Title

THE TRAJECTORY OF DEMOCRACY – WHY HUNGARY MATTERS

Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Capitol Visitor Center, Room SVC 210
Washington D.C., DC 20515
United States
Members: 
Name: 
Hon. Benjamin Cardin
Title Text: 
Chairman
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Name: 
Hon. Chris Smith
Title Text: 
Co-Chairman
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Witnesses: 
Name: 
Brent Hartley
Title: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary For European and Eurasian Affairs
Body: 
U.S. Department of State
Name: 
Hon. Jozsef Szajer
Title: 
Hungarian Member of the European Parliament
Body: 
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union
Name: 
Dr. Kim Lane Scheppele
Title: 
Director
Body: 
Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University
Name: 
Sylvana Habdank-Kolaczkowska
Title: 
Director for Nations in Transit
Body: 
Freedom House
Name: 
Paul Shapiro
Title: 
Director
Body: 
Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum

This hearing focused on recent constitutional changes to the Hungarian Constitution which has brought concerns from the United States and the European Union. Recently, Hungary has instituted sweeping and controversial changes to its constitutional framework, effectively remaking the country’s entire legal foundation. In addition to constitutional changes, there have been some bills passed without the proper democratic spirit and has brought concerns about the trajectory of democracy in that country. The witnesses raised the changes that have created the majority government into a nearly one-party rule structure and compared such actions to President Madison’s written exposé in the Federalist Papers number 47.

Relevant countries: 
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  • Good Governance

    Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting Session 3: Good Governance Before I begin, I’d like to thank the panelists today for their excellent and informative presentations. The United States has viewed with keen interest the evolving discussions in recent years on what the OSCE’s priorities should be in the Economic and Environmental Dimension. As our friend and colleague Mr. Svilanovic pointed out during last year’s Vienna Review Conference, we appear to have come to an appreciation that good governance is the key linking theme across the entire second dimension. The Maastricht Strategy is very clear on this point: “Good public and corporate governance and strong institutions are essential foundations for a sound economy, which can attract investments, and thereby enable States to reduce poverty and inequality, to increase social integration and opportunities for all, and to protect the environment. Good governance at all levels contributes to prosperity, stability and security.” As we consider the implementation of our second dimension commitments, however, we should keep in mind why it is important to implement those commitments. The global economic downturn continues to put extreme pressure on people and governments across the OSCE region. To be sure, some countries have weathered the storm better than others. Still, no country can be forever immune to market forces, and even within those that have done well, there are always citizens left behind. This is certainly the case in the United States, and for this reason President Obama is focused intently on how best to put those Americans without a job back to work. We all know that trade and investment are critical drivers of economic growth. Indeed, recognizing this important reality, the Obama Administration has launched the National Export Initiative, which seeks to deepen our strategic trade relationships around the world, recognizing that 85 percent of world GDP growth will occur outside the United States in the coming few years. As we encourage more American businesses – large and small – to embrace international trade, seek opportunities in new markets, and make strategic investments that will lead to increased global trade flows, we are keenly aware of the challenges and costs posed by official corruption, weak institutions, and lack of respect for property rights, including intellectual property. Weak governance and lack of transparency constitute non-tariff barriers to trade, which we have committed ourselves to eliminating. Furthermore, the same issues that deter trade and investment also work against comprehensive security: a lack of transparency in governance leads to diminished confidence that problems and disputes will be addressed in a fair and impartial manner. Without trust and confidence in public institutions, there is little incentive for investors and companies to pursue trade deals or direct investment in those economies. The effect is stagnating economic performance, which, as we have seen in the past several months and years, can lead to political upheaval. The United States Government is deeply committed to fostering good governance and transparency in its political and economic institutions. President Obama has made the global fight against corruption a top priority. As he has noted, “In too many places, the culture of the bribe is a brake on development and prosperity. It discourages entrepreneurship, destroys public trust, and undermines the rule of law while stifling economic growth.” The real world costs of corruption and weak institutions should not be underestimated. The World Bank estimates that more than one trillion dollars in bribes are paid each year out of a global economy of approximately 30 trillion dollars. That's an incredible three percent of the world’s economy. In 2009, companies lost nearly $25 billion to companies willing to pay bribes in deals for which the outcome is known. And bribery is especially costly for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs): a separate study has shown that up to 25 percent of SME operating capital in companies operating internationally is diverted to corruption. That is a staggering figure that illustrates how corruption diverts scarce resources to thoroughly unproductive ends. Corruption is a global problem that knows no borders. And that’s why corruption demands a truly global response – one that knows no limits on collaboration. The Obama Administration is doing its part to implement its obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by enforcing the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) strictly and fairly. We are determined to ensure that U.S. businesses do not contribute to corruption in foreign markets. At the same time, we are determined to do what we can to assist them in the fight against foreign corruption, and against the high risk and significant costs of corruption in such markets. Regrettably, at this stage, the lack of enforcement of domestic bribery laws, and of foreign bribery laws by many nations that are Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is extremely troubling and raises concerns about a lack of political will. Governments can and should prosecute both those who give bribes and those who receive them, both at home and abroad. And the OSCE should continue to encourage participating States to adopt and enforce rigorous anti-bribery regimes. Of course, the fight against corruption is not simply a law enforcement matter; rather it can also be a significant – if not the most significant – non-tariff barrier all companies face. Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade Administration (or ITA) are committed to working with our trading partners to level the playing field and to promote transparent and corruption-free markets globally. Our work to promote clean and ethical business environments occurs at both the multilateral and bilateral level. At the multilateral level, the ITA is pressing its counterparts to lead by example and to implement comprehensive anti-corruption measures. In addition to our work through the OECD, the United States has been working diligently to persuade the G20 countries to adopt a comprehensive anti-corruption action plan, which includes a commitment focused on adoption and robust enforcement of anti-bribery laws, implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption, greater engagement with the private sector, and support for transparency mechanisms, to name a few. Many of these commitments require our G20 partners to enact and implement new laws and preventive measures. The United States, at ITA’s initiative, in particular, took the lead on proposals relating to the private sector and also on whistleblower protection, within the G20. In the United States, whistleblowers play a crucial role in helping to enforce anti-corruption law. This principle is also embodied in international conventions. Articles 12 and 13 of the UN Convention require States Parties to prevent corruption in the private sector and promote the fight against corruption with the business community and civil society. Unless governments can protect whistleblowers, it is unlikely that they can identify or address systemic causes of corruption. The United States believes robust whistleblower protection should be an essential part of any good governance initiative in the OSCE, and I was encouraged to hear Ambassador O’Leary indicate that this will be an area of focus under the Irish Chairmanship. The U.S. Department of Commerce has also been committed to fostering strong private sector integrity as an integral part of promoting good governance in markets worldwide. Companies are global corporate citizens, and as such, can work collectively and with governments to foster trust, and promote transparency. I hope that some our work may provide a useful model for the OSCE to consider as it looks to embrace good governance and anti-corruption as a priority for the second dimension, a goal we fully support, and which I am personally committed to supporting. For example, the ITA has championed business ethics and corporate governance reform since the early 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our Business Ethics Manual has been translated into Chinese, Spanish and Russian and is still one of the most widely used resources on this important topic. We have partnered with business associations and chambers of commerce to develop collective action and business ethics program in many markets. Our work on business ethics has grown. This past year, the ITA has focused on trying to heighten awareness of good governance, transparency and business ethics in sectors of vital importance to many economies – by taking a “sectoral” approach to combating corruption and promoting good business practice, the challenge of dealing with corruption becomes less daunting. The ethical issues specific to different industries vary greatly – and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the problem. Within the G20, for example, the United States, at the initiative of the U.S. Department of Commerce, has taken the lead in calling for the G20 to endorse additional sectoral approaches to fighting corruption, beyond the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). We have asked G20 governments, for example, to consider supporting the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COST) – a new multistakeholder initiative, developed by the World Bank. COST uses similar approaches to EITI to promote greater transparency in public infrastructure projects and government procurement. I hope that the OSCE might similarly consider COST and other multistakeholder approaches to promoting transparency under the Irish chairmanship. Within APEC, the ITA has focused on developing new ethical principles for key sectors within the APEC region. I am pleased to report that under the APEC SME working group, we have coordinated a project with APEC countries and businesses to develop principles of business ethics in the construction, medical devices and biopharmaceutical sectors. These voluntary principles are meant to be used by businesses and trade associations – large andwithin the OSCE framework and the EEDIM, we might also consider focusing on business ethics in specific sectors of interest to all of our economies. I want to close by suggesting some activities to take the theme of good governance and transparency forward. In addition to encouraging the OSCE to formally endorse the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—a move that would send an important signal about this body’s commitment to the principles of good governance and transparency—the U.S. encourages us to explore whether there are additional sectoral initiatives that merit support from the OSCE, including the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative. The United States Government also strongly supports the Irish Chair’s goal to develop a Statement or Declaration of Transparency Principles to help guide our governments in their future activities. I want to encourage us to consider new models of bilateral cooperation to promote good governance such as the model Mr. Murray just discussed, leading to a public-private initiative in the Russian power generation sector. We at the U.S. Department of Commerce are working closely with the Center for Black Sea/Caspian Studies at American University to potentially convene a conference in May of next year that would seek to address the challenge of developing mechanisms to ensure good governance and transparency, while also balancing the goals of protecting national security and accelerating economic development faced by the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as they seek to assert their role as a gateway between Europe and Asia. In addition, the conference will also focus on specific market access challenges to regional integration and economic development in the Caucasus and Central Asia such as transparency in Government procurement and privatization, and trade facilitation challenges, including customs and lack of regional harmonization. It is our hope that the OSCE will join us for this event – focused on critical areas such as transport and infrastructure – to work on tangible ideas for projects and collaborations in the OSCE region. We look forward with great interest to the 20th Economic and Environmental Forum, where we will delve deeper into all the facets of good governance. We also thank the Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office for  ensuring that their draft Ministerial Council decision on Energy Security incorporates transparency in the energy sector – in our view, considering the vital role that energy plays in modern economic life, there can be no confidence, and thus no security, without energy transparency. In the year ahead, we envision an even broader focus on transparency principles across the entire spectrum of economic and environmental activities, and will work with all of our colleagues in the OSCE to make that vision a reality. Thank you, Mr. Moderator.  

