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Macedonia

Macedonia was an early concern of the Helsinki Commission during the course of Yugoslavia’s decade of violent disintegration in the 1990s.  With little preparation for independent statehood, the country had to adjust to economic separation from the other Yugoslav republics, enforce sanctions imposed on the remaining Yugoslav federation and contend with an influx of refugees, all while contending with numerous domestic developments and at times facing sanctions and isolation due to its name dispute with Greece.  Helsinki-organized congressional delegations concerned with these issues visited Macedonia in 1992 and 1993, during the course of the Bosnian conflict, and the country received additional attention during the course of the 1998-99 Kosovo conflicts.  

Commission staff first observed elections in Macedonia in November 1990 and, reflecting ongoing concern about meeting OSCE standards defining free and fair elections, observed subsequent parliamentary and/or presidential elections in 1994, 1998, 1999, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Macedonia was also a country of major concern regarding human trafficking, although over time the efforts by the authorities to combat trafficking have been among the best in the region. 

Ethnic tensions between the Macedonian majority and a sizable Albanian minority have been an ongoing concern regarding both human rights and democratic development. The country’s large and relatively active Romani community has also be the subject of Commission interest.  Commission hearings focused on the Balkans and the prospects for NATO enlargement have often focused on the destabilizing effects on internal developments as the name dispute has stymied the countries aspirations for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.  In recent years, this has been evident in the political crisis marked by widespread domestic surveillance and questionable actions against the country’s media.  Noting the OSCE-recognized right to self-identification, the Commission has consistently referred to the country by its constitutional name, from the beginning, however, urging Macedonian authorities to avoid provocative policies implying claims of legitimate concern to Greece. 

Staff Contact: Bob Hand, policy advisor

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  • Helsinki Commissioners Press Belgrade to Apprehend Indicted War Criminals, Cooperate with Hague Tribunal

