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Use Magnitsky Act to Fight Russian ThuggeryWednesday, March 28, 2018
In “Kremlin Revenge in Guatemala” (Americas, March 26) Mary Anastasia O’Grady rightly draws attention to the determination of Vladimir Putin’s cronies to hurt those who defy their corruption. The yearslong ordeal of the Bitkov family—their harassment, persecution and ultimate imprisonment in a Guatemalan jail after fleeing Russia—is astonishing because of its cruelty. However, the story also reveals a much larger truth about the global web of complicity that the Kremlin will weave to suppress the rule of law and human rights outside its own borders. As chairman and former chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, which works to advance international human rights, we are encouraged by the release of the first-ever sanctions list under the Global Magnitsky Act late last year. We ask that the administration put those responsible for the harm done to the Bitkovs on this list. These individuals should be held accountable for the flagrant torture and oppression they have inflicted upon this family, once at the helm of a thriving paper-mill company and now unjustly sentenced to years in a Guatemalan jail. Russia’s message of intimidation to the Bitkovs is a familiar one. We’ve seen before what the kleptocracy will do to those who challenge its crimes. We know the stories of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Sergei Magnitsky. In 2012, we championed the Magnitsky Act for the wrongful punishment and death of Magnitsky, who uncovered massive fraud at the hands of Russian authorities. Under the law, those who were complicit in his death would have their U.S. assets frozen and any travel to the U.S. denied. The Global Magnitsky Act, passed four years later, broadens America’s response to human-rights offenders around the world. We have refused to respond to these stories with silence, and we cannot tolerate impunity now. Sen. Roger Wicker (R., Miss.) Sen. Ben Cardin (D., Md.)
The Opioid Crisis and the Dark WebWednesday, March 28, 2018
The opioid crisis is devastating the health and well-being of Americans. Following a dramatic increase in the use of prescription opioid painkillers in the late 1990s, the crisis now kills more than 40,000 people in the United States annually. Experts estimate that millions more abuse prescription opioids each year, many of whom later turn to heroin. Transnational criminal organizations are one of the driving forces behind the intensity of the opioid crisis. By taking advantage of anonymous online marketplaces and legal delivery services, they can smuggle deadly drugs like fentanyl into the United States in a low-risk, high-reward way. This briefing traced the criminal networks that produce these drugs, market them on the dark web, and smuggle them into the United States to better understand how the public and private sectors can more effectively respond to this crisis and save thousands of American lives.
Transnational Criminal Organizations and the Opioid Crisis to Be Examined at Helsinki Commission BriefingThursday, March 22, 2018
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following briefing: THE OPIOID CRISIS AND THE DARK WEB: HOW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINALS DEVASTATE U.S. COMMUNITIES Wednesday, March 28, 2018 3:30 p.m. Russell Senate Office Building Room 485 Live Webcast: www.facebook.com/HelsinkiCommission The opioid crisis is devastating the health and well-being of Americans. Following a dramatic increase in the use of prescription opioid painkillers in the late 1990s, the crisis now kills more than 40,000 people in the United States annually. Experts estimate that millions more abuse prescription opioids each year, many of whom later turn to heroin. Transnational criminal organizations are one of the driving forces behind the intensity of the opioid crisis. By taking advantage of anonymous online marketplaces and legal delivery services, they can smuggle deadly drugs like fentanyl into the United States in a low-risk, high-reward way. This briefing will trace the criminal networks that produce these drugs, market them on the dark web, and smuggle them into the United States to better understand how the public and private sectors can more effectively respond to this crisis and save thousands of American lives. The following panelists are scheduled to participate: Kemp Chester, Associate Director of the National Heroin Coordination Group, Office of National Drug Control Policy John Clark, Vice President and Chief Security Officer, Global Security, Pfizer Inc. Louise Shelley, Director, Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC); Professor, George Mason University
The Good Friday Agreement at 20Thursday, March 22, 2018
Between 1969 and 1999, during a period known as “The Troubles,” almost 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland. On April 10, 1998, the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom—along with Northern Ireland political parties participating in peace talks—reached a political settlement and signed what is now known as the Good Friday Agreement. However, full implementation of the agreement has been challenging. Certain aspects of the agreement remain unfulfilled, including those related to devolved government, police reforms, and accountability for past abuses. Ahead of the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, which will be April 10, the hearing examined the agreement’s achievements as well as aspects that have not been fully implemented, including state collusion in the crimes of paramilitaries.
Helsinki Commission Chair Welcomes New Russia SanctionsThursday, March 15, 2018
WASHINGTON—Following today’s announcement by the Trump administration of the first Russian individuals and entities to be sanctioned under the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (MS) issued the following statement: “I welcome today’s action by the administration. The targets of this first round of sanctions demonstrate that the United States will not tolerate Russian cyberattacks on our critical infrastructure, and we will not accept attempts by the Putin regime to interfere in U.S. elections. I encourage the administration to continue to expand and enforce sanctions against those in Russia who violate our laws and harm our national security.” CAATSA was passed overwhelmingly by Congress in July 2017 and signed into law by President Trump on August 2, 2017. It codifies certain executive order sanctions and directs the administration to impose additional penalties on the Kremlin’s clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of international norms.
Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Smith Introduces Resolution Marking 20th Anniversary of Good Friday AgreementWednesday, March 14, 2018
WASHINGTON—Ahead of the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement on April 10, Helsinki Commission Co-Chair Rep. Chris Smith (NJ-04) and a bipartisan group of members from the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs have introduced a resolution to reaffirm U.S. Congressional support for the agreement and expressed concern about the failure to adequately implement certain aspects of it. “The Good Friday Agreement brought peace to Northern Ireland, a tremendous achievement,” said Rep. Smith. “Yet aspects of the agreement that require accountability for past abuses have been only partially implemented. The British government admits to collusion in paramilitary murders, but in many case has refused to bring to justice state agents guilty of grave crimes—a violation of the agreement and basic international human rights law.” Smith’s resolution, H.Res.777, commends the Good Friday Agreement, calling it “a blueprint for sustainable peace in Northern Ireland.” The resolution also notes that certain aspects of the agreement remain unfulfilled, including those related to devolved government, police reforms, and accountability for past abuses. It also calls on the British Government to establish a full, independent, and public judicial inquiry into the 1989 murder of human rights lawyer Patrick Finucane, and urges the U.S. Secretary of State to appoint a Special Envoy for Northern Ireland. Rep. Eliot Engel (NY-16), the lead Democrat cosponsor of the resolution, said, “For 20 years, the Good Friday Agreement has been the backbone of the northern Irish political process. It provided a path forward for the two communities to live together and govern this long-disputed land in peace. It also helped clear the way for dealing with the challenges that remain: reconciliation, an honest reckoning of what took place, and justice for those who have yet to see it. This resolution rightfully recommits us to the values and principles underlying the Good Friday Agreement and commemorates the Agreement’s first 20 years.” Rep. Richard Neal (MA-01), Chair of the Friends of Ireland, said: “As we recognize the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement this year, the United States must continue to play a meaningful role on the island of Ireland in order to ensure that all aspects of that landmark peace accord are implemented in full. I believe this timely resolution expresses those concerns clearly and in great detail.” “It’s important that we mark this anniversary,” said Smith. “The Good Friday Agreement is as relevant now as ever, given the uncertainties that Brexit has created. And many Americans played key roles in facilitating the Good Friday Agreement, and in promoting its implementation. We still have a role to play in urging reconciliation through truth and justice.” H. Res. 777 was introduced with Reps. Eliot Engel, Joe Crowley (NY-14), Richard Neal, and James McGovern (MA-02) as original cosponsors. Reps. Smith, Engel, and Crowley are Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs, and Rep. Neal is Chair of the Friends of Ireland—both are Congressional caucuses concerned with supporting justice and human rights in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Between 1969 and 1999, during a period known as “The Troubles,” almost 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland. On April 10, 1998, the two Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom—along with Northern Ireland political parties participating in peace talks, reached a political settlement and signed the Good Friday Agreement. However, full implementation of the agreement has been challenging. Rep. Smith has chaired 16 congressional hearings on the Northern Ireland justice and peace process, many of them focusing on issues of police reform and government collusion in the crimes of paramilitary organizations. Four of Rep. Smith’s bills and resolutions have been passed addressing the British government’s role in the murder of human rights lawyer Patrick Finucane, most recently H. Con. Res. 20 (110th Congress, 2007).
