Bosnian Elections III: Representatives of Bosnian Political Parties

By Robert Hand, Staff Advisor The Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE PA) met in Vienna, Austria, on February 22 and 23 for its sixth annual winter meeting. The U.S. Delegation to the meeting was led by Helsinki Commission Chairman Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL), who is also serving as President Emeritus of the OSCE PA. The delegation included Representatives Mike McIntyre (D-NC), a Helsinki Commissioner, and Hilda L. Solis (D-CA). Setting an Agenda for Future Activity Created in 1991, the OSCE PA holds an annual session every July as its principal forum to debate issues and adopt a declaration. In 2002, however, the Assembly added a short winter session to prepare for the July session. Rapporteurs from each of the three general committees that parallel the OSCE security, economic and human dimensions discussed their preparations for the annual session to be held from July 5 to 9 in Kyiv, Ukraine, while the standing committee, chaired by Assembly President Goran Lennmarker of Sweden, formally approved Kazakhstan to be the host of the 2008 annual session. The committees heard from a variety of OSCE officials, including the OSCE Secretary General, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner for National Minorities, the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. In an unprecedented step for an OSCE Chair-in-Office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos decided not to attend the Winter Meeting, sending his special envoy instead. The first committee focused primarily on implementation of the OSCE PA’s Brussels Declaration adopted in 2006, noting ongoing discussion of OSCE reform issues including the role of the Parliamentary Assembly and support for OSCE field missions. Developments in the Balkans, especially Kosovo, as well as in Moldova and Afghanistan were also discussed. Rep. McIntyre inquired about the ability of the OSCE field mission in Kosovo to adapt to changing circumstances, and expressed hope that OSCE norms, particularly regarding human rights, would be respected there no matter what decisions are made regarding Kosovo’s status. The second committee looked forward to the Kyiv annual session where it intends to focus on immigration and its effect on a country’s development, immigration policy responses and the potential for OSCE activity on immigration issues. The third committee raised a wide range of items to be considered in Kyiv, including gender equality, media freedom, combating organized crime through the rule of law and transparency, poverty, and the political and social rights of immigrants. The U.S. delegation expressed interest in focusing on the rights of immigrants, an issue that is expected to be addressed in both the second and third committees. Additional discussion during the PA meeting focused on OSCE election observation, an area in which the OSCE has traditionally taken a leading role among other international institutions. Recent election observation missions have brought to light institutional friction between the PA and the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The PA provides parliamentarians to lead short-term observing with their strong political instincts, considerable observation experience and high-profile presence, while ODIHR provides many additional short-term observers to enhance election day coverage as well as technical experts and a long-term observation effort. Both are needed, but differing perspectives and interests are beginning to threaten the success of the entire observation effort. Parliamentarians lamented the degree to which implementation of a 1997 agreement providing the basis for cooperation in the field has deteriorated, and many hoped the Spanish Chair-in Office would help the two OSCE bodies resolve their differences and ensure that future observation missions are conducted in accordance with the agreement. Debating “Energy Security”, a Vital Issue of Today The three committees convened together for a special debate on energy security in the OSCE area. Speaking for the U.S. Delegation, Rep. Solis argued that to truly achieve energy security, there needs to be increased transparency and predictability in energy supply on the one hand, and aggressive action to cut energy use and reduce emissions on the other. Adding that energy security and climate change ultimately must be addressed together, she highlighted initiatives taken in her home state of California as well as recent initiatives in the U.S. Congress. Rep. Solis concluded her remarks by calling for a global approach that “not only promotes energy security, but environmental security as well.” Other delegates similarly focused on the need for increased transparency in the energy sector and expressed concern about use of energy as a political instrument. Addressing Mediterranean Issues Chairman Hastings, in his role as the OSCE PA Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs, hosted a dinner during the winter session in Vienna to find ways to enhance security in the Mediterranean region through the partnership between countries in the region and the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly. Representatives from the parliaments and foreign ministries of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia joined the U.S. Delegation in discussing how their countries could benefit from OSCE and PA work to promote political dialogue, democracy, rule of law, and economic stability. Secretary General of the OSCE PA Spencer Oliver, PA Treasurer Jerry Grafstein, representatives of the OSCE Spanish Chairmanship, as well as the Finnish Chairmanship of the OSCE Partners Group also participated. Mr. Hastings proposed using the OSCE and the PA as a framework for increased informal dialogue among the countries in the region, and also discussed greater involvement in OSCE work to combat anti-Semitism and discrimination against Muslims.

