean region will be contingent on robust participation from the Mediterranean Partner delegations in the meetings and planning discussions of the different entities. More tangible progress toward cooperation will be made between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners if events and conferences have a singular focus, rather than attempting to address all aspects of human security. Fewer priorities that are clearly articulated will make conferences more manageable and implementation more effective. A platform should be developed for closer OSCE institution interaction with regional cooperation mechanisms for the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Micro-institutions or taskforces must be developed for the implementation of agreed upon initiatives and recommendations emanating from conferences. U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing - “Future of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation” Following the CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement, an official hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe was convened. This hearing established an official record in the United States Congress for the proceedings of the seminar, with a particular emphasis on how participation mechanisms for OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation can be optimized and improved to promote greater regional cooperation. Ambassador William Hudson, Deputy Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, Mr. Sotiris Roussos, Personal Representative on Mediterranean Affairs to the Greek Chair-in-Office of the OSCE, and the Honorable João Soares, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, all testified before the U.S. Helsinki Commission during this hearing. Commissioners participating included Chairman Benjamin L. Cardin (MD), Co-Chairman Alcee L. Hastings (FL-23), Representative Robert Aderholt (AL-4), Representative Darrel Issa (CA-49), and Representative Mike McIntyre (NC-7). Representative Gwen Moore (WI-4) of the Committee on Financial Services and Committee on Small Business also participated in the hearing. The hearing reiterated the recommendations emanating from the CSCE Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement within the context of U.S. policy toward the region and priorities of the current leadership of the OSCE and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Witness recommendations included: Recognition of the role of the OSCE and its Mediterranean dimension for its potential to develop capacity for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. The activities and events of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation generate one of the few spaces in which Israeli and Arab officials can convene open dialogue and consistently cooperate. The United States government looks forward to engaging the Mediterranean Partners on the reintegration of Iraq into the community of nations and on ways to resolve tension over oil and gas supply and demand issues in Eastern Europe. The United States government looks forward to further partnership with the Mediterranean Partners on migration, counter-terrorism, economic cooperation, and regional security. The United States government has contributed to the OSCE Partnership Fund to support NGO involvement in Mediterranean Partner events and Mediterranean Partner delegation and government training on human rights work in Warsaw through the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Support for similar efforts should continue. The prospect of a separate Helsinki Process for the Middle East or an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East has been an idea circulated in recent years, but the use of a consensus process like that of the OSCE might not be optimal for the region. The Mediterranean Partners and other countries in the region have been involved in various regional organizations and processes revolving around similar core issues of the political military environment, the regional economy, and human development. More diverse priorities must be articulated by any division of labor that might be negotiated among international organizations and process. A mechanism or standing committee to facilitate coordination and collaboration among the principal international organization processes and dialogues in the Mediterranean region should be developed to prevent the duplication of initiatives and counter diminishing regional interest. A renewed focus on the environment and the economy in the Mediterranean region through the OSCE framework would help build capacity for cooperation and common ground for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and other Middle East security challenges. The expansion of markets, global communication infrastructure development, and improved educational access within the Mediterranean Partner States present greater opportunities for regional economic cooperation. The Arab-Israeli conflict greatly influences Mediterranean Partner engagement. Thus, regardless of outcome, a prompt response on the request of the Palestinian Authority’s request to join the OSCE Mediterranean Partner should be prioritized. Some believe that inclusion of the Palestinian Authority would expand a paradigm of confidence building and conflict resolution. The visibility of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership should be enhanced and coupled with an expansion of initiatives to engage young leaders and young diplomats from the Mediterranean region. OSCE Partnership Fund initiatives should be coordinated for tangible results and mutual benefit of OSCE participating States and Mediterranean Partners. The flexibility and capacity for adaptation makes the OSCE one of the best international instruments for conflict resolution and it should be further utilized in the Mediterranean region. OSCE engagement can help advance the role of parliamentarians within Mediterranean Partner States. The OSCE Partnership Fund should be utilized for initiatives to empower women and promote entrepreneurship. Mediterranean Partner delegations should continue to be engaged in OSCE region election observation efforts and consider more frequent reciprocal exchanges. Conclusion The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Seminar on OSCE Mediterranean Partner Engagement achieved its intended purpose of generating a space in which the delegations of the Mediterranean Partner States could frankly engage the current and future leadership of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on ways to enhance participation in events, processes, and initiatives. The seminar also served as a forum for Partner State delegations to discuss potential collaborative opportunities with the U.S. Administration and Members of Congress. Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman of the Helsinki Commission committed to working with the OSCE and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly leadership and international secretariats to implement the recommendations of the seminar. Congressman Hastings also committed to travelling once again in the coming year to the Mediterranean Partner States to follow up on the discussions of the seminar.