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Could U.S. Law Help Punish Russians for Doping Scheme?Wednesday, March 14, 2018
WASHINGTON — In recent months, the United States has punished the following people for alleged human rights violations and corruption: A former Gambian president who led terror and assassination squads. A Chechen leader involved in torture, kidnapping and murder. A Pakistani man at the center of a human-organ trafficking network. And a former Russian sports minister who was implicated in a nation’s systematic doping scheme that tainted several Olympics and other international competitions? Well, not the last person — at least not yet. The United States Anti-Doping Agency is exploring the use of government sanctions to punish Russian officials involved in the state-supported doping program that turned the 2014 Sochi Games into a sham. On Tuesday, Travis Tygart, the chief executive of the agency, attended a workshop here sponsored by the U.S. Helsinki Commission to see if the Global Magnitsky Act, a 2016 law that allows the sanctions, could apply to the Russians. The law calls for individuals who have committed human rights violations or significant corruption to be barred from obtaining United States visas and blocked from using the American financial system, which effectively blacklists them from doing business with major world banks. Powerful, wealthy people don’t like to have their assets frozen. “What happened in Sochi was the worst case of corruption that we’ve ever seen in sport, so why shouldn’t the act apply to us?” Tygart said. “We have to look down every avenue if we’re working for clean athletes, particularly in light of the I.O.C.’s failure do anything.” Tygart said American athletes have been demanding that the antidoping agency find ways to better protect clean athletes in the future so the Russian doping debacle is never repeated. The International Olympic Committee punished Russia, sort of, for its widespread doping. It barred the Russian Olympic Committee, the Russian flag and the Russian national anthem from last month’s Pyeongchang Games, while letting some Russian athletes compete under a neutral flag. It also barred for life one top Russian official: Vitaly Mutko. (He was implicated in the doping program as the Russian sports minister. After the scheme was exposed, he was promoted to deputy prime minister.) Three days after the Pyeongchang Games ended, the I.O.C. reinstated Russia’s Olympic committee — even though two Russian athletes had failed drug tests during the competition. So the United States antidoping group is looking for additional ways to punish the Russians. The Global Magnitsky Act is in its infancy and the sports angle might be a long-shot, but why not try? Besides, the United States government often has to do the dirty work for sports leagues and federations that refuse to police themselves. To take down the principles and athletes involved in the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative steroids scandal that ensnared athletes like Barry Bonds and Marion Jones, law enforcement made arrests and prosecutors took it from there. To address the widespread doping problem in Major League Baseball, Congress had to drag players and management in to testify. To uncover corruption in FIFA, United States prosecutors took the lead and indicted more than two dozen officials and businessmen from all over the world — much to the dismay of soccer’s global establishment. And now it could be the Global Magnitsky Act that delivers a staggering blow to the Russians for corrupting the results of major global sports competitions — including, but certainly not limited to, the Olympics. Among the people who could be targeted for sanctions are Mutko; Yuri D. Nagornykh, the former deputy sports minister; Irina Rodionova, the former deputy director of the Center for Sports Preparation; and others mentioned in an affidavit by Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov, Russia’s former longtime antidoping laboratory chief who blew the whistle on the whole operation. Does such sports corruption rise to the level covered by the law? William F. Browder thinks so. He’s a prominent investor who worked with Congress on the original Magnitsky Act, which was passed in 2012 in response to the death of Browder’s Russian lawyer, Sergei L. Magnitsky. The lawyer had uncovered a $230 million tax-theft scheme before he was arrested and died in prison. “There’s one important issue and that’s the doping scandal at the Sochi Games led to what I believe were murders,” Browder said, referring to two officials from Russia’s antidoping agency who died within two weeks of each other in 2016. “There were a number of people involved who died very suspiciously who were most likely liquidated to cover up a crime.” He added: “There were people who effectively ruined institution of sport and have committed crimes to do so. That would reach the standard of Global Magnitsky, in my opinion. These people involved in sports doping, they’re shameless. So there needs to be really hard consequences. They need to pay a very dear price.” That price would be losing access to their money and the freedom to move about the world. And they would be on a list with some of the world’s worst criminals. “If the Olympic Games are unquestionably tainted, that has huge economic ramifications for not just U.S. athletes, but for U.S. industry, and the U.S. government has an interest in making sure that doesn’t happen,” said Robert G. Berschinski, senior vice president for policy at Human Rights First and a former deputy assistant secretary of state. I asked him if he thought the individuals involved in the Russian doping case could be sanctioned under the law. “Without getting into specifics,” he said, “it seems that you can make a case.” Tygart thinks so, too. He left the workshop on Tuesday thinking that sanctions were a last resort but “a viable option.” Is it truly a viable option, and will the antidoping agency act on it? A certain group of Russians might not be eager to learn the answers.
How to Get Human Rights Abusers and Kleptocrats Sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky ActTuesday, March 13, 2018
The workshop provided human rights organizations, transparency advocates, and congressional staff with the tools they need to effectively petition the U.S. government to review and potentially designate individuals and organizations for sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act. Sanctions experts described, from an operational perspective, how the U.S. government identifies, vets, and ultimately sanctions individuals. They also discussed the evidentiary standards for sanctioning human rights violators vs. those engaged in serious acts of corruption. Finally, panelists shared investigative techniques, communications strategies, and responses to aggressive tactics used to intimidate human rights and transparency advocates.
Helsinki Commission Workshop to Explain Global Magnitsky Sanctions ProcessWednesday, March 07, 2018
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced a workshop to provide human rights organizations, transparency advocates, and congressional staff with the tools they need to effectively petition the U.S. government to review and potentially designate individuals and organizations for sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act. HOW TO GET HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS AND KLEPTOCRATS SANCTIONED UNDER THE GLOBAL MAGNITSKY ACT Tuesday, March 13, 2018 3:00 p.m. Capitol Visitor Center Room SVC 212-10 Live Webcast: www.facebook.com/HelsinkiCommission Sanctions experts will describe, from an operational perspective, how the U.S. government identifies, vets, and ultimately sanctions individuals. They also will discuss the evidentiary standards for sanctioning human rights violators vs. those engaged in serious acts of corruption. Finally, panelists will share investigative techniques, communications strategies, and responses to aggressive tactics used to intimidate human rights and transparency advocates. Panelists include: Rob Berschinski, Senior Vice President, Human Rights First; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Brad Brooks-Rubin, Managing Director, The Sentry; formerly with the Departments of State and Treasury Bill Browder, Founder and Director, Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign Mark Dubowitz, CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies Adam Smith, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; formerly with the National Security Council and Department of Treasury Josh White, Director of Policy and Analysis, The Sentry; formerly with the Department of Treasury The Global Magnitsky Act is a powerful new tool for deterring human rights violations and fighting corruption. Presence on this list freezes any U.S. assets an individual may hold, blocks future transactions within the U.S. financial system, and bans any travel to the United States. By sanctioning individuals who engage in the worst abuses of power, the United States hardens its own system to external abuse while extending moral support and solidarity to those whose fundamental freedoms are curtailed or denied.
