Title

Combating Corruption in the OSCE Region: The Link between Security and Good Governance

Wednesday, November 19, 2014
U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Room SVC 203/202
Washington, DC 20515
United States
Official Transcript: 
Members: 
Name: 
Hon. Ben Cardin
Title Text: 
Chairman
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Name: 
Hon. Chris Smith
Title Text: 
Co-Chairman
Body: 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Witnesses: 
Name: 
Anders Åslund
Title: 
Senior Fellow
Body: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Name: 
Dr. Halil Yurdakul Yigitgüden
Title: 
Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities
Body: 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Name: 
Khadija Ismayilova
Title: 
Host of "Isden Sonra" ("After Work")
Body: 
RFE/RL Azerbaijani Service
Name: 
Shaazka Beyerle
Title: 
Senior Advisor
Body: 
International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

Combating corruption is increasingly recognized as the critical factor in ensuring long-term security, because corruption creates fertile ground for social upheaval and instability. The change in government in Ukraine in 2014 was a prime example of how corruption can fuel legitimate popular discontent.

Although the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has created new tools to address corruption, tackling the problem requires more than raising awareness and sharing best practices. In many OSCE participating States, systemic issues including lack of media freedom, lack of political will, and lack of an independent judiciary contribute substantially to persistent high-level and low-level corruption.

The hearing drew attention to the work of the OSCE in combating corruption in all 57 participating States, with a particular emphasis on the need to build effective institutions and the important role played by civil society in combatting corruption.

Relevant issues: 
Leadership: 
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  • Introduction of the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001

    Mr. President, today I introduce the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001. This legislation addresses the growing problem of official and unofficial corruption abroad. This bill is based on S. 1514, which I introduced in the 106th Congress. Endemic corruption around the world negatively impacts both the United States and the citizens of countries where corruption is tolerated. Overseas corruption directly hurts U.S. businesses as they endeavor to expand internationally. U.S. workers are affected when corruption closes doors to our exports. In addition, the honest and hardworking citizens of countries stricken with corruption suffer as they are compelled to pay bribes to officials and other people in positions of power just to get the permits and licenses they need to get things done. The trade barrier created by corruption also limits the purchasing choices available to these people. Finally, many leading U.S. companies that are eager to invest and build factories overseas to produce consumer goods for consumption in those countries, often wisely choose not to do so because they are not willing to deal with the corruption they would encounter. Overall, honest and hardworking people living all around the world suffer as productive output is unjustly harmed. As the Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Commission, I am working to address the problem of corruption. In the 106th Congress, I chaired a Commission hearing that focused on the issues of bribery and corruption in the region of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. During this hearing, the Commission heard that, in economic terms, rampant corruption and organized crime in this vast region has cost U.S. businesses billions of dollars in lost contracts with direct implications for our economy. In addition, two years ago while attending the annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg, Russia, I had an opportunity to sit down with U.S. business representatives and learned, first-hand, about the many obstacles they face. Ironically, in some of the biggest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance--countries like Russia and Ukraine--the climate is either not conducive or outright hostile to American business. The time has come to stop providing aid as usual to those countries which line up to receive our assistance, only to turn around and fleece U.S. businesses conducting legitimate operations in these countries. For this reason, I am introducing the International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001 to require the State Department to submit a report and the President to certify by March 1 of each year that countries which are receiving U.S. foreign aid are, in fact, conducive to American businesses and investors. If a country is found to be hostile to American businesses, aid from the United States would be cut off. The certification would be specifically based on whether a country is making progress in, and is committed to, economic reform aimed at eliminating corruption. In fact, monitoring and measuring corruption, and the corresponding overall economic freedom, is nothing new. The Heritage Foundation regularly produces a comprehensive report entitled the “Index of Economic Freedom.” This year's 2001 report ranks 155 countries on the basis of 10 criteria, including “government intervention, foreign investment and black market.” While corruption is not identified individually in this report, you can bet there is a strong negative correlation between overall economic freedom and corruption. The more economic freedom you have, the less corruption you will have. It should be no surprise that the countries with the lowest levels of economic freedom are the very same countries that suffer from economic stagnation year after year. We owe it to the good people trapped in corrupt political systems to do what we can to help root out and get rid of this corruption. Under this bill, if the President certifies that a country's business climate is not conducive for U.S. businesses, that country will, in effect, be put on probation. The country would continue to receive U.S. foreign aid through that end of the fiscal year, but aid would be cut off on the first day of the next fiscal year unless the President certifies the country is making significant progress in implementing the specified economic indicators and is committed to recognizing the involvement of U.S. business. My bill also includes the customary waiver authority where the national interests of the United States are at stake. For countries certified as hostile to or not conducive for U.S. business, aid can continue if the President determines it is in the national security interest of the United States. However, the determination expires after six months unless the President determines its continuation is important to our national security interest. I also included a provision which would allow aid to continue to meet urgent humanitarian needs, including food, medicine, disaster and refugee relief, to support democratic political reform and rule of law activities, and to create private sector and non-governmental organizations that are independent of government control, or to develop a free market economic system. Instead of jumping on the bandwagon to pump millions of additional American tax dollars into countries which are hostile to U.S. businesses and investors, we should be working to root out the kinds of bribery and corruption that have an overall chilling effect on much needed foreign investment. Left unchecked, such corruption will continue to undermine fledgling democracies worldwide and further impede moves toward a genuine free market economy. I believe the legislation I am introducing today is a critical step this direction, and I urge my colleagues to support its passage. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 988 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “International Anti-Corruption Act of 2001”. SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. (a) REPORT AND CERTIFICATION.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a certification described in paragraph (2) and a report for each country that received foreign assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 during the fiscal year. The report shall describe the extent to which each such country is making progress with respect to the following economic indicators: (A) Implementation of comprehensive economic reform, based on market principles, private ownership, equitable treatment of foreign private investment, adoption of a legal and policy framework necessary for such reform, protection of intellectual property rights, and respect for contracts. (B) Elimination of corrupt trade practices by private persons and government officials. (C) Moving toward integration into the world economy. (2) CERTIFICATION.--The certification described in this paragraph means a certification as to whether, based on the economic indicators described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1), each country is-- (A) conducive to United States business; (B) not conducive to United States business; or (C) hostile to United States business. (b) LIMITATIONS ON ASSISTANCE.-- (1) COUNTRIES HOSTILE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.-- (A) GENERAL LIMITATION.--Beginning on the date the certification described in subsection (a) is submitted-- (i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to such subsection (a); and (ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in clause (i) has been made. (B) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as hostile to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is no longer hostile to United States business. (2) COUNTRIES NOT CONDUCIVE TO UNITED STATES BUSINESS.-- (A) PROBATIONARY PERIOD.--A country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a), shall be considered to be on probation beginning on the date of such certification. (B) REQUIRED IMPROVEMENT.--Unless the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a) and is committed to being conducive to United States business, beginning on the first day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which a country is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a)(2)-- (i) none of the funds made available for assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including unobligated balances of prior appropriations) may be made available for the government of such country; and (ii) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote against any loan or other utilization of the funds of such institution to or by any country with respect to which a certification described in subparagraph (A) has been made. (C) DURATION OF LIMITATIONS.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the limitations described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall apply with respect to a country that is certified as not conducive to United States business pursuant to subsection (a) until the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the country is making significant progress in implementing the economic indicators described in subsection (a)(1) and is conducive to United States business. (c) EXCEPTIONS.-- (1) NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to a country described in subsection (b) (1) or (2) if the President determines with respect to such country that making such funds available is important to the national security interest of the United States. Any such determination shall cease to be effective 6 months after being made unless the President determines that its continuation is important to the national security interest of the United States. (2) OTHER EXCEPTIONS.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to-- (A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs (including providing food, medicine, disaster, and refugee relief); (B) democratic political reform and rule of law activities; (C) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental organizations that are independent of government control; and (D) the development of a free market economic system. SEC. 3. TOLL-FREE NUMBER. The Secretary of Commerce shall make available a toll-free telephone number for reporting by members of the public and United States businesses on the progress that countries receiving foreign assistance are making in implementing the economic indicators described in section 2(a)(1). The information obtained from the toll-free telephone reporting shall be included in the report required by section 2(a). SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES.--The term “appropriate committees” means the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK.--The term “multilateral development bank” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

