Title

Russia and Central Asia: the Growing Policy Challenges for the International Community

Hon.
Alcee L. Hasitngs
Washignton, DC
United States
Monday, March 12, 2007

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Distinguished Speakers and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to thank Freedom House for inviting me to speak at this important event. Freedom House has well earned its reputation as one of the foremost democracy-promoting organizations in the world. Moreover, Nations in Transit – whose 2007 edition this conference is launching – has become an indispensable source of information, measuring the advance of democratization around the globe. Thanks also to SAIS for co-hosting and my congratulations to you on the success of your Russia and Eurasian Studies Program.

As Paula said, I Chair the Helsinki Commission, which Congress created in 1976 to monitor and promote implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in all the participating States. Moreover, I have recently completed two years as president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – the only American to ever hold that post. In that capacity, I visited 31 OSCE states, including Russia and all the Central Asian countries. In my travels and in Washington, I have met with presidents and foreign ministers, with parliamentarians, opposition leaders and dissenters, and with journalists and human rights activists.

In these remarks, I would like to give you my assessment of where I see democratic governance and human rights trending in the region, more than 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But first, I want to state that we need to take back the moral high-ground that we once stood on. This starts by holding ourselves accountable when human rights issues arise here at home. Not that we have anything to be afraid of. But we must take away the credibility of those who would accuse us of double standards. As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, this will be one of my priorities.

Let me now talk about Russia. You are all surely familiar with President Putin’s speech in Munich last month, and how pundits have characterized U.S.-Russian relations these days. It’s a bad sign when our Secretary of Defense has to note that “one Cold War was enough.” Actually, one Cold War was more than enough.

Now, I understand that Russians remember the 1990s very differently than we do. Despite what many viewed from abroad as a “springtime” of freedom for Russia and the territory of the former Soviet Union, many citizens of Russia remember the nineties as a period of tremendous economic dislocation, rampant crime, chaos at home, and humiliation abroad. The relative order and, at least, superficial international respect that President Vladimir Putin brought to Russia has been welcomed by a majority of the Russian population and seems to be strongly supported by the younger generation. From our point of view, this runs somewhat counter to the assumption that the post-communist generation would yearn for still greater freedom and be less pugnacious. It is necessary that we find a way to come to grips with these divergent views of the recent past as we look to the future.

So it’s understandable that today, Russians proudly proclaim that “Russia is back.” This is certainly true, and in no small measure due to high energy prices. Nor is it surprising that a great country with vast human and material resources should rebound from even the disruptions of the last 20 years. What troubles me and many others is what kind of Russia has returned to a leading role on the world stage.

Russian officials maintain that their democracy is developing in its own way and in accordance with its own traditions. They accuse the United States of unilateralism in foreign affairs and of seeking to impose the American form of democratic governance on Russia and the rest of the world and hypocritically meddling in the affairs of others.

To be sure, our attempts to spread the undeniable benefits of the American experience have not always been distinguished by cultural sensitivity. But I get nervous when I hear the phrase “according to our own traditions and national mentality.” No rational person expects Ivan Ivanov to be a carbon copy of John Johnson. However, there are certain basic shared assumptions about what democratic governance entails: freedom of religion; freedom of speech; freedom of assembly; rule of law; a reasonable distribution of power between the branches of government; an independent judiciary; etc. I would also note that reference to one’s “traditions” as a method of denying rights to others is not solely a Russian phenomenon.

There’s little doubt that under President Putin – who is undeniably popular – some people have begun to live better materially. Many Russians are proud of their president, of his sober, disciplined approach to government and his determination to restore Russia’s greatness. But in Russia – and Central Asia – we have witnessed the emergence of super-presidencies, which have overwhelmed the legislative and the judicial branches.

For instance, in successfully recentralizing power in the Kremlin, President Putin has turned the Duma into a virtual rubber stamp. True, the Duma was quite complicit in this. And I am aware that American history has also produced “honeymoons” between popular chief executives and a congressional majority representing the same political party. We’ve just finished a six year version right here in Washington. But I hope my colleagues in the Russian Duma would agree that a vital element of representative government is a legislature that acts as a check on executive power.

