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Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan Set the Stage for a New Political System; Ethnic Tensions Remain a Key Obstacle to Stability
Monday, December 20, 2010

By Janice Helwig and Shelly Han

The OSCE concluded that although the October 10, 2010 elections in Kyrgyzstan were conducted peacefully – no small feat following the April 2010 revolution – and demonstrated a significant increase in pluralism as compared to previous elections, there remains an “urgent need for profound electoral legal reform.” Two Helsinki Commission staff members traveled to Kyrgyzstan to observe the election as part of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation and were deployed in the Osh and Kara-suu region. Although the staff experience was not inconsistent with the overall OSCE conclusion, Osh and the surrounding region appear to have had more problems during the election than other areas of the country.

In June, the constitution had been changed through a referendum to give the parliament a stronger role than the President. The improvement in the conduct of the election may have been partly a result of that change in that, because of the new parliamentary system and the relatively large number of parties competing, no one party or group could manipulate the election nationwide (which appeared to have been the case in the 2009 presidential elections). In fact, the close result which divided parliamentary seats among several main parties was a good indicator of an open competition. Nevertheless, there were some problems at the local level, where there may have been attempts to influence the outcome. In the Osh and Kara-suu region, there appeared to be problems particularly with the voters list, the inking process, and the counting process.

For example, in almost all the polling visited by Commission staff, about a third of those who had voted had added themselves to the additional list with just their ID. Other international observers reported similar findings. This would indicate that either the main voters list was extremely inaccurate, or something more problematic may have been going on. In one polling station, a man tried to add himself to the additional list but was turned down while the staff was present; he clearly was not satisfied and went back in to try again as they left. Another international observer in the neighboring Uzgen area reported the same pattern, but, suspiciously, only in polling stations easily accessible from the main road. According to the election law, the registration of any voter on the additional list should have been counterchecked and signed by an adviser or observer in the polling station, but that did not happen during the day. At the closing in one polling station, the Chairwoman had a colleague counter sign all 225 additions to the list.

The inking procedure also appeared to be a problem. In theory, anyone adding themselves to the additional list should not have been able to vote anywhere else because of the use of invisible ink sprayed on each voter’s thumb. However, spraying and checking for ink in the polling stations appeared to be haphazardly conducted. Domestic observers had to stay in their chairs across the room and could not see whether the ink checker was effective. Moreover, when Commission staff asked people who had been inked earlier it the day to put their thumb under the light, little or no ink was visible. The ink seemed not to work all of the time, or perhaps to have washed off easily.

There also were significant problems in processing protocols during the counting process in the Kara-suu district. At the district counting station, the halls and stairways were lined with polling station chairpersons busily erasing and refilling in their protocols. Protocols and stamps were strewn around everywhere. It may have been that the chairpersons were simply trying to get their numbers to add up properly so they would be accepted by Shailoo, the computerized vote-counting system. On the other hand, the numbers also could have been in the process of being changed to influence the outcome. Regardless of intent, last minute changes to protocols made unilaterally by chairpersons should not have been allowed as no observers were present and there were no controls in place to prevent fraud.

Official turnout figures said that Osh had the highest voter turnout in the country, at about sixty-six percent. However, Commission staff did not see polling stations with a turnout higher than forty-five percent, nor did other international observers in the area. Interestingly, the turnout in ethnic Uzbek areas appeared to be about the same as in ethnic Kyrgyz areas. Many ethnic Uzbeks said they were “voting for peace,” although it was not clear whether that meant that moving forward with any new parliament would be positive, or if it meant that voting for a certain party would benefit ethnic Uzbeks. Some ethnic Uzbek community leaders had said prior to election day that most political parties had offered their communities money and/or infrastructure improvements in exchange for their votes.

Ethnic tensions remain a concern

Prior to election day, Commission staff were able to visit several of the Osh neighborhoods destroyed in the June violence, as well as one tent camp. The scale and scope of the destruction in ethnic Uzbek areas was enormous. And in mixed neighborhoods – for example near Shark – the house-by-house, business-by-business singling out of Uzbek-owned structures for destruction was clear. All of the victims staff spoke with appeared to be still afraid and did not see any future in Kyrgyzstan. All wanted to leave but did not have the means to do so. None wanted to go to Uzbekistan; rather they wanted to go to Russia or anywhere else where they might find economic opportunities. While rebuilding of homes was clearly progressing, the question of earning a living in the long term was an overwhelming concern.

The divide between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz is wide and seems to be growing. Many ethnic Kyrgyz seem to genuinely believe that ethnic Uzbeks were responsible for the violence, and even burned down their own houses in an effort to get international attention. Kyrgyz media and the government seem to be reinforcing this message. If the region is to move forward and avoid future violence, there needs to be some mechanism for accountability and reconciliation. However, so far only ethnic Uzbeks have been arrested and put on trial, and the trials appear to have been unfairly conducted. Ethnic Uzbek defendants have been routinely attacked by ethnic Kyrgyz mobs during the trials, as have media representatives trying to report on the proceedings. In general, journalists and human rights defenders fear retaliation if they report on abuses against ethnic Uzbeks; as a result, there have been few voices speaking out. Standing in the ruins of his home, a man shows Commission staff the photo of his sister, who was killed during the violence in June.

This ethnic divide is likely to fester unless something is done to build confidence between the main ethnic groups and provide economic opportunities for all. Moreover, disenfranchised youth could be vulnerable to recruitment by extremist organizations. The new government will face many challenges, not least addressing continuing ethnic tension in the south. 