By Kyle Parker and Knox Thames On November 6, 2006, Tajikistan held its fourth presidential election, in which incumbent President Emomali Rahmonov easily won over four other competitors. The conduct of the campaign and the Election Day itself provided the international community with an opportunity to gauge Tajikistan’s commitment to democratization – the result was a mixed picture that displayed fundamental problems that must be addressed before Tajikistan can meet OSCE standards of free and fair elections. The final results released by the Central Commission for Election and Referenda (CCER) of Tajikistan showed that President Rahmonov defeated four other candidates with 79 percent of the vote, based on approximately 3 million ballots representing 91 percent of the electorate. The nearest competitor garnered just over five percent. The OSCE’s Election Observation Mission (EOM) reported in its preliminary findings that the elections “did not fully test democratic electoral practices… due to a lack of genuine choice and meaningful pluralism,” and concluded that “the election process also revealed substantial shortcomings.” Tajikistan in Context Tajikistan is located at the heart of the ancient Silk Road traversing the Eurasian landmass, bordering Afghanistan, China, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. With about seven million people, Tajikistan has a young, growing population that is largely Sunni Muslim and speaks Tajik, a language closely related to Farsi. Tajikistan has one of the lowest GDP’s of the former Soviet republics; up to one million Tajik citizens are migrant workers abroad, mostly in the Russian Federation. Landlocked and home to the tallest mountains in the post-Soviet space, Tajikistan possesses abundant fresh water resources from glacial runoff. However, only six percent of Tajikistan is arable. Tajikistan also hosts one of the largest and most polluting aluminum smelters in the world. Additionally, since the fall of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan in 2001, the cross-border drug trade has dramatically increased, fueling corruption, drug addiction, and HIV/AIDS among the local population. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Tajikistan was the only former Soviet republic to experience a protracted civil war that claimed the lives of at least 40,000 people and displaced nearly a million. Despite extreme poverty, the country has made notable gains since the peace agreement signed almost 10 years ago that ended the civil war. The accord created a power-sharing agreement among the warring parties, including the only legal Islamic party in post-Soviet Central Asia. President Rahmonov was first elected in 1994 and re-elected in 1999. The Constitution of Tajikistan sets a presidential term of office at seven years. In 2003, a referendum amended the constitution to limit the number of consecutive terms an individual could be elected president to two, but allowed him to run again. As a result, President Rahmonov may seek another term in 2013, potentially serving until 2020. Pre-Election Climate As elsewhere in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s political system features top-down rule by the president, whose control of the state apparatus and state-run media greatly enhance his privileged position in any election. Pre-election decrees by the CCER did address some inequities in the election system, and the government provided opposition parties free air time on state television. However, the ability of independent media outlets to operate freely was restricted. And while multiple candidates did participate, the major opposition leaders experienced significant harassment from authorities and did not or could not run. For instance, Muhammadruzi Iskandarov, the former head of the Democratic Party, was sentenced to 23 years in prison in October 2005 under questionable circumstances. This year, authorities repeatedly threatened criminal penalties against the Chairman of the Socialist Democratic Party, Rahmatullo Zoyirov, for statements made regarding the number of alleged political prisoners in Tajikistan. Before his death in August, charges of slander were brought against the late Said Abdullo Nuri, Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party, who was arguably the only opposition presidential candidate with a national following. Of these three parties, only the anti-Iskandarov “Vatan” faction of the Democratic Party entered a candidate. Their bid was unsuccessful, as they could not obtain the necessary petition signatures in time to qualify for ballot inclusion. The CCER registered five candidates out of six nominees who submitted signatures for the election: Olimjon Boboev (Party of Economic Reform of Tajikistan); Abdukhalim Gaffarov (Socialist Party); Amir Karakulov (Agrarian Party); Emomali Rahmonov (Peoples’ Democratic Party of Tajikistan); and Ismoil Talbakov (Communist Party of Tajikistan). To run, candidates had to collect signatures representing five percent of registered voters, or approximately 160,000 names. Individuals could not sign more than one petition, and yet remarkably, the six applicants reportedly collected over 1.5 million signatures, equaling roughly half of the electorate in just 20 days. Considering that the pro-government Agrarian and the Economic Reform Parties were both established this year, their ability to set up a network to collect the required signatures was remarkable