Title

Power and Politics

Thursday, May 09, 2019
2:00pm
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2200
Washington, DC
United States
Implications of Ukraine’s Presidential Elections
Moderator(s): 
Name: 
Alex T. Johnson
Title Text: 
Chief of Staff
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Name: 
Kyle Parker
Title Text: 
Senior Senate Staff Representative
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Witnesses: 
Name: 
Dr. Michael Carpenter
Title: 
Senior Director
Body: 
Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement
Name: 
Natalie Sedletska
Title: 
Journalist and Host
Body: 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Ukrainian Service

At this Helsinki Commission briefing, panelists explored the state of institutional resilience and political context for the election of Volodymyr Zelenskiy as Ukraine’s next president on April 21, 2019. This briefing also explored implications for transatlantic engagement and opportunities for reforms on issues related to the rule of law, media freedom, and corruption.

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  • Senate Concurrent Resolution 153 - Expressing the Sense of Congress with Respect to the Parliamentary Elections Held in Belarus on October 15, 2000, and for Other Purposes

    Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Campbell, and Mr. Helms) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations: S. Con. Res. 153 Whereas on October 15, 2000, Aleksandr Lukashenko and his authoritarian regime conducted an illegitimate and undemocratic parliamentary election in an effort to further strengthen the power and control his authoritarian regime exercises over the people of the Republic of Belarus; Whereas during the time preceding this election the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko attempted to intimidate the democratic opposition by beating, harassing, arresting, and sentencing its members for supporting a boycott of the October 15 election even though Belarus does not contain a legal ban on efforts to boycott elections; Whereas the democratic opposition in Belarus was denied fair and equal access to state-controlled television and radio and was instead slandered by the state-controlled media; Whereas on September 13, 2000, Belarusian police seized 100,000 copies of a special edition of the Belarusian Free Trade Union newspaper, Rabochy, dedicated to the democratic opposition's efforts to promote a boycott of the October 15 election; Whereas Aleksandr Lukashenko and his regime denied the democratic opposition in Belarus seats on the Central Election Commission, thereby violating his own pledge to provide the democratic opposition a role in this Commission; Whereas Aleksandr Lukashenko and his regime denied the vast majority of independent candidates opposed to his regime the right to register as candidates in this election; Whereas Aleksandr Lukashenko and his regime dismissed recommendations presented by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for making the election law in Belarus consistent with OSCE standards; Whereas in Grodno, police loyal to Aleksandr Lukashenko summoned voters to participate in this illegitimate election for parliament; Whereas the last genuinely free and fair parliamentary election in Belarus took place in 1995 and from it emerged the 13th Supreme Soviet whose democratically and constitutionally derived authorities and powers have been undercut by the authoritarian regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko; and Whereas on October 11, the Lukashenko regime froze the bank accounts and seized the equipment of the independent publishing company, Magic, where most of the independent newspapers in Minsk are published: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), Congress hereby-- (1) declares that-- (A) the period preceding the elections held in Belarus held on October 15, 2000, was plagued by continued human rights abuses and a climate of fear for which the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko is responsible; (B) these elections were conducted in the absence of a democratic electoral law; (C) the Lukashenko regime purposely denied the democratic opposition access to state-controlled media; and (D) these elections were for seats in a parliament that lacks real constitutional power and democratic legitimacy; (2) declares its support for the Belarus' democratic opposition, commends the efforts of the opposition to boycott these illegitimate parliamentary elections, and expresses the hopes of Congress that the citizens of Belarus will soon benefit from true freedom and democracy; (3) reaffirms its recognition of the 13th Supreme Soviet as the sole and democratically and constitutionally legitimate legislative body of Belarus ; and (4) notes that, as the legitimate parliament of Belarus , the 13th Supreme Soviet should continue to represent Belarus in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is the sense of Congress that the President should call upon Aleksandr Lukashenko and his regime to--(1) provide a full accounting of the disappearances of individuals in that country, including the disappearance of Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenka, and Dmitry Zavadsky; and (2) release Vladimir Kudinov, Andrei Klimov, and all others imprisoned in Belarus for their political views. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.  

  • Missing Journalist in Ukraine

    Mr. Speaker, it has been almost three weeks since the highly disturbing disappearance of Heorhii Gongadze, a journalist known for his articles exposing corruption in the Ukraine and for playing a prominent role in defending media freedoms. Mr. Gongadze, whose visit to the United States last December included meetings with the Helsinki Commission staff, was publisher of a new Internet newspaper called Ukrainska Pravda (meaning Ukrainian Truth), a publication often critical of senior Ukrainian officials and their associates. In fact, shortly before he vanished, Mr. Gongadze had apparently been facing pressure and threats and had complained that police were harassing him and his colleagues at Ukrainska Pravda. Unfortunately, Mr. Gongadze's disappearance takes place in an increasingly unhealthy media environment. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, his disappearance follows several suspect or inconclusive investigations into the suspicious deaths of several Ukrainian journalists over the last few years and the beatings of two journalists following their articles about official corruption this year. This disappearance has occurred within an environment which has made it increasingly difficult for professional journalists to operate, including harassment by tax police, criminal libel prosecutions, the denial of access to state-controlled newsprint and printing presses, and phone calls to editors suggesting that they censure certain stories. Such an atmosphere clearly has a chilling effect on press freedom. Mr. Speaker, I am encouraged that the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukraine's parliament, has formed a special ad hoc committee to investigate Mr. Gongadze's disappearance. I am also hopeful that the Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies will conduct a serious, vigorous investigation to solve the case of this missing journalist. As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and as someone who has a longstanding interest in the Ukraine, I am deeply disappointed that the Ukraine's relatively positive human rights record has been tarnished by an environment not conducive to the development of a free media. I remain hopeful that the Ukrainian authorities will make every effort to reverse this situation.