Mr. President, I wish to submit for the Record a report on the activity of a congressional delegation I led to Belgrade, Serbia, from July 7 to 10, to represent the United States at the 20th Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. I did so in my capacity as cochairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission.
I was joined by our colleague from New Hampshire, Senator Shaheen, who also traveled to Sarajevo, Bosnia. Senator Shaheen is also a member of the Helsinki Commission. Our colleague from Alaska, Senator Begich, also participated on the delegation but was in Dubrovnik, Croatia, as part of the official U.S. Delegation to the 6th annual Croatian Summit of regional political leaders and European officials.
As the report details, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE PA, has been an excellent opportunity for the U.S. Congress to engage our European friends and allies, and to make clear to less friendly countries that our ties to the continent will not be diminished.
U.S. engagement also provides a means for us to advance U.S. interests by encouraging Europe to focus more on policy issues of concern to us, from democratic shortcomings within Europe such as Belarus to the new challenges and opportunities coming from North Africa and the Middle East and other parts of the world.
The revised Senate schedule made us miss the opening days of the Belgrade meeting, but we made up for that with an intensive schedule from Friday to Sunday. All three U.S. resolutions and most of our delegation's amendments to resolutions were adopted, including a resolution I submitted on political transition in the Mediterranean region and amendments welcoming the arrest of at-large war crimes indictee Ratko Mladic and calling for Turkey to allow the Ecumenical Patriarch to open a theological school in Halki.
Senator Shaheen and I also used the opportunity of visiting Belgrade to encourage progress in Serbia's democratic transition. We met with President Tadic as well as the Speaker of the Serbian National Assembly, the chief negotiator in the technical talks on Kosovo-related issues, representatives of civil society, and of Serbia's Romani and Jewish communities.
We came away from our visit impressed with the progress Serbia has made thus far. While there are lingering manifestations of the extreme and violent nationalism from the Milosevic era of the 1990s, I believe there is a genuine commitment to overcome them. We should support those in and out of government in Serbia who turn this commitment into action.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the Report to which I referred.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Report of the US. Congressional Delegation (CoDel Cardin) to Belgrade, Serbia; Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Dubrovnik, Croatia July 7-10, 2011
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD), Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman, and fellow Senator and Commissioner Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) traveled to the 20th Annual Session of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), held in Belgrade, Serbia, from July 6-10, 2011. The senators were able to do this despite a U.S. Congressional schedule that precluded House Members from traveling to the meeting and curtailed Senate attendance to only three of the session's five days. Three resolutions and more than one dozen amendments to various resolutions initiated by the United States Delegation were nevertheless considered and passed by the Assembly. Senator Shaheen was also able to make a one-day visit to neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, and both Senators were able to link with their colleague, Senator Mark Begich (D-AK), attending the Croatian Summit of regional political leaders held in Dubrovnik, Croatia.
THE OSCE PA
The Parliamentary Assembly was created within the framework of the OSCE as an independent, consultative body consisting of 320 parliamentarians from the 56 participating States, stretching from Central Asia and Russia across Europe and including the United States and Canada. Annual Sessions are the chief venue for debating international issues and voting on a declaration addressing human rights, democratic development, rule-of-law, economic, environmental and security concerns among the participating States and the international community.