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But the country’s terrible human rights record complicated the development of a closer relationship.  President Islam Karimov allows no opposition, torture is pervasive, for years human rights groups were unregistered, and Tashkent has waged war against Muslims who wanted to practice their faith outside state-approved channels.    Now, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a terrorist group affiliated with al-Qaeda, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir is virulently anti-Western and anti-Semitic.  But Karimov’s exclusive reliance on repression only exacerbates matters and has probably supplied cadres for radical and terrorist organizations.   After September 11, 2001, we needed Uzbekistan’s cooperation and Karimov was delighted to help.  Uzbekistan gave us a military base and the March 2002 agreement on strategic cooperation was signed in Washington.  We agreed to support Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan pledged to move towards democracy. But Karimov only implemented the democratization commitments just enough for Tashkent and Washington to point to “progress.” Gradually, frustration grew on both sides.  It was just a matter of time before the arrangement collapsed.   People often date the breakdown of U.S.-Uzbek relations to the events that happened in Andijon on May 12 and 13, 2005. We did not condone the violent takeover of government buildings in that city.  But we condemned the indiscriminate shootings in the square that followed and when we called for an independent, international investigation, Karimov balked.    As we all know, he began to move against U.S. NGOs.  Few remain in Uzbekistan today.  Then we were unceremoniously booted out of the K-2 base.  But ties had actually soured long before, because Karimov saw the Stars and Stripes behind the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz revolutions. Most alarming for Tashkent was the Tulip Revolution which proved that “people power” was possible in Central Asia.    Like President Putin, Central Asian leaders insist that a sinister hand, based in Washington but using American NGOs working in the region, plotted the downfall of Eduard Shevardnadze, Leonid Kuchma and Askar Akaev -- and is now gunning for them.  So a split has developed in Central Asia.  Kyrgyzstan, though plagued by criminality and sometimes seemingly chaotic, is better off than with the previous corrupt regime and well disposed towards the U.S.    Uzbekistan’s Karimov sees us as his greatest strategic danger; he has cracked down even harder and state-run media accuse us of trying to enslave Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are suspicious of our allegedly revolutionary goals but still want to maintain good ties – as long as they are not threatened by civil society.  And Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan surely assume that we want their oil and gas too much to stir the pot. What can we do about this?  How can we try to make things better, especially keeping in mind that U.S. influence is limited?   This week I will be re-introducing my Central Asia bill, to help ensure that the United States is doing everything possible to encourage these governments to respect human rights and democratization.  The act will also bring greater consistency to U.S. policy, creating a framework to guide our bilateral relations in Central Asia.   The Central Asia Democracy and Human Rights Promotion Act supports the President’s freedom agenda by providing $118 million in assistance for human rights and democracy training and $15 million for increased Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America broadcasting.    The new Act will also establish a certification mechanism for the distribution of assistance to each government. The Secretary of State will determine whether each has made “significant improvements in the protection of human rights.”  This system will have a national security waiver and is modeled on the current system in Foreign Ops appropriations for Kazakhstan and expanded for all five countries.   In addition, considering the forced return of Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the new Act will require the Secretary of State to report on whether any government is “forcibly returning Uzbeks or other refugees who have fled violence and political persecution.” This is modeled on language regarding Kyrgyzstan in Foreign Ops appropriations and expanded for all five countries.    Notably, my new legislation will create a sanctions section for Uzbekistan.  First, the bill concretizes into law the limitations already in place in Foreign Ops appropriations. The limitation prevents funding to the Uzbek Government unless the Secretary of State determines the government is “making substantial and continuing progress” towards respect for human rights and that the Uzbek Government begins a “credible international investigation” of Andijon.   In addition, the new Act mirrors European Union sanctions by establishing a visa ban and an export ban on munitions.  The sanctions section also establishes an asset freeze for Uzbek officials, their family members, and their associates implicated in the Andijon massacre or involved in other gross violations of human rights.   Ladies and gentlemen, it is hard to promote democratization in strategically important countries whose leaders want to keep all real power in their own hands. Our task is especially complicated by the fact that Russia – which has re-emerged as a major international player, thanks to sky-high oil prices – is working hard to undermine our efforts.  But I think the measures which I’ve outlined here in brief offer a good chance of achieving our goals.   Thank you for your attention.  I look forward to hearing the other participants’ views and your comments.   

  • Tools for Combating Anti-Semitism: Police Training and Holocaust Education

    The Helsinki Commission held a briefing on Holocaust education tools and law enforcement training programs undertaken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Co-Chairman Smith cited the vicious murder of Ilan Halimi as a reminder of the need to redouble efforts to combat anti-Semitism and to speak out when manifestations of related hatred occur.  The briefing highlighted specific programs which promote awareness of the Holocaust and provide law enforcement professionals with the tools to investigate and prosecute hate-inspired crimes.   Paul Goldenberg, a Special Advisor to ODIHR who designed the law enforcement training program which assists police to recognize and respond to hate crimes, stressed that law enforcement professionals must be recognized as an integral part of the solution.  Dr. Kathrin Meyer addressed the challenges presented by contemporary forms of anti-Semitism and highlights ways to address the subject in the classroom. Other witnesses – including Rabbi Andrew Baker, Director of International Jewish Affairs for the American Jewish Committee; Stacy Burdett, Associate Director of Government and National Affairs, Anti-Defamation League; and Liebe Geft, Director, Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Museum of Tolerance also presented testimony at this briefing.

  • From the Maidan to Main Street: Ukraine's Landmark Democratic Parliamentary Elections

    By Commission Staff While pundits attempt to sort out the political meaning of Ukraine’s March 26th parliamentary elections to fill the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada, the significance of the conduct of the elections should not be missed.  “Free and fair” was the resounding assessment of the OSCE-led International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) that also included observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Office of Democratic Elections and Human Rights (ODIHR).  This unqualified positive appraisal – a first among the 12 former Soviet republics outside the Baltics that have conducted scores of elections since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union – underscores the consolidation of democratic gains made in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution following years of political stagnation. These clean March 26th elections stood in stark contrast to the fatally flawed first rounds of the Ukrainian presidential elections that ushered in popular revolt sixteen months earlier.  Coming on the heels of the blatantly undemocratic presidential “elections” in neighboring Belarus a week earlier, comparisons were inevitable.  The Rada elections also followed a series of recent electoral contests elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, including in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which to varying degrees fell short of international standards.  The OSCE assessment in Ukraine returns the “free and fair” formulation to the lexicon of international election observations, departing from the heavily nuanced appraisals that have become common in recent years.  This development has potentially significant implications for future OSCE observations, especially with parliamentary and presidential elections expected in Russia in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Helsinki Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings, current President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, was appointed by the OSCE Chair-in-Office to serve as Special Coordinator for short-term observers.  Commission staff observed on Election Day, as part of the IEOM deployment of 914 observers coming from 45 OSCE countries including Russia.  In all, the group examined voting and the vote count in nearly 3,000 polling stations.  The Commission contingent observed balloting throughout the Kiev and Cherkasy regions. The Ukrainian Government declined to invite observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an entity discredited in the eyes of many for its effusive praise of fundamentally flawed elections elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, including Belarus’ undemocratic March 19 presidential contest.  The CIS stood out for its sharply critical evaluation of Ukraine’s December 26, 2004 presidential elections that resulted in Victor Yushchenko’s victory in elections widely considered to have met democratic standards.  Ukraine has refused to participate further in CIS monitoring missions.  The two dozen Russian Duma observers present offered tempered, mixed opinions about the conduct of Rada elections.   Whatever shortcomings there were in these elections – and no undertaking of this scale is perfect – they appear to have resulted from late or otherwise poor planning.  Among these were delays in the formation of some district and precinct election commissions, the absence of a functioning Constitutional Court, long lines and crowding at some polling stations, and lingering inaccuracies in voter lists.  On the positive side of the balance sheet were the significantly freer media and decidedly more balanced media coverage; no systematic use of administrative resources; the transparent, consensual and professional administration of the elections at all levels; inclusion of domestic, non-partisan observers; and an overhaul of voter lists.        Election day began early with polling stations opening at 7:00 a.m.  There were over 34,000 polling stations.  Adding to the vibrancy of the elections was the large number of domestic observers, an indication of buy-in on the part of Ukrainians young and old alike with many affiliated with particular parties or candidates and others representing NGOs.  Upon entering the polling stations, one was struck by walls plastered with informational bulletins on candidates and parties.  Forty-five parties and blocs vied for seats in parliament.  While the international community was mainly focused on the parliamentary balloting, voting was also underway for regional and local government.  Voters were thus presented with four lengthy ballots: national and regional as well as local councils and mayoral races.  While some older voters were befuddled by this collection of papers, most voters seemed to take it in stride.  Election commission poll workers seemed attentive to their duties.  This was put to the test in the complicated tabulation process that began, once polling stations closed at 10:00 p.m., typically involving the sorting and counting of thousands of papers.  Processing the Rada results alone went into the wee hours of morning, with the three remaining stacks of ballots from other contests proceeding well past daybreak. The undeniable success of the domestic observation in these elections, buttressed by years of investment in training and support by the United States and others, raises obvious questions about the need for future international observations in Ukraine.  Has the time come to “graduate” Ukraine from such scrutiny and leave that necessary task to Ukrainian stakeholders themselves?  Many believe the March 26th elections confirm that that time has come, especially if Ukraine continues on its increasingly democratic trajectory.  The greater and more prominent role of domestic observers, also reinforces the notion that the time for Ukraine’s “graduation” has come.  Indeed, the OSCE should continue to encourage domestic stakeholders to prove themselves to their own people. The Maidan, Kiev’s Independence Square that featured so prominently in the massive demonstrations by orange-clad protesters in November 2004 and the jubilant crowds following Yushchenko’s victory a few weeks later, was calm on the Monday following the Rada elections.  Strolling past this bustling area, Ukrainians were going about their routines, perhaps an indicator that the politics of democracy has moved from the Maidan to the Main Streets of cities and towns throughout the country. Whatever the pundits may declaim regarding the election results or the continuing strength of the Orange Revolution, what seemed palpable was a keen appreciation for the business of governing.  Neither a democratic revolution nor a single “free and fair” election are guarantees that the resulting government will be in a position to immediately deal with the basic needs of its people.  Overcoming these obstacles will have a profound impact on how the next government meets the political and economic challenges Ukraine faces at home and abroad.                   What we can say with confidence is that the March 26th elections were a further essential step in the process of overcoming the legacy of the past – a history marred by foreign domination, genocidal famine, denial of political and cultural freedom, and more recently political stagnation.  Today, the people of Ukraine are removing the overgrowth of thorns – an image alluded to by the great poet Taras Shevchenko – that prevented them for so long from pursuing their own pathway to a brighter and more prosperous future.