As for judicial independence – a critical component of checks and balances – when was the last time a court in Russia ruled contrary to government wishes in a politically sensitive case in which the Kremlin or the security forces – some would say they are synonymous – have an interest?

Especially alarming is the contraction of freedom of the media. The Kremlin now controls all major TV stations, which parrot the official perspective. As for newspapers, though less popular as a source of information, journalism has become a very dangerous profession. In fact, according to the International News Safety Institute, Russia is the second most dangerous country for journalists in the world – the first is Iraq. Just last week, yet another investigative journalist died under suspicious circumstances. There is a long list of such crimes, which have largely gone unsolved. Obviously, the Fourth Estate is being told to shut its mouth, if it wants to keep its head.

Furthermore, I am troubled by the government’s attempts to rein in civil society, at least those elements that the Kremlin views as threatening. Many of you may have read about the judge who recently fined members of a local human rights group for meeting in a school with foreign visitors without notifying the authorities – a mentality that smacks frighteningly of the Soviet era.

Russian officials often get irritated when they hear the terms “managed democracy” or “sham democracy.” But I see in Russia a system that attempts to carefully control politics, in which the public has been removed from the political process while the state’s well-connected individuals have taken charge of the country’s most profitable giant companies. And it is hard for me to see how or when this system will open up again.

One way the system could open up is through legitimate presidential elections in 2008, when President Putin is expected to retire. But to judge by the current difficulties reported by “outsiders” testing the waters in Russia, there is no reason to expect that opposition candidates can count on an equal playing field.

The rise of “illiberal democracy” at home is also reflected in Russia’s behavior abroad. For example, Moscow’s unrelenting pressure on Georgia and Moldova has tarnished Russia’s reputation as a conscientious upholder of international law. Especially worrying for Europe are possible interruptions in oil and gas supplies, as has happened during Russia’s disputes with its neighbors. Not surprisingly, Washington and other capitals – even Minsk – are wondering whether Russia can be a reliable supplier of the energy on which our economies depend.

Of course, Russia should be able to enjoy the benefits of its energy resources, which account for fully one-quarter of its GDP. But what will benefit Russia, as well as transit and consumer countries, would be more transparency and predictability in energy supply. Think of Russia moving toward a Canadian or Norwegian model instead of an OPEC model.

This would entail the promotion of free-market policies in the energy sector. It would mean the protection of property rights, which ensure fair competition, backed up by a commitment to the rule of law that give these rights some meaning. Such transparency and predictability will help ensure that Russia can rationally exploit its resources and that consuming countries can sleep easy – and warm – at night. And Russia’s leaders must understand that other states have become hypersensitive to the possibility that the Kremlin will exploit its control of hydrocarbons for political gain and draw the appropriate conclusions. Yet I often wonder if they do. Sometimes it seems that oil has simply gone to people’s heads in Moscow.

As a senior member of the Intelligence Committee, I am well aware of the gravity of the terrorist threat facing this country as well as Russia. I understand the need for us to work together to confront this danger to the whole world. But the legitimate struggle against terrorism cannot be an excuse for gross violations of international humanitarian law and norms – Chechnya comes to mind in this context.

Before moving on to Central Asia, I would just emphasize my sincere belief that we best advance our interests with Russia in an atmosphere of mutual respect and not of mutual recrimination. Knee-jerk Russia bashing may be emotionally satisfying for some and may help bolster budgets for others, but it does little to promote our goals and, in fact, closes many doors for dialogue and understanding. On the other hand, being best friends should not be the measure of successful bilateral relations. We need to focus our efforts more on bolstering Russia’s nascent democratic institutions rather than on the rapidly changing faces of the Russian elite.

I would also add that I support granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations to Russia. Russia has complied with our law. We spend millions of dollars promoting rule of law abroad, but we seem unable or too preoccupied to comply with our own legislation and retire this Cold War relic.