  • Human Rights Problems in Kazakhstan

    Mr. Speaker, I rise today to call attention to the lamentable human rights situation in Kazakhstan. On April 4, in a meeting with Kanat Saudabaev, Kazakhstan's new Ambassador to Washington, I welcomed his desire for cooperation and his willingness to improve his country's image, but I emphasized that Kazakhstan's reputation has indeed been badly tarnished and that concrete actions, not implausible pledges of democratization, were necessary. Considering the recent political trends in that important Central Asian country, I would like to share with my colleagues a number of the concerns I raised with Ambassador Saudabaev. As a Washington Post editorial pointed out on May 1, President Nursultan Nazarbaev has recently been intensifying his longstanding campaign of repression against the political opposition, independent media, and civil society. Especially alarming is the escalation in the level of brutality. In the last few months, several opposition activists have been assaulted. Platon Pak of the "Azamat'' Party was stabbed on February 7. Fortunate to survive, he said his attackers told him to "deliver their message to the head of his political party.'' On March 1, Ms. Gulzhan Yergalieva, the Deputy Head of the opposition "People's Congress of Kazakhstan'' and a well-known journalist, was--along with her husband and son--attacked and robbed in her home. Prior to these incidents, both opposition parties strongly criticized the Kazakh Government's running of an electoral reform working group. In late February, Alexandr Shushannikov, the chairman of the East Kazakhstan branch of the "Lad'' Slavic Movement, was beaten by unknown assailants in the town of Ust-Kamenogorsk. Less violent harassment of the opposition has continued unabated. Amirzhan Kosanov, the Acting Head of the Executive Committee of the opposition Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK), found threatening graffiti in the stairwells of his apartment building, on the doors of his apartment, and on neighboring buildings on March 17. Later that night, hooligans threw rocks at the windows of the apartment of Almira Kusainova, the RNPK's Press Secretary. In one case, a large rock shattered one of the windows. To add insult to injury, Mr. Kosanov has been barred from leaving Kazakhstan. He is the former Press Secretary of Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Kazakhstan's former Prime Minister and now the exiled head of the RNPK. Claiming Mr. Kosanov had access to "state secrets,'' the authorities have confiscated his passport--even though he had left Kazakhstan many times before. To round out the campaign against Mr. Kosanov, a series of articles and reports in pro-government media have accused him of adultery and pedophilia. In addition, Pyotr Afanasenko and Satzhan lbrayev, two RNPK members who were Mr. Kazhegeldin's bodyguards, were sentenced in April 2000 to three years in prison for a weapons offense; an appeals court upheld the convictions. The OSCE Center in Almaty has stated that it considers the charges to be political in nature. Moreover, these two individuals, as former members of the security forces, should be in special prisons instead of being incarcerated among the general prison population, where they are in danger. Along with the targeting of opposition activists, the ongoing crackdown on freedom of the press has continued. Most media outlets have long been under the direct or indirect control of Mr. Bapi, who was sentenced to one year in jail and ordered to pay $280 in court expenses, was immediately pardoned under a presidential amnesty. Still, his conviction remains on the books, which will prevent him from traveling abroad, among other restrictions. Mr. Bapi is appealing the verdict. As for Mr. Gabdullin, the prosecutor's office issued a press release on April 6 stating that it had dropped the case against him due to "the absence of [a] crime,'' although his newspaper has not yet received formal confirmation. While both editors are currently at liberty, as the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) points out, their newspapers cannot publish in Kazakhstan because local printers will not risk angering local officials. In an April 17 letter to President Nazarbaev, CPJ concluded that "we remain deeply concerned about your government's frequent use of politically-motivated criminal charges to harass opposition journalists'' and called on him "to create an atmosphere in which all journalists may work without fear of reprisal.'' Apart from intimidating individual journalists and publications, Kazakhstan's authorities have taken legal action to restrict freedom of speech. The country's Senate on April 17 approved a draft media law that limits the retransmission of foreign programs and will also subject Internet web pages to the same controls as print media. Moreover, media outlets can be held responsible for news not obtained from official sources. In other words, if the New York Times or CNN runs stories Kazakhstan's leadership finds distasteful, Kazakh media outlets risk legal sanction for re-running those reports. Considering the ongoing investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice into high-level corruption in Kazakhstan, it is easy to draw inferences about what kinds of stories the authorities would eagerly spike. Indeed, although Mr. Gabdullin and Bapi were formally prosecuted for articles in their newspapers, both had also previously signed an open letter, published in the January 15 edition of Roll Call, expressing their support for the investigation. Mr. Speaker, Kazakh authorities have also stepped up harassment of NGOs. The OSCE Center in Almaty, the Washington-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Internews-Kazakhstan had jointly organized public forums in 9 regions of Kazakhstan to educate local citizens, media, and interested parties about the proposed amendments to the media law. After the law's passage, local organizers of these Forums on Mass Media were called in to the Procuracy for "conversations.'' Other government agencies which took part in this intimidation were the Tax Police and the Financial Police. According to OSCE sources, the authorities offered local NGOs "friendly'' advice about not working with the OSCE and NDI. In Atyrau, one NGO contacted by the Financial Police did not even participate in these forums but that did not stop the police from sending a written request. Finally, Mr. Speaker, to round out a very depressing picture, Kazakhstan's parliament is reportedly working towards the adoption of amendments to the law on religion that will severely limit freedom of conscience. The draft provisions would require at least 50 members for a religious association to be registered (the law currently requires 10). In order to engage in "missionary activity,'' which would involve merely sharing religious beliefs with others, individuals--citizens or not--would have to be registered with the government, and religious activity would be permitted only at the site of a religious organization, which could bar meetings in rented facilities or even private homes. Violation of these provisions could lead to a sentence of one-year in prison or even two years of ``corrective labor,'' and to the closing of religious organizations. These draft amendments to the religion law were introduced in Kazakhstan's parliament in early April. According to the U.S. Embassy in Almaty, no date has been scheduled for discussion of the legislation though it is expected the measure will be considered before the current session ends in June. The U.S. Government, the OSCE, and other international agencies have expressed concern about the possible restriction of religious liberty, and there is reason to fear the worst. In recent months, the attitude underlying these draft amendments has already had a real impact on believers. American citizens who did humanitarian work in several cities in Kazakhstan have been harassed, intimidated and eventually deported. The formal cause of their expulsion was violation of administrative regulations but one official told an American the real reason was because they were Christians. In one particularly brutal, ugly case, Americans who had been told to leave the country were preparing to do so when the authorities brought them back from the airport so they could be videotaped for TV broadcasts portraying them as engaging in various sorts of subversive activities. An American family preparing to leave Ust-Kamenorgorsk was harassed by a Kazakh security official who threatened to spend the entire night in their tiny apartment to make sure they left. It took several hours before he could be persuaded to leave, despite the fact that his presence was frightening a pregnant American woman. Jehovah's Witnesses have also reported stepped-up harassment and intimidation. Over the past few months, central and local media have been attacking Jehovah's Witnesses, who are depicted as religious extremists. In one bizarre case, according to the Witnesses, a television station broadcast video footage of Islamic terrorists, who were described as Jehovah's Witnesses, as well as footage of a police raid on a meeting held in a private home. Kazakhstan's new Administrative Violation Code, which went into effect in February, allows the suspension or prohibition of religious organizations for evading registration or for violating assembly rules. This has already been used to suspend the activity of a group of Jehovah's Witnesses in Kyzyl-Orda. A similar case is pending in Taraz. Just today, May 16, Keston News Service reports that authorities have declared a Baptist church in the town of Kulsary (Atyrau region) illegal and ordered it to stop all meetings, claiming that it may not function until it is registered. In fact, Kazakh law does not ban activity by religious communities without registration, but the regional prosecutor upheld the ban. Church leaders intend to appeal the decision, but local lawyers are afraid to take such a case. Keston further reports that on April 10, the authorities in Kyzylorda fined a Baptist church 7,750 tenge (about $53) and suspended its activities until it obtains registration. In February, police had raided a Kazakh-language service at that church, demanding that participants show their identity documents and write statements about the gathering. They confiscated religious writings in Kazakh and Russian, and took five people, including the leader of the service, Erlan Sarsenbaev, to the police station. According to the Baptists, the police told them "During the Soviet times, believers like you were shot. Now you are feeling at peace, but we will show you.'' When Sarsenbaev refused to write a statement, police officers "began to hit him on his neck, abdomen and head with a plastic bottle filled with water.'' Finally, they forged his signature, and wrote the statement on his behalf. As President Bush recently said, "the newly independent republics of Central Asia impose troubling limits on religious expression and missionary work.'' This trend in Kazakhstan is especially disturbing because despite the consistent consolidation of presidential power and general crackdown on opposition and dissent, relative religious freedom had been one of the bright spots. It seems this bright spot is about to disappear. Mr. Speaker, a few weeks ago, Erlan Idrisov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, visited Washington. In his public speaking engagements, he focused on Kazakhstan's emphasis on stability and its desire for good relations with its neighbors. These are understandable priorities which the United States has every reason to support. But Minister Idrisov simply discounted charges of human rights problems, arguing on May 2 at the Carnegie Endowment that the above-mentioned Washington Post editorial is "not the final word'' on the human rights situation in his country. Minister Idrisov may disagree with any Washington Post editorial, if he likes. But when you consider many other sources, such as the State Department's report on human rights practices, the Committee to Protect Journalists (which last year named President Nazarbaev one of the world's ten worst enemies of the media), and the OSCE Center in Almaty, the overall impression is clear and indisputable. Despite official Kazakh claims about progress, the human rights situation is poor and threatens to get worse. If President Nazarbaev wants to change that impression and convince people that he is sincere about wanting to democratize his country, he must take concrete steps to do so. The time is long past when we could take his assurances at face value.  