Helsinki Commissioner Richard Hudson Highlights Russian Aggression, Decline in Rule of Law in Turkey at Inter-Parliamentary ForumMonday, March 05, 2018
On February 22 and 23, 2018, approximately 240 parliamentarians from 53 countries in North America, Europe, and Central Asia met in Vienna, Austria for the 17th Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Helsinki Commissioner Rep. Richard Hudson (NC-08) represented the United States and actively advocated for U.S. positions and expressed U.S. concerns regarding challenges to security and cooperation in Europe, including Russia’s clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of Helsinki principles. Established in 1991, the OSCE PA is the parliamentary counterpart to the multilateral diplomacy that takes place under the auspices of the OSCE. By meeting each winter in Vienna—home of the OSCE Secretariat—the OSCE PA fosters parliamentary interaction with OSCE officials and the diplomatic representatives of the 57 participating States. The first OSCE PA meetings of the year, and second in importance only to the annual session held each summer, Winter Meetings allow parliamentarians to prepare their work for the coming year and debate issues of immediate concern. Rep. Hudson spoke in all formal sessions of the 2018 Winter Meeting and in the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, where he serves as vice-chair. During the meeting’s opening session, he forcefully denounced Russian aggression against its neighbors and expressed strong support for the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Addressing the OSCE leadership, he said, “The Kremlin needs to halt the violence in eastern Ukraine and withdraw all political, military, and financial support for its proxies, restore Ukrainian control over its international borders, and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moscow must also end its illegal occupation of Crimea. In short, President Putin needs to de-escalate his manufactured conflict.” Later in the Winter Meeting, Rep. Hudson noted the third anniversary of the murder of Russian opposition activist Boris Nemtsov in Moscow. “Three years on, the organizers and masterminds of the Nemtsov assassination remain unidentified and at large,” he said. “The connection between [Russia’s] aggressive external behavior and the retreat from democracy and violation of human rights at home … in my view cannot be stressed strongly enough.” Condemning the continued imprisonment of American citizen and fellow North Carolinian Pastor Andrew Brunson in Turkey, as well Turkey’s recent sentencing of NASA scientist Serkan Golge, Rep. Hudson called for their immediate release and a continued focus on outstanding human rights cases arising from President Erdogan’s assault on democracy in Turkey. He also supported greater energy security through diversification of sources, outlined the U.S. approach to the challenge of nuclear proliferation, and suggested ways for the OSCE more effectively counter terrorism. OSCE PA President George Tsereteli of Georgia, who recently visited New York and Washington, welcomed active U.S. engagement and credited the Helsinki Commission for turning OSCE PA efforts into diplomatic initiatives which can directly improve people’s lives. The next meeting of the OSCE PA will be its annual session, scheduled for Berlin, Germany, in early July.
Boris Nemtsov: 1959-2015Wednesday, February 28, 2018
On February 27, 2015, former Deputy Prime Minister and Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was brutally murdered on the Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge directly in front of the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia. Three years after Nemtsov’s assassination, the Helsinki Commission examined the investigation into Nemtsov’s murder to shed light on the circumstances of the most high-profile political assassination in modern Russia. The Helsinki Commission probed reasons why the plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to a fair trial, the effects Russian propaganda has had on Russian citizens in the suppression of information about the case, and the impact of sanctions resulting from the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act. The Commissioners heard testimony from Zhanna Nemtsova, daughter of Boris Nemtsov; Vladimir Kara-Murza, Chairman of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom; and Vadim Phrokhorov, Lawyer for the family of Boris Nemtsov. Sen. Roger Wicker (MS), chairman of the Helsinki Commission, introduced the witnesses and commended Ms. Nemtsova for her courageous activism against gross human rights violations in Russia. Sen. Ben Cardin (MD), the Helsinki Commission’s ranking senator, highlighted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to suppress democracy in Russia, as well as the Kremlin’s use of military force in Ukraine, interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, and involvement in the deaths of political opponents like Mr. Nemtsov. Sen. Cardin also praised Russian citizens who side with democracy and emphasized that “[members of the Helsinki Commission] are on the side of the Russian people.” Rep. Christopher Smith (NJ-04), Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, discussed how the Magnitsky Act is a breakthrough and a “very useful tool against repressive regimes.” He also asked the panelists for recommendations on actions the United States can and should take to further transparency on the investigation, and expressed interest in initiating a procedure to establish a special representative for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting in July of 2018. “And, so, for Boris himself, we need [...] all parties responsible to be held to account — total transparency,” Rep. Smith said. Ms. Nemtsova, the first to testify, criticized Russian authorities for failing to classify the murder as politically motivated. She also explained how the Russians want to end public debate on sensitive political issues. “You probably are aware of what [the Russians] are afraid of most,” she said. “They’re afraid of the sunshine. My father’s case is one of the sensitive issues, and that’s why it’s important to bring it to the sunshine.” Ms. Nemtsova also criticized the investigative committee for not identifying the individual that orchestrated the murder. In closing, she noted that the Government of Russia has tried—but failed— to erase her father’s memory, and urged the Commissioners to appoint a special representative to oversee the investigation at the July 2018 Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session in Berlin, Germany. During his testimony, Mr. Kara-Murza reiterated the importance of the Boris Nemtsov plaza-naming ceremony that took place on February 27, 2018, exactly three years after his murder. The District of Columbia renamed a section of Wisconsin Avenue, in front of the Russian Embassy, to honor Boris Nemtsov’s legacy. “It is important for those who continue to hold remembrance marches [...] for people who continue Boris Nemtsov’s work by exposing government corruption. You can kill a human being, but you cannot kill what he stood for,” he said. Mr. Kara-Murza noted that experts frequently blur the line between a country and a regime and urged political leaders in Western democracies to “not equate Russia with the regime that is ruling it.” He concluded by urging the Commissioners to initiate a process, similar to the appointment of a special rapporteur, under the auspices of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session being held in July 2018. Mr. Prokhorov reiterated how Russian authorities refused to recognize Boris Nemtsov’s murder as politically motivated and that the evidence led to the inner circle of Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya. “The problem is not that the investigation of the suspects is difficult or impossible. Our principal concern is that the investigative authorities are not willing to make any effort to do so,” Mr. Prokhorov said. Mr. Prokhorov stated that the Russian authorities breached the family of Boris Nemtsov’s right to a fair trial and how “none of the organizers or masterminds have been identified or persecuted to date.” He concluded by urging western political leaders, diplomats, and public figures to engage Russian counterparts in dialogue regarding Boris Nemtsov’s murder when given the opportunity to do so.
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Attorney for Russian ‘Icarus’ Whistleblower Blasts Olympic Anti-Doping EffortMonday, February 26, 2018
WASHINGTON—The attorney for the Russian whistleblower featured in Bryan Fogel’s Oscar-nominated movie “Icarus” is blasting the International Olympic Committee for not taking harsher measures against Russia for the state-sanctioned use of performance enhancing drugs by its athletes. Jim Walden, the attorney for Grigory Rodchenkov, who is at the center of “Icarus,” spoke to the Helsinki Commission on Capitol Hill and said the IOC’s ban on Russian participation in the recent Winter Olympics was “hardly a slap on the wrist.” “In reality, it was a PR stunt—a sham,” he said last week. “After all, Russia has now fielded one of its largest teams at the ongoing Olympics in Pyeongchang. They are permitted to compete not as neutral athletes but in uniforms bearing Russia’s name.” Rodchenkov served as the director of the Moscow Anti-Doping Center, tasked with ensuring compliance with the World Anti-Doping Agency. In fact, he was “ordered by his Kremlin bosses” to assist in “an elaborate system to allow Russia’s athletes to cheat in international competitions, including the Olympics,” Walden said. In the movie, Rodchenkov works with Fogel on his effort to use performance enhancing drugs as a way to show how Lance Armstrong evaded detection for so long. But, as “Icarus” unfolds, Rodchenkov becomes the center of the anti-doping scandal. Rodchenkov is now in hiding in the United States, given the threats from Russia, which has denied the claims. “Russian officials have harassed his family, confiscated his property, and even declared that he should be ‘shot as Stalin would have done,'” Walden said in his testimony. “To discredit Dr. Rodchenkov, even Russian President Vladimir Putin has gotten in the game, accusing the FBI of ‘drugging’ Dr. Rodchenkov to elicit false testimony while, at the same time, calling Dr. Rodchenkov an ‘imbecile’ and ‘mentally unstable.'” Rodchenkov was sued for defamation last week in New York by a group of Russian athletes, in a lawsuit that is being backed by Mikhail D. Prokhorov, who owns the Brooklyn Nets, the New York Times reported. “The IOC has stood by and watched this abhorrent conduct against its main witness without taking any action at all,” Walden said in his appearance before the commission. “Did this embolden Russia? You tell me. Russia reacted by also retaliating directly against the IOC and WADA. They hacked the IOC’s and WADA’s computers, disclosed confidential documents, and even threatened to bring sanctions against IOC members and WADA executives.” He continued, “No one can seriously argue that this cowardly and ineffective response by the IOC is appropriate, will deter future cheating, or is fair to clean athletes, Olympic sponsors, or fans. No one can seriously argue that the IOC’s self-policing system works at all.” Walden called on Congress to pass legislation to add criminal penalties for doping. He said a statute could be similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which sanctions foreign government officials for actions that impact U.S. businesses. The commission is an independent agency that includes members of the House and the Senate, and it monitors human rights and international cooperation in Europe. A spokesman for the IOC did not return a request for comment.