    By Bob Hand CSCE Staff Advisor On June 16, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that Serbia and Montenegro met U.S. criteria set forth in section 578 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. These criteria include Serbia and Montenegro’s level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Without certification, certain bilateral assistance to Serbia would have been withheld. Leading Members of the United States Helsinki Commission have long been concerned with the level of cooperation by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro with ICTY and have consistently urged the authorities in Belgrade to do more. Concerned Commissioners have sought to increase attention paid to developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the March assassination of reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. There is a general sense among Commission leaders that while Belgrade’s cooperation with the Tribunal has been improving, it still remains insufficient. In the lead up to the June 15th certification deadline, Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) participated in a Commission public briefing featuring Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. As of the May 15th briefing, Del Ponte characterized cooperation from Belgrade as uncertain, underscoring that movement comes only when it is seen as politically beneficial for the Serbian Government. She noted some cooperation in accessing documents; however, for more than a year, the prosecution has pushed for the transfer of 155 Serbian documents in connection with the Milosevic trial without success. Del Ponte expressed concern over the failure to detain wanted fugitives – particularly Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted for the 1991 Vukovar massacre in Croatia, and Ratko Mladic and five others wanted in connection with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Mladic is a great mystery because we know where Mladic is,” she asserted. “We passed this information to the Serbian Government in Belgrade, and nothing happened.” Del Ponte stressed that if law and order is to prevail criminal justice must be credible. Failure to bring together all those accused to trial frustrates the progress of the Tribunal and forces the witnesses to present repeatedly their own horrific accounts each time a separate case is brought to trial. She also assessed cooperation with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the course of the briefing. In a letter dated May 23, five Members of the Helsinki Commission urged Secretary of State Colin Powell to utilize the time prior to the certification deadline to press authorities in Belgrade to take the steps necessary to meet the certification requirements. The Commissioners recognized the significant strides Serbia has made in cooperation with the Tribunal, but underscored that “a failure to apprehend Mladic and other notorious war criminals soon would be a serious setback to the cause of reform and recovery at home and further delay Serbia’s integration in Europe.” The letter was signed by Co-Chairmen Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), and Commissioners Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). The United States Helsinki Commission held a second briefing on June 4, detailing Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal, and the prospects for human rights and democratic development in Serbia since the lifting of the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s assassination. Helsinki Commission Senior Advisor Donald Kursch opened the briefing, welcoming the tough measures authorities in Belgrade have taken in the wake of Mr. Djindjic’s murder to crack down on criminal elements. Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Coalition for International Justice, described Serbia’s actual cooperation with the Court as “very limited, begrudging, and only under pressure.” After last year’s certification, Serbia’s government promised a consistent pattern of cooperation, but only three surrenders and one arrest have followed. Bang-Jensen cited the failure to apprehend nineteen Bosnian Serb and Serbian indicted suspects, either living within Serbia or frequently crossing into Serbia, as an indication that the current government is inclined to protect the old regime. Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, recommended that the United States look not only at Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, but to its overall level of commitment to rule of law. Following Djindjic’s assassination in March, the Serbian Government imposed a state of emergency to crack down on organized crime. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people were held incommunicado for up to two months under this guise. International monitors were denied access to detainees until recently, and Andersen noted that released detainees reported widespread abuse. Despite increasing pressure from the international community on Serbia’s domestic courts to shoulder greater responsibility for holding war criminals accountable, only four domestic trials were held this year. There is also no indication of upcoming trials or of a permanent commitment to such a process. Trials that have proceeded suffered from a lack of witness protection, poor case preparation by prosecutors, and problems facilitating witnesses traveling from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. James Fisfis, Resident Program Officer for Serbia at the International Republican Institute, remained optimistic. Fisfis presented the results of an IRI survey suggesting that 56 percent of Serbian citizens believe the country is now on the right track, up from 38 percent before the assassination. Sixty-four percent of Serbian respondents currently support cooperation with The Hague, seeing it as a necessary measure toward gaining international acceptance. The data suggest a window of opportunity exists for pressure to reform to have an impact. Ivan Vujacic, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, acknowledged that “more can be done and more will be done” in cooperation with the Tribunal, but focused on the progress made over the last two and half years, which he described as “remarkable.” In particular, he pointed to the recent arrests of three “pillars of Milosevic’s rule”: Miroslav Radic, Franko Simatovic, and Jovica Stanisic. Ambassador Vujacic said that the Serbian Government was highly committed to protecting human rights. He stated that during the war “the ultimate human right, the right to life was taken from the victims in atrocities defined as war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Vujacic promised that all indictees in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro will be arrested and transferred to The Hague. A second Helsinki Commission letter to Secretary of State Powell dated June 12th, declared that certification could not be justified at the time. The letter concluded: “To certify would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy goals supporting international justice and successful and complete democratic change in Serbia.” The letter reiterated that the Serbian authorities had yet to arrest and transfer Mladic and other indictees who are most likely in Serbia, and even this did not define the full cooperation with the Tribunal desired. Commission Members warned that if certification occurred while the required conditions remained unmet, the United States’ ability to affect change in Serbia would be diminished, making it more difficult for Serbia’s political leadership to undertake necessary reforms. Some Commission Members view the June 13 arrest of the indicted war crimes suspect Veselin Sljivancanin by the Belgrade authorities as an important positive step toward increased cooperation with the ICTY. However, continued failure to apprehend Mladic and other leading indictees remains a serious cause of concern that places barriers to Serbia and Montenegro’s full re-integration into the international community. In a press release announcing certification, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher asserted that the Secretary’s decision to certify does not indicate that Serbia has fulfilled its commitment. “We have made clear ... that the United States expects further actions to be taken in order to meet those obligations,” Boucher said, “including by arresting and transferring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.” The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. United States Helsinki Commission Intern Kristin Poore contributed to this article.

  • Bringing Justice to Southeastern Europe

    Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey spoke on behalf of the Commission on the Yugoslav conflicts and its tumultuous impact on the development of post-Cold War Europe, as it exposed flaws in the United Nations and the European Union, whilst simultaneously inspiring the OSCE and NATO to act. The briefing addressed the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the understanding that justice must be part of a post-conflict recovery. The speaker – Honorable Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia since 1999 – was responsible for ensuring that those individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in contemporary Southeast Europe were held accountable. She spoke of the limitations and successes of the Tribunal, referring to two decades of experience as a prosecutor.