  • Eightieth Anniversary of the Birthday of Dr. Andrei Sakharov

    Mr. Speaker, today I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues the 80th anniversary of the birth of the late Dr. Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, one of the truly great figures in the struggle for human rights in the 20th century. On May 21 of this year, Dr. Sakharov would have celebrated his 80th birthday. A brilliant physicist, Dr. Andrei Sakharov enjoyed the respect of his colleagues and the material privileges provided by Soviet officialdom for his work in helping to develop the Soviet atomic bomb. He could easily have continued to enjoy his elevated status in Soviet society, but his conscience would not permit it. He became deeply convinced that the arms race was pointless and a threat to mankind. When he protested privately to Soviet authorities, he was ignored. In 1968, Dr. Sakharov circulated his groundbreaking essay entitled, “Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Co-Existence and Intellectual Freedom,” in which he drew the connection between human rights and international security. For this challenge to the system, he was barred from military research, and when he continued to protest, he was fired from his work.   In 1975, Dr. Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but Soviet authorities would not allow him to travel to Oslo to receive the award. In January 1980, without any legal procedure, let alone a trial, Dr. Sakharov was picked up on the streets of Moscow by KGB agents and spirited off to exile in the city of Gorky. At the same time, the Kremlin, under the leadership of former KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, launched a crackdown on Soviet dissidents. In 1984, Dr. Sakharov's wife, Dr. Elena Bonner, was convicted of “defaming the Soviet political and social system” and sentenced to join him in exile. Even in these dark hours, Dr. Sakharov, continued to speak out against the war being carried out by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, to defend persecuted human rights activists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and to address vital issues of disarmament and peace. On three occasions, Dr. Sakharov went on a hunger strike to protest the mistreatment of his friends and colleagues in the human rights movement. During his confinement, his notes and his manuscripts were stolen from him by KGB thugs. President Reagan declared his sixtieth birthday, May 21, 1980, “Andrei Sakharov Day.” In December 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev lifted Dr. Sakharov's exile and “invited” him to return to Moscow. In 1989, Dr. Sakharov was elected to the Congress of People Deputies, an organization that had previously been the rubber stamp legislature for the Soviet Union. In the short time that he served, Dr. Sakharov joined a handful of other elected leaders to press for real reforms in the Soviet Union.   On December 14, 1989, the world was saddened to learn of this great man's death. In its coverage of ``the 100 Most Important People of the 20th Century,'' Time magazine noted that, “By the time of his death in 1989, this humble physicist had influenced the spread of democratic ideals throughout the communist world. His moral challenge to tyranny, his faith in the individual and the power of reason, his courage in the face of denunciation and, finally, house arrest--made him a hero to ordinary citizens everywhere.'' Although Andrei Sakharov has passed on and the Soviet Union is no more, the issues that he and his colleagues confronted still challenge us today. “Small wars,” like the bloody conflict in Chechnya, have replaced the big Cold War. Human rights continue to be violated. Arms control and security issues are high on the agenda. Several years ago, Dr. Bonner bequeathed Dr. Sakharov's papers to an American university bearing the name of one of our country's greatest jurists--Justice Louis Brandeis. This is a priceless gift not only to Brandeis, but to our entire nation. A generation of young people who have grown up since the fall of the Soviet Union, will be able to study Dr. Sakharov's writings on civic responsibility, non-violence, ethnic and religious intolerance, and other aspects of human rights and what we now call the human dimension. Mr. Speaker, on this, the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Andrei Sakharov, I urge Americans young and old to acquaint themselves with Dr. Sakharov's struggle for peace and human dignity, and to support educational efforts such as the Sakharov archive at Brandeis to preserve the legacy of an intellectual and humanitarian giant of the 20th century.

  • Resolution on Kalmyk Settlement in America

    Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a resolution congratulating the Kalmyk people in the United States on the fiftieth anniversary of their settlement in this country. The resolution also encourages continuing scholarly and educational exchanges between the Russian Federation and the United States to encourage better understanding and appreciation of the Kalmyk people and their contributions to the history and culture of both countries. The Kalmyks were originally an ethnic Mongolian nomadic people who have inhabited the Russian steppes for around 400 years. The present Kalmyk Republic of the Russian Federation is located north of the Caspian Sea in southern Russia. During World War II, the Kalmyk people were one of the seven “punished peoples'' exiled en masse by Stalin to “special settlements'' in Siberia and Central Asia for allegedly collaborating with the Nazis. There were about 170,000 deportees. After World War II, several hundred Kalmyks who managed to escape the Soviet Union were held in Displaced Persons camps in Germany. For several years, they were not allowed to emigrate to the United States because of prejudice against their Mongolian ethnicity. However, on July 28, 1951, the Attorney General of the United States issued a ruling which cleared the way for the Kalmyk people in the Displaced Persons camps in Germany to enter the United States. In the fifty years since their arrival, the Kalmyk emigres and their descendants have survived and prospered. Moreover, they are the first community of Tibetan Buddhists to settle in the United States. While adapting to much of America's diverse and modern culture, the Kalmyk have also sought to preserve their own unique traditions. Many continue to practice the Tibetan Buddhist religion. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kalmyk community of the United States has been able to re-establish contact with the Kalmyk people in the Russian Federation. For the past ten years, a wide exchange has been developed between relatives, students and professionals. Mr. Speaker, our country is so much richer for the presence of our Kalmyk-American citizens. I urge my colleagues to join me and my colleagues Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Pitts, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Wamp, and Mr. Hastings, in congratulating the Kalmyk-American community on the fiftieth anniversary of their settlement in the United States by cosponsoring and supporting this resolution.

  • Ukraine at the Crossroads: Ten Years After Independence

    This hearing discussed Ukraine’s future, given its pervasive, high-level corruption, the controversial conduct of authorities in the Gongadze investigation, and ongoing human rights problems. Commissioners and witnesses mentioned how these issues discouraged foreign investment and expressed a desire on behalf of the U.S. Congress for the country to succeed as an independent, democratic, stable, and economically successful state.  Commissioners and witnesses discussed how the United States could best help Ukraine achieve this.

  • Ukraine at the Crossroads: Ten Years After Independence

    The rationale of this hearing, which Sen. Benjamin Nighthorse Campbell presided over, was increasing concern as to Ukraine’s trajectory. More specifically, pervasive, high-level corruption, the controversial conduct of authorities in the Gongadze investigation, and ongoing human rights problems had raised legitimate questions concerning the directions that Ukraine had appeared to be headed. Needless to say, the relationship between the CSCE and Ukraine has been an important one. It was against this backdrop of rampant corruption, which Campbell said discouraged foreign investment, a desire on behalf of the U.S. Congress for the country to succeed as an independent, democratic, stable, and economically successful state, and the recent anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster that the Commission examined how the U.S. could best help Ukraine in the development of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and a market economy.

  • International Roma Day Revisited

    Mr. Speaker, on International Roma Day last year, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities released a detailed report on the situation of Roma in the OSCE region. Unfortunately, in the intervening months, relatively little progress has been made by government authorities in addressing the problems he described. The Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair, receives so many reports on an almost daily basis which demonstrate the magnitude of the problems Roma face. We receive reports of Roma who are denied access to public places, like the three Roma who were turned away from a Warsaw restaurant last September 29, just before the OSCE convened its annual human rights meeting in that city. We receive reports of discrimination in housing, like the January 27 Hungarian television report that local authorities in Rabakoez, Hungary, have called for prohibiting the sale of real estate to Roma. We receive reports of police abuse, such as the repeated cases of unlawful police raids in Hermanovce, Slovakia. We receive reports of violent attacks, such as the assault on a Romani church in Leskovac, Serbia, at the beginning of this year. Too often, courts are part of the problem, not the solution. Rather than providing a remedy for victims, they compound the abuse. Take a recent case from the Czech Republic. The Czech Supreme Court issued a ruling that a violent attack on a Romani man in 1999 was premeditated and organized, and then remanded the case back to the district court in Jesenik for sentencing in accordance with that finding. But the district court simply ignored the Supreme Court's finding and ordered four of the defendants released. I am hopeful that Slovak courts, which are currently weighing the fate of three of the defendants charged in last year’s brutal murder of Anastazia Balazova, will do a better job of bringing her murderers to justice. In a few places, there are some glimmers of hope. In Viden, Bulgaria, for example, the Romani organization Drom has led a successful effort to bring 400 Romani children, who previously attended segregated schools, into the mainstream school system. In that instance, the cooperation of local and national authorities, governmental and non-governmental bodies, is paying off. Unfortunately, too few government leaders demonstrate the courage necessary to address these issues. Some pass the buck, looking to the European Union or the Council of Europe to fix problems that must be tackled, first and foremost, through political leadership at home. Moreover, a number of EU countries have little to teach the applicant countries about tolerance towards Roma. Many OSCE countries, not just the former Communist states, are in need of comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, a priority recognized in the 1999 OSCE summit agreement and by the European Commission in the adoption of its “race directive” in June of last year. Regrettably, nearly two years after Bulgaria received praise from many quarters for agreeing to adopt such legislation; the government is not one step closer to fulfilling its commitment. The Slovak Government's human rights office, in contrast, has undertaken a serious study of legislative options and may soon have a draft ready for a vote. In addition, it is imperative that political and civic leaders condemn anti-Roma manifestations in clear and unequivocal terms. Mr. Speaker, when the Mayor of Csor, Hungary, a publicly elected official, said “the Roma of Zamoly have no place among human beings; just as in the animal world, parasites must be expelled,” I believe it is the responsibility of Hungary's political leadership to condemn these outrageous slurs. If more leadership was demonstrated, perhaps confidence would have been strengthened and maybe 5,772 Hungarian Roma would not have applied for asylum in Canada over the past three years. When the Mayor of Usti nad Labem built a wall to segregate Roma from non-Roma, all members of the Czech parliament, not just a paper slim majority of 101 out of 200 MPs, should have voted to condemn it. And when Mayor Sechelariu of Bacau, Romania, announced plans to build a statue of Marshall Antonescu, the World War II dictator who deported 25,000 Roma to Transniestra, where some 19,000 of them perished, Romanian officials, who have pledged to the OSCE community to fight intolerance, should begin at home by ridding their country of every Antonescu statue built on public land.