and implausible. Although roughly one of every two voters signed a petition (based on the claims of the parties), Commission staff did not meet any individual voter who had signed a petition nor did staff hear of any other OSCE observer that met a voter who also signed a petition. Each candidate had up to 30 minutes of free air time on state television and radio. Nevertheless, the OSCE EOM described the campaign period as “largely invisible,” with party platforms that were “similar,” and concluded that “none of the four candidates running against the incumbent offered a credible political alternative.” Furthermore, there was “little media coverage of the election campaign and a high media profile of the incumbent, raising doubts whether voters received sufficient information to make an informed choice.” Violations on Election Day The November 6 election was the first presidential election in Tajikistan observed by the OSCE, as minimum conditions for democratic elections were not in place for previous presidential contests. The EOM deployed 12 experts and 13 long-term observers to the capital city of Dushanbe and five other cities. The Mission was headed by Mr. Onno van der Wind of the Netherlands. Mr. Kimmo Kiljunen, a parliamentarian from Finland, led the observation delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which was integrated into the EOM. On Election Day, the EOM deployed 123 short-term observers representing 31 OSCE participating States. OSCE observers visited approximately 500 of 3,042 polling stations throughout Tajikistan and observed the closing procedures and tabulations in 47 District Election Commissions. Helsinki Commission staff members were accredited as OSCE observers and visited 15 polling stations in the Dushanbe area, ranging from large urban stations to smaller semi-suburban stations and two military precincts. They witnessed the opening and closing of a polling station, as well as tabulation at the District Electoral Commission level. Commission staff witnessed some type of violation in approximately three quarters of the polling stations visited. The most common problem was the appearance of identical signatures on the voter registry, possibly indicating proxy voting. However, proxy voting was only witnessed in one station. Family voting was widespread. In the vast majority of precincts, ballot boxes were not adequately sealed, but there was no visible evidence of tampering. There were no observed instances of voters being denied the opportunity to cast a ballot, nor were any such complaints raised with Commission staff. Commission staff did encounter teams of observers accredited by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China. None of these teams appeared to operate under any kind of election observation methodology, in clear contrast to OSCE observers. As in past elections, the CIS observers drew starkly different conclusions about the electoral conditions than the conclusions of the OSCE EOM. Of the irregularities observed throughout the day, none appeared to be deliberate attempts to skew the final tally in favor of, or against any particular candidate. The infractions appeared to stem from a lack of proper training, old Soviet habits, and/or a general lackadaisical attitude to what was largely seen as an exercise with a foregone conclusion. Still, the vote count monitored by Commission staff at polling station 10 in Dushanbe’s Second District raised questions about the motives of the precinct workers, who appeared determined not to allow a credible observation. Initially, Commission staff were not permitted to enter the station. Once inside, they were not allowed to come within 15 feet of the table where election officials were counting the ballots. In addition, election officials stood in such a way as to block observers from having any view of the tabulations. Precinct staff did not follow closing procedures – counting the blank ballots last rather than first; results were not entered into the protocol as they were established, but rather at the end of the entire count. Staff questions about these concerns directed to the Precinct Election Commission head were unsatisfactorily answered. The EOM preliminary report echoed these findings. Of the polling stations visited by OSCE observers, proxy voting was cited in 19 percent of the stations and identical signatures were observed in 49 percent of the stations. The report cited incidents of security officials interfering in the work of the observers. In addition, the report found that “counting procedures necessary to ensure integrity and transparency of the process were generally not followed.” The report did note some areas of progress, such as the peaceful nature of the voting; CCER training for electoral commissions; provision of free air time for candidates; voter education efforts; ballots in multiple languages; and the availability of polling stations abroad. However, the EOM report concluded that overall the election “did not fully test democratic electoral practices” because of a “lack of genuine choice and meaningful pluralism.” The findings went on to state that “the election was characterized by a marked absence of real competition. Parties that determined themselves as political opposition to the incumbent chose not to contest the election. Thus, voters were presented with a choice that was only nominal.” Other issues of concern were: significant shortcomings in the election