  • Commissioner Camuñez's Remarks on Good Governance

    Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting Session 3: Good Governance Before I begin, I’d like to thank the panelists today for their excellent and informative presentations. The United States has viewed with keen interest the evolving discussions in recent years on what the OSCE’s priorities should be in the Economic and Environmental Dimension.  As our friend and colleague Mr. Svilanovic pointed out during last year’s Vienna Review Conference, we appear to have come to an appreciation that good governance is the key linking theme across the entire second dimension.  The Maastricht Strategy is very clear on this point: “Good public and corporate governance and strong institutions are essential foundations for a sound economy, which can attract investments, and thereby enable States to reduce poverty and inequality, to increase social integration and opportunities for all, and to protect the environment.  Good governance at all levels contributes to prosperity, stability and security.”  As we consider the implementation of our second dimension commitments, however, we should keep in mind why it is important to implement those commitments. The global economic downturn continues to put extreme pressure on people and governments across the OSCE region.  To be sure, some countries have weathered the storm better than others.  Still, no country can be forever immune to market forces, and even within those that have done well, there are always citizens left behind.  This is certainly the case in the United States, and for this reason President Obama is focused intently on how best to put those Americans without a job back to work.  We all know that trade and investment are critical drivers of economic growth.  Indeed, recognizing this important reality, the Obama Administration has launched the National Export Initiative, which seeks to deepen our strategic trade relationships around the world, recognizing that 85 percent of world GDP growth will occur outside the United States in the coming few years.  As we encourage more American businesses – large and small – to embrace international trade, seek opportunities in new markets, and make strategic investments that will lead to increased global trade flows, we are keenly aware of the challenges and costs posed by official corruption, weak institutions, and lack of respect for property rights, including intellectual property. Weak governance and lack of transparency constitute non-tariff barriers to trade, which we have committed ourselves to eliminating.  Furthermore, the same issues that deter trade and investment also work against comprehensive security: a lack of transparency in governance leads to diminished confidence that problems and disputes will be addressed in a fair and impartial manner.  Without trust and confidence in public institutions, there is little incentive for investors and companies to pursue trade deals or direct investment in those economies.  The effect is stagnating economic performance, which, as we have seen in the past several months and years, can lead to political upheaval.    The United States Government is deeply committed to fostering good governance and transparency in its political and economic institutions.  President Obama has made the global fight against corruption a top priority.  As he has noted, “In too many places, the culture of the bribe is a brake on development and prosperity.  It discourages entrepreneurship, destroys public trust, and undermines the rule of law while stifling economic growth.”    The real world costs of corruption and weak institutions should not be underestimated.  The World Bank estimates that more than one trillion dollars in bribes are paid each year out of a global economy of approximately 30 trillion dollars.  That's an incredible three percent of the world’s economy.   In 2009, companies lost nearly $25 billion to companies willing to pay bribes in deals for which the outcome is known.  And bribery is especially costly for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs): a separate study has shown that up to 25 percent of SME operating capital in companies operating internationally is diverted to corruption.  That is a staggering figure that illustrates how corruption diverts scarce resources to thoroughly unproductive ends. Corruption is a global problem that knows no borders.  And that’s why corruption demands a truly global response – one that knows no limits on collaboration.  The Obama Administration is doing its part to implement its obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by enforcing the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) strictly and fairly.  We are determined to ensure that U.S. businesses do not contribute to corruption in foreign markets.  At the same time, we are determined to do what we can to assist them in the fight against foreign corruption, and against the high risk and significant costs of corruption in such markets.   Regrettably, at this stage, the lack of enforcement of domestic bribery laws, and of foreign bribery laws by many nations that are Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is extremely troubling and raises concerns about a lack of political will.  Governments can and should prosecute both those who give bribes and those who receive them, both at home and abroad.  And the OSCE should continue to encourage participating States to adopt and enforce rigorous anti-bribery regimes. Of course, the fight against corruption is not simply a law enforcement matter; rather it can also be a significant – if not the most significant – non-tariff barrier all companies face.  Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade Administration (or ITA) are committed to working with our trading partners to level the playing field and to promote transparent and corruption-free markets globally.  Our work to promote clean and ethical business environments occurs at both the multilateral and bilateral level.  At the multilateral level, the ITA is pressing its counterparts to lead by example and to implement comprehensive anti-corruption measures.   In addition to our work through the OECD, the United States has been working diligently to persuade the G20 countries to adopt a comprehensive anti-corruption action plan, which includes a commitment focused on adoption and robust enforcement of anti-bribery laws, implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption, greater engagement with the private sector, and support for transparency mechanisms, to name a few.  Many of these commitments require our G20 partners to enact and implement new laws and preventive measures.   The United States, at ITA’s initiative, in particular, took the lead on proposals relating to the private sector and also on whistleblower protection, within the G20.  In the United States, whistleblowers play a crucial role in helping to enforce anti-corruption law.  This principle is also embodied in international conventions.  Articles 12 and 13 of the UN Convention require States Parties to prevent corruption in the private sector and promote the fight against corruption with the business community and civil society.  Unless governments can protect whistleblowers, it is unlikely that they can identify or address systemic causes of corruption.  The United States believes robust whistleblower protection should be an essential part of any good governance initiative in the OSCE, and I was encouraged to hear Ambassador O’Leary indicate that this will be an area of focus under the Irish Chairmanship.   The U.S. Department of Commerce has also been committed to fostering strong private sector integrity as an integral part of promoting good governance in markets worldwide.  Companies are global corporate citizens, and as such, can work collectively and with governments to foster trust, and promote transparency.  I hope that some our work may provide a useful model for the OSCE to consider as it looks to embrace good governance and anti-corruption as a priority for the second dimension, a goal we fully support, and which I am personally committed to supporting. For example, the ITA has championed business ethics and corporate governance reform since the early 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Our Business Ethics Manual has been translated into Chinese, Spanish and Russian and is still one of the most widely used resources on this important topic.  We have partnered with business associations and chambers of commerce to develop collective action and business ethics program in many markets.   Our work on business ethics has grown.  This past year, the ITA has focused on trying to heighten awareness of good governance, transparency and business ethics in sectors of vital importance to many economies – by taking a “sectoral” approach to combating corruption and promoting good business practice, the challenge of dealing with corruption becomes less daunting.  The ethical issues specific to different industries vary greatly – and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the problem.  Within the G20, for example, the United States, at the initiative of the U.S. Department of Commerce, has taken the lead in calling for the G20 to endorse additional sectoral approaches to fighting corruption, beyond the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  We have asked G20 governments, for example, to consider supporting the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COST) – a new multistakeholder initiative, developed by the World Bank.  COST uses similar approaches to EITI to promote greater transparency in public infrastructure projects and government procurement.  I hope that the OSCE might similarly consider COST and other multistakeholder approaches to promoting transparency under the Irish chairmanship.     Within APEC, the ITA has focused on developing new ethical principles for key sectors within the APEC region.  I am pleased to report that under the APEC SME working group, we have coordinated a project with APEC countries and businesses to develop principles of business ethics in the construction, medical devices and biopharmaceutical sectors.  These voluntary principles are meant to be used by businesses and trade associations – large and small – to guide their ethical interactions with public officials and institutions.   I hope that within the OSCE framework and the EEDIM, we might also consider focusing on business ethics in specific sectors of interest to all of our economies.  I want to close by suggesting some activities to take the theme of good governance and transparency forward.  In addition to encouraging the OSCE to formally endorse the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—a move that would send an important signal about this body’s commitment to the principles of good governance and transparency—the U.S. encourages us to explore whether there are additional sectoral initiatives that merit support from the OSCE, including the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative.  The United States Government also strongly supports the Irish Chair’s goal to develop a Statement or Declaration of Transparency Principles to help guide our governments in their future activities. I want to encourage us to consider new models of bilateral cooperation to promote good governance such as the model Mr. Murray just discussed, leading to a public-private initiative in the Russian power generation sector.   We at the U.S. Department of Commerce are working closely with the Center for Black Sea/Caspian Studies at American University to potentially convene a conference in May of next year that would seek to address the challenge of developing mechanisms to ensure good governance and transparency, while also balancing the goals of protecting national security and accelerating economic development faced by the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as they seek to assert their role as a gateway between Europe and Asia.  In addition, the conference will also focus on specific market access challenges to regional integration and economic development in the Caucasus and Central Asia such as transparency in Government procurement and privatization, and trade facilitation challenges, including customs and lack of regional harmonization.  It is our hope that the OSCE will join us for this event – focused on critical areas such as transport and infrastructure – to work on tangible ideas for projects and collaborations in the OSCE region. We look forward with great interest to the 20th Economic and Environmental Forum, where we will delve deeper into all the facets of good governance.  We also thank the Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office for ensuring that their draft Ministerial Council decision on Energy Security incorporates transparency in the energy sector – in our view, considering the vital role that energy plays in modern economic life, there can be no confidence, and thus no security, without energy transparency.  In the year ahead, we envision an even broader focus on transparency principles across the entire spectrum of economic and environmental activities, and will work with all of our colleagues in the OSCE to make that vision a reality. Thank you, Mr. Moderator.

  • Commissioner Camuñez's Opening Statement at the Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting

    Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting Opening Remarks On behalf of the United States, I would like to thank the Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office, Secretary General Zannier, Coordinator for Economic and Environmental Activities Svilanović, and of course our Austrian hosts for convening this inaugural Economic and Environmental Dimension Implementation Meeting and for providing a warm welcome to Vienna. It is an honor to be here today as head of the U.S. delegation to the OSCE, representing the U.S. Government in my capacity as an Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Market Access and Compliance (MAC) within the International Trade Administration, and as a Commissioner to the U.S. Helsinki Commission. As a Commerce Department Assistant Secretary for Market Access and Compliance, I am responsible for helping lead the effort to open new markets for U.S. companies, identifying and eliminating market access challenges such as non-tariff barriers to trade, and helping to monitor and enforce U.S. trade agreements and commitments. The work of the Environmental and Economic Dimension, especially that which focuses on transparency of markets and good governance, is closely aligned with the work we undertake in the International Trade Administration. I am here today to deliver the message that the U.S. Government is highly committed to making the second dimension even more effective and dynamic, and that we will do our part in ensuring that our economic and environmental commitments receive the same level of attention and scrutiny that those in the political-military and human dimensions currently enjoy. I will try to keep my remarks brief, but I think it is critical that we take a close look at the economic and environmental commitments as they were spelled out in the 2003 Maastricht Strategy. We still see Maastricht as the key blueprint for moving forward on all the  commitments that have come before, and in particular, note a number of areas where we could pursue significant, substantive action over the next few years to achieve measurable progress. Our commitments on economic cooperation have at their core the idea of connectedness to regional and global markets, to trade and investment networks, and to energy and transportation infrastructure, as a way to address emerging economic challenges and threats. In light of the global economic downturn, it is vital that we recommit ourselves to increasing cooperation through a variety of measures, including improving corporate governance and public management, eliminating unnecessary and discriminatory barriers to trade, continuing  to harmonize our regulations and standards where appropriate, taking further steps to combat financial crimes like bribery and money laundering, and increasing confidence through the incorporation of transparency principles in all of our public and private ventures. At the same time, in view of our progress made this year worldwide on  empowering women in the economy, first at the Invest for the Future Conference in Istanbul in January and most recently at the APEC Summit in San Francisco, we believe it is important to recognize the critical connection between women and strong economies, and to remove all barriers that prevent women from full and equal participation in the economy. I would like to focus my comments this morning on the subject of good governance, however. We have committed ourselves time and again to “good governance,” and while progress has been made, much work remains to be done. As stated in the 2003 Maastricht Strategy, achieving good governance will require a comprehensive, long-term strategic approach. In the view of the U.S. Government, good governance is the core theme within the economic and environmental dimension, and we are pleased that next year’s Forum will address the topic in a broad and detailed way. When we speak of good governance, we speak about governments having both the propensity and the competence to manage complex political and economic systems in a fair, fully inclusive, and transparent way. Anti-corruption is part of it, but not the whole picture. It’s about having transparent, clear and predictable legislative and regulatory frameworks that foster efficient and low-cost business formation and development, and most importantly allow and even encourage robust participation in the political and economic spheres by civil society. Let me say a few words about my agency’s past and current work in this area, reserving greater details and the highlights of a new proposal for Session III tomorrow. From 1998-2008, the U.S. Department of Commerce launched a Good Governance Program, focused on partnering with the public and private sectors in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern Europe. This work, focused on promoting sound corporate governance and business ethics, culminated in the publication of a Business Ethics Manual, a Commercial Dispute Resolution Handbook, and a Corporate Governance Manual translated into several languages and disseminated widely throughout the OSCE region. Today, we continue to work on numerous initiatives around the world, within multilateral fora such as APEC and the G20, which involve OSCE members, promoting consensus based principles focused on anticorruption. We have taken our business ethics work and branched out into new regions including Asia and Latin America. Despite a clear understanding of its importance, the lack of good governance and systemic corruption remain some of the single most important market access challenges for companies engaged in trade around the world. This is especially true for small and medium sized enterprises, which are the engine of economic growth and innovation throughout the world. The United States believes that addressing these issues can only lead to greater investment, economic prosperity and security. Over the next three days, we will discuss OSCE support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). I am pleased to report that the U.S. Department of Commerce played an important role in supporting the creation of the EITI in its initial phase. The OSCE now has a chance to follow in the steps of the G8 and G20, by endorsing the EITI, and I applaud the governments that have preceded the United States as implementers. The EITI is a great example of how shared commitments towards good governance and transparency in a vital sector to many countries can work and build sustained momentum and engagement between the private sector, governments and civil society. Tomorrow I will share more concrete information about the work that the U.S. Government and my Department have undertaken to promote good governance and to combat corruption. I am pleased to have an expert on business ethics and anti-corruption in the energy sector, as part of the U.S. delegation. Mr. Matthew Murray runs the Center for Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in St. Petersburg, Russia, and he’ll speak to you later about a good governance initiative involving public and private stakeholders in the power generation sector in Russia, which may serve as a model for similar programs in other OSCE countries. I am also pleased to have Kate Watters of Crude Accountability joining the U.S. delegation, who will provide some examples of how transparency is a critical component of enhancing security in the environmental sphere. A month ago, the Economic and Environmental Forum discussed the concept of sustainability and where efforts to promote sustainable practices stand in our region. Those discussions remind us that our commitments on sustainable development encompass a broad spectrum of activities related to efficiency, sound resource management, and the full involvement of all stakeholders in decision-making. Just to cite an example from the Prague Forum, we recognize that in order to further develop economies and markets in such varied areas as the Black Sea region and Central Asia we will need to address several problems: improving the efficiency of border crossings and building construction, tilting the energy mix towards cleaner fuels, harmonizing standards and practices across the region, and, just as critically, ensuring broad involvement of civil society in the decision-making on project proposal, design, and implementation. One thing that sets the OSCE apart from many other organizations addressing the environment is recognition of the clear connection between the environment and security. We recognize that many environmental disasters cannot be predicted or prevented. At the same time, greater transparency – through information sharing and civil society engagement – about possible security risks stemming from the environment will make it possible to prevent or mitigate more disasters, both natural and man-made. We also must recognize that failure to protect the environment is itself a security risk, putting increased pressure on populations facing dwindling resources of clean air and water, arable farmland, and adequate energy. Colleagues, The next three days provide a critical juncture and platform for finding consensus on measures that will improve our implementation of the OSCE commitments in the economic and environmental dimension. The Vilnius Ministerial is only a month and a half away; now is the time to summon the political will to find a way forward. We look forward to building consensus on decisions on energy security, to include good governance and transparency, and we welcome constructive dialogue on additional measures proposed on confidence-building initiatives and sustainable transport. We view these elements, along with sustainable development and protecting the environment, as the cornerstones of the Maastricht Strategy, and will be speaking about these over the next several days. Just a month ago, we found some convergence of opinion on discrete aspects of the second dimension. Let us expand that convergence to the entire dimension as we review our economic and environmental commitments over the next few days, with a view toward substantive deliverables for Vilnius. Thank you, Mr. Moderator.

  • Spotlight on Bosnia – Obstacles to Progress and Recommendations for the International Response

    This briefing addressed how politics in Bosnia are marked by increased nationalist rhetoric, which sometimes threatens the country’s peace, stability and territorial integrity, and the parties’ unwillingness to work constructively with the representatives of the international community, and the difficulties that have been faces since the October 2010 elections. Possible sources of this political impasse and possible course of action for the international community were also examined. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Clifford Bond, former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vice President of the American University in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Kurt Bassuener, Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council; and Nida Gelazis, Senior Associate of European Studies Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – provided several recommendations for improving the political situation in Bosnia, including a strong EU presence in the country, an emphasis on economic improvements, and basic reforms to improve the functionality of the Dayton state.