The Parliamentary Assembly adopts its declaration by majority voting for resolutions coming from three committees dealing with political/security, economic/environmental and democracy/human rights issues respectively, in addition to other resolutions introduced by delegations to supplement these texts. Following the amendment of these resolutions also by majority voting, this generally allows for considerable verbiage to be accepted each year but also for franker language addressing controversial or new issues to be included than the OSCE itself can achieve on the basis of consensus among the 56 participating States. The heavy focus of OSCE diplomats on issues like trafficking in persons and combating intolerance in society is rooted in initiatives originally undertaken by the parliamentarians in the Assembly.
Having the largest delegation with 17 members, the United States historically has played a key role in OSCE PA proceedings, and there has been robust congressional participation since the Assembly's inception two decades ago. This engagement is reassuring to friends and allies in Europe while ensuring that issues of interest or concern to U.S. foreign policy are raised and discussed. In addition to representing the United States as delegates, members of the Helsinki Commission have served as OSCE PA special representatives on specific issues of concern, committee officers, vice presidents and the Assembly president.
THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL SESSION
This year's Annual Session was hosted by the National Assembly of Serbia and held in Belgrade's Sava Center, the 1977-78 venue for the first follow-up meeting of the diplomatic process that was initiated by the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act and is the OSCE today. During various interventions at the session, note was made not only of the vast changes in Europe since that time but also in Serbia, which was then a constituent republic of the former Yugoslavia but is today an independent state making progress in democratic development after overcoming more than a decade of authoritarian rule and extreme nationalist sentiment.
A meeting of the Standing Committee--composed of OSCE PA officers plus the heads of all delegations--met prior to the opening of the Annual Session. Chaired by OSCE PA President Petros Efthymiou of Greece, the committee heard numerous reports on the activities of the past year, endorsed a budget that has remained frozen for a fourth consecutive fiscal year, and approved for consideration at the Annual Session 25 of the 26 items introduced by various delegations to supplement the committee resolutions. Only an Italian draft on Asbestos Contamination failed to achieve a 2/3 vote approving its consideration.
With approximately 230 parliamentarians in attendance, the opening plenary of the Annual Session featured a welcome by Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic and National Assembly Speaker Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic and reports by the OSCE Chair-in Office, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Az 0ubalis, and the newly appointed OSCE Secretary General, Lamberto Zannier of Italy. Zannier welcomed the OSCE PA's interest in fostering closer cooperation with the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna and committed himself to facilitating greater PA engagement through his leadership of the OSCE Secretariat and coordination with its institutions.
In his own remarks, PA President Efthymiou noted the "spirit of Helsinki'' which developed at the Belgrade meeting more than three decades ago and lamented the crisis in which the OSCE finds itself today. He called for significant changes to the operations of the Vienna-based organization to make it more effective and relevant in addressing the political and security issues of today. The theme for the Annual Session--Strengthening the OSCE'S Effectiveness and Efficiency, a New Start after the Astana Summit--was chosen to address this matter in light of last December's summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, which had heightened the political attention paid to the OSCE's work.
The following three days were devoted to committee consideration and amendment of the three resolutions and 21 supplementary items, and plenary consideration of the four additional supplementary items. Two additional resolutions were defeated in the process. The first was another initiative of an Italian delegate focusing on crimes causing serious social alarm, which lacked significant support. The second originated with the Belgian delegation on enlarging the OSCE's Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation to include Lebanon and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The latter was lost in a close vote after being heavily debated by those who advocate wider engagement in the long-term and those who questioned the timing of taking such an initiative. A number of parliamentarians felt it inappropriate for the OSCE to solicit interest by the Lebanese Government and the PNA while they are both under leadership that does not embrace OSCE principles. Some of the resolutions which did pass examined the deplorable human rights situation in Belarus, the unresolved conflict in Moldova, gender issues in the OSCE and the participating States, national minority concerns including the plight of Roma, cyber security, as well as combating violent extremism, transnational organized crime, and human trafficking for labor and organs.