  • Freedom Denied: Belarus on the Eve of the Election

    Presidential elections in Belarus are scheduled to be held March 19, against the backdrop of stepped up repression by the regime of Alexander Lukashenka. The Belarusian strongman's power grab, begun a decade ago, has included liquidation of the democratically elected parliament, a string of fundamentally flawed elections and manipulation of the country's constitution to maintain power. A climate of fear following the disappearance of leading opposition figures in 1999 has continued with the harassment and arrests of opposition activists and the forced closure of independent newspapers. Rights violations in Belarus have intensified in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in neighboring Ukraine, as the regime seeks to squelch dissent. The repressive environment has made it difficult for opposition candidates to engage in normal campaign activities. Meanwhile, administration of the elections at all levels remains firmly in the hands of Lukashenka loyalists.

  • Democracy in Belarus

    Ronald J. McNamara led a lively discussion regarding Belarus’s, at the time, upcoming presidential elections in the spring of 2006. The briefing centred around Belarus’s “decade of dictatorship” under Aleksander Lukashenko, a ruler who has disposed of past opposition, silenced independent voices and manipulated the political system to illegally maintain his hold on power in Belarus. In lieu of the upcoming presidential elections, repression in Belarus intensified. Aldis Kuskis, Barbara Kudrycka, and Harald Gunther commented on the significant common ground in policy toward Belarus on both sides of the Atlantic.  Kuskis and Kudrycka described the European Parliament’s most broadcasting initiative regarding Belarus while Gunther spoke on behalf of the presidency of the European Union. The briefing addressed interferences with the signature collection process candidates need to register. Authorities harassed activists gathering signature for opposition candidates, making the pre-election environment less conducive to a free and fair election process. 

  • Missed Opportunity in Kazakhstan: Fraud and Intimidation Spoil Election Promised to be “Free and Fair”