One Year Later, U.S. Consulate Employee in Turkey Remains Behind BarsFriday, February 23, 2018
By Everett Price, Policy Advisor One year ago today, Turkish authorities detained Hamza Uluçay, a 36-year veteran Turkish employee of the U.S. Consulate in the southern city of Adana. After decades of service to the United States, he spent the last year behind bars on unsubstantiated terrorism charges. Authorities initially questioned Uluçay last February about his communications with local Kurdish contacts. Such communication with local contacts, including peaceful Kurdish groups, would have been a routine part of the U.S consulate’s work. Yet within hours of his initial detention, the Turkish press claimed that Uluçay was suspected of inciting public support for the PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that has been engaged in a more than three-decade armed conflict with the Turkish state. After more than a week in custody, Uluçay was released for lack of sufficient evidence only to be re-detained hours later due to a prosecutor’s objections. This time Uluçay was formally arrested and faced graver charges. He stood accused of “membership in a terrorist organization,” a reference purportedly to the PKK and the Gulen movement, the religious and social movement the Turkish government accuses of orchestrating the failed coup in July 2016. Little is known about the prosecution’s evidence against Uluçay. According to Turkish press, authorities seized 21 U.S. dollar bills from Uluçay’s home. As seen in the case of imprisoned U.S. citizen and NASA scientist Serkan Golge, Turkish prosecutors regularly cite one dollar bills as “evidence” of a defendant’s involvement with the Gulen movement. The government claims that the founder of the movement and alleged coup mastermind, Pennsylvania-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, gave blessed dollar bills to his followers, particularly those with serial numbers beginning with “F” for “Fethullah.” Uluçay’s experience is another sobering reminder of the state of the rule of law in Turkey, where a single dollar bill can stand as “evidence” of terrorist activity. Authorities also seized on Uluçay’s possession of books about Kurdish politics and terrorism: typical possessions for a political specialist whose job is to help American diplomats understand conditions in southeast Turkey. U.S. embassies and consulates around the world hire local staff like Uluçay to facilitate engagement with local contacts and to advise on political and cultural dynamics in the host country. Since U.S. diplomats rotate among overseas posts every few years, locally employed staff (or LES, as they are known) often serve as important focal points of continuity and institutional memory in the work of a diplomatic mission. In Uluçay’s case, he offered successive rotations of American diplomats in Adana decades’ worth of established relationships and experience working with local groups and individuals. As LES directly support U.S. diplomatic representation in a country, it is rare for host nation authorities to openly interfere with their work, least of all in countries with friendly relations with the United States. For this reason—and in the absence of credible evidence to support the serious allegations against him—the detention of Uluçay last February represented a significant diplomatic incident. The affront was compounded seven months later when Turkish authorities detained another longtime Turkish employee of a U.S. consulate, this time in Istanbul. Metin Topuz was taken into custody on September 25 and shortly thereafter charged with “membership in a terrorist organization,” “gathering state secrets for espionage,” and “attempting to overthrow [the Government, Turkish National Assembly, and the Constitutional Order].” Topuz had spent more than 20 years working for the U.S. consulate where he helped officers of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration liaise with Turkish counterparts. According to Turkish press reports, his official communications had brought him into contact with suspected Gulen-affiliated officers in the Turkish security services. Topuz, therefore, was accused of belonging to the so-called “Fethullah Terrorist Organization,” or “FETO.” U.S. officials tried in vain to obtain a credible justification from Turkish authorities for Topuz’s arrest only to see them target a second employee of the Istanbul Consulate General for arrest, Mete Canturk. In response to these developments, on October 8 the United States announced the indefinite suspension of non-immigrant visa services in Turkey. Then-U.S. Ambassador to Turkey John Bass announced the decision in a videotaped statement, commenting, “Despite our best efforts to learn the reasons for [Topuz’s] arrest, we have been unable to determine why it occurred or what, if any, evidence exists against the employee.” “This arrest,” he continued, “has raised questions about whether the goal of some officials is to disrupt the long-standing cooperation between Turkey and the United States.” The State Department resumed limited visa services in Turkey on November 6 and restored full services on December 28 after receiving assurances from Turkish authorities that no additional local employees were under investigation, that local staff will not be detained for performing their official duties, and that Turkish officials would provide the United States advanced warning of any future arrest. Nevertheless, both Uluçay and Topuz remain in custody to this day. In addition, on January 31, 2018 authorities placed Canturk, the other LES who was sought by authorities in October, under house arrest allegedly for links to the Gulen movement. Although formal charges have yet to be filed, he has been unable to return to work. The U.S. Helsinki Commission convened a hearing on November 15 to examine the deterioration of Turkey’s rule of law and the ongoing detention of Uluçay, Topuz, and several U.S. citizens on coup-related charges. In his testimony before the Commission, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Turkey Jonathan R. Cohen stated, “It appears to us that Mr. Uluçay and Mr. Topuz were arrested for maintaining legitimate contacts with Turkish government and local officials and others in the context of their official duties on behalf of the U.S. government.” Helsinki Commissioners have raised their cases on several occasions and will continue to do so until they are released. In May, the Helsinki Commission’s bicameral, bipartisan leadership led a letter with the bipartisan House co-chairs of the Lantos Human Rights Commission urging President Trump to raise Uluçay’s case directly with President Erdogan during the latter’s official visit to Washington that month. Later in the year, ten Commissioners wrote to Turkish President Erdogan calling on him to help swiftly resolve Uluçay and Topuz’s cases, among others. While chairing the Commission’s November hearing, Senate Commissioner Thom Tillis said, “The harassment and detention of our consulate staff has…overstepped the bounds of diplomatic conduct among partners.” Sen. Tillis clearly expressed that the United States should “not accept anything short of true and timely justice for our detained consulate staff and our citizens behind bars.” One year since his detention, justice for Hamza Uluçay—like others—remains a distant prospect.
Chairman Wicker Urges Bosnia to Curb CorruptionThursday, February 22, 2018
WASHINGTON—Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Roger Wicker (MS) issued the following statement regarding an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe report on the failure of Bosnia’s court system to tackle corruption in the country: “I am hopeful that Bosnian officials at all levels of government will take the findings of this report to heart. Curbing corruption needs to be a top priority for Bosnia if it hopes to pursue European integration.” Chairman Wicker had previously warned of worsening corruption in Bosnia in a February 4, 2016, interview with RFE/RL. In that interview, he said that he was “troubled that responsible political authorities in Sarajevo tolerate the subversion of the rule of law by entrenched local interests.”
The Russian Doping ScandalThursday, February 22, 2018
In 2016, Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov blew the whistle on Russia’s state-run doping program, revealing a deep web of deception and fraud that he had once helped facilitate. This revelation led to the total ban of Russia from the 2018 Winter Olympics and intensified the debate over corruption in sports. After fleeing Russia for fear of retaliation, Dr. Rodchenkov now lives a precarious life in the United States, relying on whistleblower protections and fearful that Russian agents may one day come knocking. This briefing featured Dr. Rodchenkov’s attorney, Jim Walden, for a conversation on combating fraud in sports and the role of whistleblowers in safeguarding the integrity of international competitions. It also included a discussion of Oscar-winning documentary Icarus, which chronicles Dr. Rodchenkov’s journey from complicit head of Russia’s anti-doping laboratory to courageous whistleblower. During the briefing, Mr. Walden described the elaborate system Dr. Rodchenkov led to bypass doping testing. He further went on to detail the punishments levied on the Russian government by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). He said that the IOC has insufficiently punished Russia for its state-sponsored doping program by not fully banning Russia from the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeonchang. In addition, most of the 43 “lifetime” bans of doped Russian athletes have been overturned by the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Furthermore, Russia has not accepted responsibility and instead seeks to retaliate against Dr. Rodchenkov. For example, Russian officials have harassed Dr. Rodchenkov’s family, confiscated his property and launched an information campaign to discredit him. In addition, three of the guilty Russian athletes have sued Dr. Rodchenkov in New York State Supreme Court for defamation. The Russian government has even retaliated against the IOC and World Anti-Doping agency (WADA) by hacking the IOC’s and WADA’s computers, disclosing confidential documents, and even threatening to bring sanctions against IOC Members and WADA executives. Mr. Walden closed his statement with a legislative solution to combat Russian doping. He proposed creating a doping “long-arm statute” similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or amending the Controlled Substances Act to give the U.S. power to persecute foreign officials and athletes that engage in doping and provide whistleblower protection. In response to a question from Helsinki Commission Policy Advisor Paul Massaro about the IOC’s response to the incident, Mr. Walden said that the IOC’s reaction was ineffective due to corruption, complicity, or ineptitude. When asked about the motivations behind Russia’s doping program, Mr. Walden noted that the doping program is unique to Russia because of the impact on sport in Russian society and added that the success of the Sochi Olympics greatly boosted Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings.