  • Democracy at Risk in Hungary

    Mr. President, this week in Budapest there are two events of particular interest to Americans. First, Hungary has unveiled a statue of President Ronald Reagan in front of the U.S. Embassy in honor of his contribution to the goal of ending communist repression and commemorating the 100th anniversary of his birth. Second, Hungary dedicated the Lantos Institute, named after Tom Lantos, our former colleague from the House of Representatives who worked tirelessly to promote democracy and human rights in the country of his birth. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Clinton have represented the United States at these respective events. These gestures shine a light on Hungary's historic transformation as well as the close bonds between our two countries. Unfortunately, other developments in Hungary have cast a dark shadow over what should otherwise be happy occasions. Last year, Hungary held elections in which a right-of-center party, FIDESZ, won a landslide, sweeping out eight years of socialist government rejected by many voters as scandal ridden and inept. With FIDESZ winning 52 percent of the vote, Hungary has the distinction of being the only country in Central Europe since the 1989 transformations where a single party has won an outright majority--not necessarily a bad thing, especially in a region where many governments are periodically hobbled by factionalism. Those elections were also notable because more than 850,000 Hungarians--16 percent of the vote--cast their ballots for Jobbik, an anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, irredentist party. While Jobbik is an opposition party, it has clearly and negatively influenced public policy discourse. Under Hungary's electoral system, FIDESZ's 52 percent of the vote has translated into a two-thirds majority of the seats in parliament. The government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban has used that supermajority to push through one controversial initiative after another. One initiative that has generated particularly sharp criticism is Hungary's new media law. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media warned it could be used to silence critical media and public debate, it overly concentrates power in regulatory authorities, and it harms media freedom. In Ukraine, where democracy has put down only shallow roots, the Kyiv Post editorialized that "Hungary's media law should not come here.'' Another area of concern stems from the government's fixation on ethnic Hungarian identity and lost empire in ways that can only be seen as unfriendly by other countries in the region. One of the government's first acts was to amend Hungary's citizenship law to facilitate the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship by ethnic Hungarians in other countries--primarily Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. This expansion of citizenship was pushed through even though, in a 2001 statement submitted to the Council of Europe, the Hungarian Government firmly renounced all aspirations for dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians. In a further escalation of provocative posturing, a few weeks ago Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament Laszlo Kovar said that military force to change the borders with Slovakia--a NATO ally--would have been justified and, in any case, he added, the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia are "ours.'' If one side of the nationalism coin is an excessive fixation on Hungarian ethnic identity beyond the borders, the other side is intolerance toward minorities at home. For example, one increasingly hears the argument, including from government officials, that while the Holocaust was a 20th-century tragedy for Jews, the worst tragedy for Hungarians was the 1920 Treaty of Trianon--the treaty that established the borders for the countries emerging from the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire. This comparison is offensive and disturbing. Ethnic Hungarians were never targeted for extermination or subjected to mass murder by Trianon. Moreover, this line of argument presents Hungarians and Jews as mutually exclusive. But more than 400,000 Jews were sent from Hungary to Auschwitz, and more than 10,000 Jews were shot along the banks of the Danube--were they not also Hungarian? How could this not be a tragedy for Hungary? The government has also used its supermajority to adopt a completely new Constitution which has been reviewed by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission on Democracy through Law, a body of judicial experts. The Venice Commission expressed particular concern with the requirement that numerous issues can now only be addressed through supermajority or so-called cardinal laws. In other words, "The more policy issues are transferred beyond the powers of simple majority, the less significance will future elections have and the more possibilities does a two-thirds majority have of cementing its political preferences and the country's legal order.'' In short, the Commission concluded, "the principle of democracy itself is at risk.'' This combines, by the way, with a court-packing scheme--the expansion of the size of the Constitutional Court from 11 to 15--and a reduction of the retirement age for ordinary judges from 70 to 62, which will reportedly mean 10 percent of all judges will be replaced. To make exactly clear what he has intended with these reforms, Prime Minister Orban declared that he wants to tie the hands not only of the next government, but of the next 10 governments--that is, future Hungarian governments for the next 40 years. It is no wonder then that in Freedom House's latest "Nations in Transit'' survey, released this week, Hungary had declined in ratings for civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, and judicial framework and independence. Ironically, just as attention shifts to the tantalizing possibility of democratic reform in the Middle East, the red flags in Budapest keep multiplying: Transparency International has warned that transferring the power to appoint the Ombudsman from the parliament to the president means that he or she will not be independent of the executive. NGOs have warned that a new draft religion law may result in a number of religions losing their registration. Restrictions by Hungarian authorities on pro-Tibet demonstrations during last week's visit to Budapest of the Chinese Premier were seen as an unnecessary and heavy-handed limitation of a fundamental liberty. Plans to recall soldiers and police from retirement so that they may oversee Romani work battalions have predictably caused alarm. In 1989, Hungary stood as an inspiration for democracy and human rights advocates around the globe. Today, I am deeply troubled by the trends there. I understand that it sometimes takes new governments time to find their bearings, and I hope that we will see some adjustments in Budapest. But in the meantime, I hope that other countries looking for transformative examples will steer clear of this Hungarian model.

  • 2050: Implications of Demographic Trends in the OSCE Region

    The hearing focused on the implications of current demographic trends in the expansive OSCE region through the prism of the security, economic and human dimensions.  Most of the OSCE’s 56 participating states are experiencing varying stages of demographic decline, marked by diminishing and rapidly aging populations. Such patterns were identifying as likely to have significant social, economic and security consequences for countries throughout the region, including the United States. Witnesses testifying at this hearing – including Jack A. Goldstone, Director of the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University; Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy of the American Enterprise Institute; Richard Jackson, Director and Senior Fellow of the Global Aging Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Steven W. Mosher, President of the Population Research Institute – addressed issues related to the demographic trends in the OSCE region, such as shrinking workforces in a growing number of participating States that are expected to become increasingly dependent upon foreign workers in the coming decades. A concern that these factors could contribute to mounting social tensions as demonstrated by clashes in some participating States in recent years was evident.

  • Senators Cardin and McCain Engage in a Colloquy on the Magnitsky Act

    Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Arizona is recognized. Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, in a few minutes my colleague from Maryland, Senator Cardin, will be introducing a bill which I am a cosponsor of, along with a large bipartisan group of our colleagues. I wish to emphasize at the outset that some may characterize this legislation as anti-Russian. In fact, I believe it is pro-Russian. It is pro the people of Russia. It is pro the people who stand up for human rights and democracy in that country which, unfortunately, seems to be sadly deprived of. This legislation, as my colleague and friend Senator Cardin will describe, requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to publish a list of each person whom our government has reason to believe was responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky ; participated in efforts to conceal the legal liability for these crimes; committed those acts of fraud that Magnitsky uncovered; is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of human rights committed against individuals seeking to expose illegal activities in Russia or exercise other universally recognized human rights. Second, the individuals on that list would become the target of an array of penalties, among them, ineligibility to receive a visa to travel. They would have their current visas revoked, their assets would be frozen that are under U.S. jurisdiction, and U.S. financial institutions would be required to audit themselves to ensure that none of these individuals are able to bank excess funds and move money in the U.S. financial system. I guess the first question many people will be asking is who was Sergei Magnitsky ? Who was this individual who has aroused such outrage and anger throughout the world? He was a tax attorney. He was a tax attorney working for an international company called Hermitage Capital that had invested in Russia. He didn't spend his life as a human rights activist or an outspoken critic of the Russian Government. He was an ordinary man. But he became an extraordinary champion of justice, fairness, and the rule of law in Russia where those principles, frankly, have lost meaning. What Sergei Magnitsky did was he uncovered a collection of Russian Government officials and criminals who were associated with the Russian Government officials who colluded to defraud the Russian state of $230 million. The Russian Government in turn blamed the crime on Heritage Capital and threw Magnitsky in prison in 2008. Magnitsky was detained for 11 months without trial. Russian officials, especially from the Interior Ministry, pressured Magnitsky to deny what he had uncovered--to lie and to recant. He refused. He was sickened by what his government had done and he refused to surrender principle to brute power. As a result, he was transferred to increasingly more severe and more horrific prison conditions. He was forced to eat unclean food and water. He was denied basic medical care as his health worsened. In fact, he was placed in even worse conditions until, on November 16, 2009, having served 358 days in prison, Sergei Magnitsky died. He was 37 years old. Sergei Magnitsky's torture and murder--let's call it what it really was--is an extreme example of a problem that is unfortunately all too common and widespread in Russia today: the flagrant violations of the rule of law and basic human rights committed by the Russian Government itself, along with its allies. I note the presence of my colleague and lead sponsor of this important legislation. I hope in his remarks perhaps my friend from Maryland would mention the latest in the last few days which was the affirmation of the incredible sentence on Mr. Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his associate which is, in many ways, tantamount to a death sentence; again, one of these blatant abuses of justice and an example of the corruption that exists at the highest level of government. I wish to say again I appreciate the advocacy of my colleague from Maryland and his steadfast efforts on behalf of human rights in Russia, Belarus, and other countries. It has been a great honor to work with him and for him in bringing this important resolution to the floor of the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that at the appropriate time, the Senator from Maryland and I be allowed to engage in a colloquy. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Maryland. Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, let me thank Senator McCain, not just for taking time for this colloquy concerning Mr. Magnitsky but for his longstanding commitment to justice issues, human rights issues, and the values the United States represents internationally. We have had a long, proud, bipartisan, and, most importantly, successful record of promoting basic American values such as democratic governance and the rule of law around the world. Engaging the countries of the Eastern Bloc in matters such as respect for human rights was critical to winning the cold war. We will never know how many lives were improved and even saved due to instruments such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Jackson-Vanik amendment. These measures defined an era of human rights activism that ultimately pried open the Iron Curtain and brought down the Wall. Thankfully, the cold war is over and we have a stronger relationship, both at the governmental and societal levels, with countries in Eastern Europe. But, sadly, internationally recognized rights and freedoms continue to be trampled and, in many cases, with absolute impunity. With the possibility of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization, and the Presidents of the United States and Russia meeting in France, ours is a timely discussion. Last week, I joined my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Arizona, and 14 other Senators from both parties to introduce the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act--a broad bill to address what the respected watchdog Transparency International dubbed a ``systematically corrupted country'' and to create consequences for those who are currently getting away with murder. Actions always speak louder than words. The diplomatic manner of dealing with human rights abuses has frequently been to condemn the abusers, often publicly, with the hope that these statements will be all they need to do. They say oh, yes, we are against these human rights violations. We are for the rule of law. We are for people being able to come forward and tell us about problems and be able to correct things. They condemn the abusers, but they take no action. They think their words will be enough. Well, we know differently. We know what is happening today in Russia. We know the tragedy of Sergei Magnitsky was not an isolated episode. This is not the only time this has happened. My colleague from Arizona mentioned the Mikhail Khodorkovsky case. Mr. Khodorkovsky is today in prison with even a longer sentence. Why? Because he had the courage to stand up and oppose the corrupt system in Russia and something should be done about it. That is why he is in prison, and that is wrong. So it is time we do something about this and that we make it clear that action is needed. For too long, the leaders in Russia have said we are going to investigate what happened to Sergei Magnitsky . We think it is terrible he died in prison without getting adequate medical care. As Senator McCain pointed out, here is a person whose only crime was to bring to the proper attention of officials public corruption within Russia. As a result of his whistleblowing, he was arrested and thrown in jail and died in jail. He was tortured. That cannot be allowed, to just say, Oh, that is terrible. We know the people who were responsible. In some cases they have been promoted in their public positions. Well, it is time for us to take action. That is why we have introduced this legislation. While this bill goes far beyond the tragic experiences of Sergei Magnitsky , it does bear his name, so let me refresh everyone's recollection with some of the circumstances concerning his death. I mention this because some might say, why are we talking about one person? But as the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin said, ``One death is a tragedy; one million is a statistic.'' I rarely agree with Dictator Stalin, but we have to put a human face on the issue. People have to understand that these are real people and real lives that have been ruined forever as a result of the abuses within Russia. Sergei was a skilled tax lawyer who was well known in Moscow among many Western companies, large and small. In fact, he even did some accounting for the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. Working at the American law firm of Firestone Duncan, Sergei uncovered the largest known tax fraud in modern Russian history and blew the whistle on the swindling of his fellow citizens by corrupt officials. For that he was promptly arrested by the subordinates of those he implicated in the crime. He was held under torturous conditions in detention for nearly a year without trial or visits from family. He developed severe medical complications which went deliberately untreated, and he died on November 16, 2009, alone in an isolation cell while prison doctors waited outside his door. Sergei was 37 years old. He left behind a wife, two sons, a dependent mother, and so many friends. Shortly after his death, Philip Pan of the Washington Post wrote: Magnitsky's complaints, made public by his attorneys as he composed them, went unanswered while he lived. But in a nation where millions perished in the Soviet gulag, the words of the 37-year-old tax lawyer struck a nerve after he died ..... his descriptions of the squalid conditions he endured have been splashed on the front pages of newspapers and discussed on radio and television across the country, part of an outcry even his supporters never expected. I think Senator McCain and I would agree, there is a thirst for democracy around the world. People in Russia want more. They want freedom. They want accountability. They want honest government officials. They are outraged by what happened to Sergei Magnitsky . I would point out just last week I met with a leader of the Russian business community who came here and traveled at some risk, I might say. Just visiting me was a risk. We have people from Russia who are being questioned because they come and talk to us. But he said to me that what happened here needs to be answered by the Russian authorities. He understands why we are introducing this legislation. A year after his death, and with no one held accountable, and some of those implicated even promoted and decorated, The Economist noted: At the time, few people outside the small world of Russian investors and a few human-rights activists had heard of Mr. Magnitsky . A year later, his death has become a symbol of the mind-boggling corruption and injustice perpetrated by the Russian system, and the inability of the Kremlin to change it. Regrettably, we know Sergei's case, egregious as it is, is not isolated. Human rights abuses continue unpunished and often unknown across Russia today. To make this point more clear, let's look at another example far outside the financial districts of Moscow and St. Petersburg in the North Caucasus in southern Russia where Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, condones and oversees massive violations of human rights, including violations of religious freedom and the rights of women. His militia also violates international humanitarian laws. As of this April, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled against Russia in 186 cases concerning Chechnya, most involving civilians. So Sergei Magnitsky's case is not an isolated case of abuse by the Russian authorities. There has been a systematic effort made to deny people their basic human rights, including one individual, Natalia Estemirova, who personally visited my office at the Helsinki Commission. She was a courageous human rights defender who was brutally assassinated. So it is time for Russia to take action. But we cannot wait; we need to take action. Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. CARDIN. I yield back to my colleague. Mr. McCAIN. First, I thank my colleague from Maryland for a very eloquent and, I think, very strong statement, to which I can add very little. But isn't it true, I ask my friend, that this Magnitsky case and the Khodorkovsky case, which I would like for us to talk a little bit more about, are not isolated incidents? In other words, this is the face of the problem in Russia today. As the Senator mentioned, in its annual index of perceptions of corruption, Transparency International ranked Russia 154th out of 178 countries--perceived as more corrupt than Pakistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The World Bank considers 122 countries to be better places to do business than Russia. One of those countries is Georgia, which the World Bank ranks as the 12th best country to do business. In other words, isn't it true in the Magnitsky case, it is what has been taking place all across Russia, including this incredible story of Khodorkovsky, who was one of the wealthiest men in Russia, one of the wealthiest oligarchs who rebelled against this corruption because he saw the long-term consequences of this kind of corruption and was brought to trial, convicted, and then, when his sentence was completed, they charged him again? Talk about a corrupt system, isn't it true that Vladimir Putin said he should ``sit in jail,'' and we now know that the whole trial was rigged, as revealed by people who were part of the whole trial? In other words, isn't it true, I would ask my friend from Maryland, that what we are talking about is one human tragedy, but it is a tragedy that is unfolding throughout Russia that we do not really have any knowledge of? And if we allow this kind of abuse to go on unresponded to, then, obviously, we are abrogating our responsibilities to the world; isn't that true? Mr. CARDIN. I say to Senator McCain, you are absolutely right. This is not isolated. Magnitsky is not an isolated case of a lawyer doing his job on behalf of a client and being abused by the authorities. We have a lot of examples of lawyers trying to do their jobs and being intimidated and their rights violated. But in Mr. Khodorkovsy's case, we have a business leader who was treated the same way just because he was a successful business leader. Even worse, he happened to be an opponent of the powers in the Kremlin. So we are now seeing, in Russia, where they want to quell opposition by arresting people who are just speaking their minds, doing their business legally, putting them in prison, trying them, and in the Khodorkovsky case actually increasing their sentences the more they speak out against the regime. That is how authoritarian they want to be and how oppressive they are to human rights. But I could go further. If one is a journalist in Russia, and they try to do any form of independent journalism, they are in danger of being beaten, being imprisoned, being murdered. It is very intimidating. The list goes on and on. Mr. McCAIN. Could I ask my colleague, what implications, if any, does the Senator from Maryland believe this should have on the Russian entry into the World Trade Organization? Mr. CARDIN. Well, it is very interesting, I say to Senator McCain. I just came from a Senate Finance Committee hearing, and we were talking about a free-trade agreement. I am for free-trade agreements. I think it makes sense. It is funny, when a country wants to do trade with the United States, they all of a sudden understand they have to look at their human rights issues. I think all of us would like to see Russia part of the international trade community. I would like to see Russia, which is already a member of a lot of international organizations, live up to the commitments they have made in joining these international organizations. But it is clear to me that Russia needs to reform. If we are going to have business leaders traveling to Russia in order to do business, I want to make sure they are safe in Russia. I want to make sure they are going to get the protection of the rule of law in Russia. I want to make sure there are basic rights that the businesspeople in Russia and the United States can depend upon. So, yes, I understand that Russia would like to get into the WTO. We have, of course, the Jackson-Vanik amendment that still applies. I understand the origin of that law, and I understand what needs to change in order for Russia to be able to join the World Trade Organization. But I will tell you this: The best thing that Russia can do in order to be able to enter the international trade regime is to clean up its abuses in its own country, to make clear it respects the rule of law; that businesspeople will be protected under the rule of law and certainly not imprisoned and tortured, as in the cases of Mr. Khodorkovsky and Mr. Magnitsky . We do not want to see that type of conduct. If Russia would do that, if they would reform their systems, then I think we would be a long way toward that type of integration and trade. Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleague from Maryland for an eloquent statement about the situation as regards Russia. I thank him, and I can assure my colleague from Maryland that, as we speak, this will provide--and this legislation which he has introduced, will provide--some encouragement to people who in Russia now, in some cases, have lost almost all hope because of the corruption of the judicial system, as well as other aspects of the Russian nation. We all know that no democracy can function without the rule of law; and if there are ever two examples of the corruption of the rule of law, it is the tragedy of Sergei Magnitsky and, of course, Mr. Khodorkovsky, who still languishes in prison; who, in his words, believes he--by the extension of his prison sentence--may have been given a death sentence. So I thank my colleague from Maryland. Mr. CARDIN. Will my colleague yield for just one final comment? I think the Senator is right on target as to what he has said. I appreciate the Senator bringing this to the attention of our colleagues in the Senate. I will respond to one other point because I am sure my colleague heard this. Some Russian officials say: Why are we concerned with the internal affairs of another country? I just want to remind these Russian officials, I want to remind my colleagues here, that Russia has signed on to the Helsinki Final Act. They did that in 1975, and they have agreed to the consensus document that was issued in Moscow in 1991 and reaffirmed just last year with the heads of state meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, just this past December. I am going to quote from that document: The participating States-- Which Russia is a participating state-- emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of international order. They categorically and irrevocably declared that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States-- The United States is a participating state-- and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. Mr. McCAIN. That was a statement by the Government of Russia? Mr. CARDIN. That was a statement made by the 56 states of the OSCE at a meeting of the Heads of State, which happens about every 10 years. It just happened to have happened last year. Russia participated in drafting this statement. Russia was there, signed on to it, and said: We agree on this. It is a reaffirmation as to what they agreed to in 1991 in Moscow where we acknowledged that it is of international interest, and we have an obligation and right to question when a member state violates those basic human dimension commitments. Russia clearly has done that. We have not only the right but the obligation to raise that, and I just wanted to underscore that to my colleagues. I say to Senator McCain, your comments on the Senate floor are so much on point. I think people understand it. They understand the basic human aspect to this. But sometimes they ask: Well, why should America be concerned? Do we have a legitimate right to question this? Russia signed the document that acknowledges our right to challenge this and raise these issues. I thank my colleague for yielding. Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleague from Maryland, and I hope we would get, very rapidly, another 98 cosponsors. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.  