    By H. Knox Thames, Counsel On December 4, the Republic of Kazakhstan held its third presidential election. The results released by the Central Election Commission showed President Nursultan Nazarbayev winning 91.15% of the vote, with his most serious competitor, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, a former Speaker of Parliament and now leader of the opposition alliance For a Fair Kazakhstan, receiving just 6.61%.  Despite promises from President Nazarbayev that the election would be free and fair, the observation mission for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated that the election “did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.” Dynamic Culture – Stagnant Politics Over the past decade and a half, Kazakhstan’s political climate has stagnated, as President Nazarbayev has gradually consolidated power.  If he finishes his third term, he will have ruled Kazakhstan for almost a quarter of a century. President Nazarbayev oversees a vast country, the ninth largest in the world, stretching from the steppes of Siberia to the Altai Mountains to the Caspian Sea.  Kazakhstan is also where the Muslim and Slavic Christian worlds meet – its 15 million citizens are reportedly 47% Muslim and 44% Russian Orthodox.  The country is incredibly diverse; according to the 1999 census, 53% of the country is ethnic Kazakh and 30% ethnic Russians, with Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Germans, Tatars, Uygurs, and others composing the rest of the population. Mr. Nazarbayev was first elected chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet (Supreme Kenges) in February 1990. In December 1991, just a few weeks after Kazakhstan declared its sovereignty from the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev ran unopposed in Kazakhstan’s first direct presidential elections, winning a reported 98% of the vote.  For the second presidential election in 1999, the OSCE declined to send a full observation mission to protest the exclusion of opposition candidates and pre-election conditions that “clearly and substantially” did not meet OSCE commitments.  Nazarbayev won a reported 80% of the vote in an election the OSCE assessment mission said “fell far short” of OSCE standards. Other elections have also received failing grades from international observers, including the most recent election in September 2004 for the lower house of parliament.  The OSCE observation mission concluded “the election process fell short of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections in many respects.”  While opposition parties in previous Kazakh parliaments had held multiple seats, the September 2004 election resulted in only one seat going to a party not affiliated with the government (which the party refused to take in a show of protest). Also of note is the 1995 constitutional referendum arranged by President Nazarbayev, which drastically increased the powers of the president and continued Nazarbayev’s domination of the Kazakh political scene.  The referendum removed most checks and balances from the Kazakh system of government, as now only the president can appoint heads of regions and cities (as opposed to direct elections), initiate constitutional amendments, dismiss the government, and dissolve parliament. Pre-election Climate Considering the failure of past Kazakh elections to meet international standards, the December 4 vote presented President Nazarbayev and his government with a prime opportunity to show Kazakhstan could live up to its freely undertaken international commitments. With Kazakhstan publicly expressing interest in the 2009 Chairmanship of the OSCE and positive pre-election statements by President Nazarbayev, expectations were high that the election would be free and fair. There were some improvements from past elections, and the OSCE worked closely with the Government of Kazakhstan to improve the election law.  Election lists were published, multiple candidates were allowed to run for office, and all five candidates were given time on state television and space in newspapers.  Amendments to the election code were made in 2004 after consultations under the OSCE Round Table Process.  However, the OSCE continued to maintain that the election law required “further improvement to fully meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections.”  Additional amendments were passed in April 2005, but instead of bringing the law into harmony with OSCE standards, the amendments were described by the OSCE as having the “opposite effect.”  Most striking was Article 44.6 of the Election Code that prohibited protesting by voters and political parties from the conclusion of the election campaign until the official publication of the results. Other problems persisted in the election run up, with candidates and their party members being assaulted during campaign stops, campaign literature being seized and destroyed, opposition parties being repeatedly denied permission to hold campaign events in central locations, and the government refusing to allow the OSCE to review the programming codes for electronic voting.  NGOs reported on the politically motivated use of Article 318 of the Criminal Code, which penalizes a person who “insults the honor and dignity of the president.”  On May 5, 2005, the Ministry of Culture, Information and Sport closed the independent newspaper Respublika (“Republic”) under questionable circumstances, and later that month ordered the seizure of 1,000 copies of its successor newspaper, Set’Kz (“Kz Network”).  Soz (“Voice”) and Zhuma Tayms Data Nedeli (“Friday Times – Week’s Data”) have also faced government efforts to close them down. Violations on Election Day The author was one of 460 observers from 43 countries participating in the joint observation mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament.  The author observed polling stations in the rural Ilysky District north of Almaty, the largest city and former capital of Kazakhstan. Significant problems occurred on the day of the election, with the author witnessing violations in half of the polling stations visited. Contraventions included voter fraud with individuals permitted to cast multiple ballots; intimidation by uniformed police or persons believed to be connected with security agencies; irregularities in the opening of a polling station preventing monitors from ascertaining the number of blank ballots apportioned, as they were counted offsite the day before; invalid ballots issued to voters without required polling station member signatures; and unfair campaign materials of the incumbent inside some polling areas. These were not isolated events, as the OSCE found similar problems, including unauthorized persons interfering in polling stations; cases of multiple voting; ballot box stuffing; pressure on students to vote; tampering with result protocols.  The OSCE preliminary report stated, “While candidate registration was mostly inclusive and gave voters a choice, undue restrictions on campaigning, harassment of campaign staff and persistent and numerous cases of intimidation by the authorities, limited the possibility for a meaningful competition.”  The vote count was also marred, with the OSCE giving negative assessments in 27% of stations monitored. The head of the OSCE/ODIHR long-term observer mission, Ambassador Audrey Glover, expressed regret that the Kazakh authorities did not provide “a level playing field for a democratic election, whereby the candidates enjoyed equal treatment and opportunities to campaign so that voters could make an informed choice. This is despite assurances from the president that the election would be free and fair.” U.S. Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) drew a similar conclusion: “President Nazarbayev has once again made it obvious that he is not concerned about meeting Kazakhstan’s obligations under the Helsinki Process.  It is quite clear that the promises of the Kazakh Government to hold free and fair elections that meet internationally recognized standards remain empty.” U.S. Policy in Response When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Astana in October, she spoke of the importance of the upcoming election: “Kazakhstan has an unprecedented opportunity to lead Central Asia toward a future of democracy and to elevate U.S.-Kazakhstani relations to a new level.”  Since 1995, Kazakhstan has experienced a steady deterioration of civil and political rights, in direct contrast to the significant economic reforms taken on by the government.  The limitations have come legislatively – the 1995 constitutional referendum, the 2005 election law amendments; the 2005 law on extremism; the 2005 amendments to the media law; the other 2005 “national security” amendments – and through government actions.  The election could have reversed this negative trend, but instead only continued it. The ramifications of the flawed election vote will be varied, but will certainly impact Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE chairmanship.  As U.S. Helsinki Commission Chairman Sam Brownback (R-KS) concluded, “Kazakhstan’s desire to lead the OSCE in 2009 has been undermined by the conduct of these elections.”  Co-Chairman Smith added, “The massive fraud, intimidation and outright abuse of power are blatantly inconsistent with a government seeking to lead the premier human rights organization in Europe.”  The election also raises the question of whether Kazakhstan’s desire to host an OSCE meeting on tolerance in 2006 should be considered. At the bilateral level, the U.S./Kazakh relationship will not necessarily change, but there is nothing in which to justify the elevation Secretary Rice spoke of.  U.S. officials identified the three strategic interests in Kazakhstan – energy, security and expanding freedom through reform – with a clean election being key, if Kazakhstan wanted to pull closer to America.  Unfortunately, the government flouted this simple and straightforward indicator, signaling that Astana is not interested.  The United States should recognize this and hold firm, while continuing to push for democratization and human rights. The other U.S. strategic interests of energy access and security can also be met, even if the status quo holds and the bilateral relationship remains more terrestrial.  It is in Kazakhstan’s national interest to continue its expansion of access to hydrocarbons – oil and gas are the foundations for its Asian Tiger-like economic success.  In addition, roughly one-third of foreign investment in Kazakhstan reportedly comes from U.S. companies.  Considering Kazakhstan’s WTO ambitions, Kazakhstan must continue to positively engage the U.S. economically.  Lastly, concerning security, President Nazarbayev will continue to be a partner in the war on terror, at least in Central Asia, as in the past extremist cells have operated in the more lawless regions of his country and probably continue to do so. Conclusion The unquestioned popularity of Mr. Nazarbayev does not excuse the conduct of the election – in fact, it begs the question of why his government allowed these blatant and unnecessary violations.  President Nazarbayev has demonstrated the ability to implement difficult policies when he has the political will to do so.  Kazakhstan, for instance, has made tough reforms in the economic sphere, which are often more painful than democratic reforms, especially in former communist countries making the transition from command economies to capitalism. If the president were serious about wanting to elevate Kazakhstan’s relations with the United States, he could have ensured a proper vote. Kazakhstan was positioned to anchor a new “corridor of reform,” but the recent election unfortunately demonstrates that President Nazarbayev has no desire to grow democracy in his country.  The negative trend for respect of civil and political rights and the consolidation of state power will most likely continue.  As Secretary Rice said during her Astana trip, “History also teaches us that true stability and true security are only found in democratic regimes.  And no calculation of short-term interest should tempt us to undermine this basic conviction.”  Therefore, for the United States to maintain its credibility in the region, it must not ignore the conduct of the election and the events of the past year.  The United States should stand ready to expand its relationship, but only when Kazakhstan shows real interest in expanding domestic rights at home.

