Taking Stock: Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region (Part II)

Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) sits down with Yahoo Finance Live to talk about past geopolitical aggressions from Russian President Vladimir Putin, carefully applying sanctions on Russia, the energy sector, additional COVID-19 relief funds, inflation, and the federal gas tax. Video Transcript AKIKO FUJITA: Well, we are continuing to follow the latest developments from the Russia-Ukraine border. Several reports of increased shelling there with pro-Russian rebels ordering the evacuation of civilians. Amid those heightened tensions, President Biden is expected to speak this afternoon at 4:00 PM Eastern after he holds a call with NATO allies. And of course, we're going to bring that to you live right here on Yahoo Finance. Let's bring in Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland, who's also on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator, it's good to talk to you today. I think a lot of people trying to make sense of the headlines that we've gotten this week. Is diplomacy going to take its course? Is Russia-- is a Russian invasion of Ukraine inevitable? Talk to me about what you're hearing and what your biggest concerns are. BEN CARDIN: Well, first, it's good to be with you. Look, the circumstances are extremely dangerous right now. When you take a look at what Mr. Putin has done, the provocative actions he just recently took in Eastern Ukraine, the number of troops that he has on the border fully prepared to do a full incursion into Ukraine, and his past history, what he did in Georgia, what he's done-- this is part of his playbook, to use misinformation and to use everything he possibly can to bring down a country. And he wants to bring down an independent Ukraine. So it's a very, very dangerous situation. What will come next, only Mr. Putin knows. We certainly will not give up on diplomacy if Mr. Putin wants a diplomatic answer. But to now, every indication is that he is determined to use force to bring down the Ukrainian government. AKIKO FUJITA: You and your colleagues in the Senate have called for sanctions or increased sanctions against Russia. And I realize Republican senators have put forward their own sanctions as well. To what extent can these sanctions really have teeth in curtailing Vladimir Putin from scaling back some of those ambitions you just highlighted? BEN CARDIN: Well, to be clear, Democrats, Republicans, House and Senate, are fully behind President Biden and our European allies to make it clear that Mr. Putin will pay a very, very, very heavy price if he does further incursions into Ukraine. There's no dispute about that. We are fully behind the president in that regard. There's many of us who think that Mr. Putin already deserves to have additional sanctions imposed, but that would also, we think, give the president some additional leverage in his conversations with Mr. Putin. But that's more of a strategy issue, rather than our resolve that do everything we can to prevent the incursion. If it happens, the president will have our full support to impose the most serious sanctions, both on sectorial economy, as well as individuals. AKIKO FUJITA: We had your colleague, Senator Jon Tester, on earlier this week, who said, look, I'm all for sanctions, but we also need to be mindful of the economic impact this could have on our allies over in Europe, specifically on energy. How do you view that? Especially if we're talking about something like Nord Stream 2, I mean, number one, what power does the US have in halting that? And how do you think about the consequences for a country like Germany if that is halted, especially given their reliance on natural gas coming in from Russia? BEN CARDIN: Well, Senator Tester is mentioning some important points. But our number one priority is the security of Europe. And if Mr. Putin can overtake a sovereign country by the use of force without consequences, that does not bode well for the future security of Europe or other parts of the world by the use of force to try to change borders. That will have a much more devastating impact on future economies as well as the safety of Europe. So that has to be our primary concern. These sanctions on the energy sector, particularly, we need to long-term have a more secure Europe on energy sources. We know that. But in the short-term, we have to make sure that energy is not used as a weapon, as Mr. Putin is trying to do. That only will lead to bad results. So for all these reasons, we have to stay resolved and resolute in our force to say that we will impose the heaviest possible sanctions if there are further incursions into Russia. AKIKO FUJITA: Let's talk about more domestic issues. You have been, for some time here, calling for additional funds here to combat COVID-19. I know there was a request in from the Health and Human Services Department that called for $30 billion in additional funds. Given how much was spent on this most recent wave for Omicron, where do those discussions stand right now? And how are you thinking about that, number one, in terms of additional budgets that are needed on the health care side to fight the virus, and then the amount of money that could potentially go to small businesses that are still hurting in a big way? BEN CARDIN: Well, we have some unfunded programs now that need to be completely funded. And that is the Restaurant Revitalization Fund. We made certain commitments. The money, it was not adequate. We need to replenish those