  • Freedom of the Media in Russia

    Mr. Speaker, I participated recently in a Congressional delegation to Russia, led by my friend CURT WELDON, where we met with government officials and others to assess the economic and political situation in that country and the state of U.S.-Russian relations. As Co-Chairman of the Duma-Congress Study Group on which I serve with Mr. WELDON, and as former Chairman and Ranking Member of the Helsinki Commission, I have traveled to Russia and the former Soviet Union frequently since the early 1980s. We are encouraged by Russia's continued progress, however tentative it may appear at times, towards becoming a democratic state that guarantees the inalienable rights, including religious freedom and respect for human rights and the rule of law, of all its citizens. That is why it is disturbing to see an important tenet of democracy--freedom of the media--being threatened by federal government actions and by local officials as well. The seriousness of this problem has been addressed by both the Clinton and Bush Administrations and has received widespread attention in the Western press, including recent editorials in The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post. In Moscow, we were briefed by Ambassador Jim Collins, who told us about the threats to the media, particularly NTV and its holding company, Media Most, and we also met with Evgeny Kiselev, head of NTV--the only independently operated television station in Russia--who described incidents of harassment and intimidation directed against himself and other NTV personnel. Moreover, as we have seen in the past, journalists in Russia are under threat of physical attacks, even murder, at the hands of unknown assailants if they offend the wrong people with their reporting Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2000, just sent to the Congress by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, as required by law. It is a valuable document that assesses human rights conditions, country by country, around the world and has proven a reliable source of information for Members to better understand how individual governments treat their own citizens. The section on Russia, which covers 45 pages, states that the government ``generally respected the human rights of its citizens in many areas,'' but that ``serious problems remain, including independence and freedom of the media. . . .'' The report goes on to state ``Federal, regional, and local governments continued to exert pressure on journalists by: initiating investigations by the federal tax police, FSB, and MVD of media companies such as independent Media-Most. . . .'' The report also provides an account of the government harassment of and threats to Mr. Vladimir Goussinsky, founder and chairman of Media-Most, which owns NTV, and his arrest and detention in a Moscow prison. Today, Mr. Goussinsky is confined in Spain, awaiting the disposition of a Russian prosecutor's request for extradition, as Kremlin authorities have been engaged in a series of actions to shut down the country's only privately owned television station, or have it taken over by a government-controlled company. Sadly, Mr. Speaker, these efforts have come to fruition today. Press reports indicate that, in an apparent boardroom coup, the current NTV board, including Mr. Goussinsky, was ousted by the Russian gas firm Gazprom, which says it owns a controlling stake of the station. Mr. Kiselev has been replaced by an associate of the Gazprom directors. Russia's only two other nationwide television stations, ORT and RTR, are already controlled by the government. Mr. Speaker, I urge the government of the Russian Federation to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law by guaranteeing and supporting media pluralism and independence in Russia. Clearly, the foundation of a free and democratic society is a well informed citizenry. That foundation crumbles when freedom of speech and freedom of the media are suppressed. I also urge my colleagues to review the State Department's report on human rights conditions, particularly the section on Russia.

  • Draft Law on Religion Threatens Freedom in Kazakhstan

    Mr. Speaker, I rise to voice concern about attempts underway in Kazakhstan to limit freedom of religion. Currently, several drafts of amendments to that country's 1992 law on religion are under consideration. In the view of the Keston News Service, one of the world's most respected organizations on religious liberty, the passage and implementation of these amendments would move Kazakhstan into the ranks of former Soviet republics with the ``harshest climate for religious freedom.'' Draft amendments to the religion law have surfaced in October 2000, as well as in January and February of this year. Oddly, they lack any indication of origin, which allows government officials to decline to comment on them. It seems clear, however, that the drafts in January and February did not include some of the most onerous and egregious earlier provisions, perhaps in response to criticism. Nevertheless, what remains is more than enough to evoke serious concern. For example, Amendment 5 of the January and February drafts prohibits ``the activity of religious sects in the Republic of Kazakhstan.'' Amendment 16 bans ``the preparation, preservation and distribution of literature, cine-photo- and video-products and other materials containing ideas of religious extremism and reactionary fundamentalism.'' Amendment 11 of the February version introduces the provision that the charter of all religious organizations “is subject to registration.” Furthermore, Amendment 6 of the February draft would permit citizens of Kazakhstan, ``foreign citizens and persons without citizenship'' to conduct missionary activity in Kazakhstan “only with the permission of the competent state organ.” The drafts also introduce harsh penalties for conducting missionary activity without permission. January's version stipulates fines ranging between two and five month's wages, or up to one year corrective labor, or up to two months in jail. The February draft strengthens these draconian provisions: those convicted could be sentenced to two years of corrective labor, up to six months arrest, or deprivation of freedom for up to one year. Amendment 10 of the February draft would give the state enormous power over religious practice by the people of Kazakhastan--the activity of foreign religious organizations on the territory of Kazakhstan, “as well as the appointment of leaders of religious organizations in the Republic by foreign religious centers must take place with the agreement of the corresponding state organs.” Moreover, Amendment 11 requires Islamic religious groups to ``present a document confirming their affiliation with the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Kazakhstan.'' To quote Keston News Service, “Any requirement that registration be made compulsory would violate Kazakhstan's international human rights commitments, as would a ban on missionary activity and a requirement for state involvement in the selection of leaders for any religious group.” Because these drafts have been ``unofficial,'' even local representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Almaty have been unable to obtain any official texts. Nevertheless, on March 6, the head of OSCE center, Herbert Salber, communicated his concerns to the chairman of Kazakhstan's Senate (the upper chamber) of parliament. Mr. Salber described the drafts as having “masses of shortcomings” and running “counter to international legal norms.” Mr. Speaker, if these draft amendments to the religion law are passed, the effect could be to make only Islam and Russian Orthodoxy the permitted religions in Kazakhstan. Other faiths and religious organizations would be severely restricted if not actually outlawed. It appears that attempts are being made to pass this legislation on March 16, 2001 without even a public reading. Mr. Speaker, I hope the Bush administration will join me in conveying to the leaders of Kazakhstan that we are deeply concerned by this initiative to turn the clock back and to limit the rights of religious believers in Kazakhstan.

  • Serbia-Otpor Organization

    Mr. Speaker, a few weeks ago I had the opportunity to meet five representatives from the independent, non-governmental organization Otpor. “Otpor,” in Serbian, means ``resistance,'' and the organization was founded in the mid-1990s by students from Belgrade University and elsewhere in Serbia, who had enough of Slobodan Milosevic's choke-hold on the neck of Serbian society. Their efforts have forged a strong bond between idealism and realism. Otpor members engaged in passive resistance, never advocating violence nor returning the blows they received from the police and other thugs under Milosevic's control. Instead, they had a stronger determination and persistence. Fear would not keep them from putting up their posters, from wearing their black-and-white emblem of a clenched fist. Moreover, they kept their eye on the goal of a democratic and tolerant Serbia at peace with its neighbors and with itself. The organization appointed no specific leader, in a strategy to thwart any attempt to compromise the individual--they had learned the lesson from observing the many opposition politicians in Serbia who had been compromised. During the past two years, more than 1,500 Otpor activists, of about 50,000 based in over 10 Serbian cities, were arrested and interrogated by security forces under Milosevic's control. One of the five who visited my office had himself been arrested on 17 occasions.   Prior to the September 2000 elections, Otpor worked closely with the democratic political opposition, independent trade unions, NGOs and other youth groups to mobilize voters. Otpor's activists played a crucial role in the street demonstrations that began immediately following the elections and led to Milosevic's downfall. The impressive delegation of five Otpor activists visiting Washington included Slobodan Homen, Nenad Konstantinovic, Jovan Ratkovic, Jelena Urosevic and Robertino Knjur, all in their mid- to late-20s and very good English speakers. It is amazing to realize that they all grew up in the cruel, hateful and impoverished world Slobodan Milosevic had created for them in the 1990s. In the meeting, they provided one piece of very good news. One Otpor activist, Boris Karajcic, had testified in 1998 before the Helsinki Commission which I co-chair and was beaten up on the streets of Belgrade a few weeks later. Today, Boris is a member of the Serbian parliament. He is an active part of Serbia's future. Otpor itself will also be part of Serbia's future. While Milosevic is out of power, there is much to be done to recover from the nightmare he created.   First, they are investigating and compiling complaints about the police officers who brutalized them and other citizens of Serbia who opposed the regime, and they will seek to ensure that officers who seemed to take a particular delight in beating people for exercising their rights are held accountable. They want to see Milosevic himself arrested, both for his crimes in Serbia and the war crimes for which he faces an international indictment. The Otpor group also advocates the founding of a school of public administration, which does not exist in Serbia and is desperately needed as the government bureaucracies are swollen with Milosevic cronies who have no idea how to implement public policy. Along similar lines, they hope to begin an anti-corruption campaign. Finally, they pointed out that, with the fall of Milosevic, the united opposition now in power has no credible, democratic political opposition to it. Until Serbian politics develop further, they intend to serve some of that role, being a watchdog of the new leaders.   In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, the Otpor group with which I met has a track record of accomplishment, ideas for the future, and a good sense of how to bring those ideas into reality. While they have had the heart and the courage, they also have had the assistance of the United States through the National Endowment of Democracy and other organizations which promote democratic development abroad. I hope my colleagues will continue to support this kind of assistance, for Serbia and other countries where it is needed, which serves not only the interests of the United States but the cause of humanity.