  • Riding Roughshod Over Rights in Belarus

    Mr. Speaker, as co-chairman of the Helsinki Commission and the sponsor of the Belarus Democracy Act, I remain deeply concerned about the violations of human rights occurring every day in Lukashenka's Belarus.   During a recent news conference, the autocratic Belarusian leader expressed confidence in his victory in the presidential election scheduled for next year, rhetorically asking why should he be rigging this election. Given his intensified assault on civil society, his dismal human rights record, and penchant for rigged elections, Mr. Lukashenka's statements ring hollow. Yet, Lukashenka's actions against democratic forces, non-governmental organizations and the independent media belie his stated confidence regarding electoral victory.   Last week, the lower chamber of Lukashenka's pocket parliament passed a law endorsing tougher new penalties for activities “directed against people and public security,” a proposal submitted to the parliament only days before passage. These changes to the Criminal Code increase penalties for participation in organizations that were liquidated or warned to stop their pro-democratic activities, or for the training and other preparations for unauthorized demonstrations or other civic actions.   Mr. Speaker, to cite just one of the draconian provisions, the Code now gives authorities the leeway to jail an individual for up to 2 years for “providing a foreign country, a foreign or international organization with patently false information about the political, economic, social, military, and international situation of the Republic of Belarus.” Putting aside the matter of such a provision violating free speech norms, if the past is any guide, it is clear who would be the arbiter of what constitutes “false information.” There can be no doubt that the law aims to stifle the democratic opposition, and the head of the KGB (yes, in Belarus it is still called the KGB) himself recently admitted that the reasons for the law is to discourage street protests during the upcoming presidential race.   This law, while particularly blatant, is part and parcel of other actions designed to strengthen the regime's control and deny the Belarusian people any alternative voices as the presidential election campaign unfolds. Last month, a new law further controlling political parties came into force. A recent Council of Ministers decree clamps down on organizations that conduct public opinion polls. A Lukashenka decree further discriminates against independent trade unions, stipulating that only trade unions belonging to the pro-governmental federation are granted the right to premises at no cost. Yet another decree considerably limits students' opportunities to travel abroad.   Meanwhile, opposition activists are routinely beaten up or detained. Just last week, for instance, Ales Kalita was detained and at the hands of the police suffered a dislocated arm for merely distributing the independent newspaper “Narodna Volya.” Viktor Syritsya, a lecturer at Baranavichi College was fired for organizing a meeting of students with presidential opposition candidate Alexander Milinkevich. Belarusian State Economic University in Minsk expelled fourth-year student Tatsyana Khoma because she took a brief trip to France, where she was elected to the executive committee of the Brussels-based National Unions of Students in Europe (ESIB), an umbrella organization of 44 national student unions from 34 countries. The police beat activist Mikita Sasim. They detained youth activists Yauhen Afnagel and others. Other repressive actions include frequent arrests of activists of democratic youth movements such as ZUBR, a ban on worship by some religious congregations and other repressive actions against selected religious minorities, and continued harassment of members of the Union of Poles in Belarus.   Moreover, there is an emerging pattern of the regime putting obstacles in the way of Mr. Milinkevich. Recently, a public meeting he held in Borbuisk was disrupted by the authorities, with participants being told by the authorities to go home and threatened with tax inspections. During a press conference, the electricity in the room was cut off, as well as a “hot-line” phone with town residents.   Especially egregious has been the regime's intensification of the war against the already repressed and struggling independent media. Newspaper closures, suspensions, threats, and exorbitant and absurd libel fines, pressures on advertisers and other forms of harassment have become routine. Outright police confiscations of independent newspapers are also not uncommon. A seemingly more subtle tactic, implemented just a few weeks ago, involved the decision by Belarus' monopoly state postal service to stop delivery to subscribers of a dozen private periodicals. Meanwhile, the suspicious murder in 2004 of journalist Veronika Charkasova has not been resolved. Authorities have refused to open a criminal investigation into journalist Vasil Hrodnikau's death. Lukashenka himself recently admitted to Russian journalists that his regime applies very serious pressure on the media, somewhat incongruously adding that ``this does not mean I am crushing them.''   Mr. Speaker, what I have cited is by no means an exhaustive list of abuses perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime, merely a sampling of the types of repressive actions employed on a daily basis by Europe's last dictator. As Helsinki Commission Co-Chair, I will continue to monitor closely and speak out forcefully regarding these and other violations of Belarus' freely undertaken OSCE commitments. I urge the Bush Administration to step up efforts to break the Lukashenka regime's near monopoly over the country's information space and provide timely assistance to pro-democracy forces in Belarus.   It is clear that Mr. Lukashenka and his minions are laying the groundwork for yet another un-free and unfair election--similar to the 2001 presidential elections and the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections--that will fall far short of OSCE standards. Lukashenka is once again showing that, despite his confident rhetoric, he fears his own people and profoundly fails to respect their dignity as citizens and as human beings.