U.S. INITIATIVES IN BELGRADE
Despite its small size, the U.S. Delegation remained very active in the deliberations, introducing three resolutions of its own, working closely with the delegation of the Netherlands on a fourth, and suggesting over a dozen amendments to various texts. All four of these resolutions were adopted, as were all but two of the U.S. amendments.
Co-Chairman Cardin's major initiative was a resolution on Mediterranean Political Transition, which directs the OSCE and its participating States to make their expertise in building democratic institutions available to Mediterranean Partner States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The resolution specifically encouraged the interim governments of Egypt and Tunisia to make a formal request for OSCE support following their consultations with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It also called for an OSCE civil society forum to be hosted by a Mediterranean Partner State later this year. The Senator collaborated with the head of the Spanish delegation on numerous additional amendments to demonstrate the real priority this should be for the organization, and the initiative received widespread praise among the delegates. "We have all been inspired by the movements for freedom and change sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa,'' Senator Cardin noted while introducing the resolution, "and we support the citizens of the countries in the region as they demand respect for their basic human rights, economic opportunity, and open and responsive government ..... The OSCE and our Parliamentary Assembly have substantial capacity to assist our Mediterranean Partners..... We also must condemn in the strongest terms the unbridled violence unleashed by the governments of Libya and Syria against their own citizens.''
Though not in attendance, Commission Chairman Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) introduced two resolutions for the Assembly's consideration that also were adopted. The first dealt with Combating Labor Trafficking in Supply Chains, urging governments to ensure that all goods they procure are free from raw materials and finished products produced by trafficked labor and to press corporations to independently verify that their supply chains are free of exploitation. The resolution also sought to raise consumer awareness about industries more likely to use trafficked labor. Two strengthening amendments authored by Co-Chairman Cardin were adopted. The amendments welcomed a recent OSCE meeting on the issue and urged diplomats to pass a declaration on the matter during a meeting of OSCE foreign ministers later this year.
The second Smith Resolution focused on International Parental Child Abductions and passed without amendment. Its core focus was to press OSCE States to become parties to the 1983 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and to implement its provisions. The resolution also urged that parental child abduction be considered at the 2011 OSCE Ministerial Council in Vilnius this December.
Ranking House Commissioner Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), who serves as the Parliamentary Assembly's Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs, collaborated with OSCE PA Special Representative on Migration Kathleen Ferrier of the Netherlands on countering racism and xenophobia in Europe with measures to foster inclusion of affected communities. Noting that 2011 has been designated the International Year for People of African Descent, the resolution included a focus on racial bias against citizens and migrants of African descent, and called for specific measures to be taken by OSCE institutions to address reported increases of racial and ethnic discrimination in the OSCE region. The resolution also emphasized the importance of integrating ethnic minorities into economic and political life through capacity building partnerships between the public and private sector. The resolution passed with widespread support.
Supported by Senator Shaheen, Co-Chairman Cardin covered several smaller and more detailed issues with amendments, such as one welcoming the arrest in Serbia of at-large war crimes indictee Ratko Mladic, another urging Turkey to allow the reopening of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate's Theological School of Halki without condition or further delay, and another supporting greater transparency in the energy sector. Working with a German delegate, Senator Cardin also succeeded in removing language from a Serbian resolution which politicized the issue of investigating an organ-trafficking case that originated in neighboring Kosovo during the 1999 conflict. Serbian officials lobbied the PA Assembly directly and through the media to accept the resolution's call for the United Nations to conduct the investigation, contrary to the efforts being undertaken by the U.S. and EU to proceed through an already established EU rule-of-law mission. The U.S.-supported amendment was successful in designating the EU entity and the U.N. Mission in Kosovo as responsible for the investigation. There was insufficient support, however, for a U.S. amendment welcoming EU efforts thus far.