Let me now turn to Central Asia. Over the last 15 years, we have seen the rise of the familiar “super-president,” the controlled parliament, the supine judiciary and the media under pressure, while the families and cronies of rulers prosper. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, no political opposition has been permitted. Turkmenistan – which is still a one-party state today – has been one of the most repressive countries in the world, virtually a post-Soviet North Korea, with a similar cult of personality.

In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, opposition is tolerated but tightly controlled; there is very little opposition representation in their parliaments. Only Kyrgyzstan has bucked the Central Asian trend to some degree. Former President Akaev did not control the political arena as his counterparts did and civil society was much stronger than elsewhere in the region. So it was not surprising that if an opposition-led protest movement in the region had any chance of toppling a government, it would be in Kyrgyzstan.

All this was true even before the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia. But that historic event, followed by Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and the March 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, upset the rulers of most former Soviet states. Central Asian leaders, especially Uzbekistan’s President Karimov, have moved to preempt similar uprisings in their countries by undercutting opposition activists, NGOs – including foreign ones, like Freedom House and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – and human rights groups.

In this campaign they have received backing from Moscow, which has warned of sinister U.S. plots of regime change. Indeed, Moscow unfortunately seems to see democratization as a key weapon in a zero-sum competition for influence with the United States. Russia viewed the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan not only as unwelcome achievements of democracy but as a new, historic Western “incursion” into its own sphere of influence. Its apparent strategy is to build alliances with repressive rulers, while dismissing Western disapproval of their authoritarianism as geo-politically motivated. In fact, an anti-revolutionary alliance of states has emerged, embracing most post-Soviet republics and China as well.

And these efforts have borne fruit – since Kyrgyzstan, the wave has receded, at least for now.

This situation puts U.S. policymakers in a tough spot. Even before September 11, Washington had struggled to find ways to move Central Asian rulers towards more political openness. But they had already concluded that even if relations with the Americans were not very close, the U.S. interest in security, energy and providing a strategic alternative to Russia meant that Washington might criticize flawed elections or human rights problems but would not level serious sanctions or cut off ties.

After September 11, the countries of Central Asia saw the opportunity for closer relations with the United States, which was happy to accommodate them in the name of fighting terrorism. An agreement on strategic cooperation was struck with Uzbekistan. We opened military bases there and in Kyrgyzstan. The Tajiks and even Turkmenistan cooperated in overflights and assistance corridors to Afghanistan.

Today, economic concerns have come to equal security priorities: with the price of a barrel of oil down to about $60 from a high in the mid-70s and Kazakhstan’s oil and Turkmenistan’s gas beckoning, how do we influence Central Asia’s leaders to liberalize their political systems? It doesn’t look like they want to and they seem to think they don’t have to.

There are no easy answers to this question. Obviously, we cannot compel them to democratize or observe their human rights commitments. We have 150,000 troops in Iraq but we can’t ensure basic order, much less build a democratic state there at this time. Even in the 1990s, when Russia was much weaker and poorer than it is today, our leverage was limited. Today, I have the sense that our criticism has the opposite effect on Russian officials.

The countries of Central Asia don’t have issues of superpower rivalry with the United States, and they do want to have good relations with us, which facilitates dialogue with them about democratization and human rights. Still, those in power want to remain there – it is their highest priority and they will resist systemic reforms that could threaten their position.

You might infer from this overview that I am a pessimist. Not at all. No black man who grew up during the halcyon days of the segregated south and became a judge and then a Congressman while a black woman from the segregated south is Secretary of State can be a pessimist. But I have become more realistic and pragmatic. Let me share with you some conclusions I have drawn.

First, democratic transformations take much longer than we would like. The experience of the former Soviet Union proves that the collapse of communism is necessary but not sufficient. We should understand we are in this for the long haul.