  • Attacks in Hungary and the Czech Republic

    Mr. President, as co-chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, I wanted to bring to the Senate's attention that next week, February 23, will mark a tragic anniversary. Two years ago on that date, assassins gathered outside the home of Robert Csorba. They threw a Molotov cocktail into the house. Although some family members escaped the blaze, five-year-old Robert Csorba and his father did not: as they tried to flee the flames, their attackers riddled them with bullets. The murderers were prepared: if the bomb did not finish them off, their guns would. They were prepared to kill men, women, and children. The Csorbas were just two of the victims in a wave of racially motivated attacks against Roma that has roiled Hungary. According to the European Roma Rights Center, between January 2008 and July 2010 there were at least two dozen cases where Molotov cocktails, hand grenades or sniper fire were used. The victims included nine fatalities, including two children, and others who were seriously injured. Among them was the 13-year-old daughter of Maria Balogh. Ms. Balogh was murdered when snipers shot into her home in the middle of the night on August 3, 2009, killing her and leaving her daughter an orphan. Her daughter was also grievously wounded: she was shot in the face, blinded in one eye, and maimed for life. It is no wonder that these attacks led one Romani activist to declare that Roma would need to arm themselves or flee, and another asserted that if these attacks continued, Hungary would be headed toward civil war. There are some positive developments. The fatal attacks have stopped. Hungary's new government has reached out to the victims to provide support for rebuilding homes that were damaged or destroyed in arson attacks. Hungary's new Minister for Social Inclusion, Zolton Balog, has demonstrated a rare and welcome compassion for his Romani fellow citizens. But the wounded and the dead still wait for justice in Hungary. Although four men have been arrested on suspicion of carrying out the serial killings of Roma that occurred in 2008 and 2009, there have been no trials and no convictions. The Czech Republic has also seen a dramatic rise in anti-Roma rhetoric and violent actions in the past few years. Last October, I joined Helsinki Commission cochairman, Alcee Hastings in welcoming the lengthy sentences handed down in the Czech Republic to four neo-Nazis who firebombed a Romani home in 2009, an act which left an infant, widely known simply as ``Baby Natalka,'' with second and third degree burns over 80 percent of her body and a lifetime of painful rehabilitation ahead of her. When that judgment was handed down against the four men who firebombed Baby Natalka, I was heartened. I also said I was watching another Czech case--one that is largely unknown. On November 8, 2008, a roving mob attacked several Roma in the town of Havirov. One teenager was so savagely beaten, he was effectively left for dead. For a prolonged period of time afterwards, he was in a coma, and when he regained consciousness, he was unable to talk. Although he has learned to speak again, he has suffered permanent brain damage. He is paralyzed, was forced to end his studies, and may never be able to work. A decision in the case is expected to be announced in the Ostrava regional court at 8:30 a.m. on February 24. Behind the high profile murder cases of Roma that make their way into the news, there is an even larger number of cases involving Roma who have been attacked, but not fatally; they do not die but are maimed, disabled, and traumatized for life by the racially motivated violence they have encountered. Their stories are often never told, but each of them stands as a living monument to everyone in their families and everyone in their communities, testifying to the government's failure to protect them. Each of them deserves justice, including Jaroslav Horvath, the teenager attacked in Havirov.  

  • Beyond Corporate Raiding: A Discussion of Advanced Fraud Schemes in the Russian Market

    This briefing was part of a number of Helsinki Commission events focusing on corruption and fraud in modern Russia’s businesses and law enforcement. Kyle Parker led a fascinating and provocative discussion with Russia's leading anti-corruption crusader, shareholder activist, and blogger extraordinaire Alexei Navalny who Time Magazine dubbed "Russia's Erin Brockovich." Alexei shared his experiences with Russian corruption and shed light on the measures one must take to be successful. Parker and Navalny addressed the death of Sergei Magnitsky in 2009 and the fraud against Hermitage Capital. They looked at the possibility of similar situations in the future and whether or not there is hope for change. They also discussed the sharp contrast of this corruption against the strident anti-corruption rhetoric of President Dmitriy Medvedev, who has called for an end to "legal nihilism" and the corrosive practice of law enforcement "nightmaring" legitimate businesses.

  • Copenhagen Anniversary Conference

    By Orest Deychakiwsky, Policy Advisor Representatives from a majority of the 56 OSCE participating States and several dozen non-governmental organizations (NGOs) gathered in Copenhagen on June 10-11 to mark the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the 1990 Copenhagen Document and to assess implementation of key provisions of that landmark document. The anniversary conference, titled “20 years of the OSCE Copenhagen Document: Status and Future Perspectives,” was co-organized by the Kazakhstani OSCE Chairmanship and Denmark, and held at the Eigtveds Pakhus, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Michael Haltzel led the U.S. delegation, which was joined by U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Ian Kelly and representatives from the OSCE Mission in Vienna, the State Department and the Helsinki Commission. Five substantive working sessions, reflecting some of the major themes of the groundbreaking Copenhagen Document, were held: Democratic processes – elections and human rights; Rule of Law; National Minorities; Freedom of Movement; and Measures to improve implementation of the human dimension commitments. Many speakers highlighted the historic importance of the Copenhagen Document, which offered a blueprint for pluralistic democratic development, rooted in the rule of law and protection of human rights, throughout the OSCE region – a revolutionary document at the time and one that remains highly relevant two decades later. The June 1990 Copenhagen Meeting came at a unique time in history when dramatic changes were taking place; the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of one-party regimes in Eastern Europe had taken place only months earlier. And the following year – 1991 -- witnessed the emergence of 15 independent states with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Truly, those were dynamic days during which sweeping new commitments -- which would have been impossible to garner consensus for years or even months prior -- received universal support. Indeed, it is questionable as to whether consensus to the Copenhagen agreement would be found today, given the democratic and human rights backsliding that has occurred in a number of participating States. The Copenhagen Document underlines the centrality of political pluralism, civil society and human rights as fundamental elements of functioning democracies. As Ambassador Max Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation to the 1990 conference summed it up, “In effect, the Copenhagen document represents the first formal proclamation, by the States themselves, of a Europe both whole and free.” It identified the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as one of the basic purposes of government and acknowledged that democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law. Among the achievements of the Copenhagen Document were the far-reaching commitments on democratic elections which laid the groundwork for the OSCE’s future activities with respect to election observation. Copenhagen also represented a significant step forward with respect to the protection of minorities, and for the first time there was a direct reference to Roma and to anti-Semitism. While participants at the anniversary meeting underscored the significant progress over the last 20 years, many also called for fuller compliance with the Copenhagen commitments, noting, for instance, backsliding in holding democratic elections in some participating States; suppression of civil society, including independent media, NGOs and human rights defenders; the deficit of impartial and independent justice; and the lack of separation of powers – especially the concentration of power in the executive. The last session of the conference discussed measures to improve implementation of human dimension commitments, including the prevention of human rights violations through the use of reporting before the violations occur; enhancement of standards and commitments; strengthened monitoring mechanisms, including a U.S. proposal to dispatch special representatives to investigate reports of egregious human rights violations and make corrective recommendations before the violations become entrenched; and improved cooperation with, and involvement of, civil society actors in advancing democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Ultimately, however, compliance with existing standards enshrined in the Copenhagen Document, the Helsinki Final Act and all other OSCE commitments remains the primary responsibility of the participating State.

  • In the Eye of the Storm: Chechnya and the Mounting Violence in the North Caucasus

    A year after the leading Russian human rights defender, Natalya Estemirova, was abducted near her apartment building in the Chechen capital Grozny, transported to the neighboring republic of Ingushetia and brutally killed, human rights abuses and a continuing climate of fear prevailed in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.  Ronald McNamara, International Policy Director at the Commission, led a discussion on the marked increase in extrajudicial killings and politically motivated disappearances in Chechnya as well as in neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan.  Witnesses – Elena Milashina, Raisa Turlueva, and Igor Kalyapin – discussed how strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, the Republic’s Kremlin-backed president, publicly labeled independent journalists and rights activists as “traitors and enemies of the state” and how he reportedly praised the perpetrators of recent paintball gun attacks on the streets of Grozny targeting women for not wearing headscarves.  They emphasized the difficulty of resolving the problem because of Moscow’s backing of Ramzan and of a political model in which “bandits” serve as a prop for the federal powers that be.

  • A Decade of the Trafficking in Persons Report

    Senator Benjamin L. Cardin convened a standing-room only hearing centered on the diplomatic impact of the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.  The hearing focused on the ten years that the annual TIP report has been prepared by the State Department. Improvements to TIP-related efforts were suggested, such as working more closely with the Tier 2 Watch List countries in the OSCE Region, – Azerbaijan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – helping them to implement the changes necessary to meet the minimum standards and to avoid statutory downgrades which will otherwise be required in next year’s TIP report. Witnesses testifying at this hearing – including Luis CdeBaca, Ambassador at Large of the U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Jolene Smith, CEO & Co-Founder of Free the Slaves; and Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President for Government Relations of the International Justice Mission – explored ways to potentially create extra-territorial jurisdiction for trafficking cases.  They also focused on ways to deter demand for trafficking victims in all countries, including Tier 1 countries.

  • Global Threats, European Security and Parliamentary Cooperation

    From nuclear security to climate change, global terrorism to anti-corruption efforts, this hearing examined what parliamentarians can do to work together on some of the most significant challenges facing the world. Members addressed European and Central Asian security concerns, including unresolved conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere, and considered how international parliaments can cooperate to address challenges related to trafficking, tolerance, and democratic development, including elections and media freedom.

  • The Link Between Revenue Transparency and Human Rights

    This hearing focused on the lack of transparency within governments and the energy sector posing both a threat to energy exports and the ability of governments to properly manage revenue for their citizens. The hearing examined how such policies affect government accountability. Instead of serving their citizens, politicians often take advantage of the resources of the country in pursuit of their own self-interest. In particular, the continued assaults on freedom of speech and on civil society and how that bodes for the future of EITI implementation in Azerbaijan were discussed. The Commissioners and the witnesses looked into the present actions of the U.S. and what could be done within the OSCE process to address these issues.