  • Serbia Democratization Act of 2000

    Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding me this time and for his work in helping to bring this legislation to the floor today. Mr. Speaker, as we wait to see if opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica will be allowed to secure the election, which by all accounts he seems to have secured and won, it is important for this Congress to support those seeking democratic change in Serbia as well as those undertaking democratic change in Montenegro. This bill does just that. Introduced by myself and several other cosponsors in February of 1999, and updated in light of events since that time, the bill before us today includes language to which the Senate has already agreed by unanimous consent. The State Department has been thoroughly consulted, and its requested changes as well have been incorporated into the text. Throughout there has been a bipartisan effort to craft this legislation. In short, the bill authorizes the provision of democratic assistance to those in Serbia who are struggling for change. It also calls for maintaining sanctions on Serbia until such time that democratic change is indeed underway, allowing at the same time the flexibility to respond quickly to positive developments if and when they occur. Reflective of another resolution, H. Con. Res. 118, which I introduced last year, the bill supports the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to bring those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including Slobodan Milosevic, to justice. The reasons for this bill are clear, Mr. Speaker. In addition to news accounts and presentations in other committees and other venues, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, has held numerous hearings on the efforts of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic to stomp out democracy and to stay in power. The Commission has held three hearings specifically on this issue and one additional hearing specifically on the threat Milosevic presents to Montenegro. Of course, in the many, many hearings the commission has held on Bosnia and Kosovo over the years, witnesses testify to the role of Milosevic in instigating, if not orchestrating, conflict and war. Mr. Speaker, the regime of Milosevic has resorted to increasingly repressive measures, as we all know, to stay in power in light of the elections that were held yesterday in the Yugoslav Federation, of which Serbia and Montenegro are a part. Journalist Miroslav Filipovic received, for example, a 7-year sentence for reporting the truth about Yugoslav and Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. The very courageous Natasa Kandic, of the Humanitarian Law Fund, faces similar charges for documenting these atrocities. Ivan Stambolic, an early mentor but now a leading and credible critic of Slobodon Milosevic, was literally abducted from the streets of Belgrade. Authorities have raided the headquarters of the Center For Free Elections and Democracy, a civic, domestic monitoring organization; and members of the student movement Otpor regularly face arrest, detention and physical harassment. Political opposition candidates have been similarly threatened, harassed, and physically attacked. As news reports regularly indicate, Milosevic may also be considering violent action to bring Montenegro, which has embarked on a democratic path and distanced itself from Belgrade, back under his control. Signs that he is instigating trouble there are certainly evident. It is too early for the results of the elections to be known fully. However, this bill allows us the flexibility to react to those results. Assistance for transition is authorized, allowing a quick reaction to positive developments. Sanctions can also be eased, if needed. On the other hand, few hold hope that Milosevic will simply relinquish power. A struggle for democracy may only now just be starting and not ending. The human rights violations I have highlighted, Mr. Speaker, are also mere examples of deeply rooted institutionalized repression. Universities and the media are restricted by Draconian laws from encouraging the free debate of ideas upon which societies thrive. National laws and the federal constitution have been drafted and redrafted to orchestrate the continued power of Slobodan Milosevic. The military has been purged, as we all know, of many high-ranking professionals unwilling to do Milosevic's dirty work, and the place is a virtual military force of its own designed to tackle internal enemies who are in fact trying to save Serbia from this tyrant. Paramilitary groups merge with criminal gangs in the pervasive corruption which now exists. Sophisticated and constant propaganda has been designed over the last decade to warp the minds of the people into believing this regime has defended the interests of Serbs in Serbia and throughout former Yugoslavia. As a result, even if a democratic change were to begin in Serbia, which we all hope and pray for, the assistance authorized in this bill is needed to overcome the legacy of Milosevic. His influence over the decade has been so strong that it will take considerable effort to bring Serbia back to where it should be. Bringing democratic change to Serbia and supporting the change already taking place in Montenegro is without question in the U.S. national interest. We may differ in our positions regarding the decision to use American forces in the Balkans either for peacekeeping or peacemaking. Nothing, however, could better create the conditions for regional stability which would allow our forces to come home with their mission accomplished than a Serbia on the road to democratic recovery. There is, however, an even stronger interest. Indeed, there is a fundamental right of the people of Serbia themselves to democratic governance. They deserve to have the same rights and freedoms, as well as the opportunity for a prosperous future, that is enjoyed by so many other Europeans and by our fellow Americans. The people of America, of Europe, the people of Serbia all have a strong mutual interest in ending Milosevic's reign of hatred and thuggery. This bill advances that cause.      

  • Serbian Democratization of 2000

    Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding me this time and for his work in helping to bring this legislation to the floor today. Mr. Speaker, as we wait to see if opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica will be allowed to secure the election, which by all accounts he seems to have secured and won, it is important for this Congress to support those seeking democratic change in Serbia as well as those undertaking democratic change in Montenegro. This bill does just that. Introduced by myself and several other cosponsors in February of 1999, and updated in light of events since that time, the bill before us today includes language to which the Senate has already agreed by unanimous consent. The State Department has been thoroughly consulted, and its requested changes as well have been incorporated into the text. Throughout there has been a bipartisan effort to craft this legislation. In short, the bill authorizes the provision of democratic assistance to those in Serbia who are struggling for change. It also calls for maintaining sanctions on Serbia until such time that democratic change is indeed underway, allowing at the same time the flexibility to respond quickly to positive developments if and when they occur. Reflective of another resolution, H. Con. Res. 118, which I introduced last year, the bill supports the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to bring those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including Slobodan Milosevic, to justice. The reasons for this bill are clear, Mr. Speaker. In addition to news accounts and presentations in other committees and other venues, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, has held numerous hearings on the efforts of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic to stomp out democracy and to stay in power. The Commission has held three hearings specifically on this issue and one additional hearing specifically on the threat Milosevic presents to Montenegro. Of course, in the many, many hearings the commission has held on Bosnia and Kosovo over the years, witnesses testify to the role of Milosevic in instigating, if not orchestrating, conflict and war. Mr. Speaker, the regime of Milosevic has resorted to increasingly repressive measures, as we all know, to stay in power in light of the elections that were held yesterday in the Yugoslav Federation, of which Serbia and Montenegro are a part. Journalist Miroslav Filipovic received, for example, a 7-year sentence for reporting the truth about Yugoslav and Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. The very courageous Natasa Kandic, of the Humanitarian Law Fund, faces similar charges for documenting these atrocities. Ivan Stambolic, an early mentor but now a leading and credible critic of Slobodon Milosevic, was literally abducted from the streets of Belgrade. Authorities have raided the headquarters of the Center For Free Elections and Democracy, a civic, domestic monitoring organization; and members of the student movement Otpor regularly face arrest, detention and physical harassment. Political opposition candidates have been similarly threatened, harassed, and physically attacked. As news reports regularly indicate, Milosevic may also be considering violent action to bring Montenegro, which has embarked on a democratic path and distanced itself from Belgrade, back under his control. Signs that he is instigating trouble there are certainly evident. It is too early for the results of the elections to be known fully. However, this bill allows us the flexibility to react to those results. Assistance for transition is authorized, allowing a quick reaction to positive developments. Sanctions can also be eased, if needed. On the other hand, few hold hope that Milosevic will simply relinquish power. A struggle for democracy may only now just be starting and not ending. The human rights violations I have highlighted, Mr. Speaker, are also mere examples of deeply rooted institutionalized repression. Universities and the media are restricted by Draconian laws from encouraging the free debate of ideas upon which societies thrive. National laws and the federal constitution have been drafted and redrafted to orchestrate the continued power of Slobodan Milosevic. The military has been purged, as we all know, of many high-ranking professionals unwilling to do Milosevic's dirty work, and the place is a virtual military force of its own designed to tackle internal enemies who are in fact trying to save Serbia from this tyrant. Paramilitary groups merge with criminal gangs in the pervasive corruption which now exists. Sophisticated and constant propaganda has been designed over the last decade to warp the minds of the people into believing this regime has defended the interests of Serbs in Serbia and throughout former Yugoslavia. As a result, even if a democratic change were to begin in Serbia, which we all hope and pray for, the assistance authorized in this bill is needed to overcome the legacy of Milosevic. His influence over the decade has been so strong that it will take considerable effort to bring Serbia back to where it should be. Bringing democratic change to Serbia and supporting the change already taking place in Montenegro is without question in the U.S. national interest. We may differ in our positions regarding the decision to use American forces in the Balkans either for peacekeeping or peacemaking. Nothing, however, could better create the conditions for regional stability which would allow our forces to come home with their mission accomplished than a Serbia on the road to democratic recovery. There is, however, an even stronger interest. Indeed, there is a fundamental right of the people of Serbia themselves to democratic governance. They deserve to have the same rights and freedoms, as well as the opportunity for a prosperous future that is enjoyed by so many other Europeans and by our fellow Americans. The people of America, of Europe, the people of Serbia all have a strong mutual interest in ending Milosevic's reign of hatred and thuggery. This bill advances that cause.