funds. That should be done as soon as possible. I hope we can get it done in early March. In regards to additional COVID needs, there's clearly a need in our health resources to make sure that we can stay ahead of the next variant. And there's likely to be another variant. So we have to have the funds necessary to do all of the preparation, including vaccination preparations, the therapeutic drugs, protective equipment, testing. All that will require additional resources. And as they're needed, we have to make those resources available. And then we hope we're at near the end of the tunnel in regards to this COVID point, the impact it has on our economy. But if it continues, then we have to be prepared again to step forward, as we did in the past, to make sure that our economy can continue even during a pandemic. AKIKO FUJITA: You talk about the challenges in the economy. Certainly a lot of Americans feeling the pinch from price pressures and inflation now hitting a 40-year high. That has certainly hurt this administration, at least, in the eye of the public. And I wonder where you stand especially on a potential holiday on the federal gas tax. That's something that has been raised by other Democratic lawmakers. The cynical take would be to what extent that can really bring down prices and how much of this is motivated politically. Where do you stand on that? And should there be a bit of a reprieve, given how far up gas taxes have run? BEN CARDIN: Well, I understand that we have to deal with the short-term pressures that American families are sustaining, so I recognize that. But the deal with the causes for inflation, we really do need to deal with the labor force to have more people able to work. And that means in the Build Back Better agenda, affordable child care is critically important. We've got to protect our supply chains as one of the principal reasons why we seeing a shortage of goods, and therefore an increase in price. And that means pass the legislation that is passed by both the House and Senate that needs to be reconciled that would make America more products produced here in our own country. They are the two things I think we can do the most to protect against the impact of higher costs. But we recognize that American families are hurting, and that's why we want to deal with more affordable housing, more affordable educational costs. We want to deal with the cost centers that are affecting American families. AKIKO FUJITA: Specifically on the federal gas tax, though, would you support a suspension? BEN CARDIN: Well, it depends. We have to make sure that there's adequate resources to carry out our infrastructure and our transportation programs. It's not just as simple as a holiday. It's a question of how we're going to adequately fund the needs that are critically important. You know, the transit needs, the road needs, broadband, all these are important services that the American people need, and we have to make sure we can continue to carry out those programs. AKIKO FUJITA: Well, Senator Ben Cardin, we always enjoy having you on the show. I hope to have you back on again soon. Maryland Senator Ben Cardin there joining us today from Baltimore. Coming up, existing home sales--

Watch the latest video at foxnews.com Russia will face the "strongest possible" sanctions if they invade Ukraine, in the form of heavy economic and political consequences, U.S. Sen. Ben Cardin said Sunday. Cardin, D-Md., appeared on "Fox News Sunday" to discuss what the possible sanctions against Russia could look like in a "strong bi-partisan effort" that he said is almost complete and has the support of President Biden. "We hope to show Mr. Putin that Democrats and Republicans in the Senate and the House, and that the White House, are united," Cardin said. "That if he does do further incursions into Ukraine he will pay a very, very, very heavy price from the economic point of view and the isolation politically." Cardin said that the possible sanctions will include both financial and personal consequences for Russia’s current aggressive activity outside the Ukraine border. U.S. officials have said Moscow has assembled at least 70 percent of the military firepower it likely intends to have in place for a full-scale invasion. The sanctions would affect Putin personally, the Russian economy, and the financing of Putin’s activities, Cardin said. The senator added that other individuals affected would include those who use the international banking system to finance Putin’s political agenda. "These are gripping sanctions that will have an impact on the bad actors and the Russian economy in general because it is financing through corruption Putin’s political agenda," Cardin said. Leaders have given few hard details to the public, however, arguing it is best to keep Putin guessing. Cutting Russia off from international banking would be one of the toughest financial steps the U.S. and its European allies could take. The move could cut Russia off from its international profits from oil and gas production, which account for more than 40% of the country’s revenue. One tactic the U.S. has previously used is sanctioning the immediate circles of leaders, their families, and military and civilian circles.  Putin and his friends and family could face that as well, along with Russia’s powerful business oligarchs and its banks. That includes Putin’s family and a woman reported to be Putin’s romantic interest, Alina Kabaeva, who won Olympic gold in 2004 in rhythmic gymnastics. The Associated Press contributed to this report.

