99th Congress
2d Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

BASKET I—IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS ELEVEN YEARS AFTER HELSINKI

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

BY THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

NOVEMBER 1986

Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

99th Congress
2d Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

BASKET I—IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS ELEVEN YEARS AFTER HELSINKI

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

BY THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

NOVEMBER 1986

Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

64-639 O WASHINGTON : 1987

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

64-639 O - 87 - 1

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

U.S. House of Representatives
Room 237, House Annex #2
Washington, DC 20515

Sen. ALFONSE M. D'AMATO (R-NY), *Chairman*
Rep. STENY H. HOYER (D-MD), *Co-Chairman*

Senators	Representatives
JOHN HEINZ (R-PA)	DANTE B. FASCELL (D-FL)
JAMES A. McCLURE (R-ID)	SIDNEY R. YATES (D-IL)
MALCOLM WALLOP (R-WY)	TIMOTHY E. WIRTH (D-CO)
GORDON J. HUMPHREY (R-NH)	EDWARD J. MARKEY (D-MA)
CLAIBORNE PELL (D-RI)	DON RITTER (R-PA)
PATRICK J. LEAHY (D-VT)	CHRISTOPHER SMITH (R-NJ)
RUSSELL B. LONG (D-LA)	JACK F. KEMP (R-NY)
DENNIS DeCONCINI (D-AZ)	JOHN E. PORTER (R-IL)

Executive Branch Commissioners

The Honorable RICHARD NORMAN PERLE, Department of Defense
The Honorable RICHARD SCHIFTER, Department of State
Vacancy, Department of Commerce

Commission Staff

MICHAEL R. HATHAWAY, *Staff Director*
MARY SUE HAFNER, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL G. WISE, *Deputy Staff Director*

BROWN, Meredith, *Staff Asst.*
BURNS, Deborah, *Office Mgr.*
COSMAN, Catherine, *Staff Asst.*
DAVIDSON, Lynne, *Staff Asst.*
DEYCHAKIWSKY, Orest, *Staff Asst.*
EDWARDS, Barbara, *Admin. Asst.*
FINERTY, John, *Staff Asst.*
HAND, Robert, *Staff Asst.*
INGRAM, Judy, *Staff Asst.*
JACOBS, Jesse, *Staff Asst.*
McNAMARA, Ronald, *Staff Asst.*
OLIVER, Spencer, *Consultant*
STEINHORN, Leonard, *Press Officer*
WARNER, Thomas, *Printing Clerk*

CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter One—Introduction	1
Chapter Two—The Long, Hard Road From Helsinki to Vienna:	
History of CSCE	3
Positive aspects of CSCE principles	16
The European view	19
The consequences of renunciation of the Final Act	24
Conclusion	26
Chapter Three—Security in Europe:	
Introduction	28
Principles	28
Military security	33
Arms control and disarmament	41
Athens Conference on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes	43
Chapter Four—Human Rights:	
Bulgaria:	
Introduction	44
Religious rights	45
Turkish minority in Bulgaria	46
Czechoslovakia:	
Introduction	49
Civil and political rights	49
Religious rights	55
The peace movement	59
Economic and social rights	61
Ethnic rights	63
Czechoslovakia and the CSCE process	63
German Democratic Republic:	
Introduction	64
Civil and political rights	64
Religious rights	67
The peace movement	70
Economic and social rights	73
Ethnic rights	73
Independent political activity	74
The German Democratic Republic and the CSCE process	74
Hungary:	
Introduction	75
Civil and political rights	76
Religious rights	87
Ethnic and national rights	88
Economic and social issues	89
Poland:	
Introduction	90
Overview of trends since 1982	91
Civil and political rights	96
Persecution and imprisonment	96
Unofficial groups	98
Cultural rights	100
Religious rights	102
National minorities	103
Trade union rights	103
Cooperation with international human rights organizations	105
Approach to CSCE	105

Chapter Four—Human Rights—Continued
Romania: Page
Introduction 105
Civil and political rights 107
Religious freedom 110
Economic and social rights 115
Ethnic rights 117
Romania and the CSCE process 118
Soviet Union:
Introduction 119
New Soviet laws and regulations 123
Civil and political rights 126
Economic rights in the Soviet Union 145
Cultural rights 158
National rights in the Soviet Union and the Baltic States 173
Ethnic minority rights 183
Situation of religious believers in the U.S.S.R. 190
Footnotes and sources 232

APPENDIXES

Appendix A: Chronology of major terrorist events, November 1982–September 1986 237
Appendix B: Update on the status of political activists in Czechoslovakia 248
Appendix C: Soviet political prisoners 258
Appendix D: (see contents page on page 269) 270

CHAPTER ONE—THE COMMISSION

Created in 1976 by Public Law 94-304 as an independent agency, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is charged with monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

The Helsinki Commission, as it is commonly known, is composed of 21 legislative and executive branch officials.

The Commission's mandate, as outlined in P.L. 94-304, is to "monitor the acts of the signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with particular regard to the provisions relating to Human Rights and Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields." The Commission is further authorized and directed to "monitor and encourage the development of programs and activities of the U.S. Government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and a greater interchange of people and ideas between East and West." Carrying out its mandate, the Commission actively documents violations of the Final Act, promotes public awareness of implementation of its provisions and helps formulate and execute U.S. Government policy on these issues.

Monitoring compliance, or lack thereof, with the Final Act is the Commission's main activity. Public hearings with expert witnesses have been held on such issues as religious rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Soviet treatment of ethnic groups, emigration from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, family reunification and binational marriages, martial law in Poland, human rights violations in Ukraine, religious and national dissent in Lithuania, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, forced labor in the Soviet Union, restrictions on cultural freedom, and on the future of the CSCE process.

The Commission issues periodic reports, providing information on Final Act implementation to the Congress, the press and the public. Comprehensive reports on implementation, focusing on the records of the Soviet Union and East European states, were published previously in 1977, 1980 and 1982. U.S. compliance with the Final Act was the subject of a Commission report in 1979. In 1985, the Commission issued a report entitled, *The Helsinki Process and East-West Relations: Progress in Perspective* on the positive aspects of the implementation of the Final Act during the period 1975 through 1984.

Much of the Commission staff's daily activity focuses on human rights casework. Visa denials, cases of separated families, political prisoners, and other human rights violations are followed closely. The staff compiles and disseminates information on these cases and

advises family members, congressional offices and interested nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on steps to resolve them.

Nongovernmental organizations are a primary source of information for the Commission as well as a major channel through which the Commission publicizes its work. The Commission is geared to bring the particular CSCE-related concerns of private groups to the attention of the government decision-makers. In turn, the Commission endeavors to make government policies and activities regarding CSCE more accessible to NGOs.

The Commission plays a unique role in planning and executing U.S. policy in various CSCE forums, beginning with the Belgrade Review Meeting of 1977–78 and including the Madrid Review Meeting of 1980–83. Commissioners and staff hold periodic meetings with officials of the executive branch on CSCE policy and implementation. The Commission is represented on U.S. Government delegations to CSCE meetings and participates in consultations with other governments which signed the Final Act.

CHAPTER TWO—THE LONG, HARD ROAD FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA

HISTORY OF CSCE

The CSCE negotiations

The Soviet Union first proposed a European security conference on February 10, 1954, and periodically reiterated the proposal over the years. It appeared that Moscow's principal objective was to exploit such an event to produce a surrogate World War II peace treaty. The idea was received with little enthusiasm from Western and neutral nations. However, as both East and West began to move toward detente, a renewed Warsaw Pact appeal from Budapest on March 17, 1969, elicited a cautiously positive reaction from NATO. The West took the position that such a conference might serve a useful purpose, once some progress had been achieved on the issue of Berlin.

In December 1969, the NATO countries agreed that conclusion of a new Four-Power agreement on Berlin, aimed at effecting practical improvements in relations between the people on both sides of the Wall and between Bonn and West Berlin, could lead to allied willingness to participate in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The allies also increasingly emphasized the importance they attached to improving West German (F.R.G.) relations with East Germany (G.D.R.), the U.S.S.R., Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. The Berlin Accord, signed September 3, 1971, took effect in June 1972. CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks thereupon opened in Helsinki the following November, after the Warsaw Pact countries had agreed to commence exploratory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna, beginning in January 1973.

Stage I of CSCE took place at the Foreign Minister level in Helsinki from July 3–7, 1973. Ministers approved the "Final Recommendations" of the preparatory phase, which set the agenda and established mandates to committees and subcommittees during the stage II negotiations.

Stage II began September 18, 1973 in Geneva, where experts from the 35 participating countries met to work out the final document organized under four agenda items, or "baskets." After almost 2 years of intense and difficult negotiations, stage III opened in Helsinki on July 30, 1975. There the heads of state of the 35 nations signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, commonly known as the Helsinki Agreement.

The nature of the Helsinki Final Act

The Final Act covers three major components of East-West relations: security; economic, industrial and scientific cooperation; and

humanitarian issues including basic human rights and specific concerns such as family reunification, travel, information flow, and educational and cultural cooperation. The document itself is comprised of three sections, popularly known as "baskets." The first basket contains 10 principles "guiding relations between states," including: inviolability of frontiers (Principle III), nonintervention in internal affairs (Principle VI), respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Principle VII) and self-determination of peoples (Principle VIII). In addition, Basket I deals with certain aspects of military security and disarmament, known as confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Basket II discusses cooperation in the economic sphere, including science and technology. There is a section known as Basket II B, which deals with issues of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. Basket III calls for and encourages cooperation in the humanitarian fields: expansion of human contacts across borders; improvement of access to printed and broadcast information; improvement in the working conditions of journalists; expansion of cultural and educational cooperation.

Finally, there is a section entitled "Follow-up to the Conference," which calls for experts meetings and periodic review meetings of the 35 Governments.

In accordance with the desire of the signatories, the Final Act is not a legally binding document. In fact, the Final Act states that it is not eligible for registration as a treaty or international agreement under article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, the participating States generally accept the proposition that, by signing the Final Act, they have given solemn, political commitments to fulfill their declared intentions. They can be held publicly, if not legally, accountable by other signatories. So accepted is this concept that not one of the participating States has relied on the nonbinding nature of the Final Act as a defense against charges of nonfulfillment of its provisions. Another concept agreed upon by all 35 signatories is that all areas of the Final Act are of equal importance. No one section of the document is to be emphasized at the expense of another and, conversely, no area is to be ignored or relegated to a lower status.

Follow-up meetings of the CSCE to date

The Helsinki Final Act's unique follow-up provisions call for periodic major review meetings—the first of which was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1977–78) followed by one in Madrid, Spain (1980–83)—and for other spin-off fora, such as specialized or "experts" meetings on particular facets of the accords. The follow-up meetings provide opportunities for the signatory states to exchange views on the state of the Final Act's implementation and to adopt by consensual agreement new commitments which strengthen and expand upon the original Final Act provisions.

Insofar as the Final Act lacks an enforcement mechanism, these meetings are an important means by which a signatory state may be taken to task publicly for the violation of Helsinki standards. From the beginning, all Helsinki signatories have acknowledged that full implementation of the Helsinki accords' provisions cannot be accomplished overnight and that CSCE necessarily will be a

long-term process. Nonetheless, all signatories are expected to make constant and tangible progress towards full implementation.

As the following CSCE negotiating history will show, the closed Communist systems of the East bloc have been particularly resistant to human rights concerns and to the free flow of ideas, information and people across East-West borders. Efforts by the West to foster the balanced development and implementation of CSCE's humanitarian aspects thus have met with continuing East bloc intransigence.

Belgrade.—For 5 months—between October 4, 1977 and March 9, 1978—delegates of the 35 nations that signed the 1975 Helsinki accords met in Belgrade to determine how well the commitments set out in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had been kept. From their work, a new ingredient in East-West diplomacy emerged: recognition of human rights as an integral aspect of East-West relations. This was an important step on the road toward making Europe a place where human rights are universally respected in all countries, even though it carries no guarantees of speedy results.

Although participants to the Belgrade Meeting examined new proposals, drafted a concluding document and scheduled the next review meeting in Madrid, the main work of the Belgrade Meeting was a line-by-line review of the Final Act. To understand the advance made at Belgrade and the limits on it, it is necessary to remember the rules under which all decisions of the Helsinki process are reached. Decisions of the 35 countries can only be arrived at unanimously; each country has veto power and can reject any proposal or document by withholding its consensus. In addition, all procedural or administrative decisions must be arrived at by consensus. Moreover, the discussions at Belgrade were closed to the public and not transcribed, except for 2 weeks of formal, on-the-record speeches at the start and 1 week at the end of the meeting. Given these circumstances, Belgrade was more what therapists would call an "encounter session" than what jurists would regard as a tribunal. It was better suited for exchanges of views and arguments than for the issuance of formal findings or decrees.

Objectives and Results: The United States and its allies—along with many of the neutral and nonaligned countries—sought to make the review of Final Act implementation the touchstone of the Belgrade Meeting. For the United States, the most urgent and important matters centered on questions of human rights, for it was here that performance was the most glaringly deficient. The working sessions at Belgrade demonstrated the determination of Western and neutral signatories to record specific criticisms of Eastern implementation of the Final Act.

In reviewing past action (and inaction) and in presenting suggestions for new commitments to improve implementation of the Final Act, the Western delegations voiced concern over a number of Helsinki provisions, not just those directly related to human rights. Various East bloc practices came under critical scrutiny, such as barriers to the flow of economic information, impediments to contact between businessmen and potential customers, obstacles to the conduct of scholarly research or scientific collaboration, and censorship of cultural imports. While such topics were unusual diplo-

matic fare, they were not as sensitive aspects of Helsinki noncompliance as repression of dissent, persecution of religious believers, restriction of emigration and interference with journalists. Soviet delegates and their allies objected even to the mention of these latter topics. Discussions of domestic conduct in the field of human rights, the Soviets alleged, constituted interference in the internal affairs of a state (in violation of the Final Act).

Nevertheless the Soviet Union and some of the East European states counterattacked with alleged Western shortcomings, such as racism and economic injustice. In so doing they effectively conceded to the solid Western thesis that no aspect covered by the Final Act—as human rights are by the terms of Principle VII—can be purely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. Tacitly then, the East recognized the legitimacy of human rights as an issue of Helsinki compliance.

Operating under the rule of consensus, the end result of the Belgrade Conference was a terse communique noting that the meeting had been held, that the 35 countries disagreed on many issues, and that they had agreed to meet again at Madrid in 1980. The communique acknowledged the important role of the CSCE process and provided for an experts meeting on cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The Belgrade Concluding Document provided for three meetings of experts to continue the multilateral process and East-West dialogue between the follow-up meetings. Two of these, the Scientific Forum and the experts meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes already were called for in the Final Act. The third, an experts meeting on Cooperation in the Mediterranean, was the one new measure adopted by the Belgrade Meeting. These experts meetings, as the name indicates, were intended to be smaller-scale gatherings up to 6 weeks in duration, dealing with one or two specific CSCE issues. Subsidiary to the Belgrade and Madrid review meetings, the experts meetings were not empowered to make decisions, but could only adopt recommendations, by consensus, for consideration at Madrid.

The Hamburg Scientific Forum.—The Scientific Forum was a 2-week-long meeting in February 1980, preceded by a 6-week-long preparatory meeting that took place in Bonn in June–July 1978. Envisaged as a forum to bring together "leading personalities" in the scientific communities of the participating States—and in this sense the closest CSCE parallel to the Budapest Cultural Forum—the Scientific Forum was originally intended to make a substantial contribution to scientific exchanges among the participants and their scientific institutions. Most delegations, including the one for the United States, consisted mainly of scientists representing a broad range of scientific concerns and endeavors. Unfortunately, the forum took place in a troubled atmosphere, coming on the heels of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the arrest and internal exile of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Andrei Sakharov. During the meeting itself, the Soviet Union was subjected to scathing criticism by a large number of delegations for the treatment of its scientists.

Significantly, the Final Report of the Scientific Forum contained a reference to the importance of human rights in fostering coopera-

tive exchanges, the first explicit reference to human rights in a CSCE document since the original commitment was made in the Final Act in 1975. The Soviets' willingness to agree to this reference demonstrated a readiness to accept strong criticism when perceived to be in their interests to do so—in this case, because, in their view, it would help preserve scientific exchanges and the continuation of the CSCE process.

Montreux Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (PSD).—The Montreux Meeting took place from October 31-December 11, 1978. This meeting was essentially a continuation of lengthy discussions held during the Geneva negotiations prior to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The basis of work at Geneva, as it was at Montreux, was a "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," written by a Swiss legal professor. The concept of the peaceful settlement of disputes is embodied in the Final Act as Principle V of the Declaration of Principles section of Basket I.

Unfortunately, the Montreux Meeting ended without any tangible progress. The Soviet Union and its allies refused to agree to any third party mechanism which would include mandatory procedures for the settlement of international disputes, while Western and neutral countries insisted that mandatory procedures were the only way to enhance already existing methods.

Valletta Meeting on Cooperation in the Mediterranean.—The most problematic of the three experts meetings was the meeting on Mediterranean cooperation held from February 13 to March 26, 1979 in Malta. From the start of the CSCE process, the Maltese have advocated that the participating States pay more attention to the Mediterranean dimension of the Final Act. They have been particularly interested in involving states bordering the Mediterranean which are not CSCE signatories—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Morocco—in the CSCE process and in ventures undertaken under CSCE auspices.

A wide range of proposals for enhanced Mediterranean cooperation (most introduced by Malta but some from other Mediterranean countries) were considered. Many of these proposals were later adopted as recommendations to be presented to the Madrid Meeting for further consideration and possible adoption.

The Valletta Meeting was marginally useful in encouraging somewhat greater cooperation in the Mediterranean without burdening the CSCE process with new administrative machinery and without interfering in ongoing Mediterranean projects.

Madrid.—While the first CSCE review meeting in Belgrade (1977-1978) ended with a terse communique, the second review meeting in Madrid, which expanded over a 3-year period, ended with a comprehensive concluding document.

Objectives and Results: The protracted Madrid Meeting began on November 11, 1980 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and under the threat of an invasion of Poland. The United States chiefly was interested in advancing human rights issues at the conference. The neutral and nonaligned (NNa) European states and NATO allies, fearing that a repeat of Belgrade at Madrid would diminish significantly the stature of the CSCE process and exascerbate East-West tensions, were extremely desirous to end the

Madrid Meeting with a balanced and substantive concluding document. To accomplish these interdependent goals, the United States and its allies developed and maintained a strong and united NATO negotiating position at the meeting.

Adding to the complexity of the negotiations was the fact that many West European and NNa Governments, under growing domestic pressures for disarmament, were anxious that the Madrid Meeting provide an impetus for improvements in East-West relations as well as for the invigoration of arms control negotiations. Combined with a strong effort by the Soviet Union, this led to a push to include in the final document a mandate for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The West reasoned that the U.S.S.R. and its allies, then involved in a European "peace offensive" aimed at deflecting the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces deployments scheduled to begin in late 1983, had a stake in bringing the Madrid Meeting to a successful conclusion in order to show the world that detente was still viable. Under CSCE rules, adoption of a concluding document requires unanimous consensus of the 35 participating States. Ultimately, therefore, it was necessary to reconcile polarized NATO and Warsaw Pact positions.

The other major theme of the Madrid Meeting was human rights. The United States and other Western Governments, with the sympathy and often with the vocal support of the NNa, meticulously documented and protested the East's worsening human rights transgressions and pushed for the adoption of remedial measures.

One year into the already deadlocked proceedings martial law was imposed in Poland and negotiations came to a standstill. The next session was attended by all NATO and most NNa Foreign Ministers, who travelled to Madrid expressly to condemn the crackdown in Poland. As it was obvious that further negotiations would neither be appropriate nor productive under the circumstances then prevailing, the meeting recessed for 8 months. During the break, the human rights situation continued steadily to deteriorate in the Soviet Union. Solidarity was outlawed in Poland and human rights conditions elsewhere in the East bloc remained grim. When delegations returned to the negotiating table in the fall of 1982, the West collectively introduced a package of tough new proposals designed to address the continuing violations in Poland and those taking place elsewhere in the East.

Finally, after a third year of contentious negotiations over human rights and military security issues, the Madrid Meeting ended September 9, 1983 much as it had begun, in a darkening East-West atmosphere. Even the adoption of a lengthy concluding document was overshadowed largely by the Soviet shootdown of the Korean passenger airliner on the eve of the Madrid closing ceremonies. There had been virtually no change for the better in East bloc human rights behavior.

Conclusion and Outlook: For 3 long years at the Madrid Meeting, Western countries succeeded in focusing attention on human rights tragedies and the Eastern countries were forced to pay a political price for their violations of the Helsinki Final Act.

The concluding document that finally emerged from the Madrid Meeting is a balanced and substantive document containing promises for improved East-West relations and the mandate for a post-Madrid Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The document also reflects the West's purposeful preoccupation with humanitarian questions throughout the course of the talks. New or strengthened provisions fall largely on those areas—human rights and human contacts—where experience has shown that the greatest problems exist. The modest textual advances over the original accords include oblique references to Helsinki monitors and direct reference to the right freely to join trade unions (a legacy of Solidarity), to enhanced religious liberty, to measures against terrorism, to better working conditions for journalists and to improved procedures for family reunification.

Provision was also made for specialized or "expert" meetings on a variety of subjects, including the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting and the Budapest Cultural Forum in 1985 as well as the Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting in 1986. In addition, the document called for a successor to the Belgrade and Madrid review conferences, to be held in Vienna beginning November 4, 1986. These meetings create, in effect, a continuing framework for the consideration of a broad range of East-West issues between and among the 35 participating States and keep the door open to the possibility of some concrete progress when the international climate is propitious and the political-will emerges.

Six meetings of the 35 Helsinki signatory states were mandated to be held between Madrid and Vienna in order to explore specific CSCE subjects in more depth. Also, in observance of Helsinki's Tenth Anniversary, a commemorative meeting was scheduled to take place in Finland in August 1985.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE).—On September 9, 1983, the participating States accepted the Madrid Concluding Document which contained a precisely worded mandate for CDE. According to the Madrid mandate, the aim of the CDE is to "undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security, and in achieving disarmament, so as to give affect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

On January 17, 1984, representatives of the 35 participating countries, convened the Stockholm CDE Conference. Designed to enhance CSBMs contained in the Final Act, the Conference's primary purpose was to adopt measures to reduce the danger of war due to misunderstanding or miscalculation.

The objective of the United States and the West at the CDE was to reduce the risk of war by making military activities more predictable and stable, and ensuring that no weapons of any kind are ever used.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies sought to portray the United States as militaristic. In general, the East attempted to broaden the scope of discussions of the Stockholm Conference to include issues outside of the Madrid mandate, such as reduction of conventional arms and general disarmament.

Work on specific proposals got underway in December 1984, with the creation of subsidiary working groups dealing with: Non-use of Force; Information, Verification, and Communication; Constraints; Notification; and Observation.

During the first 2 years, progress at the Stockholm Conference had been glacial due to fundamental differences between the East and West on what constituted the main substantive concern of the meeting. While the NATO countries proposed an array of concrete measures, such as notification and observation of military exercises as well as specific arrangements to monitor and verify compliance with them, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies were reluctant to address the substance of the NATO proposals, charging that they were thinly-disguised efforts at military espionage and insignificant "technical" measures.

In an effort to break the impasse at the time, President Reagan offered in his Dublin speech of June 4, 1984 to "discuss" the Soviet proposal on the non-use of force in Stockholm in exchange for Eastern agreement to "negotiate" on Western CSBMs. While indicating a willingness to deal with the question of non-use of force, the West continued to reject the other Soviet proposals as either unacceptable or inappropriate for consideration at Stockholm.

At the November summit conference in 1985, President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev called for "an early and successful completion of the work of the CDE" and expressed "their intention to facilitate, together with other participating States, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference."

Another impetus for reaching agreement at Stockholm was contained in Gorbachev's mid-January 1986 foreign policy statement, in which he accepted in principle the concept of on-site verification for arms control agreements and suggested that notification of independent naval maneuvers—one of the Warsaw Pact proposals at Stockholm—be "carried over to the next stage of the Conference." In addition, Secretary Gorbachev made special reference to the CDE during the course of his address to the Warsaw Pact leadership in Budapest during the spring of 1986. At that time, the Soviet leader expressed the possibility that proposals for reductions of armed forces and conventional weapons could be discussed during a "second stage" of the CDE.

In an effort to break this impasse in Stockholm, the 16 members of NATO introduced a package of modifications to their original NATO proposal put forward in February 1984. This proposal, put forward on June 30, 1986, was designed to enhance the CSBMs contained in the Helsinki Final Act by:

(1) Raising the numerical threshold above the original Western proposal of 6,000. The numbers under negotiation were in the range of 12,000–14,000 troops.

(2) Providing increased flexibility regarding mobilization practices to meet the concerns of nations which rely upon the mobilization of reserve forces for their national defense.

(3) Shortening the period of observation of notifiable military maneuvers, dropping the original requirement that observers be present for the entire duration of the exercise.

(4) Reducing the number of proposed annual inspections from the original proposal of 2 to 1.

Following the NATO initiative, the Soviets displayed greater flexibility on the crucial issue of verification. In a plenary address, Soviet Marshal Akhromeyev, announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to permit aerial and ground inspection as part of the verification regime under consideration in Stockholm. In an attempt to avoid a deadlock between the East and West over issues concerning aircraft to be used during inspections, the NNa offered to make aircraft available for such purposes. The issue consumed considerable time during the closing days of the conference. The West eventually accepted the NNa offer while the East flatly rejected it. The official clock was stopped on the evening of the 19th as the participants worked to resolve outstanding issues. Consensus finally came on September 21, nearly 3 years after the CDE opened.

The Stockholm Document

On September 22, 1986, representatives of the 35 participating States reached consensus on the following package of CSBMs:

Notification: Each state will be required to provide 42 days advance notification of military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks.

Observation: Each state will be required to invite observers to military activities over a threshold of 17,000 troops.

Inspection: Modalities include both on-site ground and aerial inspection. Each state within the zone of application will be subject to up to three on-site inspections per year, although no state will be obliged to accept more than one inspection from the same state during a single year. While aerial inspections will utilize aircraft supplied by the inspected states, inspectors will have access to the aircraft's navigational equipment, radios, and will be allowed to take photos of the area of inspection.

Inspectors must be permitted to enter the area of inspection within 36 hours after a request has been made. Upon arrival, inspectors will have 48 hours to complete their inspection.

Forecast: Each state will be required to provide an annual calendar of military maneuvers above the 13,000 troop threshold by November 15 of the preceding year. States must provide 2 years advance notification of maneuvers involving 75,000 troops and 1 years notice for those involving 40,000 troops.

Provisions of the Stockholm Document will come into force on January 1, 1987. The Vienna Meeting will review progress made in Stockholm and determine whether to proceed to a new stage of the CDE.

Athens Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (PSD).—A follow-up to the 1978 meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, took place in Athens, Greece from March 21 to April 30, 1984. It concluded with the adoption of a four-paragraph final report indicating a basic lack of progress, which could doom the holding of further meetings on this subject in the CSCE context.

In contrast to the outcome of the Montreux Meeting, the Athens Final Report contained no recommendation for further meetings. It simply noted that the meeting was held, that there was much discussion on the examination and elaboration of a method for peacefully resolving disputes among the 35 states, and that no consensus on such a method was reached.

Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean Within the Framework of the Valletta Meeting of Experts.—The Venice Seminar, held October 16–26, 1984, reviewed progress since the Valletta Meeting of 1979 and produced a final report calling for renewed action in specific areas. Unlike the East-West dimension of most CSCE meetings, the focus of the Venice Seminar was on relations between the more prosperous northern countries of Europe, the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and the Mediterranean states on the other.

U.S. objectives at the seminar—aimed largely at maintaining the status quo—were generally achieved. The United States and other CSCE participants undertook no additional specific commitments as a result of the seminar other than to give a pledge of general support for various Mediterranean economic, scientific and cultural activities, many of which were already underway.

Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting.—The NATO countries viewed the HREM as a centerpiece of the post-Madrid human rights-related meetings which the West insisted upon to ensure balance between the Final Act's humanitarian aspects and its security dimension. On May 7, 1985, experts from the 35 participating States convened to discuss "questions concerning respect, in their states, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in all their aspects, as embodied in the Final Act." The HREM was mandated to "draw up conclusions and recommendations to be submitted to the Governments of all participating States."

The United States' principal objectives for Ottawa were: to demonstrate continued concern for human rights within the CSCE framework and commitment to achieving balanced progress in all aspects of CSCE, including human rights; to conduct an exhaustive review of compliance with CSCE human rights provisions, encouraging resolution of human rights cases; to encourage improved implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid human rights provisions through agreement on new measures; and, to counter efforts by the East to portray their social and economic systems as superior to those of the West in fulfilling human social and economic aspirations.

As early as the Ottawa preparatory meeting, which took place the 2 weeks immediately prior to the main meeting, it was evident that the Soviet Union and its East European allies viewed Ottawa chiefly as a "damage control" exercise. During the review of implementation phase of the meeting the West and sympathetic neutrals thoroughly addressed the East's human rights violations of freedom of expression, trade union and national minority rights, and freedom of religion as well as poor Soviet performance in the social and economic area. In response to the criticism, the Soviet delegation delivered a series of strident broadsides against the ills of capitalist society, taking particular aim at the United States and Britain.

Due to Soviet intransigence, the meeting failed to fulfill the second part of its mandate—the drawing up of conclusions and recommendations. Increasingly isolated and resented for their obstructionism, the Soviets refused to deal seriously with Western and neutral proposals related to improved human rights performance, in the end going so far as to block consensus on a recommendation

that the Vienna Meeting even consider holding another HREM. The West and the neutrals reaffirmed their essential unity of views and values on human rights, agreeing at the close of the HREM that no final document was preferable to one which would merely paper over differences.

An important legacy of the Ottawa Meeting was the draft document OME.47, a collection of conclusions and recommendations put forward by 17 Western countries (NATO states plus Ireland), which reflected a common human rights agenda.

The Helsinki Tenth Anniversary.—At the invitation of the Government of Finland, the Foreign Ministers of the 35 participating States met July 30 through August 1, 1985 in Helsinki to commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Final Act's signing.

Speaking for the United States, Secretary of State George Shultz said that it had no illusions in 1975, and has none today. Words alone cannot strengthen security and nurture freedom. "The message of the Final Act," Shultz stated, "was that we can reduce the divisions in Europe, that we can ease the sufferings they have caused, and that we can someday hope to see an undivided peaceful continent, if we are wise enough, practical enough, dedicated enough. . . . We all knew that it would not be easy to turn our hopes into reality. We knew that our expectations about what could be would have to be tempered by realism, that progress might come slowly." Secretary Shultz concluded that the lesson of the first 10 years of the Helsinki accords is that "greater security and a more stable peace among our nations depend on greater freedom for the people of Europe." This same theme was sounded repeatedly thoughout the 3-day observances by all NATO ministers and by the vast majority of neutral and nonaligned envoys.

The new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevarnadze called the Helsinki Final Act a "document of truly historic significance" which "orients states to live in peace, to cooperate fruitfully, and not to foist one's own views and rules upon others." Shevarnadze's address was measured but heavily weighed with Soviet peace propaganda and allusions to a revival of detente. The thrust of his message was designed to skew Helsinki efforts away from human rights toward the Soviet conception of European security.

The Budapest Cultural Forum.—At the invitation of the Government of Hungary, a 6-week Cultural Forum convened in Budapest October 15, 1985. The Forum, attended by "leading personalities in the field of culture from the participating States," was mandated to discuss "interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and cooperation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture." In all areas where Soviet agreement was not required, the results were good; where consensus was required, the Soviets and their allies blocked progress. Frank discussion of human rights-related cultural problems was possible but agreement on a substantive concluding document listing these problems was not. Contrary to the hopes and expectations of many delegations, the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva had no perceptible impact on the Forum.

Going into the Forum, the United States had several main objectives, all shared in greater or lesser degree by its allies. First, it was considered fundamental that there be a frank exposition of the

problems of cultural creation, dissemination and cooperation in the East-West context, including specific reference to the human rights-related issues which underlie those problems. The U.S. delegation (and other Western delegations) and a number of cultural personalities confronted a number of these issues head-on, naming both culprits and victims.

A second major goal was to assure the proper conditions for the activities of private groups and individuals present in Budapest during the Forum. When the U.S. at the Madrid Meeting, agreed to Budapest as the site for the Forum, the Hungarian Government promised to observe the Madrid precedent for treatment of nongovernmental groups and individuals. As it turned out, the Hungarians, in a formal sense, reneged on their commitment by refusing to permit NGO activities—primarily a series of seminars on cultural freedom organized by the International Helsinki Federation—to take place in hotel rooms. However, in practice, they were flexible and allowed the same activities to take place in private apartments. Given the reality in Eastern Europe, most observers, including the private participants, felt that the practical resolution of this problem was a positive outcome.

A third objective was to provide an opportunity for all cultural personalities to engage in a give and take discussion with their counterparts from other participating States. This aim was only partially achieved in the Forum itself because of the near total Soviet insistence on strict observance of CSCE procedures requiring speakers' lists and containing no limitation on the length of speeches. Outside the Forum, there were greater opportunities for more informal contacts among the cultural figures, which were exploited to some extent. An unexpected development was the initial hesitation or disinclination of a number of cultural personalities to discuss basic impediments to greater cultural cooperation such as censorship, jamming and travel restrictions. As the Forum wore on and more experience was gained, this initial reluctance to tackle core issues became less of a problem.

It was clear that the Soviets had decided early on against any kind of a substantive concluding document at Budapest, even one doing little more than listing the more than 200 proposals put forward by delegations and cultural personalities themselves during the Forum. The most the Soviets could have accepted was a short, factual statement along the lines proposed by the Hungarians at the last hour and unexpectedly vetoed by their fraternal Romanian neighbors. The Western countries in the end produced a proposed final document representing their views, BCF.116. While not adopted along with an Eastern proposal and an informal neutral compromise effort, BCF.116 presents a good, balanced statement of Western views toward East-West cultural relations.

Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting.—Among other human contacts measures considered at Madrid, the Helsinki Commission staff initially proposed the idea for what later was to evolve into a Human Contacts Experts Meeting (HCEM). With great reluctance, and in order to facilitate agreement on their prime objective at the review conference—the CDE—the Soviets agreed to the HCEM near the end of Madrid. The meeting convened April 15, 1986 in Bern, Switzerland, 1986, in accordance with the mandate "to dis-

cuss the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations," the results of which were to "be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting."

A primary goal of the United States at Bern was to achieve better compliance on existing commitments. For the first time in CSCE, several Western countries witnessed some significant results occurring within the context of an ongoing CSCE meeting. The Romanian delegation announced the resolution of about one-half of the cases presented to it by the United States. The Bulgarians resolved 12 of 18 U.S. representation list cases the week before the Bern Meeting opened. On the last scheduled day of the meeting, the Soviet authorities in Moscow gave U.S. officials the names of 36 families whose cases were to be resolved. Within 10 days the names of an additional 29 families to be given permission to emigrate were announced. In all, the resolution of the Soviet cases would affect about 200 persons.

A second primary goal was to examine how the human contacts provisions of Helsinki and Madrid have been implemented thus far. The freer flow of people across East-West borders was forthrightly raised as the overriding humanitarian theme of the Bern Meeting. The West forcefully raised problems regarding family visits, family reunification, binational marriages, travel for personal and professional purposes, trade union contacts, postal and telephone communications, and contacts between members of a religious faith or a national minority. In light of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union, which occurred during the course of the meeting, the U.S. delegation called upon the Soviet Union to improve channels of communication between Soviet citizens and their relatives in the West. The discussion, which often went into considerable detail on these issues, was direct but did not evoke responses from the East as confrontational as those at meetings in Ottawa and Budapest.

After a discussion of various new proposals submitted by both East and West, the West introduced a draft final document, BME.47, which distilled Western concerns and offered practical new provisions designed to reduce obstacles to East-West contacts. The East also tabled a document, BME.48, which attempted to divert attention from their implementation shortcomings.

As the meeting drew to a close, the neutral and nonaligned nations submitted a draft compromise document, BME.49, which incorporated elements from both Eastern and Western papers. While, as finally refined, all other 34 states indicated they could accept BME.49, the U.S. delegation at the last minute surprised the meeting by casting a lone veto, arguing that the text was so filled with loopholes and qualifications that any positive elements it contained would be outweighed by its shortcomings. Many delegations expressed strong disagreement and disappointment with the U.S. decision, but they agreed that the discussion at Bern in itself had made a useful contribution to the promotion of contacts between the peoples of East and West.

POSITIVE ASPECTS OF CSCE PRINCIPLES

Public diplomacy and the CSCE principles

The "Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States" stands at the heart of the Helsinki Final Act. These 10 principles set forth basic standards by which the signatory states agree to behave in their relations with one another, as well as the spirit in which they will conduct their relations with states not signatory to the Helsinki Agreement. As such, the Declaration can be considered the most important political element in the entire Helsinki document.

As anticipated, the provisions of the Declaration of Principles in Basket I have not been fully implemented since the signing of the Final Act in 1975. The Declaration has, however, helped to focus public attention on three issues—human rights abuses, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and events in Poland during the past several years—which constitute instances of noncompliance. The principles have supplied the participating States with a justification and a useful diplomatic tool with which to call public attention to these and other violations of the Final Act. They have also constituted an international standard by which participating States can be held accountable.

The CSCE principles and the process originated at Helsinki have helped to establish human rights as a legitimate issue of international concern, and have provided additional instruments for calling attention to and promoting greater respect for such rights. In this sense, the entire process of CSCE has been a source of hope to citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The comprehensive, probing review of implementation, held during the follow-up conferences in Belgrade from 1977–78 and in Madrid from 1980–83, clearly established the legitimacy of the human rights issue in East-West discourse. It is now generally recognized by the CSCE signatories that the manner in which a state treats its own citizens is of legitimate concern to all the other states in the Helsinki process and an integral element in building confidence and security among them.

The mere holding of the Belgrade and Madrid Review Meetings created political pressures which helped bring about some progress in human rights in the nations of Eastern Europe. These countries, wishing to diminish potentially embarrassing criticisms of human rights violations, took steps—some significant, others more cosmetic—prior to the review meetings to ease repressive or restrictive practices which might have been subject to criticism during the implementation review. In some countries, political prisoners were given amnesty, political dissidents permitted to emigrate and a number of long-standing family reunification cases favorably resolved. This pressure for compliance, induced by periodic review meetings such as Belgrade and Madrid, has made the Helsinki process a significant and unique tool of international diplomacy through which the violators of human rights have been held accountable for those actions which contradict the Final Act.

Political relations and contacts with Eastern Europe

Among the political benefits of the CSCE process is that it serves, through various bilateral and multilateral contacts, as a channel for political dialogue with the East even when other forums have been reduced in status or suspended. It has thus contributed to more regular and stable East-West relations, despite continuing tensions and differences.

The Helsinki process has also provided a valuable multilateral framework which has encouraged bilateral discussions and high-level contacts between the United States and the nations of Eastern Europe other than the Soviet Union. The commitments undertaken at Helsinki—contained in the principles and, indeed, throughout the Final Act—have facilitated the United States' pursuit of a policy of differentiation in its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. The Helsinki framework has enabled East European nations to engage in bilateral endeavors with the West, including the United States, that were not previously possible and has given the East European states marginally greater room for maneuver vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in conducting their foreign and domestic policy. This limited increase in flexibility has been demonstrated in the series of bilateral meetings covering the broad range of CSCE issues, including human rights, held between the United States and many of the East European countries since the end of the Belgrade Meeting in 1978.

These bilateral consultations provided the framework for a broader and more indepth exchange of views on both bilateral and international issues than would ever have been possible before the initiation of the CSCE process. For the most part, these talks were held between the Belgrade and Madrid Meetings as part of the bilateral approach to implementation called for in the follow-up section of the Helsinki Final Act. A new round of bilaterals is expected to take place around the time of the Vienna review conference in late 1986.

A unique and direct result of the human rights dimension of the Final Act were the two bilateral roundtable discussions on human rights issues held between the United States and Romania. Conducted in Bucharest in February 1980 and in Washington in February 1984, these human rights roundtables provided valuable opportunities for the United States to encourage improvements in Romania's human rights performance. Use of the human rights roundtable format was specifically endorsed by the Madrid Concluding Document. In addition to these bilateral U.S.-East European talks on CSCE issues, the Helsinki era ushered in a series of high-level talks between the United States and Eastern Europe in which CSCE issues were discussed at length.

The Helsinki monitoring movement

Following the signing of the Final Act, Principle VII, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, unexpectedly sparked a new awareness of and demand for basic human rights throughout the Soviet Union and the rest of Eastern Europe. The mass circulation of the text of the Final Act in the media of Eastern Europe made millions familiar with the important precepts on human

rights and fundamental freedoms which recently their Governments freely had endorsed. This development and what followed was welcomed by the United States as a positive step forward.