  • U.S. Helsinki Commission: Ukraine Needs to Accelerate Reforms

    Ukraine's new President Viktor Yanukovych 'will need to accelerate economic and political reforms, tackle systemic corruption and overcome the rule of law deficit, including building up an underdeveloped judiciary to strengthen its independence', U.S. Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Benjamin L. Cardin said in the first Congressional hearing on Ukraine in Washington on Tuesday, information of the Voice of America. "Such reforms will reduce Ukraine's vulnerability to outside pressures and bring it closer to its stated goals of European integration," Senator Cardin emphasized. "Ukraine has developed an open and pluralistic political system and media freedoms have expanded," said U.S. Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, who served as deputy head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly election observation mission in Ukraine in February and has observed two other national elections there. "Although Ukraine has had good elections now for the last five years, I can tell you that you need more than good elections to make a functioning democracy," he added. In turn, Anders Aslund, Senior Fellow at Peterson Institute for International Economics, underlined that two thirds of young Ukrainians have higher education, but they have no opportunity to apply their knowledge in particular areas. Aslund said that this is a reason why Ukraine is ranked 110th worldwide on GDP per capita.

  • Ukraine: Moving Beyond Stalemate

    This hearing examined how the U.S. can best continue to encourage and assist Ukraine in developing democracy, rule of law, and a market economy.   The panel also discussed Ukraine’s relationships with its neighbors, the United States, and European states and organizations. The panel of witnesses explored the democratic developments and progress since the Orange revolution and U.S. policy implications of Ukraine’s interest in further integration with Europe.

  • U.S. Senator Laud Iraq's Plan to Become EITI Candidate Country

    US Sens. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) expressed their strong support for Iraq’s commitment to make its oil and gas industry more transparent following Iraq’s Jan. 11 announcement that it plans to become an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative candidate country. EITI is an international coalition of governments, companies, and others that promotes good governance through publication of oil, gas, and mining revenues, the two Senate Foreign Relations Committee members noted on Jan. 12. “Corruption remains a significant problem in Iraq,” said Lugar, the committee’s ranking minority member. “As oil and gas is the single largest source of revenue [there], it is important that the revenue generated benefit the people of Iraq and not just a handful of businessmen and officials. By committing to implement EITI, Iraq is creating a foundation for good governance in a sector critical to Iraq’s future stability.” Cardin said, “This is a significant step toward a greater future for Iraq.” The senator also has promoted EITI as chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, more commonly known as the US-Helsinki Commission. “The EITI process has proven to strengthen civil society and increase revenue transparency. By joining this coalition, Iraq’s leaders are committing to transparency that will empower citizens to hold their government accountable,” Cardin maintained. Iraqi Prime Minister Noori al Malaki announced Jan. 11 that Iraq plans to become an EITI candidate country in February and would implement the initiative in May. With 11% of the world’s total reserves, Iraq would become the largest oil-producing nation to implement the standards, EITI officials said. At a conference launching Iraq’s effort in Baghdad, Jonas Moberg, who heads EITI’s secretariat, said the country’s implementation of EITI would be important in driving Iraq’s recovery and ensuring that its oil and gas wealth was managed for its citizens’ benefit. Lugar and Cardin, along with eight other cosponsors, recently introduced S 1700, the Energy Security Through Transparency Act, which aims to increase transparency through public disclosure of oil, gas, and mining payments, and encourage US participation in EITI.