  • Elections in Azerbaijan

    Mr. Speaker, on November 5, parliamentary elections were held in Azerbaijan. In anticipation of those elections, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, held hearings in May, at which representatives of the government and opposition leaders testified. While the former pledged that Baku would conduct a democratic contest, in accordance with OSCE standards, the latter warned that Azerbaijan's past record of holding seriously flawed elections required the strictest vigilance from the international community and pressure from Western capitals and the Council of Europe, to which Azerbaijan has applied for membership. Subsequently, I introduced a resolution, H. Con. Res. 382, which called on the Government of Azerbaijan to hold free and fair elections and to accept the recommended amendments by the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to the law on elections.   From the start, there was pressure to withdraw the resolution from the Azerbaijani government and others. They argued that President Aliev had made, or would make, the necessary changes to ensure that the election met international standards, claiming to render the resolution either irrelevant or out of date. That pressure intensified as the election drew near; in fact, the resolution never came to a vote before Congress went out of session in early November.   It is worth recalling this brief history in light of what actually happened during Azerbaijan's pre-election period and on November 5. With respect to the election law, one of ODIHR's concerns was ultimately addressed by a decision of Azerbaijan's constitutional court, but on other important issues, Baku rejected any concessions and refused to incorporate ODIHR's suggested changes. From the beginning, therefore, the election could not have met OSCE standards, as ODIHR made plain in several statements. During the registration period, the Central Election Commission (CEC) rejected several leading opposition parties. Claiming that government experts could tell which signatures were forged, fraudulent or otherwise invalid merely on the basis of a visual examination, the CEC maintained the Musavat and the Azerbaijan Democratic Party had failed to get 50,000 valid signatures. The same thing happened to Musavat in the 1995 parliamentary election. At that time, the OSCE/UN observation mission emphasized the need to amend or get rid of this obviously flawed method of determining the validity of signatures, but Azerbaijan's authorities did not heed that advice. The exclusion of leading opposition parties drew strong criticism, both inside and outside the country, including the OSCE and the U.S. Government.   In early October, in apparent reaction to international concern, President Aliev “appealed” to the CEC to find some way of registering excluded opposition parties. Some CEC members objected, arguing there was no constitutional basis for such a presidential appeal or a changed CEC ruling, but the Commission moved to include opposition parties. Though their participation certainly broadened the choice available to voters, the manner of their inclusion demonstrated conclusively that President Aliev controlled the entire election process. ODIHR welcomed the decision by the CEC and urged a reconsideration of the exclusion of over 400 individual candidates, about half of those who tried to run in single-mandate districts. But the CEC did not do so, and only in very few cases were previously excluded candidates allowed to run. As 100 of parliament's 125 seats were determined in single mandate districts, where local authorities exercise considerable power, the rejection of over 400 candidates signaled the government's determination to decide the outcome of the vote.   Though coverage of the campaign on state media favored the ruling party, opposition leaders were able to address voters on television. They used the opportunity, which they had not enjoyed for years, to criticize President Aliev and offer an alternative vision of governing the country. Their equal access to the media marked progress with respect to previous elections, as noted in the ODIHR's election report.   However, this voting and vote count on election day itself, according to the ODIHR's election, would be bad enough, considering that the election was the fourth since 1995 that failed to meet OSCE standards, even if some progress was registered in opposition participation and representation in the CEC. Much more interesting and disturbing, however, were the words used in a post-election press conference by two key international observers: Gerard Stoudman, the Director of ODIHR, who generally employs measured, diplomatic language, said he had not expected to witness “a crash course in various types of manipulation,” and actually used the phrase “primitive falsification” to describe what he had seen. Andreas Gross, the head of the observer delegation of the Council of Europe, an organization to which Azerbaijan has applied for membership and which is not particularly known for hard-hitting assessments of election shenanigans, amplified: “Despite the positive changes observed in Azerbaijan in recent years, the scale of the infringements doesn't fit into any framework. We've never seen anything like it.”   Mr. Speaker, in the context of international election observation, such a brutally candid assessment is simply stunning. As far as I know, representatives of ODIHR or the Council of Europe have never expressed themselves in such terms about an election that they decided to monitor. One senses that the harshness of their judgment is related to their disappointment: Azerbaijan's authorities had promised to conduct free and fair elections and had long negotiated with the ODIHR and the Council of Europe about the legal framework and administrative modalities but, in the end, held an election that can only be described as an embarrassment to all concerned. According to Azerbaijan's CEC, in the party list voting, only four parties passed the six-percent threshold for parliamentary representation: President Aliev's governing party, the New Azerbaijan Party; the Communist Party; and two opposition parties, the Popular Front (Reformers) and Civil Solidarity. Other important opposition parties allegedly failed to break the barrier and apart from a few single mandate seats won no representation in parliament. In the aftermath of the election and the assessments of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe, the international legitimacy of Azerbaijan's legislature is severely undermined. Within Azerbaijan, the ramifications are no better.   All the leading opposition parties have accused the authorities of massive vote fraud, denounced the election results, and have refused to take the few seats in parliament they were given. Though some governing party representatives have claimed that opposition representation is not necessary for the parliament to function normally, others, perhaps including President Aliev, understand that a parliament without opposition members is ruinous for Azerbaijan's image. New elections are slated in 11 districts, and perhaps President Aliev is hoping to tempt some opposition parties to abandon their boycott by offering a few more seats. Whether opposition parties, which are bitterly divided, will participate or eventually agree to take up their deputies' mandates remains to be seen. What is clearer from the conduct of the election and its outcome is that President Aliev, who is preparing the succession of his son as Azerbaijan's next president, was determined to keep opposition leaders out of parliament and ensure that the body as a whole is supportive of his heir. If the only way to guarantee the desired outcome was wholesale vote fraud, so be it.   Prognoses of possible accommodation with the opposition, or possibly even some power sharing arrangements, to facilitate a smooth and peaceful transfer of power, have proved unfounded. Indeed, President Aliev reportedly has told the new UK Ambassador to Baku that Azerbaijan does not need to join the Council of Europe, indicating that he is not prepared to make any concessions when it comes to maintaining his grip on power and passing it on to his chosen heir, whatever the international community thinks. Even more worrisome is that by depriving the opposition of the possibility to contend for power through parliamentary means, Aliev has seriously reduced the chances of a “soft landing” in Azerbaijan. When he eventually leaves the scene, anything could happen. This is not only a frightening prospect for the citizens of Azerbaijan, its neighbors and hopes for resolving regional disputes, especially the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is a scenario that should alarm policymakers in Washington as well.   Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention to say “I told you so” to those colleagues who argued against my resolution. I would much have preferred to make a statement congratulating Azerbaijan on having held exemplary elections and making substantial steps towards democratization. Alas, I cannot do so, which should sadden and concern all of us. But I fear the consequences will be far more serious for the citizens of Azerbaijan.

  • Voicing Concern About Serious Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Most States of Central Asia

    Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 397) voicing concern about serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in most states of Central Asia, including substantial noncompliance with their Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) commitments on democratization and the holding of free and fair elections, as amended. The Clerk read as follows: H. Con. Res. 397 Whereas the states of Central Asia--Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--have been participating states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since 1992 and have freely accepted all OSCE commitments, including those concerning human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; Whereas the Central Asian states, as OSCE participating states, have affirmed that every individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, expression, association, peaceful assembly and movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and if charged with an offense the right to a fair and public trial; Whereas the Central Asian states, as OSCE participating states, have committed themselves to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government, and are obligated to hold free elections at reasonable intervals, to respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office without discrimination, to respect the right of individuals and groups to establish in full freedom their own political parties, and to allow parties and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process access to the media on a nondiscriminatory basis; Whereas the general trend of political development in Central Asia has been the emergence of presidents far more powerful than other branches of government, all of whom have refused to allow genuine electoral challenges, postponed or canceled elections, excluded serious rivals from participating in elections, or otherwise contrived to control the outcome of elections; Whereas several leaders and governments in Central Asia have crushed nascent political parties, or refused to register opposition parties, and have imprisoned and used violence against, or exiled, opposition figures; Whereas in recent weeks fighting has erupted between government troops of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Whereas Central Asian governments have the right to defend themselves from internal and external threats posed by insurgents, radical religious groups, and other anti-democratic elements which employ violence as a means of political struggle; Whereas the actions of the Central Asian governments have tended to exacerbate these internal and external threats by domestic repression, which has left few outlets for individuals and groups to vent grievances or otherwise participate legally in the political process; Whereas in Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev dissolved parliament in 1993 and again in 1995, when he also annulled scheduled Presidential elections, and extended his tenure in office until 2000 by a deeply flawed referendum; Whereas on January 10, 1999, President Nazarbaev was reelected in snap Presidential elections from which a leading challenger was excluded for having addressed an unregistered organization, `For Free Elections,' and the OSCE assessed the election as falling far short of international standards; Whereas Kazakhstan's October 1999 parliamentary election, which featured widespread interference in the process by the authorities, fell short of OSCE standards, according to the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); Whereas Kazakhstan's parliament on June 22, 2000, approved draft legislation designed to give President Nazarbaev various powers and privileges for the rest of his life; Whereas independent media in Kazakhstan, which used to be fairly free, have been pressured, co-opted, or crushed, leaving few outlets for the expression of independent or opposition views, thus limiting the press's ability to criticize or comment on the President's campaign to remain in office indefinitely or on high-level corruption; Whereas the Government of Kazakhstan has initiated, under OSCE auspices, roundtable discussions with representatives of some opposition parties and public organizations designed to remedy the defects of electoral legislation and now should increase the input in those discussions from opposition parties and public organizations that favor a more comprehensive national dialogue; Whereas opposition parties can function in Kyrgyzstan and parliament has in the past demonstrated some independence from President Askar Akaev and his government; Whereas 3 opposition parties in Kyrgyzstan were excluded from fielding party lists and serious opposition candidates were not allowed to contest the second round of the February-March 2000 parliamentary election, or were prevented from winning their races by official interference, as cited by the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); Whereas a series of flagrantly politicized criminal cases after the election against opposition leaders and the recent exclusion on questionable linguistic grounds of other would-be candidates have raised grave concerns about the fairness of the election process and the prospects for holding a fair Presidential election on October 29, 2000; Whereas independent and opposition-oriented media in Kyrgyzstan have faced serious constraints, including criminal lawsuits by government officials for alleged defamation; Whereas in Tajikistan, a civil war in the early 1900s caused an estimated 50,000 people to perish, and a military stalemate forced President Imomaly Rakhmonov in 1997 to come to terms with Islamic and democratic opposition groups and agree to a coalition government; Whereas free and fair elections and other democratic steps in Tajikistan offer the best hope of reconciling government and opposition forces, overcoming the legacy of the civil war, and establishing the basis for civil society; Whereas President Rakhmonov was reelected in November 1999 with 96 percent of the vote in an election the OSCE did not observe because of the absence of conditions that would permit a fair contest; Whereas the first multiparty election in the history of Tajikistan was held in February-March 2000, with the participation of former warring parties, but the election fell short of OSCE commitments and 11 people, including a prominent candidate, were killed; Whereas in Turkmenistan under the rule of President Saparmurat Niyazov, no internationally recognized human rights are observed, including freedom of speech, assembly, association, religion, and movement, and attempts to exercise these rights are brutally suppressed; Whereas Turkmenistan has committed political dissidents to psychiatric institutions; Whereas in Turkmenistan President Niyazov is the object of a cult of personality, all political opposition is banned, all media are tightly censored, and only one political party, the Democratic Party, headed by President Niyazov, has been registered; Whereas the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), citing the absence of conditions for a free and fair election, refused to send any representatives to the December 1999 parliamentary elections; Whereas President Niyazov subsequently orchestrated a vote of the People's Council in December 1999 that essentially makes him President for life; Whereas in Uzbekistan under President Islam Karimov, no opposition parties are registered, and only pro-government parties are represented in parliament; Whereas in Uzbekistan all opposition political parties and leaders have been forced underground or into exile, all media are censored, and attempts to disseminate opposition newspapers can lead to jail terms; Whereas Uzbekistan's authorities have laid the primary blame for explosions that took place in Tashkent in February 1999 on an opposition leader and have tried and convicted some of his relatives and others deemed his supporters in court proceedings that did not correspond to OSCE standards and in other trials closed to the public and the international community; Whereas in Uzbekistan police and security forces routinely plant narcotics and other evidence on political opposition figures as well as religious activists, according to Uzbek and international human rights organizations; and Whereas the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), citing the absence of conditions for a free and fair election, sent no observers except a small group of experts to the December 1999 parliamentary election and refused any involvement in the January 2000 Presidential election: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress-- (1) expresses deep concern about the tendency of Central Asian leaders to seek to remain in power indefinitely and their willingness to manipulate constitutions, elections, and legislative and judicial systems, to do so; (2) urges the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other United States officials to raise with Central Asian leaders, at every opportunity, the concern about serious violations of human rights, including noncompliance with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) commitments on democracy and rule of law; (3) urges Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to come into compliance with OSCE commitments on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, specifically the holding of free and fair elections that do not exclude genuine challengers, to permit independent and opposition parties and candidates to participate on an equal basis with representation in election commissions at all levels, and to allow domestic nongovernmental and political party observers, as well as international observers; (4) calls on Central Asian leaders to establish conditions for independent and opposition media to function without constraint, limitation, or fear of harassment, to repeal criminal laws which impose prison sentences for alleged defamation of the state or public officials, and to provide access to state media on an equal basis during election campaigns to independent and opposition parties and candidates; (5) reminds the leaders of Central Asian states that elections cannot be free and fair unless all citizens can take part in the political process on an equal basis, without intimidation or fear of reprisal, and with confidence that their human rights and fundamental freedoms will be fully respected; (6) calls on Central Asian governments that have begun roundtable discussions with opposition and independent forces to engage in a serious and comprehensive national dialogue, on an equal footing, on institutionalizing measures to hold free and fair elections, and urges those governments which have not launched such roundtables to do so; (7) calls on the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to condemn and take effective steps to cease the systematic use of torture and other inhuman treatment by authorities against political opponents and others, to permit the registration of independent and opposition parties and candidates, and to register independent human rights monitoring organizations; (8) urges the governments of Central Asia which are engaged in military campaigns against violent insurgents to observe international law regulating such actions, to keep civilians and other noncombatants from harm, and not to use such campaigns to justify further crackdowns on political opposition or violations of human rights commitments under OSCE; (9) encourages the Administration to raise with the governments of other OSCE participating states the possible implications for OSCE participation of any participating state in the region that engages in clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of its OSCE commitments on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; and (10) urges the Voice of America and Radio Liberty to expand broadcasting to Central Asia, as needed, with a focus on assuring that the peoples of the region have access to unbiased news and programs that support respect for human rights and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) each will control 20 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter). Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on this measure. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska? There was no objection. Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the author of this resolution with whom I have worked. I appreciate his great effort. Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) for yielding me this time, and I want to thank him for his work in shepherding this resolution through his Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and for all of those Members who have co-signed and cosponsored this resolution. Mr. Speaker, this resolution expresses the sense of Congress that the state of democratization and human rights in the countries of Central Asia, Kazahkstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is a source of very, very serious concern. In 1992, these States freely pledged to observe the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents. The provisions contained in the 1990 Copenhagen Document commit the participating states to foster democratization through, among other things, the holding of free and fair elections, to promote freedom of the media, and to observe the human rights of their citizens. Mr. Speaker, 8 years have passed since then, but in much of Central Asia the commitments they promised to observe remain a dead letter. In fact, in some countries the situation has deteriorated substantially. For instance, opposition political activity was permitted in Uzbekistan in the late 1980s. An opposition leader even ran for president in the December 1991 election. In mid-1992, however, President Karimov decided to ban any manifestation of dissidence. Since then, no opposition movements have been allowed to function openly and the state controls the society as tightly as during the Soviet era. An even more disappointing example is Kyrgyzstan. Once one of the most democratic Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has gone the way of neighboring dictatorships. President Akaev has followed his regional counterparts in manipulating the legal, judicial, and law enforcement apparatus in a way to stay in office, despite domestic protest and international censure. On October 29, he will run for a third term; and he will win it, in a pseudo-election from which all serious candidates have been excluded. Throughout the region, authoritarian leaders have contrived to remain in office by whatever means necessary and give every sign of intending to remain in office as long as they live. Indeed, Turkmenistan's President Niyazov has made himself President for Life last December, and Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev, who has extended his tenure in office through referenda, canceling elections, and staging deeply flawed elections, this summer arranged to have lifelong privileges and perks go his way. It may sound bizarre, but it may not be out of the realm of possibility that some of these leaders who already head what are, for all intents and purposes, royal families, are planning to establish what can only be described as family dynasties. Certainly the worst offender is Turkmenistan. Under the tyrannical misrule of Niyazov, President Niyazov, his country is the only one-party state in the entire OSCE region. Niyazov's cult of personality has reached such proportions that state media refer to him as a sort of divine being, while anyone who whispers a word of opposition or protest is dragged off to jail and tortured. Corruption is also rampant in Central Asia. Rulers enrich themselves and their families and a favored few, while the rest of the population struggles to eke out a miserable existence and drifts towards desperation. We are, indeed, already witnessing the consequences. For the second consecutive year, armed insurgents of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan invaded Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. While they have been less successful than last year in seizing territory, they will not go away. Impoverishment of the populace fills their ranks with people, threatening to create a chronic problem. While the most radical groups in Central Asia might have sought to create theocracies regardless of the domestic policies pursued by Central Asian leaders, the latter's marriage of corruption and repression has created an explosive brew. Mr. Speaker, finally let me say the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan seem to believe that U.S. strategic interest in the region, and the fear of Islamic fundamentalism, will keep the West and Washington from pressing them too hard on human rights while they consolidate power. Let us show them that they are wrong. America's long-term and short-term interests lie with democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. So I hope that my friends and colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join in backing this important resolution. Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. The post-Soviet independence of the Central Asian states has not panned out in the way that benefited the population of these countries. Instead, it created wealthy and often corrupt elites and impoverished the population. Although all of these newly-independent states have joined the OSCE and appear, at least on paper, to be committed to OSCE principles, in reality the leaders of these countries have consistently fallen back on their OSCE commitments. The political development reinforced the Office of the President at the expense other branches of government. Parliaments are weak and the courts are not free. Presidents of some countries, such as Turkmenistan, have pushed laws through their rubber-stamp legislatures that extend their presidential powers for life. Other governments, like the government of Uzbekistan, have been using the justification of fighting terrorism and insurgency as a means to imprison and/or exile the opposition, censor the press, and control civic and religious activities. On the other hand, some countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have demonstrated varying degrees of progress. Until recently, opposition parties could function freely in Kyrgyzstan, while the OSCE agreed to Kazakhstan's 1999 parliamentary election, which they found falling short of international standards but, nevertheless, an improvement over the past. The stability of Central Asia is key to the stability of this region which borders on Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Pakistan. The governments of Central Asia cite the destabilizing influence of drugs and arms-trafficking from outside of their borders and the need to fight Islamic fundamentalism as justifications for their authoritarian regimes. 

  • Russian Arms Sales to Iran

    Mr. Speaker, there is no greater sponsor of terrorism in the world than the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran has taken Americans for hostages, given weapons to suicide bombers, and taken the lead in the movement to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. There is no government more radical, more extremist, or more dangerous to our national interests. So why did Vice President Al Gore cut a deal with the Russians to allow weapons sales to Iran? Al Gore himself when he was Senator introduced the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act in 1992. And now he winks and nods to Viktor Chernomyrdin, letting him know it is okay to violate American national interests. Mr. Speaker, the recent bombing of the U.S.S. Cole demonstrated again how serious a threat terrorism is to America and her allies. It is a violation of law to tell Russians it is okay to sell arms to Iran. Worse, it places American lives at risk. And now they are trying to hide it from Congress. We expect better judgment from a man who wants to be our President.