legislation; lack of transparency by the CCER; a government-controlled media environment; and an unusually high signature threshold for candidate participation. Post-Election Tajikistan The outcome of Tajikistan’s presidential contest was never in doubt – the only question was whether President Rahmonov’s final tally would be in the 80th percentile (as in Kyrgyzstan last July) or the 90th percentile (typical for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and recently equaled in Kazakhstan). By that standard, the 79 percent that Rahmonov received could be considered modest for Central Asia. Nevertheless, the international community was able to assess Tajikistan’s commitment to democratization through its conduct before and during the election. Overall, the campaign and election presented a mixed, but generally frustrating, picture – while the electoral code reform, the lack of Election Day violence, and the participation of multiple candidates was positive, the prevalence of irregularities and the intimidation or arrest of major opposition leaders call into question President Rahmonov’s commitment to democratic reform. Although there was little question he would win a fair contest, the deck was carefully stacked anyway. Problems with Tajikistan’s electoral conduct are not new, as the OSCE observed their 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections and found significant violations in both. The conclusions of the 2000 observation mission stated that Tajikistan must do more to “meet the minimum democratic standards for equal, fair, free, secret, transparent and accountable elections.” Despite OSCE engagement in the pre-election period last year, the 2005 parliamentary elections remained problematic, with the OSCE mission stating they “failed to meet many key OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.” Against that background, the 2006 presidential election was disappointing for not having achieved more and deeper systemic reforms. President Rahmonov, now safely reelected, has consolidated his position. The next real test of his commitment to electoral reform will be the 2010 parliamentary election, specifically, whether independent opposition parties can operate and organize freely. Many observers believe that the electorate’s vivid memory of the civil war has created an appreciation for the stability he represents, despite the country’s democratic shortcomings. However, 60 percent of the population is reportedly under 35 years old and if serious democratic reforms are not entrenched, and the 2010 parliamentary election again falls short of international standards, the political gains achieved since the end of the war may be jeopardized. As Rakhmonov begins a new seven-year term of office, it is critical that reform efforts move forward. A good sense of his government’s direction could come early in his new administration, if problematic draft NGO or religion laws, are reintroduced, since previous versions fell short of OSCE commitments. In addition, continued governmental efforts to close or harass independent media outlets will also indicate whether old policies will hold sway during the new term of office. Conclusion The United States should continue to find ways to help this impoverished nation develop economically and democratically, lending assistance when appropriate, while continuing to hold Tajikistani authorities to the OSCE commitments they freely undertook. The United States would do well to continue to actively encourage those laboring for a stable and open society in this country that has the potential to be a key partner in battling regional threats to U.S. interests. In addition, the growth of democracy and respect for human rights would enable Washington and Dushanbe to deepen their engagement, while cementing the stability and progress achieved in Tajikistan.

By Chadwick R. Gore, Staff Advisor U.S. Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Sam Brownback convened a hearing focused on the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and its promotion of democracy and human rights in the OSCE region over the past 15 years, work that has come under pressure, in part, from those seeking to divert attention away from their own poor records of implementation. The hearing “Advancing the Human Dimension in the OSCE: The Role of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights” was held on May 17, 2006. In his opening statement, Chairman Brownback highlighted the international role of ODIHR and its importance in sponsoring democratic institutions and monitoring the conduct of elections and assessing their freeness and fairness. He remarked that ODIHR’s work encompasses a wide range of human rights activities aimed at closing the gap between the commitments of the participating States on paper and their reality in practice. Chairman Brownback noted, however, that the Warsaw-based ODIHR faces serious challenges, especially from the Russian Federation, Belarus, and a small minority of the OSCE participating States that neither desire democratic reform nor recognize the universality of human rights. On behalf of the U.S. Department of State, Kurt Volker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, voiced strong support for ODIHR. He particularly highlighted its leadership as the flagship of the OSCE’s democracy-promotion efforts. Volker emphasized ODIHR’s success in promoting democracy, defending human rights, and