Nemtsov Murder Investigation Under Scrutiny at Upcoming Helsinki Commission HearingWednesday, February 21, 2018
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following hearing: BORIS NEMTSOV, 1959-2015: SEEKING JUSTICE, SECURING HIS LEGACY Wednesday, February 28, 2018 3:30 p.m. Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 138 Live Webcast: http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?type=live&comm=csce&filename=csce022818 Three years after Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was gunned down on a bridge in front of the Kremlin, and one day after the unveiling of Boris Nemtsov Plaza in front of the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the Helsinki Commission will examine the outcome of the official investigation and trial into his assassination. An officer of the Russian Interior Ministry with links to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov was convicted of pulling the trigger; four others were sentenced as perpetrators. Gen. Alexander Bastrykin, the head of Russia’s Investigative Committee has declared the case “solved.” Yet, three years on, the organizers and masterminds of the Nemtsov assassination remain unidentified and at large. The United States has sanctioned both Kadyrov and Bastrykin for gross human rights violations under the Magnitsky Act. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has appointed a Special Rapporteur to assess the status of the case and report on its shortcomings. At this hearing, the Commission will consider whether similar oversight is needed within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This hearing will also examine the particular importance of Boris Nemtsov’s legacy of public and competitive politics as Russia looks to Vladimir Putin’s fourth official term in office. Witnesses scheduled to testify include: Zhanna Nemtsova, Daughter of Boris Nemtsov Vadim Prokhorov, Lawyer for the Nemtsov family Vladimir Kara-Murza, Chairman, Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom
Russian Doping and Fraud to Be Probed at Helsinki Commission BriefingFriday, February 16, 2018
WASHINGTON—The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, today announced the following briefing: THE RUSSIAN DOPING SCANDAL: PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS AND COMBATING FRAUD IN SPORTS Thursday, February 22, 2018 3:30 p.m. Capitol Visitor Center Room SVC 203 Live Webcast: www.facebook.com/HelsinkiCommission In 2016, Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov blew the whistle on Russia’s state-run doping program, revealing a deep web of deception and fraud that he had once helped facilitate. This revelation led to the total ban of Russia from the 2018 Winter Olympics and intensified the debate over corruption in sports. After fleeing Russia for fear of retaliation, Dr. Rodchenkov now lives a precarious life in the United States, relying on whistleblower protections and fearful that Russian agents may one day come knocking. This briefing features Dr. Rodchenkov’s attorney, Jim Walden, for a conversation on combating fraud in sports and the role of whistleblowers in safeguarding the integrity of international competitions. It will also include a discussion of the Oscar-nominated documentary Icarus, which chronicles Dr. Rodchenkov’s journey from complicit head of Russia’s anti-doping laboratory to courageous whistleblower.
Religious Freedom in the National Security Strategy of the United StatesTuesday, February 06, 2018
The National Security Strategy of the United States is the most important comprehensive national security report an Administration releases. During the drafting process there is robust competition inside and outside government over wording. None of the first eight editions of the National Security Strategy, issued from 1987 to 1996, mentioned religious freedom. Legislation and law, grassroots advocacy, and external events like the civil war in Sudan contributed to President William Clinton including the first reference in 1997. From 1997 to 2017, eight of the nine editions, spanning two Democratic and two Republican Administration, have included religious freedom (2010 was the exception). Download the full report to learn more.
Chairman Wicker and Rep. Engel Nominate Natasa Kandic and the Humanitarian Law Center for the 2018 Nobel Peace PrizeWednesday, January 31, 2018
WASHINGTON—Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (MS) and Rep. Eliot Engel (NY-16), the Ranking Member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, today nominated Nataša Kandić and the Humanitarian Law Center for the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize. Ms. Kandić founded the Humanitarian Law Center (Fond za humanitarno pravo) in Belgrade in 1992 to document egregious human rights violations committed during the conflicts associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. More than 25 years later, the Humanitarian Law Center continues to fight for justice for victims of war crimes and to battle the extreme nationalism and strained ethnic tensions that linger in the Western Balkans. The nomination by Chairman Wicker and Rep. Engel reads in part: “The thorough documentation of these crimes by the Center became essential for the provision of justice, both at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which concluded its work at the end of 2017, and in the national war crimes chambers in the countries of the region. Principal perpetrators, including political and military leaders, were held internationally accountable for the first time since the Second World War. Surviving victims, and the traumatized communities in which they lived, were given a chance to find closure and to rebuild. The countries of the region have been encouraged to adhere to the rule of law and to accept the legacy of a horrific past… “As members of the U.S. Congress, we helped shape the international response to the conflicts which erupted in the Western Balkans and we continue to support and encourage post-conflict recovery in the countries of the region. We can think of no person or organization more deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize than Nataša Kandić and the Humanitarian Law Center and are confident that such recognition would further the cause of peace and reconciliation in this and other troubled regions of our world.” The full text of the nomination letter to the Norwegian Nobel Committee can be found below: The Norwegian Nobel Committee Henrik Ibsens gate 51 0255 Oslo, NORWAY Dear Nobel Committee Members: We write to nominate Nataša Kandić and the Humanitarian Law Center for the Nobel Peace Prize of 2018. Ms. Kandic and the Center are based in Belgrade, Serbia. In 1992, Nataša Kandić founded the Humanitarian Law Center (Fond za humanitarno pravo) to document egregious human rights violations committed during the conflicts associated with the former Yugoslavia’s demise. Of particular importance were the conflicts in Croatia (1991 and 1995), in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992 to 1995), and in Kosovo (1998 and 1999). These human rights violations came to be viewed as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide. The gruesome ethnic cleansing campaigns of which they were a part led directly to deaths of more than 100,000 people, the rape and torture of tens of thousands more, and the displacement of millions. The thorough documentation of these crimes by the Center became essential for the provision of justice, both at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which concluded its work at the end of 2017, and in the national war crimes chambers in the countries of the region. Principal perpetrators, including political and military leaders, were held internationally accountable for the first time since the Second World War. Surviving victims, and the traumatized communities in which they lived, were given a chance to find closure and to rebuild. The countries of the region have been encouraged to adhere to the rule of law and to accept the legacy of a horrific past. The Center continued its work throughout the conflicts and in a hostile environment for human rights advocacy. Far too many in Serbia have sought to deny abhorrent crimes or to justify them by demonizing the victims; many more remained silent as ethnic cleansing proceeded unchecked. In contrast, under Kandić’s leadership the Center spoke publicly against acts of aggression, reported on atrocities committed, and rejected the hatred upon which they were based. Although impossible to measure, we can safely assume that the Center’s efforts deterred additional human rights violations. Today, Nataša Kandić remains an inspiration to a new generation of dedicated young professionals who now lead the Humanitarian Law Center as it exposes those who have evaded justice and takes on the extreme nationalism and strained ethnic tensions that linger in the Western Balkans. As members of the U.S. Congress, we helped shape the international response to the conflicts which erupted in the Western Balkans and we continue to support and encourage post-conflict recovery in the countries of the region. We can think of no person or organization more deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize than Nataša Kandić and the Humanitarian Law Center and are confident that such recognition would further the cause of peace and reconciliation in this and other troubled regions of our world. Thank you for considering this nomination. Sincerely, Roger F. Wicker U.S. Senator Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Eliot L. Engel U.S. Representative Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Foreign Meddling in the Western BalkansTuesday, January 30, 2018
Malign outside influence in the Western Balkans, in particular by Russia, is of increasing concern. The lack of a strong legal framework makes countries in the region especially vulnerable to foreign capital that can be used to sow instability, undermine integration, and delay democratic development. In the past decade, Russia has exponentially increased its economic investment in Balkan countries. Without adequate governance and transparency, so-called “corrosive capital” will wield its financial power to distort policy making, lessen the European focus of the countries concerned, and potentially cause instability in the region. The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) has worked with local private and civil society partners to analyze the economic governance gaps that allow “corrosive capital” to gain a foothold in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. According to panelists, Russia’s economic footprint is most obvious in key strategic sectors, including real estate, banking, energy, and mining. Russian foreign direct investment stock is close to 30 percent of Montenegro’s GDP and it exerts both direct and indirect control of approximately 10 percent of the economy of Serbia. The dependency of Balkan countries on Russian imports and financial loans is also a prevalent form of indirect power. As a result, when Montenegro joined NATO in 2017, the Russian Foreign Minister announced that Montenegro had sacrificed its economic relations with Russia. Russia further sanctioned Montenegro by discouraging travel to the country by Russian tourists, characterizing it as a dangerous place. Although the anti-NATO campaign has not succeeded, it did indicate Russian intentions as well as local vulnerability to outside influence. The economic presence of outside actors other than Russia was also discussed. In general, the panelists emphasized the need to diversify foreign direct investment and reduce reliance on capital from non-democratic countries. Transparency in foreign investment and a depoliticization of corporate governance is also necessary. A free, independent and diverse media also will help ensure greater accountability in both the political and economic sectors. Helsinki Commission activity regarding the Western Balkans reflects ongoing concern for the countries of the region. With several Balkan states on the cusp of NATO and EU membership, it is particularly important for these countries to strive for greater democratic development and economic prosperity. The United States has played a significant role in the region, providing political, economic and military support. If not seen through to completion of NATO or EU membership as desired, these states face the continued risk of backsliding.