  • Democracy Denied: The Outcome of the Azerbaijan Elections

    By Ronald J. McNamara International Policy Director In 1992, Azerbaijan joined the Helsinki Process, unconditionally accepting all OSCE provisions back to the Helsinki Final Act, including the commitment “to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.”  Consequently, the November 6, 2005 elections for the 125 single-member constituency seats in the parliament (Milli Majlis) – the first held under President Ilham Aliyev – provided an important opportunity for the Azerbaijani leadership to demonstrate its commitment to bringing the country’s election practices into closer conformity with OSCE standards.  Azerbaijani authorities, most prominently the President, had repeatedly proclaimed their intention to hold an election that would meet those norms. The November 2005 elections were the fifth to be observed by the OSCE, following parliamentary contests in 1995 and 2000, and presidential elections in 1998 and 2003.  According to OSCE monitors, all of these elections have fallen short of international standards. On election day, Ronald J. McNamara of the U.S. Helsinki Commission staff participated as one of 617 short-term observers deployed as part of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA).  The IEOM also included 30 long-term observers.  Helsinki Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings, President of the OSCE PA, was appointed by OSCE Chairman-in-Office as Special Coordinator to lead the short-term observers.  In all, Mission members observed the polling in over half of the country’s 5,053 polling stations and tabulation of results in 90 of 125 constituency election commissions. A Standard Still Not Met During the final days of the campaign in Baku, there was an air of guarded optimism among many international observers that the November 6th elections could meaningfully advance democratization, despite all the problems during the pre-election period.  Accordingly, a great deal hinged on what happened on election day itself, specifically the balloting and vote count. Unfortunately, despite a number of steps taken by authorities at the highest levels, including two presidential decrees, implementation fell short. On the positive side were the more inclusive registration of candidates, including controversial opposition leaders; free airtime on the state-funded media and televised debates; and exit polls.   Shortly before voting day, Baku also lifted its ban on the inking of voters’ fingers, and on domestic observers who received funding from foreign sources.  The Council of Europe and others had long been urging concessions on these fronts. At the same time, Azerbaijani authorities asserted tight control of all election commissions, including the Central Election Commission.  This was despite calls by the Council of Europe and the OSCE to make them more representative.  Other problems included undue restrictions on the ability of opposition parties to conduct rallies at desired venues, with disproportionate use of force by police against unsanctioned rallies; detentions and harassment of some opposition candidates; lack of uniformity in updating voter lists; and interference by local executive authorities in the election process with impunity. The IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on November 7th noted, “While voting was generally calm, the election day process deteriorated progressively during the counting and, in particular, the tabulation of the votes.  The general atmosphere in the polling stations deteriorated sharply during the count.” In a telling statistic, 43% of counts assessed by OSCE observers were either “bad or very bad,” with a high lack of confidence in the announced results.  Among the more serious violations observed were tampering with tabulation protocols, protocols completed with pencil, intimidation of observers and unauthorized persons directing the process.  Official protocols reporting the results were not posted, as required by law, in over half of the counts observed.  Violations were also observed in the tabulation process at the constituency electoral commissions. Influenced by the serious violations observed, as well as problems during the pre-election period, the IEOM concluded, “The 6 November parliamentary elections did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards and commitments for democratic elections.”  Speaking at a crowded Baku press conference the day after the elections, OSCE Special Coordinator Rep. Hastings said, “It pains me to report that progress noted in the pre-election period was undermined by significant deficiencies in the count.” One Observer’s Perspective The experience of Ronald J. McNamara, International Policy Director of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, is indicative of much of what transpired in the Azeri elections: “My observations began on November 6 with the opening of a polling station at a university in downtown Baku, followed by other precincts in the capital and surrounding rural districts.  Throughout the day, at the dozen or so stations I visited, including two military bases, there were an impressive number of domestic observers, most affiliated with individual candidates or political parties.  In nearly every station I encountered voters whose names did not appear on the official voter list posted at each station, including one irate individual complaining that she had voted at the same school all her life but had been dropped from the roster.  Otherwise, the balloting generally proceeded smoothly. “However, as someone once said, ‘It’s not the people who vote that count -- it’s the people who count the votes,’ and unfortunately, most of the officials I encountered on November 6 were the very same individuals who had administered Azerbaijan’s earlier flawed elections. “The 7:00 p.m. poll closing was accompanied by a dramatic and tense turn of events at the polling station I observed when the precinct election commissioners began moving unused ballots and other materials to an office well beyond the sight of observers.  Amid shouting protests from the dozen or so domestic monitors, I reminded commissioners that all aspects of the closing and vote count were supposed to be conducted in full view of observers.  After a momentary pause, the ballots were retrieved and the count proceeded without further incident.  Aided by a low voter turnout – 30 percent at this particular polling station – the vote counting process moved along rapidly. “Ultimately, an independent candidate among the 21 people on the ballot won in the constituency.  Subsequently, however, the entire vote in the Binagadi constituency electoral district #9 was invalidated, as also happened in a handful of other districts.” The Aftermath  Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Sam Brownback expressed deep disappointment in the conduct of the elections, “We were hoping this election would mark a first step for democracy in Azerbaijan. Leading up to the election, the President of Azerbaijan made technical improvements designed to make the election as free and fair as possible. Unfortunately, the authorities who implemented the election did not pass the test.”  Similarly, Commission Co-Chairman, Rep. Chris Smith, said, “The high expectation that the elections would move democratization forward in Azerbaijan has, regretfully, not been realized.”  While Commission Ranking Member, Rep. Ben Cardin observed, “It is not at all clear where Azerbaijan goes from here, but I am not optimistic.” Considering the international community’s hopes and expectations for significant improvement, disappointment over the November 6 election was all the greater.  It is difficult to see in the conduct of the election any convincing evidence of meaningful progress – instead, the election and its aftermath resemble previous Azerbaijani elections, rather than signaling a significant opening toward greater democratization, including the holding of free and fair elections.  Since the election, the police have broken up, sometimes violently, opposition rallies.  While Azeri President Aliyev has been willing to engage with the West on the implementation of reforms so long as those reforms do not seriously threaten the status quo, it is clear that Azerbaijan’s leadership is determined to make sure that no “colored” revolution takes place such as those that took place in neighboring Georgia and Ukraine. A Final OSCE Report, presenting a comprehensive analysis of all observers’ findings and offering recommendations for further improvements is expected to be released shortly.