  • Corruption: A Problem that Spans the OSCE Region and Dimensions

    By Troy C. Ware, with contributions from Shelly Han In July 2008, Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission) and other Members of Congress traveled to Astana, Kazakhstan for the seventeenth Annual Session of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). The session’s theme was “Transparency in the OSCE.” At the outset of the trip, Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, then Chairman of the Commission, remarked that while he supported the candidacy of Kazakhstan for the Chairmanship of the OSCE it was “imperative that the government undertake concrete reforms on human rights and democratization.”1 A number of nongovernmental organizations have cited the high level of corruption in Kazakhstan as one impediment to democratic reform. Kazakhstan is by no means alone. Recognizing the existence of corruption throughout the OSCE region, Helsinki Commissioners have consistently addressed the problem by raising it through hearings, legislation, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Hearings in 2006 identified corruption as a hindrance to fulfilling human rights commitments and economic development in South-Central Europe (Helsinki Commission June 2006 Hearing). The role of corruption as a force in restricting freedom of the media in Azerbaijan was highlighted in a 2007 hearing (Helsinki Commission August 2007 Hearing). This report will draw attention to recent initiatives undertaken by the Helsinki Commission that have shown corruption undermines human rights, fundamental freedoms and overall security. Wherever found, corruption not only stunts democratic reform, but also weakens the security and economic condition of states. Although corruption manifests itself in various ways, this report can practically only discuss a few. For example, prominent manifestations within the three OSCE dimensions discussed include parliamentary corruption, diversion of funding from infrastructure and human trafficking. Understandably, countries will not solve a widespread and pervasive problem with a singular approach. Additionally, this report will discuss the importance of capacity building initiatives that focus on prevention as a critical element in an anti-corruption campaign. This is an element that must be included alongside the high profile anti-corruption prosecutions governments may be inclined to conduct. A number of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations produce regular surveys or reports on corruption. The 2008 survey of corruption by Transparency International (TI), an international nongovernmental organization that promotes anti-corruption policies worldwide, ranked twelve OSCE participating States in the bottom half of 180 countries surveyed. The least corrupt countries were assigned the highest ranking. Kazakhstan ranked 145, which was still ahead of the OSCE countries of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.2 Experts point out that since TI uses a survey, its findings may lag behind reality, reflecting only perceptions based on increased reporting resulting from government enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Others point out that surveys place too much emphasis on bribery although forms of corruption vary greatly from country to country.3 Nonetheless, other barometers, such as evaluations of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), which measures anti-corruption policy reform and capacity through a multi-year expert evaluation process, suggest that some OSCE participating States are only partially implementing standards set by the group. Corruption, which was explicitly highlighted in the Parliamentary Assembly’s concluding document, the Astana Declaration,4 is a multidimensional blight that undermines human, economic, environmental, and security dimension policy goals throughout the OSCE region. Human Dimension Genuine democracy and rule of law cannot exist if the passage, implementation and judgment of the law favor the highest bidder. Moreover, the rule of law requires more than elections and a neutral and impartial judiciary; it requires that individuals receive the unbiased and dispassionate benefits of the law from all public servants. Larry Diamond wrote in the March/April 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs that, “[f]or a country to be a democracy, it must have more than regular, multiparty elections under a civilian constitutional order.” He points out that when regular elections are accompanied by corrupt police and bureaucracies, many people are “citizens only in name” and in their disillusionment gravitate toward authoritarian leadership.5 Observers frequently focus attention on removing graft from courts and elections. However, corruption in other spheres of society, such as among lower level public servants, contributes to the notion of corruption as an acceptable behavior often having the most immediate adverse effect on the average person. Government employees of modest rank are capable of denying basic fundamental freedoms such as equal protection of the law, enjoyment of property, the right of minorities to exercise human rights and freedoms, and the independence of legal practitioners.6 Those who advocate for the victims of corruption, even within the judicial systems, often cannot do so without repercussions. Furthermore, when parliaments become sanctuaries for persons engaged in corruption the protection conveys a message that corruption will be tolerated elsewhere in society. Parliamentary Immunity In a 2006 brief, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) defined parliamentary immunity as “a system in which members of a legislature are granted partial immunity from prosecution from civil and/or criminal offenses.” USAID further states that parliamentary immunity’s purpose is to “reduce the possibility of pressuring a member to change his or her official behavior [with] the threat of prosecution.”7 Unrestrained parliamentary immunity impedes the investigation and prosecution of corruption, makes parliamentary acquiescence and perpetuation of corruption possible, fosters a culture of corruption among other government officials and security officials, and disproportionately affects minority populations. According to Development Alternative Incorporated (DAI), a development consulting company, developing democracies tend to favor the broadest scope of immunity which allows corrupt activities almost with impunity. Although rare, a parliament may vote to lift immunity from one of its members, as was the case in Armenia in 2006 when immunity was removed for a parliament member who allegedly failed to pay taxes and instigated a gun fight.8 While parliamentary immunity can protect the independence of legislatures, frequently it is a shield for illicit activity. A 2007 USAID report, Corruption Assessment: Ukraine, found that “legislators have amassed fortunes through business interests and other means . . . with little transparency or accountability.” Moreover the report found that broad immunity created a powerful incentive to seek public office and introduced “illicit funding” into the political process.9 Even if prosecuting agencies investigate the activities of legislators, the individuals are rarely prosecuted because the parliament will not lift immunity. ArmeniaNow, an NGO publication, found that in the first fifteen years of Armenian independence, immunity was waived in only five instances.10 Although democratic attributes exist ostensibly in most OSCE participating States, features such as elections may ironically serve to conceal the self-serving rule that results from corruption. Parliamentary corruption can lead to a cycle in which the parliament cannot effectively exercise an oversight role because its members have a personal stake in the illicit activity. The Bulgarian parliament’s resistance to closing duty-free vendors along its borders is an example of the controlling power of corruption according to Bulgaria’s Center for the Study of Democracy. Since 1992, duty-free fuel, cigarette and alcohol vendors have operated at Bulgaria’s borders.11 These operations, allegedly tied to organized crime, deprived the state of significant tax revenue and could undercut prices of competitors subject to duties. As a condition of joining the European Union, Bulgaria was required to raise excise duties up to a standard set by the EU. Furthermore, in 2003 the Minister of Finance signed a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund to close all duty-free shops.12 In response to the increased tax, the illegal trade in duty-free goods increased. In 2004, the Finance Minister extended a license for the shops to continue until 2009 despite international commitments to the contrary. In 2006, the Bulgarian Parliament, instead of closing the shops, passed a law that allowed the shops to shift to the non-EU borders with Serbia, Turkey, and Macedonia.13 Finally, in early 2008, the Parliament passed a law to close the duty-free shops.14 Previously, the Center for the Study of Democracy asserted that “national level illegal proceeds from duty-free trade [had] been deployed to capture the state” and the vendors had used “political corruption to secure perpetual monopoly business positions.”15 Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Benjamin L. Cardin has raised the issue of unbridled parliamentary immunity on many occasions. In a hearing in June 2006 on Human Rights, Democracy, and Integration in South Central Europe, Senator Cardin made a commitment to push the Parliamentary Assembly to adopt initiatives calling for changes to parliamentary immunity laws. At the July 2006 OSCE Annual Session Cardin authored a resolution on parliamentary immunity, which passed, urging the OSCE participating States to “[p]rovide clear, balanced, transparent, and enforceable procedures for waiving parliamentary immunities in cases of criminal acts or ethical violations.” In 2007, Cardin raised the issue of how parliamentary immunity can serve as cover for corruption in a Helsinki Commission hearing on Energy and Democracy (Helsinki Commission July 2007 Hearing). He has also urged nations such as Ukraine to consider changing their parliamentary immunity laws.16 Petty Corruption Like water flowing downhill, if corruption exists at the higher levels of government and society, it will permeate the performance of public servants at every level. During a 2008 Helsinki Commission hearing on Kazakhstan’s accession to the OSCE Chairmanship, Martha Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace identified corruption that is “rampant in daily life” in Kazakhstan and present at all levels of government (Helsinki Commission July 2008 Hearing).17 Endemic corruption within the government bureaucracy has an immediate effect in terms of confidence in government and cost to the people of any country. A 2009 report stated that among European Union countries, 17 percent of Greeks and thirty percent of Lithuanians had admitted to paying a bribe to obtain service from a public administrative body.18 In many countries, widespread corruption has led to a level of acceptance. GfK Research, an international marketing and research company, conducted a study in 2006 which reported that 61 percent of Romanians, 58 percent of Bosnians, and 56 percent of Czechs regarded bribes as a normal part of life.19 Frequently, national health care service is provided only to those willing to pay extra to medical personnel. In Romania, $225 paid by Alina Lungu to her doctor was apparently not enough to prevent him from leaving the pregnant women alone for an hour during labor and her baby from being born blind, deaf, and with brain damage due to the umbilical cord being wrapped around him.20 Global Integrity, a nonprofit organization that monitors governance and corruption worldwide, provides an account of a Latvian girl experiencing stomach pain who was allowed to sit in a hospital for several days without pain-killers or treatment until her father paid money to the doctor.21 A survey in Bulgaria showed that the amount of Bulgarians identifying the health sector as the most corrupt in comparison to others such as customs, police, and judiciary increased from 20 percent in 2002 to 39 percent in 2007.22 According to 2007 reporting, Bulgarians experienced corruption in almost every type of health service including referrals, surgery, birth delivery, and emergency care. The problem is very widespread in hospital care.23 Some conclude that health workers take extra payments from patients for services already covered by health insurance and administrators overstate costs in hospital care due to insufficient hospital financing and financing regulations that encourage overspending.24 fficials regularly abuse their authority in the enforcement of traffic laws and in the area of travel. Vladimir Voinovich, a prominent Russian author, points out that to become a public official or policeman you must pay off your boss and that payment is financed through taking bribes.25 Even when officials wish to behave honestly, providing “a stream of payments to patrons” becomes a matter of survival.26 In Uzbekistan, permission from the local government is required to move to another city and according to the 2008 Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in Uzbekistan, local authorities commonly issue the required documents only in return for a bribe. The report also states that police “arbitrarily detained people to extort bribes” on a regular basis.27 The 2008 report on Human Rights Practices in Azerbaijan noted that police officers regularly impose arbitrary fines on citizens and seek protection money.28 The report on Poland recognized that corruption among police was widespread.29 In many countries, drinking and driving has become commonplace because police can be bribed to look the other way. The Effect of Corruption on Minorities More often than not, police corruption disproportionally affects minority groups. In a Helsinki Commission briefing in 2004, Leonid Raihman of the Open Society Institute described the plight of Roma in Russia who are trapped in a cycle of poverty exacerbated by bribes extracted by the Russian police (Helsinki Commission September 2004 Briefing). Often detained on charges of not possessing proper personal documents or a false accusation of committing a crime, Roma will hire an attorney whose sole function is to negotiate the price of the bribe for their release. According to Raihman, the situation is analogous to that of a hostage whose freedom is being negotiated. This can sometimes lead to families selling their car, life savings or home. He noted that the worst case scenario results in homelessness.30 Regulations that require people to register their official place of residence or obtain an internal passport provide fertile soil for minority exploitation through corruption. According to the 2007 Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in Russia, “darker skinned persons from the Caucasus or Central Asia” were regularly singled out to see if they possessed an internal passport and had registered with local authorities.31 Typically, if allowed to register, a person must pay a bribe.  Retaliation against Lawyers The legal profession, in addition to an independent judiciary, is an essential part of a functioning democracy. Still, government officials have used retaliatory criminal prosecution and coercive measures to discourage lawyers from representing clients in cases that expose corruption. An example from Russia is that of the attorneys representing Hermitage Capital and its executives.32 Lawyers from four independent law firms representing Hermitage have apparently been subject to unlawful office searches, illegal summonses demanding that they testify as witnesses in the same cases where they are representing clients, and that they falsify testimony against clients. Lawyers who failed to comply were subjected to criminal charges. Several of the lawyers have fled Russia.33 Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer with Firestone Duncan, a firm which represented Hermitage Capital, was arrested in November 2008 in connection with his investigation of government corruption. Magnitsky died in custody this November in a case that highlighted the difficulty of standing up to corruption and poor Russian prison conditions. As the dismissal of the head of the tax agency which Magnitsky was investigating suggests, the death is still reverberating at the Kremlin.34 However, it remains to be seen if long-term actions to protect lawyers exposing corruption will be undertaken. Persons familiar with the Russian legal system say little importance is placed on the attorney-client privilege.35 Allegedly, companies like the 2X2 television network, charged with committing crimes against the state by broadcasting content including the Simpsons and South Park encounter difficulties finding legal representation.36 Government attacks on lawyers and their clients who expose corruption represent a serious threat to the rule of law. When lawyers are intimidated and afraid to represent clients, citizens are defenseless against corruption. A primary reason for this is that courts present many complexities that non-attorneys may find difficult to overcome. The U. S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama explained the challenge faced by a non-attorney representing himself in saying that the non-attorney often cannot recognize if the “indictment is good or bad,” is “unfamiliar with the rules of evidence,” and “lacks the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense.”37 It is imperative that lawyers are protected from government interference and political persecution so that they may effectively represent and protect their clients’ interests. The Economic Dimension Studies suggest corruption retards economic development and generally results in a lower standard of living. The OSCE Best-Practice Guide for a Positive Business and Investment Climate, asserts that “corruption is clearly a major indicator of the health of a business and investment climate” and that the “wealthiest OSCE countries are generally the countries judged to be least corrupt by international observers.”38 Corruption adversely affects economic growth by slowing infrastructure development, increasing costs for businesses, and preventing competitive business outcomes. Moreover, the responsibility of wealthier OSCE participating States cannot be disregarded. Multinational corporations from developed nations, largely through acquiescent behavior, may promote corruption in countries where it is most prevalent. Cost to Business and the Overall Economy Bribes pose a significant cost for businesses in many OSCE countries. The Best Practice Guide notes that in former Soviet countries a higher percentage of business revenue is dedicated to paying bribes than in Western Europe.39 The guide reported that in some countries businesses pay up to four percent of their total costs in bribes.40 Whether through customs, licenses, or permits, the opportunity for graft exists where there are excessive bureaucracies or regulations. The CATO Institute’s report, The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe, identifies building permits as “an especially attractive source of extra income.”41 According to a World Bank report, building a general storage two-story warehouse in Moscow requires 54 procedures and 704 days.42 This interaction with numerous agencies and government officials increases the opportunity for bribes. Bribes ultimately distort market outcomes because the most competitive companies are not rewarded for their efforts and therefore some companies choose not to compete at all. For example, government contracting is one area where bribes undermine competition and the public good. J. Welby Leaman, an advisor to the U.S. Treasury Department wrote in the Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal, “public officials’ solicitation of their ‘cut’ impoverish government programs.”43 The CATO Institute report cites the case of Dell Corporation losing a computer contract with the Czech parliament. Dell’s bid reportedly met all technical specifications, was the lowest cost and offered to pay a penalty fee for late delivery. Nonetheless, the contract was awarded to a Czech firm that asked for twice as much as Dell.44 Leaman also notes that if a firm cannot pass on a bribe’s cost to the customer, that firm may choose not to compete, which robs the economy of “additional investment and competition.”45 Diversion of Wealth from Natural Resources While a number of OSCE participating States are fortunate to possess large reserves of oil and natural gas, in many instances the wealth produced by these resources does not benefit the citizens of the states, but only the few who control the resources. The Helsinki Commission held hearings in 2007 spotlighting this misappropriation and betrayal of public trust. Simon Taylor of Global Witness identified the problem’s crux in many countries noting that in Turkmenistan, a country of approximately five million people, “[60] percent of [the] population lives below the poverty line despite two billion dollars in annual gas revenues.”46 Remarkably, in Kazakhstan, the economy grew only 0.3 percent between 2000 and 2005 despite its exportation of 1.2 million barrels of oil a day. Taylor also framed the diversion of profits for personal use as a matter of energy security resulting in unreliable supply and higher prices (Helsinki Commission July 2007 Hearing).47 Following the hearings, then-Commission Chairman Alcee L. Hastings introduced an amendment to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (H.R. 3221), which became law, making it U.S. policy to support the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and for the U.S. Secretary of State to report annually on U.S. efforts to promote transparency in extractive industry payments.48 The 2009 report notes United States contributions to the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund, senior level State Department encouragement to developing economies to join EITI, embassy officer engagement with government officials in developing economies, and U.S. Treasury Department collaboration with development banks.49 In 2008, then-Co-Chairman Cardin sponsored an amendment to the Statement of the July 2008 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session that among other things, “encourages governments from oil and gas producing countries to introduce regulations that require all companies operating in their territories to make public information relevant to revenue transparency.” The amendment was approved by the OSCE parliamentarians and adopted as part of the Astana Declaration.50 If the economies of oil and natural gas rich OSCE participating States are to reach their full potential, transparency and accountability must exist between extractive industries and national government. Infrastructure In addition to the price of bribes, a business is disadvantaged to compete in a market with less infrastructure due to corruption. Ukraine exemplifies an OSCE country that stands to gain from economic growth if road projects are funded, efficient and transparent. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness report on Ukraine notes that the poor state of Ukraine’s roads is hindered by road construction processes that provide many opportunities for corruption.51 This situation impedes not only new road construction, but also repair of existing roads and bridge construction. The State Motor Road Service of Ukraine reported that Ukraine loses the equivalent of one billion U.S. dollars annually due to poor road conditions.52 While new road projects are underway, including a new ring road around Kyiv, current legislation does not allow for a competitive private bidding process, without which the road system will continue to rank 120th out of 134 countries ranked by the World Economic Forum in quality of roads. Ukraine is not alone, Moldova ranked 133rd out of 134 countries.53 Not surprisingly, business leaders in Moldova ranked corruption as the second most problematic business obstacle in that country behind access to financing.54 Fraudulent Appropriation of Private Property A pattern of takeovers of private companies and the government-directed persecution of their executives and lawyers is reportedly becoming the norm in Russia. A prime example was the illegal takeover of companies belonging to the Hermitage Fund, a joint venture between Hermitage Capital Management and HSBC Bank. The takeover was allegedly achieved through brazen abuses of power by law enforcement authorities and interference by government officials with Russian courts. William Browder, the founder of Hermitage, and Jamison Firestone, his attorney, recently met with Helsinki Commission staff to discuss their case. Browder’s visa was revoked in 2005 for what he believes was his work in exposing corruption in state controlled companies with close links to the Kremlin. He then appealed to high-level Russian officials, Browder said, including an impromptu conversation with then-First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the Davos annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. After these appeals, Browder alleges he received a phone call from a senior law enforcement officer apparently offering to restore his visa for a price. When this offer was rejected, the Russian Interior Ministry raided the offices of Hermitage and Firestone (see Human Dimension – Retaliation against Lawyers). Corporate seals, charters, and certificates of registration for the Hermitage Fund companies as well as documents belonging to numerous other clients were confiscated during the raids. Following the raids, the corporate documents taken by the Interior Ministry in the office raids were used to wipe HSBC off the share registry of the Hermitage Fund companies. The same documents were used to forge back dated contracts and to file lawsuits against the Hermitage companies alleging significant liabilities. Although Hermitage and HSBC were not aware of these cases, various judges awarded $973 million in damages in legal proceedings that were concluded in a matter of minutes. These same fraudulent liabilities were used by the perpetrators to seek a retroactive tax refund of $230 million in profit taxes that Hermitage had paid to the Russian government in 2006. At the time of the refund, HSBC and Hermitage had already filed six criminal complaints with the heads of Russian law enforcement authorities documenting the involvement of senior government officials in this fraud. Despite these detailed complaints, the fraudulent tax refund was promptly approved and paid to the perpetrators in a matter of days in sharp contrast to the lengthy process normally associated with such a refund. In response to the complaints Russian authorities created an investigative committee staffed by the very officials implicated in the complaints. Moreover, a number of spurious retaliatory criminal cases have been lodged against Browder, his colleagues, and four lawyers from four separate law firms. In the meantime, Mr. Browder and a senior colleague, Ivan Cherkasov, have been placed on the Russian Federal Search List and face the possibility of becoming the subjects of an Interpol Red Notice. Because of the coordinated nature of actions taken by state officials in this scheme together with the official reaction to the Hermitage complaints, Browder suspects high level political interference.55 A country where property can be seized without due process is one where investment is likely to be depressed for fear of arbitrary loss. Regulation of Multinationals While the OSCE participating States of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union often receive the most criticism for failing to curtail corruption, West European countries also face problems with corruption. One notable case is the recent investigation of defense contractor BAE Systems, a British firm, for alleged bribery in arms sales to Saudi Arabia and separate probes into wrongdoing in arms transactions with Chile, the Czech Republic, Romania, South Africa, Tanzania, and Qatar. The British newspaper, The Telegraph, reported that an alleged six billion pounds (approximately nine billion dollars) were paid to various Saudi officials. Citing a threat to cease intelligence sharing by Saudi Arabia, the British government terminated the investigation.56 In response to the termination of the investigation, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), issued a report criticizing the British government for not considering alternatives to discontinuing the investigation. Moreover, the report criticized the U.K. for not enacting legislation to meet the country’s obligation under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.57 While other companies are under investigation, and some like Siemens A.G. have paid record-setting fines, the case of BAE systems stands out because of the record of the U.K. in holding its multinationals to account for overseas bribery. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 2006, Ben Heinemann and Fritz Heimann argue that an area of “emphasis must be the implementation of enforcement and prevention measures by developed nations, where bribery of foreign officials can be more readily exposed and prosecuted.” Unfortunately, their article points out that as of 2006, only France, South Korea, Spain and the United States have brought more than one prosecution.58 In July 2008, the House of Lords upheld the decision of the British government to end the investigation of BAE systems and the government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown has taken no steps to reopen the case. It should be noted that under the pioneer Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which predates the OECD Convention, the United States has steadily increased investigations and prosecutions.59 The FCPA has three major provisions. Its best known provision prohibits U.S. Corporations and individuals from using an instrumentality of interstate commerce to bribe a foreign official, political party or candidate.60The two other primary provisions require corporations to maintain records which accurately reflect transactions and to maintain “internal accounting controls” to provide assurance transactions61 are executed with management’s authorization.62 Observers note that U.S. courts are limiting exceptions to the law and extending its scope while the Department of Justice is joining FCPA charges with charges under other federal laws.63 Reportedly, as of May 2009, the Department of Justice was pursuing 120 investigations of possible FCPA violations.64Recent prosecutions have resulted in favorable court decisions for authorities. In 2004, in a broad interpretation of the law’s application, a Fifth Circuit Court ruling rejected the claim that Congress meant to limit the FCPA only to bribes relating to contracts. The court held that the legislative history implies that the law applies broadly even to payments that indirectly assist in obtaining or retaining business.65 A recent lower court narrowed an exception for lawful payments under the laws of the foreign country. In a situation where a person was relieved of liability after reporting the bribe, the court wrote there “is no immunity from prosecution under the FCPA . . . because a provision in the foreign law “relieves” a person of criminal responsibility.”66 The aggressive enforcement environment and the government’s willingness to consider company-implemented compliance programs in deciding whether to prosecute has a positive consequence of incentivizing other companies to establish such programs. What remains to be seen is to what extent nations with mature economies will hold multinational corporations to account during times of economic hardship. Although only a handful of countries have brought prosecutions, it should be noted that many investigations result in settlements which require fines. In the case of Siemens A.G., the company settled to pay more than $1.6 billion in fines to both German and U.S. authorities.67 If mature economies do not hold multinational corporations accountable, they are in effect promoting corrupt behavior and being duplicitous in criticizing corrupt practices elsewhere. The Security Dimension One account from the book The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade is the story of Stefa from Moldova who traveled to Romania looking for work. Stefa met a man who introduced himself as an agent marketing positions as maids. Regrettably, nothing could have been further from the truth. This man placed Stefa and other girls in a crowded apartment where they were paraded naked and auctioned like cattle. Natasha was eventually sold and smuggled to Italy where she was sexually assaulted and forced to work as a prostitute.68 Stefa’s story is a common one that is usually facilitated by corruption. Heinemann and Heimann write “one ignores corrupt states that are failed or failing at one’s peril, because they are incubators of terrorism, the narcotics trade, money laundering, human trafficking, and other global crime.”69 In addition to these illicit activities, many recent reports tie corruption to the proliferation of small arms trafficking and sales. Terrorism Many observers believe that terrorists appear to have taken advantage of corruption to conduct attacks. It was reported that one of two female suicide bombers from Chechnya who brought down two Russian passenger aircrafts in August 2004 paid a $34 bribe to board a plane for which she did not have a ticket. Shortly after, flight 1047 and another flight boarded by the second suicide bomber, flight 1303, blew up in mid-air after departing Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport. Prominent Russian author Vladimir Voinovich, wrote on the Pakistani online newspaper The Daily Times that the terrorists who took control of the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow in 2002 were reportedly stopped fifty times by authorities while traveling to Moscow, but solely for the purpose of soliciting a bribe.70 An article inCrime & Justice International alleged that officials identified 100 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) police personnel who were complicit in the travel of the Chechen fighters to Moscow.71 Corruption facilitates terrorism by decreasing border security and increasing money laundering. Kimberley Thachuk writes in the SAIS Review that “[c]riminal and terrorist groups depend on unimpeded cross-border movements, and so border guards, customs officers, and immigration personnel are notable targets of corruption.”72 In the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, corruption among border guards was identified as a risk in the OSCE region, particularly Albania, Armenia, Kosovo, and Moldova.73 The targeting of border guards by criminal elements extends even to the United States. Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reestablished its internal affairs unit amid increased corruption investigations. It had been disbanded in 2003. In the spring of 2008, there were 200 open cases against U.S. law enforcement officers on the border. This corruption has involved smuggling of guns, drugs, and people.74 Corruption ultimately undermines the effectiveness of security forces to fight terrorism. Kimberly Thachuk notes that “such corruption spreads, as does an attendant loss of morale and respect for the command structure.”75 This deterioration in professionalism and morale could not come at a worse time. A July 2008 article in Forbes magazine on European crime claimed a 24 percent increase in terrorist attacks from 2006 to 2007.76 Arms Sales  As evidenced by prior testimony before the Helsinki Commission, corruption is a factor in many illicit arms sales worldwide. In June 2003, Roman Kupchinsky, then a Senior Analyst with Crime and Corruption Watch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, pointed out that sales from former Soviet states frequently involve a marriage of security forces and organized crime (Helsinki Commission June 2003 Hearing).77 This means individuals, not the government, are making the sales. Moreover, although OSCE participating States have agreed through the Forum for Security Cooperation to not issue export licenses for arms without an authenticated end-user certificate, these certificates are often forged. Accordingly, the buyer may not be the actual recipient of the weapons. United Nations arms embargoes notwithstanding, individuals and companies from numerous countries are involved in the manufacture, transit, diversion from legal use, and fraudulent company registration for illicit arms trafficking to countries or non-state actor groups under embargo according to Control Arms, a group of concerned non-governmental organizations. The list of countries included Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.78 These illegal sales, which fuel conflict in the developing world, are estimated to be worth one billion dollars a year according to Rachel Stohl, an analyst at the World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information. She noted in an article published for the SAIS Review that “[a]rms brokers are able to operate because they can circumvent national arms controls and international embargoes” frequently through corrupt practices.79 Human Trafficking The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by [involuntary means] for the purpose of exploitation.”80 Victor Malarek, author of The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade, makes clear that corruption is the lynchpin of the trade in women and girls. Even when countries enact laws and policies to prevent trafficking, corruption threatens to render them ineffective. Mohamed Mattar writes in the Loyola and Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review that there are indications that exit requirements such as exit visas for trafficked victims are being obtained through bribes.81 Furthermore, Malarek asserts that besides former Soviet states corruption also exists in destination countries in which officials are complicit in allowing the illicit trade. Specifically, the book draws attention to corruption among border guards and police in Greece that enables the trafficking.82 Human trafficking for sexual and labor exploitation has wreaked havoc on Moldova. Moldova is an extremely susceptible source country because of poverty and associated corruption. The breadth of the problem is detailed in an article by William Finnegan in the May 2008 issue of The New Yorker. In large measure due to its economic plight, over 25 percent of Moldova’s workforce has migrated out of the country. A third of all children are missing a parent due to migration. Much of the population views emigration as the only hope to living a better life. Such conditions create a setting abundant with potential victims for traffickers. Finnegan asserts local authorities are generally not helpful unless you are a trafficker. He quotes a local prosecutor as saying “[t]he most powerful pimps in Moldova are all former cops.”83 In 2008 the U.S. Department of State initially ranked Moldova as a Tier 3 country meaning that it had failed to comply with minimum standards and failed to make significant efforts to eliminate human trafficking as outlined in U.S. law.84 In October 2008, the President upgraded Moldova to Tier 2 status because it had reopened investigations into official complicity and drafted a code of conduct for public officials.85 Although less reporting occurs on the breakaway republic of Transnistria than Moldova, the situation there appears alarming. Finnegan discovered that law enforcement officials are uncooperative with NGOs working on behalf of trafficked victims and corruption deters relatives of trafficked victims from contacting the police.86 Finnegan’s article makes clear that destination countries share a significant responsibility for human trafficking.87 Whether through deliberate corruption or turning a blind eye, doctors, police, border guards, accountants, lawyers, travel agencies or hotels in destination countries enable trafficking and exacerbate the problem in source countries. Every Western European country and the United States and Canada are destinations for trafficked persons. In its report, the Department of State claims that more than half of commercial sex workers in France were trafficking victims. The Department also recognizes Turkey as a significant destination country. Trafficked women and girls from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan find themselves in Turkey. The report notes that many police in Turkey are complicit in trafficking. The United States is not immune, the recent increase in corruption investigations against Customs and Border Protection officers are in part for taking bribes to allow the passage of human beings.88 OSCE Field Missions and Prevention Efforts89 While it is necessary to sound the alarm and call attention to corruption’s presence across the three OSCE dimensions, it is equally necessary to assess OSCE and non-OSCE efforts in the region to counter corruption. The last two decades have seen a consensus at the international level concerning norms and necessary anti-corruption action at the national level. This consensus is manifested in the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Despite international achievements, some would say that national level progress in decreasing corruption is at a standstill or being rolled back in some OSCE participating States. Broadly conceived, implementation is stalling. To understand why it is helpful to think of implementation occurring in two phases. The first phase consists of the passing of national laws implementing international commitments. The second phase, which is just as important, consists of institutions with independent and trained persons complying with and impartially executing the anti-corruption laws. This second phase has proven most problematic for many countries because the actions required to build capacity require a long term commitment and the dedication of resources and do not often attract media attention. Additionally, the notion that the nature of corruption differs from country to country should be embraced.90 The Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) leads OSCE efforts in combating corruption. Through field missions, handbooks, and coordination with other international organizations, the OCEEA has promoted implementation of international anti-corruption agreements, efficient management of public resources and implementation of the Arhus Convention allowing greater access to information on the environment. Work to implement the UNCAC has paid off, with only thirteen OSCE participating States not having ratified the convention; and of those thirteen, only six have not yet signed the convention. However, this underscores the reality that ratification does not equate to true implementation of and compliance with the convention. This report cites corrupt activities within many OSCE participating States that have ratified the convention. With respect to this corrupt activity, OSCE field missions can be effective institutions for promoting substantive compliance with the convention. An official with one international organization stressed that the hard part in decreasing corruption is the taking of preventative measures. OSCE field missions routinely undertake and promote some of these measures which include identifying and resolving conflicts, training government officials, and engaging civil society. OSCE field missions commonly provide anti-corruption assistance to local governments. However, in a manner befitting the nature of the problem, field missions conduct distinctive work appropriate to their assigned country. For example, in Georgia the mission assisted, before being closed down this year, in establishing an Inspector General’s office to review the finances of government ministries. Advocacy and legal advice centers are operated by the mission in Azerbaijan to provide legal advice on complaints and to educate the public and government authorities. In 2008, the centers in Azerbaijan provided assistance in response to 2,500 complaints. Additionally, mobile workshops reached 2,360 people with awareness campaigns and frequently provided on the spot legal advice.91 Similar centers provide aid in Armenia. The use of existing advocacy and legal advice centers is not high among people in Kazakhstan. This lower use may exemplify the benefit of an approach that carefully addresses the needs of people and nature of corruption in a given country. Centers that target audiences other than the general public have been successful. In Tajikistan, Resource Centers for Small and Agribusiness and Centers for Promotion of Cross-Border Trade reportedly draw many patrons. It has also been reported that due to these centers, businesspeople have resisted illegal government inspections. Good Governance Centers in Georgia that assisted municipalities received high marks, and in addition to the government, were sometimes used by the general public. Prevention efforts directed at government employees at all levels are essential. Second round GRECO evaluation reports released in 2007 and 2008 identified a number of countries - some with field missions, such as Azerbaijan, and others without, such as Greece - that had not taken appropriate steps to protect government employees who are whistleblowers. In the case of Greece, sufficient protections for career advancement were not in place and employees typically could only report corruption to their immediate supervisor.92 Because the follow-on Addendum to the Compliance Reports are not public, it is unclear if adequate protections and measures to assist reporting has improved. Education coupled with preventative programs that build upon training are initiatives that field missions are well suited to provide through the various types of centers. The OSCE mission in Ukraine has initiated a public-private dialogue that addresses accountability in local government. Fostering a dialogue between government, private sector, and civil society is important because in many countries these groups mistrust one another. In Georgia, the OSCE is supporting the efforts of Transparency International to ensure that a broad range of voices from civil society and the business community are heard by the Task Force on Fighting Corruption as it develops a new Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan. These initiatives recognize that not only will implementation vary from country to country, but that implementation measures will differ at different levels of government and require input from all facets of society. Field missions are conducting varying efforts to promote a similar dialogue between government and civil society in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Recent meetings between Helsinki Commission staff and members of civil society and officials from international organizations suggest it may be misguided to keep a primary focus on national level authorities prosecuting alleged corrupt acts. One NGO member recently remarked that there are enough national level laws and that what is needed is impartial enforcement and an unbiased judiciary. In Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National Integrity, Daniel Kaufmann referred to this as the “Tackling-the-symptom bias” which “instead of identifying the root cause, involves thinking that the solution is to catch and jail a target number of criminals . . . or to pass another anti-corruption law in the country.”93 Kaufmann describes what may be the best case scenario. The worst case scenario expressed by both members of the NGO community and international organizations to the Helsinki Commission is that prosecution is used to target political opposition and journalists. Amplifying the problem are enforcement agencies that may lack the capacity to conduct an even-handed investigation. An official from Bosnia-Herzegovnia recently said that the country “has adopted three strategic plans and ratified numerous international conventions on corruption,” but there is no implementation and the commitments go unmet.94 Public GRECO compliance reports from its second round of evaluations conclude that Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Romania have only partially implemented measures to fully train investigators, prosecutors and judges to handle corruption cases.95Again, because the follow-on addendum to the reports are not public it is unclear if training has improved in these participating States. In 2005, the President of Kyrgyzstan signed a decree establishing the National Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic for Preventing Corruption. Reportedly, in that first year, the agency opted not to put into practice a number of recommendations of an outside expert sponsored by an international organization to provide support. Later, the agency disagreed with international organizations on the use of funds offered by those organizations. Reportedly, $300,000 were made available for capacity building, but the leadership of the agency was adamant that the money be used to increase salaries. Today the agency has seven computers for 49 staff and no Internet access, Helsinki Commission staff was told. Concerns also exist that a strong parliamentary immunity is a necessity when many governments are focused on prosecution of political opponents. The NGO member added that this prosecution is often targeted at politicians in a minority party highlighting the continued need for parliamentary immunity laws even if they allow some offenders and wrongdoers to evade prosecution. This view of targeted prosecutions has been echoed by workers with international organizations that have communicated with the Helsinki Commission on this subject. With the above in mind, it should be noted that the resolution authored by Chairman Cardin, and adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly in 2006, incorporates preventative measures by calling for the publishing of “rigorous standards of ethics and official conduct” and establishing “efficient mechanisms for public disclosure of financial information and potential conflicts of interest.”96 The goals set out in that resolution constitute a starting point that must be reinforced with other measures that over time build a common ethos of public integrity and service throughout government. It should also be noted that the OSCE has worked in tandem with the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) in participating States such as Kyrgyzstan to train parliamentarians in roles of oversight and budget control. Finally, Chairman Cardin’s resolution recommending that the Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) develop best practices for parliamentarians to use echoed the 2005 OSCE PA’s Washington Declaration. That document praised the work of GOPAC and recommended that the OSCE “with other parliamentary associations and [GOPAC develop] a programme of peer support, education and anti-corruption initiatives.”97 The OSCE has also worked with GOPAC in running workshops and supporting local GOPAC chapters particularly in Southeast Europe. This is an effort that should receive continued support. The importance of capacity building within parliaments cannot be forgotten when confronting corruption. Conclusion: The Related Nature of Corruption Across the OSCE Dimensions No account of corruption in any dimension can be viewed in isolation. If corruption thwarts a competitive business environment or is endemic among public servants then the conditions are set for an underworld of crime to flourish. Once seedlings of graft take root, they grow rapidly. Soon the institutions of democracy that require the nutrients of transparency and accountability are choked by what people may have once considered the harmless taking of small amounts of money or property. In the aggregate, petty corruption emboldens grand corruption and vice versa. Eventually, a government cannot perform the basic tasks expected of it. It cannot defend individual rights enshrined in national law, protect the engagement of commerce, or provide for the security of its people. In many instances, elites restrict political access and limit economic competition. This is what Larry Diamond refers to as a “predatory state.” Moreover, Diamond asserts when people no longer advance “through productive activity and honest risk taking” but only through operating outside the law, the predatory state becomes a “predatory society.”98 While observers may disagree whether some OSCE participating States have reached such an extreme point, all states are always somewhere on the continuum between a functional electoral democracy and a predatory society. To combat corruption the OSCE, through existing field mission mandates, should continue to focus adequate attention to building capacity to identify and address corruption and promotion of a culture of integrity and anti-corruption among civil servants and civil society. All participating States should implement commitments under international treaties such as the UNCAC. However, ratifying the UNCAC and passing national laws targeting corruption is not enough. While prosecutions serve a deterrence function, they must be balanced by relatively low profile well-planned prevention programs that are sustained by sufficient resources. In order to identify and address the circumstances that foster corruption, collaboration must increase between governments, NGOs, corporations and small and medium size enterprises to develop specific strategies. OSCE countries should consider supporting neighbors by building upon the model of field missions. Corruption is a problem not likely to end soon, but is an area where progress may be made if small successes are reinforced with adequate resources. Work is needed to live up to the ideals recorded in the Parliamentary Assembly’s Astana Declaration and the earlier Istanbul Declaration of the 1999 OSCE Summit, in which OSCE participating States recognized corruption as a threat to “shared values” and pledged “to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and the conditions that foster it.” The OSCE countries need to muster the political will, individually and collectively, to conduct a smarter fight against corruption – a threat to security, property, and fundamental freedoms throughout the expansive OSCE region. Footnotes 1 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev Hints that Democratization will Take Back Seat on OSCE Agenda,” Eurasia Insight, July 9, 2008,http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070908.shtml (accessed June 1, 2009) 2 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index: Persistently high corruption in low-income countries amounts to an “ongoing humanitarian disaster” (Berlin: Transparency International, 2008). 3 Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge, 2005), 19-21. 4 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Astana Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Seventeenth Annual Session, 2008, 7, 28, and 45. 5 Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State,” Foreign Affairs87, no. 2 (2008): 39, and 42-44. 6 The participating States committed to support and advance these rights and freedoms, in addition to others, in the 1990 Copenhagen Document. “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,” June 29, 1990. 7 United States Agency for International Development, Parliamentary Immunity Brief: A Summary of Case Studies of Armenia, Ukraine and Guatemala, August 2006, 1-2. 8 Carmen Lane, Parliamentary Immunity and Democracy Development (Washington D.C.: DAI, 2007) 1-3. 9 United States Agency for International Development, Corruption Assessment Ukraine, Final Report February, 2006, 49 10 Gayane Mkrtchyan, “Not Above the Law?: Parliament Lifts Immunity, MP Hakobyan Must Face Prosecution,” ArmeniaNow.com, October 13, 2006, http://www.armenianow.com/?action=viewArticle&AID=1768 11 Center for the Study of Democracy, Effective Policies targeting the Corruption – Organized crime Nexus in Bulgaria: Closing Down Duty-Free Outlets, Brief, December 2007, 3. 12 Ibid., 5. 13 Ibid., 3. 14 Elena Koinova, “Changes to Duty-Free Trade Act passed in Parliament,” The Sofia Echo, March 28, 2008, http://sofiaecho.com/2008/03/21/659426_changes-to-duty-free-trade-act-passed-in-parliament 15 Center for the Study of Democracy, Effective Policies targeting the Corruption, 3. 16 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Energy and Democracy: Oil and Water?, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2007 (Prepared statement of Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, not unofficial transcript), https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/energy-and-democracy-oil-and-water (accessed June 22, 2009) 17 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Promises to Keep: Kazakhstan’s 2010 OSCE Chairmanship, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, (Prepared statement of Martha Olcott not unofficial transcript), https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/promises-keep-kazakhstan-s-2010-osce-chairmanship (accessed June 8, 2009). 18 Transparency International, 2009 Global Corruption Barometer Report, (Berlin: May, 2007) 32. 19 GfK Research, Corruption Climate in Europe, August 9, 2006, available athttp://www.gfk.hr/press1_en/corruption2.htm (accessed June 17, 2009). 20 Dan Bilefsky, “Medical Care in Romania Comes at an Extra Cost,” The New York Times, March 9, 2009. 21 Global Integrity, Global Integrity Scorecard: Latvia, 2007, 1-2. 22 Konstantin Pashev, Center for the Study of Democracy, Corruption in the Healthcare Sector in Bulgaria (Sofia, Bulgaria: 2007) 17. 23 Ibid, 17. 24 Ibid, 35. 25 Vladimir Voinovich, “Drunk on Corruption,” Daily Times, January 3, 2003,http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_3-1-2003_pg3_4 (accessed June 18, 2009). 26 Michael Johnston, “Poverty and Corruption,” Forbes, January 22, 2009. 27 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Uzbekistan, February 25, 2009,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119143.htm. 28 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Azerbaijan, February 25, 2009,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119068.htm. 29 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Poland, February 25, 2009,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119098.htm. 30 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Romani Minority in Russia, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, 8 (Prepared statement of Leonid Raihman found in official transcript). 31 U.S. Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia, March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100581.htm. 32 The account of how Hermitage Capital was seized corruptly through a series of non-transparent proceedings is told in the section addressing the Economic Dimension. 33 Jamison Firestone, conversation with Helsinki Commission staff, April 14, 2009. 34 Carl Mortished, “Kremlin sacking linked to Sergei Magnitsky case,” TimesOnline, December 16, 2009,http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article6957931.ece (accessed December 22, 2009). 35 Lynda Edwards, “Russia Claws at the Rule of Law,” ABA Journal 95 (2009): 41. 36 Ibid., 42. 37 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 38 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Best-Practice Guide for a Positive Business and Investment Climate, 2006, 30. 39 Ibid. 40 OSCE, Best-Practice Guide 30-31. 41 Marian L. Tupy, CATO Institute, The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe: Big Government, Corruption, and the Threat to Liberalism, November 8, 2006, 14. 42 The World Bank, Doing Business 2009: Country Profile for Russian Federation, 2008, 12. 43 J. Welby Leaman, “It’s Not Always Nice to Play Nice: Collusion, Competition, and Development,”Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal 20, no. 2 (2007): 291. 44 Tupy, Rise of Populist Parties, 9. 45 Leaman, “It’s Not Always Nice to Play Nice,” 291. 46 CSCE, Energy and Democracy, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2007 (Prepared statement of Simon Taylor not unofficial transcript) (accessed June 12, 2009). 47 Ibid.  48 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Public Law 110-140, 110th Cong., 1st sess. (December 19, 2007). 49 .S. Department of State, Report on Progress Made in Promoting Transparency in Extractive Industries Resource Payments, June 24, 2009. On file with United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 50 Parliamentary Assembly, Astana Declaration, 28. 51 Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz and Thierry Geiger, eds., World Economic Forum, The Ukraine Competitiveness Report: Towards Sustained Growth and Prosperity, 2008, 56. 52 Hanouz and Geiger, eds., The Ukraine Competitiveness Report, 56. 53 Michael Porter and Klaus Schwab eds., World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009, 385. 54 Ibid., 242. 55 William Browder, conversation with Helsinki Commission staff, April 14, 2009. William Browder did testify at a Helsinki Commission hearing just as this report was being completed in June 2009. During his testimony he provided a website (http://www.compromat.ru/main/vragi/raderykak.htm) that provided a price list for a range of activities attacking a corporate entity in Russia from erasing a company’s registration data to a complete takeover. 56 Jon Swaine, “BAE Systems executive ‘questioned over alleged bribery,’” The Telegraph, October 23, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/badot/3245563/BAE-Systems-executive-questioned-over-alleged-European-bribery.html (accessed June 15, 2009). 57 Organizations for Economic Co-operating and Development, United Kingdom: Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International business Transactions, October 17 2008, 4. 58 Ben W. Heineman, Jr., and Fritz Heimann, “The Long War Against Corruption,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (May/June 2006), 77, 82. 59 Control Risks, Corruption, Compliance and Change: Responding to Greater Scrutiny in Challenging Times (London: 2009) 3. 60 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1. 61 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 62 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 63 Gail P. Granoff and Brian Mich, 2008 FCPA Review, January 28, 2009 (Presentation at International Quality & Productivity Center FCPA Conference). 64 Dionne Searcey, “U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes,” The Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2009. 65 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004). 66 United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y 2008). 67 Cary O’Reilly and Karin Matussek, “Siemens to Pay $1.6 Billion to Settle Bribery Cases,” The Washington Post, December 16, 2008. 68 Victor Malarek, The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), 112-113. 69 Heineman and Heimann, “The Long War,” 79. 70 Voinovich, “Drunk on Corruption”. 71 Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Corruption, Crime and Murder Undermine Counter-terrorist Efforts,”Crime & Justice International 21, no. 87 (July/August 2005), 8. 72 Kimberly Thachuk, “Corruption and International Security,” SAIS Review XXV, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2005), 147. 73 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, Europe and Eurasia Overview, April 2009. 74 Randal Archibold and Andrew Becker, “Border Agents, Lured by the Other Side,” The New York Times, May 27, 2008. 75 Thachuk, “Corruption,” 147. 76 Parmy Olson, “Europe’s Crime Capitals,” Forbes, July 15, 2008,http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/15/europe-capitals-crime-forbeslife-cx_po_0715crime.html 77 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Arming Rogue Regimes: The Role of OSCE Participating States, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, 40 (Prepared statement of Roman Kupchinsky found in official transcript). 78 Control Arms, UN Arms Embargoes: An Overview of the Last Ten Years, Briefing Note, March 16, 2006, 2. 79 Rachel Stohl, “Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms,” SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 2005), 64. 80 “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,” Article 3 (a), United Nations, (2000). 81 Mohamed Y. Mattar, “State Responsibilities in Combating Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia,”Loyola and Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 27 (Spring 2005), 161 (see footnote 76). 82 Malarek, The Natashas, 140-141. 83 William Finnegan, “The Counter Traffickers: Rescuing Victims of the Global Sex Trade,” The New Yorker, 2, 6, 7-8, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/05/05/080505fa_fact_finnegan (accessed June 8, 2009). 84 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2008, 184. 85 U.S. Department of State Senior Coordinator for Public Outreach, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, email to author, December 10, 2008; Embassy of the United States, Moldova, “Moldova Moved up to Tier 2 in Trafficking in Persons,” press release, October 10, 2008,http://moldova.usembassy.gov/pr102908.html. 86 Finnegan, “The Counter Traffickers,” 10. 87 Ibid., 9, 11. 88 Rick Jervis, “Arrests of Border Agents on The Rise,” USA Today, April 23, 2009. 89 This section of report is based upon meetings and discussions with a variety of international governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations who to the extent possible are not identified. Any opinions expressed or conclusions drawn do not necessarily reflect the official views of any of these organizations. 90 Johnson, Syndromes of Corruption, 186. 91 Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, March 25, 2009, email to author providing numbers of complaints and people contacted. 92 Group of States against Corruption, Second Evaluation Round: Compliance Report on Greece, February 15, 2008, 9. 93 Daniel Kaufmann, “Anticorruption Strategies: Starting Afresh? Unconventional Lessons from Comparative Analysis,” in Curbing Corruption: Towards a Model for Building National Integrity, ed. Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundeh (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 1999), 37. 94 Miroslav Ajder, “Corruption Claims Hold Back Bosnia: Allegations of Fraud in Government Contracts and Privatization are Pitting the Government Against Monitors and Scaring off Foreign Investors,” BusinessWeek, March 17, 2009. 95 These compliance reports may be found at the GRECO web page,http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports(round2)_en.asp (accessed June 15, 2009). 96 Resolution on Limiting Immunity for Parliamentarians in order to Strengthen Good Governance, Public Integrity and Rule of Law in the OSCE Region, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 15th sess., Brussels Declaration (July 7, 2006). 97 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Washington, DC Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Fourteenth Annual Session, 2005, 35. 98 Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” 43. 