The harrowing tale of Bill Browder—how an American-born businessman became an enemy of the Russian state, how he has to live in constant fear, never knowing if the long arm of the Kremlin will snatch him, or kill him—is its own kind of daily terror. But what Browder’s story tells us about the way Vladimir Putin operates, and what he might want from this country, should scare us all.
William Browder took his family on vacation in July, though he won't say where because that is one of those extraneous bits of personal information that could, in a roundabout way, get him bundled off to a Siberian prison or, possibly, killed. For eight years, he's been jamming up the gears of Vladimir Putin's kleptocratic machine, a job that seems to often end in jail or death, both of which he'd very much like to avoid. He'll concede, at least, that his leisure travels took him from London, where he lives, through Chicago, where he changed planes. As he walked through a terminal at O'Hare, he got a call from a New York Times reporter named Jo Becker.
"Do you know anything," she asked, "about a Russian lawyer named Natalia Veselnitskaya?"
Browder stopped short. "Yes," he said. "I know a lot about her."
One of the most important things he knew was that Veselnitskaya had spent many dollars and many hours trying to convince Washington that Browder is a criminal. More than a decade ago, Browder was the largest individual foreign investor in Russia, managing billions in his hedge fund. Then, in 2009, one of his attorneys was tortured to death in a Moscow jail after exposing a massive tax fraud committed by Russian gangsters. His name was Sergei Magnitsky, and Browder has spent the years since trying to hold accountable anyone connected to Sergei's death. The most significant way is through the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, a 2012 U.S. law that freezes the assets and cripples the travel of specific Russians, many of whom have allegedly laundered millions of dollars in the West.
The Kremlin hates that law. Putin's hold on power requires the loyalty of dozens of wealthy oligarchs and thousands of complicit functionaries, and their loyalty, in turn, requires Putin to protect the cash they've stashed overseas. Putin hates the law so much that he retaliated by banning Americans from adopting Russian children—yes, by holding orphans hostage—and has said that overturning the Magnitsky Act is a top priority.
That's where Veselnitskaya comes in. As a lawyer, she represented a Russian businessman trying to recover $14 million frozen by the Magnitsky Act. More important, she was involved in an extensive 2016 lobbying and public-relations campaign to weaken or eliminate the act, in large part by recasting Browder as a villain who conned Congress into passing it. That was not empty political spin for an American audience: The Russians really do want Browder in prison. In 2013, a Russian court convicted him in absentia (and Sergei in his grave) of the very crime Sergei uncovered and sentenced Browder to nine years in prison. Later, it got worse. In April 2016, Russian authorities accused Browder of murdering Sergei—that is, of killing the person on whose behalf Browder had been crusading, and who the Russians for seven years had insisted was not, in fact, murdered.
The campaign was oafish yet persistent enough that Browder thought it wise to compile a 26-page presentation on the people behind it. Veselnitskaya appears on five of those pages.
"I've been trying to get someone to write this goddamned story," Browder told Becker on July 8. "She's not just some private lawyer. She's a tool of the Russian government."
But why, Browder wanted to know, was Becker suddenly interested?
"I can't tell you," she said. "But I think you'll be interested in a few hours."
Browder flew off to the place he won't name, switched on his phone, and scrolled to the Times website. He drew in a sharp breath.
He exhaled. F***.
Donald Trump Jr. told the Times that the June 9, 2016, meeting had been about adoptions, which demonstrated either how out of his depth he was or how stupid he thought reporters were. If Veselnitskaya had been talking about adoption, she of course had been talking about the Magnitsky Act.
Which meant she'd also been talking about Bill Browder.
He read the story again, closely. Browder wasn't sure what the implications were. But if he'd known about it in real time—that the staff of a major-party presidential candidate was listening intently to those who accuse him of murder and want him extradited and imprisoned—he would have been terrified.
"Putin kills people," Browder said to me one afternoon this autumn. "That's a known fact. But Putin likes to pretend that he doesn't kill people. So he tends to kill people he can get away with killing."
Browder did not say this as if it were a revelation. (And technically it's an allegation that Putin has people killed, albeit one so thoroughly supported by evidence and circumstance that no one credibly disputes it.) Rather, he told me that by way of explaining why he was telling me anything at all: The more often and publicly he tells the story of Sergei Magnitsky, the less likely he'll be to get poisoned or shot or tossed out a window, which has happened to a number of Putin's critics. If anything does happen to him, he reasons, the list of suspects would be short.
He spoke softly, methodically, though with great efficiency; not scripted, but well practiced. We were in the conference room of his offices in London. Afternoon light washed through a wall of windows, threw bright highlights onto his scalp, sparked off the frame of his glasses. Browder is 53 years old, medium build, medium height, medium demeanor, and was wearing a medium-blue suit. He does not look like a threat to Russian national security, which the Kremlin declared him to be 12 years ago. Still, there is a hint of steel, something hard and sharp beneath all of the mediumness; if he confessed that he'd served in the Special Forces, it would be a little surprising but not shocking.
It was late September, and Donald Trump had been president for 248 days. In the weeks after the election, Browder was "worried and confused." Trump has a creepy habit of praising Putin, but he'd also surrounded himself with Russia hard-liners like General James Mattis, Nikki Haley, and Mike Pompeo—secretary of defense, ambassador to the United Nations, and director of the CIA, respectively. Browder war-gamed the Magnitsky Act but didn't see any way that Trump could kill it—Congress would have to repeal the law—only a chance that he might refuse to add more names to the target list. (Five people were added to the list last January, bringing the total to 44.) He figured the same was true with the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which President Obama signed shortly before leaving office, expanding the targeted-sanctions tool to human-rights abusers worldwide. The Russians hate that law, too, because having "Magnitsky" in the title reminds the entire planet where the standard was set and by whom.
The first months of the new administration unspooled, spring into summer. Trump's flirtation with Putin persisted, but with no practical effect. "The Russians got nothing," Browder said. Congress, in fact, imposed its own sanctions on Russia for meddling in the 2016 election, cutting Trump out of the loop entirely. "I watch this like a hawk," Browder said, "and so far they've gotten nothing. There's not a single piece of Russian policy that's gone Putin's way."
But then, in July, the Times reported that Veselnitskaya had met with Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort, Trump's campaign manager at the time, in June 2016. That shifted the calculus. "America has been my staunchest ally," Browder said. "It wasn't an assumption but a question: Had they flipped my biggest ally?"
That was still an open question when we met in London. Much more had been reported about Trump and Russia. Other contacts and communications were known, and details kept evolving, an endless, sloppy churn of information. There was more, too, about the meeting with Veselnitskaya, which happened two weeks after Trump secured the nomination: It was attended by eight people in all, including Rinat Akhmetshin, who is usually described as a former Russian military-intelligence officer, though that generously assumes that any Russian spook is ever fully retired from the spy game. Browder has another PowerPoint presentation on him. Additionally, Manafort's notes on the meeting reportedly mentioned Browder by name.