Second, repressive leaders often maintain that their people are not ready for democracy. I think, however, that publics are much more ready than governments. People in Russia and Central Asia, who have experienced or witnessed enough disruption for several lifetimes, understandably value stability and predictability. But that does not mean they do not want the basic gifts of democracy and human rights. Everyone wants a say in his or her own government and to be treated with respect. When circumstances permit, those desires, I believe, will come to the fore.

Third, we in the West saw the so-called color revolutions as a glorious exercise in popular sovereignty, as people peacefully went to the streets to oust corrupt, unresponsive regimes. But we sometimes forget that revolutions are evidence of failed politics. They reflect a crisis in the relations between state and society when people have no satisfactory methods of influencing policy or seeking redress of grievances, such as recourse to the courts for the impartial administration of justice. So while I welcome the Rose, Orange, and Tulip revolutions, I regret their necessity. Slow, steady progress towards democratic governance would be better for all concerned. It is this goal we should work for, through the building of institutions that promote the rule of law and civil society.

Fourth, in the absence of established institutions, the ruler’s character remains critical in such highly personalized political systems. It was clear, for example, that while President Niyazov lived, there was no chance of reform in Turkmenistan. The notion may not be popular among some scholars today, but his long reign clearly demonstrates the power of individuals to shape history, certainly for ill and I hope, for good.

Fifth, succession can spark unexpected events and accelerate or slow down institution-building. I suspect the death of President Niyazov in December has got the other Central Asian leaders thinking. They are not young men and they have some serious inheritance issues to consider. Nowhere has there been established any tested method for peacefully transferring power at the top. In Kyrgyzstan, a head of state has been removed, but presidential succession has come to be associated with street politics as much as constitutional requirements. In the other countries…well, we will have to see. But barring dramatic headlines, the first important such decision will come in Uzbekistan. President Karimov’s term runs out this year. He will have to decide whether to step down or resort to some ploy to remain in office. I believe that if he chooses the latter course, he will damage his reputation still further and make instability more likely.

Whatever happens, however, I strongly believe that all of Central Asia will be watching how President Putin handles his own succession problem. If he steps down, some may be more inclined to follow his example.

Sixth, we must not turn our backs on the region and its people. I know Uzbekistan is a repressive state and I share the widespread revulsion at the slaughter in Andijon, but does it help us not to be engaged with President Karimov? Have we gained anything by these frozen relations – quite apart from the loss of our base at K-2, has democracy advanced in Uzbekistan while we criticize him from afar?

At the same time, Tashkent must understand we cannot turn a blind eye to atrocities. I have supported the European Union’s serious effort to restore ties with Uzbekistan based on human rights progress, but I would welcome a good faith gesture from Tashkent. For example, Umida Niyazova, a human rights activist who used to work for Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, is in jail. I call on President Karimov to release her immediately.

As for Turkmenistan, President Niyazov’s death offers no guarantees of liberalization. But at least there is reason now to hope for a more rational leadership that will focus on the public good, not the president’s ego.

I see mixed messages coming out of Ashgabat. On the one hand, the new president has pledged to broaden internet access and has restored the tenth grade and physical education to the school curriculum. That doesn’t sound like much but when you start from such a low base, it can seem like a huge improvement. I expect that gradually, the more bizarre aspects of President Niyazov’s misrule will disappear. But I hope to see much more – the release of people jailed on political grounds and the beginnings of political pluralism. I expect to travel to Ashgabat to discuss with the new Turkmen leaders the prospects for systemic democratization. We need to engage with them in a process of consultation and give and take.

Let me conclude by mentioning a few things we should not do, starting with not shooting ourselves in the foot. I have in mind the Voice of America. As many of you probably know, the American Administration has called for major cuts in VOA broadcasting, including closing down the Uzbek and Georgian Services and ending radio programs while retaining television transmission in Russian and Ukrainian. This, ladies and gentlemen, seems to me to be the height of folly. As I have argued here, the democratic transition in the former Soviet Union is far from secure. VOA broadcasts are one of the most effective, biggest-bang-for-the-buck tools in our arsenal to propagate democratic ideals.