Beginning in May 1976, voluntary Helsinki Monitoring Groups were formed, first in Moscow and later in Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. These small but unique and unprecedented citizens' groups were comprised of individuals guided by the Principle VII recognition of their right to "know and act upon" their rights. Seeking to encourage the Soviet authorities to bring their human rights practices more into line with the pledges it had made in Helsinki, these groups published numerous reports documenting violations of human rights. Numerous other monitoring groups concerned with specific issues covered by the Final Act's Declaration of Principles also emerged in the U.S.S.R. after 1976, many of which were affiliated with the original Helsinki Monitoring Groups. These included the Working Commission on Psychiatric Abuse, the Christian Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers, the Association of Free Unions of Workers (AFTU) and the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers (SMOT). In June 1982, the first unofficial peace group in the U.S.S.R., called the Group to Establish Trust Between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., was formed in Moscow. This group issued appeals calling upon both the United States and the Soviet Union to end the arms race and specifically urged the U.S.S.R. to bring its practices, including the handling of foreign mail and access to foreign journals, into line with international norms. Regrettably, members of all these groups have been subjected to varying forms of harassment and repression including imprisonment and incarceration in psychiatric hospitals.

Similar citizen Helsinki Monitoring Groups were established in several other East European countries. In January 1977, in Czechoslovakia, approximately 300 citizens signed Charter '77 and formed a loose-knit organization which has published voluminous reports on the status of the Czechoslovak Government's implementation of its own laws and international obligations, including the Helsinki Final Act. Today, despite continued harassment and imprisonment, particularly of its leaders, there are over 1,000 signatories of Charter '77. In 1978, an affiliated group, the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) was formed to report and document violations of basic human freedoms.

In Poland, the Committee on Worker's Self-Defense (KOR) was formed in September 1976 by a small group of intellectuals dedicated to defending the rights of striking workers in the city of Radom. In 1977, KOR broadened its activities to include the wide range of human and civil rights in Poland, and in 1979 organized Poland's first Helsinki Monitoring Committee, which like its counterparts in the other East European countries, has issued a series of reports documenting the observance of human and civil rights in Poland. KOR was subsequently instrumental in the formation of the free trade union, Solidarity, in August 1980, and key members were arrested after martial law was imposed in 1981. These members were released from prison in the July 1984 conditional amnesty. Today, a newly constituted Helsinki Committee, closely affiliated with the Solidarity Underground, regularly issues reports documenting human rights violations in Poland.

Clearly, the Helsinki Final Act and, specifically, the Basket I Declaration of Principles has kindled new hopes and evoked new awareness of human and civil rights throughout Europe and North America. Despite the repression of many of the members of the various Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the East European countries, these groups have demonstrated that the Helsinki Final Act is a unique and unprecedented means of exposing human rights abuses in their respective countries.

The Final Act prompted the establishment of a Helsinki monitoring movement in the United States and Western Europe as well. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a U.S. Government agency, was formed in 1976 and charged with monitoring and encouraging Helsinki compliance in Eastern Europe as well as the United States. In the private sector, the New York-based Helsinki Watch Committee was established in 1978 and has issued numerous comprehensive reports on the status of human rights in CSCE signatory nations, including the United States. Helsinki Watch has counterparts in eight European countries and together these organizations form the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights with headquarters in Vienna. The Helsinki process also reinvigorated the many existing human rights, ethnic and religious organizations in North America and Europe who focused their efforts on achieving compliance with the principles of the Final Act.

Strengthening NATO unity

From the U.S. perspective, one of the most important contributions of the CSCE process has been the possibilities it has afforded for the strengthening of unity and cohesion among the NATO allies. The approach of the United States to many of the significant issues raised by the Helsinki Final Act often has differed from that of West European allies. Nevertheless, these differences have been resolved and the NATO group has consistently been able to speak and act in concert. Such unity of purpose has been critical to the progress that has been made in CSCE.

NATO unity has been preserved and strengthened through an elaborate caucusing mechanism in which differences between the allies have been meticulously ironed out. The focal point of these discussions has been NATO headquarters in Brussels, where CSCE issues are considered on a regular basis. During CSCE review or experts meetings, the heads of delegation of all the NATO countries regularly meet as a NATO caucus to discuss pertinent developments and to coordinate policy. The success of these NATO caucuses at the Belgrade and Madrid Meetings, as well as at the numerous experts meetings held in the CSCE process, has significantly advanced the spirit of allied unity among NATO countries, particularly at a time when the alliance has been under stress in other areas.

THE EUROPEAN VIEW

On the basis of information supplied to the Commission by other signatory states, a clear picture emerges that in Western Europe, as in the United States, the Helsinki Final Act and, in particular,

its Basket I Declaration of Principles, is considered to have brought several nonquantifiable yet important political benefits. Broadly speaking, these countries consider the central contribution of the CSCE process, embodied in the principles set forth in Basket I, to be the establishment of a lasting framework of East-West relations, within which both sides have been forced to confront and deal with a wide array of important political, military, social and cultural issues.

For the West Europeans, the CSCE process has added a new multilateral dimension to relations in Europe, setting relations between them, despite occasional setbacks, on a new more forward-looking course, aimed at increasing dialogue and mutual understanding. More specifically, the Europeans see the principles of the Helsinki Final Act as having provided a series of political advantages to the West including fostering high-level political contacts, the establishment of human rights questions as legitimate topics of international attention, and the establishment of a continuing monitoring process for human rights and other CSCE issues. Other benefits have included the encouragement of more independent activity by the nations of Eastern Europe and the increased significance of the role of the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries in solving the problems confronting contemporary Europe.

High on the list of significant contributions of the CSCE process in the view of many West European states is the notion that the Helsinki Final Act and its principles have enhanced the normal fabric of East-West bilateral relations by building upon established principles of mutual cooperation and supplementing them in fields not covered by existing bilateral treaties and arrangements. This has been particularly true in the case of the F.R.G.-G.D.R. relationship.

As Austrian Foreign Ministry officials have pointed out, the CSCE process has helped to maintain, in the troubled 1980's, a modicum of bilateral cooperation between East and West built up during the detente era of the 1970's. Corresponding to this view, French officials emphasized that the Helsinki process has provided the only forum within which all European countries (with the exception of Albania) can meet consistently together and currently contributes the only effective forum wherein East and West are talking on a regular basis. The French consider the CSCE framework to be the only concrete proof of the unity of Europe. Others consider CSCE as one of the few surviving elements of detente.

Some West European countries take this notion even further. Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen has expressed concern that, without CSCE, East and West currently would hardly be talking to one another and that there would be no instrument to discuss serious East-West issues. An official of the Dutch Foreign Ministry has emphasized the importance of the CSCE process as a natural channel of communication—a channel significantly kept open by the East when it had closed others in the wake of the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In fact, the CSCE process has provided the forum for all of the high-level political contacts held between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. in 1983 to 1985, a time when bilateral relations were at a low point. Secretary of State George Shultz met with Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko in September 1983 at the conclusion of the Madrid Meeting, in January 1984 at the inaugural session of the Stockholm CDE Conference, and at the Helsinki Tenth Anniversary in August 1985, where Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met for the first time. These CSCE meetings also provided opportunities for bilateral contacts among the other Foreign Ministers of Eastern and Western Europe. The ability of the CSCE process to weather storms in East-West relations was again demonstrated September 22, 1986, when the signatories reached consensus on a Stockholm document amid the tensions created by the hostage-taking of journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, which was threatening a United States-Soviet summit.

The proven durability and timelessness of the Final Act's Declaration of Principles are viewed by some West European states as enabling the nations of Europe to deal with crisis management situations in times of East-West tensions. In the view of Austria, the Helsinki process has contributed to a more relaxed atmosphere in Europe and, in many respects, has contributed to the development of less complicated procedures in the shaping of European political relations.

However, most West European states stop short of directly crediting CSCE for specific improvements in bilateral relations with nations of the East. Many of these improvements had been set in motion before the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and thereby could not be attributable solely to the influence of the CSCE process. For instance, Austrian officials note that the provisions of the Final Act's Declaration of Principles had been guiding Austria's relations with Eastern Europe even before 1975, and therefore could not be said to have a direct influence on its substantive relations with those nations. A notable exception to this case was the Federal Republic of Germany, which stresses that the F.R.G.-Polish agreements of 1975, that eventually enabled 270,000 ethnic Germans living in Poland to resettle in the F.R.G. bore a direct relationship to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

Most West European sources observe that high-level political contacts and visits with the countries of the East had increased since the CSCE process began, but notably do not attribute this increase either solely or directly to Helsinki-related factors. However, many do emphasize that CSCE had created the framework, despite increased East-West tension in recent years, for these bilateral and multilateral contacts to continue and even, in some cases, to expand. For instance, Greek officials note that they make reference to the Final Act in all agreements signed with the countries of Eastern Europe, but admitted that it was difficult to determine whether it was existing government policy or the Final Act which was responsible for the agreements themselves. Officials of the Federal Republic of Germany directly credit the CSCE process with having facilitated governmental contacts with the G.D.R., particularly the increasing high-level political contacts of recent years.

In the view of the West Europeans, the original Soviet goal of using the CSCE, particularly the Declaration of Principles, as a surrogate peace treaty ratifying the post-war political situation in Europe, has failed. CSCE has not led, as some had predicted, to a consolidation of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Nor has it

generated measures towards change in Western Europe. On the contrary, according to officials of the United Kingdom, the Final Act established a standard of behavior and values which already existed in Western Europe. While the Final Act did not require any fundamental changes in the societies of the West, it has in the East.

In addition, as pointed out by U.K. officials, the Final Act's Declaration of Principles, particularly Principle I on the sovereign equality of states, which recognizes the right to change frontiers by peaceful means, has provided the opportunity for the West, and particularly the F.R.G., to address the question of German reunification, as well as the general problem of the division of Europe, in a peaceful way.

Several countries noted that the principles of the Final Act have helped increase the maneuvering space of the smaller East European states vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In this view, which is shared by the U.S. Government, the CSCE process has enabled the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies to operate, at least marginally, more independently and more freely in multilateral endeavors in Europe. In addition, as noted by Foreign Ministry officials in the Netherlands, the people of the countries of Eastern Europe have attached great importance to the Helsinki principles as safeguards of national sovereignty.

A point stressed by several West European countries is that an important aspect of the CSCE process is the active participation of all European states, each having equal rights and, thereby, an equal voice in the future of the process. This political fact was deemed to be particularly important to the NNA countries who have endeavored to use their participation in the CSCE process to expand their political influence in Europe and their impact on issues heretofore considered solely in the domain of East-West relations. Noteworthy in this regard has been the key mediating role the NNA states have played at many fora held as part of the CSCE process, particularly the Madrid Meeting and Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting. Similarly, the Stockholm CDE Conference has given the NNA countries an unprecedented opportunity to participate directly in important security negotiations affecting Europe.

The West European CSCE states are in basic agreement that the CSCE review mechanism, embodied in periodic review conferences such as Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna have added a new and valuable dimension to the CSCE process. As one Western CSCE signatory emphasized, the Helsinki process has brought the issues of human rights and human contacts into the focus of international attention. These sentiments have been echoed by officials of the United Kingdom who emphasize that CSCE has helped raise certain issues in a direct way with the countries of Eastern Europe which, prior to the Helsinki era, would have been difficult. Through the CSCE review mechanism, these Eastern countries have been forced to confront and discuss issues they would prefer to avoid, most notably, human rights. Similarly, Dutch officials emphasize that meetings like Belgrade and Madrid provided useful fora for calling attention to Soviet and East European human

rights violations. The pressure of review conferences of this sort has, in their view, a positive effect on implementation.

This view was also endorsed by many non-NATO countries. According to Swedish Foreign Ministry officials, the Helsinki Final Act and specifically Principle VII, the human rights principle, has legitimized international action and a process of criticism in matters relating to the safeguarding of human rights. Officials of the Holy See stressed that the CSCE principles opened a "Pandora's Box" permitting people recourse to action in terms of human rights and creating possibilities for concerned people throughout Europe to raise human rights issues directly with East European Governments, thereby making human rights a legitimate topic of international discourse. Through the CSCE process, many countries stressed, both East and West have had to acknowledge the mutual right to monitor implementation of all the provisions of the Final Act.

French officials carry this argument further. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act, they emphasized, permitted the West to maintain permanent pressure on human rights issues, and to make a direct connection between human rights and security issues in Europe. Without the Final Act, they note, the human rights movements in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe would not have been able to operate as long as they have. The linkage of their activities to the principles of the Final Act has provided them extra latitude with the authorities in Eastern Europe.

The Europeans, however, are acutely aware of the limitations of the CSCE process and caution against excessive public expectations in human rights and other Helsinki-related issues as well. Most could agree with the sentiments expressed by former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in his address to the inaugural session of the Stockholm CDE Conference. Despite progress in some areas, he said, respect for human rights in Europe had certainly not increased to the extent aimed at in Helsinki. While recognizing this fact, many cautioned that the CSCE process was geared to the long-term, that it could not bring about immediate, far-reaching improvements in various CSCE fields nor heal the ideological rift between East and West. In their view, it was never realistic to expect that CSCE standards of behavior would be implemented overnight. Nor could the CSCE process be counted on to preclude crises or setbacks in East-West relations.

Rather, in the European view, through the CSCE, a process of slow improvement of relations could be achieved. French officials stress that the spirit of Helsinki should not be viewed as something already achieved but as a dynamic, ongoing process with its own fluctuations. Similarly, officials in the United Kingdom stress that because one country might violate certain provisions of the Final Act, these actions by no means signified that the provisions were worthless. On the contrary, the French assert that while the Final Act had created the unfortunate illusion to some that relations with the Soviet Union had normalized, the CSCE process had nevertheless helped the West maintain relations with the East even during the worst of times. The mere existence of the CSCE process, in this view, has had a beneficial effect on life in all of Europe. Despite repeated violations of its provisions, the Helsinki Final Act

remains a fixed point of reference for public opinion in both East and West Europe.

While disappointment was expressed in many countries with the overall level of progress made in implementing the Final Act's human rights provisions, the Holy See emphasizes that the CSCE process had opened up unprecedented possibilities for improved respect for religious liberty in Eastern Europe. Improvements were particularly noted in the dissemination of religious material, in the well-being of various, but certainly not all, religious communities, and in the opportunities for increased contacts between these communities and the outside world.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF RENUNCIATION OF THE FINAL ACT

Arguments for renunciation

There have been suggestions that the United States unilaterally renounce, or threaten to renounce, the Helsinki Final Act on the grounds that continuing and egregious violations of the human rights provisions by the Soviet Union and its East European allies have, in effect, rendered the agreement meaningless. This argument views the Final Act as a trade-off between the Soviet desire for Western ratification of the post-World War II borders in Europe and the Western desire for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks. In addition, to gain additional support for CSCE, the Soviets agreed to a set of provisions concerning human rights. Since Helsinki the Soviets and most of its allies in Eastern Europe have shown continuing and contemptuous disregard for the human rights commitments under the Final Act, and therefore, the United States need no longer be bound by its commitments under the Act. Indeed, according to this argument, continued U.S. involvement in CSCE serves to hide these violations and perpetuates the illusion that the Soviets have respectable humanitarian concerns.

The argument concludes that this "charade" should stop. If the United States should move to renounce the Final Act, hopefully in conjunction with some NATO allies, there is a possibility the Soviets and East Europeans might reconsider some of their policies in order to save what they may have to gain in the CSCE process. If not, they would at least get the message that there is a high price to pay for their poor human rights performance. Technically, all that is needed to renounce the Final Act, which is not a formal treaty and therefore a nonbinding declaration of intent, is for the President to undo with a stroke of the pen that which President Ford signed for the United States in 1975. In short, it would be a legal, nonbelligerent and cost-free way to make evident U.S. abhorrence of East bloc human rights performance.

Legal considerations of renunciation

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe have been guilty of gross violations of the Final Act. According to legal experts from the Department of State and the Library of Congress, the President can unilaterally renounce the Final Act. From an international legal point of view, it makes no difference whether the act of renunciation be directed toward all the signatories or merely toward one, although in terms of the

Final Act itself, renunciation toward an individual state would appear to be a violation itself ("[The participating States] declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of [the principles] in its relations with *all* other participating States."). Furthermore, as a practical matter renunciation vis-a-vis an individual state would appear to be difficult or politically impossible because of the likely reaction of the other states and the emphasis on cohesion and indivisibility throughout the CSCE process. Finally, renunciation of the nonbinding Final Act would not leave the United States with residual commitments upon which we could lay subsequent claim.

World War II boundaries

Contrary to a widespread and continuing public belief, fostered by the Soviets and the Western press at the time of the Helsinki signing, the expert legal view of the effect of the Final Act on Europe's World War II boundaries is that, basically, the document makes no difference since it goes no further and, in some cases, not as far as previous international arrangements on frontiers. Moreover, rather than constitute a consolidation of Soviet territorial claims, the Final Act language is substantially less than what the Soviets sought at the outset of the negotiations. Consequently, the claim that the Soviets achieved legal ratification of World War II borders at Helsinki and that, by renouncing the Final Act, the United States could withdraw its ratification, is a specious argument.

Advantages of U.S. renunciation for the East

It is highly questionable whether U.S. renunciation of the Final Act would mean an end to the CSCE process. There were signs from the beginning of the process that the Soviets strongly preferred to have CSCE with the Americans looking on from the outside. It was only the insistence of the NATO countries which forced the Soviets to accept the United States as a participant. How the leadership in Moscow now views U.S. participation is open to question, but given previous Soviet opposition and sharp U.S. criticism of human rights abuses at the Belgrade and Madrid Review Conferences and the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting, it seems reasonable to conclude that they might not be displeased to see the United States as the outsider and to see themselves as the dominant force in CSCE. The commensurate gains in seeing the United States removed from an important European forum and separated from its allies might be a very acceptable counter-balance.

Effect on other CSCE participants

U.S. renunciation of the Final Act would most likely produce a strong negative effect among other participants. Since most West European nations hope for some concrete long-term results from CSCE and see the U.S. emphasis on human rights as a possible impediment to progress in other areas, it is doubtful whether even its closest NATO allies could be persuaded to go along with the United States. A more probable result would be that allies and others would interpret withdrawal as a sign of decreased U.S. interest and influence in Europe. For many, there is the belief that there is a

better chance of altering Soviet behavior through CSCE than without it. They could well conclude that the United States does not care to be a part of the first all-European effort to reduce tension and that the United States prefers to retreat from a tough problem rather than fight for what it believes.

The dissidents

Dissidents initially reacted negatively to the Helsinki Final Act. They felt it legitimized Soviet annexation of the Baltic states and other territories after World War II. Soon, however, dissidents had discovered that the Helsinki accords made human rights a legitimate item on the international diplomatic agenda. Acting on that discovery, citizen Helsinki monitoring groups were established in various parts of the U.S.S.R.; the movement also spread into Czechoslovakia and later to Poland.

As the Soviet human rights situation worsened in the early 1980's, some emigre dissidents, including some who were Helsinki monitors, have again rejected the Helsinki accords. Generally, they reject the Final Act because the Helsinki process has not resulted in prisoner releases—especially of those imprisoned in the U.S.S.R. for their Helsinki monitoring. They believe that the threat of renouncing Helsinki can cause the release of those monitors who are currently serving sentences for their activities. They conclude that the continuation of the Helsinki process in its present form legitimizes oppressive systems and can have only negative effects.

This argument arose solely among Soviet emigrants. Soviet and East European Helsinki-watchers and other dissidents have declared repeatedly that Western pressure on their governments provides their staunchest support. U.S. withdrawal from CSCE would presumably have a devastating effect on these individuals and others who might be inclined to follow them. How could they not help but think, buttressed by Soviet propaganda, that the United States had abandoned them?

Basis for complaint

Since there is little chance that the other Western participants would allow the United States to renounce its CSCE commitments vis-a-vis the Soviet Union alone, the only way open is renunciation toward all participants. Either way the United States would lose its right to review and criticize Soviet and East European shortcomings in violation of the Helsinki Final Act. As Belgrade and Madrid have shown, without a strong U.S. voice in the lead, there is little inclination among other CSCE signatories to hold the Soviets to account on such politically sensitive subjects as human rights. The net result of a U.S. withdrawal could be silence.

CONCLUSION

Looking ahead

On November 4, 1986, in Vienna, the 35 CSCE signatories commenced the third review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Like the two previous meetings, Belgrade (1977–78) and Madrid (1980–83), Vienna will have a threefold function: a review of the implementation records of the partici-

pating States, the consideration of new proposals to enhance the provisions of and promote compliance with the Final Act (and the Madrid Concluding Document), and the possible adoption of a concluding document. The meeting will examine all aspects of CSCE—humanitarian (human rights and human contacts), security, economic and other forms of cooperation—and will examine the outcome of the six post-Madrid subsidiary meetings on specific areas.

As the United States begins the Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE, it knows from the past 11 years of tough negotiations that the West faces an uphill fight in its continuing effort to preserve and promote the human dimension of CSCE.

From the beginning, the United States has struggled to preserve balance in CSCE among all its aspects, but particularly between its security and humanitarian aspects. The United States has worked to counter Eastern efforts to turn the process into a one-dimensional security platform for Soviet peace propaganda. The challenge in Vienna to maintain real balance between the security and humanitarian aspects of CSCE will be especially difficult to achieve in light of General Secretary Gorbachev's recent initiative on conventional arms control, which he suggested might be folded into CSCE via the Stockholm CDE and the recently adopted Stockholm Agreement.

The Helsinki process was painstakingly started in Geneva. It has developed slowly and has suffered many setbacks. But, despite its imperfections, the Helsinki process is an important instrument of diplomacy for the United States and for the other Western democracies. In East-West relations, the Helsinki process has become a vehicle by which concerns in humanitarian, military, political, economic, social, cultural and other fields routinely are raised and discussed. Helsinki's European focus ensures that debate remains centered on an area where Western ideas fall on fertile soil. The future of the process will remain dependent on persistent efforts to bring its promises to fruition.

CHAPTER THREE—SECURITY IN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

The first section or "basket" of the Helsinki Final Act has two main parts. The first part is a declaration of 10 principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating States agree to observe in relations with one another as well as with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating States endorse certain confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

The following 10 principles are contained in the declaration of principles guiding relations among states in the Helsinki Final Act:

Principle I.—Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle II.—Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Principle III.—Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle IV.—Territorial integrity of states;

Principle V.—Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle VI.—Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Principle VII.—Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle VIII.—Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle IX.—Cooperation among states; and

Principle X.—Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN

In direct violation of at least half of the principles of the Final Act, approximately 120,000 Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan, nearly 7 years after the initial invasion in December 1979. The Soviet occupation and subjugation of Afghanistan violates the letter and spirit of the Final Act, the U.N. Charter, and other international accords. Considerable attention was focused on the Soviet occupation during the Madrid Meeting by the United States, the Western allies, and the neutral and nonaligned countries. In addition, continued Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has been the subject of extensive debate at the United Nations and other

international fora. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has refused to undertake a meaningful withdrawal of its troops.

In the introductory language of Basket I, the participating States recognized "the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole." Accordingly, events in Afghanistan cannot be isolated from events in Europe. The principles guiding relations among states are applicable to the situation in Afghanistan. The continued Soviet occupation of, and military activity in Afghanistan violates at least five principles of the declaration: Principle I which calls upon the participating States to respect the right of every state to "juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and independence"; Principle II which calls upon the participating States "to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state"; Principle VIII which calls on the participating States to "respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination"; Principle IX which stipulates that the signatories "develop their cooperation with one another and with all states in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations"; and Principle X which declares that signatories will "fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law."

Using terms of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978 as the basis for its invasion, more than 100,000 Soviet troops crossed into Afghanistan during December 1979. Despite nearly 7 years of occupation, the Soviets and their Marxist clients in Kabul have failed to maintain control beyond the capital, which is protected by 60,000 Soviet and Afghan security personnel. Both Herat and Kandahar, the second and third most important cities in the country, are substantially under the control of the mujahedeen. It is estimated that two-thirds of the Afghan population and even a greater proportion of its territory are beyond the regime's control. The Soviet-sponsored regime has made few political or military gains since the invasion. This led to the ouster of Afghan leader Babrak Karmal in May 1986. The continued Soviet occupation has involved considerable costs to the U.S.S.R. Soviet casualties since 1979 have climbed to over 30,000, including more than 10,000 killed. The Soviets and Afghans together have lost nearly 800 aircraft during the same period. The occupation also has presented the Soviets with serious domestic policy problems. Draft evasion appears to be on the rise. Nevertheless, the Soviets appear to be settling in for a long-term stay in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the mujahedeen, with growing international assistance, has increased its firepower and reduced operational and political disputes between its various components. Amid growing resistance, the Soviets have increasingly relied upon violence and terrorism, including the use of chemical weapons, against the Afghan people. This, in turn, has resulted in a massive exodus of Afghans to neighboring countries. An estimated 2.5 million have fled to Pakistan, while 1.5 million have crossed into Iran. An additional 1 million internal refugees remain inside Afghanistan.

Seven rounds of indirect talks have taken place in Geneva, between Pakistan and the Soviet-backed Afghans since 1982, under the auspices of the United Nations. The Soviets have resisted all attempts to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the situation in Af-

64-639 O - 87 - 2

ghanistan. During a trip to Vladivostok in June 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev announced plans to withdraw six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan. In addition, Gorbachev indicated that as soon as a political settlement is worked out, all Soviet troops would be withdrawn. While the Soviets have withdrawn 8,000 troops from Afghanistan, the reduction is militarily insignificant in light of its 120,000 troops which remain in Afghanistan and the 40,000 Soviet troops poised along the Soviet-Afghan border. Despite these statements and limited actions, the Soviets continue to pursue the military option in Afghanistan in clear violation of the Final Act.

THE DOWNING OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER

A Korean Air Lines (KAL) commercial jet was shot down August 31, 1983, after it crossed into Soviet airspace while enroute to Seoul from New York. All 269 people aboard, including 61 Americans, were killed. While certain aspects of the incident remain unclear, the Soviet response is well documented. According to Secretary of State Shultz, the KAL jet strayed into Soviet airspace north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido and was tracked by Soviet radar for 2½ hours before it was shot down. Shultz noted that eight Soviet aircraft were involved in tracking the jet during that period. Intercepted radio contact indicated that the Soviet pilot was in visual contact with the KAL airliner for 14 minutes before firing an air-to-air missile which sent the jet plunging into the sea, near Sakhalin Island. The Soviet Government would neither confirm nor deny that it had shot down the passenger jet. On September 6, 1983, nearly 1 week after the incident occurred, the Soviets acknowledged that the airliner had been downed by one of its aircraft. Asserting that Soviet frontiers were "sacred," Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko argued that the jet had been on a spy mission for the United States, and that blame should rest with the U.S. Secretary Shultz, attending the closing ceremonies of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting, denounced the Soviet Union's "totally unacceptable" version of the incident.

The Soviet attack on the KAL aircraft violated the Convention on International Aviation, an agreement to which the Soviet Union has adhered since 1970. The Convention, accepted by nearly 100 nations, sets forth general principles of law in the international aviation field. Article 25 of the Convention obliges states to provide assistance to aircraft in distress over their territory. In addition, standard international practice is to either require the aircraft to land or escort it to international airspace. Thus the downing of the passenger jetliner violated Principle X of the Final Act concerning fulfillment of obligations under international law.

Following the downing of KAL 007, representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan conducted a series of negotiations to improve the safety of civil aviation in the North Pacific. A memorandum of understanding was signed on July 29, 1985 and entered into force on October 8, 1985.

DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

On July 17, 1984, an agreement was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union to expand and improve the operation of the

U.S.-Soviet Direct Communications Link, commonly known as the "hotline." First authorized under terms of a Memorandum of Understanding agreed to in June 1963, the hotline was designed to provide a means of direct communication between the leaders of the two nations in times of emergency. The system was upgraded during the 1970's to include two satellite circuits. In addition, the two countries agreed, under provisions of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War, to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launch extending beyond its national territory in the direction of the other.

During May 1983, President Reagan proposed further improvements to the hotline including: the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability and the establishment of high-speed data links between each government and its embassy in the other's capital. Also included in the proposal was the establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link. Negotiations on these measures began in August 1983. Under terms of the 1984 agreement, a facsimile capability will be added to the hotline which will allow for the transmission of graphic materials. Other enhancements will increase the speed of communications. The initiatives expanding the communications link between the United States and the Soviet Union represent a positive step in accordance with Principle IX of the Final Act regarding cooperation among states.

MURDER OF MAJOR ARTHUR D. NICHOLSON, JR.

On March 25, 1985, Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., an unarmed member of the military liaison mission (MLM), was shot to death by a Soviet sentry while on assignment in East Germany. Nicholson was operating under terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 1947 which governs activities of the MLM. No verbal warning was given by the Soviet sentry. In addition, members of the Soviet military contingent prevented Major Nicholson's driver from administering first aid to Nicholson, leaving him to bleed to death. The murder of Major Nicholson is a clear demonstration of the unacceptable use of force and violence by the Soviets. Even if Nicholson had been engaged in unauthorized activities as the Soviet maintained, a charge which the U.S. rejected, the Soviet response far exceeded any infraction which might have occurred.

The killing violated terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and Principle X of the Final Act concerning fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER

Principle IX calls upon the participating States to promote mutual understanding and good-neighborly relations, as well as to increase mutual knowledge and progress in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural, and humanitarian fields. The principle of cooperation was dealt a severe blow as the result of Soviet behavior in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. On April 26, 1986, an explosion at a Soviet nuclear power plant near Chernobyl, Ukraine, resulted in the world's worst nuclear disaster. The failure of the Soviet Government to notify immediately neighboring states and the population in the affected area has

raised many serious questions regarding Soviet willingness to cooperate with other states, particularly during a disaster. Only after being confronted with evidence from neighboring states did the Soviet Union even acknowledge that an accident had occurred. The release of large amounts of radioactive iodine, cesium, and other harmful substances into the atmosphere posed a serious threat to the health of millions. Despite the scope of the disaster, the Soviets initially rejected offers of assistance from a host of countries, including the United States. Subsequently, an American medical expert in the field bone marrow transplants was permitted to treat selected victims of the disaster.

Antiterrorism provisions

Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.—Principle VI, "Non-Intervention in internal affairs," in the Helsinki Final Act contains a brief reference to the problem of terrorism: "(The participating States) will . . . refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities."

In the Madrid Concluding Document, however, there is a much expanded section on terrorism:

> The participating States condemn terrorism . . . as endangering or taking innocent human lives or . . . jeopardizing human rights . . . They express their determination to take effective measures for the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, both at the national level and through international cooperation including appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements, and accordingly to broaden and reinforce mutual cooperation to combat such acts. They agree to do so in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States and the Helsinki Final Act.
>
> (The participating States) . . . will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization, or commission of terrorist activities . . . This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize, or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism.
>
> The participating States confirm that they will refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities or to subversive or other activities directed toward the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State. Accordingly, they will refrain, *inter alia*, from financing, encouraging, fomenting, or tolerating any such activities.

The Helsinki Final Act merely contains a brief injunction that participating States not assist terrorism in any way. The Madrid Concluding Document, however, goes much further. It encourages Helsinki signatories to take "effective measures" against terrorism. It encourages recourse to national and international agreements, at bilateral and multilateral levels, to combat terrorism.

Participating States are urged to undertake new diplomatic initiatives to combat terrorism. They also pledge that their own territories will not be used in any way for the "preparation, organiza-

tion or commission" of terrorist acts. Diplomats, who are particular terrorist targets, are singled out as needing special protection by the participating States.

The issue of terrorism has been raised in various forms at some of the post-Madrid CSCE Experts Meetings. At the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting, the delegations of Spain, the United States, and Turkey, introduced on June 4, 1985 a proposal which briefly reiterated some of the antiterrorism pledges in the Madrid Concluding Document. At the Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting, Ambassador Novak, head of the U.S. delegation, responded on April 17, 1986 to criticism of the U.S. bombing of Libyan terrorist sites.

After acknowledging that terrorism was not in the mandate for the Bern Meeting, Novak said, "Civilization is the rule of law substituted for the rule of terrorism." He referred to recent tragic acts of terrorism at a West Berlin discotheque and on a TWA airplane from Athens. In conclusion, Novak asserted, "In the coming renaissance of Europe of which I speak today, Europe will also break the grip of terrorism. . . . The citizens of Europe and of the United States now bear the burden of this struggle, not because we chose to, but because it was thrust upon us."

The document of the Stockholm CDE Meeting, adopted on September 19, 1986, contains an extensive reference to the antiterrorism provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document.

A State Department outline, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," edited to show only participating States, is appended to this report. According to this report, the four participating States in which major acts of terrorism have been most frequent are: France (12), West Germany (11), Spain (10) and Greece (9). The report shows four groups to have committed the greatest number of major terrorist acts on the territories of the participating States: the radical Palestinian group, Abu Nidal (7), the Irish Republican Army (5); the French leftist Action Directe (5) and the radical Palestinian Black September group (5).

The expanded antiterrorism provisions in the Madrid Concluding Document reflect increased concern with this problem among CSCE signatories. Faced with major new acts of terrorism in 1986, French authorities were forced to adopt a visa requirement for all foreigners entering their territory. Despite stepped-up antiterrorism measures by signatory States, terrorism seems to have become a tragic and chronic fact of contemporary life.

MILITARY SECURITY

The Helsinki Final Act

"Recognizing the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities," the 35 signatories adopted the following CSBMs:

Notification of Military Maneuvers.—The 35 States agreed to provide prior notification (21 days) of major military maneuvers involving 25,000 or more troops, including amphibious and airborne

troops, taking place "on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space." They also agreed to provide voluntary notification of military maneuvers below the 25,000 troop threshold.

Exchange of Observers.—The States further agreed to voluntarily invite observers from other participating States to attend military maneuvers.

Other Confidence-Building Measures.—In addition, the participating States were encouraged to promote other exchanges between military personnel.

Implementation of CSBMs

Prior Notification of Major Military Maneuvers.—Compliance with the Final Act requirement of prior notification of major military maneuvers, those involving 25,000 or more troops, generally improved over the previous reporting period. All major military maneuvers sponsored by NATO, NNa, and Warsaw Pact states were notified. This is particularly significant in light of the serious violations of the security provisions of the Final Act which occurred during the prior reporting period.

While breaches as described in the last report did not occur during the current reporting period, problems persisted with regard to notifications made by Warsaw Pact states. They continued to provide a minimal amount of information, often failing to include specific location of maneuvers, types of forces participating, dates of maneuvers, and composition of forces.

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS NOTIFIED FROM 1982-OCTOBER 1986

NATO

1982

Carbine Fortress, sponsored by the U.S., Canada and the F.R.G., and held between 12–23 September on territory of the F.R.G. It was a 73,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the F.R.G., Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Starke Wehr, sponsored by the F.R.G. and held between 13–17 September on territory of the F.R.G. It was a 45,000 troop maneuver involving participants from the F.R.G., The Netherlands, and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Bold Guard 82, sponsored by NATO and held between 20–24 September on territory of the F.R.G. and Denmark. It was a 47,200 troop maneuver involving participants from Denmark, the F.R.G., The Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. Observers were invited.

1983

Wehrhafte Lowen, sponsored by the F.R.G. and held 19–23 of September in Kassel-Bad Hersfeld of the F.R.G. It was a 50,000 man exercise involving troops from the F.R.G., Belgium and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Atlantic Lion, sponsored by the F.R.G. and The Netherlands and held 20–29 September along the border of the two sponsoring states. It was a 41,000 troop maneuver, involving participants from

the F.R.G., The Netherlands, the U.S. and the U.K.. Observers were invited.

Confident Enterprise, sponsored by the F.R.G. and the U.S. and held 20–29 September in the Bad Hersfeld of the F.R.G. It was a 62,000 troop maneuver, involving participants from the F.R.G. and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Eternal Triangle, sponsored by the F.R.G. and the U.K. and held 27 October–2 November in the Celle-Wolfenbuttel areas of the F.R.G. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver, involving participants from the F.R.G. and the U.K. Observers were not invited.

1984

Avalanche Express, sponsored by Norway and held 16–22 March in northern Norway. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver, involving participants from Canada, the F.R.G., Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, the U.K., and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Lion Heart 84/Spear Point 84, a joint maneuver sponsored by the F.R.G. and the U.K., and held from 3–29 September on territory of the F.R.G. It was a 132,000 troop maneuver, including participants from the F.R.G., The Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Flinker Igel, sponsored by the F.R.G. and held between 13–20 September on territory of the F.R.G. It was a 55,000 troop maneuver, including participants from Canada, the F.R.G., and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Certain Fury, sponsored by the F.R.G. and the U.S. and held between 17–28 September on territory of the F.R.G. It was a 50,000 troop maneuver, including participants from the F.R.G. and the U.S. Observers were invited.

1985

Central Guardian, sponsored by the F.R.G. and the U.S. and held 21–31 January on F.R.G. territory. It was a 72,000 troop maneuver with participants from the U.S., the F.R.G., Luxembourg, and France. Observers were invited.

Brave Defender, sponsored by the U.K. and held 2–13 September on U.K. territory. It was a 65,000 troop maneuver with participants from the U.K., The Netherlands, and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Defiant Saxon, sponsored by the F.R.G. and held 12–21 September on F.R.G. territory. It was a 60,000 troop maneuver with participants from the F.R.G., the U.K., The Netherlands, and the U.S. Observers were invited.

1986

Certain Sentinel, sponsored by the F.R.G. and the U.S. and held 20–30 January on F.R.G. territory. It was a 73,000 troop maneuver with participants from the F.R.G., the U.S., Canada, and France. Observers were invited.

Fraenkischer-Schild, sponsored by the F.R.G. and held between 15–26 September on F.R.G. territory. It was a 50,000 troop maneuver with participants from Belgium, France, the F.R.G., and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Warsaw Pact

1982

Friendship 82 (Druzhba 82), sponsored by Czechoslovakia and held 25–30 January on Czechoslovakian territory. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the U.S.S.R. Observers were not invited.

Shield 82 (Tarcza 82), sponsored by Bulgaria and held between 25 September–1 October on Bulgarian territory. It was a 60,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Warsaw Pact states. Observers were not invited.

1983

A major exercise sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and held 29 June–4 July in the Baltic and Belorussian military districts and the eastern Baltic Sea. It was a 50,000 troop maneuver of Soviet forces. Observers were not invited.

A major exercise sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and held 25–30 July in southeastern G.D.R. It was a 26,000 troop maneuver of Soviet forces. Observers were not invited.

1984

Zapad 84, sponsored by the U.S.S.R., the G.D.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia and held 28 June–5 July in the G.D.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic Sea. It was a 60,000 troop maneuver involving Soviet forces. Observers were not invited.

Shield 84 (Tarcza 84), sponsored by Czechoslovakia and held 4–14 September on Czechoslovak territory. It was a 60,000 troop maneuver of Warsaw Pact forces. Observers were not invited.

1985

A major maneuver sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia and held 25–31 May on Czechoslovak territory. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving Soviet and Czechoslovak forces. Observers were not invited.

Kavkaz 85, sponsored by the Soviet Union and held 15–21 July in the Caucasus region of the U.S.S.R. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving Soviet forces. Observers were invited from select states.

A major maneuver sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. and held 6–14 July on G.D.R. territory. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving Soviet and East German forces. Observers were not invited.

1986

Zapad '86, sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and held 10–17 February in the Soviet Baltic Military District. It was a 50,000 troop maneuver involving Soviet forces. Observers were not invited.

Kavkaz '86, sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and held 17–21 February in the southern U.S.S.R. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving Soviet forces. Observers were not invited.

A major maneuver sponsored by the G.D.R. and held between 8–13 September on East German territory. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving participants from the U.S.S.R. and G.D.R. Observers were not invited.

Druzhba-86, sponsored by Czechoslovakia and held between 8–12 September on Czechoslovakian territory. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., and Hungary. Observers were invited.

Neutral and nonaligned maneuvers

1982

Panzer-Jagd, sponsored by Switzerland and held between 15–19 November on Swiss territory. It was a 30,000 troop maneuver involving Swiss forces. Observers were invited.

1983

No major maneuvers reported.

1984

No major maneuvers reported.

1985

Tornado, sponsored by Switzerland and held 7–17 October on Swiss territory. It was a 25,000 troop maneuver involving Swiss forces. Observers were not invited.

1986

Raumverteidegung-Herbstuebung-86, sponsored by Austria and held between 9–17 October on Austrian territory. It was a 30,000 troop maneuver involving Austrian forces. Observers were invited.

Prior Notification of Smaller Scale Maneuvers—Under provisions of the Final Act, participating States are encouraged, but not required to provide prior notification of smaller scale maneuvers, those involving 25,000 or less troops. NATO continued to provide voluntary prior notifications of all smaller scale maneuvers. Although the Soviet Union did make its first discretionary notification in connection with the Dnestr 83 exercise during the current reporting period, Eastern performance in this area remained poor.

Non-Notification of Smaller Scale Maneuvers 1982–October 1986.—Of the 10 smaller scale maneuvers conducted by the Warsaw Pact states during this period, Dnestr 83 was the only exercise notified. Several smaller scale maneuvers, including three French exercises, which took place during the current reporting period were not notified according to notification guidelines contained in the Final Act.