  • The Meaning of Egypt's Elections and Their Relevance to the Middle East

    The United States Helsinki Commission held a briefing on October 12, 2005 to examine Egypt’s September 7, 2005 presidential election and its ongoing parliamentary elections.   The presidential election was the first in Egyptian history to be open to opposition candidates, while the parliamentary elections are being held in three phases over a six- week period to be concluded in early December. In the Egyptian presidential election, as was widely expected, incumbent President Hosni Mubarak of the National Democratic Party won a fifth consecutive six-year term with  88% of the vote. Out of numerous opposition candidates, the two main challengers, Ayman Nour of the Al-Ghad party and Noaman Gomaa of Al-Wafd, received 7.3% and 2.8% of the vote, respectively Post-election Analysis While the elections were generally acknowledged to have fallen short of meeting international standards, it was broadly agreed that the vote represented a change in Egyptian politics.  The nature of that change was, however, disputed by the panelists. Consequently, much of the discussion at the briefing was critical of the government’s conduct of the elections, with claims that electoral reforms that had been undertaken in Egypt had not gone far enough. “While the Egyptian elections did not meet internationally recognized standards of fairness, the mere fact that the regime allowed the opposition a place on the ballot had opened a doorway,” said U.S. Helsinki Chairman Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) in prepared remarks. In a statement, Commission Co-Chair, Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) said, “The Egyptian people have tasted electoral freedom for the first time and began to debate the future of their country in a way that once was unthinkable. This is the beginning of a long process of democratic reform which over time will reverberate throughout the Arab world.” Thomas Garrett of the International Republican Institute (IRI), who had observed the pre-election period and the elections as part of a 15-member observer delegation, remarked on the significant progress made by Egypt in allowing open elections.  “For the first time in history, Egyptian voters were given the opportunity to choose from among several candidates for the position of president,” he said. Garrett noted that one of the problems in the lead-up to the elections was that access to voter lists was not provided to opposition parties until two days before the election, making voter contact difficult for all but the incumbent.  He was also concerned that apparent “off-the-cuff remarks”  by members of the independent electoral commission regarding candidacies and party participation were given the force of law by virtue of the fact that such remarks could not be subjected to legal challenge.  These issues notwithstanding, Garrett commented that the election broke the historic taboo against citizens openly criticize their government in a way that had previously been unheard of in Egyptian politics.  Overall, Garrett concluded, the aspirations of the voters were not subverted in that it was the clear intent of those who did vote to re-elect President Mubarak. Khairi Abaza, visiting fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and formerly of Egypt’s Wafd Party, the second major opposition party in the election, discussed the nature of the opposition.  Abaza pointed out that although Mubarak received 88% of the vote, estimates are that only 15-23% of the 32 million registered voters participated in the election, meaning that Mubarak had the support of 6.5 million in a country of 72 million. Abaza listed less-than-democratic aspects of the election, arguing that these had the impact of lowering voter turnout. These problems notwithstanding, Abaza noted that the public gains for the opposition were very important, allowing for the first time in 50 years a real civic debate about political reform and systemic change.  He added that the lead-up to the election saw the growth of the opposition which, as a result, began to speak much more openly against the government.  However, “there’s still a long way to go before we can see free and fair elections in Egypt,” he said.  “What happened in Egypt is probably a step toward a freer system, but it could only be considered a step if it’s promptly followed by many other steps.”  Abaza also remarked that it because of its comparatively more solid national, social, and linguistic identity as well as parliamentary history, Egypt was well positioned to serve as an example for the region. A Different Perspective Somewhat in contrast to the prevailing view, Dr. Amr Hamzawy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace did not view the presidential election as representing an historic step or breakthrough.  Hamzawy maintained that describing the election as historic was misleading, especially when taking into account the low voter turnout and the lack of serious competitors to Mubarak.  Rather, Hamzawy suggested, the election was simply the latest step forward in an ongoing reform of Egyptian politics that had gone on for the past 5 to10 years.  He predicted that the impact of the irregularities suffered in the election would be minimized by judges who would play a greater role in monitoring the elections than had historically been the case.  This, Hamzawy argued, would help restore the public’s belief in the neutrality of state institutions.  Hamzawy also added that he believed that opposition parties would win 15-20% of the seats in the People’s Assembly in the parliamentary elections. First Steps Counselor Wael Aboulmaged of the Embassy of Egypt noted that, as the vote was Egypt’s first experience with open presidential elections, it was perhaps inevitable that an assessment of their conduct would show them to have been deficient in various aspects. He added that Egyptians were only beginning to understand such facets of an election as campaigning nationally; how to raise funds; addressing people in different parts of the country who have different concerns; when to talk substance, when to talk style. Aboulmaged further contended that voter apathy and low voter turnout in the elections was due to many citizens lacking faith in the process.  However, he thought there was evidence of a new trend in which average people were becoming more involved politically and were beginning to feel that they have a real stake in electoral outcomes. The Counselor made note of the election’s irregularities, but reminded the audience of the significance of the recent events:  “For the first time, an incumbent president in Egypt had to campaign nationwide to present his political, economic and social agenda for public scrutiny:  to be held, in effect, accountable.  This is something that presidents in Egypt simply did not do in the past.  He had to ask for the trust of the voters.” Commission Ranking Member Rep. Ben Cardin (D-MD) in a statement observed, “Nobody would mistake this election as free and unfettered.  The opposition was fragmented, its main party excluded, and campaigning was tightly restricted.  However, the sight of any public debate in the very heart of the Arab world’s most important state is the first crack in the façade of the old regime.” Witnesses Mr. Thomas Garrett, Director of Middle East and North Africa Program, International Republican Institute Dr. Amr Hamzawy, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Mr. Khairi Abaza, Past Cultural Secretary, Wafd Party; Visiting Fellow, The Washington Institute Mr. Wael Aboulmagd, Counselor, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt Moderator Mr. Chadwick R. Gore, Staff Advisor, U.S. Helsinki Commission

  • Democracy Denied

    By Ronald J. McNamara, International Policy Director In 1992, Azerbaijan joined the Helsinki Process, unconditionally accepting all OSCE provisions back to the Helsinki Final Act, including the commitment “to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.”  Consequently, the November 6, 2005 elections for the 125 single-member constituency seats in the parliament (Milli Majlis) – the first held under President Ilham Aliyev – provided an important opportunity for the Azerbaijani leadership to demonstrate its commitment to bringing the country’s election practices into closer conformity with OSCE standards.  Azerbaijani authorities, most prominently the President, had repeatedly proclaimed their intention to hold an election that would meet those norms.  The November 2005 elections were the fifth to be observed by the OSCE, following parliamentary contests in 1995 and 2000, and presidential elections in 1998 and 2003.  According to OSCE monitors, all of these elections have fallen short of international standards.  On election day, Ronald J. McNamara of the U.S. Helsinki Commission staff participated as one of 617 short-term observers deployed as part of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA).  The IEOM also included 30 long-term observers.  Helsinki Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings, President of the OSCE PA, was appointed by OSCE Chairman-in-Office as Special Coordinator to lead the short-term observers.  In all, Mission members observed the polling in over half of the country’s 5,053 polling stations and tabulation of results in 90 of 125 constituency election commissions. A Standard Still Not Met During the final days of the campaign in Baku, there was an air of guarded optimism among many international observers that the November 6th elections could meaningfully advance democratization, despite all the problems during the pre-election period.  Accordingly, a great deal hinged on what happened on election day itself, specifically the balloting and vote count. Unfortunately, despite a number of steps taken by authorities at the highest levels, including two presidential decrees, implementation fell short. On the positive side were the more inclusive registration of candidates, including controversial opposition leaders; free airtime on the state-funded media and televised debates; and exit polls.   Shortly before voting day, Baku also lifted its ban on the inking of voters’ fingers, and on domestic observers who received funding from foreign sources.  The Council of Europe and others had long been urging concessions on these fronts. At the same time, Azerbaijani authorities asserted tight control of all election commissions, including the Central Election Commission.  This was despite calls by the Council of Europe and the OSCE to make them more representative.  Other problems included undue restrictions on the ability of opposition parties to conduct rallies at desired venues, with disproportionate use of force by police against unsanctioned rallies; detentions and harassment of some opposition candidates; lack of uniformity in updating voter lists; and interference by local executive authorities in the election process with impunity.  The IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on November 7th noted, “While voting was generally calm, the election day process deteriorated progressively during the counting and, in particular, the tabulation of the votes.  The general atmosphere in the polling stations deteriorated sharply during the count.”  In a telling statistic, 43% of counts assessed by OSCE observers were either “bad or very bad,” with a high lack of confidence in the announced results.  Among the more serious violations observed were tampering with tabulation protocols, protocols completed with pencil, intimidation of observers and unauthorized persons directing the process.  Official protocols reporting the results were not posted, as required by law, in over half of the counts observed.  Violations were also observed in the tabulation process at the constituency electoral commissions.  Influenced by the serious violations observed, as well as problems during the pre-election period, the IEOM concluded, “The 6 November parliamentary elections did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards and commitments for democratic elections.”  Speaking at a crowded Baku press conference the day after the elections, OSCE Special Coordinator Rep. Hastings said, “It pains me to report that progress noted in the pre-election period was undermined by significant deficiencies in the count.” One Observer’s Perspective The experience of Ronald J. McNamara, International Policy Director of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, is indicative of much of what transpired in the Azeri elections: “My observations began on November 6 with the opening of a polling station at a university in downtown Baku, followed by other precincts in the capital and surrounding rural districts.  Throughout the day, at the dozen or so stations I visited, including two military bases, there were an impressive number of domestic observers, most affiliated with individual candidates or political parties.  In nearly every station I encountered voters whose names did not appear on the official voter list posted at each station, including one irate individual complaining that she had voted at the same school all her life but had been dropped from the roster.  Otherwise, the balloting generally proceeded smoothly.  “However, as someone once said, ‘It’s not the people who vote that count -- it’s the people who count the votes,’ and unfortunately, most of the officials I encountered on November 6 were the very same individuals who had administered Azerbaijan’s earlier flawed elections.  “The 7:00 p.m. poll closing was accompanied by a dramatic and tense turn of events at the polling station I observed when the precinct election commissioners began moving unused ballots and other materials to an office well beyond the sight of observers.  Amid shouting protests from the dozen or so domestic monitors, I reminded commissioners that all aspects of the closing and vote count were supposed to be conducted in full view of observers.  After a momentary pause, the ballots were retrieved and the count proceeded without further incident.  Aided by a low voter turnout – 30 percent at this particular polling station – the vote counting process moved along rapidly. “Ultimately, an independent candidate among the 21 people on the ballot won in the constituency.  Subsequently, however, the entire vote in the Binagadi constituency electoral district #9 was invalidated, as also happened in a handful of other districts.” The Aftermath Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Sam Brownback expressed deep disappointment in the conduct of the elections, “We were hoping this election would mark a first step for democracy in Azerbaijan. Leading up to the election, the President of Azerbaijan made technical improvements designed to make the election as free and fair as possible. Unfortunately, the authorities who implemented the election did not pass the test.”  Similarly, Commission Co-Chairman, Rep. Chris Smith, said, “The high expectation that the elections would move democratization forward in Azerbaijan has, regretfully, not been realized.” Commission Ranking Member, Rep. Ben Cardin observed, “It is not at all clear where Azerbaijan goes from here, but I am not optimistic.” Considering the international community’s hopes and expectations for significant improvement, disappointment over the November 6 election was all the greater.  It is difficult to see in the conduct of the election any convincing evidence of meaningful progress – instead, the election and its aftermath resemble previous Azerbaijani elections, rather than signaling a significant opening toward greater democratization, including the holding of free and fair elections.   Since the election, the police have broken up, sometimes violently, opposition rallies.  While Azeri President Aliyev has been willing to engage with the West on the implementation of reforms so long as those reforms do not seriously threaten the status quo, it is clear that Azerbaijan’s leadership is determined to make sure that no “colored” revolution takes place such as those that took place in neighboring Georgia and Ukraine. A Final OSCE Report, presenting a comprehensive analysis of all observers’ findings and offering recommendations for further improvements is expected to be released shortly.