And in this connection, I want to associate myself with remarks made on Thursday by my good friend Tom Lantos, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a hearing on U.S. assistance. Like him, I simply cannot comprehend why we should now cut our funding for democracy promotion – especially to the tune of 40 percent. He called for more aid to NGOs that try, under ever worsening conditions, to promote freedom in Russia. I am in full solidarity with him and together with likeminded Members of Congress, we hope to roll back the VOA cuts and increase assistance for democracy promotion.

The same applies to funding for the OSCE, which the budgeters also want to slash. Please be assured that I will fight this.

Paula, I’ve gone on for quite some time. I hope I haven’t overstayed my welcome. Thank you once again for inviting me. Let me end here and I look forward to hearing from the other speakers.

Leadership: 
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    * Public Hearing on Restrictions on Artistic Freedom in the Soviet Union The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 210, Cannon House Office Building, at 10 a.m., Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, cochairman, presiding. In attendance: Commissioners and Senators John Heinz, Gordon J. Humphrey, and Dennis DeConcini; Commissioners and Representatives Dante B. Fascell, Don Ritter, and Christopher H. Smith. Also in attendance: Michael R. Hathaway, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, general counsel of the Commission. This hearing concerned restrictions on creative freedom in the Soviet Union.   Public Hearing on the Budapest Cultural Forum The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 538, of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 11 a.m., Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, cochairman, presiding. In attendance: Senator Malcolm Wallop, Commissioner. Also in attendance: Michael R. Hathaway, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, general counsel of the Commission. In this hearing, the Helsinki Commission heard testimony on the most recent international meeting in the Helsinki process, the Budapest Cultural Forum.

  • Baltic Tribunal Against the Soviet Union

    On July 25 and 26, 1985, the Baltic World Conference, representing the three central Baltic organizations in the free world - the Estonian World Council, the World Federation of Free Latvians and the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania - held a Tribunal against the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The purpose of the Tribunal was threefold: to bring to the attention of the world the illegal Soviet occupation of the once free and independent Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; to document the atrocities and genocide committed against the Baltic people; and to condemn the Soviet Union for these acts against humanity. As evidenced by the materials presented in this publication, the objectives were accomplished beyond any reasonable doubt. A panel of internationally known authorities in the field of human rights served as judges: Per Ahlmark, the Rev. Michael Bourdeaux, Jean-Marie Daillet, Sir James Fawcett and Dr. Theodor Veiter, who as Chairman presided over the proceedings. After listening to the testimony of sixteen witnesses, the jurists assembled and weighed the evidence and at the conclusion of the Baltic Tribunal issued their verdict: The Copenhagen Manifesto. This publication is the result of numerous requests made by public officials, libraries, journalists, private citizens and others, for the information and testimonies given at the Tribunal. We have included in this publication the indictment, background information, the testimonies of the witnesses, and the Copenhagen Manifesto as well as brief biographies of the jurists and witnesses. It is our hope that this publication will serve not only as an historical document, but also as a source of information to all who are interested in the realization of human rights and freedom for all people.

  • THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS MEETING AND THE FUTURE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS

    The commissioners gave testimony on the importance of the 35-nation conference which addressed "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief," The discussion centered on inconsistencies between the rhetoric of the United States on the subject of human rights and its actions.  The focus of human rights covered the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and also Afghanistan. In response to human rights violations- recognizing the framework provided by the Helsinki accords- the witnesses discussed constructive measures to concentrate on human rights violations that could be corrected with relative ease and without effecting systemic change within the Soviet Union or the other states in the Soviet sphere.