NATO

Langres 82, sponsored by France and held between 19–24 September on French territory. It was a 17,000 troop maneuver involving French forces. Notification was given 3 days prior to the start of the exercise. Observers were not invited.

Damocles, sponsored by France and held during September 1984. It was a 7,500 troop maneuver involving French forces. While France did provide notification of the maneuver, it failed to do so 21 days prior to the exercise as called for under the Final Act. Ob-

servers were invited from all NATO countries plus Hungary and Romania.

Jourdan, sponsored by France and held during June 1985. It was a 5,000 troop maneuver involving French forces. While France provided notification of the maneuver, it failed to do so 21 days prior to the exercise as called for under the Final Act. Observers were invited from all states having military attaches in Paris.

Warsaw Pact

Danube 83, sponsored by Hungary and held during January 1983. No details were provided regarding the number of troops participating in this small scale maneuver. Hungary did inform members of the Budapest Attache corps, although it failed to do so 21 days prior to the exercise as called for under the Final Act. Observers were not invited.

Kunsag 83, sponsored by Hungary and held between 6–16 June. It was a 14,000 troop maneuver involving Hungarian forces. Hungary did inform members of the Budapest Attache corps, although it failed to do so 21 days prior to the exercise as called for under the Final Act. Observers were not invited.

Druzba-84, held in Czechoslovakia during February 1984, participants included Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. No information was provided regarding the number of troops involved, the dates of the maneuver, or location. No notification was provided. Observers were not invited.

Soyuz-84, held in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, the southwestern region of the Soviet Union, and the Black Sea during March 1984. No information was provided regarding the number of troops involved in the exercise, the dates of the maneuver, or location. No notification was provided. Observers were not invited.

Danubex-84, held between 26 June–2 July, it was a 16,000 troop maneuver involving participants from the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. No notification was provided. Observers were not invited.

Danube 85, sponsored by Hungary and held between 28 June–4 July. It was a 23,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. No notification was provided. Observers were not invited.

Friendship 85, held in Poland during September 1985, the maneuver involved participants from Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. No notification was provided. Observers were not invited.

Duna '86, held in Hungary. No information was provided regarding the number of troops involved in the exercise, the dates of the maneuver, composition of forces, or location. No notification was provided. Observers were not invited.

An unnamed field training exercise was held in East Germany during 1986. No information was provided regarding the number of troops involved in the exercise, the dates of the maneuver, composition of forces, and location. No notification was provided. Observers were not invited.

SMALLER SCALE MANEUVERS NOTIFIED FROM 1982–OCTOBER 1986

NATO

1982

Alloy Express, sponsored by NATO and held between 12–17 March on [and held] on Norwegian territory. It was a 14,200 troop maneuver involving participants from Canada, the F.R.G., Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, the U.K., and the U.S. Observers were not invited.

1983

Cold Winter 83, sponsored by Norway and held between 11–17 March. It was a 10,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, the U.K. and the U.S. Observers were not invited.

Viking 83, sponsored by Norway and held between 11–17 March. It was a 10,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Norway and the U.K. Observers were not invited.

Moselle 83, sponsored by France and held 16–24 September in northeastern France. It was a 22,000 troop maneuver with participants from France. Observers were invited.

Ample Express 83, sponsored by Denmark and held 20–24 September in Zealand Islands. It was a 10,000 troop maneuver with participants from the U.K., the F.R.G., Luxembourg, Italy, The Netherlands, and the U.S. Observers were not invited.

Eternal Triangle, sponsored by the F.R.G. and U.K. and held between 24 October–5 November. It was a 21,000 troop maneuver involving participants from Denmark, the F.R.G., and the U.K. Observers were not invited.

1984

Doubs 84, sponsored by France and held between 8–14 September on French territory. It was a 20,000 troop maneuver involving French forces. Observers were invited.

Bold Gannet 84, sponsored by Denmark and held between 15–20 September on the Zealand Islands. It was a 21,000 troop maneuver, involving participants from Denmark, the F.R.G., The Netherlands, and the U.K. Observers were not invited.

1985

Cold Winter '85, sponsored by Norway and held 15–21 March on Norwegian territory. It was a 10,000 troop maneuver, with participants from Norway, Canada, The Netherlands, the U.S., and the U.K. Observers were not invited.

1986

Anchor Express, sponsored by Norway and held 6–12 March in northern Norway. It was a 20,000 troop maneuver with participants from Norway, Canada, the F.R.G., Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. Observers were invited.

Blue Fox, sponsored by Norway and held between 9–15 September on Norwegian territory. It was a 23,000 troop maneuver involving Norwegian forces. Observers were invited.

Warsaw Pact

1982

No smaller scale maneuvers reported.

1983

Dnestr 83, sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and held 5–10 September in the Odessa area. It was a 23,000 troop maneuver involving Soviet forces. Observers were invited from select states.

1984

No smaller scale maneuvers reported.

1985

No smaller scale maneuvers reported.

1986

No smaller scale maneuvers reported.

[VI] Neutral and nonaligned

1982

Sydfront, sponsored by Sweden and held between 23–29 September on Swedish territory. It was a 23,000 troop maneuver involving Swedish forces. Observers were not invited.

Area Defense Exercise 1982, sponsored by Austria and held between 15–22 October on Austrian territory. It was a 14,000 troop maneuver involving Austrian forces. Observers were not invited.

1983

Unity 83, sponsored by Yugoslavia and held 13–15 September in Macedonia. It was a 22,000 troop maneuver involving Yugoslav forces. Observers were invited.

Ostkust, sponsored by Sweden and held 25 September–6 October on Swedish territory. It was a 20,000 troop maneuver of Swedish forces. Observers were invited.

1984

Vastgrans, sponsored by Sweden and held 18 February to 5 March. It was a 22,000 troop maneuver involving Swedish forces. Observers were invited.

1985

No smaller scale maneuvers reported.

1986

No smaller scale maneuvers reported.

Exchange of Observers.—While the Final Act does not require that observers be invited to maneuvers for which notification is made, participating States are encouraged to extend such invitations. NATO and NNa countries continued to invite observers to all major military maneuvers.

Exchange of Military Visitors.—"The participating States are encouraged, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better understanding, to promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations." While such exchanges are common between members of NATO, and members of the Warsaw Pact, few East-West exchanges take place. During the current reporting period only two such visits occurred. Two U.S. Naval vessels, the U.S. *Valdez* and the U.S. *Yarnel* visited Romania June 9 to 13, 1982.

Source: NATO, Tables of Notifications of Military Maneuvers Made Under Provisions of CSCE Final Act During the Period 1975–1985, ISD/373 (Revised), June 9, 1986.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

With the largest concentration of armed forces in the world stationed in Europe, the issue of European security remains of paramount concern. While the Final Act does not contain specific provisions regarding arms control per se, "(T)he participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political detente in Europe and strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament."

Pursuant to these objectives, the United States and the Soviet Union participated in a series of bilateral arms control negotiations. On January 8, 1985, the two superpowers announced agreement to begin negotiations relating to space and nuclear arms, designed to bring about a reduction of nuclear arms and a strengthening of strategic stability. In addition, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were involved in a variety of discussions dealing with strategic nuclear, intermediate-range nuclear, and antisatellite weapons during the current reporting period. Highlights of these negotiations are presented below.

Strategic arms reduction talks (START)

The United States and the Soviet Union began the strategic arms reduction talks in 1982. The primary objective of the United States throughout the negotiations was to achieve a stable balance at significantly reduced levels of nuclear forces. The U.S. has been most concerned about reducing the levels of destabilizing ballistic missile systems, particularly MIRVed land-based ICBMs, and demonstrated its willingness to negotiate limits on other systems as well. Accordingly, the U.S. proposed a build down concept which provided a mutual, guaranteed reduction in nuclear systems, including ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers. The negotiations stalled over differences regarding the definition of "strategic." The U.S. proposal for strategic arms reductions applied only to intercontinental systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Soviet proposal included nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory; which included Pershing II, cruise missiles, carrier-based aircraft and aircraft based in Europe and Asia. Under the Soviet definition, SS-20s would have been excluded. On Decem-

ber 8, 1983, the Soviet delegation declined to set a date for the resumption of negotiations. The Soviet action was linked to the U.S. deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles as part of a NATO modernization program.

Intermediate-range nuclear force (INF)

The United States and Soviet Union began talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces in 1981. The U.S. initiative was consistent with NATO's decision to pursue a dual-track policy of force modernization and negotiated arms reductions. Following close consultations with other members of NATO, the U.S. tabled two draft treaty texts. One, the Zero-Zero treaty proposed a worldwide ban on all U.S. and Soviet longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF) missile systems. Adoption of the Zero-Zero treaty would have required the elimination of all Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles as well as NATO Pershing missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. Following Soviet refusal to consider this proposal, the U.S. tabled an Interim Proposal treaty, which called for global ceilings of warheads deployed on U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. In the absence of progress at the negotiating table in Geneva, the U.S. proceeded with the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles pursuant to a 1979 NATO decision. In November 1983, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks.

Nuclear and space talks (NST)

In March 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union resumed arms control talks within a new framework. The nuclear and space talks (NST) combined elements of START, INF, and space weaponry.

In addition to these bilateral arms control negotiations, the United States participated in the following multilateral negotiations.

Mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR)

Representatives of several member states, NATO and the Warsaw Pact have held a series of meetings over the past 13 years designed to reach a verifiable agreement which would reduce and limit conventional forces in central Europe. The purpose of the negotiations is the creation of a more stable balance of forces at an equal and significantly lower level in central Europe, the area of greatest concentration of armed forces in the world. In February 1985 the Warsaw Pact proposed a time-limited, first-stage agreement calling for initial reductions of U.S. and Soviet ground forces—without prior agreement on the actual numerical level of those forces—followed by a freeze on all forces of the two alliances remaining in the area. On December 5, 1985, NATO agreed to this framework. No progress has been made with respect to the Western verification proposals within the scope of MBFR negotiations despite Soviet statements pledging dependable verification, including on-site inspections.

Conference on disarmament

In December 1986, the NATO Alliance agreed to expanded conventional arms talks between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact to

embrace "The Whole of Europe," according to the Alliance declaration, the negotiations "Build and Expand" the results of the Stockholm CDE. The Warsaw Pact had called for such expanded talks in May 1985.

Key objectives of the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) have been adoption of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) and a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Additional attention was focused on the Conference following the suspension of test ban negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The United States proposed a draft treaty, at the CD, calling for a total ban on chemical weapons. In light of Soviet violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the United States has insisted on effective verification of any ban on chemical weapons. Maintaining that the U.S. proposal is intrusive, the Soviets have rejected the initiative, insisting that verification should be accomplished through national technical means and self-inspection. Despite general agreement on the importance of a ban on chemical weapons at the U.S.-Soviet summit in 1985, little progress has been made toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons at the CD.

ATHENS CONFERENCE ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

The 35 CSCE participating States met in Athens March 21–April 30, 1984 in an attempt to develop a framework for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with Principle V of the Final Act. The meeting was mandated by the Madrid Review Conference. A similar meeting on this subject was held in Montreaux, Switzerland in 1978.

The Western position at Athens was based on a commitment to a graduated system of disputes settlement: when bilateral discussions proved unproductive, either party in a dispute would have recourse to third-party mechanisms such as good offices, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. The East, meanwhile, maintained a position that disputes should be settled by direct negotiations or consultations. The NNa argued that small countries forced into negotiations with the Soviet Union could be manipulated. They insisted upon a system which would include a conciliation commission to which such disputes could be brought. During the course of the meeting the United States proposed a detailed document providing for several levels of third-party conciliation and mediation.

A brief report was approved at the conclusion of the 6-week meeting noting that discussions were held on the peaceful settlement of disputes and that there was particular emphasis on how to include a third-party element.

CHAPTER FOUR—HUMAN RIGHTS

BULGARIA

INTRODUCTION

There has been no significant progress in Bulgaria's compliance with the human rights and humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act since the Commission's previous implementation report. There is virtually no known organized dissident activity and there continue to be few publicized or documented arrests or trials of individuals for human rights activity. Organized religion continues to be closely monitored and circumscribed. The Bulgarian Government's previously poor treatment of minorities has deteriorated even further with its brutal campaign to forcibly assimilate members of Bulgaria's Turkish minority.

While the Bulgarian Government claims to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" according to the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, it is in fact a dictatorship controlled by the leaders of the elitist Communist Party, which comprises less than 10 percent of the population. The Communist Party leadership maintains almost total control of Bulgaria's political, social, economic and cultural life. The Bulgarian Constitution provides for certain basic rights, including free speech and press, association and demonstration, and freedom of worship. In practice, these freedoms are either severely curtailed or nearly nonexistent. The Government interferes in the private lives of its citizens through its system of surveillance, telephone monitoring and mail censorship.

Internal opposition is suppressed quickly and harshly. Except for widespread resistance by the Turkish minority to the Government's assimilation campaign, there is little known opposition. Bulgaria does not release figures on the number of political prisoners and detainees. According to the State Department's 1985 Human Rights Country Report, however, "Several thousand such persons is a reasonable estimate for 1985, including those caught while trying to escape across the country's borders, as well as Turkish-Bulgarians rounded up in the early months of the year." Brutal treatment by camp guards or other inmates continue to be a feature of prison life in Bulgaria, although conditions among camps vary.

Although the Bulgarian Constitution provides for freedom of association, in practice, the Government decides which organizations can exist. While human rights monitoring groups are virtually unknown in Bulgaria, a small group of up to 17 persons operated near the city of Mikhailovgrad in 1983-84. The group operated clandestinely and after the arrests of some of its members, ceased its activity. One of the group's leaders, Yanko Yankov, was sentenced in 1985 to a 5-year term in the Pazardzhik prison for "defamation of the state." Another Bulgarian dissident, Valodya Nakov, was sen-

tenced to 4 years imprisonment in September 1984 for having contacts with Western Embassies. Nicolas Chamurlisky, sentenced 1 month after the signing of the Final Act following requests to visit his brother in the United States, continues to be imprisoned in Stara Zagora Prison. Several hundred political prisoners are believed to be held in Stara Zagora. Pentecostalist Kostadin Kalmukov, sentenced in 1984 to a 5-year term for his religious beliefs, was beaten unconscious by guards at Stara Zagora on December 25, 1984, "for objecting to the fact that Christmas Day was being treated by the prison authorities as an ordinary working day." [1]

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

Bulgaria officially espouses atheism and discourages religion. Religious activity is closely monitored and discouraged even though article 53 of the Bulgarian Constitution provides for freedom of religion. The Government maintains careful and strict control over organized religion, reviewing clerical appointments and closely monitoring the importation and distribution of religious literature. Religious practice is discouraged, particularly among party and Government officials, and active believers have been subjected to discrimination. Religious education of children and open proselytizing are prohibited. According to Keston College, "recent travelers to Bulgaria suggest that pressure on believers in various parts of the country is, in fact, being maintained. House searches and confiscations have been conducted in Sofia, Stara Zagora and Kazanlak." [2] Although a Bulgarian language Bible was printed in 1982, only several thousand copies have been distributed domestically. This number is barely enough to meet the needs of Bulgaria's approximately 2,600 Orthodox churches alone.[3]

The Government "recognizes" only three religious groups: the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Judaism and Islam, each of which receives government subsidies. The Orthodox Church, because of its long association with Bulgarian nationalism, enjoys the most privileges. In addition to the three recognized groups, several denominations are permitted to operate, which means they are allowed churches and congregations. They include Catholics (Latin rite and Uniate), Evangelicals, Baptists, Pentecostalists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Methodists, Congregationalists and Armenians. Some of these groups refuse to apply for subsidies from the state so as not to be dependent on it. In addition, there is a religious underground among Protestants which receives religious texts from outside Bulgaria.

Catholics and Protestants are regarded with suspicion by the authorities because of their foreign origins and contacts. Catholic clerics and active believers are subjected to harassment, including house searches and confiscation of religious material. The Catholic Church, which has about 70,000 members, experienced even greater difficulties after the arrest in Italy of Bulgarian airlines employee Sergei Antonov in November 1982. Antonov was arrested for complicity in the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. According to the State Department's 16th Semiannual Report covering

[1] [2] [3] See footnotes on p. 232.

the period December 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984, the Catholic Church has had "the most severe problems with the Government, including disputes over the training and ordination of new priests, religious instruction for the young, baptism, and travel to Rome by church leaders." The church faces other problems: its candidate for a successor to the Bishop of Plovdiv has been rejected by the Government, and the See remains vacant; there is a shortage of seminaries; and Catholic youths are not permitted to gather in meetings prior to their 16th birthday.

Members of various Protestant denominations have been harassed and detained by Bulgarian authorities. The homes of active believers have been searched and religious material confiscated. Young churchgoers are sometimes dissuaded from attending services. During the fall of 1985, for instance, police appeared at several meetings in Sofia of unregistered Pentecostals, ". . . noting down the names of those present and dispersing the gatherings. Three pastors, Pavel Ignatov, Boris Ivanov and Toma Spassov were summoned to an interrogation. Subsequently, Ignatov and Ivanov were forbidden to leave Sofia for an indefinite period. Spassov was sent into internal exile for 3 years." [4]

Also in 1985, the oldest Protestant Congregationalist church in Bulgaria was compelled to accept a government-appointed pastor over two popular pastors—the Kulishev brothers. In May 1985, Hristo Kulishev was removed from the pulpit and sentenced to 8 months imprisonment for the "willful practice of the profession of titular pastor to the detriment of personal and public interests." His brother, Dimiter, was sentenced to 6 months on the same charge. Both were forbidden to practice as pastors. Government relations with other Protestant denominations remain tense.

Bulgaria's small and elderly Jewish community and the Armenian Church have had relatively conflict-free relations with the Government since the previous implementation report. Today, there are about 5,500 Jews in Bulgaria. Some 3,000 live in Sofia, and about 50 continue to worship publicly.

The most visible target of the Bulgarian Government's suppression of religion has been Islam. The authorities have combined their campaign against the Muslim religion with their attempt to eradicate Turkish ethnic identity.

TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA

Since the previous implementation report, the Bulgarian Government has systematically violated the rights of its Turkish minority through a forcible assimilation of the Turkish minority of about 900,000 (10 percent of Bulgaria's population).

The Bulgarian Government has never been favorably disposed toward its Turkish minority and has engaged in persistent efforts to assimilate this and other minorities. In the 1970's, for example, the Government limited the teaching of Turkish. It abolished Turkish schools and forbade the teaching of classes in any language other than Bulgarian. It also closed several mosques. Although in the early 1980's there were instances of forcible attempts to assimi-

[4] See footnote on p. 232.

late individuals, and even villages, the ethnic Turks were nevertheless recognized as a minority. As late as October 1984, Bulgaria made reference to a recognized Turkish minority in a note to the United Nations.[5]

In late 1984, however, the Bulgarian Government embarked on what appears to be a full-scale campaign to assimilate and deny the existence of its Turkish minority. From December 1984 through the winter of 1985, the Bulgarian Government compelled members of the entire Turkish-speaking minority to change their Turkish names to Bulgarian ones. This campaign was carried out by the army and members of paramilitary organizations, often at gunpoint. Towns and villages in Turkish-speaking regions, mostly in the southern and northeastern areas of the country, were surrounded by the army, often in the early morning. Officials then went from house to house with new identity cards bearing Bulgarian names. Essential services, including medical care, were denied to persons presenting documents with the old names. Despite Bulgarian Government claims that the name change was voluntary and spontaneous, there have been numerous reports that force was used, including torture and rape. Those who refused to accept the new names were threatened or arrested, and hundreds were reportedly killed by security forces. According to Amnesty International, over 250 ethnic Turks were arrested between December 1984 and March 1985. In early 1985, Rasim Rezhebov, Salim Salimov, Ismet Abdulov, Hasine Mustafova and Ferdiye Salifova were tried and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 2 to 7½ years' in Kardzhali for attempting to organize a meeting of ethnic Turks in the area to protest against the name change campaign. Many others were arrested for refusing to accept or use the new identity cards. According to reports some were released only after accepting new Slavic names. Still others were forced to live and work in other parts of the country. There have also been reports of ethnic Turks killed by the security services—Amnesty International has received the names of over 100 members of the Turkish minority reported killed resisting the name changes. Reports from Turkey indicate that the numbers could reach 1,000.

Throughout the campaign, the Bulgarian state media asserted that no Turkish minority existed in Bulgaria. The media claimed instead, that there were only ethnic Bulgarians who spontaneously and voluntarily rediscovered their true Bulgarian identity, which had been suppressed during Ottoman rule. The Government contends that the ethnic Turks are descendants of "Slav Bulgarians" who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the period of Ottoman rule. In a March 1985 speech, Politburo member Stanko Todorov pronounced the name change campaign a success, claiming that "our blood-brothers and sisters have returned to the common family." He said that Bulgaria was now a "single-nationality state."

Since the name change campaign, the Bulgarian Government has been taking systematic measures to eradicate Turkish identity. For all practical purposes, numerous activities pertaining to Turk-

[5] See footnote on p. 232.

ish ethnic identity and Islamic religious practices is forbidden. Turks who have not changed their names are not permitted to work in state enterprises. The use of the Turkish language in public is banned. "In many municipalities the use of Turkish in public places, including the streets, has been made an offense punishable by a fine. . . ." [6] The only formerly bilingual Turkish-Bulgarian publication, *Nova Svetlina*, has been available only in Bulgarian since January 1985. Turkish language radio broadcasts have ceased. Receiving and reading of Turkish publications is punishable by fine, and radio and television programs from Turkey are jammed. Traditional Turkish clothes, most notably the traditional shalvari (wide pantaloons), have been prohibited in some areas in which there are large Turkish populations. Persons wearing the pantaloons are subject to a fine of up to 60 leva. The campaign has extended even to removal of road signs in Turkish, and "restaurants have removed their menus for 'Turkish' coffee." [7] Finally, several reports suggest that Bulgaria may have begun implementing a program of forced resettlement of some ethnic Turks to non-Turkish areas of the country.

Travel into and out of ethnic Turkish areas is restricted. During the height of the campaign guards at roadblocks turned back foreigners in some villages. Only a few diplomats and journalists have been permitted to travel in these areas, although travel restrictions are gradually easing. Those few journalists and diplomats who are permitted to visit do so only under heavy surveillance.

The Government-controlled media have markedly stepped up their attacks on aspects of Islamic religious practice, presumably because ethnic Turks comprise the majority of Bulgaria's Moslem population (the remainder being Gypsies and Slavic Pomaks). The media have attacked the practice of circumcision, the teaching of the Koran to the young, the giving of alms on certain holidays, and fasting during the Moslem holy month of Ramadan. The Bulgarian paper *Nova Svetlina*, for instance, claimed that Ramadan fasting is a destructive superstition because it prevents those who fast from working properly. According to reports, Islamic religious practices have been banned outright. An unknown number of mosques have been closed, Moslem graveyards have been obliterated, the Koran is not published within Bulgaria and cannot be imported, and Bulgarian Muslims are forbidden to participate in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

The Bulgarian assimilation campaign is reminiscent of the country's previous campaign against the Macedonian minority and its efforts to create a homogeneous Bulgarian state. Throughout the 1960's and 70's, the Bulgarian Government conducted a gradual campaign to compel groups such as the Macedonians and the Pomaks to assimilate. (Pomaks are ethnic Slavs who converted to Islam during the period of Ottoman rule, but who maintained their Bulgarian language and culture.) Mention of these groups has gradually disappeared from the official records. The preliminary 1985 census makes no mention of nationalities other than Bulgarian.

---

[6] [7] See footnotes on p. 232.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

INTRODUCTION

Czechoslovakia is home to a disaffected populace and an ever more defensive regime. The increasing rebelliousness of Czechoslovak youth, the spread of dissent beyond intellectual circles, and the burgeoning independent activity of church prelates and laity alike demonstrate that the gap between regime and society is growing wider rather than closing in post-1968 "normalized" Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia also is home to a long-standing human rights monitoring movement which is unique in the region for withstanding the state's attempts to interrupt its work, and for its continuing growth in membership and the scope of its endeavors. Czechoslovak human rights monitors painstakingly document and publicize their Government's violations of its own laws as well as the commitments it has undertaken in international fora.

The Czechoslovak regime continues to exile, imprison and harass in numerous ways those Czechoslovak citizens who register their criticism of the regime, whether in public proclamations or private correspondence. It seeks to stem all independent development of Czechoslovak culture beyond the bounds set by the state. And it sharply restricts its citizens' contacts with the outside world.

Czechoslovak citizens who express independent opinions on any subject which the regime considers its domain are charged with subversion, incitement, defamation of the Republic, or damaging the interests of the Republic abroad. Citizens who seek contact with foreign diplomats or visit embassy libraries have been charged with espionage. Believers arrested for their religious activities are charged with obstructing state supervision over churches. And like the authorities in neighboring East European countries, Czechoslovak authorities have brought political and religious activists to trial on trumped-up criminal charges.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Charter 77, a coalition of Czechoslovak citizens united in their determination to encourage official compliance with the human rights agreements it has signed, represents one of the most active independent movements in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Since 1977, when 241 people signed the Charter 77 manifesto, the number of signatories has risen to over 1,100. The manifesto stated, and subsequently issued charter documents have confirmed, that the purpose of Charter 77 is not to set up an opposition body targeted against the party and Government, nor to seek to change the Czechoslovak system, but rather to establish a mechanism whereby private citizens can maintain a dialogue with the Government. Charter documents have focused on economic and social issues touching Czechoslovak society as well as limitations on the rights of the individual.

Charter 77 has carried on debate with parties outside of Czechoslovakia as well. It has addressed independent East European groups such as Poland's Solidarity and Hungary's Danube Circle, international conferences, such as the recently concluded Bern

Human Contacts Experts Meeting of the 35 Helsinki Final Act signatories, and Western peace groups. It has promoted steadfastly the principle of the indivisibility of peace and human rights which all charter signatories share. The Prague Appeal, which Charter 77 issued in March 1985, explains the link the charter signatories see between peace and human rights:

> The freedom and dignity of individual citizens are the key to the freedom and self-determination of nations. And only sovereign nations can transform Europe into a community of equal partners which would not pose the threat of a global nuclear war, but instead serve as an example of real peaceful coexistence.[1]

In April 1978, Charter 77 signatories founded the working group VONS, the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted. Its work complements the work of Charter 77, but it focuses solely on specific cases of human rights abuses in Czechoslovakia. VONS members, who have all signed onto the Charter 77 manifesto, play a monitoring and advocacy role for Czechoslovak political prisoners incarcerated for the exercising of their human rights. They also provide support for political prisoners' families. VONS issues frequent communiques describing the repression of human rights and independent cultural activists.

The Czechoslovak authorities have responded to Charter 77 and VONS with harassment, detention, imprisonment and increasing surveillance of activists. For a time, the regime seemed to favor meting out suspended sentences and reduction of liberties rather than actually imprisoning activists. Consequently, there were few political prisoners in Czechoslovakia incarcerated for their human rights work rather than their attempts to leave the country, for which many political prisoners are serving time. However, harassment of human rights activists continues and has even increased. And recently, authorities have renewed the crack down on citizens who have sought to follow an independent path in social, cultural and religious life with detentions and imprisonment.

At present, 6 Charter 77 signatories are serving prison terms or are in detention—Walter Kania, serving 2 years for "harming the interests of the Republic abroad;" Frantisek Veis, serving 12 years for espionage; Jiri Wolf, serving 6 years for "subversion;" Herman Chromy, serving 2 years for "incitement;" and Jan Dus, detained during a house search and charged with "harming the interests of the Republic abroad and subversion." Eduard Vacek, serving 1 year for "possessing, distributing and producing ideologically objectionable literature." These and other current Charter 77 and VONS cases are included in the annex to this report.

During the period under review the regime inaugurated a new method to hamper Charter 77 and VONS activists' efforts. This method of harassment grew out of a 1963 statute which legalized a strict regimen of curfews, interrogations and restricted movement for chronic criminal offenders released from prison. According to Amnesty International, it was first employed against Czechoslovak political activists in 1981. In 1984 it was invoked to control the

---

[1] See footnote on p. 232.

movement of Charter 77 signatories and VONS members Ladislav Lis and Jan Litomisky. Under the protective supervision regimen, Lis and Litomisky were required to report daily to the police station, provide authorities with information on their jobs and salaries, let their homes be searched at any time, observe strict curfews, and obtain prior permission to travel outside their assigned places of residence. Litomisky's term of protective supervision was scheduled to end in 1986.

Four former political prisoners in addition to Lis were confined in 1986 by protective supervision: Jiri Gruntorad, Frantisek Starek, Ivan Jirous and Petr Cibulka. All are Charter 77 signatories. Starek and Jirous were involved in the independent development of culture through the *samizdat* periodical *Vokno* ("Window") and the pop musical group, "Plastic People of the Universe," whose prosecution in 1976 was closely tied with the formation of Charter 77. Released from prison in May 1984 and May 1985 respectively, Starek and Jirous next faced 2- and 3-year terms of protective supervision each. Gruntorad, released from prison in January 1985 after serving almost 4 years for his independent publishing activities and subsequent complaints that guards had beaten him in prison, was made subject to protective supervision for 3 years. Cibulka, released in July 1986 after 7 months' imprisonment for "insulting the nation," faces a further sentence of 3 years' protective supervision and a ban on visiting Prague. In September 1986 Cibulka was detained again for violating the terms of his protective supervision sentence.

Still others have terms of protective supervision awaiting them upon release from prison. Jiri Wolf, for instance, was sentenced in 1983 to 6 years imprisonment and 3 years "protective supervision" for subversion. This latest imprisonment, Wolf's third, was due to his dissemination of Charter 77 materials and informing foreign journalists and a Western Embassy in Prague of prison conditions in Czechoslovakia.

Many Charter 77 signatories, while technically free, are hampered in their activities by unceasing harassment. Playwright Vaclav Havel, an original signatory of Charter 77 and one of its first spokespersons, has had a long history of conflict with the Czechoslovak authorities. First sentenced in 1977 upon publication of the Charter 77 manifesto for "harming the interests of the Republic abroad," Havel has withstood several detentions, imprisonment, surveillance, house searches and other unending harassment from authorities. In January 1983, after serving 3½ years of a 4½-year sentence, Havel was released from prison into the intensive care unit of a civilian hospital after falling seriously ill. In late 1985 he wrote a letter to the Czechoslovak Prosecutor General (which subsequently appeared in *The Washington Post* in December 1985) protesting police harassment during his auto trip to visit friends in Czechoslovakia.

Political prisoners incarcerated in Czechoslovakia range from Charter 77 signatories to religious activists to citizens who have sought to leave the country without official permission. The number of political prisoners is not known, but the U.S. State Department estimates that it falls between 300 and 1,000. Most of the would-be emigrants imprisoned in Czechoslovakia receive 1- to 2-

year sentences, but VONS has documented cases in which such prisoners have served for 10 or more years on multiple charges associated with their attempted escape.

Under Czechoslovak law, detainees can be held for up to 48 hours without charges. This limit often is exceeded in practice. One common form of harassment used against political activists is repeated 48-hour detentions. Authorities also employ searches and interrogations to harass citizens into inaction.

Detainees may be held for 60 days for investigation if the authorities decide to press charges. Investigative detention may be and often is extended at the request of the prosecution, and detainees occasionally are held for long periods without being brought to trial. During this time, they are not permitted to receive family visitors. On occasion, detentions without charges have lasted for up to 1 year. For example, ethnic Hungarian human rights advocate Miklos Duray was arrested in May 1984 and released 1 year later without ever having been brought to trial. In general, however, Czechoslovak authorities do not detain suspects for a long time, but instead release them pending trial.

Czechoslovak law provides that citizens charged with criminal offenses should be granted a fair and open public trial. The law provides that the accused has a right to be informed of the charges against him, to have counsel, and to present a defense. Few of these legal guarantees are effective in practice. However, authorities began in 1985 for the first time to allow Western diplomatic representatives on occasion to attend Czechoslovak trials.

The Czechoslovak Constitution theoretically guarantees freedom of speech and the press. However, it proclaims explicitly that freedom of expression will be safeguarded only if it accords with the "interests of the working class." Article 100 of the Czechoslovak Criminal Code (incitement) or article 112 (harming the interests of the Republic abroad) are the most common articles invoked to curb freedom of expression in Czechoslovakia.

In the period covered by this Implementation Report, the Czechoslovak regime intensified its campaign to stem all independent cultural and publishing activities. Throughout the period, VONS has documented police harassment of rock concert performers and attendees. The years 1982 and 1983 saw a series of vitriolic pieces on contemporary music in official newspapers. Charter 77 identified the source of the regime's concern about contemporary cultural developments in the fact that in Czechoslovakia, a "relatively silent" country, where "(s)ilence equals even the ritual repetition of worn-out words and phrases," a singer becomes "also a poet, preacher and spokesman." [2]

In October 1984, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Culture ordered the disbanding of the 7,000-member Jazz Section of the Czechoslovak Musicians' Union. This attempt to end the Jazz Section's activities through direct means was far from the first attack by the regime, which had become increasingly alarmed over the independent publishing activities of the Section—focusing largely on nonconformist art—and the growing popularity of rock music. In

[2] See footnote on p. 232.

March 1985, the Jazz Section was dissolved under a statute dating from 1968 which bans counter-revolutionary activity. However, the Chairman of the Jazz Section, Karel Srp, and his deputy, Josef Skalnik, contend that the Government's dissolution of the Section alone could not end the Section's activities, as it is a member of the International Jazz Federation of the Music Council of UNESCO.

In September 1985, the Jazz Section's financial records and membership lists were confiscated after police searched the Section's offices and its leaders' apartments. In the same month Jazz Section member and Charter 77 signatory Petr Cibulka was sentenced to 7 months imprisonment for "insulting the nation." Authorities confiscated Srp's passport and levied criminal charges against him. In September 1986, the authorities moved decisively against the Section, arresting seven of its members, including Srp and Skalnik. They were charged with unauthorized business activities. Sentences for such charges can range from 2 to 8 years.

On September 30, 1986, four associates of the Jazz Section announced the formation of the Action Committee for the Jazz Section. The Committee's aims are to represent the Jazz Section temporarily, work for the release of Jazz Section detainees, continue the Section's activities, and support the detainees' families. In October, the Committee sent an appeal on behalf of the Jazz Section to the CSCE Vienna Review Meeting.

Over 200 writers publish their work in *samizdat* in Czechoslovakia. The writers are interrogated regularly, but rarely are imprisoned for their writings. Instead, the regime usually punishes those who reproduce, distribute and bring into the country *samizdat* materials. For example, in 1985, authorities detained and interrogated five Catholics who allegedly set up an underground printing press for disseminating religious materials. In July of the same year, Petr Kozanek and Zdenek Kotrly were charged with "attempting to damage the Czechoslovak Republic's interests abroad" for trying to take some of Catholic writer Iva Kotrla's manuscripts to Austria in their car. Each was handed a 10-month suspended sentence. Iva Kotrla is the author of three volumes of poetry and a novel, none of which have been published openly in Czechoslovakia.

In 1985, poet Lenka Mareckova was sentenced to 7 months in prison, after a 2-month detention, for incitement. At a reading, she had presented poems which authorities deemed critical of the Czechoslovak system and the Soviet Union. In 1984 Mareckova had been sentenced to a 1-year imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, and had lost an appeal against that sentence. Subsequently, the judge ruled that she had been charged under the wrong provision of the Criminal Code, and re-sentenced her for violating the legal provisions against incitement.

One of Czechoslovakia's most illustrious cultural figures, the late Nobel Prize-winning poet Jaroslav Seifert, also was a victim of state censorship. In its essay on "The Right to Information," Charter 77 observed that the Czechoslovak media embarked on a disinformation campaign, claiming that Seifert was one of the most frequently published poets in the country. The campaign belied the truth that none of Seifert's poetry had been published in Czechoslo-

vakia for 10 years and that his recent poetry had been published, in uncensored form, only abroad or in *samizdat.*[3]

Czechoslovak citizens unaffiliated with any officially recognized institute or organization cannot legally obtain printing and photocopying equipment. They can and do still own typewriters. However, the Czechoslovak authorities are attempting to halt the dissemination of *samizdat* literature by confiscating typewriters and paper. To justify their action, they cite section 118 of the Czechoslovak Penal Code, on unauthorized business enterprises.

The Charter 77 *samizdat* monthly, *Information about the Charter*, is a special target of harassment. Security police ransacked its editor's apartment for 10 hours after learning that the journal had been awarded the Jan Palach Prize for 1984 in Paris. The search allegedly was sparked by reports that the apartment might be holding weapons, explosives, and other items dangerous to the public.

Despite the official campaign to stamp out *samizdat,* new *samizdat* publications continue to be issued in Czechoslovakia. In 1985, the first issue of the *samizdat* periodical *Komentare* appeared, carrying essays by anonymous Czechoslovak citizens on approaches to peace. It also included contributions by many prominent members of Western peace movements.

Czechoslovak vigilance against "harming the interests of the Republic abroad" extends also to private letters. In November 1985, ecologists Pavel Krivka and Pavel Skoda were sentenced to 3 years and 20 months respectively for subversion and incitement, after they had written and sent a letter to friends in West Germany that detailed the ecological problem areas in Czechoslovakia and the handling of floods there in 1984.

Theoretically, the Czechoslovak Constitution upholds freedom of assembly. However, public meetings may be held only with official permission, and private gatherings are considered subversive. In March 1985, 48 Czechoslovak citizens were detained after meeting in a private home where they had watched historical films. The independent philosophical seminars carried on by Charter 77 signatory Dr. Ladislav Hejdanek consistently have been subject to such harassment, ever since the inception of the seminar series in the late 1970's. Dr. Hejdanek has been subject to numerous detentions and interrogations, most recently in May 1986.

In 1983, Czechoslovakia withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association after that organization declared that Czechoslovakia abused psychiatry for political purposes. During the period covered by this Implementation Report, authorities used psychiatric confinement to punish several individuals for their religious or other independent activities. Most often, such confinement has been ordered for persons who dissent publicly from regime policies or actions. But it is also used to intimidate those whose dissent is expressed in *samizdat* literature and in personal correspondence.

Probably the longest standing case of the abuse of psychiatry in Czechoslovakia involves the Adventist Korinek couple, who went into hiding in July 1985 to escape involuntary incarceration in a

[3] See footnote on p. 232.

psychiatric hospital. For over a decade they had been subjected to continual treatment in psychiatric institutions, and had fought a losing battle to regain custody of their children.

Another case of psychiatric abuse occurred in 1984 when Jan Pukalik was charged under article 100 (incitement) for collecting signatures on a petition protesting deployment of Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia. After he had circulated his petition, Pukalik was detained, interrogated and beaten. Authorities determined that Pukalik was mentally deranged and ordered him into outpatient psychiatric care against his will.

The case of Czech Catholic activist Augustin Navratil is a further instance of psychiatric abuse in Czechoslovakia. In November 1985, Navratil was arrested and jailed in Brno for incitement, after he disseminated a letter alleging that state security forces had been involved in the murder of a clandestinely ordained Catholic priest in 1981. The following month he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital. Prior to his 1985 arrest, Navratil had been forced to undergo psychiatric treatment for distributing religious literature. According to one source, another likely reason for his arrest was the authorities' suspicion that he might be sheltering the Korineks.[4]

Several Charter 77 signatories have had to undergo psychiatric examinations in recent years. They include Tomas Liska, David Nemec, Karel Soukup, Professor Julius Tomin and Father Vaclav Maly. Karel Svorcik was confined to a psychiatric clinic for 3 weeks in fall 1984 after a house search during which police confiscated *samizdat* materials and personal letters.

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

Next to the Charter 77 and VONS activists, no group in Czechoslovak society troubles the authorities more than religious believers. Compared to the human rights monitors, the churchgoers form a formidably large and committed group; committed, that is, to the practice of their religion over the state's secular and socialization goals. Perhaps nowhere else in Eastern Europe, next to Poland, is the contest between the majority church and the state so heated.

Most worrying to the Government is the church's growing attraction for young people. As Charter 77 signatory Jiri Dienstbier stated, "The church is becoming an outlet for the frustration among the young. . . . It is the only activity left which is official and also a symbol of opposition." [5]

The largest church in Czechoslovakia is the Catholic Church, with an estimated 8 to 11 million members (of a total population of 15½ million). One million or so Czechoslovak citizens are Protestants, and Czechoslovak citizens can belong legally to 16 other officially recognized denominations. Others belong to banned churches with a proseletyzing mission, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Mormons.

As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovak authorities maintain strict control of religion through harsh application of laws and statutes and, most effectively, through state administra-

---

[4] [5] See footnotes on p. 232.

tion of the various churches. The state's control, centered in the federal and two subsidiary Offices for Religious Affairs, is multi-layered and established through both formal and informal mechanisms—it dictates prelates' appointments and salaries, seminary admissions and religious education directly; it guides the members of *Pacem in Terris*, a political organization of Catholic priests set up by the regime in defiance of the Vatican; and it controls religious contacts through its passport policies and co-opting of several religious organizations. The state also discriminates against believers in employment and education.