  • Calling the President to Issue a Proclamation Recognizing the 25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act

    Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) for yielding me time. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me give a special thanks to Bob Hand, who is a specialist on the Balkans, especially the former Yugoslavia and Albania, at the Helsinki Commission. As my colleagues know just a few moments ago, we passed H.R. 1064 by voice vote, legislation that I had introduced early last year. We went through many drafts and redrafts, and I would like to just thank Bob for the excellent work he and Dorothy Taft, the Commission's Chief of Staff, did on that legislation. H.R. 1064 would not have been brought to the floor in a form we know the Senate will pass quickly and then forward for signature, without their tremendous work on this piece of legislation, and their organization of a whole series of hearings that the Helsinki Commission has held on the Balkans. We have had former Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic, for example, testify at several hearings. The Congress itself has had so much input into this diplomatic process which we know as the ``Helsinki process,'' and they have done yeoman's work on that. Mr. Speaker, I rise and ask my colleagues to support passage of H.J. Res. 100, recognizing the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. I am pleased that we have more than 40 cosponsors on this resolution, and that includes all of our colleagues on the Helsinki Commission. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) is the ranking Democratic Member, and my good friend and colleague. Mr. Speaker, the Helsinki Final Act was a watershed event in European history, which set in motion what has become known as the Helsinki process. With its language on human rights, this agreement granted human rights the status of a fundamental principle regulating relations between the signatory countries. Yes, there were other provisions that dealt with economic issues as well as security concerns, but this country rightfully chose to focus attention on the human rights issues especially during the Cold War years and the dark days of the Soviet Union. The Helsinki process, I would respectfully submit to my colleagues, was very helpful, in fact instrumental, in relegating the Communist Soviet empire to the dust bin of history. The standards of Helsinki constitute a valuable lever in pressing human rights issues. The West, and especially the United States, used Helsinki to help people in Czechoslovakia, in East Germany and in all the countries that made up the OSCE, which today comprises 54 nations with the breakup of the Soviet Union and other States along with the addition of some new States. Let me just read to my colleagues a statement that was made by President Gerald Ford, who actually signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. He stated, and I quote, “the Helsinki Final Act was the final nail in the coffin of Marxism and Communism in many, many countries and helped bring about the change to a more democratic political system and a change to a more market oriented economic system.” The current Secretary General of the OSCE, Jan Kubis, a Slovak, has stated, and I quote him, “As we remember together the signature of the Helsinki Final Act, we commemorate the beginning of our liberation, not by armies, not by methods of force or intervention, but as a result of the impact and inspiration of the norms and values of an open civilized society, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and of the encouragement it provided to strive for democratic change and of openings it created to that end. Mr. Speaker, the Helsinki Final Act is a living document. We regularly hold follow-up conferences and meetings emphasizing various aspects of the accords, pressing for compliance by all signatory states. I urge Members to support this resolution, and I am very proud, as I stated earlier, to be Chairman of the Helsinki Commission. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the Statement made by the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, David T. Johnson, at the Commemorative meeting on the 25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act Statement at the 25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (By Ambassador David T. Johnson to the Commemorative Meeting of the Permanent Council of the OSCE) Madame Chairperson, as we look with fresh eyes today at the document our predecessors signed on August 1, 1975, we are struck by the breadth of their vision. They agreed to work together on an amazing range of issues, some of which we are only now beginning to address. The States participating in the meeting affirmed the objective of “ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security;” they recognized the “indivisibility of security in Europe'' and a ``common interest in the development of cooperation throughout Europe.” One of the primary strengths of the Helsinki process is its comprehensive nature and membership. Human rights, military security, and trade and economic issues can be pursued in the one political organization that unites all the countries of Europe including the former Soviet republics, the United States and Canada, to face today's challenges. Over the past twenty-five years we have added pieces to fit the new realities, just last November in Istanbul we agreed on a new Charter for European Security and an adapted Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. But the most significant provision of the Helsinki Agreement may have been the so-called Basket III on Human Rights. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in a speech three weeks after the Final Act was signed, “At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiations. The conference put forward . . . standards of humane conduct, which have been, and still are, a beacon of hope to millions.” In resolutions introduced to our Congress this summer, members noted that the standards of Helsinki provided encouragement and sustenance to courageous individuals who dared to challenge repressive regimes. Many paid a high price with the loss of their freedom or even their lives. Today we have heard from you, the representatives of the many who have struggled in the cause of human rights throughout the years since Helsinki. We are in awe of you, of the difficult and dangerous circumstances of your lives, and of what you have and are accomplishing. Many of us here cannot comprehend the conditions of life in a divided Europe. And those who lived under repressive regimes could not have imagined how quickly life changed after 1989. Political analysts both East and West were astounded at the rapidity with which the citizens of the former Iron Curtain countries demanded their basic rights as citizens of democratic societies. What we have heard time and again is that the Helsinki Final Act did matter. Leaders and ordinary citizens took heart from its assertions. The implementation review meetings kept a focus fixed on its provisions. Even before the Wall came down, a new generation of leaders like Nemeth in Hungary and Gorbachev in the Soviet Union made decisions to move in new directions, away from bloodshed and repression. In the summer of 1989, the Hungarians and Austrian cooperated with the West Germans to allow Romanians and East Germans to migrate to the West. Looking at what was happening in Europe, the young State Department analyst Francis Fukuyama, wrote an article which captured the world's attention. In ``The End of History,'' he claimed that what was happening was not just the end of the Cold War but the end of the debate over political systems. A consensus had formed that democracy, coupled with a market economy, was the best system for fostering the most freedom possible. And then in the night of November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall opened unexpectedly. Citizens emerging from repressive regimes knew about democracy and told the world that what they wanted more than anything else was to vote in free and fair elections. Only a year after the fall of the Wall, a reunited Germany held elections at the state and national level. Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states carried out amazing transformations beginning with elections which brought in democratic systems. When Albania descended into chaos in 1997, groups across the country shared a common desire for fair elections. We have seen Croatia and the Slovak Republic re-direct their courses in the past several years, not by violence but through the ballot box. Just a few weeks ago, citizens of Montenegro voted in two cities with two different results, in both instances there was no violence and the new governments are moving forward with reforms to benefit their citizens. OSCE has time and again stepped up to assist with elections and give citizens an extra measure of reassurance that the rest of the world supports them in the exercise of their democratic rights. We are all aware that in the decades since Helsinki, we have seen conflict, torture, and ethnic violence within the OSCE area. Unfortunately, not all areas in the OSCE region made a peaceful transition to the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic prosperity. Some OSCE countries remain one-party states or suffer under regimes which suppress political opposition. Perhaps the most troubled region is the former Yugoslavia. As Laura Silber has written in the text to the BBC series “The Death of Yugoslavia,” “Yugoslavia did not die a natural death. Rather, it was deliberately and systematically killed off by men who had nothing to gain and everything to lose from a peaceful transition from state socialism and one-party rule to free-market democracy.” We need only look at the devastation of Chechnya and the continuing ethnic strife in parts of the former Yugoslavia to realize there is much still to be done in the OSCE region. We must continue our work together to minimize conflict and bring contending sides together, foster economic reforms through enhanced transparency, promote environmental responsibility, and or fight against organized crime and corruption. Human rights remain very much on our agenda as we seek to eradicate torture, and find new solutions for the integration of immigrants, minorities and vulnerable peoples into our political life. “Without a vision,” wrote the prophet Isaiah so long ago, “the people will perish.” We here today have a vision of collective security for all the citizens of the OSCE region. After twenty-five years, the goals embodied in the Helsinki final act remain a benchmark toward which we must continue to work. The Panelists have reminded us today that the Helsinki Final Act has incalculable symbolic meaning to the citizens of our region; we must continue to take on new challenges as we strive to keep this meaning alive. Mr. Crowley. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the ranking member of the Helsinki Commission.   Mr. Hoyer: Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) for yielding me the time. I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for bringing this resolution to the floor. I am pleased to join my very good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), with whom I have served on the Helsinki Commission since 1985 and who is now the chairman of our commission and does an extraordinarily good job at raising high the banner of human rights, of freedom, and democracy and so many other vital values to a free people. I am honored to be his colleague on the Helsinki Commission. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.J. Res. 100 which commemorates the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act which, was signed on August 1, 1975. It is my firm belief that the political process set in motion by the signing of the Final Act was the groundwork for the forces which consumed the former Soviet empire. In 1975, many of the Final Act signatory states viewed the language of the act dealing with human rights and the obligation that each state had toward its own citizens, as well as those of other states, as essentially meaningless window dressing. Their objective, it was felt that of the Soviets, was to secure a framework in which their international political position and the then existing map of Europe would be adjudged a fait accompli. Let me say as an aside that as we honor the 25th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, we ought to honor the courage and the vision of President Gerald Ford. I am not particularly objective. President Ford is a friend of mine for whom I have great affection and great respect, but those who will recall the signing of the Final Act in August of 1975 will recall that it was very controversial, and that many particularly in President's Ford's party thought that it was a sellout to the Soviets, thought that it was, in fact, a recognition of the de facto borders that then existed with the 6 Warsaw Pact nations, captive nations, if you will. President Ford, however, had the vision and, as I said, the courage, to sign the Final Act on behalf of the United States along with 34 other heads of state; that act became a living and breathing process, not a treaty, not a part of international law, but whose moral suasion ultimately made a very significant difference.