  • GAO Report: Helsinki Commission: The First 8 Years

    This report, which describes and evaluates the work of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is in response to Chairman Fascell's request.  The report's conclusions: We believe that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has helped, through its hearings and reports, to focus public attention and to inform public opinion and has made itself a principal Western source of information on Soviet and East European violations of the Final Act; helped resolve numerous family reunification cases for Eastern victims of Communist repression; played a key role in planning and conducting U.S. Helsinki diplomacy.; and effectively promoted a strong U.S. human rights policy in the East-West dialogue about cooperation, detente, and international security. The Commission has put considerably less emphasis on implementing its second mandate--to monitor and encourage governmental and private programs aimed at expanding East-West economic and cultural cooperation. The Commission's unusual organizational arrangement has worked well, although there were some initial difficulties, and as some observers have pointed out, more orthodox arrangements could also have worked well. Commission-participation in the international conferences has enhanced its ability to carry out its mandate to monitor and report on implementation of the Helsinki accords, and it has increased the ability of the Commission's congressional members to influence U.S. policy in the Helsinki process. Yet it has invited criticism on constitutional grounds relating to the separation of powers because it has, in practice, given executive functions to staff personnel who report to members of Congress. No one we consulted has suggested that this arrangement should be changed with respect to the Helsinki Commission. Some, however, have cautioned against suggestions that such an arrangement might be applied to other areas of U.S. foreign relations.

  • Documents of the Soviet Groups to Establish Trust Between the US and the USSR

    Appeal To The Governments and People of The USSR and The USA: The USSR and the USA have the means to kill in such proportions that would end the history of mankind. A balance of terror cannot be a reliable guarantee of safety in the world. Only trust between peoples can create a firm assurance of the future. Today, when elementary trust between the two nations has been completely lost, the problem of trust has ceased to be simply a question of bilateral relations. This is the question: Will mankind be wiped out by its own destructive capabilities or will it survive? This problem demands immediate action today. It is, however, very obvious that political leaders of both sides are incapable of coming to any sort of agreement about significant arms limitations in the near future . ... to say nothing of genuine disarmament. Due to their political interests and circumstances, politicians find it difficult to be objective on disarmament issues  Recognizing this, we do not wish to accuse one side or the other of not wishing to promote the peace process, nor certainly of any aggressive designs for the future. We are convinced of their genuine desire for peace and curtailment of the nuclear threat. However, the search for the path to disarmament has become difficult. We all share an equal responsibility for the future. The active peace movement among citizens of many countries proves that this is understood by millions of people. But our common desire for peace must not be blind It must be perceived and expressed in concrete terms. It must be presented in the context of actual conditions. The world is concerned about its future. Everyone understands that there must be dialogue if the threat is to be removed. The prevailing principles of conducting bilateral dialogue must be changed immediately. We are convinced that the time has come for the public not only to confront decision makers with the issue of disarmament, but to participate in the decision making process with the politicians. We are in favor of quatrapartite dialogue - for dialogue in which average Soviet and American citizens are included on an equal footing with political figures. We favor consistent and, ultimately complete destruction of stockpiles of. nuclear weapons and other forms of mass destruction, and for limitations of conventional weapons. We view the present program for the search for peace as the following: 1. As a first step to abolish the nuclear threat, we appeal to everyone who does not desire the death of his neighbor to submit his own specific proposals on bilateral limitations and cutbacks of weaponry, and, most of all, for the establishment of trust. We call for each such proposal to be forwarded simultaneously to the governments of both countries and to representatives of independent public peace groups. We hope espeially that our call will be heeded by the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, whose governments bear the main responsibility for maintaining the safety of the world. 2. We call upon the citizens of both countries to create combined international public groups, based on the principles of independence. Their functions would include: the receipt and analysis of individual proposals on disarmament and promoting trust between nations: the selection of the most interesting and realistic proposals: bringing these proposals to the attention of the respective populations about the possible consequences of the use of nuclear arms, and about all issues concerning disarmament. 3. We appeal to the scientific community, particularly to independent international scientific organizations involved in the campaign for peace, to work on scientific problems directly connected with the preservation of peace. For instance, at the present stage, it is extremely important to develop a unified mathematical method for evaluating the weaponry of the opposing sides. We call upon scientists to create independent research groups to scientifically analyze citizen proposals. 4. We call upon political leaders and the media of both countries to refrain from mutual accustions about intentions to use nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes. We are convinced that such accusations only inflame distrust between the sides and thus make any constructive dialogue impossible. 5. We view as necessary guarantees of the establishment of trust that the USSR and the USA must create conditions for the open exchange of opinions and to inform the publics of both nations on all issues on the process of disarmament. We appeal to the governments of the USSR and the USA to create a special international bulletin (with a governmental guarnatees of distribution in both countries), in which both sides would conduct a dialogue, hold discussions, and would make public reports on the following issues, among others: a. An analysis of disarmament negotiations and the documents of the negotiations b. An exchange of opinions and proposals on possible ways to limit arms, and on disarmament c. An exchange of proposals on the establishment of trust d. An exchange of information on the possible consequences of using nuclear arms. Such a bulletin would provide an opportunity for independent citizens' peace groups to participate in general discussions, publish uncensored materials, especially proposals on disarmament and trust and information on (various) peace movements and the steps they have taken. We appeal to the governments and public opinion of the USSR and the USA since we are convinced that everyone who understands that the future needs to be defended must have a genuine opportunity to defend it! Moscow; June 4, 1982 Batovrin, Sergei Blok, V.R. Fleishgakker, Maria I. Khronopulo, Yu. G. Fleishgakker, V.N. Rozenoer, S.A. Sobkov, I.N. Ostrovskaya, L.A. Krochik, G.M. Kalyuzhny, B.I. (and seventy-four signatures in support) (the appeal is open for signatures.)