Nevertheless, believers persist in practicing their faith and marking life's milestones with religious rituals. The Catholic *samizdat* paper, "Information About the Church," reported recently on a speech by the former Czechoslovak Minister of Religious Affairs, in which he cited some statistics which support the impression that the Catholic Church remains an important institution in many Czechoslovak citizens' lives: in 1984, 71.6 percent of newborn babies in Slovakia and 31.2 percent in the Czech lands were baptized; 53 percent of weddings in Slovakia and 15.8 percent in the Czech lands were conducted in churches; and 80.5 percent of the dead in Slovakia and 50.6 percent in the Czech lands were buried with church rites.[6]

Despite continuing adherence of believers, the church must struggle with a state apparatus that is intent on weakening it and ultimately winning full subservience from it. One of the Catholic Church's greatest complaints against the Czechoslovak authorities is that for years resident bishops have not been appointed to 10 out of 13 bishoprics. The seats are vacant not merely because of a shortage of licensed priests, but because the church's and state's candidates are mutually unacceptable. The state will accept only members of the *Pacem in Terris* organization, the state-sponsored "peace association" of Catholic clergy founded in 1971. The church favors the appointment of only those prelates who have refused to join *Pacem in Terris*. (In 1982, the Vatican banned clergy participation in political organizations.) The majority of Catholic prelates, including Cardinal Tomasek, Archbishop of Prague and Primate of Bohemia, have disassociated themselves from the officially favored organization.

The regime goes further, however, than blocking the appointment of bishops to dioceses. It also assigns priests to parishes and to all higher church offices. It withdraws priests' licenses, and enforces the withdrawals by prosecuting priests who continue to perform religious duties without a license. The most commonly invoked legal provision in such circumstances is article 178 of the Czechoslovak Criminal Code, concerning obstruction of state supervision of churches. In a recent interview with the Italian magazine *Il Sabato*, Cardinal Tomasek, reported that as of 1985, 1,161 of 4,336 parishes in Czechoslovakia had no priest.[7]

In August 1984, Father Adam Rucki's license was revoked without explanation. Earlier in the year Father Rucki had been interrogated by the police concerning his contacts with youth. An appeal

---

[6] [7] See footnotes on p. 232.

signed by 466 parishioners on his behalf was sent to Cardinal Tomasek. In the same year, authorities revoked the license of Jan Keller, minister of the Czech Brethren Evangelical Church, for organizing informal youth groups. The charges were dropped in February 1986 in the wake of a citizens' protest petition bearing 2,000 signatures; but he remains barred from practicing as a clergyman.

The state controls religious education of both children and clergy, and prohibits unofficial gatherings, such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, and seminars. In a recent incident of unauthorized religious assembly, in 1984, Father Joseph Kajnek received a suspended sentence and lost his license because he allowed an unlicensed prelate to teach religious classes and showed slides to children in a church without obtaining official permission for a meeting. In 1984, state authorities warned Father Bohumil Sitavanc that his note to parents reminding them of the right to register their children for school religious instruction constituted "illicit duplicating" and "interference in family life." He was told that such an action could lead to the loss of his license.

Parents must obtain permission from state officials if they wish their children to receive religious training in elementary school. Thus they become vulnerable to discrimination against themselves and their family. Reportedly, children who have received religious instruction automatically are made ineligible for higher education; their parents often lose their jobs. Moreover, believers are barred from higher public office or managerial positions in almost all nonreligious institutions.

In recent years, the two Catholic seminaries in Czechoslovakia accepted a few more students than in recent years (43 students instead of the usual 30 were accepted for the 1984–85 schoolyear; 38 were accepted for 1985–86).[8] However, according to some sources, although more candidates for the priesthood are being allowed to study at the Bratislava Seminary, a reorganization of professorships may strengthen the state's influence over the curriculum.[9] And the number of seminary students still falls far below the demands of both would-be priests and parishes.

The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, long under siege from the state, is shadowed by an underground church which is even more of a target for official repression. Unlicensed priests, underground publishers and members of religious orders carry on their activities outside the bounds of the officially recognized church.

During the period in review, authorities embarked on a campaign to intimidate suspected Franciscans, members of one of the religious orders which have been banned in Czechoslovakia since 1950 but have occasionally made their continued existence known. In a 1985 pilgrimage in predominantly Catholic Slovakia, for instance, Franciscan monks appeared in public in their habits for the first time since the dissolution of the monasteries. Most of the detained Franciscans have been handed suspended sentences. However, recently authorities have taken a harder line against Franciscans in response to that order's increasing influence and visibility in Czechoslovak religious life. In 1986, a Franciscan prelate, Father

[8] [9] See footnotes on p. 232.

Bystrik Cyril Janik, was sentenced to 28 months in prison for allegedly "obtaining money by deception;" in reality he had participated in religious rituals without a permit.

The growing visibility and strength among believers of these churches in Czechoslovakia have been nowhere more apparent than in the pilgrimages and church celebrations that recently have taken place in the country. In April 1985, over 1,000 Catholic priests, both licensed and banned, gathered at Velehrad for the opening celebration of the 1,100th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius, which was conducted by Cardinal Tomasek. The celebration continued in July, when 150,000 Czechoslovak Catholics participated in the Velehrad pilgrimage, the largest religious gathering in Czechoslovak postwar history. Many instances of restrictions of religious rights took place around the 1985 pilgrimage to Velehrad, including the state's withdrawal of licenses from three priests.

The church's conflict with the authorities over Velehrad had begun already in early 1984, when Catholics began to collect signatures on an invitation to the celebration addressed to the Pope. The group collected 20,000 names on the invitation before it abandoned its efforts due to official harassment. In Feburary 1985, Cardinal Tomasek took up the cause personally by extending an invitation to the Pope. In the end, not only the Pope, but also Polish Primate Cardinal Glemp, Archbishop of Vienna Cardinal Koenig, Archbishop of Paris Cardinal Lustiger and Primate of England and Wales Cardinal Hume were refused Czechoslovak permission to come to Velehrad.

The state enjoys substantial control over church publications. It can hire and fire employees, as well as exercise censorship directly. In 1984, the editorial board of *Cesky Bratr*, the Czech Brethren Church periodical, was fired when all its members refused to suspend publication of an issue deemed offensive to the state.

Religious *samizdat* is a source of unending concern to Czechoslovak secular authorities. A number of detentions and arrests for possession and distribution of religious *samizdat* occurred during the period under review. In 1984, Matej Nemeth, a Catholic priest, was accused of possessing illegal religious material and was charged with incitement. Also, three Slovak Catholics were given sentences of 16–18 months in March 1985 for having tried to carry religious material from Poland into Czechoslovakia. They were charged with "violating the regulations regarding exchange of goods with foreign countries." Their trial provoked considerable protest both inside the country and abroad. For example, seven Czechoslovak Catholic mothers signed a protest against the convictions, which was later publicized in *samizdat*. In June 1985, their sentences were reduced to 14 months.

In May 1986, six Catholics went on trial for importing, duplicating and disseminating religious literature. They were tried on the usual charge of obstructing state supervision of the church for possessing and using typewriters, duplicators and religious literature from abroad. The indictment against them condemned "the increased activity of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," especially its secretly ordained priests who "led the accused to believe

that there is insufficent religious liberty in the country." [10] None of the accused were sentenced to prison.

Other denominations beside the Catholic Church are involved in the printing and distribution of religious *samizdat* materials. In October 1984, Jan Juhascik and Rudolf Sobanos were arrested in eastern Slovakia with 700 Russian language Bibles (printed in the West) in their car; Juhascik's father was arrested the next day. Several days later Vladislav Rakay was arrested when 1,000 Bibles were found in his possession. All are members of the Church of the Brethren, and were charged with seeking to smuggle the Bibles into the Soviet Union.

Czechoslovak believers are taking an increasingly strong stance in defending their rights. In February 1986, Catholics in Gottwaldow, the scene of a state crackdown on independent religious activity in fall 1985, drew up a petition protesting the state's abuse of believers' rights and addressed to the Czechoslovak Minister of Culture (who oversees the Office of Church Affairs). The petition demanded the release of individuals incarcerated for their "attempts to compensate for the lack of literature, principally religious [literature] . . ." [11]

Czechoslovakia's Jewish community has some 7,000 adherents, the vast majority of whom are elderly. A central body, the Community of Religious Congregations, regulates the Jewish community's affairs in both the Czech and Slovak regions. It is financed in large part by the state. Jewish religious life is in a state of decay, with infrequent religious services, and next to no religious education.

Until 1984, Czech Jews had neither a rabbi nor a religious school. Slovakia had just one rabbi. In spring 1984, Rabbi Daniel Mayer, trained in the Rabbinical Seminary in Budapest, became Prague's first resident rabbi since 1970. Now two rabbis serve the Czechoslovak Jewish community, one in Prague and one in Kosice. Nevertheless, Czechoslovak Jews have little hope for the continuation of the centuries-old Jewish life in Czechoslovakia in coming decades.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The peace movement in Czechoslovakia falls into three categories: the official, state-sponsored campaign, the tools of which are press articles and secular leaders' public addresses; the debate by and among Charter 77 signatories and other Europeans interested in peace issues; and spontaneous demonstrations by the young and religious believers. Churches in Czechoslovakia have not been as involved in the peace movement as churches in other East European countries such as the G.D.R. or Hungary, in part because they do not enjoy as strong a position vis-a-vis the state.

The authorities have made clear that they will not tolerate independent participation in the peace movement, which they claim as the regime's own province. Authorities did allow protest letters from private citizens against stationing of missiles in Czechoslovakia to be published in *Rude Pravo*; but this is the farthest authorities allowed independent participation to go. In 1983, Interior Min-

[10] [11] See footnotes on p. 232.

istry warned Charter 77 leaders that the authorities would regard any attempt to oppose the deployment of Soviet missiles as subversion (which can carry a sentence of up to 10 years). In spite of the warning, throughout the period in review, Charter 77 has continued to participate in debates on peace.

The World Peace Council held a "World Assembly for Peace and Life Against Nuclear War" in Prague in June 1983. The Council shut out Charter 77 participation. Nevertheless, Charter 77 members managed to meet outside the conference with West European activists, who signed a joint statement proclaiming that "peace and human rights belong together." Charter activists were harassed throughout the Assembly, causing Greenpeace and Pax Christi International to withdraw their delegates. Delegates representing the Federal Republic's Green Party also walked out of the Assembly to protest Czechoslovak stifling of the freedoms of the press and expression.

Charter 77 has issued many manifestos and other thought pieces reflecting a wide range of ideas on the arms race and peace. The most important peace-related document to emerge from Charter 77 is the Prague Appeal of March 1985. It represents the widest consensus yet of unofficial Czechoslovak thinking on the issue of peace. The Appeal was the result of months long discussions between charter signatories and was sent to a peace movement congress in Amsterdam. Not only Czechoslovak citizens but also citizens of other West and East European states entered into dialogue with the signatories to the Appeal, and that dialogue has not yet ended.

The Prague Appeal was the unofficial Czechoslovak reply to a West European peace movement which seemed to many Czechoslovak human rights monitors to be excessively one-sided (limited to criticizing the Western arms build-up and making only very faint references to the Eastern build-up) and too willing to dispense with human rights beyond the right to live in security. It identified the division of Europe as the root of its citizens' insecurity and took as its starting point, "Our common hope . . . lies in overcoming this division." It praised the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe for conducting negotiations between equal partners rather than blocs. And it called for Europeans to begin to debate previously taboo subjects which the peace movement so far had only skirted, including the division of Germany and withdrawal of foreign troops. Its solution was not to redraw European borders, but rather to make such redrawing unnecessary. The core of the document was the long-held Charter 77 premise, "(T)he principle of the indivisibility of peace, a legacy of European culture, has been embodied in relations not only between states, but also between the state and society, and between citizens and governments." [12]

Charter 77's manifestos to other peace groups in Western and Eastern Europe were accompanied by suggestions to the Czechoslovak regime for reforms in military service requirements. In 1985, for example, Charter 77 proposed to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly that Czechoslovakia follow the example of the German

[12] See footnote on p. 232.

Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany and shorten mandatory military service from 24 to 18 months. The charter also suggested that like neighboring countries, Czechoslovakia should establish an alternative form of service for those citizens whose consciences or religion made it morally impossible for them to bear arms.

The third category of peace activities, spontaneous demonstrations, has gained momentum in the past few years. The demonstrations have ranged from circulating individual petitions against deployment of missiles to graffiti critical of the arms race to chanting of peace slogans at unofficial gatherings. The largest gathering of this type took place in December 1985 on the fifth anniversary of singer John Lennon's death. On this occasion, a group of mostly young people which ranged at different times from an estimated 200 to 1,000 participants, marched through the streets of Prague with a picture of Lennon bearing the inscription, "When will there be peace, John?" The crowd grew increasingly outspoken as its march progressed, chanting at different times, "We want freedom, we want peace," "No missile is a peace missile," "Do away with the Army," and "Do away with the SS-20s." In a positive development, police did not respond with force to break up the demonstration.[13]

In May 1986, a group of young people applied for official approval to form an organization called "Young Art for Peace." The group intended "to search for answers and for assistance in the pursuit of peace, disarmament, and the spreading and development of moral values." Authorities intimidated the would-be members of the group, persuading them through threats of unemployment and criminal prosecution to withdraw their request in June.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

Long credited with enjoying one of the highest standards of living in Eastern Europe, in recent years Czechoslovakia has experienced an economic decline. The economy, dogged by central planning, aging infrastructure in a state of increasing disrepair and high energy costs, is stagnating, while any notion of substantive economic reform remains anathema to the regime. The regime has offered few incentives to labor and has allowed next to no scope for private activities in any sector of the economy. Despite the declining economic situation, most citizens have access to adequate means of existence, including food, shelter and medical care. But with such an economic decline, the regime is left with less and less to offer its citizens in the way of an improved quality of life.

Charter 77 has issued commentaries on the very serious problems Czechoslovakia faces in the economic, social and environmental areas. In doing so, it has come to fill a vacuum in Czechoslovak society where, as Charter 77 points out in its essay on "The Right to Information," "it is forbidden to make public anything dealing with important economic and ecological problems," and official newspapers carry only "optimistic-sounding ideas."[14] Charter essays published during the period in review addressed such

[13] [14] See footnotes on p. 232.

64-639 O - 87 - 3

themes as the environmental impact of certain construction plans, discrimination in employment, the shortfalls of the national health system, proposed economic reforms and the Chernobyl disaster.

Charter 77 points out that in many of these areas the Czechoslovak regime has violated its commitment to uphold broad economic and social rights. One charter criticism which echoes the opinions of other independent commentators in Eastern Europe addresses the moral decline which accompanies a stagnating political situation. Charter signatories have pointed out,

> "Society is permeated with corruption, bribery, abuse of positions, shoddy work, cheating, pilfering, indifference to the soil which feeds us, indifference to values which were entrusted to us, squandering of those values and wasting human work." [15]

The increasing number of articles on economic crime in the official press demonstrates that the Charter 77 criticism has hit on a phenomenon that worries the secular authorities as well.

Another issue which Charter 77 has raised is discrimination throughout Czechoslovak society. Advancement in employment is contingent as much on political loyalty as qualifications. Many Charter 77 signatories and others who participated in the heady Prague spring of 1968 continue to work in menial jobs.

Discrimination crosses generational lines, and affects educational opportunities as well. The regime continues to intimidate the families of human rights activists by discrimination in higher education. In recent years, the children of several prominent Charter 77 signatories have encountered educational barriers. Some have sought to continue their education abroad and have been compelled to go into exile. In 1984, Jiri Dienstbier's daughter was permitted to accept a scholarship on the condition that she renounce her Czechoslovak citizenship. In 1986, Jiri Hajek's son likewise was required to renounce his citizenship in order to pursue his education in Norway. Education is politicized to the point where it is "subordinated . . . to ideology; the schools are presenting a distorted picture of reality and are deforming the cultural awareness of the young generation." [16]

Workers in Czechoslovakia are neither allowed "freely to establish" unions, nor to avoid becoming members of the state-sponsored workers' organization, the Revolutionary Workers' Movement (ROH). The right to strike does not exist in Czechoslovakia. However, on occasion workers' organizations within industries or factories have been able to gain some improvements in working conditions through negotiation with management.

Only a few instances of independent labor activity have been reported during the period under review. In December 1982, four young Czechoslovaks were sentenced to 1 to 4 years in prison for disseminating leaflets urging solidarity with Polish workers. And in late 1983 the "Preparatory Committee for Free Trade Unions" issued a statement criticizing the official trade unions for having supported the Government's decision to accept the deployment of Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia.

---

[15] [16] See footnotes on p. 232.

ETHNIC RIGHTS

Only about 5 percent of the Czechoslovak population is not ethnically Czech or Slovak. Approximately 550,000 Hungarians live in Czechoslovakia. They are proportionally represented in federal and local legislative bodies but are underrepresented in high-level jobs in industry, the Government and the party. The state provides some elementary and secondary education in Hungarian and permits a limited number of ethnic Hungarians to pursue higher education in Hungarian. Czechoslovakia's small Gypsy population, numbering about 250,000, faces discrimination as it does elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

In November 1982, ethnic Hungarian minority rights proponent Miklos Duray was interrogated by police about his criticisms of Czechoslovak minority policies, which had appeared in *samizdat* and in publications in the West (including a report to the CSCE Madrid meeting on resolving internal minority problems). In February 1983 he was tried for "hostile acts against the state" (section 98 of the Criminal Code), but the trial ended without a verdict and he was released. The charge against Duray was never dropped. In August 1983, he signed the Charter 77 manifesto.

Duray came into conflict with the Czechoslovak authorities once again in May 1984, when he was arrested following his protests against a new schooling law in Slovakia which the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia (which is concentrated in Slovakia, where it comprises 11 percent of the population) regarded to be damaging to Hungarian-language education. Duray had organized a widespread protest against an education reform law which permits the curtailment of minority language teaching in Slovak schools. He was released on May 10, 1985, from prison in Slovakia after 1 year's detention; he had never formally been charged.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE CSCE PROCESS

In November 1983, Charter 77 spokespeople sent a letter to President Husak in which they reconfirmed the link between peace and human rights and pointed out specific ways in which Czechoslovakia could better meet its Helsinki obligations as reaffirmed at Madrid. These included: amending the Czechoslovak legal system to make it correspond to international obligations; supporting the creation of a Czechoslovak Human Rights Committee competent to handle reports from individuals on the implementation of the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and respecting citizens' initiatives by individuals and by informal or formal associations. As in the case of all Charter 77 initiatives, the Government never replied.

The CSCE process provides Western countries with an opportunity to bring to light Czechoslovak violations of its citizens' rights and to pursue the resolution of specific cases. But when it comes to engaging in dialogue about human rights concerns, the Czechoslovak authorities are as loathe to discuss these concerns with CSCE delegations as with their own citizenry.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION

The continuing high levels of legal emigration from the German Democratic Republic, as well as the isolated, desperate and infrequently successful escape attempts over the border with the Federal Republic of Germany, testify not only to the lure of the West to East German citizens but also to continuing repression in the German Democratic Republic. Living in the heart of Europe, well within reach of West European media, East Germans hear of life in the West every day, and are in a position to compare their society to neighboring ones, as well as to share in at least a limited way in the movements that ripple through those societies. The West European peace movement, for instance, found particular resonance in the German Democratic Republic in recent years.

Enjoying the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe, East Germans enjoy few of the freedoms which accompany prosperity in the West. Yet some have found accommodation with the Government in a closely circumscribed but significant sphere of independent cultural and religious life. The majority Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, for instance, plays an active role in the life of the German Democratic Republic.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Specific regulations significantly limit the activities of G.D.R. citizens, but the broad application of generally worded laws is the most severe threat to human rights in that country. For example, a 1981 law on house arrests allows authorities to order the detention and questioning of citizens suspected of being threats to security "even if a violation of a particular law has not occurred." The Penal Code provides that the transmission of information damaging to the interests of the German Democratic Republic, even if it is not secret, may be considered treason. Laws against "anti-state agitation" and "asocial behavior" (parasitism) frequently are used to curb citizens' independent activities.

The G.D.R. Constitution guarantees the freedoms of conscience, belief, expression, the press, peaceful assembly and association. However, the official commentary to the Constitution limits these freedoms with the countervailing "(c)onstitutional duty to oppose . . . the spreading of anti-socialist ideology which is practiced in the name of 'freedom,' 'democracy,' or 'humanity.'" Thus, individuals face imprisonment for: sending unclassified information to individuals or groups abroad which can harm the interests of the G.D.R.; criticizing the condition of G.D.R. society and its allies; and disseminating publications or symbols which can "disturb the Socialist way of life or bring the state or public order into contempt." G.D.R. authorities do not consider independent human rights advocacy to be a legitimate or legal activity.

A few small, unofficial human rights groups are known to exist in the G.D.R. Over the past few years, small dissident groups have formed on occasion and been suppressed by the authorities. The German Democratic Republic has a state-sponsored Committee for

the Protection of Human Rights which monitors human rights concerns in the West.

G.D.R. citizens involved in political activities are subject to frequent police interrogations, even when formal charges have not been brought against them. Lengthy pre-trial detention is common for political prisoners. Detainees legally may be held for 3 months before charges are brought against them, but authorities have been known to extend this period. Although G.D.R. law requires prompt notification of a detainee's family or employer, in most cases involving political detainees notification of interested parties comes far later than 24 hours after detention. Political trials are closed to observers, despite the guarantee of "fair" and "public" trials guaranteed in the Constitution.

The number of political prisoners in the German Democratic Republic is unknown. Estimates from various Western human rights organizations between 1982 and 1986 have ranged from 6,000 to 10,000. This number includes citizens who have sought to leave the country by applying to emigrate or through illegal channels, peace activists, opposition Marxists and conscientious objectors who have refused to be drafted into the East German military. An F.R.G. government agency which monitors G.D.R. human rights violations, the *Zentrale Erfassungstelle Salzgitter*, announced in 1986 that it had noted 24,716 prosecutions for political offenses in the German Democratic Republic since the Berlin Wall was erected 25 years ago.

Many ex-political prisoners are permitted to emigrate through official procedures after their prison terms are complete; alternatively, they are "bought out" by the West German Government. Since 1963, when the Federal Republic of Germany began to pay for the emigration of G.D.R. political prisoners, it has paid for the freedom of approximately 25,000 such prisoners. Each year, increasing numbers of ex-political prisoners have emigrated to the Federal Republic through this informal intra-German program. The Federal Republic bought out about 1,000 G.D.R. political prisoners in 1982, 1,034 in 1983; 2,341 in 1984 and 2,676 in 1985.[1]

The freedom of assembly that theoretically is safeguarded in the G.D.R. Constitution is significantly limited by various articles in the Penal Code. The Code stipulates that citizens "uniting to pursue illegal goals" can be sentenced to up to 5 years imprisonment. Leaders of such gatherings can receive 8-year sentences. "Riotous assembly," "rowdyism" and "impeding state and social activity" are some of the categories under which participants in unauthorized gatherings are prosecuted.

Restrictions on the freedom to associate with others extend beyond the German Democratic Republic's boundaries. Section 219 of the Penal Code prohibits "establish(ing) contacts with organizations, institutions, groups of persons or individuals whose aims are opposed to the State system of the German Democratic Republic." Written as well as personal contact comes under this provision, and section 219 often is invoked to halt G.D.R. citizens' publishing activities abroad. In February 1984, authorities arrested songwriter

[1] See footnote on p. 232.

Karlheinz Bomberg after he transmitted copies of some of his songs to contacts in the West. He was handed a 30-month suspended sentence for unlawful contacts with foreigners. In April of the same year, author Lutz Rathenow wrote a letter of protest to the G.D.R. Ministry of Culture because he had not been allowed to receive a copy of his book published in the Federal Republic. (Rathenow, imprisoned in 1980, was the first East German writer to be imprisoned for publishing his works abroad.) He was refused permission to visit the University of Texas in 1986 because, as the G.D.R. authorities informed him, he did not fit the profile of G.D.R. cultural figures who present a positive image of the German Democratic Republic abroad and who would be allowed foreign travel. G.D.R. economist Hermann von Berg lost his Humboldt University professorship in 1985 because one of his books was published in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Restrictions on the freedoms of association and assembly reach equally into private homes. In recent years, the regime has implemented existing regulations more consistently than previously to prevent political gatherings in private. Since February 1983, in the wake of a Christmastime and New Year's wave of arrests and other harassment of independent peace activists, the authorities have prosecuted attendees of meetings, discussion groups and exhibits in private homes who have not obtained an official permit prior to their gatherings. Thus the authorities have further circumscribed the already narrow fora in which G.D.R. citizens can share their independent opinions.

In May 1984, the G.D.R. *Law Gazette* published an update of a decree on police powers over unauthorized demonstrations and petitions which "abuse the interests of society" or constitute "offenses against the public order and security." The prohibition of unauthorized demonstrations extends to symbols and signs. Publication of the decree seemed to be targeted specifically at symbols such as the "Swords into Ploughshares" badges which independent peace advocates sported on their sleeves and which were banned in 1982. In February 1985, four peace activists were sentenced to 5 to 8 months in prison for printing signs criticizing the stationing of Soviet missiles in the German Democratic Republic.

A July 1984 decree authorized the levying of a 500-mark fine for "disturbances of the socialist community life." According to this law, citizens will be prosecuted who "organize, support, or in some other way participate in a gathering which is likely to flout society's interests or to affect adversely the public order and security," "evince or encourage in a demonstrative way a disrespect for laws and other legal regulations, or national or social interest," or "make use of themes, symbols, or other signs in a way which goes against governmental or social interests."

The detentions, arrests and other punishment of citizens whose independent actions ranged from public demonstrations to private discussion show clearly that independent political participation by citizens is anathema to G.D.R. authorities. In January 1983, peace activist Roland Jahn was arrested for "defaming the nation" after he had carried a flag publicly manifesting support for the independent Polish trade union, Solidarity. In June of that year, he was removed forcibly from the German Democratic Republic and

stripped of his citizenship. Some 25 other peace activists were forced to leave the German Democratic Republic shortly thereafter. In 1984, four members of the Weimar Montagskreise, a church-connected discussion group, were sentenced to up to 32 months in prison for "prejudicing state and social activity" and "illegal association." In mid-July of the same year, four more activists were sentenced to 24 to 34 months in prison for disseminating literature which spoke against the German Democratic Republic's official policies concerning peace and the environment and which called for a boycott of the upcoming local elections.

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

While East German activists seeking to exercise political rights independently have been prosecuted, many activists have found some room for maneuver within the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church. While not immune to government censure and sanctions, church officials play a prominent role in secular as well as in spiritual life. In a process of continued accommodation, the church has established a place for itself in the East German political order, forcing the regime to grant it some leeway in return for the church's acceptance of the party's leading role in the German Democratic Republic. Next to the Polish Catholic Church, the Evangelical Church enjoys the most autonomy from the state of any East European church.

The situation of the church in the German Democratic Republic is unique among the East European churches in many respects. Almost equal numbers of East Germans claim no religious affiliation as belong to the Evangelical Church (45 percent versus 47 percent), and 8 percent claim membership in the Catholic Church. Thus only a narrow majority of the population claims to have religious loyalties. Even if the Evangelical Church in the G.D.R. were inclined to play the sort of all-encompassing role that the Catholic Church in Poland does, its membership numbers could not sustain a struggle with the state over social and political power.

Despite relatively small numbers, the Evangelical Church enjoys broad latitude in the German Democratic Republic. It owns property, publishes and is involved in religious broadcasting. It collects church taxes directly from believers and sends its students to six state-funded theological seminaries at G.D.R. universities. Since the immediate post-war years, the church actively has explored social issues and sometimes has provided the Government with a social safety net which is evident in areas such as child care, medical services and care for the elderly. The state has not placed barriers in the way of the church's private supplementation of state-provided social welfare services. The church also provides ample opportunity for musicians and other artists, and can boast more church-associated musicians proportionate to population than any other church in the world.[2]

The framework which guides the life of the church in the German Democratic Republic was established in a 1978 meeting between President Honecker and East German Bishop Albrecht

[2] See footnote on p. 232.

Schoenherr. Bishop Schoenherr declared that the Evangelical Church sought to be a "Church in Socialism" which would recognize the existing power structure and still carve out a place and a mission for itself in G.D.R. society. Thus the church would play the role of a loyal opposition, criticizing some regime policies while accepting the regime's primacy in secular affairs.

In 1983, the East German Government appeared to relax control of the churches, particularly in the realm of censorship. Certain nonconformist musicians and writers were allowed to perform in church facilities, and some previously banned subjects were permitted to be discussed. The relaxation trend did not last beyond 1983, and in any case close state surveillance of the church's activities remained uninterrupted. Nevertheless, the Evangelical Church has spoken out increasingly on foreign policy issues, such as intra-German relations, and on domestic issues, such as alcoholism, crime, juvenile delinquency and the militarization of society.

G.D.R. President Erich Honecker has sought to establish amiable relations with church leaders. When the Protestant Church Federation elected a new leadership in 1985, he sent a highly complimentary letter of congratulations to the Federation which was reprinted in the state press. Church activities usually are treated favorably in the official media.

Various instances of church-state cooperation attest to the ability of these two institutions to coexist in the German Democratic Republic, with compromises made on both sides. The 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther in 1983 was such an occasion. 200,000 people attended seven different congresses organized by the Protestant Churches to mark the anniversary. The fact that the church-sponsored discussion groups set up for the celebration went well beyond the immediate subject of their gatherings to such social issues as family life, suicide, alcoholism, juvenile delinquency and pacifism attests to the church's involvement with society in a wide range of secular areas.

State participation in the administration of the church, while minimal, causes some friction between secular and church authorities. The Evangelical Church Synod complains that the state does not provide sufficient materials to maintain and restore existing churches. But the German Democratic Republic does not experience divisive showdowns between churchgoers and state authorities over building code violations, licensing or other state interference in what the church considers its own domain. One positive development during the period under review was the state's decision of March 1985 to pay pensions to Protestant deaconesses (who perform social work). With this decision, the state signalled that it recognized and valued the contributions of church workers to G.D.R. society beyond the religious community.

The state regulates the printing and distribution of religious materials in the German Democratic Republic. Some church newspapers have been delayed, withdrawn from circulation, or self-censored under government pressure because letters on sensitive questions were to appear in various issues. In September 1984, for instance, government monitors suspended distribution of the Evangelical Church newspaper *Mecklenburgische Kirchenzeitung* until a report on a church synod discussion of environmental issues, de-

ployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, and the German Democratic Republic's conscription policy was excised. Earlier in that year, state censors pulled an issue of the church bulletin *Der Sonntag* which contained a poem deemed objectionable to the state.

Individual believers still are prey to state-sponsored surveillance and discrimination as the regime continues to press for full allegiance to the state over the church. Western-based human rights groups regularly have received reports of official discrimination against believers' children in state schools and universities.

Reportedly, believers discussed many of their concerns about official discrimination in a number of church synods during the period in review. For instance, discussants at a Berlin-Brandenburg Synod broached the subject of the G.D.R. State Security Service's role in supervising believers. One minister explained that young church members were summoned from their homes to answer questions on their congregations' activities. Other church members reported that they were subject to obvious and unceasing surveillance.[3]

The regime's relationship with minority and unofficial churches in the German Democratic Republic has sometimes been rocky, but nevertheless subject to compromise in favor of those churches' activities in their communities. Relations between the state and the Catholic Church, for instance, often have been strained. Since the inception of the German Democratic Republic, the Catholic Church has sought to avoid engagement with secular authorities over political issues, confining its negotiations with the Government to narrowly defined issues of believers' rights, such as religious education. By following such a policy of restricted relations with the regime, the church avoided legitimizing the regime but also forfeited any opportunity to make a positive difference for citizens of the German Democratic Republic.

In January 1983, Catholic bishops in the German Democratic Republic joined the Evangelical Church for the first time in opposing militarism in the German Democratic Republic and had a pastoral letter on this theme read to every Catholic congregation in the country.[4] In the fall of 1984, Cardinal Meissner, the head of the Roman Catholic Church in East Germany, met with Klaus Gysi, the Minister for Religious Affairs, and expressed his displeasure that students in the country are being compelled to undertake a form of military preparation before conscription. He also sharply criticized the authorities' attitude towards school pupils who are believers.

The Jehovah's Witnesses have been banned in the German Democratic Republic since 1950. However, an estimated 28,000 Witnesses continue to practice their religion there. The authorities do not search them out for special persecution, but they are prosecuted for their categorical refusal to serve in the military with the customary 18-month imprisonment.

The Christian Science Church has been banned in the German Democratic Republic since 1951, due in part to its refusal to submit membership lists to the state and to its members' refusal of medical care. However, here too, the state and the small church have

---

[3] [4] See footnotes on p. 232.

found room for accommodation. In December 1984, state officials met with Christian Scientists and arranged the importation of some church literature from abroad. Recently state authorities granted permission for some new Christian Science churches to be built.

The German Democratic Republic's smallest religious group is the 450-member Jewish community. The leadership of the G.D.R. central Jewish body, the Federation of East German Jewish Congregations, is unquestioningly loyal to the regime and there are no public conflicts between the Jewish community and the state. While East German Jews, two-thirds of whom are over 60 years of age, are well cared for physically, spiritually they are starved. There has been no rabbi or cantor in the German Democratic Republic since 1969, and the community must send to Hungary or the Federal Republic for officiants at High Holiday services, funerals and other religious rituals. Recently, an American Jewish organization received official encouragement to arrange for a permanently stationed rabbi in East Berlin.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The early 1980's saw the emergence in the German Democratic Republic of a broad-based and outspoken peace movement which threatened to overshadow and show up the regime's own peace propaganda. The G.D.R. regime had long sought to convince its population and the world of the inseparable link between socialism and peace, but belied this connection by instituting ever more militaristic policies.

The growing militarization of G.D.R. society was manifest during the period in review in an increasing emphasis on military values and hatred of the enemy in schools, and the codification of state regulations defining military service requirements. From kindergarten, where children are encouraged to play with toy weapons, through secondary schools and university, where students learn to use hand grenades and rifles, into adulthood, when citizens are obliged to participate in civil defense exercises, the G.D.R. population is prepared continually for war. In March 1982, the regime promulgated a law requiring all institutions, enterprises and organizations to prepare citizens for military service, and making women between 18 and 50 years of age eligible for call-up in emergencies. These developments, together with the estimated 1,200,000 soldiers in the German Democratic Republic, the increasingly sharp rhetoric between East and West, and the threat of missile deployment, alarmed G.D.R. citizens and spurred them to take up the cause of peace.

The existence and outspokenness of the independent peace movement in the German Democratic Republic is difficult to understand without taking into account the special place of the "Church in Socialism" in the German Democratic Republic. In fact, most likely it would not have survived as long as it has without the support of the Evangelical Church. The church has affected the peace movement in three ways: by providing a source of information and analysis independent of the state, by intervening actively on behalf of peace activists being prosecuted by the authorities, and by refrain-

ing from questioning the regime's commitment to peace and arms control. It also has pursued dialogue with both the state and independent activists on peace issues.

The broad-based, independent peace movement originated in the German Democratic Republic largely in response to the increasing militarization of G.D.R. society discussed above and, to a lesser degree, to the large West German peace demonstrations of 1982 and 1983. During the 1970's the Evangelical Church had made some representations against the growing militarism of East German society. Since 1978, when compulsory defense studies were introduced into secondary schools, the Evangelical Church has been in the forefront of protests to the state about the disturbing militaristic trend in G.D.R. society. The Catholic Church joined in these protests in 1983.

Numerous church-connected and completely independent peace groups and movements emerged in the German Democratic Republic, beginning in 1981. In that year, the East German Evangelical Church adopted the Biblical slogan, "Swords into Ploughshares," which ironically echoed the slogan of a sculpture that the U.S.S.R. had presented to the United Nations. Authorities interrogated and harassed peace activists who wore badges with this slogan, sometimes ripping them off their clothing or threatening the activists with job demotions. In March 1982, the badges were banned.

The 100-member Women for Peace group was founded in 1982. In 1985 Women for Peace members Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe served about 1 year in prison before being released as a result of a hunger-strike. They had been arrested in December 1983 in part for maintaining contact with acquaintances in the West.

In 1981, the church approached state officials proposing modification of the construction unit service—in which those who do not want to carry arms can join a military building brigade—into a "social peace service," along the lines of the West German alternative service. Such a service would be purely civilian, limited to work in hospitals, geriatric homes, nursery schools and the like. The church has had little success in pressing the issues of militarism and a "social peace service," but nevertheless has kept the state involved in a lively debate as well as a constant struggle to explain away the militaristic overtones of the supposedly peace-loving German Democratic Republic.

The church provides a shelter for would-be peace activists who would be too exposed to state persecution without some sort of institutional shield. While the church's membership has been declining steadily, it is attracting ever increasing interest and participation from East German youth. Its role in the peace campaign may be attributable to this trend.

Despite the protection the church can provide, some East German churchpeople have been and continue to be prosecuted for their peace activism. Church leaders have been warned by authorities to restrain activist pastors and laity. In 1983, Evangelical deacon Lothar Rochau, who had counseled young men on how to take on construction work as an alternative to military service, was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for anti-state behavior. In 1984, four members of a church-connected peace group in Gera

were sentenced to prison terms under paragraph 218 of the Criminal Code (which prohibits "organizing to pursue illegal aims").

More often, it is the peace activists without church ties or protection who are prosecuted and isolated from G.D.R. society. Reportedly, in late 1983 25 peace activists from Jena, the most militantly peace-activist oriented town in the German Democratic Republic, either were expelled from or emigrated from the German Democratic Republic. The Jena group had disassociated itself from the church, which some of its members accused of complicity with the regime's repression of peace activities through silence, and thus exposed itself to the state's retribution. In December 1982 and January 1983, 17 Jena activists had been arrested after they had tried to hold a "moment of silence for peace" on Christmas Eve; they were released in early 1983 under international pressure. In March of the same year several Jena peace activists infiltrated an officially sponsored peace demonstration and passively resisted police attempts to remove them and their signs. The emigration of many of the Jena peace activists to the Federal Republic from 1983 on led to sharply decreased activism in that city and effectively defused a potentially explosive falling-out between peace activists and the church.

In other instances, peace activists have been detained before engaging in any demonstration. In October 1983, 100 peace activists were detained to prevent them from holding a demonstration in Berlin. In November 1983, during the annual Peace Week for Lutheran Churches in both East and West Germany, about 300 peace activists were held in 24-hour preventive detention to prevent a planned demonstration in protest of nuclear weapon deployment. The G.D.R. peace activists were to be joined by Western friends to petition both the American and Soviet Embassies, calling for no new deployment of nuclear weapons. About 30 East Germans, together with West German Green Party and Dutch IKV (Inter-Church Peace Council) representatives, held a demonstration in East Berlin, but were arrested immediately. Two days after the demonstration, Evangelical Bishop Forck delivered the petitions to the Embassies. Aside from protection of individual activists and church-initiated dialogue with the state on peace issues, this was the first time the church publicly had supported such a mass action for peace.

The church's calls for alternative service were accompanied by increasing numbers of male citizens throughout the period under review who resisted military service. All male citizens of the German Democratic Republic aged 18 to 24 are subject to call-up for 18 months of military service. Beyond this, however, military drafters have pressured men into signing up for longer terms of military service. An estimated 1,000 East Germans refused active service in the army each year from 1983 through 1985, which was an increase from the estimated average of 250 to 700 per year during the 1970's. Many of these conscientious objectors are Mennonites, who refuse to perform any military service whatsoever.[5]

[5] See footnote on p. 232.

Growing numbers of conscripts insist on placement in the construction battalions, and the Government is placing more of them there or on waiting lists to enter the battalions.

In 1985, authorities refrained from punishing some peace activists who had collaborated with Czechoslovak dissidents in issuing a peace manifesto. Later in the year the same activists sent an open letter to President Honecker criticizing official youth policies and again were not prosecuted or otherwise punished. Another sign of a more lenient attitude toward peace activists came in November 1985, when authorities refrained from prosecuting a few conscientious objectors who had refused to serve in the military. The authorities' recent tolerance of some peace demonstrations may be a function of lessening independent activity resulting from both earlier persecution and discouragement over the 1983 deployment of Soviet missiles in the German Democratic Republic, decreasing Western media attention to both the Western- and Eastern-based peace movements, and the regime's growing confidence in its ability to co-opt the peace movement to serve the state's purposes.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

In comparison with the populations of other East European countries, the G.D.R. population enjoys a high standard of living. However, there are serious shortages of housing, and occasionally of consumer goods. Also, in recent years concern has mounted over environmental deterioration in the German Democratic Republic. The population feels this threat most immediately in the impending shortage of potable water in that country. But environmental damage goes far beyond polluted waters to unregulated dumping sites, unacceptably high sulfur emissions and a sharp increase in environment-related health problems.