  • The Meaning of Egypt’s Elections and Their Relevance to the Middle East

    This briefing addressed the prospects for increased liberalization in Egypt and the Middle East in light of the recent Egyptian presidential election and in spite of its flaws. The Egyptian elections were provided as an example for one of the many steps on the long road to creating a true democracy, and the likelihood of the regime continuing down that path was a topic of discussion. Witnesses testifying at the briefing discussed the impact of the recent Egyptian presidential and forthcoming parliamentary elections on Egypt and the wider Middle East region. The importance of gains made by the opposition, despite some reports of irregularities and a low turnout, was particularly emphasized.

  • Excerpts of Remarks by Rep. Chris Smith

    Polish Solidarity Trade Union - 25th Anniversary Today we continue celebrating the 25th Anniversary of Solidarity and in particular, the bravery, tenacity and innate goodness of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Lech Walesa. It is especially timely to host the former President owing to yesterday’s stunning election results that have ushered Solidarity’s ideological soulmates back into power.  Projections suggest that the Law and Justice Party got almost 28% of the vote and the Civil Platform gained 24%. Some time ago, I read Lech Walesa’s powerful and riveting autobiography, “A Way of Hope.”  Filled with insight and brutally honest, the book walks the reader through a series of volatile events—personal and public—that have literally transformed the world. In the book, we get a glimpse into Lech Walesa’s deep faith—and the role his beloved mother, and her Catholic beliefs had on him; “Neighbors came to our house to say the rosary.” he tells us in the book.  The book is filled with remembrances of family—and his love for his wife. On leadership he tells us: I’ve never wished or prepared for a leadership role: paradoxically, it’s because I never really wanted it, absorbed as I was by quite different concerns, different problems which needed solving, that I found myself out in front, leading the others—“leading the flock,” I call it with a smile. He tells us of the strike of 1970 “All we wanted was to free our fellow workers, we wanted no violence.” And that his worst fears were realized: “Poles had fired against Poles.” In the chapter “The Strike and the August Agreement” he tells us how the movement had matured: Until then I had been talking, bluffing, playing “on credit.” Although we pretended to be holding all the high cards, our opponents knew our game inside out, they’d been playing against us for years! But what they didn’t know was the nature of our very last card: the determination that had been maturing for ten years now, since the death of three of our colleagues right in front of the second entrance to the shipyard.  When His Holiness Pope John Paul II made his historic trip to his homeland in 1979, he counseled his flock and his country men and women, “Be Not Afraid.”  But Lech Walesa gave us additional insight into how Solidarity and Pope John Paul II were “inextricably bound together” and how it almost ended in 1981.   It was in Japan that we heard of the dramatic attempt on the Pope’s life. The news broke in the middle of the night May 13-14, 1981. We were in my hotel room in Nagasaki, discussing the events of the day, and our visit the next day to the museum set up in memory of the victims of the atomic bomb. The first news flash was terrifying: the Pope was dead! The next news flash retracted it: no, the Pope was still alive, he was fighting for his life. I was overcome by a feeling of immense loneliness; the whole world seemed to have turned upside down; with our lodestar gone, some of us were wandering in a wilderness with out hope. The tragedy of the Polish Pope was also the tragedy of Poland and of Solidarity: they were inextricably bound together; this was just the beginning.  Then the news changed, became less alarming; there was still hope. In his chapter “Martial Law,” Lech Walesa tells us how they decided that if the militia invaded the shipyard during the night, they decided on passive resistance: “Our greatest strength is precisely our weakness—our living bodies and empty hands confronting tanks and nightsticks.” His wife Danuta writes in the book how she was discouraged when he was locked up during marital law but “he seemed rather pleasant, …we had to be dignified about it all, because even in a place like this, we still had the upper hand; we, not they, were making history.” By 1989, Solidarity leaders sat across the table from Wojtech Jaruzelski, the same General who had imposed martial law in 1981.  And they negotiated what had seemed to most of the world impossible:  the peaceful transition from communism to free and fair elections.  In August of 1989, less than a decade after the Gdansk shipyard strikes that gave birth to Solidarity, Poland would elect its first non-communist Prime Minister since the communist takeover. Finally, Lech Walesa tells us in the book that in his school years “history was my weak point.”  But, I am here to say to you, Mr. Walesa, studying history does not matter when you are the one who makes history by bringing freedom, respect for human rights, and enduring democracy not only to your own country, but the entire region as well.

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