This is all bad. "They were in a meeting to discuss Bill Browder, the Magnitsky Act, and how to get the Magnitsky Act repealed," he said. "Now, what [the Russians] were offering in return, we don't know. But if it had just been a courtesy meeting, only one of [the Trump team] would have showed up."
Maybe no one will ever know what, if anything, the Russians offered. But there's no doubt what they wanted, and how badly. In a four-page memo prepared for the meeting by Veselnitskaya (and later obtained by Foreign Policy), the Magnitsky Act was inspired by "a fugitive criminal" who ripped off the Russian treasury and then went on a worldwide publicity tour to, apparently, cover it up. "Using the grief of the family of Magnitsky to his own advantage, Browder exposes them as a human shield to distract attention from the details of his own crime," she wrote. Passage of the Magnitsky Act, moreover, marked "the beginning of a new round of the Cold War."
That is an assertion as grandiose as it is belligerent. And yet it is not wholly inaccurate. To understand why the Kremlin is so perturbed, it helps to understand Bill Browder. In many ways, he is the Rosetta Stone for decoding the curious relationship between the Trumps and the Russians.
Browder's grandfather Earl was a communist. He started as a union organizer in Kansas and spent some time in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, where he married a Jewish intellectual and had the first of his three sons, Felix. The family moved to Yonkers in 1932, where Earl became secretary general of the Communist Party USA. He ran for president twice, in 1936 and 1940, and Time magazine put him on its cover in 1938 above the headline COMRADE EARL BROWDER. His fortunes fell in 1941, when he was convicted of passport fraud. His four-year sentence was commuted after 14 months, and he was released into relative obscurity until the 1950s, when he was harassed by the House Un-American Activities Committee.
Bill's grandmother steered her boys away from politics and toward academics, in which they wildly overachieved. Felix enrolled at M.I.T. at the age of 16, graduated in two years, and had a Princeton Ph.D. in math when he was 20. He met his wife, Eva, at M.I.T., a Jewish girl who'd fled Vienna ahead of the Nazis and spent her teenage years in a tenement with her impoverished mother.
Felix and Eva had two boys. Their first, Thomas, took after his father: University of Chicago at 15, doctoral student in physics at 19. Their second, Bill, did not. He liked to ski and smoke and drink. He got kicked out of a second-tier boarding school and barely got into the University of Colorado, which was fine with him because it was a notorious party school. By his account, he spent his formative years rebelling against everything his leftist-intellectual family held sacred.
"Rejecting school was a good start, but if I really wanted to upset my parents, then I would have to come up with something else," he wrote in his 2015 book, Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man's Fight for Justice. "Then, toward the end of high school, it hit me. I would put on a suit and tie and become a capitalist. Nothing would piss off my family more than that."
He started studying, transferred to the University of Chicago, got into a two-year pre-MBA program at Bain & Company, in Boston. He parlayed that and an essay about Comrade Earl Browder—from communist to capitalist in two generations!—into a seat at Stanford. Out of genealogical curiosity, he began thinking about Eastern Europe. "If that's where my grandfather had carved out his niche," he wrote, "then maybe I could, too." He got a job with a consulting firm and moved to London in August 1989. Three months later, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union crumbled. Eastern Europe was wide open for business.
His first account was consulting for a Polish bus manufacturer that was bleeding cash. It was miserable work in a miserable little city, but while he was there his translator explained the financial tables in the local newspaper. With the fall of communism, nationalized companies were being privatized and their stocks were offered at fire-sale prices: A company with $160 million in profits the previous year had a stock valuation of only $80 million.
Browder invested his entire savings, $2,000, in Polish stocks. He eventually walked away with $20,000. He'd found his niche.
By 1993, he was in Moscow, investing in staggeringly undervalued stocks: He invested $25 million and turned a $100 million profit. With money that good and almost no Western competition, Browder, in 1996, raised enough cash to open his own fund, Hermitage Capital.
Over the next decade, Hermitage did exceptionally well. The downside, though, was that the economy wasn't transitioning from communism to capitalism so much as it was devolving into gangsterism. Corruption was endemic. A handful of oligarchs looted and swindled at their leisure. Browder countered by positioning himself as an activist shareholder; he and his staff would piece together who was ripping off what, name names, try to impose a modicum of order on a lawless system.
When Vladimir Putin rose to power, Browder believed he was a reformer eager to purge the kleptocracy. In 2003, for example, Putin arrested the country's richest man, oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky, charged him with fraud, and displayed him in a cage in a courtroom until his inevitable conviction. In the context of the time, many critics saw the ordeal as a capricious show trial orchestrated by an authoritarian thug.
Not Browder. "I would trust Putin any day of the week," he told The Washington Post in early 2004. "It's like being in a lawless schoolyard where there's bullies running around and beating up all us little people, and then one day a big bully comes along and all the little bullies fall into line. That's what the state is supposed to be—the big bully."
But Putin, he discovered, wasn't pushing for good corporate governance. He was taking over the rackets. Putin put Khodorkovsky in a cage for the same reason Vito Corleone put a horse's head in Jack Woltz's bed: to send a message. Oligarchs could steal, but they had to pay tribute.
Oligarchs no longer needed to be named and shamed; they needed to be kept in line and to keep earning. At that point, an activist shareholder like Browder became an expensive nuisance. Browder was kicked out of the country on November 13, 2005.
For a while, he thought the Russian bureaucracy had made a mistake by canceling his visa, confusing him with someone else, perhaps, or misfiling some paperwork. He enlisted the help of British diplomats—Browder had been a British citizen since 1998—to no avail. There had been no mistake. Browder had been declared a threat to Russian national security.
Hermitage Capital remained in business, though, its office run by Browder's staff while he oversaw operations from London. But in Moscow, the pressure only increased. In June 2007, security forces raided Hermitage and the office of the law firm it employed. They carted away computers and files and, interestingly, all the corporate seals and stamps. At first, none of that made sense.
But then Sergei Magnitsky, a 36-year-old Muscovite who handled tax matters for Hermitage, started digging around. He eventually discovered three of Hermitage's holding companies had been used by Russian gangsters to swindle $230 million in tax rebates. It was a straight-up robbery of the Russian treasury. The scam wasn't unheard of, except the amount was perhaps the largest such tax fraud ever uncovered in Russia.
Browder and his staff reported the theft to the authorities and the media in the summer of 2008. They even named suspects, including some of the security officials who'd earlier been involved in the office raids. Nothing happened. Then, a few months later, on November 24, 2008, Sergei was arrested at his home.
He was held for nearly a year in various prisons, overrun with rats and damp with sewage. According to complaints Sergei wrote, he was fed porridge infested with insects and rotten fish boiled into mush. He contracted pancreatitis and gallstones but was refused treatment. Yet he was repeatedly told he would be released if he would recant his allegations and, instead, implicate Browder as the mastermind of the tax scam. He refused every time.
Almost a year after he was arrested, desperately ill, Sergei was handcuffed to a bed rail in an isolation cell. Eight guards beat him with rubber truncheons. A little more than an hour later, he was dead.
Before Sergei was killed, Browder had been lobbying anyone he could think of to pressure the Russians into releasing his accountant. One of the agencies he approached in the spring of 2009 was the U.S. Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency in Washington that monitors human rights in 57 countries, including Russia.
Kyle Parker, one of the Russia experts there, wasn't interested. He knew who Browder was—the money manager who'd championed Putin, the guy who'd made the rounds of Western capitals a few years earlier trying to get his visa restored. He assumed that's what Browder was still after. "Not gonna be able to make it," he e-mailed a colleague scheduling the meeting. "Unless much has changed, I see this meeting as info only and would not support any action on our part."
He eventually met with Browder, though, and he listened to the story of Sergei. Parker understood, but it didn't seem especially uncommon. "I was thinking: Why is Bill trying to suck us into a pissing match between competing criminal groups?"
Parker didn't even include Sergei in a 2009 letter to Obama highlighting the commission's most pressing concerns.
After Sergei had been killed, Browder went back to the Helsinki Commission.
Parker told him how sorry he was. He told him that he cried when he heard Sergei was dead, that he read about it through teary eyes on the Metro, riding the Red Line home to his wife and kids. He said he was going to help.