During the course of debate, Co-Chairman Cardin also suggested granting Mediterranean Partner countries a greater ability to participate in OSCE PA sessions through changes to Assembly rules. He also highlighted U.S. policy on cyber security in the vigorous debate of a resolution which in some respects diverged from the U.S. approach. In his capacity as an OSCE Vice President, the Senator, as an urgent matter, also supported consideration of a resolution focused on the lack of transparency in the OSCE during the recent selection of a new Secretary General. Language on this matter was also included in the final declaration.
SELECTING THE OSCE PA LEADERSHIP FOR THE COMING YEAR
In addition to hearing closing comments from Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic and adopting the final declaration, the parliamentarians attending the Annual Session voted for contested seats in the Assembly's leadership. President Efthymiou was unopposed, as was Treasurer Roberto Battelli of Slovenia, and both were re-elected by acclamation. In a race among six candidates for three of the nine Vice President positions, Wolfgang Grossruck of Austria was re-elected, with Walburga Habsburg-Douglas of Sweden and Tonino Picula of Croatia elected for the first time. Senator Cardin has one additional year in his term as Vice President and is not eligible for another re-election.
Committee officers saw more dramatic changes, with only one officer retaining his position as committee chair. Others moved to higher positions within the committees or ran for the three Vice President seats. Unfortunately for the U.S. Delegation, Representative Robert B. Aderholt (R-AL), a Helsinki Commissioner, did not win his second re-election bid as a committee Vice Chair due to his inability to be in Belgrade. He was unsuccessful in fighting off a challenge by a French delegate who entered the race at the last minute.
SIDE EVENTS IN BELGRADE
In addition to the formal proceedings, OSCE PA meetings often offer the possibility for delegations to sponsor side-events on issues needing additional attention. A luncheon focusing on gender issues in the OSCE is held annually, including in Belgrade. Non-governmental organizations may also hold their own events and invite the delegates to participate. In Belgrade, a coalition held a session on continued use of torture in OSCE States, with a focus particularly on the situation in Kyrgyzstan following the ethnic violence in 2009. Delegation-sponsored events in Belgrade included one on human rights abuses in Belarus, one on cases of alleged trafficking in human organs in Kosovo and elsewhere, and one featuring a film on two Jewish sisters in Serbia who escaped the Holocaust during World War II. With Senator Shaheen and U.S. Ambassador to Serbia Mary Burce Warlick in attendance, Senator Cardin participated in the latter event with opening comments on the work of the Vienna-based organization Centropa, which prepared the -film. Delegation staff attended most of the other side events as well.
BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH SERBIA AND A SIDE-TRIP TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
While the delegation travelled to Belgrade principally to represent the United States at the OSCE PA Annual Session, the Helsinki Commission leadership regularly uses this travel to discuss bilateral issues with the host country and to visit nearby countries of concern. In Serbia, the delegation met with President Boris Tadic, National Assembly Speaker Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic, and chief negotiator for technical talks on Kosovo Boris Stefanovic. Ambassador Warlick briefed the Senators and attended the meetings.
Evident in the bilateral meetings was the progress Serbia was making in its internal political transition and attainment of European integration. Serbian officials made clear they were committed to overcoming the nationalist legacy of the Milosevic era, strengthening Serbia's democratic institutions and encouraging greater respect for the rule of law. While there are clear differences between the United States and Serbia regarding Kosovo, the officials asked for an expression of congressional support for agreements being reached in technical talks between Belgrade and Pristina that were of direct benefit to the people and brought an increased sense of regional stability, as well. They also stressed their support for Bosnia-Herzegovina's unity and territorial integrity. The U.S. Delegation welcomed Serbia's approach and encouraged Belgrade to curtail the activity of parallel Serbian institutions in northern Kosovo which are currently the greatest source of instability in the region. The message was amplified throughout the region by a VOA interview conducted with Senator Cardin.