While the G.D.R. Constitution guarantees the freedom to form trade unions, in practice independent unions are banned. Like trade unions in other East European countries, the G.D.R. trade unions are manipulated by authorities to carry out official policy and to transmit party economic directives to workers. East German workers do not enjoy the right to strike.

Academic freedom is circumscribed severely in the German Democratic Republic. All scholarship must serve the cause of building socialism. The sole exception to this rule is theology, which remains in the control of the church.

ETHNIC RIGHTS

There are few reports of state-sponsored discrimination against the only substantial minority in the German Democratic Republic, the Lusatian Sorbs. Approximately 45,000 Sorbs make their home in the German Democratic Republic. The state provides instruction in the Sorbian language and culture in some schools. It also subsidizes a Sorbian-language theater. The great majority of Sorbs belong to the Roman Catholic Church, which recently initiated a new program for the Sorbian minority in the German Democratic Republic to provide religious materials in Sorbian.[6]

---

[6] See footnote on p. 233.

INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Citizens who seek to participate independently in the political life of the German Democratic Republic suffer punishment ranging from interrogations to imprisonment to exile. The only lasting independent movements that have involved more than a handful of people and have not been crushed immediately by the regime have had close ties to the Evangelical Church.

The one exception to this pattern is the independent human rights group, *Menschenrechte DDR* ("Human Rights G.D.R.") which first emerged in early 1985. In January 1985, this group sent an open letter to Honecker on the occasion of the beginning of United Nations Youth Year. Like the Czechoslovak Charter 77, this group appended the addresses of three sponsoring activists to the letter: Ralf Hirsch, Peter Rolle and Peter Grimm. The letter called for freedom of expression, assembly and movement and freedom from religious and ideological discrimination.

Menschenrechte DDR issued several further letters, including a Petition for the World Festival of Youth in July 1985 and an appeal to the G.D.R. official peace council proclaiming solidarity with the unofficial Soviet Group to Establish Trust in September 1985. Another September 1985 document was devoted to freedom of movement. Its 17 signatories announced in that document, "It is unacceptable that we should receive our rights only as a favor granted to us, provided that we refrain from independent political activity." Thus they reject any trade-off of one right for another. To date the G.D.R. authorities have not taken any action against the members of *Menschenrechte DDR*.[7]

In recent years an independent environmental movement has emerged in the German Democratic Republic. Like the independent peace movement, it has found partial refuge in the Evangelical Church, which provides some information on environmental conditions in the country and has initiated "auto-free Sundays," ecologically-oriented church services and landscaping activities.

The authorities have treated independent environmental activists harshly. In 1985, environmentalist Udo Zeitz was sentenced to 3½ years in prison for "defamation of the German Democratic Republic" after protesting official G.D.R. environmental policies and the authorities' refusal to let him and his family emigrate to the West. Prior to applying to emigrate, Zeitz had sought to form an independent environmental advocacy group, "Progress," in the German Democratic Republic. Zeitz's daughter reportedly had suffered ill health from chemical spraying in the German Democratic Republic.

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE CSCE PROCESS

The German Democratic Republic took four steps after the conclusion of the Madrid Conference to manifest its intention to fulfill commitments made at that Conference. First, it published the entire text of the Madrid Concluding Document in the official legal gazette and the party newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*. In September

[7] See footnote on p. 233.

1983, it published a new law creating an office of foreign cultural centers to oversee the German Democratic Republic's participation in exchanges. Later that month the regime modified its mandatory minimum currency exchange requirement by exempting children up to the age of 14. Still later in September, it issued a new ordinance slightly liberalizing official policy on permanent family reunification and binational marriages.

The G.D.R. regime has learned to use emigration to its advantage, exiling those who challenge the system. And it has learned how to coexist with an independent church which knows the limits on its participation in the life of the state. But it has not learned to react to independent activity among citizens with anything but persecution. This remains the area in which the G.D.R. regime best demonstrates that it complies neither with the letter or the spirit of Helsinki.

HUNGARY

INTRODUCTION

While it does not allow full freedom of political, religious and social expression, Hungary continues to have a relatively positive record in the implementation of Principle VII. Hungarian citizens are given opportunities for travel abroad, including to the West, and enjoy certain benefits from the economic decentralization which has taken place. Within certain bounds, they can voice constructive criticism. Writers and artists have gained more latitude in their work, and religious denominations generally have access to Bibles and other religious materials.

At the same time, these positive aspects of Hungary's compliance with the human rights provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document are treated by the Hungarian Government more as benefits to be granted or taken away than as rights to be protected. In addition, they have come at a certain price. Participation in the political process can take place only under the terms set by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP). Any direct challenge to the regime, particularly in the form of questioning the legitimacy or the authority of the HSWP or the Soviet presence in Hungary, is not tolerated. And the expression of religious belief or of views bordering on the unacceptable may limit an individual's advancement in government, industry and the professions.

Generally, the Hungarian population is reluctant to seriously and openly oppose the basic premises of the political system itself. The trauma caused by the 1956 Revolution and the crackdown in the years which immediately followed still have a strong effect on Hungarian society. As the situation improved in the 1970's, a form of self-censorship developed so as not to risk losing what liberalization had taken place. Given this largely passive, apolitical attitude, the Hungarian Government does not feel the need to resort to blatant forms of repression in the face of oppositionist opinion. Instead, more subtle measures are employed to counter dissent, such as denial of permission to travel abroad, periodic house searches, detention, fines and employment difficulties.

Despite a relative tolerance on the part of the Hungarian authorities, the situation has worsened since late 1982 due to a crackdown on the activities of dissident intellectuals. These individuals, who engage primarily in independent, *samizdat*, publishing, have become increasingly active since the late 1970's in exercising the rights guaranteed them in the Helsinki Final Act. The authorities have responded with stepped-up measures, usually the ones mentioned above but also more blatant forms of repression, including a police beating of one individual who was then tried for assaulting the officers responsible (the first trial of a dissident in Hungary in over 10 years), a form of house arrest for another individual, and periods of general harassment for others.

While individuals generally are allowed freedom of religious expression, conscientous objectors to military service continue to be imprisoned, and those who openly oppose close cooperation between the church hierarchy and the state occasionally are harassed by authorities.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

While the Hungarian Government's performance concerning respect for civil and political rights continues to be positive relative to the other East European states and the Soviet Union, the ability to exercise these rights is qualified by article 54 of the Hungarian Constitution which provides that the rights of Hungarian citizens are to be exercised "in accordance with the interest of Socialist society."

The most visible actions taken by the Hungarian Government in violation of its Principle VII commitments are those against dissident intellectuals, most of whom live in Budapest. These individuals usually are harassed through intimidation and administrative measures. For lesser known individuals, however, especially those who live outside Budapest, it is possible that the harassment may be more severe. For example, an article in the February 1984 edition of *Magyar Jog* (Hungarian Law) by Dr. Lajos Kovacs, a professor at the Hungarian Police Officers Academy, claims that about 50 citizens are convicted annually for "incitement and harming the public interest," a charge which is often used to encompass political offenses. In examining 420 cases involving 570 accused offenders, the "crimes" included "a need to disseminate views," "wishing to protest certain measures," "criticism," and "spreading the broadcasts of RFE (Radio Free Europe)."

The Opposition. There is a group of dissidents in Hungary who refer to themselves as the "democratic opposition" and who have been increasingly active in recent years. This is not a formal group, and its members represent a broad spectrum of thought. The principal activity of the individuals involved is the publishing of *samizdat* journals and books. In this regard, they claim to represent a "second public opinion" by presenting alternative thoughts on, as well as possible solutions to, issues such as human rights and the quality of life in Hungary, environmental issues, the plight of the Hungarian minorities in neighboring Romania and Czechoslovakia, the 1956 Revolution and its official treatment, and events in Poland.

Originally, the unofficially-published material was represented by a small number of typewritten manuscripts which were circulated discretely among a limited number of trusted friends and acquaintances. The early 1980's witnessed the development of *samizdat* publishing into a few fairly well-established publishing houses, the most well known of which is AB Independent Publishers. The unofficial publishers have published several dozen officially-banned books from the West, such as works by George Orwell and Arthur Koestler, as well as specific works by Hungarian poets, novelists and other writers banned from official publication.

In 1981, several new *samizdat* journals appeared, including *Magyar Fiegyelo* (Hungarian Observer) and *Kisugo* ("Outformer," as opposed to "Informer"). In October 1981, the journal *Beszelo* (Speaker, or Prison Visit, connoting free speech in a place where free speech is forbidden) appeared in 1,000 copies, 2,000 copies for some later issues. It has become the most popular and sophisticated of the journals. To make this increasing amount of *samizdat* available to anyone interested and not afraid to obtain it, an independent bookshop, the "Samizdat Boutique," was opened in February 1981 in the downtown apartment of Laszlo Rajk. Rajk, a well-known member of the democratic opposition, reported that approximately 150 to 200 people visited the "Boutique." The increased number of *samizdat* material and the improved means for which it was disseminated led to a considerable increase in readership of many thousands.

Throughout 1982, there appeared several signs that the Hungarian Government would not tolerate the increasingly open activities of the democratic opposition. In June 1982, several members of the democratic opposition—the founders of AB Independent Publishers, Gabor Demszky and Jeno Nagy; two *Beszelo* editors, Ferenc Koszeg, and Janos Kis; and Andras Nagy—were subjected to continuous police surveillance. They were harassed to such a degree that 20 leading Hungarian intellectuals felt it necessary to send a petition to the Procurator General of Hungary, stating that "whatever opinion the persons mentioned above may hold, they have been subjected to ill-treatment for expressing their belief in the values of opinion and freedom of speech. . . . We respectfully request the Procurator General . . . to enforce the principles laid down in the Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic, and not allow the repetition of such incidents to produce fear and anxiety among the public." Later that summer the harassment ceased, although in August Gabor Demszky was fined 4,000 forints for operating the publishing house without official permission.[1]

Several warnings to the democratic opposition soon followed. On October 8, 1982, Istvan Horvath, Hungarian Interior Minister, delivered a speech to the Hungarian Parliament, in which he distinguished between the misled but well-intentioned critics who could be convinced by further discussion, and the committed opponents of the regime, against whom the state could and might have to take action. A more ominous attack came on December 11, 1982, in the leading HSWP newspaper *Nepszabadsag*, which contained an arti-

[1] See footnote on p. 233.

cle entitled "The Game is Not Played for Peanuts." Written by Peter Rényi, the paper's deputy chief editor, the article alleged that the opposition was serving, whether intentionally or not, the interests of the "imperialist headquarters" in the West, whose strategy is to "support destructive dissident groups that disseminate bourgeois nationalism and the ideals of the capitalist world within the Socialist camp."

Three days later, on Tuesday, December 14, just before Laszlo Rajk's "Samizdat Boutique" was to open, several policemen entered the apartment and searched it, taking duplicating equipment and all the *samizdat* they could find. Reportedly, the material confiscated filled two minibuses and one car. The homes of five other dissidents were entered and searched as well, and the total value of the material seized was estimated as nearly one-half million forints. The six—Rajk, Demszky, Geza Buda, Istvan Csorba, *Beszelo* editor Balint Nagy and Miklos Sulyok—were detained for questioning. All were released the following morning, and no charges were brought against them.

One week later, on December 21, the police entered the apartment just as the boutique was about to open and, while not detaining anyone, again confiscated all materials found. The next week, on December 28, the police did not enter the apartment but took the names of those who did, some of whom were questioned later by the police. Then, on January 15, 1983, the authorities notified Rajk that he must vacate the apartment in the center of Budapest, which he had inherited from his mother. He was evicted on January 25, reportedly with the assistance of several police officers. He was able to set up the boutique in his own apartment in the outskirts of the city. Although it was harder to reach, Rajk advertised the new location in an issue of *Beszelo*, providing detailed information on how to get there by streetcar. Meetings of the democratic opposition continued, despite continual police surveillance.

The harassment continued throughout the spring and summer of 1983. On March 29, police entered and searched the apartments of six dissidents—Rajk, Demszky, *Beszelo* editors Miklos Haraszti, Ferenc Koszeg, Jeno Nagy and Ottilia Solt (founder of SZETA, an organization created to assist the poor). All but Rajk were charged with violation of the press law prohibiting the publication and dissemination of unauthorized material; the charges were dropped in May. In another incident, Rajk and Demszky were stopped by police on April 7 for a traffic check. When they were told to open their bags and refused, the police drew their guns, ordered them to drop their bags and put their hands on their heads, and took them away for questioning until the early morning of April 8. By May 1, the harassment of the declining number of visitors became so great that Rajk decided to close the "Samizdat Boutique." [2]

On September 1, 1983, a new decree was adopted which permits the imposition of fines independent of and without appeal to the court system against those engaged in unauthorized publishing activity. The change also increased the maximum fine for violation of this press law from 3,000 to 10,000 forints. In that this is the law

[2] See footnote on p. 233.

most often used against independent publishers, these changes signalled that more official actions against the democratic opposition could be expected.

On September 24, 1983, less than one month after the close of the Madrid CSCE Follow-up Meeting and a few days after U.S. Vice President George Bush visited Hungary, Gabor Demszky, co-founder of AB Independent Publishers, was stopped by police. He objected when the police began a search of his car without a warrant. When his personal papers were taken (no *samizdat* material was found) and he sought to regain them, an ensuing argument developed into a scuffle resulting in Demszky being so badly beaten with rubber truncheons that he was hospitalized for 3 days with a head concussion. Rajk and two other members of the opposition wrote a letter to the Hungarian chief prosecutor shortly thereafter, calling for an investigation of the incident.

Action against Demszky escalated further on December 21, 1983, when he was put on trial for assaulting the police officers who had beaten him. This was the first time that a dissident had been put on trial in Hungary in 10 years. When more than 100 supporters filled the courtroom, the judge moved the trial to another room which was reportedly sealed-off by police with billy-clubs. Attendance was limited to those with official invitations. Observers from certain human rights organizations and the U.S. Embassy were denied permission to attend. Demszky received a 6-month sentence, suspended for 3 years. Demszky's appeal of the sentence was rejected on May 22, 1984.

Although those active in *samizdat* writing and publishing generally receive permission to travel abroad, the Hungarian Government has on occasion denied such permission to certain individuals because of their activities. In one instance it made such travel conditional on not returning to Hungary. In July 1984, Gaspar Miklos Tamas, a member of the opposition who has been particularly active on the issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania (where he was born), was denied permission to study at Columbia University in New York unless he agreed to accept emigration papers that would prohibit his return following study abroad. In October 1984, the passport of political essayist Pal Szalai was taken away after he attempted to travel to Poland.

Another individual continually denied permission to travel abroad was Gyorgy Krasso, a retired economist who, due to activities in 1956 for which he spent 7 years in jail, has become somewhat of a historian and symbol of the attempted revolution. He repeatedly tried to visit his brother in the United Kingdom but was refused. When he attempted to visit Poland, he was stopped at the border and denied permission to travel to any of the Socialist countries as well.

On June 8, 1984, Gyorgy Krasso was questioned by police for 9 hours in connection with an interview he gave to the *samizdat* journal *Hirmondo* in December 1983, republished in the summer 1984 edition of the British journal *Survey*, on the trial and execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter and other leaders of Hungary in 1956. No charges were made against him, but he was given a police reprimand. Then, on October 18, Krasso was detained and his apartment raided. After *samizdat* material was found and confis-

cated, he was fined the full 10,000 forints for violation of the press law. In the ensuing 2 weeks, five other dissident intellectuals had their apartments raided and were given fines ranging from 5,000 to 9,000 forints.

Actions against Gyorgy Krasso grew more severe on November 22, 1984, the same week that the preparatory meeting for the CSCE Cultural Forum convened. Krasso was given a police surveillance order, a form of house arrest which no court can overturn, pursuant to which he was required to report to the police once a week and forbidden to leave his apartment between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. In reaction to these restrictions, 12 dissident intellectuals presented a letter of protest to the delegations at the Cultural Forum preparatory meeting, asking them to "consider this case before reaching any conclusion concerning the state of civil liberties in Hungary." The following month over 300 Hungarians signed a protest of the police order on Krasso. Following his return from the hospital in early 1985 after suffering a heart attack, he continued to be under continual surveillance, with police entering his apartment and taking the names of all visitors.[3]

A number of police searches also took place in late 1984 and early 1985. In January 1985, for example, a police raid outside Budapest resulted in the seizure of 1,000 copies of an edition of *Beszelo*, approximately 50 percent of the edition's run. In addition, a new legal provision (Decree 48/1984 [XI.21.]) in November 1984, gave the police authority to search an automobile or person without cause (previously they were permitted to ask for identity papers only). Apparently, this new law was in reaction to the incident involving Demszky in September 1983. Another new law in late 1984 (Decree 49/1984 [XI.21.]) required the registration of all duplicators and copiers, with the exception of typewriters. The registration and operation of the copiers have to be checked by the police.

In 1985, a new law (Decree 4/1985 [VII.20.]) came into effect which gave the head of police stations the power to apply coercive measures, such as police surveillance, expulsion or both against any Hungarian citizen or resident alien whose attitude imposes a permanent danger to the Hungarian People's Republic or to the public order or public security. The new law strengthened the terms of a police surveillance order, such as that placed on Krasso, from 1 to 2 years with the possibility of an additional extension of 1 year.

Also, on March 2, 1985, another official warning to the dissidents appeared in the leading party paper, *Nepszabadsag*. In an article entitled "Our Order and Our Policy," Interior Minister Istvan Horvath noted that the Hungarian Government was even willing to risk its liberal image in the West in order to keep the democratic opposition in check, stating: "whoever attempts to act against the country's domestic stability and the achievements of our social order has to realize that the authorities are never in 'recess' and their action is not determined by external impacts. Persons who violate public order will be made aware that they face a firm and

[3] See footnote on p. 233.

resolute calling to account proportionate to the seriousness of the action."

Despite these ominous signs, Hungarian authorities appeared to loosen the reins on the democratic opposition as the Cultural Forum approached in late 1985. Harassment of individuals became less frequent. The police surveillance order on Gyorgy Krasso ended in October 1985, just before the convening of the CSCE Cultural Forum. Near the end of the Forum, after years of continual denials, he was permitted to leave Hungary when his brother, who lived in the United Kingdom, was critically injured in a fire that later proved fatal. Krasso has since decided to stay in the West. Many prominent dissident intellectuals who had also been previously denied permission to travel to the West were suddenly granted permission in late 1985 and early 1986, including Gaspar Miklos Tamas.

Other events, however, pointed to a return to tougher line. During the Forum, editor Lajos Jakab was fined 9,000 forints for possession of copies of a book on Soviet-style societies by democratic opposition members Janos Kis and Gyorgy Bence.

On January 16, 1986, police ransacked the home of Jeno Nagy, co-founder of AB Independent Publishers. A number of publications and manuscripts were confiscated following the 7-hour search. On February 26, he was fined for violation of the press law. Two days later he was found distributing copies of *Hirmondo* at the cafeteria of an indoor pool in Budapest. The police took the names of everyone involved, confiscated every copy of the *samizdat* publication, including the 20 copies still in Nagy's possession, and took him to a police station for further questioning. On March 14, the police returned to the pool cafeteria and searched four persons. While they found no *samizdat*, later that night the apartment of one of the four individuals was searched and *samizdat* was confiscated. Nagy's apartment was searched again on March 13 and yet again on April 1. Subsequent charges of violating the press law have resulted in additional heavy fines.

On March 3 and 11, police raided the apartment of Gyorgy Gado, who was fined 10,000 forints for violating the press law each time. Then, on April 1, along with the raid on Nagy's apartment, the police entered another apartment and found Miklos Sulyok and Istvan Csorba printing *samizdat*. All publications of the 16th issue of *Beszelo* as well as all printing and duplicating equipment were confiscated. Csorba and Sulyok were both fined for violation of the press law. Later that day Sulyok was further harassed by police in downtown Budapest.[4]

On March 20, 1986, the Hungarian National Assembly passed a new press law which came into effect on September 1. The law, represents the first comprehensive statutory treatment of matters relating to press for Hungary under Communist rule. Sections of the new law state the need for governmental approval in order to publish, and reinforce the arbitrary right of the police to confiscate unofficial material and to fine those who possess such material.

---

[4] See footnote on p. 233.

It is unclear what net effect these actions against the democratic opposition has had on their activities. Despite the continuous harassment, independent publishing has continued. For example, for much of 1983 and 1984, *Beszelo* disappeared. *Tajekosztato* (The Guide) filled the gap for a brief period until it too was stopped. It reappeared in late 1983 under the name *Hirmondo* (The Messenger). In June 1984, *Beszelo* reappeared.

The distribution of *samizdat,* if it has not contracted, has at least become more discrete. With the closing of Rajk's "Samizdat Boutique" in 1983 there was no longer any central location where *samizdat* could be obtained. In addition, the perception created by the treatment of the opposition—that the legal safeguards of individual rights and freedoms are vague, fragile and subject to a changing political climate—probably has increased the hesitancy of some people outside of the opposition to risk the loss of what benefits they have gained over the years in order to assert more fully their rights.

Actions Against Other Individuals. The Hungarian Government has also taken action against other individuals, primarily writers, for going beyond the bounds of what is officially acceptable. Although selective and, at times, censored works of some of these individuals appear in official publications, authors often publish their works uncensored in *samizdat.* The state also targets any individuals employed on the editorial boards of official publications who, in the eyes of the central authorities, do not demonstrate adequate "vigilance" over their publications.

An example of actions taken against these individuals occurred in June 1983. Sandor Csoori, a poet and essayist, wrote a preface to a book entitled *Kutyaszorito* ("Up Against the Wall" or "Cornered"), which was written by the Hungarian minority activitist in Czechoslovakia, Mikos Duray, and published in the United States. For writing this preface, Csoori was criticized in the weekly paper of the Hungarian Writers Association and put on a "consultation list" that effectively barred him from publication for a full year. He was also prohibited from travelling abroad.

Refusing to approve the sanction on Csoori, noted Hungarian writer and playright Istvan Csurka resigned from the Presidium of the Writers Association and ended his membership in that organization. In July 1986, the authorities banned Csurka's work indefinitely from publication in Hungary. The grounds for this action by the authorities was that, during his travel through the United States, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany in the spring of 1986, he published essays in New York and gave lectures and statements, one of which was broadcast over Radio Free Europe.[5]

Another incident involved Gaspar Nagy, also an officer of the Writers Association. In March 1985, central authorities insisted that he resign, from the Association for a poem he wrote concerning the execution of Imre Nagy, leader of the Government during the 1956 Revolution. A stormy debate followed as Nagy, at first, refused to resign and the President and Executive Secretary of the Association, Miklos Hubay and Miklos Jovanovics, respectively,

[5] See footnote on p. 233.

both submitted their resignations. The HSWP officials refused to accept their resignations, and eventually Nagy did resign. The Deputy Minister of Culture at the time, Deszo Toth, explained that Nagy's resignation was necessary because the authorities "were worried about the international repercussions. . . . The estimation and standing of the union among our neighbors would have suffered if Nagy remained."

On November 27, 1985, barely 2 days after the Cultural Forum closed in Budapest, Sandor Leszak was accused of "counter-revolutionary activities" and dismissed as the director of the cultural center in the village of Lakitelek. The reason for his dismissal was that he organized an unofficial poetry gathering and exhibition on graphic art on October 22, while the Forum was underway.

Occasionally, even official literary journals can exceed the bounds of the party's guidelines. On October 15, 1982, the representatives from publishing houses and cultural centers were summoned to a "political guidance" briefing session with government and party representatives on cultural affairs, at which the editors of the journals *Mozgo Vilag* (The World in Motion) and *Tiszataj* (Tisza Panorama) were told to resign because both had published articles on the plight of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The editors refused to resign.

Approximately 1 year later, in September 1983, the editor of *Mozgo Vilag*, Ferenc Kulin, was fired on grounds that he had pursued an editorial policy that did not adequately represent Marxist views and presented an "erroneous interpretation of the situation." The reason for the dismissal was the publication in the September issue of *Mozgo Vilag* of an article on Hungary's unprepared Second Army on the Don River in the winter of 1942–43, including pictures depicting the suffering during the winter fighting and letters from the front by Hungarian soldiers. (A television series on the same subject was suddenly suspended earlier in the year.) In protest of Kulin's removal, the entire editorial board of the journal resigned, and the Attila Jozsef Circle (which in the summer of 1981 succeeded the Young Writers' Attila Jozsef Circle dissolved by the authorities in March of that year) approved a resolution protesting the action taken against Kulin, as well as that taken against Csoori earlier in the year. Protests also came from students of several Hungarian universities as well as from members of the democratic opposition.[6]

Despite the difficulty the authorities had in finding a replacement for Kulin, publication of *Mozgo Vilag* continued. The journal again experienced problems with the authorities in August 1984, when the latest issue of the journal was ordered destroyed because it contained reprints of some material written by Leon Trotsky. The August issue reappeared in mid-September 1984 after the Trotsky material was removed.

More recently, *Tiszataj* was closed down completely in July 1986 because of "political errors." The last issue of the journal contained another poem by Gaspar Nagy on the events of 1956, as well as other material not acceptable to the authorities.

---

[6] See footnote on p. 233.

Independent Groups and Organizations. Although the Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and the right to form associations, Government approval or tacit acceptance is required for the exercise of these rights. A case in point is the autonomous "Peace Group for Dialogue." Created in 1982 by students, recent graduates, artists and working people, Dialogue was tolerated initially. It organized a number of events: participation in an official peace march (some 450 Dialogue members participated), several public meetings, a lecture by Western activist leaders, and a three-way dialogue among independent and official peace group members and foreign disarmament activists.

Beginning in April 1983, however, the Hungarian authorities began to intimidate the group. Members were prevented from attending an international peace conference in West Berlin in May 1983 and were forced to leave the youth village during the Prague Peace Assembly in June 1983. In July 1983, the Government suddenly cancelled cooperation efforts between Dialogue and the official Peace Council. When 15 pacifists from Western Europe and the United States met with 20 members of Dialogue later that month, the Dialogue members were detained by the police for several hours and warned that they were taking part in anti-state activities. The 15 Western pacifists were expelled. Dialogue was told to cease its contacts with foreigners, and one of the founders was summoned to the Interior Ministry to be questioned on why his organization opposed the Hungarian Government. The membership in Dialogue dropped by several hundred to about 50 members, and, in late July 1983, the remaining members of Dialogue decided to dissolve the group and join the Peace Council. While internal disagreements played a role in the dissolution, the harassment the group received from the authorities exacerbated the internal problems and ensured that Dialogue would never play any significant role.

What remains of the independent peace movement includes small peace "clubs" and groups of former members of Dialogue, and some religious leaders who encourage conscientious objection to military service. A number of individuals in peace groups have been detained, harassed, and warned of press law violations. Other than these groups and few independent peace activities continue in Hungary, and those that do are loosely organized.[7]

Rock groups have been harassed on occasion as well. On May 23, 1984, in the town of Szeged, three members of the Coitus punk rock group, all in their early twenties, received 2-year sentences and one underaged member received a 2-year suspended sentence for "incitement against the constitutional order of the Hungarian Peoples Republic and against its international alliance, friendship and cooperation agreements . . . rooted in nihilism and anarchism or, in other words, the desire to create hatred." The sentences were in reaction to lyrics which were critical of Hungarian society and, in songs such as the one entitled "SS-20," which inferred that the Soviet Union was at least equally to blame for the arms race. In December 1984, members of the punk group Public Enemy were

[7] See footnote on p. 233.

also given 2-year sentences for lyrics critical of communism, even though witnesses stated that the lyrics were in mock English and could not be understood.

Other organized artistic activity has been the target of state harassment. The Club of Young Artists has had material confiscated by the authorities and, on January 30, 1984, its art exhibit in Budapest, entitled "Hungary Can Be Yours," was closed. Tamas Molnar, a founding member of club, has been harassed by the authorities on other occasions.

Several intellectuals, many of them members of the democratic opposition, formed in December 1979 a group called the Foundation for the Assistance of the Poor, more commonly known by its Hungarian acronym, SZETA. The stated purpose of the group is to raise money and provide financial, legal and other assistance for the poor within Hungarian society. Its activities included a 1981 summer camp for Polish children at Lake Balaton in Hungary. In 1983, the group collected the essays, poems and drawings of 37 writers and artists and compiled them into a *samizdat* volume, entitled *In the Dark*, the proceeds of which were donated to the poor. Some of the leaders of SZETA, such as Ottilia Solt and Gabor Demszky, have been the target of apartment searches and other forms of harassment for their activities. While the organization has continued with its works, it has done so more discretely than previously. In November 1984, a group of individuals, including many from SZETA, were not permitted to hold a roundtable meeting on income differentials in Hungary.

Environmental issues have evoked much concern in Eastern Europe and Hungary is no exception. The independent ecological group Duna Kor (Danube Circle) was formed in 1984. On February 8, 1986, the group planned an "environmental walk" from Batthany Square in Buda to Margit Island in a display of opposition to the construction of the joint Hungarian-Czechoslovak Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric dam project on the Danube River. While the leaders of the group had cancelled the march the day before, under pressure from the authorities, about 80 people, primarily Austrians, either did not know that it was cancelled or simply decided to proceed with the march anyway. As the group proceeded toward Margit Island, the police moved in and dispersed the group, reportedly using truncheons on some individuals. One Austrian video camera operator was detained. When the Austrian participants said they would leave Hungary provided this individual was released, the authorities agreed to do so.

On March 15, 1986, the traditional holiday when Hungarians celebrate the 1848 revolution against Austria, police broke up unauthorized celebrations. Following an official celebration at the National Museum, a group reportedly numbering several thousand people walked to the statute of the hero of the revolution, the poet Petofi, where patriotic songs were sung and poems read. One individual was known to have been detained by police as he attempted to join the crowd. A woman was also detained for much of the day after she attempted to collect money to pay a fine recently imposed on a *samizdat* publisher for violation of the press law. As the crowd moved to several locations in the city to protest the woman's detention, the police made several attempts to break up the crowd.

When a large number of the protesters staged a sit-down protest, the police dragged some away, confiscated the identity cards of others and detained one individual. Later that day, police took additional actions against the remainder of the group, some 700 people, when they attempted to cross the Chain Bridge to go to another location in Budapest. It has been reported that eleven people were detained, four of which were fined for "disturbing the peace."

In October 1985, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights sought to hold an independent cultural symposium parallel to the CSCE Cultural Forum in a public hotel room. Authorities refused to permit the Federation to meet with writers in the hotel room. The Hungarian Government reneged on a commitment it undertook during the 1980–83 Madrid CSCE Review Meeting to observe the Madrid precedent for treatment of nongovernmental groups and individuals during the Cultural Forum. However, due to the tenacity of the participants, which included nongovernmental organizations from the West and Hungarian intellectuals, they were allowed to meet in a private apartment.

The New Election Law. A new election law (Law III/1983) was announced in 1983 and first implemented in 1985, which mandates multiple candidacies in every one of 352 parliamentary seats (about 35 seats were to be left unopposed for senior officials) as well as in the approximately 45,000 local government seats. Although candidates are not required to be members of the Communist Party, they are required to accept the platform of the party-controlled Patriotic People's Front.

Despite the promises held out by the new election law, certain members of the democratic opposition were effectively barred from participation in the nominating process. On April 18, when the first step of the procedure to nominate at least two candidates for each office began, about 40 percent of the 200 people present at one Budapest district voted for the nomination of democratic opposition member Laszlo Rajk. At the second meeting for nominations on April 22, the party filled the same district meeting hall to full capacity with party loyalists 2 hours ahead of time, reportedly increasing attendance at the meeting by more than three times. Rajk, who stated that he had accepted the platform of the Patriotic Peoples Front, spoke out on issues such as conscientious objection to military service, Hungarian minorities in other states, and the environment. He and his supporters received mostly jeers, which made the whole affair rather tense. In the end, Rajk received 27 percent of the vote, short of that needed to be officially nominated. This result led one individual to note that the "new electoral law allows candidates to run, and lose."

Another democratic opposition member, Gaspar Miklos Tamas, was not successful in obtaining the necessary one-third of the votes in the first meeting but nevertheless had the opportunity to speak in the presence of a rather prominent candidate, Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi, on the Hungarian minority problem in Romania and Czechoslovakia and the proposed construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam.

While not actually members of the opposition group, other individual citizens critical of official policies such as economist Tamas Bauer were able to take advantage of the election process. Thus

though the candidates were restricted and most have not been successful in getting elected, a legal platform, however limited, for the expression of other than official points of view has been provided. As Tamas concluded of the election: "Hundreds of thousands of people for the first time in their lives participated in a political something. It's not genuine politics but it's something."

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

The right of the individual to freedom of religion, conscience or belief is restricted in Hungary. There is, on the surface, good relations between the state authorities and the leaders of the 19 recognized religious denominations. The official line accepts believers and nonbelievers working together in the interests of "Socialist society," and the state attempts to utilize the church as a "transmission belt" in dealing with social problems such as alcoholism, divorce and juvenile delinquency. In practice, the Hungarian churches, unlike those in other East bloc countries, do not serve as centers for dissent. They accept a limited role and accomodate the state in the hope of gaining and maintaining certain religious freedoms. This approach is most visible in the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church's "small steps" policy, initiated by the late Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Laszlo Lekai.

For the unrecognized faiths, there are, on occasion, additional difficulties. In May 1986, plainclothed police broke-up a worship service of the 30-member congregation of the Faith Christian Fellowship in the town of Zalaegerszeg.

Professing religious beliefs can limit a person's advancement in government and in high-level positions generally. In addition, the number of church-sponsored schools and the hours of religious instruction for young people are restricted. In recent years, however, these restrictions may have become slightly less severe in certain instances, reflected by an agreement with the Catholic Church in late 1985 permitting laymen to teach catechism in church buildings and to assist priests in parish works (An earlier understanding that trained laymen could teach catechism in Hungarian schools was rescinded by the authorities.).

Access to Bibles and other religious material, as well as contacts with co-religionists in other states, are relatively good. In recent years, there have been reports of additional publications of Bibles within Hungary. Bibles in Hungarian braille are also available. Some established faiths publish their own periodicals and newspapers, although such material is subject to the same censorship as are other publications. In late 1984, however, it was reported that government officials reduced the circulation of the Catholic weekly, *Uj Ember* (New Person), by about 10 percent.

Among the positive developments in recent years is the establishment by the Catholic Church of a Jesuit-staffed center for meditation, the first Jesuit facility in Hungary since the order was officially prohibited by the Government in 1950. In early 1986, Cardinal Laszlo Lekai announced that a new order of sisters would be established in Hungary to engage in social work such as caring for the elderly or working with the youth. Hungary is also home to the only rabbinical seminary in the East bloc.

In late July 1984, the World Lutheran Federation met in Budapest and elected Bishop Zoltan Kaldy its president. While the Federation generally seemed to view the situation of religious believers in Hungary to be good, some delegates have accused the Lutheran hierarchy of too close collaboration with the state.

Within the Roman Catholic Church, the largest of Hungary's faiths, there is a so-called "basic communities" movement which also charges that the church hierarchy is "collaborationist." The church hierarchy has not been supportive of this movement. While many sources quote the number of members of the basic communities at less than 10,000 (some Hungarian bishops have stated that there are only 2,000 to 4,000 people associated with the movement), others state that a large influx of young people have swelled the ranks to between 10,000 and 30,000. In June 1982, Cardinal Lekai and the Bench of Bishops denied the leader of a federation of basic communities, Father Gyorgy Bulanyi, the right to say Mass, preach, or administer the sacraments. Action was taken against several of his followers as well.

The actions by the church leaders in opposition to, rather than in support of, the basic community members has enabled the state authorities to take only limited action themselves. Nevertheless, on June 6, 1984, for example, Kathpress news agency reported that Hungarian police confiscated 119 volumes of a collection of prayers and theological writings by members of the basic communities and charged two individuals, Ignac Kiraly and Joszef Merza, with violation of the press law.

Conscientious objectors, including those belonging to the basic communities movement, continue to be tried and sentenced for refusing to do military service, although some individuals who are members of certain smaller religious groups, such as the Nazarenes and Adventists, reportedly are offered alternative service. While the State Department reports that there are currently 10–15 individuals serving prison terms of 1 to 3 years in 1985, some sources claim the number to be significantly higher. One Catholic pacifist, in a letter to the Budapest Cultural Forum, claimed that there are as many as 150 pacifists in Hungarian prisons. It is believed that individuals from the Roman Catholic and other religions which do not explicitly forbid military service receive harsher treatment for seeking other than military service. There are also a few known cases of individuals serving in the military who have been punished for attending Mass by being placed in solitary confinement.

ETHNIC AND NATIONAL RIGHTS

As a general rule, ethnic and minority rights are not a significant problem in Hungary. Members of minorities such as Germans, Slovaks, and Serbs have full legal equality.

Representing as much as 5 percent of the country's population, or about 500,000 people, Gypsies in Hungary are the largest of the minority groups. Gypsies are not recognized officially as a minority group but as an ethnic group on grounds that about three-fourths of them speak only Hungarian. Although there is considerable popular prejudice against Gypsies, who tend to hold the lowest-paying

jobs and have an unemployment rate of 10–20 percent, the Government claims to assist the Gypsies economically.

There are an estimated 100,000 Jews in Hungary, of which about 15,000 are thought to be practicing. In Budapest alone, there are 30 synagogues and prayer houses. The Central Council of Hungarian Jews (MIOK), which organizes Jewish activities in Hungary, publishes its own biweekly newspaper, *Uj Elet* (New Life), and runs both a Jewish retreat on Lake Balaton and a retirement center. In 1984, a number of conferences were held in Budapest on the Jewish Holocaust. In May 1984, the Hungarian Government improved the ability of Hungarian citizens of Jewish descent to travel to Israel and for Israelis to travel to Hungary.

There seem to be few, if any, problems unique to the other minority or ethnic groups, which include Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Romanians are the smallest of the minorities; numbering between 20,000 and 25,000, only about 50 percent claim Romanian as their native language. Cultural life is organized by a Democratic Federation of Romanians in Hungary. There is bilingual education opportunities, radio and television programs in Romanian, and several Romanian language libraries. For the approximately 110,000-strong South Slav groups, there are several bilingual schools. Bilingual education was introduced in five more elementary and secondary schools in 1985 alone. In addition, there is the Serbo-Croatian paper, *Narodne Novine*, published by the Democratic South Slav Association of Hungary.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

Hungary is well known in the West for the results of its New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which was originally introduced in 1968. The main characteristic of the New Economic Mechanism has been the decentralization of the economy and, to a very small extent, its privatization. Private farming and some private consumer services, while encouraged, are limited by credit and product shortages. Nevertheless, the NEM has helped to prevent the food shortages common in other East European countries and has given Hungarians a relatively high standard of living for the region.

In the late 1970's and the early 1980's, however, Hungary, along with all of the other East European countries and the Soviet Union, witnessed deteriorating economic conditions, primarily the result of external difficulties. While the Hungarian Government embarked on further reforms, it could not prevent the economy from sliding and the quality of life along with it. Income differentials widened, causing those on the lower ends to become increasingly demoralized. An increasing number of people took second jobs, some legal and others illegal, to maintain their current lifestyles as price hikes created an increasing price/income ratio. While such price hikes might have averted food shortages and other economic crises experienced in neighboring countries, it contributed to a perceptible deterioration in the quality of life as demonstrated by a growth in alcohol consumption, high suicide rates, and increases in crime and poverty.[8]

---

[8] See footnote on p. 233.

The difficult economic situation created the need for additional efforts at reform. In early 1984, albeit on an extremely limited basis, the purchase of five types of utility and construction bonds were permitted for the first time. The Hungarian leadership claims to be committed to continuing economic reform.

Unfortunately, the recent economic problems have also created some less innovative measures. For example, a decree (19/1984) came into effect in 1984 under which anyone not having regular income or visible means of support such as proof of employment can be labelled a "public menace" and sentenced to 1 year corrective labor. These individuals would have to work at an assigned workplace and live in a corrective facility, although, after working hours they are free to move within the administrative boundaries of their assigned location. The workplace for a male offender is a mine, for a female a leather factory. Earlier this year an official union paper reported that 80 people have been sentenced under this law. One individual has noted that, while it is directed against the poor generally, it has been used chiefly against Gypsies. Prior to the law, a person who has been unemployed for 3 months was subject only to a fine.[9]

Regarding trade union rights, the Hungarian National Trade Union Council (SZOT) is one of the HSWP's mass organizations and is directly controlled by the party. In fact, the chairman of the Council is a member of the HSWP Politburo. While the Council can represent workers' interests within certain bounds, such as the ability to veto the appointment of state-nominated managers and a few other powers at the local and enterprise level, it is more active as a transmitter of official policies to the workers. The Constitution does not provide the right to strike, and there have been only occasional work stoppages on a local level in recent years. In 1985, the National Trade Union Council incorporated some aspects of the new election law into elections within the Council. Despite this increasing openness within its structure, and some increasingly assertive rank-and-file members at the 25th Congress of the Council in February 1986, the Council has continued to function primarily as a tool to mobilize workers to fulfill the state's economic goals.