  • Forced Labor in the Soviet Union

    The subject of our hearing is forced labor in the Soviet Union. We have long been interested in the subject at the Commission, as many others have. The Commission issued staff reports on the subject as early as August 1980. There is no exact statistics exist in the West on the central question of the total number of Soviets engaged in various types of forced labor. The generally accepted minimum number is 3 or 4 million people-including about 10 000 political prisoners-performing forced labor in places of imprisonment and on penal labor brigades. The robust discussion provided by experts will make clear the vast extent of Soviet reliance on forced labor.

  • Report: The Madrid CSCE Review Meeting

    The second follow-up meeting of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) finally came to a close on September 9, 1983, nearly three years after the deliberations began on November 11, 1980. Burdened throughout by sharply deteriorating East-West relations -- the result of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland and continuing Soviet human rights abuses -- the Madrid Meeting served to focus international attention on Soviet actions which violated the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. Even the formal closing week of the meeting was overshadowed by yet another Soviet atrocity -- the shooting down of a Korean commercial airliner with the loss of 269 lives. Review meetings like Madrid and its predecessor in Belgrade (October 1977 - March 1978) have a three-fold function: a review of the implementation records of the 35 participating states, the consideration of new proposals to enhance the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the adoption of a concluding document. The review of implementation at Madrid was frequently heated, at times tempestuous. Continuing East-West tensions over human rights and other issues determined that the consideration of new proposals and the adoption of a concluding document would necessarily be a protracted affair. While it did not take consensus to criticize implementation failures, CSCE procedures require unanimous consent of all 35 signatory states for agreement to a concluding document. The gulf between East and West was such, particularly on the key issues of human rights and military security, that more than two years of negotiations were necessary to produce the compromise concluding document. The length of these negotiations was also heavily conditioned by external events such as Poland and Afghanistan which had a strong negative effect on the proceedings.

  • Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union

    This joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations was held in response to a request from the American Psychiatric Association to generate an opportunity for discussion about the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. This human rights violation was a common weapon of punishment utilized by the Soviet Union against its citizens. The hearing was held in the context of the Soviet Union withdrawing from the international association that represents psychiatry because it knew it would not be able to abide by the expected standards. Experts in the field of psychiatry presented testimony as this hearing on examined this issue as of the Soviet government in suppressing individuals who voice opposing opinions. The uniqueness of the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union as a widespread and systemic issue was addressed.

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