  • Human Rights and Inhuman Treatment

    As part of an effort to enhance its review of implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments, the OSCE Permanent Council decided on July 9, 1998 (PC DEC/241) to restructure the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings periodically held in Warsaw. In connection with this decision - which cut Human Dimension Implementation Meetings from three to two weeks - it was decided to convene annually three informal supplementary Human Dimension Meetings (SHDMs) in the framework of the Permanent Council. On March 27, 2000, 27 of the 57 participating States met in Vienna for the OSCE's fourth SHDM, which focused on human rights and inhuman treatment. They were joined by representatives of OSCE institutions or field presence; the Council of Europe; the United Nations Development Program;  the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;  the International Committee of the Red Cross; and representatives from approximately 50 non-governmental organizations.

  • Helsinki Commission Examines U.S. Policy toward the OSCE

    By Erika B. Schlager, CSCE Counsel for International Law On October 3, the Helsinki Commission held a hearing on "U.S. Policy toward the OSCE." Originally scheduled for September 12, the hearing was postponed after the September 11 terrorist attacks. This hearing was convened to examine U.S. priorities and human rights concerns in the OSCE region; how the OSCE can serve to advance those goals and address human rights violations; the pros and cons of the institutionalization and bureaucratization of the OSCE and field activities; and the openness and transparency of the Helsinki process. Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), Commissioners Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD), and Rep. Robert B. Aderholt (R-AL) heard from four witnesses: A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (who has since been formally appointed by the President as one of the three executive-branch Commissioners); Ambassador Robert Barry, former Head of OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina; and P. Terrence Hopmann, professor of political science at Brown University and research director of the Program on Global Security at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. Catherine Fitzpatrick, Executive Director of the International League for Human Rights, had agreed to participate in the hearing as originally scheduled for September 12, but was unable to attend on October 3. In her prepared statement, Assistant Secretary Jones described the OSCE as an important tool for advancing U.S. national interests “by promoting democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, arms control and confidence building measures, economic progress, and responsible or sustainable environmental policies.” While portraying the OSCE as “the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in [the] region,” she also argued that “it is not the forum for discussion or decision regarding all security issues” – a role implicitly reserved for NATO. Jones alluded to a possible role for the OSCE in combating terrorism, an issue that will be taken up at the OSCE Ministerial, scheduled for December 3 and 4 in Bucharest. In this connection, Chairman Campbell urged the State Department to pursue an OSCE meeting of Ministers of Justice and Interior as a step toward promoting practical cooperation in fighting corruption and organized crimes, major sources of financing for terrorist groups. Assistant Secretary Craner tackled an issue of key concern to human rights groups: would the war against terrorism erode efforts to promote democracy and human rights, particularly with respect to Central Asian countries that are now key U.S. allies in that war? Craner observed that “[s]ome people have expressed concern that, as a result of the September 11 attack on America, the Administration will abandon human rights. I welcome this hearing today to say boldly and firmly that this is not the case. Human rights and democracy are central to this Administration’s efforts, and are even more essential today than they were before September 11th. They remain in our national interest in promoting a stable and democratic world. We cannot win a war against terrorism by stopping our work on the universal observance of human rights. To do so would be merely to set the stage for a resurgence of terrorism in another generation.” The testimony of the two expert witnesses, Professor Hopmann and Ambassador Barry, examined the operational side of the OSCE, with particular focus on the field work of the institution. Hopmann, one of a small number of analysts in the United States who has written in depth about the work of the OSCE and who served as a public member on the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE Review Conference in Istanbul in 1999, offered several specific recommendations: 1) enhance the professional qualifications and training of its mission and support staff; 2) strengthen its capacity to mediate serious conflicts that appear to be on the brink of violence or that have become frozen in the aftermath of violence, including making better use of ‘eminent persons’ to assist these efforts; and 3) attract more active support from its major participating States, especially from the United States, to strengthen the OSCE's capacity to intervene early in potentially violent conflicts when diplomacy still has a chance to win out over force. Ambassador Barry drew on his experience as head of one of the OSCE’s largest missions to address the complex issue of the OSCE’s relations with other international organizations. Barry asserted that OSCE has, at times, “bitten off more than it can chew” and the United States needs to exercise discretion in assigning tasks to the OSCE. When asked specifically to describe the relationship between the OSCE and the Council of Europe, he characterized it as “permanent struggle.” He suggested that the two organizations should not compete with other, but play to their relative strengths: the OSCE, for example, should be dominant in field missions, while the Council of Europe should be given the lead in providing expert advice on legislative drafting. One area where the OSCE is underutilized is in the area of policing – the focus of a Commission hearing held on September 5, 2001. Barry remarked, “Last month several witnesses testified before the Commission concerning the OSCE role in police training and executive policing. With its requirement of universality, the [United Nations] must call upon police who are unable or unwilling to deal with terrorism or human rights violations at home. We cannot expect them to be much help, for example, in dealing with mujahedin fighters in Bosnia or Macedonia. Therefore I believe the OSCE ought to be the instrument of choice for both police training and executive policing. In order to fill the latter role the OSCE should change its policy on arming executive police. Unarmed international police have no leverage in societies where every taxi driver packs a gun.” Barry also argued that the United States needs to involve the Russian Federation more closely with OSCE. “Too often in the past,” he said, “we have marginalized Russia by making decisions in NATO and then asking OSCE to implement the decisions. Macedonia is only the most recent example.” Many of the questions raised by Commissioners focused on institutional issues such as the transparency of the weekly Permanent Council meetings in Vienna, the respective roles of the Chair-in-Office and Secretary General and pressure to enlarge the OSCE’s bureaucracy by establishing new high-level positions to address whatever is, at the moment, topical. State Department witnesses were asked several questions relating to specific countries where human rights issues are of particular concern, including Turkmenistan, a country whose human rights performance is so poor that some have suggested it should be suspended from the OSCE, and Azerbaijan, a country engaged in a significant crackdown against the media. Assistant Secretary Jones argued that, when faced with an absence of political will to implement OSCE human dimension commitments, it is necessary to “persevere” and to hold OSCE participating States accountable for their actions. Noting that the death penalty is the human rights issue most frequently raised with the United States, Commissioner Cardin asked Assistant Secretary Craner how the United States responds to this criticism and whether the use of capital punishment in the United States impacts our effectiveness. Craner noted that the death penalty in the United States is supported by the majority of Americans, in a democratic system, and that the quality of the U.S. judicial system ensures its fairness. He also argued that it does not affect the credibility of the United States on human rights issues. Professor Hopmann, however, disagreed with this assertion. Based on extensive contacts with European delegates to the OSCE in Vienna, Hopmann observed that Europeans find it difficult to reconcile the U.S. advocacy on human rights issues with a practice Europeans view as a human rights violation. Chairman Campbell recommended that similar hearings be convened on a periodic basis to update Congress and the American people on the ongoing work of the OSCE and how it advances U.S. interests across the spectrum of the security, economic, and human dimensions.