POLAND

INTRODUCTION

Despite Helsinki and Madrid pledges, Poland continues to violate the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people. Although the Jaruzelski government released virtually all prisoners of conscience by mid-September 1986 and called for the formation of a consultative social council comprised of representatives from independent elements to advise the Council of State, no genuine dialogue yet exists between the Government and Polish society. The Solidarity Union remains outlawed; its newly formed aboveground national council has been declared illegal by the authorities. An extensive array of repressive legislation passed in the years since the imposition of martial law remains in place as a formidable instrument of social control.

[9] See footnote on p. 233.

OVERVIEW OF TRENDS SINCE 1982

The previous report ended on a somber note. From the cataclysmic conditions that prevailed in the immediate aftermath of martial law's imposition on December 13, 1981, Poland entered into a bleak period of "normalization," the term Jaruzelski's Military Council of National Salvation (WRON) used to describe an aggressive policy that threatened to reduce the country to a state of leaden conformism similar to that forced on Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The rubber-stamp Parliament (*Sejm*) had outlawed Solidarity and other freely established organizations. Poland was caught in a downwardly spiraling cycle of regime repression, massive popular resistance and harsh regime reaction.

In the years that followed, the Jaruzelski government has, through enactment and enforcement of repressive legislation, tightened the machinery of internal control. On the other hand, it has made calculated gestures—such as successive amnesties and state visits—in an effort to defuse domestic resistance and achieve maximum impact in the West. Meanwhile, Solidarity and the Catholic Church successfully have maneuvered to preserve and assert their respective roles as independent forces within Polish society. And a pervasive opposition culture has emerged.

Just over 1 year after its imposition, the Parliament formally suspended martial law on December 31, 1982. However, the Sejm approved a series of attendant regulations creating machinery to facilitate its re-imposition at the will of the Government. With the suspension, the practice of internment without trial ended, and other restrictions were removed. Nearly all internees—announced by the Government to have approached more than 10,000 persons in all since December 1981, with no more than 5,000 reportedly to be held during any one period—were released. But other internal controls were applied. Martial law restrictions were incorporated into the civil and criminal codes, thus "institutionalizing" the ongoing repression. Moreover, pre-martial law restrictions that had not been enforced now were put into practice. On the eve of anticipated opposition events such as street demonstrations, usually timed to correspond with dates bearing a significance in Polish history or for the Solidarity movement, a new form of harassment was employed against former internees and Solidarity activists—special reserve military call-ups followed by incarcerations in punitive military internment camps under inhumane conditions. The practice was discontinued in February 1983. Street demonstrations, though diminishing in size and intensity, still were countered by hostile and overwhelming force by the authorities and resulted in new waves of detentions.

Furthermore, the suspension of martial law did not bring freedom to the estimated 900 persons who had been tried, convicted and sentenced for martial law violations by summary military and civil tribunals, nor did it lead to the release of those under investigatory arrest awaiting trial. People engaged in unofficial publishing and members of the Solidarity Union's clandestine Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) were principal targets for arrest and prosecution. Meanwhile, other independent opposition groups formed—both above and below ground—including a reconstituted

Helsinki Monitoring Committee, whose members were forced by repressive conditions to remain anonymous.

Following the successful papal visit in June, the martial law period officially was lifted by an act of the *Sejm* on July 22, 1983. Poland returned to civilian rule, WRON was disbanded and most workplaces were demilitarized. The "lifting" was accompanied by a significant, but conditional amnesty (the first of four large annual amnesties that were to be recorded in the reporting period). The Government engaged in an accelerated effort to create new or remake previously-existing institutions—such as the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth or PRON, a popular-front organization, and the National Trade Union Alliance, OPZZ, an umbrella group for the new official trade unions—which were advertised as an effort to bring about "national reconciliation" by decentralizing economic and social decisionmaking and eventually to supplant public loyalty to Solidarity and other freely established organizations. The formidable array of repressive legislation kept growing and the independence of institutions of higher learning became a primary target. Throughout, the Government continued its practice of "preventive" detentions of suspected organizers of opposition events.

Beginning with the international attention focused on Poland during the showcase papal visit, which was presented as a demonstration of the close cooperation possible between church and state, the Jaruzelski government began to seek legitimacy from, and consequently, secure improved economic relations with, the international community—an effort that continues to the present. The U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar visited Poland in February 1984 and Poland visibly increased its participation in bilateral and multilateral endeavors, including its activist role at the Madrid Review Meeting as a principal sponsor of the Warsaw Pact's proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). At Madrid and other international meetings, Poland took a carefully legalistic approach to its international obligations in the fields of human, civil and trade union rights. It did not cooperate with the International Labor Organization's Special Board of Inquiry that was given the task to investigate violations of ILO Conventions in Poland. And, when the ILO's Governing Body formally took note of the Board's critical findings in late 1984, Poland announced it would withdraw from that organization. At the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Poland remained obstructionist, using procedural obstacles to thwart criticism.

A series of state visits by Jaruzelski to Socialist countries were followed by return visits from his Warsaw Pact counterparts in July 1985 for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Polish People's Republic (PPR). Official Polish media played up Poland's role in the Stockholm CDE as well as government agreement on debt rescheduling with commercial bank creditors. From late 1984, starting with the visit to Warsaw of Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, through 1986, Poland made other bids for international "normalization." In 1985, Italian Prime Minister Craxi, F.R.G. Foreign Minister Genscher, F.R.G. ex-Chancellor and Social Democratic Party leader Brandt and British Foreign Secretary Howe traveled to Poland. Jaruzelski went to New York to address the U.N.

General Assembly, and ended the year with a controversial trip to Paris, where he met with President Mitterrand. In 1986, former U.S. envoy to Poland (1968–72) and retired Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel traveled to Poland on a private visit, where he met with Jaruzelski, Primate Glemp and members of the opposition. Subsequently, Stoessel flew to Rome for a meeting with the Pope. In April, Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski became the first senior Polish official to visit the F.R.G. since the crackdown, where he met with Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher, among others. In August, Poland eased visa procedures for Israel, agreeing to a reciprocal opening of bureaus in Warsaw and Tel Aviv and fueling speculation that Poland might serve as an intermediary between the U.S.S.R. and Israel on emigration and other matters.

Domestically, however, opposition activists—particularly those engaged in underground publishing or broadcasting—and civil rights lawyers were subjected to increased pressure from arrests, searches and detention. The prisoner population had swelled well beyond that which existed before the previous amnesty. The second large, but again conditional amnesty took place in July 1984. Prisoners of conscience engaged in hunger strikes in an effort to obtain political prisoner status and to secure other prisoners' rights. Reports of beatings of prisoners and of other forms of inhumane treatment by prison authorities reached the West in growing numbers. The fatal beating in May 1983 of Grzegorz Przemyk, son of pro-Solidarity poet Barbara Sadowska, and the suspected murder by security police in January 1984 of Rural Solidarity leader Piotr Bartoszce increasingly evidenced extra-legal acts of violence perpetrated against opposition leaders and supporters. The Przemyk trial generally was regarded as a mockery of justice. The Bartoszce case never went to trial. After a 2½-year wait in pre-trial detention, four leading KOR (Workers' Defense Committee) activists were tried on charges of attempting to overthrow the state, but proceedings were soon suspended and the defendants amnestied.

Church and state engaged in a fitful dialogue on issues such as the legal status of the Catholic Church; establishing diplomatic relations between the PPR and the Vatican; the legal framework for the proposed church fund to aid private agriculture; harassment of activist clergy; the treatment of prisoners; and, the social welfare of Solidarity activists. The so-called "war of the crosses" provoked an outpouring of popular sentiment that led to the retention of one crucifix in each school building.

The abduction and murder by security police of Father Jerzy Popieluszko in October 1984 threw church-state relations into a crisis. In order to diffuse widespread suspicion of criminal involvement by high-level officials, the arrest, trial, conviction and stiff sentencing of the four security service (SB) defendants were given extensive coverage in the Polish mass media and extraordinary access was permitted the foreign press. The spectacle of East bloc security police on trial before a rapt domestic and international public was unprecedented in post-war Eastern Europe. However, the slanderous attacks on Popieluszko and the church that were heard in the courtroom during the trial and echoed in the official media vitiated this public relations effort.

64-639 O - 87 - 4

The official press quickened the drumbeat against activist priests, accusing them of "illegal" activities and even going so far as to criticize the Pope, prompting a public outcry and an indignant denial by Primate Glemp. Another round of the "war of the crosses" was fought. In September and February, expected meetings between Glemp and Jaruzelski failed to take place. Eventually, they met in June 1985 for the first time in more than 1 year. Negotiations on the church aid plan for private agriculture were stalled. Physical attacks on activist priests and others under suspicious circumstances continued to occur with alarming frequency. In an especially grisly episode, Krakow priest and Solidarity advisor Tadeusz Zaleski reported on April 6, 1985 that he was attacked by a hooded assailant (allegedly an SB officer) who gassed him unconscious and burned him repeatedly with cigarettes.

By mid-1985, the prisoner population had climbed through new arrests and the re-arrest of prominent Solidarity and human rights activists from the 22 acknowledged by the Government in July 1984 to an estimated 360 persons held on politically motivated grounds. Under new court procedures adopted by the *Sejm* in May 1985, authorities had been given the power to convict and imprison political offenders within 48 hours of arrest. The campaign against opposition activists intensified following the trial of Popieluszko's murderers and the arrest in Gdansk in mid-February of ex-KOR member Adam Michnik and TKK leaders Bogdan Lis and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk. The three had been meeting with Lech Walesa and others to discuss a (subsequently aborted) general strike against food price increases and other trade union matters when the police broke up the gathering. Attempts to discredit Solidarity leaders and other oppositionists by implicating them as tools of "enemy centers" such as Radio Free Europe and the Central Intelligence Agency became the order of the day. Prosecution on treason charges carrying a maximum penalty of death became an ominous possibility for prominent activists. In June 1985, amidst loud public protest in Poland and abroad, Michnik, Lis and Frasyniuk were tried in a proceeding closed to Western journalists and sentenced to prison terms of 3, 2½ and 3½ years, respectively, for "membership in an illegal organization," i.e., the TKK, and for fomenting public unrest.

The Polish Government also stepped up its propaganda tirade against Western diplomats, correspondents and radios for interference in Poland's internal affairs. A sore-point was the formation in November 1985 of the Solidarity Endowment by leading U.S. political figures.

By November 1985, over 400 prisoners of conscience were incarcerated. Church and opposition groups pressed hard for an amnesty. On November 9, in response to a government-orchestrated "humanitarian initiative" by the PRON, a review of the cases of all prisoners held for "noncriminal offenses" was ordered. By the end of the year, one-half of the prisoners had been released, but *cause celebres* remained behind bars. Their numbers began to rise again in the new year. Reports of the brutal treatment of inmates and detainees mounted.

On February 11, Walesa was put on public trial in Gdansk on insubstantial charges of slandering local election officals for state-

ments questioning the accuracy of the results of the *Sejm* elections in October 1985. The Government, evidently wishing to avoid controversy, dismissed the case by means of a transparent face-saving maneuver. Lis, Frasyniuk and Michnik's appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court on February 21, but the sentences of Lis and Michnik were reduced. Due to the fact that he was a recidivist, Frasyniuk's original sentence was upheld. Subsequently, information reached the West of his mistreatment in prison. After nearly a year of investigatory arrest, leader Leszek Moczulski, along with four other activists in the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), finally went to trial for engaging in "anti-state activity" on March 3, 1985 in a courtroom closed to the foreign press.

Meanwhile, the Polish authorities made a series of damaging and demoralizing arrests of opposition figures. Bogdan Borusewicz, TKK's second-in-command, was arrested in a raid in January against an underground publishing operation. Perhaps the greatest blow to the Solidarity underground was struck with the apprehension on May 31, 1986 of TKK leader Zbigniew Bujak, who had been in hiding since the imposition of martial law.

During the Tenth Communist Party Congress in June 1986, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev gave his seal of approval to Jaruzelski's handling of "a period of keen ideological and political confrontation," i.e., the rise of Solidarity and the stewardship of martial law's aftermath, and accused the West of attempting to destabilize Poland. In a lengthy address, Jaruzelski declared Poland "normalized," ruled out any return to union pluralism, defended his repression of Solidarity and delivered his own blistering attack against the United States. At the same time, Jaruzelski alluded to a fourth conditional amnesty. He further claimed that the Government seeks improved relations with the church, but condemned "anti-socialist clericalism articulated by some of the priests."

The amnesty took place pursuant to a July 17 act of parliament and was to be carried out through mid-September. On September 4, 1986, the church bitterly announced the abandonment of its 4-year effort to reach agreement with the Government on a church-sponsored agricultural fund for private farmers. Speculation and public pressure mounted at home and abroad regarding the extent of the amnesty. Steadily, scores of prisoners, including long-held prominent activists, were released seemingly without condition. In a surprise move on September 11, Interior Minister Kiszczak announced that all persons "sentenced and/or under arrest for offenses and transgressions against the state and public order" would be released. Fugitive activists would have until the end of the year to give themselves up. By mid-September, virtually all of Poland's prisoners of conscience—some 225 persons—were summarily freed. Furthermore, Jaruzelski called upon the opposition to abandon underground activity and sought the church's support for a new social council of political independents, church laymen and moderate Solidarity activists that would advise the Council of State.

With the sweeping prisoner release and plan for the state advisory council, Poland's post-martial law history clearly had entered a new phase that offered new challenges to the Government, church and opposition alike. Solidarity and church leaders engaged in intensive talks on how best to respond to the changed circumstances.

The Solidarity leadership completed a plan for what they described as the most aggressive public activity that the movement had attempted since the 1981 crackdown. On September 30, the Solidarity Union announced that a seven-member "temporary Solidarity council" had been created to replace the TKK (the union's underground). Members of the new council are Zbigniew Bujak, Solidarity's Warsaw leader and former underground head, Bogdan Borusewicz and Bogdan Lis of Gdansk, Tadeusz Jedynak of Silesia, Janusz Palubicki of Posznan, and Jozef Pinior and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk of Wroclaw. Underground activists began to emerge from hiding and the independent union embarked upon its first effort to operate openly since its de-legalization in 1982. However, "technical and organizational structures will continue underground," including the extensive clandestine publishing operations and independent union cells in factories.

Walesa's September 30 statement announcing the formation of the temporary Solidarity Council summed up the situation as Poland faced a new crossroads: "The decision to release political prisoners is an important fact and it creates a chance to change the social climate in the country. The step should be followed immediately by such measures that will break the deadlock between the authorities and society. If this will not happen, then the results of this decision will be short-lived. The prisons will begin to fill up again and a dangerous further deterioration of the economy and ecology will follow."

The Government's response to Solidarity's Council was swift as well as categorical. On October 6, the director of the socioadministrative department at the Gdansk provincial government office ruled the union's new council illegal, saying that it "may cause a threat to security, peace or public order. The investigation concluded that the . . . organization . . . cannot function within the legal order because its creation was not legalized on the basis of the law on association or other legal regulations." *Pravda* has charged the council with "planning to revive illegal activity, in contravention of Poland's laws." Walesa and the members of the new council have been called in for questioning, but there have been no arrests to date.

There follows a topical description of human rights conditions in Poland:

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Persecution and imprisonment

More than 10 years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, 6 years after the Gdansk Agreement and 5 years after the declaration of martial law, the rights of freedom of association, free assembly, freedom of expression and other internationally guaranteed rights remain seriously restricted in Poland despite constitutional guarantees to the contrary. Under Polish law, the articles in the Penal and Petty Offenses Codes are broadly worded so that the exercise of these basic rights and freedoms carries with it the real risk of legal penalty. Extensive powers given to police and security forces during martial law subsequently have been made part of the permanent legal structure. As a result, the police now have virtual-

ly unlimited search and arrest powers; they have used deadly weapons and coercive force to quell public protests; and, they regularly violate inherent privacy rights of Polish citizens. Solidarity and other opposition members and supporters have been subjected to discrimination, harassment, searches, surveillance, interrogation, repeated short-term detention, prosecution, physical assault and even murder for efforts to know and act upon their human and workers' rights.

Beyond the hundreds of persons held under indefinitely renewable periods of investigative arrest awaiting trial and others sentenced and serving terms of imprisonment, the PPR has employed broadscale suspended sentences (concomitant with restrictions on civil liberties, movement, and employment reinstatement by the courts at any time), fines, and conditional releases from imprisonment. Particular targets for persecution and arrest on political grounds have been those engaged in the printing of illegal publications and books and those who have continued to engage in banned trade unions and other independent associations. In recent months, a growing number of people have been sentenced for conscientious objection and were not included in the sweeping 1986 amnesty.

The Polish authorities do not recognize the status of political prisoner nor are officially acknowledged prisoner statistics reliable. Often, independent sources and the church estimate that official figures are well below actual numbers. Political prisoners are often interrogated, beaten, and held under cruel and inhuman conditions. Generally, they are denied rights to meet with defense counsel or their families, to correspondence, and to other internationally recognized rights of prisoners. According to the Helsinki Committee in Poland, some of the most cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners is found at the Investigative Detention Centers. Abused prisoners such as Czeslaw Bielecki, independent author and architect, have engaged in hunger strikes to protest the conditions under which they were being held (Bielecki had been imprisoned without trial since April 1985 and was released in the recent amnesty). When amnesty acts are in effect, investigative proceedings are conditionally suspended and the suspects released.

According to the Helsinki Committee in Poland's *Third Report on Human and Civil Rights: January–October 1984*, published in English translation by the Committee in Support of Solidarity in New York and the Information Center for Polish Affairs in London, most of the individuals imprisoned for political reasons were accused of membership in an illegal organization, such as the banned Solidarity union; defamation of the State and dissemination of illegal information, a charge levied against the editors, printers, and distributors of independent publications; participation in or organization of public disturbances, applied against those taking part in peaceful demonstrations; unlicensed use of transmitters, levied against those active in Radio Solidarity; misuse of Socialist property, i.e. using state property, such as copying machines and state printing equipment for opposition activities; and acts against the fundamental interests of the state or treasonable offenses—the most serious offenses under the Penal Code providing for lengthy sentences up to a possible death penalty—levied against TKK ringleaders such as Zbigniew Bujak.

Also, for primarily political reasons, numerous persons have been sentenced under dubious criminal charges such as theft, assault, rape, and even complicity in murder.

The *Law on Special Regulations Governing the Period of the Socio-Economic Crisis*, promulgated July 23, 1983 and in force until December 31, 1985, provided to Governors of Voivodships and Presidents of Cities, powers to institute states of "emergency" in cases where peaceful demonstrations were organized. These powers included the introduction of summary procedures, with no right of appeal, in both penal and misdemeanor courts.

Thus, authorities have used both legislative and judicial instruments with summary procedures to impose sentences on persons detained for participating in a peaceful assembly or detained prior to demonstrations.

Since 1982, there have been widespread instances of cruel and inhuman treatment, and even murder, of opposition leaders and sympathizers by functionaries of police organs, prison personnel and faceless attackers. This includes police beatings of persons under detention, attacks by "unknown assailants" and police functionaries in homes and on the streets, the abduction of persons from the street by police and "unknown assailants" and their subsequent subjection to torture. Human rights sources in Poland have reported more than 30 cases of mysterious disappearances or deaths since the imposition of martial law that were neither investigated nor resolved by the authorities. In addition, the police have used excessive force to disperse peaceful assemblies.

The Helsinki Committee in Poland estimates that at least 46 deaths have resulted from police violence in the post-Madrid period.

The practice of psychiatric abuse of dissidents as known in the Soviet Union and Romania does not exist in Poland.

Unofficial groups

Solidarity remains the besieged vanguard of broadly based social opposition. Opposition groups, largely working in cultural and educational spheres and engaged in unofficial publishing (as many as 1,000 separate *samizdat* publications circulate by some counts), have evolved from the martial law experience. Notable groups include:

Citizens' Committees Against Violence (KOPPs). In the aftermath of the Popieluszko abduction and murder in October 1984, independent Citizens' Committees against Violence (KOPPs) formed in a number of Polish cities despite warnings from the authorities to refrain from monitoring activities. KOPPs were set up above ground in Wroclaw, Krakow and Warsaw by intellectuals and Solidarity activists as well as former members of KSS "KOR" (Committee for Social-Self-Defense, the most influential dissident organization in the pre-Solidarity era which self-dissolved in 1981). The groups were to monitor acts of police brutality, submit the facts to the legal authorities as well as publicize them. Other groups were created in Gdansk, Katowice, Lodz, Poznan, Slupsk and Lublin. However, harassment and arrests rendered the KOPPs initiative virtually inactive within a few months' time.

In one of its first statements, the Warsaw founding group asserted that: "our society has a right to defend itself against fear, to organize itself against political banditry and it is this self-defense and self-organization that our activities will serve. That, too, is Solidarity." In Krakow, a citizens' group statement issued by 22 persons declared: "Let everyone do everything within his power so that Poland is no longer a place of political murders, beatings, abductions and persecutions for political reasons." The aim of the KOPPs was perhaps best summed up in the remarks of Professor Lipinski, (former KOR activist) who emphasized that the groups were not political—"We will have no structure, we will only react to situations" and "reveal facts and connections between facts which may have escaped the notice of the authorities." The ultimate goal was to end "police terror."

As above-ground organizations, the committees attempted to abide scrupulously by the law and therefore applied for registration with the Government. However, the Government deemed the KOPPs illegal and admonished their members that legal steps could be taken against them. In response to the threat, Jacek Kuron, a former KOR member and one of Poland's leading intellectuals, said that the action of the KOPPs are only illegal under a government "based on lawlessness" and that "organizing people in order to research acts of political terrorism and to inform public opinion about them is supported by law in a country where there is law, and by a government, if this government is based on law." The formation of the committees marked the first (in hindsight, premature) attempt by the political opposition to engage in open activities since the imposition of martial law at the end of 1981.

The Helsinki Committee. The Helsinki Committee in Poland, first formed under KOR auspices in 1979 and headed by physicist Zbigniew Romaszewski, was reformed during martial law in October 1982. Since its re-establishment—this time anonymously and underground under TKK auspices—the Helsinki Committee has issued five comprehensive *Reports on Human and Civil Rights in the PPR* covering the martial law period through 1985 and has prepared an extensive report on the post-Madrid period expressly for the Vienna Review Meeting entitled *Violations of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in the Polish People's Republic from 1983 to 1986.* The first Helsinki Committee *Report* was submitted to the Madrid Meeting by Jerzy Milewski, Director of the Coordinating Office Abroad of Solidarity. U.S. Ambassador Max Kampelman issued a press statement to acknowledge its receipt.

In addition, the Helsinki Committee has issued specialized reports on *The Situation of Trade Unions* for submission to the ILO's 69th Annual Conference in 1983; a 1984 *Special Report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights*, which responded to a report of the Secretary General's rapporteur on Poland, Patricio Ruedas; on *Acts of Violence and Terror* in December 1985; on *The Right to Work in the Polish People's Republic and the Norms of International Law* (June 1985); and, *The Helsinki Accords, the Human Rights Conventions and Poland*, produced in March 1986.

The Helsinki Committee formally announced its formation in the March 27, 1983 supplement of the unofficial bimonthly newsletter "KOS": "Several months ago the Helsinki Committee in Poland

was founded. The purpose of the Committee is to gather, process, and publish materials concerning human rights violations in Poland. The Committee does not represent any political line and is not associated with any organization of a political nature. We only want to combat illegality by means of providing extensive information on its manifestations. . . . Despite the tradition of the Helsinki Committees active in many countries, we have decided, compelled by circumstances, to remain anonymous. The reports we publish will be authenticated by institutions and persons who command respect in the community."

The reconstituted Helsinki Committee has continued its predecessor's tradition of maintaining contacts and issuing statements of solidarity with Helsinki monitoring groups in other Warsaw Pact countries. On May 19, 1986, the Polish Helsinki Committee addressed a letter to Charter 77 and VONS, stating in part—"The work of Charter 77, the result of your courage, deserves our highest esteem. Your perseverance in facing totalitarian injustice is for us, the participants in the Helsinki Committee in Poland, as well as for the entire Solidarity movement, a source of hope in making our common values and goals a reality. We believe that the natural bond of common purpose should lead to mutually agreed upon forms of cooperation."

Solidarity's new temporary national council, formed following the Government's sweeping amnesty in mid-September 1986, marks the free union's first attempt to operate openly above-ground since the imposition of martial law in December 1981.

CULTURAL RIGHTS

A lasting legacy of the Solidarity movement has been the flourishing of independent culture, a phenomenon that blossomed in the pressured hot-house environment of post-martial law Poland to an extent unmatched in the Warsaw Pact. The burgeoning of independent culture has been met with efforts on the part of the Government to reassert state control over the "production" of culture by tightening control over all aspects of official culture and by attempting to eliminate all forms of independent cultural activity. Some parts of the more liberal Solidarity era censorship law (October 1, 1981) were suspended, and in 1982 and 1983, new restrictive legislation was enacted.

Repressive or restrictive measures taken against independent culture have included: under martial law (December 1981 to July 1983), the introduction of a range of severe prison sentences for all forms of independent publishing and dissemination of information; since the formal lifting of martial law in July 1983, the arrest and imprisonment of large numbers of people engaged in such activities; and, official propaganda efforts to link cultural activists with "Western centers of subversion."

In 1985, the Government stepped up its campaign against the independence of Poland's traditionally outspoken academic community. A number of damaging amendments to the law on higher education were passed and punitive actions were taken against academics prominent in the opposition. In late 1985, 70 rectors and

deans were dismissed from their administrative posts, but retained their teaching responsibilities.

At the CSCE Cultural Forum in Budapest (1985), U.S. delegates raised the names of Polish cultural figures who had been persecuted for their independent activities. U.S. cultural figure Peter Blake named the case of fellow architect Czeslaw Bielecki, then imprisoned for his unofficial publishing activities, and U.S. Deputy Head of Delegation Polansky referred to the Polish people's deprivation of many excellent works by Nobel Laureate Czeslaw Milosz. Polansky quoted a deputy director of the Cultural Section of the Polish United Workers Party, who is reported to have suggested that too many works by Milosz are available to the Polish public.

Despite repressive actions by the Government, the Polish Underground Publications Unit of Radio Free Europe counted 632 titles in its collection of uncensored journals appearing regularly in Poland as of July 1985. The publications ranged from lengthy quarterlies of a literary or socio-political nature to short factory floor newssheets. Despite repression, an estimated 50 independent publishing houses, which have produced hundreds of periodicals, titles, and books in circulations of 2,000–2,500 copies each, a production feat unthinkable elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact. In addition to printed matter, unofficial culture produces tapes and videocassettes, calendars and postcards. Other aspects of the breadth and depth of independent cultural life include self-education groups, poetry readings, art exhibits and theatrical performances.

More orthodox party and government officals attempt to retain tight control over the most influential print and electronic media. Yet editors-in-chief of individual publications can and do wield significant influence. Articles appearing in the unofficial press frequently spark lively debate in the official press as well.

The Independent Catholic Weekly "Tygodnik Powszechny" and official publications present contending views on economic reform, party ideology and cadre policy, the extent of dialogue with various spheres of society, bilateral issues, the role of the church, and the role of the intellectual in society. The officially sanctioned press also freely discusses social and family problems, acute housing conditions, drug and alcohol abuse, poor delivery of medical services, problems in education and alienated youth, environmental issues, and many other subjects highlighting current concerns in Poland. Even within the sphere of international issues, and specifically those involving East-West relations, the Polish media contain a handful of well-known journalists who frequently treat individual subjects, such as arms negotiations, by focusing on the facts and eschewing the usual public propaganda lines.

Many journalists who were dismissed during martial law or who resigned in protest are now active again in a variety of smaller-circulation but widely read publications.

In October 1986, the editors of *Respublica*, a clandestine quarterly that began publication in 1978, received the green light from Polish authorities to operate legally. *Respublica* had first applied for legalization in 1981, before the imposition of martial law.

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

Compared with other East European countries, the practice of religion in Poland is relatively free. Poland is overwhelmingly a Roman Catholic country with representation by a number of Protestant denominations, perhaps one-half million Orthodox, and less than 10,000 Jews remaining after the devastation of World War II and post-war purges. Generally speaking, religions are required to register with the Government. Registration offers certain advantages in the purchase of property and other matters. Permission to register is not always granted. Poland's small number of Zen Buddhists, for example, have no Government recognition (although they continue to function nevertheless). The Roman Catholic Church has no legal standing. Discussions on the question of the church's status have been held on-and-off over the years but no resolution is in sight. In acknowledgement of the church's influential role in Polish society, the Jaruzelski government has enlisted its aid in anti-alcoholism and other social welfare campaigns.

The state usually does not interfere in the appointment of pastors to parishes although at times the state tries to persuade the church to transfer or muzzle activist priests. In 1984, Father Stanislaw Malkowski, whose virulently anti-Communist sermons raised the ire of the authorities, was ordered by the Episcopate to desist from preaching in the Warsaw archdiocese. As is the case in other European countries, the Government must acquiesce to the appointments of bishops ordinary. The church's candidate is usually approved but occasionally only after a considerable delay.

The roster of Roman Catholic publications is long and recently the church has been able to issue its publications in larger numbers. Other religious denominations print a variety of religious publications subject to availability of newsprint and paper. As with all above-ground publications in Poland, religious publications must pass censorship. The Catholic Church continues to broadcast Sunday Mass on state-run radio; the smaller Protestant Churches do so on a rotating basis.

The Primate, the Episcopate as a whole, and the clergy have been outspoken in calling for greater individual freedom and respect for human rights, often drawing fire from the Government and official media for its defense of Solidarity figures and other opposition activists.

The Government drive has been relentless against activist priests who have defended openly human rights and who have opened their churches to independent cultural and educational activities. In 1984, the Government was said to have a blacklist of 69 activist priests (the existence of which was never confirmed by church or state). During the Popieluszko trial, state prosecutors attempted to place the church in the dock along with the convicted defendants for its civil and human rights activism. Other activist priests have been singled out for harassment (such as Father Henryk Jankowski, pastor of Lech Walesa's church in Gdansk) and have been the targets of assaults (such as Father Tadeusz Zaleski of Krakow).

An issue of principle that symbolized the conflict between church and state is the question of displaying crosses in public places such as classrooms. The issue surfaced in March 1984, when authorities

in a small town south of Warsaw removed crosses from classrooms, basing their action on the doctrine of separation of church and state. Many students and local church leaders objected. Although the positions of church and state on the issue are irreconcilable in principle, a compromise was reached in this instance which permitted the hanging of a cross in one highly visible location in each school. However, government efforts to remove crosses from schools and public places have increased.

In early September 1986, the church, bitterly citing government intransigence, abandoned its 4-year-old proposal—stemming from the 1983 papal visit—for a church-sponsored aid fund for private agriculture.

NATIONAL MINORITIES

Poland is basically an ethnically homogeneous nation with no minorities recognized as such. After normalization of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1972, the Polish Government worked out an arrangement permitting the emigration of people considered to be ethnic Germans by the German authorities in exchange for credits. In recent years the rate of "German" emigration has fallen considerably. The Polish authorities insist that there is no German minority in Poland and have received support from Roman Catholic Primate Cardinal Glemp to that effect. The P.P.R. has resisted F.R.G. suggestions that German language and cultural instruction be provided to the remaining ethnic Germans in Polish schools.

Government sensitivity regarding the permanence of Poland's post-war borders remains an issue vis-a-vis the F.R.G. The Polish Government and state media frequently lambaste political forces of "revanchism" in the Federal Republic and pursued the issue during high-level bilateral exchanges with F.R.G. officials in 1985 and 1986.

Many of Poland's Ukrainian population, either Orthodox or Uniate, feel discriminated against, not so much by the Polish authorities as such but by the Roman Catholic Church, which dominates religious life in Poland. With the exception of a Ukrainian-language newspaper, the Polish authorities do little to promote or preserve Ukrainian culture within Polish boundaries. Poland's small remaining Jewish community, with an average age of over 70, is slowly disappearing. The Polish authorities have subsidized a Jewish theater in Warsaw for years and have restored a few synagogues, but no rabbi has served the needs of the Jewish community in Poland on a regular basis for the past 30 years.

TRADE UNION RIGHTS

The question of free trade union activity is the principal human rights issue in Poland today. Martial law was declared and implemented to suppress and destroy the free trade union movement, Solidarity. The trade union language in the Madrid Concluding Document was a direct legacy of Solidarity. The ongoing violations by Poland of civil and workers' rights directly contravene the PPR's Madrid Concluding Document obligations with respect to the rights of freely established and joined trade unions. To reinforce

the new and hard-won Madrid language, and to underscore ongoing violations of trade union rights in Poland and the U.S.S.R., the Western countries addressed the issue of free trade unions at the CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa (1985) and the Human Contacts Experts Meeting in Bern (1986), both in the crafting of proposals and in speeches.

On June 27, 1984, the International Labor Organization released a report by its special Commission of Inquiry highly critical of the trade union situation in Poland in the martial law period. The appointment of the Commission, set up in May 1983, to look into charges submitted by Western trade unions, was the strongest action the ILO can take against any of its 151 members. Describing conditions in Poland as "a situation today which no one can consider normal and even less to be satisfactory," the Commission report resolutely called upon the Jaruzelski government to take part in "free and unprejudiced exchanges of views" with the "representatives of the various trade union trends that have arisen . . . in recent years," i.e. Solidarity. The Commission went on to urge the release and amnesty of all workers still in prison for exercising trade union rights, the abolition of exceptional measures and the full restoration of freedom of expression and assembly.

Furthermore, directly quoting from Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act, the Commission deemed it: "of the greatest importance for the full observance of the Conventions on freedom of association if, as provided by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted at Helsinki in 1975, the Government of Poland, which subscribed to that act, were to promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development."

In compiling the report, the Commission of Inquiry exhaustively reviewed evidence submitted by international trade union organizations and invited submissions from a number of Western, neutral and East bloc Governments (the Eastern Governments refused to cooperate).

There is widespread discrimination in employment against Solidarity members. Union members, activists and elected leaders have been subjected to frequent police surveillance, apartment searches, detentions, interrogations and physical violence. A particularly ominous development in recent years was the spurious linking by the Polish Interior Ministry of the Solidarity Underground and its coordinating office abroad in Brussels with Western intelligence. The Director of the Ministry's investigative office said that some Solidarity members are being investigated for treason on the basis of documents provided by an informer, Polish exile Jacek Knapik, who returned to Poland recently after a 10-year absence. The Brussels Office has issued a statement claiming Polish authorities have forged documents to try to discredit the Solidarity movement.

With the formal delegalization of Solidarity in October 1982, a new set of laws was passed severely limiting the prospects for the future development of free trade unions in the Solidarity mold. The laws prescribed a timetable for the formation of unions under the new rules and proscribed strikes except in extremely circumscribed

circumstances. At the same time, new trade unions, alleged to be "free and independent," were created under the auspices of the Government. The new unions have coalesced into a national organization and have reintegrated themselves into the international network of "Socialist" unions under the umbrella National Trade Union Alliance, or OPZZ. However, the new unions lack credibility. Government leaders have rejected emphatically trade union pluralism as an invitation to political chaos but trade union pluralism *de facto* exists. Underground Solidarity (the TKK) claims 1 million dues-paying members and Solidarity has infiltrated factory self-management councils to a certain extent.

On October 21, 1985, the OPZZ took over 21.5 billion *zlotys* worth of Solidarity assets that had been seized under martial law.

COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

The Polish authorities regard any critical comment on Poland's performance on human rights as interference in its internal affairs. The most glaring example is the PPR's categorical refusal to cooperate with the ILO's Commission of Inquiry. Poland suspended its participation in the ILO after the Commission of Inquiry released its report on June 27, 1984 highly critical of Poland's record. After the ILO routinely voted to make the report part of the official ILO record, Poland announced its intention to withdraw from that organization in protest by the end of November 1986.

APPROACH TO CSCE

The imposition of martial law in Poland, coming 1 year into the already deadlocked Madrid Meeting, had a profound effect on the conduct of that negotiation. The Polish delegation, consistent with its practice at other international fora, took a highly legalistic approach in defending its actions, insisting that Poland should be permitted to solve its own difficult problems, that international criticism would only complicate a return to normalization, and that such criticism constitutes interference in Poland's internal affairs. This approach remained consistent throughout Ottawa and Bern. At Budapest, Western criticism of Poland's cultural policy and repression of independent cutural figures elicited a similarly indignant reaction from the Polish delegation.

While taking a combative hard-line when challenged on human rights matter, Poland has prided itself in the active role it has played in the security aspects of CSCE as a principal sponsor of the East's military security proposal at Madrid, which eventually led to the Stockholm CDE.

ROMANIA

INTRODUCTION

Romanian restrictions on individual and collective liberties as set forth in the Helsinki and Madrid agreements have not decreased since the publication of the last CSCE Implementation Report. Rather, in the past several years Romanian authorities have kept up harassment and arrests of Romanian citizens who have sought to act upon the rights guaranteed in the Helsinki Final Act.

Romanian citizens have had to contend with a government-sanctioned austerity program which forces them to live close to the margin of existence. Food and essential services are in extremely short supply. Yet there is little sign of protest aside from the occasional joke or whispered criticism of Ceausescu's disastrous policies. Reports that military officers attempted a coup in January 1983 remain unsubstantiated.

The independent labor and human rights protection groups which surfaced briefly beginning with the Goma movement in 1977 have remained silent since they were crushed by the regime. However, religious life continues to provide an outlet for spiritual expression in Romania, which is enjoying a religious revival unmatched in Eastern Europe.

In spite of the Romanian Government's repressive treatment of its citizens, the lines of communication between concerned Westerners and the Romanian authorities have remained open and have been employed frequently. Romanian authorities have proved willing to discuss human rights concerns voiced by other CSCE signatory states and have, on occasion, acted in specific cases to allay those concerns.

The annual most-favored-nation status review process plays an important role in the United States-Romanian dialogue on human rights. A nonmarket economy country enjoying MFN status since 1975, Romania is granted lower tariff rates for exports to the United States as well as U.S. credits and investment guarantees. The annual confirmation of this trading status explicitly is contingent on Romania's emigration practices and implicitly depends upon Romanian performance in a wide range of human rights areas, including religious and minority rights and prisoners of conscience.

In recent years, Romania has encountered increasing difficulty in obtaining extension of its MFN status. The President must submit to Congress his recommendation on whether to extend MFN status for Romania, among other nonmarket economy countries, by June 3 each year. Both Houses of Congress have the opportunity to lodge a resolution disapproving the Presidential recommendation. Traditionally, before the designated 60-day congressional decision period has passed, the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee schedule public hearings to afford the executive branch and nongovernmental organizations a chance to air their views.

Each year, Romania has come up with some limited human rights concessions during the annual MFN review season. In June 1983, Romanian authorities gave assurances to the U.S. Government that they no longer would levy the education tax for would-be emigrants announced in November of the previous year. In 1984, prominent prisoner of conscience Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa was released from prison, and in 1985, he was allowed to emigrate to the United States. Also in 1985, Romanian authorities came to an agreement with U.S. special envoy Counselor Edward Derwinski whereby Romanian citizens whose emigration to the United States have been approved no longer will suffer hardships such as loss of employment, access to social services and other

rights of citizenship. In 1986, an amnesty announced in early June—well before the more commonplace Romanian National Day amnesty in August—freed prisoners serving 3 to 5 years in prison and significantly reduced the sentences of others. Also, the Romanians released several Christian prisoners of conscience, such as Adventist Dorel Catarama (imprisoned since 1982 for "economic crimes"), and allowed Catarama and others to emigrate.

Yet other Romanian actions, even during the MFN review period, raise serious questions about the country's willingness to find common ground with either Western human rights advocates or its own citizens. Days before the Senate subcommittee debate on extension of MFN status, demolition crews in Bucharest knocked down a Sephardic synagogue. This action directly violated assurances given to members of the religious community in Romania and abroad.

The U.S. Congress remains dissatisfied with the Romanian human rights performance and continues to weigh carefully the option of suspending or revoking Romania's Most-Favored-Nation status. Congressional concerns cover a variety of areas, including religious and minority rights, prisoners of conscience and emigration.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

The Romanian Constitution guarantees several fundamental rights, including the freedoms of speech, press and assembly. Yet various articles in the Constitution interfere with and imperil these rights. One of the most blatant contradictions lies in article 29, which forbids the exercise of freedoms determined to be "hostile to the Socialist system and to the interests of the working people." Article 29 goes on to proclaim, "Any association of a fascist or antidemocratic character is prohibited. Participation in such associations and propaganda of a fascist or anti-democratic character are punished by the law." Many cases demonstrate that the Romanian authorities interpret fascist and antidemocratic activities widely. The state thus sets substantial limits around the notion of these freedoms set forth in the Constitution.

Several new decrees promulgated since 1982 further restrict the already narrow bounds in Romania of the basic freedoms which should be enjoyed by every CSCE signatory state's citizens. These include some unpublished decrees which reduce Romanian citizens' already minimal permissible personal contact with foreigners visiting Romania. Rights which are not limited by any article in the Constitution are routinely violated at every level of authority from local government to the nationwide *Securitate* (Secret Police).