"Here you have this Russian hero almost of a literary quality in Sergei Magnitsky," Parker told me. "He wasn't a guy who went to rallies with a bullhorn and protested human-rights abuses in Chechnya. He was a bookish, middle-class Muscovite. I see Sergei metaphorically as that Chinese guy standing in front of the tanks, but with a briefcase. He provided an example for all the other Russians that not everybody goes in for the deal, not everybody is corrupt, not everybody looks the other way when people are swindled."
What Browder wanted was some form of justice for Sergei, though what form that would take was unclear. He'd researched his options for months. The Russians weren't going to prosecute anyone—officially, Sergei died of heart failure. There was no international mechanism to hold Russian nationals criminally accountable in another country. "Eventually," Browder said, "it became obvious that I was going to have to come up with justice on my own."
He outlined a three-pronged approach. One was media, simply getting Sergei's name and his death and the reasons for it into the public consciousness. He talked to reporters, and he produced a series of YouTube videos, short documentaries on the people allegedly involved in Sergei's death.
The second was tracing the money. "They killed him for $230 million," Browder said, "and I was going to find out where that money went." It was parceled out to dozens of people, tucked away in Swiss accounts and American real estate and Panamanian banks, some of it held by proxies; part of it allegedly ended up in the account of a Russian cellist who happened to be a childhood friend of Putin's. By mining bank transfers and financial records, Browder and his staff have accounted for much of it, including $14 million allegedly laundered by a Cypriot company into Manhattan property. (The Justice Department froze those funds in 2013 but settled with the company, Prevezon, last summer for $5.9 million. Prevezon's owner, a Russian named Denis Katsyv, is represented by Natalia Veselnitskaya. The case did not allege that he had any role in Magnitsky's death.)
The final prong was political. Browder had heard about an obscure regulation that allows the State Department to put visa restrictions on corrupt foreign officials. But in the spring of 2010, the Obama administration was attempting to normalize relations with Russia—a "reset," as Obama famously put it. People die horrible deaths every day, and it's terrible and it shouldn't happen. But Russia is also a large country with a significant sphere of geopolitical influence and a lot of nuclear weapons. In that context, a dead middle-class tax lawyer wasn't relevant.
But what if, Parker suggested, they went to Congress? What if the legislature, rather than the administration, took action?
That was also a long shot. Getting any law passed is difficult, let alone one the administration opposes. But Browder told Sergei's story to congressional committees and individual senators and congressmen, and he kept telling it until the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act was passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law 11 days before Christmas 2012.
The act originally named 18 Russians, including bureaucrats implicated in the original scam; investigators Sergei had accused of being involved and getting a cut of the $230 million; jailers who tormented him; and two alleged killers. As more of the stolen money was traced, more names were added to the list. Everyone on it is banned from entering the United States and, more damaging, cut off from the American banking system. That has a ripple effect: Legitimate financial institutions all over the world monitor the Treasury Department list of sanctioned individuals and are loath to do business with anyone on it. "That's what people hate about it the most," Browder said. "It makes you a financial leper."
And that matters to Putin, Browder maintains, because the Russians on the list are not independently wealthy, like, say, Bill Gates or Richard Branson. "They're dependently wealthy," he said. "They're dependent on Putin." If the deal is that corrupt Russians can keep their cash in return for their loyalty, the Magnitsky Act is an enormous thorn in Putin's side. If he can't protect anyone's pilfered money, what's the point of loyalty? Putin surely understands that, because he was so transparently rattled: Taking orphans hostage is not the reasoned reaction of a man merely annoyed.
Browder initially wanted to call the law the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act. But Parker never took to that. "Banning some corrupt officials from coming here isn't even close to justice," he said. "But it's a legislative monument to Sergei Magnitsky until one day Russia builds a stone monument to him. Because I have no doubt he'll be seen as the Russian patriot and hero that he was."
Not quite three weeks after the Times broke the story of Veselnitskaya lobbying the Trump campaign to get rid of the Magnitsky Act, Browder testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about, primarily, how Russian operatives wield influence and frame their propaganda. Eight years after he'd started targeting a handful of Russian crooks, Browder was suddenly very relevant to a much larger political storm.
He flew home to London after he testified but had to return to the United States in early August. He checked in at an airline counter in Heathrow but was told there was a problem with his visa. He'd been flagged by Interpol, which had issued a red notice on him. It's basically an international arrest warrant, and it was the fourth requested by the Russians for Browder. Technically, a member nation is supposed to extradite him to the country that asked for the notice. But the British, along with other sensible Western nations, stopped taking Russia's attempts regarding Browder seriously years ago.
In the end, it was only an inconvenience. But what if he'd been in, say, Finland when that notice popped up? The Finns are fine people, but they also have a 500-mile border with Russia. Would letting Browder go be worth risking an international incident with a bigger, more aggressive neighbor? He can make a reasonable case that, no, he would not be worth it. "I'm very realistic about who's coming to my defense," he said. "I am my defense."
So he's careful. He avoids countries that might be friendly to Putin. Much of the Third World is out. So is Hong Kong. He'd be fine in Japan, but only if he didn't fly over Russian airspace. What if the plane has trouble and makes an emergency landing in Novosibirsk? That's where Khodorkovsky was seized and hauled off to a cage.
Even in London, he's cautious. He won't talk about his family or where he lives. He varies his schedule and his route to work every day. He doesn't eat in the same restaurant twice in succession, or in any restaurant with predictable frequency; Russian agents have reputedly twice poisoned dissidents in London. He told me the British government has rebuffed at least a dozen requests to extradite him, and American intelligence has warned him that Russian agents planned to grab him off the street.
Years ago, a Russian living in London came to Browder's staff with information about certain wealthy, corrupt people in Moscow. He was cagey and shifty and, at first, it seemed like he might be a Russian agent trying to plant false clues. But his information checked out and Browder learned who he really was. His name was Alexander Perepilichnyy, and he was nervous because he believed he was on a Russian hit list.
On November 10, 2012, Perepilichnyy dropped dead in front of his house in Surrey. There was no obvious cause of death—no heart attack or stroke or aneurysm—and an inquest wasn't opened until last June. Perepilichnyy wasn't a well-known dissident, so no one thought to take a hard look when he died. "They got away with it," Browder said, meaning the Russians. "That's a perfect example of why you don't want to be an anonymous guy who drops dead."
So Browder is deliberately not anonymous. He does not live in cloistered fear. When a car service got confused trying to pick him up for a photo shoot—definitely a way to not be anonymous—we took the Tube a few stops, then walked through Kentish Town to the studio. There was no security, just two men wandering around London. He has hobbies that he asked I not name, but none of them are solitary or sedentary. "One thing I can tell you," he said, "with the threat of death hanging over you, you live life to the fullest." He laughed a little.
In this new version of his life, Browder is still most often referred to as a financier, but that's only marginally true. He gave all his investors their money back, and manages only his own now. Justice for Sergei—and aggravating Putin—is his full-time job. His staff of 11 tracks money launderers, deciphering which flunky is fronting for which oligarch, sniffing out the rest of that $230 million. He lobbies other governments to pass their own versions of the Magnitsky Act. The United Kingdom has one, as does Estonia. Lithuania is close, and Canada passed one in October. "Unconstructive political games," Putin told a Canadian interviewer immediately after, orchestrated by "the criminal activities of an entire gang led by one particular man, I believe Browder is his name."
And Putin wasn't finished. A week later, Russia slipped another red notice into Interpol's system. For the second time in three months, Browder was temporarily barred from entering the U.S. It's relentless, Putin clawing at him, thrashing. "Their main objective is to get me back to Russia," he said. "And they only have to get lucky once. I have to be lucky every time."
"Everything Bill's done has cost him tremendously," Parker said. "It's cost him money, restricted his personal freedom. And he didn't have to. He was out of Russia. He could have done what many did and walked away. Bad things happen, right? But here's a guy who's proven whatever he needed to prove to himself. He made his money. Now here's a way to find meaning. It's also a debt of honor."
No, it's more than that. "It's penance," Browder said. Sergei Magnitsky was an ordinary Muscovite who happened to work for an American who annoyed Vladimir Putin. "Sergei was killed because of me. He was killed instead of me." He let that hang there a moment. "So, yeah, it's all penance."
Sean Flynn is a GQ correspondent.
This story originally appeared in the December 2017 issue with the title "Putin Enemy No.1."