  • Roadblock to Religious Liberty: Religious Registration

    The United States Helsinki Commission conducted a public briefing to explore the issue of religious registration, one of many roadblocks to religious liberties around the world, focusing on religious registration among the 55 nations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The troubling trend followed by several OSCE participating states toward restricting the right to freedom of religion by using registration schemes, making it virtually impossible for citizens to practice their faith was addressed. Panelists at the event – including Dr. Sophie van Bijsterveld, Co-Chair of the OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief; Dr. Gerhard Robbers, Member of the OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief; Vassilios Tsirbas, Senior Counsel for the European Centre for Law and Justice; and Col. Kenneth Baillie, Commanding Officer of the Salvation Army-Moscow – discussed the various ways governments are chipping away at religious liberty. New legislation concerning religious registration policies that could potentially stymie religious freedom within the OSCE region was also addressed.

  • Civilian Police and Police Training in Post-Conflict OSCE Areas

    This hearing examined international efforts to deploy civilian police in post-conflict regions in Europe. The hearing also examined efforts to monitor and train local police for effectiveness in keeping with democratic standards and the rule of law. One of the more critical and difficult challenges in the transition to democracy in the OSCE region has been the process of transforming law enforcement structures. Progress in meeting this challenge has been mixed, and regrettably, in some countries those charged with upholding the law are themselves responsible for human rights violations

  • Serbia after Milosevic: A Progress Report

    This Helsinki Commission briefing assessed the progress made in the five months since democratic forces came to power in Serbia following the December 2000 elections. The briefing evaluated conditions for bolstering democratic development, enhancing economic recovery, and maintaining long-term stability in Serbia and southeastern Europe as a whole. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Daniel Serwer, Director of the Balkans Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace; Sonja Biserko, Chair of the Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights; Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director of the Coalition for International Justice; James M. Lyon, Political and Economic Analyst for the International Crisis Group; and Milan Protic, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States  – focused in particular on Yugoslav cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Belgrade’s evolving stance toward Bosnia and other neighbors, and the effect of internal reform measures in correcting Milosevic abuses, including the continued imprisonment of hundreds of Kosovar Albanians in Serbia.