  • Report on the Russian Presidential Elections March 2000

    On March 26, 2000, Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin, running with the backing of the “Unity” party, was elected by a sizable margin to a full 4-year term. As reported by the Central Election Commission, Putin received almost 53 percent, with 39,740,434 votes out of a field of 11 candidates and the option of voting “against all candidates.” His nearest competitor, Communist Party chairman Gennady Zyuganov, tallied a little under 30 percent with almost 22 million votes. The rest of the field showed single-digit percentages. More than 75 million people took part in the election, for a 68.74 percent turnout. A comparatively small number of voters, about 1.5 million, chose the “none of the above” option. Details of the election results are listed below. The presidential election was occasioned by the abrupt resignation of President Boris Yeltsin on New Year’s Day, 2000, and his appointment of Prime Minister Putin as Acting President. Yeltsin had been elected to a second term in 1996. As Acting President, Putin had promoted a no-compromise policy in pressing the war against Chechnya, and created an image of returning Russia to stability after the economic and social uncertainties of the Yeltsin presidency. Putin ran an almost “above it all” campaign, refusing to issue a platform or make significant election-oriented policy statements. In its March 27, 2000 press release, the elections were characterized by the International Election Observation Mission (a joint effort of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)  Office of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Council of Europe) as "[marking] further progress for the consolidation of democratic elections in the Russian Federation.”" Both the Communist Party and Yabloko leadership claimed to have “evidence of blatant violations in several regions.” The final report of the OSCE/ODIHR observer mission also found that “Notwithstanding the CEC effort to enforce the law vigorously, candidates, campaign organizations and supporters circumvented the law in some cases.”

  • Calling for Immediate Release of Mr. Edmond Pope from Prison in Russian Federation

    Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. First of all, I rise in very strong support of the Peterson resolution, H. Con. Res. 404, calling for the immediate release of Edmond Pope from prison in the Russian Federation based on humanitarian reasons. I think it is very important that the chairman of the House Committee on International Relations and the ranking member, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), have moved very quickly on this resolution to bring it to the floor and before our colleagues because this is a very, very important resolution of humanitarian concern.   This resolution calls for the immediate release of Mr. Pope, an American citizen arrested for allegedly spying in Russia and, as we know, in prison now in Moscow since early April of this year. Mr. Pope has been arrested for trying to purchase so-called secret technology that had already been advertised for commercial sale. Mr. Speaker, I would be the first to agree that countries are entitled to protect sensitive information or state secrets; but the case against Mr. Pope is without merit. When we consider that the Russian Government has already released the alleged co-conspirator in this case, it is difficult to understand why Mr. Pope is considered such a danger. As the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Peterson) so passionately and eloquently pointed out, Mr. Pope is seriously ill and the Russian Government has not permitted an American physician to even visit him, which one might expect on simple humanitarian grounds.   Mr. Speaker, the Russian Government recently announced that the Pope case has been turned over to the court. This may look like progress, but experience tells us otherwise. When we look at the long drawn out case of Alexandr Nikitin, for whom it took 4 1/2 years to prove his innocence on trumped-up charges of espionage, I believe it is unlikely Mr. Pope would survive a lengthy judicial process. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Government has repeatedly raised this case with the Russian Government. Why are they not listening? At a recent hearing of our Committee on International Relations, our Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, reiterated her conviction this case should be resolved quickly in Mr. Pope's favor. Finally, I would note that in connection with this case, a Moscow radio station stated that the Russian security service often considers principles of humanity in deciding whom to release. It seems no other person in Russia today fits that definition. This man is sick, he is innocent, and he needs to be released. Again, I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Peterson) for his great leadership on this case.

  • Missing Journalist in Ukraine

    Mr. Speaker, it has been almost three weeks since the highly disturbing disappearance of Heorhii Gongadze, a journalist known for his articles exposing corruption in the Ukraine and for playing a prominent role in defending media freedoms. Mr. Gongadze, whose visit to the United States last December included meetings with the Helsinki Commission staff, was publisher of a new Internet newspaper called Ukrainska Pravda (meaning Ukrainian Truth), a publication often critical of senior Ukrainian officials and their associates. In fact, shortly before he vanished, Mr. Gongadze had apparently been facing pressure and threats and had complained that police were harassing him and his colleagues at Ukrainska Pravda. Unfortunately, Mr. Gongadze's disappearance takes place in an increasingly unhealthy media environment. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, his disappearance follows several suspect or inconclusive investigations into the suspicious deaths of several Ukrainian journalists over the last few years and the beatings of two journalists following their articles about official corruption this year. This disappearance has occurred within an environment which has made it increasingly difficult for professional journalists to operate, including harassment by tax police, criminal libel prosecutions, the denial of access to state-controlled newsprint and printing presses, and phone calls to editors suggesting that they censure certain stories. Such an atmosphere clearly has a chilling effect on press freedom. Mr. Speaker, I am encouraged that the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukraine's parliament, has formed a special ad hoc committee to investigate Mr. Gongadze's disappearance. I am also hopeful that the Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies will conduct a serious, vigorous investigation to solve the case of this missing journalist. As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and as someone who has a longstanding interest in the Ukraine, I am deeply disappointed that the Ukraine's relatively positive human rights record has been tarnished by an environment not conducive to the development of a free media. I remain hopeful that the Ukrainian authorities will make every effort to reverse this situation.

  • Calling the President to Issue a Proclamation Recognizing the 25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act

    Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) for yielding me time. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me give a special thanks to Bob Hand, who is a specialist on the Balkans, especially the former Yugoslavia and Albania, at the Helsinki Commission. As my colleagues know just a few moments ago, we passed H.R. 1064 by voice vote, legislation that I had introduced early last year. We went through many drafts and redrafts, and I would like to just thank Bob for the excellent work he and Dorothy Taft, the Commission's Chief of Staff, did on that legislation. H.R. 1064 would not have been brought to the floor in a form we know the Senate will pass quickly and then forward for signature, without their tremendous work on this piece of legislation, and their organization of a whole series of hearings that the Helsinki Commission has held on the Balkans. We have had former Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic, for example, testify at several hearings. The Congress itself has had so much input into this diplomatic process which we know as the ``Helsinki process,'' and they have done yeoman's work on that. Mr. Speaker, I rise and ask my colleagues to support passage of H.J. Res. 100, recognizing the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. I am pleased that we have more than 40 cosponsors on this resolution, and that includes all of our colleagues on the Helsinki Commission. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) is the ranking Democratic Member, and my good friend and colleague. Mr. Speaker, the Helsinki Final Act was a watershed event in European history, which set in motion what has become known as the Helsinki process. With its language on human rights, this agreement granted human rights the status of a fundamental principle regulating relations between the signatory countries. Yes, there were other provisions that dealt with economic issues as well as security concerns, but this country rightfully chose to focus attention on the human rights issues especially during the Cold War years and the dark days of the Soviet Union. The Helsinki process, I would respectfully submit to my colleagues, was very helpful, in fact instrumental, in relegating the Communist Soviet empire to the dust bin of history. The standards of Helsinki constitute a valuable lever in pressing human rights issues. The West, and especially the United States, used Helsinki to help people in Czechoslovakia, in East Germany and in all the countries that made up the OSCE, which today comprises 54 nations with the breakup of the Soviet Union and other States along with the addition of some new States. Let me just read to my colleagues a statement that was made by President Gerald Ford, who actually signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. He stated, and I quote, “the Helsinki Final Act was the final nail in the coffin of Marxism and Communism in many, many countries and helped bring about the change to a more democratic political system and a change to a more market oriented economic system.” The current Secretary General of the OSCE, Jan Kubis, a Slovak, has stated, and I quote him, “As we remember together the signature of the Helsinki Final Act, we commemorate the beginning of our liberation, not by armies, not by methods of force or intervention, but as a result of the impact and inspiration of the norms and values of an open civilized society, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and of the encouragement it provided to strive for democratic change and of openings it created to that end. Mr. Speaker, the Helsinki Final Act is a living document. We regularly hold follow-up conferences and meetings emphasizing various aspects of the accords, pressing for compliance by all signatory states. I urge Members to support this resolution, and I am very proud, as I stated earlier, to be Chairman of the Helsinki Commission. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the Statement made by the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, David T. Johnson, at the Commemorative meeting on the 25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act Statement at the 25th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (By Ambassador David T. Johnson to the Commemorative Meeting of the Permanent Council of the OSCE) Madame Chairperson, as we look with fresh eyes today at the document our predecessors signed on August 1, 1975, we are struck by the breadth of their vision. They agreed to work together on an amazing range of issues, some of which we are only now beginning to address. The States participating in the meeting affirmed the objective of “ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security;” they recognized the “indivisibility of security in Europe'' and a ``common interest in the development of cooperation throughout Europe.” One of the primary strengths of the Helsinki process is its comprehensive nature and membership. Human rights, military security, and trade and economic issues can be pursued in the one political organization that unites all the countries of Europe including the former Soviet republics, the United States and Canada, to face today's challenges. Over the past twenty-five years we have added pieces to fit the new realities, just last November in Istanbul we agreed on a new Charter for European Security and an adapted Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. But the most significant provision of the Helsinki Agreement may have been the so-called Basket III on Human Rights. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in a speech three weeks after the Final Act was signed, “At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiations. The conference put forward . . . standards of humane conduct, which have been, and still are, a beacon of hope to millions.” In resolutions introduced to our Congress this summer, members noted that the standards of Helsinki provided encouragement and sustenance to courageous individuals who dared to challenge repressive regimes. Many paid a high price with the loss of their freedom or even their lives. Today we have heard from you, the representatives of the many who have struggled in the cause of human rights throughout the years since Helsinki. We are in awe of you, of the difficult and dangerous circumstances of your lives, and of what you have and are accomplishing. Many of us here cannot comprehend the conditions of life in a divided Europe. And those who lived under repressive regimes could not have imagined how quickly life changed after 1989. Political analysts both East and West were astounded at the rapidity with which the citizens of the former Iron Curtain countries demanded their basic rights as citizens of democratic societies. What we have heard time and again is that the Helsinki Final Act did matter. Leaders and ordinary citizens took heart from its assertions. The implementation review meetings kept a focus fixed on its provisions. Even before the Wall came down, a new generation of leaders like Nemeth in Hungary and Gorbachev in the Soviet Union made decisions to move in new directions, away from bloodshed and repression. In the summer of 1989, the Hungarians and Austrian cooperated with the West Germans to allow Romanians and East Germans to migrate to the West. Looking at what was happening in Europe, the young State Department analyst Francis Fukuyama, wrote an article which captured the world's attention. In ``The End of History,'' he claimed that what was happening was not just the end of the Cold War but the end of the debate over political systems. A consensus had formed that democracy, coupled with a market economy, was the best system for fostering the most freedom possible. And then in the night of November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall opened unexpectedly. Citizens emerging from repressive regimes knew about democracy and told the world that what they wanted more than anything else was to vote in free and fair elections. Only a year after the fall of the Wall, a reunited Germany held elections at the state and national level. Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states carried out amazing transformations beginning with elections which brought in democratic systems. When Albania descended into chaos in 1997, groups across the country shared a common desire for fair elections. We have seen Croatia and the Slovak Republic re-direct their courses in the past several years, not by violence but through the ballot box. Just a few weeks ago, citizens of Montenegro voted in two cities with two different results, in both instances there was no violence and the new governments are moving forward with reforms to benefit their citizens. OSCE has time and again stepped up to assist with elections and give citizens an extra measure of reassurance that the rest of the world supports them in the exercise of their democratic rights. We are all aware that in the decades since Helsinki, we have seen conflict, torture, and ethnic violence within the OSCE area. Unfortunately, not all areas in the OSCE region made a peaceful transition to the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic prosperity. Some OSCE countries remain one-party states or suffer under regimes which suppress political opposition. Perhaps the most troubled region is the former Yugoslavia. As Laura Silber has written in the text to the BBC series “The Death of Yugoslavia,” “Yugoslavia did not die a natural death. Rather, it was deliberately and systematically killed off by men who had nothing to gain and everything to lose from a peaceful transition from state socialism and one-party rule to free-market democracy.” We need only look at the devastation of Chechnya and the continuing ethnic strife in parts of the former Yugoslavia to realize there is much still to be done in the OSCE region. We must continue our work together to minimize conflict and bring contending sides together, foster economic reforms through enhanced transparency, promote environmental responsibility, and or fight against organized crime and corruption. Human rights remain very much on our agenda as we seek to eradicate torture, and find new solutions for the integration of immigrants, minorities and vulnerable peoples into our political life. “Without a vision,” wrote the prophet Isaiah so long ago, “the people will perish.” We here today have a vision of collective security for all the citizens of the OSCE region. After twenty-five years, the goals embodied in the Helsinki final act remain a benchmark toward which we must continue to work. The Panelists have reminded us today that the Helsinki Final Act has incalculable symbolic meaning to the citizens of our region; we must continue to take on new challenges as we strive to keep this meaning alive. Mr. Crowley. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the ranking member of the Helsinki Commission.   Mr. Hoyer: Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) for yielding me the time. I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for bringing this resolution to the floor. I am pleased to join my very good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), with whom I have served on the Helsinki Commission since 1985 and who is now the chairman of our commission and does an extraordinarily good job at raising high the banner of human rights, of freedom, and democracy and so many other vital values to a free people. I am honored to be his colleague on the Helsinki Commission. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.J. Res. 100 which commemorates the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act which, was signed on August 1, 1975. It is my firm belief that the political process set in motion by the signing of the Final Act was the groundwork for the forces which consumed the former Soviet empire. In 1975, many of the Final Act signatory states viewed the language of the act dealing with human rights and the obligation that each state had toward its own citizens, as well as those of other states, as essentially meaningless window dressing. Their objective, it was felt that of the Soviets, was to secure a framework in which their international political position and the then existing map of Europe would be adjudged a fait accompli. Let me say as an aside that as we honor the 25th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, we ought to honor the courage and the vision of President Gerald Ford. I am not particularly objective. President Ford is a friend of mine for whom I have great affection and great respect, but those who will recall the signing of the Final Act in August of 1975 will recall that it was very controversial, and that many particularly in President's Ford's party thought that it was a sellout to the Soviets, thought that it was, in fact, a recognition of the de facto borders that then existed with the 6 Warsaw Pact nations, captive nations, if you will. President Ford, however, had the vision and, as I said, the courage, to sign the Final Act on behalf of the United States along with 34 other heads of state; that act became a living and breathing process, not a treaty, not a part of international law, but whose moral suasion ultimately made a very significant difference.