At a February 3 Helsinki Commission hearing on Russian aggression toward Ukraine, William B. Taylor, an expert on Russia and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, told Commissioners,  "I believe President Putin will blink. I think Presidents Biden and Zelensky are staring him down successfully. Putin appears, for now, to be seeking negotiations. He has complained about but has not rejected the responses from the United States and NATO to his demands."

Europe begins the new year on the brink of major war. Russia has amassed more than 100,000 troops and heavy equipment along Ukraine’s border and issued an ultimatum to the West demanding it trade Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for its peace. Such demands are a strategic nonstarter, but the seriousness of the Kremlin’s threats appear all too real. To stop this war before it begins, muddling through is not an option; this demands immediate and bold action. Russia claims its 100,000-plus troops at Ukraine’s doorstep is a response to NATO enlargement and its infrastructure in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. These arguments are unconvincing. The Kremlin has used NATO as a straw man for its grievances, yet Russian disquiet has little to do with NATO itself, which has no immediate plans to expand anywhere near Russia and would not threaten Russia if it did. Although the United States and its European partners have provided material and technical military assistance to Ukraine, it has not changed the region’s balance of power. Instead, Russia’s demands evince anxiety over global status and the possibility that its borderlands may be able to escape from its grip. In particular, Ukraine has the size and industrial capacity to make it a credible economic and military power regardless of whether it joins NATO. For Russia, a strong and hostile Ukraine is intolerable, even though Russian aggression husbanded Ukraine’s pro-West turn. By supporting Donbass separatism and annexing Crimea, the Kremlin stoked patriotism in Ukraine, lanced Ukraine’s most Russia-friendly population, and earned Kyiv’s hostility. Ukraine is not the only country for which this applies, but it may be the most significant given its size, geography, and symbolic position in official Russian neoimperial mythology. War should be avoided at all reasonable costs. Another invasion would risk tens of millions of lives and further undermine Europe’s increasingly fragile security. The United States and Europe should be willing to negotiate in good faith to avoid wider conflict—so long as Ukraine, Georgia, and Eastern Europe’s sovereignty are preserved. However, acceding to Russia’s maximalist demands would strip Ukraine of its already battered sovereignty and invite a new Iron Curtain over Europe—consigning many millions of people to generations of domination and conflict. History and international relations theory may offer some guidance in this crisis. In the runup to the Peloponnesian War between the sprawling Athenian league and Sparta’s opposing empire, Athens faced a dilemma between its ally Corcyra and Corinth, a powerful member of the Spartan alliance. As chronicled by classical historian Donald Kagan in his On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace, Corcyra called on Athens for protection, but Athens was anxious to intervene lest it precipitate a ruinous great-power war with Sparta, which was increasingly fearful that Athens, the rising force in Greece, would eclipse Spartan power. Yet Athens worried that abandoning Corcyra would undermine its alliances and invite Spartan aggression. As a compromise, Athens deployed a mere 10 ships out of its vast 400-ship fleet to join the Corcyraeans in the hopes that it would be enough to deter Corinth’s advancing 150-ship armada. However, as Kagan notes, Athens’s symbolic deployment was not strong enough to deter Corinth—much less defeat it—but too aggressive to completely assuage Spartan fears about Athenian ambitions. In the ensuing Battle of Sybota, the Corinthian armada destroyed the combined Corcyraean-Athenian fleet, launching a spiral of events that led to the devastating Peloponnesian War. As the United States deliberates with its partners and allies to craft countermeasures against Kremlin aggression, the West should avoid its own 10-ship trap. In some ways, NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit decision is an example, where the alliance promised eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine without a concrete pathway. This compromise left Georgia and Ukraine vulnerable while stoking the Kremlin’s strategic anxieties. The recently departed Columbia University political scientist Robert Jervis considered such problems in his international relations theory classic Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Jervis weighed deterrence against a “spiral” model, which posited that counterescalating in response to perceived escalation could provoke the opposite of the intended response. An attempt at deterrence could instead be viewed as further provocation. While deterrence preaches strength and resolution, the spiral model generally counsels conciliation. However, Jervis theorized that while the deterrence and spiral models are often presented