  • U.S. Statements at the 1999 OSCE Review Conference

    In February 1999, officials from 90 governments, including representatives from many OSCE participating States, visited Washington for the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption among justice and security officials. Participants concluded that their governments must cooperate more closely if they were to succeed in promoting public integrity and controlling corruption among their officials. OSCE efforts served as an example to others when the international community gathered in the Netherlands in 2001 for the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption.

  • Milosevic’s Crackdown in Serbia and Threat to Montenegro

    At this hearing, with Commissioners Chris Smith (NJ-04) and Benjamin Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) in attendance, witnesses testified on the atrocities committed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Foremost on people’s minds was the conviction and sentence of years in prison of a Serbian journalist for committing “espionage” after he wrote about Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. More broadly, the hearing examined Milosevic’s efforts to perpetuate his power by forcing changes to the Yugoslav constitution and cracking down on forces in Serbia.  Also in attendance were Branislav Carak of the Serbian Independent Trade Union; Stojan Cerovic, fellow at the U.S. Institute of peace; Dr. David Dasic, head of the Trade Mission of the Republic of Montenegro; and Bogdan Ivanisevic, researcher at Human Rights Watch.

  • 25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act

    Mr. Speaker, next Tuesday marks the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which organized what has become known as the Helsinki or OSCE process, a critical venue in which the United States has sought to advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law. With its language on human rights, the Helsinki Final Act granted human rights of a fundamental principle in regulating international relations. The Final Act's emphasis on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is rooted in the recognition that the declarations of such rights affirms the inherent dignity of men and women, and are not privileges bestowed at the whim of the state. The commitments are worth reading again. Among the many pages, allow me to quote from several of the documents: In the Helsinki Final Act, the participating States commit to `respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.' In the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the participating states declared, `Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government.' In the 1991 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, the participating States `categorically and irrevocably declare[d] that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the States concerned.' In the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the participating States committed themselves `to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.' The 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security and Istanbul Summit Declaration notes the particular challenges of ending violence against women and children as well as sexual exploitation and all forms of trafficking in human beings, strengthening efforts to combat corruption, eradicating torture, reinforcing efforts to end discrimination against Roma and Sinti, and promoting democracy and respect for human rights in Serbia. Equally important, the standards of Helsinki, which served as a valuable lever in pressing human rights issues also provided encouragement and sustenance to courageous individuals who dared to challenge repressive communist regimes. Many of these brave men and women, members of the Helsinki Monitoring and affiliated Groups in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and similar groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, Soviet Jewish emigration activists, members of repressed Christian denominations and others, paid a high price in the loss of personal freedom and, in some instances, their lives, for their active support of principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. Pressure by governments through the Helsinki process at various Helsinki fora, thoroughly reviewing compliance with Helsinki commitments and raising issues with Helsinki signatory governments which violated their freely undertaken human rights commitments, helped make it possible for the people of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to regain their freedom and independence. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the OSCE region has changed dramatically. In many of the States, we have witnessed widespread and significant transformations and a consolidation of the core OSCE values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Unfortunately, in others, there has been little if any progress, and in some, armed conflicts have resulted in hundreds of thousands having been killed and in the grotesque violation of human rights. Mr. Speaker, this milestone anniversary presents the President an appropriate opportunity to issue a proclamation in recognition of the obligations we and the other OSCE States have committed to uphold. It is important to keep in mind that all of the agreements of the Helsinki process have been adopted by consensus and consequently, each participating State is equally bound by each document. In addition to committing ourselves of the faithful implementation of the OSCE principles, the President should encourage other OSCE signatories as all of us have recognized that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic principles, economic liberty, and the implementation of related commitments continue to be vital elements in promoting a new era of democracy and genuine security and cooperation in the OSCE region. Each participating State of the OSCE bears primary responsibility for raising violations of the Helsinki Final Act and the other OSCE documents. In the twenty-five years since this historic process was initiated in Helsinki, there have been many successes, but the task is far from complete. Mr. Speaker, we can look at OSCE's past with pride and its future with hope, keeping in mind President Ford's concluding comments at the signing of the Helsinki Final Act: `History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow, not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.'