The Romanian Government employs a wide array of legal and extralegal forms of punishment and intimidation to discourage Romanian citizens from dissenting from the regime or otherwise questioning Romanian state practices. In addition to imprisonment, the Romanian Penal Code authorizes varying degrees of confinement. It sanctions detentions without charges, which can last from 2 to 4 days, and sometimes stretch into months. Often detainees are beaten. It also sanctions preventive arrests. The authorities also employ forced confinement to psychiatric institutions, forced reset-

tlement, forced labor and forced emigration to still opposition. Authorities initiate exhaustive investigations of fraud or embezzlement to harass religious believers whose zeal oversteps the bounds set by the authorities.

Extrajudicial measures taken against activists and their families include the confiscation of identification and ration cards, which are necessary to obtain basic foodstuffs, social services and other necessities of life, expulsion from employment or university and forced retirement. The Romanian authorities have continued to employ all of these methods in the past several years.

The number of political prisoners in Romania is unknown. These prisoners include individuals who have protested the authorities' denial of permission to leave the country as well as individuals who have attempted to leave Romania illegally. Reportedly, the *Securitate* continues to intimidate former political prisoners through surveillance, interrogations and physical abuse.

One Western human rights advocacy organization has reported that it continues to receive grim reports of conditions in Romanian prisons. Food, hygiene and medical care are inadequate, and treatment of prisoners is cruel. For instance, one former prisoner of conscience alerted Amnesty International to the practice in at least one prison of forcing prisoners in solitary confinement to stand in shackles, unable to sit or lie down, but only to squat.[1]

In 1984, a Catholic priest, Father Geza Palfi, died apparently as a result of the beatings he received while in custody of the *Securitate.* He had been detained for delivering a sermon critical of the Government. Romanian officials denied that Father Palfi had been imprisoned or beaten and claimed that he had died of cancer in April 1984. In November 1985, Gheorghe-Emil Ursu, a prisoner of conscience who had undergone an exhaustive investigation based on his personal diaries, died after 2 months in detention. The circumstances of his death have yet to be explained satisfactorily, as reportedly he was in fine health at the time of his detention. The officially tendered cause of death was intestinal blockage, liver problems and bronchial pneumonia.

The Romanian regime tightly controls the field of culture. Formal pre-censorship by government officials is required only for plays, while other literary works are censored in a less direct but still effective manner. The authorities cite a shortage of paper as the rationale for limiting the number of works a writer can produce. But clearly, writers who toe the official line, and particulary those who write of President Ceausescu in glowing terms, get published more frequently. Some Romanian writers have protested the regime's discriminatory treatment of artists, seeking instead "an end to the confusion of patriotism with the literature of flattery."[2]

Several authors and editors who have published provocative pieces in official publications have been transferred or prohibited from publishing again. For example, in November 1984, Georgeta Naidin, an editor known for her promotion of contemporary literature with an obliquely critical tone was moved from the Cartea Ro-

[1] [2] See footnotes on p. 233.

maneasca publishing house to another publishing house. Shortly afterward, the editor's husband, a literary critic, was removed from the editorial board of *Romania Literara.* Fifty-seven Romanian writers signed a protest letter against this move to the Writers' Union. In February 1985, writer Augustin Buzura published an essay critical of totalitarianism in a cultural weekly; his works did not appear in that publication for several weeks afterwards.[3]

Other writers have not waited for the authorities to censor their works or ban them from publishing altogether. In 1984, writer Mircea Sandulescu resigned from the Communist Party to protest against the party's interference in culture. In July 1985, dissident poet Dorin Tudoran was allowed to emigrate after years of harassment by authorities. Ever since his resignation from the Council of the Romanian Writer's Union in 1981 in protest of the regime's domination of that body, Tudoran had been unable to publish in Romania. Earlier in 1985, he had gone on a hunger strike lasting 40 days to dramatize his desire to emigrate.

The regime likewise has cracked down firmly in the area of independent publishing and has succeeded in stemming the flow of *samizdat.* In March 1983, the Romanian regime promulgated a decree requiring Romanian citizens to register their typewriters with the militia and forbidding the use of duplicating machines. Citizens with a criminal record or "whose behavior represents a danger to public order or to the security of the state"—which can, of course, be interpreted broadly—are prohibited from owning typewriters whether they are registered or not. No written materials can be taken out of the country without official permission. In June 1984, Nicolae Stoia, the author of a *samizdat* book critical of the Ceausescu regime, was arrested. His whereabouts since his arrest remain unknown.

Nevertheless, a few *samizdat* publications have surfaced in the past several years, as well as a Hungarian-language *samizdat* newspaper which appears regularly. The independent Hungarian press in Transylvania continues to publish, but it is subject to harsh recriminations by the Romanian authorities. Ethnic Hungarian dissidents involved in writing and disseminating *Ellenpontok,* "Counterpoints," which first appeared in December 1981 and put out 10 issues before being disbanded in January 1983 by Romanian authorities, were beaten. Two of the three ethnic Hungarian editors of the journal, Attila Ara-Kovacs and Karoly Toth, were expelled to Hungary. Only the third editor, poet Geza Szocs, remained in Romania, subject to repeated house searches and interrogations. In August 1986, Szocs was allowed to emigrate to the West.

In May 1983, the underground *Hungarian Press of Transylvania* was founded after *Ellenpontok* forcibly was closed. HPT, which has declared itself the Transylvanian Hungarians' "unofficial news agency," has issued over 200 releases so far. The editors have not revealed their identities for fear of official retribution.

The Romanian regime tolerates no political, economic or social participation from individuals or groups acting without the guidance of the state and party. In this context, the situation of workers in Romania is instructive. Article 27 of the Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to join trade unions and other mass or-

---

[3] See footnote on p. 233.

ganizations, but also confirms the Romanian Communist Party's control of workers' "through mass and public organizations." The International Labor Organization has determined that sections 164 and 165 of the Romanian Labor Code, as well as article 26, limit the workers' right to establish independent organizations of their choice, and make the founding of any organization independent of party control illegal.

The Romanian free trade union formed in February 1979, the Free Labor Union of the Working People of Romania (SLOMR), never recovered from the arrests of its founding members. The human rights advocacy movements which emerged briefly in the late 1970's among the intelligentsia, religious communities, workers and minority groups no longer exist in Romania; aside from the group behind the Hungarian-language independent press, no organized group operates. Unrelenting harassment, arrests, imprisonment and forced emigration took a toll on these groups, which included SLOMR and ALRC (the Christian Committee for the Defense of Religion and Conscience).

Individuals, however, particularly those involved with the Hungarian and German minorities and with the churches, continue to risk imprisonment, physical and psychological abuse, and exile by speaking out against the regime. In 1983 engineer Radu Filipescu was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in prison for "propaganda against the socialist order." He had distributed literature calling for demonstrations against the regime. (Filipescu was released from prison in the amnesty of summer 1986, after numerous representations on his behalf by the United States and other CSCE signatories.)

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

After Poland, church attendance in Romania is the largest in Eastern Europe. Both to believers and the Romanian authorities, the area of religious rights is one of the most troublesome.

Article 30 of the Romanian Constitution guarantees Romanian citizens the freedom "to share or not to share a religious belief." However, the same article makes clear that religious groups will be regulated by the state. Each of the 14 officially recognized—that is, legal—religious denominations functions according to a state-approved charter.

The church enjoying the largest membership by far is the Romanian Orthodox Church, which includes 16 million of Romania's 23 million citizens (69 percent) as members. Traditionally, the Orthodox Church has gotten along well with the state powers; as a body, it does not protest state policies. Individual priests, however, such as prominent Orthodox dissident Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa, have been defrocked by their church as a result of their challenges of the church and state. Father Calciu was defrocked in 1984 by the Bucharest Diocesan Consistory because of "his disobedience and insubordination to the ecclesiastic authority and his infringing the regulations in force in the Orthodox theological schools." Father Calciu had been in prison since 1979, serving a 10-year sentence for charges which never were made public, but which probably relate to his support for SLOMR and ALRC. Father

Calciu was released from prison in August 1984, after serving 5 years. He then was placed under house arrest, and was allowed no contact with foreigners. Father Calciu finally was permitted to emigrate to the United States in August 1985.

According to Keston College, since fall 1985, several Orthodox priests have been removed from their parishes and threatened with defrocking by the church hierarchy. Most of the priests had been associated with the five priests who had written an open letter to the Orthodox Patriarch in February 1981, condemning the church's subservience to the Romanian regime. Recently, they have been harassed on account of their activity in the Lord's Army movement and their association with Uniates, or Catholics of the Eastern Rite, a group banned in Romania since 1948.

Alexandru Pop, a 39-year-old Orthodox priest from Banat, sent an open letter to the West in spring 1986. In that letter, he called for eight reforms affecting religious life in Romania: freedom of religion and conscience; a halt to anti-religious propaganda and dissemination of atheism in the media; freedom of religious instruction; noninterference in church affairs; a halt to church demolition and freedom to build new churches; and no more persecution of priests and believers.

The small evangelical Protestant sects are the chief targets of harassment by the Romanian authorities. Members of officially recognized denominations, including Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists and Pentecostalists, are as susceptible to official persecution as members of such banned denominations as Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists and the Uniate Church. Pentecostals, Evangelical Brethen and unofficial Baptists are perceived as a particular threat to the state because of their insistence on the primacy of religious belief over state authority in moral matters. The Roman Catholic Church, which does not hold a charter but does nevertheless enjoy *de facto* recognition, is harassed from time to time.

Freedom of religion in Romania is closely bound to freedom of assembly. Romanian citizens must obtain official permission to organize or assemble. Attempts to gather independently for worship by members of officially recognized faiths are treated as "illegal assemblies," with participants sometimes arrested, fined and evicted from their homes. Unrecognized groups are forced underground by laws and extra-legal sanctions against unauthorized assembly.

Any group which holds meetings in homes—where neither the secular nor officially recognized church authorities can supervise their activities easily—is subject to particular scrutiny. For instance, the evangelically-leaning Orthodox break-away group known as the Lord's Army, banned in Romania since 1947, has been attacked in the Romanian press. Recently, authorities have levied fines on Lord's Army members in some sections of Romania for unauthorized meetings in private homes. Lord's Army leader Traian Dors was released in early 1983 after almost 6 months imprisonment for distributing Bibles illegally.

The nonrecognized churches are not allowed to hold services and are subject to severe penalties if they do. Participants in illegal services even of officially recognized denominations often are arrested or fined on charges of illegal assembly or disturbing the peace. Believers who act beyond the circumscribed limits on reli-

gious expression set by the regime are denied promotion, disqualified from school entrance exams, or otherwise harassed. Ilie Neamtu, of the Open Brethren Church in Ploiesti was arrested in August 1985, and held for months without charges being disclosed. Sentenced originally to 4½ years in prison for involvment in unauthorized use of socialist property, Neamtu saw his sentence increased to 7½ years, then reduced under the terms of the June amnesty to the original 4½ years. Neamtu was released finally in November 1986 after an appeals court ruled that the original charges against him were incorrect. Probably he was persecuted for organizing unofficial evangelistic meetings for his fellow workers and for his successful work and close ties with Romanian Christian youth.

In the summer of 1985, articles in government periodicals attacked Romanian Nazarenes and Jehovah's Witnesses. In December 1985, *Scinteia Tineretului,* the organ of the Communist Youth League, offered a sharply worded report on a Jehovah's Witness who sought to proselytize two neighboring children; the daily returned to the case in its March 1986 issue to drive home the point that proselytizing would not be tolerated in Romania.

The Romanian State Department of Cults controls religious affairs in the country. Among other duties, it controls the importation or printing of religious materials, including Bibles, issues licenses to preach, subsidizes clerical salaries, approves permits for church construction or renovation, establishes the number of new admissions to seminaries, and in general ensures the churches' "respect of legality." All of these are areas of friction between believers and the state.

The shortage of Bibles (particularly the "Cornilescu," or Baptist, Bibles) in Romania causes problems for believers as they try to compensate. Circulating unofficial publications, including Bibles, has been illegal in Romania since 1974. Constantin Sfatcu was arrested in April 1985 when he was found with approximately 600 Bibles that had been smuggled in from the West. Sfatcu was sentenced to 7½ years for "attempted murder" of the arresting police officer. His term later was reduced to 4½ years when he was convicted on appeal of "assaulting a police officer." Elisei Ruse, Cornel Mich, Nicula Levi and Ilie Dociu, members of the Open Brethren Church, were convicted in September 1985 for distributing Bibles and other religious literature and sentenced to 10 to 12 months of Socialist labor. All of these "Bible smugglers" were freed in the summer of 1986, before completion of their sentences. Sfatcu was allowed to emigrate.

Bibles in minority languages also are in very short supply. No Hungarian- or German-language Bibles or religious materials have been published in Romania since World War II. In a 1985 incident that was publicized highly outside of Romania, Dr. Alexander Havadtoy of the Hungarian Reformed Church in America produced evidence that a shipment of Hungarian-language Bibles from the U.S. Hungarian Reformed community destined for ethnic Hungarian worshipers in Transylvania had been turned into toilet paper at a Romanian paper and pulp mill in Braila. German Bibles, while in short supply, do find their way into Romania from the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the fall of 1986, Romanian authorities announced that they will allow 5,000 Cornilescu (Baptist) Bibles to be printed by the end of the year, and several thousand more during each subsequent year. The announcement signalled that the Romanian authorities will grapple with the Bible problem, which has long disturbed both Romanian and foreign believers.

The Department of Cults is in charge of licensing pastors. It can punish errant prelates by withdrawing their licenses. The shortage of Baptist pastors who have completed the seminary training approved by the Department of Cults has created pressure on congregations to engage pastors who have not gone through formal seminary training. Lack of seminary training is a further, technical excuse for the Department of Cults to refuse to license clergymen whom it deems suspect.

The two pastors of the Oradea Baptist Church, Europe's largest, waited for over 3 years to receive their licenses. During this time, Nicolae Gheorghita and Paul Negrut faced prosecution for preaching without having completed formal seminary training. The Department of Cults refused to accredit them if they had not completed the requisite courses. Signalling that the true reason for the long delay was hardly technical, but rather political, the Department of Cults offered legal recognition to the pastors in the fall of 1984, in spite of their continued lack of licenses, in return for their pledge to work in different parishes. The two pastors turned down the offer. They finally received their licenses in the spring of 1985 and continue to preach at Oradea.

Activist Baptist pastor Petre Dugulescu began work as pastor of a Timisoarea Church in March 1986, but had to continue living 110 miles away in Hateg, because the Baptist Union had not yet approved his transfer to the church. Representatives of the Department of Cults and the Baptist Union have sought to persuade Dugulescu to withdraw from the Timisoara Church, which is located close to the Romanian border with Hungary and Yugoslavia and thus is considered by authorities to be a particularly sensitive area.

Unlicensed activist pastors belonging to officially recognized denominations such as Gheorghita, Negrut and countless others, are subject to harassment through legal investigations of embezzlement (article 223 of the Penal Code), parasitism (Council of State Decree 153), and "having possessions in excess of explainable income" (Law 18/1968). Also, occasionally unlicensed clergymen are denied residence permits in "closed cities," such as Bucharest and many other large urban areas, where authorities are seeking to keep population growth down. Unlicensed Baptist pastors leading dissenting factions of recognized faiths have been harassed in recent years.

Licensed prelates likewise can be prevented from performing their church functions by other, bureaucratic means. Bunian Cocar, pastor of a Bucharest Baptist Church since 1982, although licensed and under contract to the church, never succeeded in obtaining a Bucharest residence permit from local authorities. In June 1985, in the middle of a confrontation Cocar provoked over new church construction, authorities ordered him to leave Bucharest with his wife and terminally ill mother.

One area of Romanian policy that particularly has incensed many believers both inside and outside Romania concerns the

upkeep of churches. Some congregations still await government approval for repairs on churches damaged or destroyed during the 1977 earthquake that devastated many areas in Romania. Congregations often suffer long delays in receiving permission to undertake renovations or extend their churches. Churches have been razed during urban renewal campaigns and, in some cases, when their construction has violated building codes and zoning regulations. In some, but not all cases, congregations are offered replacement accommodations.

For example, in November 1984, Bistrita-Nisaud Baptist Church was destroyed after the church leadership knowingly violated building codes. The Baptist Churches in Resita and Bistrita also were demolished in 1983 and 1984. In June 1984, a Pentecostal Church in Tirgu Mures, with a congregation of 500, was demolished to make way for a new block of apartments. In September 1984, the "Number Two" Baptist Church in Oradea was given 4 weeks' notice that its building was to be demolished. Church leaders and congregants stood firmly in opposition to the demolition and won assurances that the building would be safeguarded until an agreement could be reached on a new building. The situation still is in flux: the church has received permission to rebuild, but has been told first that the new church must be the same size as the old one, and second, that it must be even smaller. The church has protested that the state's solution is unacceptable, since it claims that its congregation has grown. Reportedly, at least four Baptist Churches have been destroyed entirely, one has been destroyed partially and six are under threat of demolition. One congregation got a replacement building for its demolished church, and negotiations are under way to find new accommodations for several of the churches under threat of demolition. Despite frictions between secular authorities and groups of believers, some 600 Baptist Churches function in Romania.

The Baptist Churches are not the only targets of demolition in Romania. While most of the Baptist Church demolitions are due to "building code violations" and "zoning laws," other churches—including some of considerable historical and cultural, as well as religious value—have been razed because they lie within areas targeted for modernization. The Orthodox Church is by no means immune. In Bucharest alone, 14 historic Orthodox Churches and monasteries have been moved, partially dismantled or destroyed during the present urban renewal campaign. A majority of these churches and monasteries were located in the sector of Bucharest being razed to allow construction of a huge "House of the Republic," which will house the Communist Party Central Committee and the Council of State, and the "Victory of Socialism Boulevard." The demolition campaign has provoked considerable protest from Romanians, some of whom have refused to carry out orders to demolish historic religious buildings. Yet the Orthodox Church has publicly, at least, not chosen to protest the demolitions.

Individual Orthodox priests, however, have protested the regime's actions affecting Orthodox places of worship. In Alexandru Pop's aforementioned letter to the West, he pointed out that aside from historical value, the buildings which are being torn down had provided essential services for Orthodox believers: "(I)n large areas

. . . no bells ever toll, and Romanians have no proper place to marry, baptize their children or mourn for their dead."[4]

Most recently, in late July 1986, the last remaining Sephardic synagogue in Eastern Europe, Bucharest's Spanish Synagogue, was demolished along with a Jewish old-age home over the protest of the Romanian, American and other Jewish communities, as well as several governments. An Adventist Church central to the country's Adventist community was bulldozed in August 1986 after a standoff between the demolition crew and worshippers occupying the building; in early September authorities promised the congregation a new building to replace the temporary quarters turned over to it in August.

In 1984, authorities promised several denominations, including Baptists, places for additional students in seminaries. The number of places still remains far below demand. For the first time in several years, in the fall of 1984 the Baptist Theological Seminary in Bucharest had 10 new students enrolled for the 4-year program. Ten more students followed in 1985, and 10 were expected to be accepted for each new session in the following years. Ten were admitted also to the Protestant seminary in Cluj, where Reformed, Lutheran and Unitarian prelates are trained. Two Catholic seminaries operate in Romania, but these have been forced to accept lower numbers of new students. In 1985, 20 students—of 120 who had applied—were accepted to start their training for the priesthood in these seminaries.[5]

Today 19,000 to 24,000 Jews remain in Romania. The majority are elderly. They are the remnants of a pre-war population of over 1 million which suffered tremendous losses during World War II and the postwar emigration of over 380,000 Romanian Jews to Israel. In spite of dwindling numbers, the Jewish community of Bucharest has maintained its own community center, nursing home, religious schools, newspaper and a kosher restaurant.

Some instances of officially tolerated anti-Semitic provocations have taken place during the period under review. In July 1983, the literary journal *Saptamina* published a rabidly anti-Semitic poem by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, who had written a similarly anti-Semitic article in 1980 as well. In 1984, one of the state publishing houses reprinted a 19th century work with strong anti-Semitic references. However, on some occasions President Ceausescu has responded to internal and external pressures to distance himself from these anti-Semitic occurrences.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

Romania's notorious austerity regime has attracted fascination and contempt from foreign observers. The regime has succeeded in cutting significantly its total foreign debt from over $10 billion in 1981 to $6.6 billion in 1985. The program reduces Romanian citizens to subsistence on minimal nourishment. Not only energy but food supplies and other necessities of life have been in very short supply, ever since imports of these products were curtailed sharply and rationing was instituted in 1980.

---

[4] [5] See footnotes on p. 233.

Energy "conservation" began in 1979, and energy use has been cut drastically since then. In 1982, domestic energy consumption was cut by 20 percent; it was cut by 50 percent the following year and again in January 1985. Domestic energy consumption in Romania in winter 1984–85 reached only one-fifth the 1981–82 amount. Yet energy supplies to industry were cut back officially for the first time only in 1985. In October 1985, President Ceausescu announced a state of emergency in Romania's powerplants and charged the military to take over that sector of the economy. Romanians live with ever decreasing light and heat. Teams of citizens watch their neighbors to ensure their compliance with the harshly reduced energy consumption.

In September 1983, authorities enacted a law termed the Global Agreement. The law eliminated guaranteed minimum wages. Now workers must sign a contract which amounts to a pledge of productivity. This pledge ties workers' salaries to the enterprises' production rather than their own productivity: salaries are lowered if production targets are not met.[6] Workers' livelihoods are dependent on the performance of entire enterprises.

Also, in the same year the regime instituted a wage system requiring workers to stay at a new job for at least 5 years or suffer financial consequences. During this time, the worker draws only half a salary (the other half is deposited in a state savings bank without interest; if the worker leaves the enterprise before the end of the 5-year period, he or she loses the savings as well as part of his or her pension.)[7]

Western analysts expected that the overall effect of the Global Agreement would be to bring down workers' real incomes. However, as expected, there has been no known protest against the agreement. The proposed goal of the new wage system was to enhance labor stability. But stability is severely threatened by other official measures to maximize proceeds earmarked to payoff the foreign debt.

In January 1984, Romanian authorities announced a program which squeezes the private agricultural sector to supplement the unsuccessful socialized agricultural sector to the greatest extent possible. Every private plot must produce a defined minimum quota. If farmers fail to comply with this stated quota they can lose their land to the socialized sector. The *Journal of Commerce* reported in November 1983 on "visible [Romanian] Government efforts" to bring people back to rural areas to work the land only shortly after having drained the countryside of manpower for huge industrial projects in the cities which cannot be operated profitably.[8]

In September 1985, President Ceausescu announced a new program to move some pensioners from big cities to rural areas. Reportedly, the program has not yet been initiated, but officials have been refusing permission to pensioners who seek to move to the city to live with their children.

---

[6] [7] [8] See footnotes on p. 233.

ETHNIC RIGHTS

Article 17 of the Romanian Constitution guarantees members of national minorities the same rights as other Romanians. In theory, minority members are assured "the free use of their mother tongue, as well as . . . books, periodicals, theater and education at all levels" in their own languages. Romanian practice of the past several years belies this theoretical safeguarding of minority rights.

The style as well as the focus of Ceausescu's campaign for legitimacy bode ill for the continued development of minority culture in Romania. His brand of rabid nationalism, which often is directed against the surrounding states and their populations, impinges directly on the ability of Romania's minority communities to transmit their culture and maintain communications with citizens of their ethnic homelands. They are increasingly unable to obtain education in minority languages and history from the elementary to the most advanced levels and to maintain contact with their ethnic homeland either through personal contacts, mail or exchanges of publications. Romania's educational and cultural policies reflect an attempt to assimilate the minorities into Romanian society and cut off expression of their ethnic heritage.

In August 1984, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly issued its "Report on the Situation of Minorities in Romania." That report stated, in part, "(M)inority groups in Romania often say that they live under a double burden: the burden of repression in a totalitarian state and the burden of discrimination stemming from Romanian chauvinism and 'Romanisation.' " [9]

Twelve percent of Romania's population of approximately 23 million are members of ethnic minorities. An estimated 1.7 to 2.4 million Romanian citizens are ethnic Hungarians; they are concentrated in Transylvania, a region long contested between Hungary and Romania, and constitute the largest minority group in Eastern Europe. The Germans, the second largest minority group with a homeland outside Romania, number between 270,000 and 363,000.

The regime has shifted populations of ethnic Romanians into heavily ethnic Hungarian cities and areas purportedly as part of the official campaign to maintain even economic development throughout the country. Hungarian high school and university courses and Hungarian-speaking professors are being replaced by Romanian courses and professors. Hungarian-language educational opportunities at Cluj University have been reduced sharply. In June 1985, the *London Times* reported that a new decree had been passed to limit the number of Hungarian-speaking students at the University of Cluj to 5 percent of the student population. Major library collections dealing with minority history have been made almost inaccessible to ethnic research scholars. Minority-language publications and other media have been merged, purportedly solely in the interests of conserving short supplies. One prominent ethnic Hungarian observer estimated in 1984 that the number of Hungarian-language books published in Romania had shrunk to one-third the number published in 1950.[10]

---

[9] [10] See footnotes on p. 233.

Several ethnic Hungarian political prisoners have been incarcerated in Romania since 1983. Erno Borbely, a school teacher, and Laszlo Buzas, an engineer, were sentenced to 6 years in prison for treason. Both men had protested the appearance of anti-Hungarian publications in 1982. Bela Pall, a retired school teacher, likewise has been imprisoned since 1983 on undisclosed charges. Amnesty International received reports that he was imprisoned for sending a letter to Romanian media requesting more Hungarian-language programming and for attending the funeral of prominent poet Gyula Illyes in Hungary. Allegedly he is being held in a psychiatric ward.

In the summer of 1984, Father Janos Csilik, a Roman Catholic priest in Oradea, was beaten for refusing to cooperate with the *Securitate.* Apparently the *Securitate* was investigating his relations with Attila Ara-Kovacs, an ethnic Hungarian Roman Catholic philosopher who had been one of the editors of the Transylvanian *samizdat* periodical, *Ellenpontok,* before his emigration to Hungary in 1983.

The most visible minority rights activist in Romania, ethnic Hungarian poet Geza Szocs, emigrated to the West in August 1986 after a long struggle with Romanian authorities. Szocs had been one of the editors of *Ellenpontok.* In 1984, he submitted a proposal to the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee pressing the regime to correct abuses of minority rights. Szocs also sent a memorandum to the United Nations suggesting creation of a subsidiary agency to protect minority rights and a letter of protest to the CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum in October 1985.

Ethnic Germans continue to emigrate in large numbers—ranging from about 11,500 to about 14,800 from 1982 through 1985—to the Federal Republic of Germany. As the German population in Romania decreases, the number and range of services to the community are diminishing. German-language as well as Hungarian-language schools are being closed down or turned over to Romanian-language teaching, and fewer German-language teachers are being trained. Likewise, German studies in Romania progressively are being curtailed. Television broadcasts both in German and Hungarian ceased as of December 1984. Romanian and German language radio programs have been reduced to 30 minutes each day. However, several German-language dailies continue to be published in Romania.

Eastern Europe's largest Gypsy population makes its home in Romania. Numbering about 500,000, Romanian Gypsies are not only an unassimilated national minority but also an underclass. No detailed reports of discrimination against Gypsies by Romanian authorities have been received. However, as elsewhere all over Europe, Gypsies encounter prejudice and mistrust on the part of the majority population.

ROMANIA AND THE CSCE PROCESS

The Romanian Government has a significant political stake in the Helsinki process, but perceives CSCE as a means of furthering foreign policy and trade objectives rather than as a commitment to respect and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of

its own people. Nevertheless, the CSCE process affords the United States and other Governments useful opportunities to raise human rights concerns with Romanian officials and to focus international attention on the continuing problems. The Madrid Review Meeting on the CSCE, for example, served as a major forum from which in early 1983 the United States and other Western Governments protested the Romanian education tax on prospective emigrants.

The second United States-Romanian bilateral human rights roundtable took place in Washington in February 1984, following up on the 1980 United States-Romanian human rights roundtable in Bucharest. The roundtable meeting took place in accordance with a provision of the Madrid Concluding Document urging that participating States voluntarily meet bilaterally "to discuss issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with an agreed agenda in a spirit of mutual respect." The topics discussed included freedom of religion and expression, rights of national minorities, rights of workers to establish and join free trade unions, free availability and exchange of information, cultural and educational exchanges, freedom to emigrate, and future human rights meetings in the CSCE process. They also focussed on concrete instances of treatment of prisoners of conscience, the appearance of anti-Semitic publications in Romania and harassment suffered by prospective emigrants. The 1984 roundtable played an important role in bilateral human rights diplomacy by signalling U.S. concerns to the Romanian authorities early on and focussing attention on Romanian human rights abuses well before the most-favored-nation status review season in the summer.

The Romanian delegations to three of the intermediary experts' meetings held since Madrid—at Ottawa, Budapest and Bern—have proved willing to meet frequently on a bilateral basis with the U.S. delegation to discuss both specific cases and broad principles. Just after the close of the Bern Meeting, the Romanian Government announced that 1,092 family reunification cases had been resolved in 2 months.

Soviet Union

INTRODUCTION

With Yuri Andropov's ascension to power in November 1982, repression against human rights activists intensified noticeably, and despite occasional cosmetic measures, has continued to this day.

New Soviet laws and regulations

In recent years, the Soviet Government has introduced a battery of repressive new laws and regulations. These new laws fly in the face of the Madrid Concluding Document pledge that domestic laws enhance human rights and fundamental freedoms. On the contrary, this wide range of repressive new Soviet laws is an important indicator that the Soviet Government does not take its Helsinki and Madrid human rights pledges seriously.

Definitions of such major categories of political "crimes" as "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" are broadened. Political prisoners are singled out for seemingly ever more strict controls,

before, during and after camp. These new laws sharply increase official Soviet penalties for independent views.

The Soviet population at large is reminded that unofficial contacts with foreigners are a risky business. The new law which sets heavy penalties for those who disclose to foreigners vaguely defined "work-related secrets" and the new regulations which penalize unauthorized acts of hospitality to foreigners make these risks abundantly clear.

The determination of Soviet authorities to eradicate dissent may be epitomized by a new law that allows courts to re-sentence dissidents in labor camps to new sentences for "repeated disobedience to the demands of camp authorities." At least eight human rights activists have thus been re-sentenced in camp over the reporting period.

Civil and political rights

The proclaimed "openness" policy of General Secretary Gorbachev has allowed Soviet citizens more leeway in criticizing isolated situations where economic and social performance have fallen short of proclaimed goals under "developed socialism." Nevertheless, critics—either from the left or right—who openly question the philosophical underpinnings of the Soviet economic system and the social problems it has engendered, continue to be repressed and imprisoned.

The best-known *samizdat* publication, the *Chronicle of Current Events,* apparently ceased publication in 1982. Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Andrei Sakharov remains in illegal exile in Gorky. There are presently 38 Helsinki monitors or members of associated groups in labor camp, prison, or internal exile. Conditions in the labor camps and prisons have worsened, and the reporting period saw the deaths of several well-known imprisoned human rights activists.

One of the most ominous developments over the reporting period in the authorities' treatment of human rights activists is an apparent decision to return to the use of physical force to discourage dissent, obtain confessions, and punish resisters in camp.

Although clearly not all deaths of dissidents or physical attacks on human rights activists on the street can be shown to be the work of the police and KGB, the strictures against physical abuse have been relaxed in favor of the attacker.

Cultural rights

Soviet cultural policy in the past few years seems to have followed the zigs and zags of the three Kremlin leaders. Yuri Andropov's brief rule saw a slight easing of cultural constraints. After all, Andropov was rumored to be an admirer of Yuri Lyubimov's famous experimental Taganka theater. Konstantin Chernenko, on the other hand, was an orthodox party man, and this orthodoxy was reflected in his cultural policies. Chernenko's brief tenure was characterized by a crackdown against "decadent" Western cultural influences, particularly in popular culture. Under Chernenko, Soviet cultural life regained the most stagnant features of the Brezhnev reign.

Mikhail Gorbachev seems to have taken his cultural cues from Andropov, as he presides over the limited liberalization of establishment culture. Signs of such tentative liberalization are: the staging of more lively plays, releasing previously banned films, and rejuvenating the leadership of Soviet artistic unions. Much of this may be part of Gorbachev's campaign for greater openness in Soviet society. An example is Gorbachev's unprecedentedly extensive—if misleading—reference to the existence of censorship in the U.S.S.R.

There are some indications that Soviet cultural policy may continue on a relatively liberal path: these include the recent elections in the Soviet Union of Writers and Union of Cinematographers; the softened official statements on Soviet artists who have opted to stay in the West; and the greater originality of recently released Soviet films and plays.

Despite these signs of modest liberalization, however, Soviet artists must play by the rules of the Soviet Party game. Evidence of this is all too easy to find: Dozens of Soviet cultural figures who have gone beyond official limits are now in prison. After all, the main aim of Soviet culture remains: to make official ideology more palatable to the Soviet population—not to open Soviet culture to genuine individual talent.

Social and economic rights

Soviet society has long suffered from major social ills—just as all societies do. Under Gorbachev's campaign for *glasnost* or publicity, the Soviet media has begun at least to discuss some of these problems. Alcoholism has been tackled as a major target of Gorbachev's efforts to increase efficiency. The price of vodka has been sharply increased. There is public pressure to imbibe less. Alcoholics and their families are urged to seek medical treatment.

Unlike other social and economic problems, alcoholism bears no ideological baggage. Other major Soviet problems, such as the inherently inefficient collectivized Soviet agriculture, are clearly connected to the Soviet political structure. Still other serious problems, such as increased mortality rates largely caused by deficient medical care, require increased funding. But increased funding for medicine, education, housing, or transport is impossible as long as the Soviet military sector takes up some 14 percent of the Soviet GNP.

The fate of Soviet citizens who independently have called attention to social, economic or labor problems remains grim. Organizers of independent labor unions have faced particularly harsh punishment which shows no sign of easing. Even Soviet war invalids who have asked for an improvement in their situation have not met with success. Ironically, many Soviet citizens currently are imprisoned for criticizing some of the same conditions which now the Soviet leadership is decrying.

National and ethnic rights

The nationality question has been described as the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. In the huge multi-national Soviet Union, tensions among national and ethnic groups are natural. Nevertheless, Soviet officials have usually portrayed the U.S.S.R. as a land of

perfect ethnic harmony and equality—though recent official Soviet writings on this issue are more candid, or at least acknowledge the complexity of the issue. But regardless of Soviet representations of the nationality question, Western scholars note that the official policy of the Soviet Government remains linguistic and cultural russification.

There are 103 nationalities represented in the 1979 all-union census, 22 of which have less than 1 million members, 49 with fewer than 100,000. Many of these ethnic minorities are Siberian peoples whose national cultures and languages were well on their way to extinction before the Bolshevik Revolution. Although the Soviet Government maintains regional ethnic museums, supports ethnic artistic ensembles, and devotes considerable energy to seminars and studies of ethnic minorities, their languages and cultures, one fact remains clear—ethnic heritage and culture is retained and promoted to the extent that the rule of Moscow is not threatened. Preserving the ethnic heritage of the approximately 13,000 Chukchis of Eastern Siberia presents no threat to the authorities' political hold on the Chukotsky Peninsula. Allowing 40 million Ukrainians the same leeway, with their rich cultural heritage and historical opposition to russification, is clearly not in Moscow's interest.

Religious rights

There has been no discernible improvement in the situation of religious believers in the Soviet Union since the last CSCE Implementation report. Continuing the post-1979 pattern, the rate of arrests of religious activists has doubled in recent years. According to Keston College, as of November 1986 there were 392 known religious prisoners of conscience in the U.S.S.R. Soviet laws on religion remain largely unchanged, despite a change in the legal status of religious groups as persons under the law. Discrimination against religious believers in daily life, accompanied by frequent attacks in the Soviet press, also continues.

The legal recognition that religious organizations are persons under Soviet law is a minor improvement which should ease their dealings with the Soviet authorities on some practical matters. Also, the Russian Orthodox Church has been granted better facilities in Moscow for holding conferences. In return, however, the Russian Orthodox hierarchy must be prepared to follow state dictates on matters of foreign and religious policies.

In the main, unfortunately, the situation of religious believers in the Soviet Union has not improved in recent years. In the post-1979 general crackdown on dissent of all kinds, Soviet religious believers have been imprisoned twice as often as previously. Whereas Soviet evangelical Protestants, particularly Baptists, are still arrested in large numbers, the Soviet authorities apparently have increased repression against Lithuanian Catholics and Russian Orthodox. More instances of Islamic *samizdat* and unofficial religious activity are now known in the West. Also in western Ukraine, a Ukrainian Catholic defense movement was organized for the first time. Although legalization of their church was one of its main demands, Soviet authorities continue to treat the Ukrainian Catholic Church as an outlaw.

NEW SOVIET LAWS AND REGULATIONS

In recent years, the Soviet Government has introduced a battery of repressive new laws and regulations. These new laws fly in the face of the Madrid Concluding Document pledge that domestic laws enhance human rights and fundamental freedoms. On the contrary, this wide range of repressive new Soviet laws is an important indicator that the Soviet Government does not take its Helsinki and Madrid human rights pledges seriously.

Definitions of such major categories of political "crimes" as "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" are broadened. Political prisoners are singled out for seemingly ever more strict controls, before, during and after camp. These new laws sharply increase penalties for independent views.

The Soviet population at large is reminded that unofficial contacts with foreigners are a risky business. The new law which sets heavy penalties for those who disclose to foreigners vaguely defined "work-related secrets" and the new regulations which penalize unauthorized acts of hospitality to foreigners make these risks abundantly clear.

On October 11, 1982, article 209 ("parasitism") RSFSR Criminal Code was amended to broaden its scope and to increase its penalties. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree now omits the word "systematic" from its description of the "parasitic way of life" for which a person is criminally liable. The maximum punishment for first offenses has been increased from 1 to 2 years, and for recividists up to 3 years. Furthermore, a new form of punishment has been introduced: people can now be sent to an educational labor colony. The conditions in such colonies are set by special unpublished regulations.[1]

These amendments to the "parasitism" law have special relevance for Soviet prisoners of conscience who may be charged for this "crime" and receive harsher sentences. At this point, there is no information available on any political prisoners who have been charged under this article.

One week after the Madrid Conference ended, the Russian Republic added to its criminal code article 188.3, "Malicious Disobedience of the Administration of Corrective Labor Institutions." Clearly violating Madrid Concluding Document precepts, this new law made prisoners' minor infractions of labor camp regulations a criminal offense.[2]

The decree, issued by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on September 13, 1983, allows administrators of corrective labor camps and other penal institutions to charge inmates with "malicious disobedience to its lawful demands." A precondition for culpability is that the inmate had already been in solitary confinement or transferred to a regular prison during the previous year. Conviction can carry a maximum term of 3 or 5 years if the offense was committed by an "especially dangerous recidivist or person convicted of a grave crime."

---

[1] [2] See footnotes on p. 234.

Article 188.3 is directed mainly at political and religious prisoners who engage in protest and other prohibited activities. Such prisoners are frequently punished for failure to "reform." Many actions, which earlier had resulted in solitary confinement or denial of mail or family visits, are now punished with new terms of imprisonment. Such actions include arguing with the camp administration, sending messages out of camp (political statements or reports on camp conditions) or engaging in collective protests. (See Penalties section for examples of application of article 188.3.)

Article 198.2, passed at the same time, makes persons sentenced to unconfined corrective labor or internal exile liable for up to 3 years of imprisonment for evading administrative surveillance or for failing to report on time to the designated area of residence after release from confinement. Both articles came into force on October 1, 1983.

The incorporation of labor camp infractions into the Criminal Code puts inmates more at the mercy of camp commanders. The camp administration can now add a new term to a prisoner's sentence merely by initiating criminal charges, submitting a report on insubordination to the local prosecutor's office, and providing testimony at the trial. Thus, this new article provides authorities with a streamlined legal procedure (camp inmates no longer have to be summoned as witnesses) for adding a new term to prisoners' original sentences.

These two new laws provide for additional sentences for minor infractions. Previously, such infractions had been punished by solitary confinement, without the addition of new terms. In effect, these laws revive the Stalinist practice of creating a category of "Eternal Prisoners" subject to repeated re-sentencing. Prisoners of conscience who do not recant—and they are in the majority—are particularly liable for punishment under these two new articles.

In January 1984, the Soviet Government, then headed by Yuri Andropov, amended a law to tighten already harsh rules of order in the camps. Article 14.1 or "Actions Serving to Disorganize the Work of the Corrective Labor Organizations" was first passed in May 1961 to control the activities of professional criminals in the camps.

As amended on January 11, 1984, the law is now directed at political prisoners. A new paragraph specifies punishment of 3 to 8 years of imprisonment for "persons" (rather than "especially dangerous recidivists") charged with acts of terrorism. The amendment is probably intended to protect informers from reprisals by camp inmates and to punish prisoners for solidarity actions or organized opposition (joint protests, hunger strikes, written declarations) to the camp authorities.