as opposing, generalizable theories, their usefulness varies with the circumstances. He surmised that deterrence is applicable between two powers with genuinely incompatible positions, and the spiral model best applies to disputes between status quo powers where their perceived incompatibility is mostly illusory. One exercise Jervis suggests is to interrogate evidence that the second power is not engaged in revisionist aggression. In this case, a charitable reading of Russian actions suggests that Russia’s grievances are oriented to the security situation on its borders—the “belt of Russia’s vital interests.” In this interpretation, Russia’s historical influence along its borders need not be a cause for alarm on its own, much less for war. Indeed, if arms limitations and codes of conduct represent an acceptable compromise to defuse the present crisis without sacrificing the freedom or sovereignty of the states on Russia’s border, this is worth pursuing. However, which vital interests necessitate Russian dominion over its periphery? Although Russia’s perceptions of insecurity may be real, it is demonstrably not materially insecure, with a large, full-spectrum, and sophisticated military that is arguably the most powerful in Europe. Russia’s neighbors are far weaker, Western states largely disarmed after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and remnant Allied forces remained in Western Europe in compliance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, even as Russia has significantly militarized. And Russia’s economic fortunes are far better served by peace and integration with the West, not conflict. However, the stability and integrity of European security architecture as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act remain fundamental to U.S. national security. Any countenance of the Kremlin’s broader abrogation of that framework and the restoration of a new Yalta Conference would reverse decades of peace and prosperity—and likely drive continental militarization that would only compound Russian security anxieties and conflict. It appears the West and the Russian regime’s positions are indeed incompatible. In response, the United States and its allies must be wary of the 10-ship trap. Although caution is often a virtue in national security and foreign policymaking, a moderate response to the enormity and notoriety of Russia’s belligerence would likely neither protect Ukraine nor satisfy Russian imperial appetites. Broad economic sanctions on their own are likely to be sufficient to forestall an invasion; and token, light deployments behind NATO’s high walls while Ukraine burns will inflame Kremlin paranoia without arresting or appreciably punishing Russian militarism. Negotiations and diplomacy should be given the time to work, and any kind of durable solution is unlikely to completely satisfy either party. However, the United States and its allies should undergird these talks with serious and significant measures to prevent another, greater war in Ukraine before it begins. As in Corcyra, half measures are unlikely to ameliorate the crisis and may only exacerbate them. What, then, do full measures look like? The critical factors here are speed and plausibility: steps that not only can be taken quickly but that Russia will believe Washington will carry through. Although economic sanctions have been broadly regarded as useful tools in this regard, most measures being envisioned are likely already baked into Russian calculations or may not have an immediate effect. In addition, the United States—and Europe, if it is willing—should significantly curtail Russian energy imports and aim to wean Russian hydrocarbons from European markets entirely—perhaps even going so far as to employ Defense Production Act authorities to stockpile and potentially surge liquefied natural gas and other fuel alternatives to Central and Eastern Europe. Boosting other energy sources on a strategic scale could also accompany this approach. Moscow must be convinced that military aggression will only dramatically increase and complicate what it believes are its existing security vulnerabilities. Toward that end, the United States and Europe could begin studying withdrawal from the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and planning can begin in earnest for repositioning heavy forces in Europe in the event of a wider Russian war. NATO can signal that new European applications for NATO membership would be welcomed and expediently ratified (perhaps even pre-ratified in some form), particularly from Sweden and Finland, should Russia go through with its militaristic gambit. Washington could also consider scenarios to provide aspirants—Ukraine, Georgia, and potentially the Nordics—with bilateral treaty guarantees prior to NATO accession. In Corcyra, the compromise of 10 Athenian ships only served to anger Corinth and Sparta as well as fed beliefs that war was not only necessary but an urgent enterprise. Against the colossal coercive symbolism and military reality posed by the Russian buildup—and the even greater weight of the Kremlin’s demands—the United States and Europe should prepare responses to match the moment. Michael Hikari Cecire is a senior policy advisor at the U.S. Helsinki Commission.