  • Azerbaijan's Parliamentary Elections

    Mr. Speaker, today I introduce a resolution calling on the Government of Azerbaijan to hold free and fair parliamentary elections this November. After a series of elections marred by irregularities, the upcoming election will help define the country's political orientation and its international reputation. Is Azerbaijan developing towards Western-style electoral democracy or mired in the Soviet pattern of controlled voting results? The answer to that question is important for the United States, which has significant strategic and economic interests in Azerbaijan.   At age 77, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev is the most experienced politician in the former Soviet space. Since returning to power in 1993, he has created a semi-authoritarian political system that features highly centralized, hands-on presidential rule, with constant positive coverage in the state-run media. President Aliev controls all branches of government and the state's instruments of coercion. His implicit bargain with Azerbaijan's citizens offers stability in return for unquestioned predominance. While Azerbaijan's constitution enshrines separation of powers, neither the legislature, judiciary, press, nor opposition parties may challenge President Aliev's hold on power. Indeed, in an interview published in last Sunday's New York Times, he openly said, `I will always be president here.' Opposition parties function, publish newspapers and have some representation in parliament. But they have no access to state media, which portray them negatively, and their opportunities to influence the political process, let alone actual decision-making, are carefully restricted.   With respect to elections, Azerbaijan's record has been poor. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) monitored the 1995 and 1998 parliamentary and presidential elections, and concluded that they did not meet OSCE standards. Council of Europe observers harshly criticized the first round of the local elections in December 1999, though they noted some improvements in the second round. These flawed elections have exacerbated the deep distrust between the government and opposition parties.   On May 25, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, held hearings on the upcoming election, in which Azerbaijani Government representatives and opposition leaders participated. At that time, the main bone of contention between them was the composition of the Central Election Commission. During the hearing, a government spokesman announced that Baku was prepared to let government and opposition members veto the other side's nominees for the Commission posts set aside for independents, a major step forward. In fact, that assurance subsequently turned out to be not entirely reliable when the hard bargaining began in Baku, with the mediation of the ODIHR. Nevertheless, the agreement eventually reached did give opposition parties an opportunity to block decisions taken by the pro-presidential majority and was acclaimed by ODIHR as a fair and necessary compromise.   Since then, unfortunately, the process has collapsed. Azerbaijan's parliament passed an election law on July 5 that did not include amendments recommended by the ODIHR to bring the legislation into accord with OSCE standards. The law excludes an opposition party registered in February 2000 from fielding a party list; other problematic aspects include territorial and local election commissions which are effectively under government control, the restriction of voters' rights to sign petitions nominating more than one candidate or party, and the right of domestic observers to monitor the election. President Aliev claims that he proposed modifications to the election law but parliament refused to accept them. This assertion, considering his hold on the legislature, where a loyal, pro-presidential party controls over 80 percent of the seats, is simply not plausible. In any case, if he did not approve of the law, he could have vetoed it. Instead, he signed it.   On July 7, the ODIHR issued a press release `deploring' shortcomings in the election law. Opposition parties refused to participate in the work of the Central Election Commission unless the law is changed. In response, parliament amended the Central Election Commission law, depriving the opposition of the ability to block decisions. On July 20, 12 political parties, among them the leading opposition parties, warned that if parliament refuses to amend the election law, they will boycott the November ballot. Most recently, the State Department issued a statement on July 24, regretting the recent actions of Azerbaijan's parliament and urging the government and parliament in Baku to work with ODIHR, the opposition and non-governmental organizations to amend the election law in accordance with OSCE standards. Mr. Speaker, this turn of events is extremely disappointing. The last thing Azerbaijan needs is another election boycott by opposition parties. The consequences would include a parliament of dubious legitimacy, deepened distrust and societal polarization, and a movement away from electoral politics to street politics, which could threaten the country's stability.   November's election offers a historic opportunity to consolidate Azerbaijani society. It is essential for the future development of Azerbaijan's democracy and for the legitimacy of its leadership that the election be free and fair and the results be accepted by society as a whole. This resolution calls on the Administration to remind President Aliev of the pledge he made in August 1997 to hold free and fair elections, and urges Azerbaijan's Government and parliament to accept ODIHR's recommendations on the election law, so that it will meet international standards. I hope my colleagues will join me, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Pitts and Mr. Cardin in this effort, and we welcome their support.

  • Religious Liberty: The Legal Framework in Selected OSCE Countries

    At the briefing, an in-depth study examining the religious liberties laws and constitutional provisions of twelve countries: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, the United States, and Uzbekistan formally released by the Helsinki Commission was discussed. The project was inspired by the agreement of OSCE participating States to “ensure that their laws, regulations, practices and policies conform with their obligation under international law and are brought into harmony with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles and other OSCE commitments.” Various panelists addressed the issue of governments continuing to impose restrictions on individual religious liberties, despite a prior agreement to curtail anti-religious laws and governmental practices designed to prevent people from practicing or expressing their religious beliefs. Legal specialists from the Law Library of Congress emphasized a “frightening” trend in France to limit an individual’s right to freely express religious views or participate in religious activities, a Greek policy requiring one’s religious affiliation to be listed on government-issued identification cards, and Turkish raids on Protestant groups as examples of the violations of religious liberty that continue to plague these selected OSCE countries.