  • Human Rights in Russia

    Chief of Staff Dorothy Douglas Taft addressed human rights in Russia and commented upon the expansion of the 2000 report - written by the Moscow Helsinki Group  and the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ) - by twice as many regions in the 1999 report, which covered only 30 of Russia’s 89 regions. The report provides objective and complete information on the situation with human rights in Russia and greatly helps the OSCE monitor the regions. Lumilla Alexeyeva and Micah Naftalin represented these two organizations and discussed the issues raised by the report. They were joined by Victor Lozinsky, who shed light on his experience as a human rights advocate in the regions of Russia. They addressed the glaring discrepancies between Russian constitutional guarantees and international obligations and the daily realities of life, as well as the election of President Vladimir Putin and whether he has only made human rights efforts worse in the Russian Federation.

  • Religious Persecution Occurring in Turkmenistan

    Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Helsinki Commission, and also as the Co-chair of the Religious Prisoners Congressional Task Force, I rise today to speak on behalf of a young man who has had his human rights violated, a young man with a wife and five young children, a man who, because of the peaceful practice of his religious beliefs, is in prison in Turkmenistan. In December of 1998, security officials arrested and imprisoned Mr. Shageldy Atakov, pursued trumped-up charges against him, and on March 19, 1999, Mr. Atakov was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Why? Simply because he decided to change his religion from Muslim to Christian. Despite the fact that the government of Turkmenistan is a signatory to the Helsinki Accords and other international agreements, officials have blatantly violated Mr. Atakov's and other individuals' rights to freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, and the freedom of assembly.   Before KNB officials, that being the new name for the KGB, arrested Mr. Atakov, they, along with local religious community leaders, told him if he converted back to his previous religion, he would receive a car, a house and a good job, a great offer in a country like Turkmenistan where people make approximately $40 per month. However, these community leaders and security officials made it clear that if Mr. Atakov refused this offer, they would “find” charges against him and ensure that he was imprisoned. Over a 2-month period, various officials visited Mr. Atakov to repeat this offer and threats. In one of the visits, secret police officials said he would be imprisoned and “we will quickly force you into silence.” The KNB secret police have tried to silence Mr. Atakov in prison. Reports show that in July of 1999 and March of 2000 Mr. Atakov was forced into the special punishment cell in which he was severely beaten by guards, denied water, and fed only every other day. His family saw him at the end of the 10 days in 1999, and they reported that he was barely alive.   In July of 1999, it was reported that President Niyazov gave Mr. Atakov presidential amnesty, as allowed under Section 228 of the criminal code; but for some strange reason, security officials did not release him. Instead, they put him in the punishment cell described above. In fact, because of the pressure from the prosecutor, who said the previous sentence was too lenient, a new trial was held in August of 1999; and Mr. Atakov was sentenced to 4 years in prison and fined $12,000. That is an amount equivalent to about 25 years of salary for the average Turk citizen. Since February of this year, KNB officials forced his family into internal exile, the principal has kicked his children out of school, his wife has been told she will remain in exile until she renounces her faith, Mr. Atakov's brother was arrested and tortured in April of 1999, and other family members have lost their jobs and suffered as well. In December of 1999, during a raid on a Russian family living in Turkmenistan, KNB officials told them, “First we will deport all of you foreign missionaries, then we'll strangle the remaining Christians in the country.” All of this government attention to one man and his family simply because of religious beliefs. This injustice is an outrage.   The tactics of the KNB show that the KGB forces and methods of operations did not disappear with the demise of the Soviet Union, but are still alive and well. The arrest and subsequent imprisonment of Mr. Atakov are not isolated events, but are a result of the KNB secret police policy in Turkmenistan. In 1997, the legislature adopted severe restrictions on religion, imposing compulsory re-registration of all religious communities. According to the legislation, a religious community must have at least 500 members before it can obtain registration. Without this legal status, all religious groups are considered illegal and their activities therefore are punishable under the law. Since June of 1997, the secret police have detained, interrogated and physically assaulted many religious believers. In addition, these officials have raided churches, interrupted worship services, searched homes and confiscated over 6,700 pieces of literature. In each instance, the KNB warned citizens that the Christian faith in particular is forbidden in Turkmenistan. Religious believers throughout Turkmenistan suffer if they practice their religion but do not belong to either of the two ``registered'' religions. One is the Islamic faith; the other is the Russian Orthodox.   Mr. Speaker, I recently received reports that Mr. Atakov's health has deteriorated rapidly and he may be at the point of death. I urge the government of Turkmenistan to allow an international organization, such as the Red Cross, to visit Mr. Atakov, assess his health, and provide any medical assistance he might need. Even, I might say, the old ruthless Soviet regime allowed prisoners medical health. I urge the government of Turkmenistan to live up to its commitments under the Helsinki Accords and other international agreements to uphold and to protect freedom of speech, assembly and belief. Further, I urge the government of Turkmenistan to release Mr. Atakov under their own president's amnesty granted to him last year. Finally, I urge the government to stop harassing and persecuting people of faith and recognize their important and rich contribution to their nation.

  • U.S. Statements at the 1999 OSCE Review Conference

    In February 1999, officials from 90 governments, including representatives from many OSCE participating States, visited Washington for the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption among justice and security officials. Participants concluded that their governments must cooperate more closely if they were to succeed in promoting public integrity and controlling corruption among their officials. OSCE efforts served as an example to others when the international community gathered in the Netherlands in 2001 for the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption.

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