building civil society, and stressed the State Department’s support for the current regional and international programs undertaken by ODIHR. Mr. Volker summed up the criticisms of ODIHR election monitoring as focused on two main aspects: alleged undue pressure on states of the former Soviet Union and alleged lack of transparency in election observation procedures. Describing ODIHR’s election monitoring as the “gold standard,” Volker rejected these assertions and affirmed that ODIHR is doing “a first-class job in election monitoring and all of the areas of democracy promotion that it takes part in.” He opined that ODIHR has been instrumental in advancing democracy in Russia. ODIHR’s mandate to monitor elections is set forth in the 1990 Copenhagen document and subsequent documents. Accordingly ODIHR Director Ambassador Christian Strohal focused much of his testimony on elections and discussed the many challenges faced by ODIHR as various OSCE States endeavor to prevent free and fair elections by limiting competition and marginalizing voters. He stated that this is accomplished through, “…refusal of registration or deregistration; issues of state administrative resources; pressure on groups of the electorate to vote in a specific manner; media bias; electoral administrations with insufficiently inclusive composition; no clear voter registration guidelines; no clear complaints and appeal procedures; and most importantly of all, no sufficient political will to rectify identified shortcomings.” To confront these challenges, Ambassador Strohal emphasized the need for greater political commitment by all OSCE States, highlighting the necessity of accountability, transparency, and public confidence combined with strong leadership by example as demonstrated by the United States in its election transparency. Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, focused his remarks on what he described as a backlash against democracy development in various OSCE nations. He identified the problem as stemming from governments attempting to further consolidate power by weakening civic participation and democratic institutions, as evidenced in Russia with the recent passage of a strict NGO law. Yet, Gershman pointed out, the people of Russia are not losing hope and are indeed gaining some international support. Gershman conveyed the hope of indigenous NGOs that the international community would offer a “long-term coherent policy of support” to civil society. A former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, as well as a former Helsinki Commissioner, affirmed at the hearing the critical role of the OSCE and ODIHR to advance democracy in the region. Lorne Craner, President of the International Republican Institute, focused on ODIHR’s unique multilateral structure and superior work on human rights and democracy, as well as its contributions to the recent global democratic movement. He noted with concern, however, that while democratic advances have occurred throughout the OSCE they are currently under attack by Russia and a few other countries. That the attacks focus on election standards, democratic development and the ODIHR make them “particularly insidious and particularly important.” According to Patrick Merloe, Senior Associate and Director of the Programs on Election Processes at the National Democratic Institute, several OSCE States are specifically critical of the election monitoring process, in an effort to deflect attention from their own electoral shortcomings. Merloe recommended five obligations that the OSCE should address in order to increase the effectiveness of the ODIHR: universal and equal suffrage, accountability, transparency, public confidence, and follow up to election-related recommendations. Jeff Fischer, Senior Director of the Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance at IFES, stressed the historical significance of the OSCE’s election supervision practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and the lessons learned from those experiences. Two lessons exemplified from these OCSE administrative practices were the necessity for a flexible election timeline and a separate organizational election monitoring mission. Chairman Brownback voiced particular concern about Russia’s ongoing challenges to democratic institutions and civic organizations. Gershman identified Georgia’s Rose Revolution and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as the origin of the current Russian mindset committed to preventing similar democratic movements from arising in other countries of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Gershman suggested that the Putin administration could not transform Russia into a Soviet-like dictatorship, citing the rapid growth of Russian human rights NGOs. He cited statistics showing that the number has grown from just two dozen in the mid-1990s to over 3,000 in 2003. Gershman stressed that the function of ODIHR and similar institutions is not regime change, but to support indigenous democratic groups, to strengthen democratic processes and to strengthen the protection of human rights. Craner agreed with Gershman’s assessment that Russia was not capable of completely reversing its democratic development, stating, “You cannot turn the clock back all the way. You can try and turn it back some of the way, but people, once they get a taste of these things, as we have seen in many countries for the last 30 years, want more.”