  • Tenth Anniversary of Ukraine Sovereignty Declaration

    Mr. Speaker, ten years ago, on July 16th 1990, the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the Ukrainian S.S.R. adopted a far-reaching Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine. The overwhelming vote of 355 for and four against was a critical and demonstrative step towards independence, as Ukraine was at that time a republic of the Soviet Union.   The Declaration, inspired by the democratic movement Rukh whose key members were veterans of the Helsinki movement seeking greater rights and freedoms, proclaimed Ukraine's state sovereignty and stressed the Republic's intention of controlling its own affairs. Ukraine and its people were identified as the sole source of state authority in the republic, and they alone were to determine their own destiny. The Declaration asserted the primacy of Ukraine's legislation over Soviet laws and established the right of Ukraine to create its own currency and national bank, raise its own army, maintain relations with foreign countries, collect tariffs, and erect borders. Through this Declaration, Ukraine announced its intention not to use, possess, or acquire nuclear weapons. Going beyond Soviet leader Gorbachev's vision of a `renewed' Soviet federation, the Declaration asserted Ukraine's sovereignty vis-a-vis Moscow, a move that only a few years earlier would have been met with the harshest of sanctions. The Declaration's assurances on the protection of individual rights and freedoms for all of the people of Ukraine, including national and religious minorities, were extremely important and viewed as an integral aspect of the building of a sovereign Ukraine.   The Declaration itself was the outcome of emerging democratic processes in Ukraine. Elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the first in which non-communists were permitted on the ballot, had been held only a few months earlier, in March 1990; one-third of the new members elected were representatives of the democratic opposition. Even the Communist majority voted for the Declaration, reflecting the reality that the Soviet Empire was steadily unraveling. A year later, on August 24, 1991, the same Ukrainian parliament declared Ukraine's independence, and in December of that year, on the heels of a referendum in Ukraine in which over 90 percent voted for independence, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.   Mr. Speaker, since the adoption of the Declaration ten years ago Ukraine has witnessed momentous transformations. Independent Ukraine has developed from what was, for all practical purposes, a colony of the Soviet empire into a viable, peaceful state with a commitment to ensuring democracy and prosperity for its citizens. It has emerged as a responsible and constructive actor in the international arena which enjoys good relations with all its neighbors and a strategic partnership with the United States. Obviously, the heavy legacy of communism and Soviet misrule has not yet disappeared, as illustrated by stifling corruption, and inadequate progress in rule of law and economic reforms. However, the defeat of the communists in last November's presidential elections, and the appointment of genuinely reformist Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko have given grounds for renewed optimism, which is supported by evidence of growth in some sectors of the economy.   Mr. Speaker, now is the time for the Ukrainian people to strengthen and ensure independence by redoubling their efforts to build democracy and a market economy, thereby keeping faith with the ideals and goals of the historic 1990 Declaration on Sovereignty.

  • Torture in the OSCE Region

    In advance of the 2000 commemoration of the United Nations Day in Support of the Victims of Torture, the Helsinki Commission held a briefing to focus on the continuing problem of torture in the OSCE region. In spite of these efforts and the efforts of our Commission, including introducing and working for passage of two bills, the Torture Victims Relief Act and the Reauthorization of the Torture Victims Relief Act, torture continues to be a persistent problem in every OSCE country including the United States. This briefing considered two specific problem areas, Chechnya and Turkey, as well as efforts to prevent torture and to treat torture survivors. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Dr. Inge Genefke, International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims; Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for  Europe and the Middle East, Amnesty International; and Douglas Johnson, Executive Director of the Center for the Victims of Torture – highlighted statistics about the number of torture victims in Turkey and Chechnya and related violations of individual rights.

  • Elections, Democratization, and Human Rights in Azerbaijan

    The hearing will outline recent developments in Azerbaijani elections. Azerbaijan government officials announced Thursday that Azerbaijan’s government has accepted proposals to agree with the opposition about independent members of the Central Election Commission in advance of the November parliamentary election. The announcement was made during a hearing of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Azerbaijan’s Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev, accompanied by several experts who arrived from Baku for the hearing, said that negotiations between the sides, with the active mediation of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), would continue about the Central Election Commission and the election law. How these electoral developments effect Azerbaijan will be outlined.

  • Report on the Presidential Election in Georgia

    On April 9, 2000, Georgia held a presidential election. According to the Central Election Commission, turnout was almost 76 percent. Incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze won reelection with about 80 percent of the vote. Former Communist Party boss Jumber Patiashvili came in second, with 16.6 percent. The other candidates on the ballot were largely irrelevant. Though Shevardnadze’s victory was anticipated, it remained unclear until election eve whom he would defeat. Batumi Alliance leader Aslan Abashidze, boss of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, had announced last year plans to mount a presidential race, but many expected him to drop out, as he had no real chance of winning. By threatening a boycott, Abashidze won concessions from the CUG on the election law, but his overall strategy collapsed when his Batumi Alliance colleague, Jumber Patiashvili, announced plans to run against Shevardnadze no matter what. One day before the election, Abashidze withdrew, leaving Patiashvili as Shevardnadze’s only serious contender. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights election observation mission began its assessment by stating that “considerable progress is necessary for Georgia to fully meet its commitments as a participating state of the OSCE.” Among the problems in the election, ODIHR noted, inter alia, the authorities’ support for the incumbent, the failure of state media to provide balanced reportage, and the dominant role of the CUG in election commissions at all levels. While voting was generally conducted “calmly,” the “counting and tabulation procedures lacked uniformity and, at times, transparency.” The ODIHR also observed ballot stuffing and protocol tampering. Shevardnadze’s prospects for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia are bleak and he has little reason to expect help from Russia. Since the beginning of Russia’s latest campaign against Chechnya, Moscow has accused Tbilisi of allowing or abetting the transit of Chechen fighters through Georgian territory. These allegations also aim to pressure Georgia in negotiations about the withdrawal of Russia’s four military bases. High-level Russian political and military figures have made it plain that Moscow will try to retain the bases and will reassert its interests in the region to counter gains by Western countries, especially the United States. Tbilisi will need help from the United States in resisting a newly aggressive Moscow. Eduard Shevardnadze has long enjoyed good relations with Washington, which gratefully remembers his contribution as Soviet Foreign Minister to ending the Cold War peacefully. The United States has provided substantial assistance to Georgia and backed Shevardnadze morally as well. Presumably the congratulations tendered at the beginning of the State Department’s April 10 statement reflected appreciation for his past services, rather than acceptance at face value of the election’s results. President Clinton noted the election’s shortcomings in a post-election letter to Shevardnadze, reiterated Washington’s longstanding exhortation to attack corruption, and pressed him to implement urgent economic changes.

  • The Deterioration of Freedom of the Media in OSCE Countries

    The stated purpose of this hearing, presided over by Rep. Christopher Smith (NJ-04) was to draw attention to the deteriorating status of free speech and press throughout the OSCE region, raise alarm about this deterioration, and call upon OSCE participating states to recommit themselves to these freedoms. Such an impetus was drawn from how members of the press were mistreated in foreign countries. For example, 34 journalists were killed in the OSCE region in the year of 1999.

  • The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption On Democratic and Economic Reform

    Commissioners Christopher Smith and Ben Nighthorse Campbell, along with others, discussed just how detrimental organized crime and corruption are on society. More specifically, organized crime negatively impact democracy’s expansion, the promotion of civil society, and security in the OSCE region, as well as economic development, particularly in southeast Europe and Central Asia. This is relevant to the United States because it has a strategic interest in promoting democratic reform and stability in the former U.S.S.R. and Central Asia. Countries in this region assist U.S. businesses exploring market opportunities, and the U.S. provides a good bit of bilateral assistance to these countries. The Helsinki Commission has pressed for greater OSCE involvement in efforts to combat corruption.