  • Slovakia and Hungary Relations

    Mr. President, in 1991, then-Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel brought together his counterparts from Poland and Hungary. Taking inspiration from a 14th century meeting of Central European kings, these 20th century leaders returned to the same Danube town of Visegrad with a view to eliminating the remnants of the communist bloc in Central Europe; overcoming historic animosities between Central European countries; and promoting European integration. Today, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are together known as the Visegrad Group, and all four have successfully joined NATO and the European Union. They are anchors in the Trans-Atlantic alliance, and I am pleased to have had the opportunity to travel to all four of these countries where I have met with public officials, non-governmental representatives and ethnic and religious community leaders. Unfortunately, it appears that some additional work is necessary to address one of the principal goals of the Visegrad Group; namely, overcoming historic animosities. In recent months, relations between Hungary and Slovakia have been strained. Having traveled in the region and having met with leaders from both countries during their recent visits to Washington, I would like to share a few observations. First, an amendment to the Slovak language law, which was adopted in June and will enter into force in January, has caused a great deal of concern that the use of the Hungarian language by the Hungarian minority in Slovakia will be unduly or unfairly restricted. Unfortunately, that anxiety has been whipped up, in part, by a number of inaccurate and exaggerated statements about the law. The amendment to the state language law only governs the use of the state language by official public bodies. These state entities may be fined if they fail to ensure that Slovak--the state language--is used in addition to the minority languages permitted by law. The amendment does not allow fines to be imposed on individuals, and certainly not for speaking Hungarian or any other minority language in private, contrary to what is sometimes implied. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has been meeting with officials from both countries and summarized the Slovak law in his most recent report to the OSCE Permanent Council: “The adopted amendments to the State Language Law pursue a legitimate aim, namely, to strengthen the position of the State language, and, overall, are in line with international standards. Some parts of the law, however, are ambiguous and may be misinterpreted, leading to a negative impact on the rights of persons belonging to national minorities.” Since the law has not yet come into effect, there is particular concern that even if the law itself is consistent with international norms, the implementation of the law may not be. I am heartened that Slovakia and Hungary have continued to engage with one of the OSCE's most respected institutions--the High Commissioner on National Minorities--on this sensitive issue, and I am confident that their continued discussions will be constructive. At the same time, I would flag a number of factors or developments that have created the impression that the Slovak Government has some hostility toward the Hungarian minority. Those factors include but are not limited to the participation of the extremist Slovak National Party, SNS, in the government itself; the SNS control of the Ministry of Education, one of the most sensitive ministries for ethnic minorities; the Ministry of Education's previous position that it would require Slovak-language place names in Hungarian language textbooks; the handling of the investigation into the 2006 Hedvig Malinova case in a manner that makes it impossible to have confidence in the results of the investigation, and subsequent threats to charge Ms. Malinova with perjury; and the adoption of a resolution by the parliament honoring Andrei Hlinka, notwithstanding his notorious and noxious anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma positions. All that said, developments in Hungary have done little to calm the waters. Hungary itself has been gripped by a frightening rise in extremism, manifested by statements and actions of the Hungarian Guard, the ``64 Counties'' movement, and the extremist party Jobbik, all of which are known for their irredentist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma postures. Murders and other violent attacks against Roma, repeated attacks by vandals on the Slovak Institute in Budapest, attacks on property in Budapest's Jewish quarter in September, and demonstrations which have blocked the border with Slovakia and where the Slovak flag is burned illustrate the extent to which the Hungarian social fabric is being tested. Not coincidentally, both Hungary and Slovakia have parliamentary elections next year, in April and June respectively, and, under those circumstances, it may suit extremist elements in both countries just fine to have these sorts of developments: nationalists in Slovakia can pretend to be protecting Slovakia's language and culture--indeed, the very state--from the dangerous overreach of Hungarians. Hungarian nationalists--on both sides of the border--can pretend that Hungarian minorities require their singular protection--best achieved by remembering them come election day. Meanwhile, the vast majority of good-natured Slovaks and Hungarians, who have gotten along rather well for most of the last decade, may find their better natures overshadowed by the words and deeds of a vocal few. In meetings with Slovak and Hungarian officials alike, I have urged my colleagues to be particularly mindful of the need for restraint in this pre-election season, and I have welcomed the efforts of those individuals who have chosen thoughtful engagement over mindless provocation. I hope both countries will continue their engagement with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, whom I believe can play a constructive role in addressing minority and other bilateral concerns.

  • U.S. Diplomats Rap Astana's Democratization Performance

    As Kazakhstan prepares to assume the chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, US diplomats are exerting pressure on Astana to enact promised reforms. Kazakhstan’s laws on media, elections and political parties continue to "fall short of OSCE standards," Philip Gordon, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, asserted in written testimony submitted for a hearing October 28 of the US Helsinki Commission. Gordon also pointed out in his testimony that "Kazakhstan has not held an election that the OSCE has deemed fully to have met OSCE commitments and international standards." Both Gordon and Michael Posner, the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, called attention to the case of Yevgeny Zhovtis, a human rights activist convicted in September for vehicular manslaughter. The trial was allegedly marred by procedural violations. Even so, a Kazakhstani judge rejected an appeal of the conviction. The US Helsinki Commission’s chair, Sen. Benjamin Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, said the Obama administration and the State Department has given short shrift to human rights, adding that the issue of the OSCE summit in Kazakhstan presented an opportunity for the United States to take a strong stand on human rights.  

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