  • Recent Developments in and Around Kosovo

    This hearing discussed the escalating tensions in the Balkans and potential actions by NATO, the OSCE and the U.S. to address the situation.   Witnesses expressed their concern that the latest outbreak of violence threatened to undermine efforts by the international community to bring a degree of order to the region.  This hearing also discussed the OSCE’s work in Kosovo.

  • U.S. Statements at the 1999 OSCE Review Conference

    In February 1999, officials from 90 governments, including representatives from many OSCE participating States, visited Washington for the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption among justice and security officials. Participants concluded that their governments must cooperate more closely if they were to succeed in promoting public integrity and controlling corruption among their officials. OSCE efforts served as an example to others when the international community gathered in the Netherlands in 2001 for the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption.

  • Milosevic’s Crackdown in Serbia and Threat to Montenegro

    At this hearing, with Commissioners Chris Smith (NJ-04) and Benjamin Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO) in attendance, witnesses testified on the atrocities committed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Foremost on people’s minds was the conviction and sentence of years in prison of a Serbian journalist for committing “espionage” after he wrote about Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. More broadly, the hearing examined Milosevic’s efforts to perpetuate his power by forcing changes to the Yugoslav constitution and cracking down on forces in Serbia.  Also in attendance were Branislav Carak of the Serbian Independent Trade Union; Stojan Cerovic, fellow at the U.S. Institute of peace; Dr. David Dasic, head of the Trade Mission of the Republic of Montenegro; and Bogdan Ivanisevic, researcher at Human Rights Watch.

  • Torture in the OSCE Region

    In advance of the 2000 commemoration of the United Nations Day in Support of the Victims of Torture, the Helsinki Commission held a briefing to focus on the continuing problem of torture in the OSCE region. In spite of these efforts and the efforts of our Commission, including introducing and working for passage of two bills, the Torture Victims Relief Act and the Reauthorization of the Torture Victims Relief Act, torture continues to be a persistent problem in every OSCE country including the United States. This briefing considered two specific problem areas, Chechnya and Turkey, as well as efforts to prevent torture and to treat torture survivors. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Dr. Inge Genefke, International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims; Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director for  Europe and the Middle East, Amnesty International; and Douglas Johnson, Executive Director of the Center for the Victims of Torture – highlighted statistics about the number of torture victims in Turkey and Chechnya and related violations of individual rights.

  • Report on Macedonia's Parliamentary Elections of October and November 1998

    When, on October 18, the citizens of Macedonia voted for a new parliament, they not only had choices between extremes but also among several moderate candidates. The more open environment reflected growing political maturity in a country beset by instability—both internal and external—since becoming an independent state in 1991. Approximately 1,200 people representing political parties, electoral coalitions and independent candidates competed for the 120 seats in the Macedonian Assembly. Eighty-five of those seats were contested on a majority basis in districts, while the remaining 35 seats were determined by proportional voting for party, coalition and independent lists across the country. The mixed system represents an agreement between the ruling and opposition parties to abandon a solely majority-based system viewed as favoring those in power. The newly established electoral districts were more consistent demographically, although ethnic Albanians continued to allege that they were still left somewhat under-represented. The ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), the successor to the former League of Communists, ran essentially on its own in the elections. The main challenge to the SDSM came from an unlikely coalition of the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), named after the 19th century extremist Macedonian liberation group, and the newly formed and politically liberal Democratic Alliance (DA). A secondary challenger was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the product of a recent merger of two moderate political parties. The election picture was complicated by the continued existence of a practically separate polity in Macedonia, the Albanian community which constitutes at least 23 percent of the country's population and has its own political parties. For these elections, however, moderates in the Macedonian Government formed a coalition with more nationalistic Albanian parties. The campaign environment was open and competitive, with fewer government controls on access to information than before. In addition, election administration was more transparent, with opposition parties able to participate more fully. Given the close results of the first round, campaigning in districts with second-round voting was notably more negative and tense. In addition, there were some problems with the timely release of results, raising suspicions about the ruling parties willingness to fully respect the outcome. Problems like family- or group-voting were evident, but there were few signs of intentional manipulation during the voting. In the second round, however, there were some reports of party representatives checking voter registration cards outside polling stations, as well as more ominous proxy voting practices. The VMRO-DPMNE/DA coalition emerged victorious, and the ruling SDSM conceded defeat. President Kiro Gligorov, whose office will be contested in 1999, selected VMRO-DPMNE head Ljupco Georgievski to form a new government. Georgievski has continued the SDSM's practice of inviting Albanian parties to join the government, despite not needing these parties to form a government. Neither a calm change of government nor an effort to be inclusive are characteristic of politics in former Yugoslav republics, and these signs of political stability will hopefully enable Macedonia to steer clear of ethnic conflict on its own territory at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is deploying an extraction force to assist unarmed civilian monitors in conflict-ridden Kosovo to the north.

  • Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia: Electoral and Political Outlook for 1999

    Robert Hand, policy advisor at the Commission, led a discussion regarding Bosnia and its different regions. He spoke of the situation in Bosnia in 1998 and the power of ethnically-based political parties, retained through nationalism, corruption, and control of the media. Reconstruction in Bosnia is poor due to poor economic conditions and the continued displacement of certain populations.  The witnesses - Luke Zahner, Candace Lekic, Jessica White, Roland de Rosier, Kathryn Bomberger, Brian Marshall – have served in regions all over Bosnia and gave valuable input on the differences between regions and their rehabilitations processes after the Dayton Accords. They also spoke of the influence of Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Federation on said regions.  Paying attention to these differences, the state, is important in that the United States wants to support only those that successfully implement the Dayton Accords. 

  • The Ombudsman in the OSCE: An American Perspective

    This briefing assessed the role of ombudsmen institutions in the countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from an American perspective. The ombudsman institution was described as a flexible institution; adaptable to national and local government structures in a wide variety of countries, and a brief evaluation of the evolution of this institution was presented. Dean M. Gottehrer, a consultant on ombudsmen in human rights institutions for the United Nations Development Program, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, and the United States Information Agency, presented a personal analysis of the role of ombudsmen institutions in protecting human rights in OSCE participating states.

  • Deteriorating Religious Liberty in Europe

    Senior Advisor to the Commission, E. Wayne Merry, chaired this briefing which was part of a series by the Commission on the subject of religious liberties within the OSCE region. This series was prompted by a perceived developing problem of restrictions on religious liberties in several participating states to the OSCE. At the time, the Commission was devoting most of its attention to the countries that that traditionally had a much more tolerant view toward religious minorities, such as those in Western and Central Europe. Participants in this briefing included Francesca Binda, Karen Gainer, and Paul Rowland, all with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) personnel Eric Jowett and Kent Patton.

  • Deterioration of Religious Liberty in Europe

    This briefing addressed the persisting question of problems of religious liberty and the patterns of discrimination against religious minorities and other belief groups that had developed in a number of countries in the OSCE region in the aftermath of the Cold War. Efforts of improving religious liberty in former communist countries were discussed, as well as the need for spending time and attention on countries farther west, like France, Belgium, and Austria, in which concern for religious minorities was also expressed. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Willy Fautre, Director of Human Rights without Frontiers and James McCabe, Assistant General Counsel of Watchtower Bible and Tract Society – examined the multi-tiered system that European countries employ regarding religion, and the different statuses and treatment of citizens based on where their religion falls within this system. The issues faced by minority religious associations, like being targeted by fiscal services, were also topics of discussion.