  • Change in Croatia

    Mr. Speaker, in October of last year, I expressed concerns in this Chamber on the condition of democracy in Croatia.   At that time, the leadership of Croatia was resisting the transition towards free elections, stalling the construction of democratic institutions, flaunting the rule of law, and squashing ethnic diversity. Those that held power were maintaining it in two significant ways. The first was through the manipulation of the political system to their advantage, including, in particular, efforts to control the media and the unwillingness to allow free and fair elections. Second, there was heavy reliance on nationalist passions for support. Zagreb's policies swayed the loyalties of Croats in neighboring Bosnia and made it difficult for the displaced Serb population to return to the country.   Since last October, things have changed drastically and for the better. In the Parliamentary election of January 3, the desire of the people for change was manifested as the party that had ruled since the fall of communism was defeated by an opposition coalition led by the new Prime Minister, Ivica Racan. Meanwhile, in a special presidential election on February 7 to succeed the late Franjo Tudjman, Stipe Mesic won on promises of reform, of a more democratic political system with diminished power for the presidency, of greater cooperation with The Hague in the prosecution of war criminals, of progress in the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, and of the return of Croatia's displaced Serb population. These changes have been universally applauded, specifically by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her visit to Croatia on February 2. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I join the Secretary of State in commending the new policies of Croatia's leaders, and I complement our able Ambassador to Croatia, William Montgomery, for his role in pressing for democratic change.   Mr. Speaker, it is good that Croatia's new leadership is talking about substantial reform. However, we must be sure that it is not just talk. We must be sure to encourage Croatia to move closer towards full freedom, true justice, and greater prosperity for all of her citizens, regardless of ethnicity. We must continue to press for the surrender to The Hague of those indicted for war crimes. As we do, we must be ready to support Croatia, even as we have been ready to criticize Croatia's shortcomings in the past. Recent violence in southeastern Europe underscores the need for true democracy in the region. In closing, I congratulate Croatia's new leadership and its promise of progress. Now that reform is on the horizon, I am hopeful that Croatia will soon be an integrated partner in European affairs.  

  • Report on Ukraine's Presidential Elections: October and November 1999

    On November 14, President Leonid Kuchma was re-elected for another 5-years term as President of Ukraine, beating Communist Party candidate Petro Symonenko, with 56.3 percent of the votes to Symonenko's 37.8 percent. More than 27 million people, nearly 75 percent of the electorate, turned out to vote. Nearly one million people, or 3.5% of the voters, selected the option of voting for neither candidate. Despite the economic decline and widespread corruption that were hallmarks of his first term, voters chose to re-elect Kuchma, principally out of fear of a return of communism, and certainly not due to any enthusiastic embrace of his economic policies. While there were violations of Ukraine's elections law and OSCE commitments on democratic elections, especially during the second round, these did not have a decisive affect on the outcome, given Kuchma's substantial margin of victory (over five millions votes). The elections were observed by some 500 international observers, with the largest contingent by far coming from the OSCE, and some 16.000 domestic observers. While the West welcomed the Ukrainian people's rejection of communism and any plans to reinvent the Soviet Union or Russian empire, the lack of economic reforms, as well as inappropriate governmental involvement in the election campaign, dampened Western exuberance over Kuchma's election victory. Following his victory, President Kuchma claimed a mandate and promised to work resolutely for economic reforms. This, however, needs to be weighed against his dismal economic record and the questionable resumes of some of his major campaign supporters. Western governments, including the United States, almost immediately reiterated their commitment to assisting Ukraine's transition to democracy and a market economy. At the same time, these governments are waiting to see if the reality will match the rhetoric of reform.                     

  • Democratization and Human Rights in Central Asia

    Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the House schedule did not permit consideration of my resolution, H. Con. Res. 204, which has been co-sponsored by Representative Hoyer, Representative Forbes and Representative McKinney. The resolution voices concern about serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in most states of Central Asia, in particular, substantial noncompliance with OSCE commitments on democratization and the holding of free and fair elections. Among the countries of the former Soviet Union, only in Ukraine and Moldova have sitting presidents lost an election and peacefully left office. We will yet see what happens in Russia, where President Yeltsin has launched another war in Chechnya. It may be too much, given the historical differences between our respective societies, to hope the post-Soviet states could find among their political leaders a George Washington, who could have been king but chose not to be, and who chose to leave office after two terms. But it is not too much to hope that other post-Soviet leaders might emulate Ukraine's former President Leonid Kravchuk or Moldova's former President Mircea Snegur, not to mention Lithuania's Algirdas Brazauskas, who all allowed a peaceful transfer of power. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, Central Asian leaders give every indication of intending to remain in office for life. Their desire for unlimited and permanent power means that they cannot implement all OSCE commitments on democracy, the rule of law and human rights, as doing so would create a level playing field for challengers and allow the media to shine the light on presidential misdeeds and high-level corruption. The result has been an entire region in the OSCE space where fundamental OSCE freedoms are ignored while leaders entrench themselves and their families in power and wealth. To give credit where it is due, the situation is least bad in Kyrgyzstan. President Akaev, a physicist, is the only Central Asian leader who was not previously the head of his republic's Communist Party. One can actually meet members of parliament who strongly criticize President Akaev and the legislature itself is not a rubber stamp body. Moreover, print media, though under serious pressure from the executive branch, exhibit diversity of views and opposition parties function. Still, in 1995, two contenders in the presidential election were disqualified before the vote. Parliamentary and presidential elections are approaching in 2000. Kyrgyzstan's OSCE partners will be watching carefully to see whether they are free and fair. Until the mid-1990s, Kazakstan seemed a relatively reformist country, where various political parties could function and the media enjoyed some freedom. But President Nazarbaev dissolved two parliaments and single-mindedly sought to accumulate sole power. In the last few years, the regime has become ever more authoritarian. President Nazarbaev has concentrated all power in his hands, subordinating to himself all other branches and institutions of government. A constitutional amendment passed in October 1999 conveniently removed the age limit of 65 to be president. The OSCE judged last January's presidential elections, from which a leading opposition contender was barred as far short of OSCE standards. Last month's parliamentary election, according to the OSCE, was “severely marred by widespread, pervasive and illegal interference by executive authorities in the electoral process.” In response, President Nazarbaev has attacked the OSCE, comparing it to the Soviet Communist Party's Politburo for trying to “tell Kazakstan what to do.” Tajikistan has suffered the saddest fate of all the Central Asian countries; a civil war that killed scores of thousands. In 1997, the warring sides finally ceased hostilities and reached agreement about power-sharing, which permitted a bit of hopefulness about prospects for normal development and democratization. It seems, however, that the accord will not ensure stability. Tajikistan's Central Election Commission refused to register two opposition candidates for the November 6 presidential election. The sole alternative candidate registered has refused to accept the results of the election, which, according to official figures, current President Emomaly Rakhmonov won with 97 percent of the vote, in a 98 percent turnout. Those numbers, Mr. Speaker, say it all. The OSCE properly declined to send observers. Benighted Turkmenistan practically beggars description. This country, which has been blessed with large quantities of natural gas, has a political system that combines the worst traits of Soviet communism with a personality cult seen today in countries like Iraq or North Korea. No dissidence of any kind is permitted and the population enjoys no human rights. While his impoverished people barely manage to get by, President Niyazov builds garish presidential palaces and monuments to himself. The only registered political party in Turkmenistan is the Democratic Party, headed by President Niyazov. In late October he said the people of his country would not be ready for the stresses and choices of a democratic society until 2010, adding that independent media are “disruptive.” On December 12, Turkmenistan is holding parliamentary “elections,” which the OSCE will not bother to observe. Finally, we come to Uzbekistan. The Helsinki Commission, which I chair, held hearings on democratization and human rights in Uzbekistan on October 18. Despite the best efforts of Uzbekistan's Ambassador Safaev to convince us that democratization is proceeding apace in his country, the testimony of all the other witnesses confirmed the widely held view that after Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan is the most repressive country in Central Asia. No opposition political activity is allowed and media present only the government's point of view. Christian denominations have faced official harassment. Since 1997, a massive government campaign has been underway against independent Muslim believers. In February of this year, explosions rocked Tashkent, which the government described as an assassination attempt by Islamic radicals allied with an exiled opposition leader. Apart from elections, a key indicator of progress towards democratization is the state of media freedom. On October 25-27, an International Conference on Mass Media in Central Asia took place in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Not surprisingly, Turkmenistan did not allow anyone to attend. The other participants adopted a declaration noting that democratization has slowed in almost all Central Asian states, while authoritarian regimes have grown stronger, limiting the scope for genuine media freedom as governments influence the media through economic means. I strongly agree with these sentiments. The concentration of media outlets in pro-regime hands, the ongoing assault on independent and opposition media and the circumscription of the media's legally-sanctioned subject matter pose a great danger to the development of democracy in Central Asia. Official statistics about how many media outlets have been privatized cover up an alarming tendency towards government monopolization of information sources. This effectively makes it impossible for citizens to receive unbiased information, which is vital if people are to hold their governments accountable. Mr. Speaker, it is clear that in Central Asia, the overall level of democratization and human rights observance is poor. Central Asian leaders make decisions in a region far from Western Europe, close to China, Iran and Afghanistan, and they often assert that “human rights are only for the West” or the building democracy “takes time.” But delaying steps towards democracy is very risky in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious region of Central Asia, where many people are highly educated and have expectations of faster change. If it does not come, tensions and conflicts could emerge that could endanger security for everyone. To lessen these risks, continuous pressure will be needed on these countries to move faster on democracy. Even as the United States pursues other interests, we should give top priority to democracy and respect for human rights, or we may live to regret not doing so.