By Commission Staff While pundits attempt to sort out the political meaning of Ukraine’s March 26th parliamentary elections to fill the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada, the significance of the conduct of the elections should not be missed.  “Free and fair” was the resounding assessment of the OSCE-led International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) that also included observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Office of Democratic Elections and Human Rights (ODIHR).  This unqualified positive appraisal – a first among the 12 former Soviet republics outside the Baltics that have conducted scores of elections since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union – underscores the consolidation of democratic gains made in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution following years of political stagnation. These clean March 26th elections stood in stark contrast to the fatally flawed first rounds of the Ukrainian presidential elections that ushered in popular revolt sixteen months earlier.  Coming on the heels of the blatantly undemocratic presidential “elections” in neighboring Belarus a week earlier, comparisons were inevitable.  The Rada elections also followed a series of recent electoral contests elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, including in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which to varying degrees fell short of international standards.  The OSCE assessment in Ukraine returns the “free and fair” formulation to the lexicon of international election observations, departing from the heavily nuanced appraisals that have become common in recent years.  This development has potentially significant implications for future OSCE observations, especially with parliamentary and presidential elections expected in Russia in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Helsinki Commissioner Rep. Alcee L. Hastings, current President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, was appointed by the OSCE Chair-in-Office to serve as Special Coordinator for short-term observers.  Commission staff observed on Election Day, as part of the IEOM deployment of 914 observers coming from 45 OSCE countries including Russia.  In all, the group examined voting and the vote count in nearly 3,000 polling stations.  The Commission contingent observed balloting throughout the Kiev and Cherkasy regions. The Ukrainian Government declined to invite observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an entity discredited in the eyes of many for its effusive praise of fundamentally flawed elections elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, including Belarus’ undemocratic March 19 presidential contest.  The CIS stood out for its sharply critical evaluation of Ukraine’s December 26, 2004 presidential elections that resulted in Victor Yushchenko’s victory in elections widely considered to have met democratic standards.  Ukraine has refused to participate further in CIS monitoring missions.  The two dozen Russian Duma observers present offered tempered, mixed opinions about the conduct of Rada elections.   Whatever shortcomings there were in these elections – and no undertaking of this scale is perfect – they appear to have resulted from late or otherwise poor planning.  Among these were delays in the formation of some district and precinct election commissions, the absence of a functioning Constitutional Court, long lines and crowding at some polling stations, and lingering inaccuracies in voter lists.  On the positive side of the balance sheet were the significantly freer media and decidedly more balanced media coverage; no systematic use of administrative resources; the transparent, consensual and professional administration of the elections at all levels; inclusion of domestic, non-partisan observers; and an overhaul of voter lists.        Election day began early with polling stations opening at 7:00 a.m.  There were over 34,000 polling stations.  Adding to the vibrancy of the elections was the large number of domestic observers, an indication of buy-in on the part of Ukrainians young and old alike with many affiliated with particular parties or candidates and others representing NGOs.  Upon entering the polling stations, one was struck by walls plastered with informational bulletins on candidates and parties.  Forty-five parties and blocs vied for seats in parliament.  While the international community was mainly focused on the parliamentary balloting, voting was also underway for regional and local government.  Voters were thus presented with four lengthy ballots: national and regional as well as local councils and mayoral races.  While some older voters were befuddled by this collection of papers, most voters seemed to take it in stride.  Election commission poll workers seemed attentive to their duties.  This was put to the test in the complicated tabulation process that began, once polling stations closed at 10:00 p.m., typically involving the sorting and counting of thousands of papers.  Processing the Rada results alone went into the wee hours of morning, with the three remaining stacks of ballots from other contests proceeding well past daybreak. The undeniable success of the domestic observation in these elections, buttressed by years of investment in training and support by the United States and others, raises obvious questions about the need for future international observations in Ukraine.  Has the time come to “graduate” Ukraine from such scrutiny and leave that necessary task to Ukrainian stakeholders themselves?  Many believe the March 26th elections confirm that that time has come, especially if Ukraine continues on its increasingly democratic trajectory.  The greater and more prominent role of domestic observers, also reinforces the notion that the time for Ukraine’s “graduation” has come.  Indeed, the OSCE should continue to encourage domestic stakeholders to prove themselves to their own people. The Maidan, Kiev’s Independence Square that featured so prominently in the massive demonstrations by orange-clad protesters in November 2004 and the jubilant crowds following Yushchenko’s victory a few weeks later, was calm on the Monday following the Rada elections.  Strolling past this bustling area, Ukrainians were going about their routines, perhaps an indicator that the politics of democracy has moved from the Maidan to the Main Streets of cities and towns throughout the country. Whatever the pundits may declaim regarding the election results or the continuing strength of the Orange Revolution, what seemed palpable was a keen appreciation for the business of governing.  Neither a democratic revolution nor a single “free and fair” election are guarantees that the resulting government will be in a position to immediately deal with the basic needs of its people.  Overcoming these obstacles will have a profound impact on how the next government meets the political and economic challenges Ukraine faces at home and abroad.                   What we can say with confidence is that the March 26th elections were a further essential step in the process of overcoming the legacy of the past – a history marred by foreign domination, genocidal famine, denial of political and cultural freedom, and more recently political stagnation.  Today, the people of Ukraine are removing the overgrowth of thorns – an image alluded to by the great poet Taras Shevchenko – that prevented them for so long from pursuing their own pathway to a brighter and more prosperous future.