  • Report on Human Rights and the Process of NATO Enlargement

    The Commission held a series of three public hearings on “Human Rights and the Process of NATO Enlargement” in anticipation of the summit of Heads of State and Governments of Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be held in Madrid, Spain, on July 8 and 9, 1997. The emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the demise of the Warsaw Pact created a security vacuum in the territory between the current eastern frontier of NATO and the Russian border. The first attempt to address the new security realities in the region occurred at the end of 1991 with the establishment of NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for the evolution of a new relationship based on constructive dialogue and cooperation. In early 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched with the aim of providing a practical program to transform the relationship between NATO and states participating in PfP, moving beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a genuine security partnership. (All 27 states of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) are OSCE participating States.) Simultaneously, NATO began to consider the possibility of enlarging the Alliance. The result was the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement which addressed practical steps and requirements candidates for membership would have to satisfy. In December 1996, NATO foreign ministers called for a NATO summit at which one or more countries that wanted to join NATO would be invited to begin accession negotiations. The U.S. Congress was instrumental in stimulating the debate through several legislative initiatives. The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (PL 103-447) provided a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about NATO enlargement, consistent with U.S. interests in ensuring stability in Europe. The law lists a variety of criteria, such as respect for democratic principles and human rights enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, against which to evaluate the suitability of prospective candidates for NATO membership. The Act stipulates that participants in the PfP should be invited to become full NATO members if they... “remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens....” Under section 203, a program of assistance was established to provide designated emerging democracies with the tools necessary to facilitate their transition to full NATO membership. The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (PL 104-208) included an unqualified statement that the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights are integral aspects of genuine security. The law also makes clear that the human rights records of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe interested in joining NATO should be evaluated in light of the obligations and commitments of these countries under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.  

  • Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

    This briefing focused on the topics of European security and NATO enlargement, specifically in terms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Elements of the treaty that remained especially important, including the goal of avoiding destabilizing concentrations of forces in Europe and the goal of creating greater transparency and promoting information exchange among governments in Europe, were discussed. Witnesses testifying at this briefing spoke to the need for amendments and changes to the CFE, but maintained the relevance of the treaty to international security. Different strategies for making these changes related to Russian pressure and NATO involvement were presented. 

  • U.S. Statements on the Human Dimension, 1996 OSCE Vienna Review Conference and Lisbon Summit

    This compendium of statements illustrates the U.S. perspective that one of the key and distinguishing features of the OSCE is the interlocking framework of critical, politically binding commitments which provide a common set of principles to which all participating States can aspire. The OSCE draws its real strength and practical flexibility from participating states' commitments to the values of the original Helsinki Act, rather than from a legalized, treaty-based institutional structure. A fundamental strength of the OSCE is the review process, which provides a regular opportunity to assess a participating states' efforts to further the realization of the Helsinki Accords within its own borders, and in its relations with other OSCE states. The OSCE is increasingly a pillar of European security. By facilitating honest implementation review the OSCE can strengthen security links based on common values.

  • Report: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugolsavia, An Update

    In early 1996, with little fanfare, the U.N. Security Council quietly and quickly selected Canadian Judge Louise Arbour to succeed Justice Richard Goldstone, the first chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The relative ease with which a replacement was chosen -- in contrast to the prolonged, relatively public, and embarrassing manner in which the Security Council members fought among themselves for nearly a year over the selection of the first prosecutor -- reflects the dramatically changed circumstances in which the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal now finds itself. At the time of Goldstone’s appointment in 1994, most observers of the Yugoslav conflict seemed to fall into one of two categories: those that thought war crimes trials should be held, but did not believe the Tribunal would ever indict anybody above the rank of private (let alone hold an actual trial), and those who believed that the mere discussion of war crimes trials undermined peace negotiations. Under Goldstone’s able stewardship, the Tribunal has developed a full complement of staff, including prosecuting attorneys and investigators; issued more than fifty indictments, including for the two highest ranking Bosnian-Serb political and military leaders and three members of the Yugoslav People’s Army; obtained custody of three men; and begun the Tribunal’s first trial. Goldstone has deftly managed a multitude of political crises, successfully traversed the treacherous waters of the U.N. bureaucracy, and, thus far, helped safeguard the legal integrity and credibility of the Tribunal. All of these factors, combined with the achievement of a tenuous peace agreement in Dayton in November 1995,2 now make the possibility of war crimes trials seem, to many, more real than ever before. This memorandum outlines the basic structure of the Tribunal and the most recent developments with respect to investigations and trials, cooperation by U.N. member states with the Tribunal, and funding.

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