Listening to Victims of Child Sex Trafficking

Thursday, October 04, 2012
2255 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
United States
Hon. Chris Smith
Title Text: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
“Mr. B”
Survivor of Child Trafficking in Amsterdam, Netherlands
Klaas Langendoen
Former Chief of Criminal Intelligence Services
The Netherlands
Adèle van der Plas
Bakker Schut & Van Der Plas
Samantha Healy Vardaman
Senior Director
Shared Hope International

In this briefing, which Rep. Christopher Smith (NJ -04) moderated, attendees examined how and to what extent allegations of trafficking and abuse should have been investigated. The Commission held this briefing in the context of a series of cases in which allegations were raised against the secretary-general at the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands, Mr. Jorris Demmink, who had been accused by a witness, present at the briefing, of sexually abusing and raping the witness when the witness was being trafficked in a brothel in Amsterdam at age 15.

Demmink had been accused by two Turkish males of having raped them in Turkey between 1994 and 2003. At the time of the assault, the boys were 11- and 14-years-old, and at least one of them was homeless. Unfortunately, the allegations against Demmink were never given a criminal investigation.

Witnesses at the briefing included: “Mr. B”, a survivor of child trafficking in Amsterdam, Netherlands; Klaas Langendoen, the Former Chief of Criminal Intelligence Services for the Netherlands and Private Investigator; Adèle van der Plas, an advocate with Bakker Schut and Van Der Plas; and Samantha Healy Vardaman,  Senior Director with Shared Hope International.

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