  • Central Asia: The “Black Hole” of Human Rights

    Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a resolution on the disturbing state of democratization and human rights in Central Asia. As is evident from many sources, including the State Department's annual reports on human rights, non-governmental organizations, both in the region and the West, and the work of the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, Central Asia has become the “black hole” of human rights in the OSCE space. True, not all Central Asia countries are equal offenders. Kyrgyzstan has not joined its neighbors in eliminating all opposition, tightly censoring the media and concentrating all power in the hands of the president, though there are tendencies in that direction, and upcoming elections in 2000 may bring out the worst in President Akaev. But elsewhere, the promise of the early 1990's, when the five Central Asian countries along with all former Soviet republics were admitted to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, has not been realized. Throughout the region, super-presidents pay lip service to OSCE commitments and to their own constitutional provisions on separation of powers, while dominating the legislative and judicial branches, crushing or thwarting any opposition challenges to their factual monopoly of power, and along with their families and favored few, enjoying the benefits of their countries' wealth. Indeed, though some see the main problem of Central Asia through the prism of real or alleged Islamic fundamentalism, the Soviet legacy, or poverty, I am convinced that the essence of the problem is more simple and depressing: presidents determined to remain in office for life must necessarily develop repressive political systems. To justify their campaign to control society, Central Asian leaders constantly point to their own national traditions and argue that democracy must be built slowly. Some Western analysts, I am sorry to say, have bought this idea, in some cases, quite literally, by acting as highly paid consultants to oil companies and other business concerns. But, Mr. Speaker, building democracy is an act of political will above all. You have to want to do it. If you don't, all the excuses in the world and all the state institutions formed in Central Asia ostensibly to promote human rights will remain simply window dressing. Moreover, the much-vaunted stability offered by such systems is shaky. The refusal of leaders to allow turnover at the top or newcomers to enter the game means that outsiders have no stake in the political process and can imagine coming to power or merely sharing in the wealth only be extra-constitutional methods. For some of those facing the prospect of permanent exclusion, especially as living standards continue to fall, the temptation to resort to any means possible to change the rules of the game, may be overwhelming. Most people, however, will simply opt out of the political system in disillusionment and despair. Against this general context, without doubt, the most repressive countries are Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's President Niyazov, in particular, has created a virtual North Korea in post-Soviet space, complete with his own bizarre cult of personality. Turkmenistan is the only country in the former Soviet bloc that remains a one-party state. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has five parties but all of them are government-created and controlled. Under President Islam Karimov, no opposition parties or movements have been allowed to function since 1992. In both countries, communist-era controls on the media remain in place. The state, like its Soviet predecessor, prevents society from influencing policy or expressing its views and keeps the population intimidated through omnipresent secret police forces. Neither country observes the most fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion, or permits any electoral challenges to its all-powerful president. Kazakstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev has played a more clever game. Pressed by the OSCE and Western capitals, he has formally permitted opposition parties to function, and they did take part in the October 10 parliamentary election. But once again, a major opposition figure was not able to participate, and OSCE/ODIHR monitors, citing many shortcomings, have criticized the election as flawed. In general, the ability of opposition and society to influence policymaking is marginal at best. At the same time, independent and opposition media have been bought, coopted or intimidated out of existence or into cooperation with the authorities, and those few that remain are under severe pressure. Tajikistan suffered a devastating civil war in the early 1990's. In 1997, war-weariness and a military stalemate led the disputants to a peace accord and a power-sharing agreement. But though the arrangement had promise, it now seems to be falling apart, as opposition contenders for the presidency have been excluded from the race and the major opposition organization has decided to suspend participation in the work of the National Reconciliation Commission. Mr. Speaker, along with large-scale ethnic conflicts like Kosovo or Bosnia, and unresolved low-level conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, I believe the systemic flouting of OSCE commitments on democratization and human rights in Central Asia is the single greatest problem facing the OSCE. For that reason, I am introducing this resolution expressing concern about the general trends in the region, to show Central Asian presidents that we are not taken in by their facade, and to encourage the disheartened people of Central Asia that the United States stands for democracy. The resolution calls on Central Asian countries to come into compliance with OSCE commitments on democracy and human rights , and encourages the Administration to raise with other OSCE states the implications for OSCE participation of countries that engage in gross and uncorrected violation of freely accepted commitments on human rights . Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me, Mr. Hoyer, and Mr. Forbes in this effort and we welcome their support.

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