Another action, which restricts the residence rights of political prisoners, was undertaken by the Soviet Government. According to Malva Landa, a Moscow Helsinki Group member, the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers passed Secret Decree No. 736 on August 6, 1985. This decree bars from entry into Moscow and most towns in the Moscow area everyone refused a Moscow residence permit, including those denied this permit due to a previous conviction, and those tried for a previous offense, regardless of whether they have the right to acquire a Moscow residence permit. Only in emergen-

cies, such as a death in the family, may special permission to visit Moscow be granted by the local office of internal affairs.[3]

Other important amendments to Soviet laws on "state crimes" were passed in January 1984. The decree with these revisions to the December 25, 1958 law "On Criminal Liability for Crimes Against the State," was signed by Andropov on January 11, 1984. It strengthened and broadened provisions on treason, sabotage, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and the transmittal of "work-related secrets" and economic data to foreigners.

The definition of "treason" was broadened to include acts threatening "state security." This change permits almost any political offender to be charged with treason, given vague Soviet definitions. The punishment of up to 15 years imprisonment plus 5 years exile or death remains unchanged.

Sabotage now includes any act "aimed at the mass destruction of people, the causing of bodily harm, or any other harm to health." While the charge of sabotage now appears applicable to aircraft hijackings which result in deaths, to political terrorism, or to responsibility for disasters, including major environmental pollution, the potential exists for abuse under this broad definition—as it was abused in the Stalin period. The penalty remains the same as for treason.

Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (the preparation, dissemination or possession of anti-Soviet literature) has been broadened to include "materials . . . in written, printed, or other form." This new formulation may permit the prosecution of the author or owner of any written or reproduced material, object or art form deemed "anti-Soviet" by the authorities. Now, mere possession of such material may be deemed sufficient grounds for prosecution.

At the same time, article 70 was amended to punish more severely (with camp terms of up to 15 rather than 12 years) people who have ties to foreign organizations or those "acting in the interests of such organizations." The new language can be applied against any Soviet citizen who receives support from abroad: independent writers who get payments from foreign publishers; beneficiaries of the Russian Social Fund to Aid Political Prisoners and Their Families; and refuseniks or religious believers who receive support from abroad.

The definition of state secret has also been expanded. "The Transmission of Information Constituting a Work-Related Secret to Foreign Organizations" (article 13.1), a new Criminal Code article introduced in January 1984, now includes the new notion of "work-related secrets." The "transmission or collection, with the aim of transmission to foreign organizations or their representatives, of economic, scientific-technical, or other information constituting a work-related secret by a person to whom this information was entrusted owing to service or work or to whom the information became known in any other way," may now be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment or up to 2 years correctional work. Similar actions resulting in significant material damage to state or social organizations may by punished by up to 8 years of imprisonment.

[3] See footnote on p. 234.

64-639 O - 87 - 5

Since other articles on state secrets were left in place, it seems clear that the intent of the new law was to discourage unofficial contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners.

Article 13.1 reflects the traditional Soviet view that all information about the U.S.S.R. is a state secret unless it has been officially approved for release. This law applies equally to foreign diplomats, journalists, professors and business representatives in the Soviet Union to prevent contacts with Soviet citizens. The definition of "work-related secret" is so vague that anyone having contact with a foreigner might be liable. Furthermore, this law may serve as a convenient justification for denial of exit visas to those who have had access to such "secrets."

Another Soviet legal decree issued in 1984 also aims at discouraging contacts between foreigners and Soviet citizens. This decree, "Rules for Stay in the U.S.S.R. by Foreign Citizens or Stateless Persons," was issued on May 25, 1984 and was to go into effect on July 1.

The decree sets fines of 10–50 rubles for Soviet citizens who provide foreigners with "housing or means of transportation . . . or other services in violation of the established regulations. . . ." As is true of many other Soviet laws, the decree does not explain a reference to "established regulations." The ostensible purpose of the decree is to discourage Soviet citizens from inviting foreigners to spend the night in their homes without the required registration with the authorities or providing foreigners with other services, such as the use of a car or assistance in buying train or plane tickets.

As can be seen from these extensive revisions of a broad range of Soviet laws, the Soviet Government is far from heeding its Helsinki and Madrid pledges. In fact, these laws—which affect both political prisoners and ordinary Soviet citizens—are an important and incontrovertible indication of Soviet governmental intentions.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act calls for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. These freedoms include the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. In the Madrid Concluding Document, the signatory states further pledge to promote and encourage the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms.

The principles of the Helsinki accords are basically reiterated in the Soviet Constitution of 1977 (article 29). Soviet spokesmen also claim that there is a continuing effort by their Government to expand human rights for Soviet citizens. With regard specifically to civil and political rights, article 50 of the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to "speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations." But article 50 is also prefaced by a phrase that limits its guarantees: "In correspondence with the national interest, and with the goal of strengthening and *developing the socialistic system* . . ." (emphasis ours) This caveat does not precede the other "rights" proclaimed by the Soviet Constitution: the right to work, health care, vacations, old-age security, etc. In

effect, there are no rights for anyone whose "speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations" can be judged by the authorities to threaten the Socialist system, that is, the rule of the Kremlin.

Among the laws most frequently employed by Soviet authorities to combat the effective exercise of civil and political rights are: article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (with corresponding laws for the 14 other Republics) concerning "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda;" article 190-1 on "dissemination of slander against the Soviet political and social system;" and article 190-3 on "illegal assembly." Other laws, while not specifically targeted against civil and political liberties, are also employed to repress their exercise. These include: "resisting lawful authority," "infringing on the life of a police officer or voluntary police auxiliary," "violation of the passport system," "violation of the rules of administrative surveillance," "hooliganism (disorderly conduct)," "parasitism" and possession of drugs or firearms, to name but a few.

Soviet Helsinki groups

By September 1982, Soviet authorities had succeeded in repressing the public activities of the five independent Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups that were formed after the signing of the accords, along with most of the activities of affiliated groups that dealt with specific human rights concerns. This has not prevented many members from continuing their protests from behind barbed wires and prison walls.

As of December 1986, there were 38 members of Helsinki monitoring groups imprisoned in the Soviet Union and Lithuania (see Appendix). The latest monitors to be sentenced were Tenghiz Gudava and Emmanuel Tvaladze, members of the renascent Georgian Helsinki group. The Georgian group had been founded in January 1977, but was soon forced into inactivity by repression and arrests. The group reorganized in 1984 and issued three or four documents. Gudava and Tvaladze were also members of the "Phantom" musical group which had attempted to organize a concert in honor of the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting of spring 1984. Tried in June 1986 on "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" charges, Gudava received 7 years strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile; Tvaladze, 5 years strict regime camp and 3 years exile. Other members of the group sentenced since the last reporting period included Tenghiz Gudava's brother, Eduard, who was sentenced to 4 years in labor camp in November 1985 for "hooliganism" as a result of his attempts to emigrate. Valentina Pailodze, was sentenced on May 25, 1983 to 8 years strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile for "giving bribes." Merab Kostava, who had been sentenced in 1981 to 5 years for "hooliganism" while in camp, was re-sentenced in June 1985 to 2 more years camp for "repeated disobedience of the demands of camp authorities." Two members of the Georgian group, the brothers Isai and Grigory Goldshtein, were allowed to emigrate in early 1986.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group lost three of its members serving labor camp terms in the "special regime" zone of Perm Camp No. 36. Oleksy Tykhy died of malnutrition in May

1984, Yuri Lytvyn apparently committed suicide in late August 1984, and Vasyl Stus' succumbed to poor health and deplorable camp conditions in September 1985. Moscow Helsinki Monitor Anatoly Marchenko died at Chistopol Prison in early December 1986. Joseph Zisels, one of the few Ukrainian monitors at liberty when the previous report was published, was sentenced in April 1985 to 3 years strict regime camp for "dissemination of slander against the Soviet political and social system." A few days prior to his release from camp, Mykola Horbal was re-sentenced to 8 years in strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Another Ukrainian monitor arrested shortly before release from camp and sentenced anew is Olha Heyko, who received 3 years strict regime in November 1983 for "dissemination of slander." In a sign of solidarity with their fellow political prisoners, Lithuanian monitor Viktoras Petkus and Estonian human rights activist Mart Niklus joined the Ukrainian group in 1983. Niklus was transferred by court ruling in 1983 from the political prisoners' camp at Perm to the more arduous conditions of the Chistopol Prison. The Ukrainian newspaper "Prikarpatskaya Pravda" published a supposed recantation by Father Vasily Romanyuk in February 1983. Two other Ukrainian monitors, Ivan Sokulsky and Oles Berdnyk, recanted in 1984.

One of the three remaining Moscow Helsinki Monitors at liberty when the previous report was published, Dr. Elena Bonner, was sentenced to 5 years internal exile for "dissemination of slander against the Soviet political and social system" in August 1984. She was exiled to the city of Gorky, where her husband, the well-known human rights activist and Nobel Laureate, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, has been exiled since January 1980. Dr. Bonner was permitted to visit the West for 6 months in early 1986 for medical treatment. Just prior to her release date in May 1985, Tatyana Osipova was arrested in camp and re-sentenced to 5 years strict regime camp for "repeated violation of the demands of camp administrators. (Article 188-3). Helsinki Monitor and former political prisoner Vyacheslav Bakhmin was arrested for "hooliganism" in March 1985 and sentenced to a year's corrective labor without confinement but with a 20 percent reduction in pay. After having served almost 9 years of a 13-year sentence, Anatoly Shcharansky was exchanged on February 11, 1986 for four East Europeans being held in the United States on espionage charges.

The founder of the Armenian Helsinki Group, Eduard Arutyunyan, died while serving a camp term for "dissemination of slander," having been arrested in November 1982. Another Armenian monitor, Shagen Arutyunyan, was allowed to emigrate in 1985.

Ona Lukauskaite-Poskiene, the only member of the Lithuanian Helsinki group whom the authorities had allowed to remain at liberty (probably due to her advanced age), passed away in December 1983. Also in December 1983, Eitan Finkelstein, a founding member who reportedly resigned from the group in 1979, emigrated to Israel.

After the Lithuanian Helsinki Group was forced into inactivity by Soviet authorities, much of its work was continued by the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers. Founded in 1978, "the committee became a highly effective forum for dissent in Lith-

uania," issuing 53 documents, the last one dated January 31, 1983. Two of its most outspoken members, Fathers Alfonsas Svarinskas and Sigitas Tamkevicius, were sentenced in 1983 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Svarinskas was given 7 years strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile, while Tamkevicius received 6 years camp and 4 years exile. Father Vaclovas Stakenas, was physically attacked by unknown assailants on August 22, 1985. Another member, Father Juozas Zdebskis, died under suspicious circumstances in an auto accident in February 1986. In April 1984, the Chronicle of the Catholic Church reported that the Committee had officially gone underground. As of this writing, only three known members remain at liberty.

The Initiative Group for the Rights of the Disabled, another group affiliated with the Helsinki Monitors, continued to put out documents on behalf of handicapped persons in the Soviet Union as late as December 1985. One of its members, Vasily Pervushin—seriously wounded in World War II—was placed under involuntary psychiatric detention for an indefinite term in November 1983.

Two members of the Working Commission on Psychiatric Abuse remain in confinement. One of them, Anatoly Koryagin, was resentenced in November 1985 to an additional 2 years labor camp for alleged "resistance to camp authority." Irina Grivnina, another member of the Working Commission, was allowed to emigrate to The Netherlands in November 1985.

September 1982 saw the establishment of the Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church, a Helsinki-affiliated group devoted to securing legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church. The official position of the Soviet Government is that the Ukrainian Catholic Church is "nonexistent in our country." As of 1986, the group had released at least 10 documents describing repression not only of Ukrainian Uniates, but of members of other denominations as well.

In April 1986, it was reported that an "Estonian Helsinki Group" had released its first document. It is said to contain demands that nuclear arms be abolished, troops be removed from foreign soil, and political prisoners be released.

Anatoly Cherkasov, who attempted to found a Helsinki Monitoring Group in Shevchenko in 1977, has been periodically placed in psychiatric hospitals over the reporting period (August 1984-January 1983, late 1984, and July 1985). He is apparently at liberty at this writing.

In Voronezh, RFSFR, three persons were sentenced to up to 3 years labor camp in mid-1982 for distributing strike literature signed by the "Voronezh Helsinki Committee."

Independent peace groups

The "Group to Establish Trust Between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A." continues to exist fitfully, though it is repressed and depleted by forced emigration. It is kept partially afloat by support from disarmament groups in the West, and by the determination of its members to eschew open political confrontation with the authorities. As the number of supporters has grown, the "Group for Trust" has issued appeals for support of fellow pacifists abroad, invitations to visit Moscow, and messages to international organiza-

tions. Besides the original Moscow group, documents also emerged from similar organizations in Odessa and Akademgorodok. The group's opening "Appeal to the Governments and People of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A." of June 4, 1982 was signed by 89 persons. By May 1983, according to founder Batovrin, the group consisted of 16 members and 900 sympathizers in 12 Soviet cities. At approximately the same time, a group of younger pacifists calling itself "Free Initiative" had issued an appeal to American young people calling upon them to support unofficial contacts between average citizens of the two countries. Two years later, there were "Trust Groups" in Leningrad, Riga, Tallinn, Rybinsk, Gorky, Novosibirsk and Odessa.

In response to virulent criticism of its work, the group asserts that it never criticized, but "has rather supported the Government's peace initiatives and has never violated any Soviet laws." Nevertheless, the Soviet Government's approach to the independent peace initiative has been to label the group's activities as "provocative," and to crack down with measures ranging from petty harassment in most cases to severe repression. Grigory Lokshin, secretary of the official Soviet Peace Committee, has referred to independent peace marchers in the Soviet Union as "drunks, anti-socials, provocateurs working for the CIA." In July 1984, Evgeny Silin, deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, told a disarmament assembly in Italy that "public opinion and official opinion are the same in our society. They are always the same. We have ways of establishing this link." Some members, including Batovrin, have been expelled from the country or allowed to emigrate. Others have received 15-day jail sentences on trumped-up "hooliganism" charges, compulsory psychiatric confinement, or lengthy prison camp sentences.

As popular support for the movement widened, independent "peaceniks" attempted to gather signatures from sympathetic Soviet citizens on the street. In one particularly notable case, five independent activists collected 300 signatures in May 1984 calling upon the Governments of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to resume arms talks. As a result, they were picked up by the police and taken to a local police station. Four were detained until midnight and one sentenced to 15 days for "hooliganism." For attempting to help organize a "peace march" in August 1984 to commemorate the victims of Hiroshima, long-time human rights activist Kirill Popov was placed in a psychiatric facility for 3 months, and in the following year received 6 years strict regime camp and 5 years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." One week later, when around 50 members of the group met to hold a seminar on Hiroshima Day, it was broken up with a comment by police that "We'll create such a Hiroshima for you that you'll envy the victims of Hiroshima." When two other pacifist groups, "Independent Initiative" and "The Group of Good Will," staged anti-nuclear and pacifist demonstrations totaling around 500 persons in three separate Moscow locations on June 1, 1984, not only were several demonstrators detained by police, but also some passers-by. One year earlier, when a similar demonstration was held in Tsaritsino Park, about 200 persons were detained by the police.

Following the 1983 demonstration, the "Independent Initiative" founder Yuri Popov was placed in psychiatric confinement, and as of March 1985, was reported to be at the Special Psychiatric Hospital in Smolensk. Another member of Independent Initiative, Yuri Troyansky, was also placed under psychiatric care, and subjected to sulfazine treatment as a form of punishment.

Olga Medvedkova and her husband Yuri have been active members of the "Group for Trust" since its inception. In August 1982, they hosted an art exhibit in memory of the victims of Hiroshima featuring 88 works by Sergei Batovrin. The exhibit was raided by the KGB and the paintings confiscated. In May 1983, when Olga Medvedkova accompanied four British women anti-nuclear activists to a meeting with representatives of the official peace committee in Moscow, the latter became enraged and called Ms. Medvedkova's presence a "provocation" and "unfriendly act." Ms. Medvedkova was eventually (December 1983) brought up on charges of "threats or violence against a representative of authority" in connection with her attempt to attend the trial of another Trust Group member, Oleg Radzinsky. She was convicted in March 1984, and given a suspended sentence of 2½ years. On June 22, 1985, four women from the Greenham Common encampment were blocked by Soviet police from entering the Medvedkovs' apartment while visiting the Soviet Union. On the eve of the 27th Communist Party Congress in February 1986, Yuri Medvedkov wrote an appeal to that body calling for the following resolutions: (a) on the impropriety of crushing peaceful initiatives by ordinary citizens with the club of authority and (b) on the harm caused by police stupidity—"their blind obedience which undermines (our country's) peace policy by declaring the ideals of the "Trust Group" to be prohibited. . . ." Further in his message, Medvedkov describes one of the myriad incidents of physical violence perpetrated by the authorities against peace activists:

> N.G. Kovalenko, a woman artist, was savagely beaten the evening of 4 February 1986 right in front of my wife and me, on the stair landing outside our apartment. We saw Kovalenko attacked, about 9:15 p.m., by four people in civilian clothes and one uniformed policeman on duty whom they summoned. Kovalenko was flung up against the wall and knocked to the floor and then yanked bodily into the elevator, over our protests. As she told us later, those in civilian clothes pounded her head against the wall in the (police station) room. As a result, N.G. Kovalenko spent 7 days in Botkinskaya Hospital where she was brought with a brain concussion.

In June 1986, the Medvedkovs were fired from their jobs at the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Science. When they attempted to protest against this action publicly, they were detained by police. During the July 1986 "Good Will" games in Moscow, Yuri Medvedkov was arrested and sentenced to a brief jail term for "hooliganism." The Medvedkovs have since been allowed to emigrate to the West.

Another member of the group, Alexandr Shatravka, was released from labor camp in June 1986 and allowed to emigrate, apparently

as a result of protests on his behalf by anti-war activists in the West. Shatravka, who had sought to emigrate for several years and spent 6 years in psychiatric confinement for his efforts, had been arrested (along with a fellow worker named Vladimir Mishchenko) in 1982 in Tyumen Oblast for collecting signatures under the "Appeal" of the Trust Group. He was sentenced to 3 years for "dissemination of slander," and an additional 2½ years for alleged drug possession while in camp in January 1985.

In mid-September 1986, another independent peace activist and political prisoner, Dr. Vladimir Brodsky, was released from prison and allowed to leave for the West. Brodsky is a founding member of the "Trust Group" and a refusenik who was sentenced on August 15, 1985 in Moscow to 3 years labor camp for "malicious hooliganism" and for allegedly beating up several members of the voluntary auxiliary police.

Larisa Chukaeva, wife of social-democrat political prisoner Alexandr Chukaeva, had been conducting "duplicate" peace seminars in her apartment for young persons who had been denied access by police to the regular seminars. As a result, custody of her 3-year-old child was taken from her by court order, and she was subsequently sentenced to 3 years labor camp in May 1986 for "dissemination of slander." In late December 1986, Chukaeva was unexpectedly released, according to a fellow peace activist in Moscow.

Compulsory psychiatric confinement has been widely applied to independent peace activists. Olga Kabanova and Natalya Atyulyonok were placed in a psychiatric hospital in May 1985; Kabanova was subjected to medical treatment. Viktor Smirnov was placed under compulsory psychiatric care on January 30, 1986, and held there until late March. According to Amnesty International he was again detained and sent to a psychiatric facility about 1 month later, where he apparently remains at this writing. In addition, Irina Pankratova, Anetta Fadeeva, and Nina Kovalenko have been confined to psychiatric facilities over various periods of time in 1986. In one case, Kovalenko was sent for "a checkup" when she and four representatives of the Western peace movement were handing out leaflets in Moscow's Gorky Park on measures for protection against nuclear radiation. On September 25, 1986 she was forcibly committed for protesting the arrest of Nicholas Daniloff. In January 1987, Kovalenko was allowed to emigrate to the West. Numerous other members of the Moscow "Group to Establish Trust" have been thrown in jail for short terms, placed under virtual house arrest by police blockades, subjected to fines, apartment raids, etc.

Several Soviet political prisoners have been implicated for their support for the "Group of Trust." This means that they might have signed the group's appeals, met with members, possessed group documents confiscated during searches, or committed other acts considered sympathetic to the group. Vadim Yankov was arrested and sentenced to 4 years labor camp, 3 years internal exile 1 week after he had signed the group's "Appeal" in June 1982. Aleksandr Vorona was arrested in 1983 in Novosibirsk in connection with his distribution of the "Group of Trust's" documents and placed in psychiatric confinement, where he remains. Lydia Latsis-Doronina, a Latvian human rights activist, was arrested in January 1983 for

distribution of the group's proposals in Riga and received 5 years strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile. Another well-known Latvian peace advocate, Mikhail Bombin of Riga, signatory of the initial "Group of Trust" document and organizer of several pacifist meetings and appeals in Latvia (in 1978, he was one of the organizers of a pilgrimage to Yasnaya Polyana on the 150th birthday of Lev Tolstoy) was declared "responsible" by the Serbsky Institute, and sentenced to 2 years correctional labor in August 1986. Long time human rights activist, Vladimir Gershuni was arrested in June 1982, shortly after he signed the "Trust Group's" opening appeal, and is currently confined to the Special Psychiatric Hospital in Alma-Ata.

Another group with a pacifist profile is a group of Baltic activists who called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Baltic States in a petition dated October 10, 1981. The final paragraph of the document states:

> We hope that the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers will be able to guarantee the ban on nuclear weapons in the nuclear-free zone in North Europe, including the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries. Such a ban on nuclear weapons in the one area would be an important step towards the fulfillment of the greatest expectation of mankind—A COMPLETE DISARMAMENT.

Of the 38 signatories of that document, 5 were arrested in 1983 and received long sentences. One of the five, Ints Calitis of Riga, Latvia was unexpectedly released from the political prisoners' labor camp in Perm on July 4, 1986 and allowed to return to his home in Riga. The remainder of his prison status is not clear (he was scheduled to be released in April 1989).

Some of the Estonian signatories of the Baltic nuclear-free zone petition may have been among the compilers of a message from an Estonian group, "Neutral and Nuclear-Free Balticum," which was addressed to the participants of the Stockholm CDE. The document related the history of the Soviet-occupied Baltics and called upon the CDE to: 1) declare the observation of human rights as a precondition for international confidence and security; 2) demand release of Estonian political prisoners; 3) create a Baltic nuclear-free zone; and 4) consider the issue of Baltic de-colonization at the next Helsinki follow-up conference.

"Socialist" groups

In July 1986, the West learned of a "manifesto" allegedly published by high-ranking party officials calling themselves the Movement for Socialist Renewal. Such "manifestos" and socialist "oppositionist groups"—while not claiming nomenklatura parentage—emerge fairly frequently on the dissident and samizdat horizon. Theoretically, socialist groups would enjoy a greater measure of legal protection from the Soviet state, inasmuch as they are striving to strengthen and defend socialism as prescribed by the Soviet Constitution. However, this has not been the case. Since 1982, the West has learned of the repression of at least two socialist groups. Sometime late in 1979 or early 1980, the KGB became aware of a "socialist group," and called in about half a dozen suspected par-

ticipants for interrogation. By November 1982, most of those implicated had been coerced into refuting their activities, and were released upon signing statements to that effect. One participant, however, Mikhail Rivkin, refused to capitulate and received 7 years strict regime camp and 5 years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" in July 1983. Another, Igor Kondrashov, was last reported to be confined to a psychiatric hospital.

In late 1983, a *samizdat* publication by a "Marxist-Research Group 68 80" discussed "the Electoral System in the U.S.S.R. and the Moral-Political Unity of Soviet Society."

In December 1984, a group that called itself "Mensheviks" was charged by authorities with attempting to establish a social-democratic party. While one of the leaders, Vyacheslav Demin, reportedly repented, another member, Alexander Chukayev, was sentenced to 7 years camp, and 5 years internal exile following his arrest in February 1985.

Amnesty International

The activities of the Moscow branch of Amnesty International have been completely curtailed due to pressure from the authorities. The last known leader of the group, Georgy Vladimov, was given a choice in May 1983 to "go East or West." He chose the latter and left on May 26, 1983. In an interview with the Helsinki Commission in April 1984, Vladimov stated that:

> . . . the regime could not tolerate us. We received our orders from London Amnesty International headquarters. We could not register officially as an organization. The regime did everything in its power to stop us in our seemingly innocuous activities. . . . The Soviet Post Office held letters from 6 to 12 months, and by the time we received the mail in response, it was no longer timely. . . . When I left, many were awaiting further persecutions and arrests.
>
> The question now stands whether to continue the Amnesty Group or do as the Helsinki Group . . . my friends are active people of conscience who are committed to continuing the struggle for human rights. The threat of repression will not stop them. They will seek other ways of working.

Another former AI activist, Vladmir Albrekht, was arrested in April 1983 and given a 3-year camp sentence for "dissemination of slander. . . ." In February 1986, he received another 3½ years for "malicious hooliganism." Father Sergei Zheludkov, a respected Russian Orthodox theologian and founding member of the Moscow branch of Amnesty International, died of natural causes in February 1984.

"Right to Emigration" group

Since publication of the last report, there has been little organized activity by the Right to Emigrate group, although individual adherents, most of whom are Pentecostals, continue to seek the right to emigrate. The group's leader, Vasily Barats, was sentenced in March 1983 to 5 years strict regime labor camp. His wife, Galina, who actively supported her husband and his work, was

tried 3 months later and sentenced to 6 years strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile. According to Lubarsky's "News from the U.S.S.R.," membership in the "Right to Emigration" group constituted part of the charges against three Pentecostals, Adam Zarivny, Semyon Dudyenko, and Tamara Shved, during their trial in Ternopol, UkSSR, in December 1983. Zarivny received 3 years strict regime camp; Dudyenko, 1½ years general regime, and Shved, 2 years general regime, suspended for 1 year due to the recent birth of her child.

Samizdat and tamizdat

In June 1982, mathematician Vladimir Golovach was told by KGB agents that they intended to abolish all *samizdat* and "all supplies of anti-Soviet literature." One month previously, Yuri Andropov had officially resigned as head of the KGB and assumed his position in the Central Committee Secretariat. Although *samizdat* ("the backbone of the human rights movement" according to exiled Moscow Helsinki monitor, Ludmilla Alexeyeva) continues to be produced in the Soviet Union, the amount of such literature reaching the West has declined in comparison to that of the halcyon days of the human rights activity in the mid-1970's. The *Chronicle of Current Events* which was issued anonymously from 1968–82, has apparently not been reestablished. The West continues to receive occasional issues of the independent labor union SMOT *Information Bulletin,* the publications of the Initiative Group for the Rights of the Handicapped, and sporadic individual pieces, such as trial transcripts, accounts of religious and national repression, descriptions of official corruption, etc. In 1985, three issues of the "+" Bulletin, *+26, +27, +28,* similar to the *Chronicle* and *Bulletin "V"* format, reached the West.

A corollary to the *samizdat* phenomenon is the reproduction and distribution of "tamizdat" literature—published abroad, from the Russian word "tam" meaning "there." One of the most widely circulated pieces of tamizdat, Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago," began its existence as *samizdat* while the author was still living in the Soviet Union. A new form of underground literature is "magnitizdat," which includes songs, lectures, speeches, and radio broadcasts, on tape. Magnitizdat takes many forms, one of the most widespread being the taping of foreign radio broadcasts. In most cases, the possession of *samizdat,* tamizdat or magnitizdat is construed by Soviet courts as "dissemination of slander." or "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," depending on the nature of the material, and offenders are severely punished.

In early 1983, a new samizdat publication reached the West, entitled *"Ekspress-informatsiya, Bulletin V"* (issues 94/95, 96, 102, 104, and 105). Similar to the *Chronicle of Current Events, Bulletin "V"* contained information on trials, arrests, sentences and conditions in camp, along with essays on political topics and letters from prisoners. In April 1983, Viktor Yanenko was sentenced to 7 years strict labor camp and 5 years internal exile, reportedly for editing and distributing the SMOT *Bulletin.* In May 1983, human rights activist Aleksei Smirnov was tried under article 170, "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," for allegedly disseminating *Bulletin "V"* and helping compile issue No. 38 of the *Chronicle of Current*

Events. He was sentenced to 6 years strict regime camp and 4 years internal exile. In October 1983, Sergei Grigoryants was tried on charges of compiling and editing 10 issues of *Bulletin "V"* and sentenced to 7 years strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile. Yuri Shikhanovich received 5 years strict regime labor camp and 5 years internal exile in September 1984 for his involvement in producing the *Chronicle of Current Events*.

December 1983 saw the appearance of a new *samizdat* publication, *"The Herald of the Human Rights Movement,"* carrying the basic format and contents of the *Chronicle of Current Events*. Also, the first issue of a new issue of Jewish *samizdat*, the *Leningrad Jewish Almanac*, appeared in the West in late 1984. It was dated September 1982.

As mentioned in connection with the Ukrainian Action Group for the Rights of Believers and the church, another major entry into the *samizdat* scene was the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*, which first appeared in early 1984. The 10th and last issue of the *Chronicle* refers in its title to the "Church in the Catacombs," but it is a continuation of reports on the state of the Catholic Church in Ukraine and the overall human rights picture. One of the issues of the *Chronicle* carries a detailed account of the KGB's attempts to persuade Joseph Terelya to abandon his dissident activity on behalf of the church. An earlier issue contains Terelya's account of his family's association with Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, his subsequent arrest by Soviet authorities, and Terelya's claims of Soviet complicity in Wallenberg's disappearance. Another samizdat publication concerning Ukrainian Uniates and human rights in Ukraine is the *Herald of the Ukrainian Catholic Church*, which is apparently connected with the Ukrainian *Chronicle*.

Soviet-occupied Lithuania continues to yield regular editions of samizdat, although the volume reaching the West has, like its counterparts in other areas of the Soviet Union, declined considerably. Even the usually accessible *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* has had difficulty in reaching the West (67 issues as of July 1986). One of the charges that resulted in a 7-year camp and 5-year internal exile sentence for Father Tamkevicius (see Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers) was his participation in publishing and circulating the *Chronicle*. The 48th issue of the well-known fixture of Lithuanian samizdat "Ausra" took more than 1 year to reach the West. Nevertheless, a new samizdat publication, *Juventus Academica* (Academic Youth) reached the West in August 1984, purporting to be the voice of a newly established Lithuanian Youth Association. Among other things, the group called for nullification of the Helsinki accords, in view of Soviet lack of compliance.

The Council for Baptist Prisoners' Relatives continues to issue its *Bulletin* (as of July 1986, around 130 issues had been produced), providing documentation of arrests, trials, and other forms of persecution against Baptists in the U.S.S.R. It also publishes the *Herald of Truth*, which is devoted mainly to religious themes. Another leading source of "underground" Baptist material is the "Khristianin" printing press, a makeshift, mobile enterprise that publishes Bibles and hymn books. A "Khristianin" printing press

was discovered and destroyed in 1984 in Issyk, Alma-Ata region. At that time, 30,000 Bibles and 3 tons of unused paper were confiscated. For their part in this endeavor, Ivan Steffen, and the brothers Andrei and Egor Volf, received 5 years each labor camp. In the Moldavian village of Staraya Obrezha, six Baptist underground printers were arrested in October 1985. Following conviction in May 1986, Andrei Borinsky, Zinaida Tarasova, Natalya Shevchenko, and Anna and Yelena Yanushevskaya were sentenced to 3 years labor camp. The sixth, Lyubov Ivashchenko, received 2½ years. As of July 1986, six of these underground Baptist printing presses had been uncovered by authorities, and almost 100 persons were jailed as a result.

Possession of *samizdat* played a large part in the trial of Valentin Novoseltsev, a metal worker, whose apartment had been searched in connection with the *samizdat* literary journal *Poiski.* During the search, police confiscated Milovan Djilas' *The New Class*, a photocopy of Zinovev's *Yawning Heights*, and 10 of Novoseltsev's own stories. Investigators also attempted to link Novoseltsev with disseminaton of the *Chronicle of Current Events*. Eventually Novoseltsev was indicted for disseminating *The New Class*, two novels by Zinovyev, and Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*. He was sentenced to 5 years strict regime camp and 5 years internal exile. When Ukrainian Helsinki monitor and Jewish cultural activist Josef Zisels was tried in April 1985, among the charges was that he possessed, "for the purpose of circulating," books that had been published abroad.

In July 1983, Margarita Klimova was sentenced to 8 months strict regime camp (which she had served in pre-trial detention) and 4 years internal exile, for allegedly having circulated 39 books of *samizdat* and tamizdat publication. Valery Senderov, a SMOT activist and member of NTS (an nationalist anti-Soviet organization with headquarters in the Federal Republic of Germany), was sentenced in February 1983 to 7 years strict regime camp and 5 years internal exile for, among other charges, authorship of and circulating *samizdat* articles and statements. Authorship of an "Address to the Workers of the World" resulted in a sentence of 7 years strict regime camp and 5 years internal exile for Ukrainian worker Klim Semenyuk in 1985. As is frequently the case, Semenyuk's apartment in Kiev had been searched "in connection with another case." Among the items confiscated were documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, later characterized by the prosecuting attorney's office as anti-Soviet and slanderous. In March 1983, poet Irina Ratushinskaya of Kiev was tried for having written anti-Soviet poems and distributing them in typescript form. Her sentence was 7 years strict regime labor camp and 5 years internal exile (On October 9, 1986 Ratushinskaya was unexpectedly allowed to return to her home in Kiev and later given permission to travel to England for medical treatment). Although he was subsequently pardoned, Vladimir Frenkel was sentenced on June 16, 1985 for, among other things, contributing to an underground Jewish cultural journal.

The self-immolation of a Crimean Tatar was the subject of a samizdat poem entitled "Torch over Crimea" by Grigory Alexandrov of Tashkent. Tried in August 1983, Alexandrov was last reported to

be in the Special Psychiatric Hospital. A veteran of the Stalin camps, Alexandrov had also written "I Lead to the Outcast Village." A television technician from the northern Caucuses, Alexei Baida, received 4 or 5 years general regime camp in July 1985 for translating and circulating literature. Baida and his co-defendants at the trial are members of the Hari Krishna sect (see Religious Rights).

The rampant corruption among local organs of government led former political prisoner Mikhail Zhikharev to write a book entitled *The Great Swindle* in 1974, which was circulated in *samizdat.* He was subsequently arrested, declared mentally incompetent and consigned to the Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital for over 10 years. The book must still be causing concern for the authorities, for not long after his release (as reported in April 1986) he was re-arrested and pressured to recant the allegations contained in his book. Zhikaharev refused and was last reported back at the same psychiatric hospital where he had been held.

One example of the Andropov era crackdown on *samizdat* that had been more or less tolerated during the Brezhnev era was the August 1982 arrest of Zoya Krakhmalnikova, a Russian Orthodox publicist, author, and translator. For at least 6 years, Krakhmalnikova had been publishing and signing—without any interference from the authorities—*Nadezhda*, a *samizdat* collection of sermons, essays, and discussions of contemporary religious issues. However, she was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" in April 1983, and sentenced to 1 year labor camp and 5 years internal exile. Following a trial in January 1986, Krakhmalnikova's husband, Felix Svetov, another *samizdat* author and former member of the Soviet Writers' Union, was sentenced to 5 years exile.

Samizdat among Soviet Moslems in the central Asian regions is not widespread, but the printing and distribution of a booklet in Tashkent entitled *About the Islamic Faith* brought a 7-year sentence in September 1982 for a Moslem metal worker named Abuzakar Rakhimov. In March 1985, three persons were sentenced in Baku, Azerbaizhan for printing (on the Petro-chemical ministry printing press) Arabic literature for distribution in the North Caucasus area. A. Glukhov received 7 years camp; L. Belyaeva and A. Mutsologov, 4 years. In the Samarkand oblast, a farmer named Mardan Pulatov and his daughter Dzhamaila Kambarova were reported by the Soviet press to have been given camp sentences in the spring of 1985 for selling Muslim literature.

In the first half of March 1984, Seventh Day Adventist Gennady Bedarev was arrested and charged with "dissemination of slander" for having recorded and circulated foreign radio broadcasts. Some time between the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984, Yuri Krivda of Frunze, Kirghizia, was sentenced to 2 years general regime labor camp for having taped and circulated foreign music and having sold the tapes. According to the prosecution, the items in question were "works advocating anti-Communist and anti-humanitarian morals." A newspaper in Turkmenistan complained in January 1984 about the appearance in the marketplaces of unauthorized musical cassettes. The newspaper did not mention the contents of the cassettes, but it is suggested from analogous reports

from other parts of the Soviet Union that such cassettes may contain political commentary critical of the Soviet system.

Demonstrations and leaflets

Public protest demonstrations ranging from organized gatherings to individual actions—sometimes expressed in forms verging on simple vandalism, such as defacing party posters and writing anti-Soviet slogans on public property—represent Soviet citizens' attempts to vent their frustration over the inability to find other legitimate avenues of effecting change through the political process. Among the subjects that have caused public protest are nationality concerns, religious repression, peace issues, emigration and conscription for military service in Afghanistan, among others.

According to Sergei Batovrin (see independent peace groups) even participants in official "peace" demonstrations organized by party officials are not allowed to produce their own signs and placards; these items are handed to them when they show up at their assigned places for the demonstration. According to one study covering the years 1953–83, the number of persons taking part in open protests is decreasing, while the number of such actions is on the rise. In June 1986, it was reported that police forces in Syktyvkar, Komi Province, were being trained in breaking up street demonstrations.

The largest demonstration reported during 1982–86 was a gathering of about 40,000 Jewish citizens in 1984 in Minsk to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Minsk ghetto executions. On the other end of the spectrum is the case of Victor Monblanov, who staged a one-man demonstration in February 1982 on the fifth anniversary of the arrest of Yuri Orlov. After spending some time under psychiatric examination, Monblanov was sentenced to 5 years strict regime labor camp. Monblanov had spent 3 years in camp previously, having gone out on the streets of Kiev in 1978 with a tin cup and a Bible seeking funds for imprisoned prisoners of conscience. Another one-man demonstration was carried out in May 1984 by refusenik Vladimir Lifshitz, who stood in front of the Leningrad City Council with a sign saying "Free me from Soviet citizenship." Lifshitz was picked up by police, interrogated, and released after 3 hours. Eventually his attempts to emigrate led to a 3-year labor camp sentence. In March 1982, an ethnic Tatar named Khazi Gumer stood up in a Moscow theatre and shouted "Down with Soviet Fascism," an act that subsequently earned him 3 years labor camp for "hooliganism." Vladimir Kartukha of Sverdlovsk was sentenced to 2 years labor camp for "hooliganism" for having hung a poster over the balcony of his apartment in July 1983 calling for the overthrow of the Communists. Former political prisoner Boris Chernobylsky demonstrated in front of the Bolshoi Theatre in May 1986 with a poster reading "Ten years is enough. We demand visas to Israel," for which he received a 15-day jail sentence.

International Human Rights Day, December 10, has been a traditional date for peaceful demonstrations on Pushkin Square in Moscow since 1977. Prior to that year, the demonstrations had been held on December 5, Soviet "Constitution Day."

From 1982 through 1986, Moscow police and KGB have been by and large successful in thwarting the slightest attempt to demonstrate, even through the innocuous gesture of standing with one's hat removed at the Pushkin Monument on Human Rights Day.

As a result of the Human Rights Day demonstration in December 1982, around 60 persons were detained by police. In 1983, 16 were detained after "several dozen persons" gathered at the monument and removed their hats. Around a dozen were detained in 1984, and about the same number in 1985. The reduction in the number of arrests does not indicate a softening of the official position toward the occasion, but rather an increased ability to take preventive measures against potential participants. During the 1985 demonstration, an American television cameraman who tried to film the proceedings was knocked down and his camera lens broken. Participation in the same demonstration by artist and peace activist Nina Kovalenko was considered so detrimental to the reputation of the RSFSR Artists Union that her membership therein was terminated and she was asked to turn in her membership card.

Soviet ethnic German and Jewish citizens frequently (by Soviet standards) stage group demonstrations with demands to be allowed to emigrate. In January 1983, four ethnic Germans from Kamyshin in the Volgograd region tried to demonstrate in Moscow before the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany. In September 1983, three women from the same city unfurled banners on Red Square in Moscow demanding to be allowed to repatriate, and 1 month later eight Kamyshin Germans carried out the same protest in the same place. In each case, they were immediately arrested. In March 1985, 19 families of German refuseniks from Kabardino-Balkar tried to demonstrate at the city council building in the city of Prokhladny, but were dispersed by police. A quartet of Germans from Kabardino-Balkar ASSR demanding repatriation demonstrated on Red Square in November 1985. They were picked up by police and sent home. Reportedly they were later charged with disturbing the peace. In April 1986, four German refuseniks from Tadzhikistan were sentenced to brief (10–15 days) jail terms for a demonstration in Dushanbe with signs that read "Let Us Go to the F.R.G." Another four ethnic Germans staged a demonstration in October 1986 in front of the Federal Republic Embassy in Moscow with signs saying "we want to go back to our homeland." They were taken away in police cars. In June 1986, a group of seven Jewish refuseniks staged a demonstration at the Gogol Monument with signs saying "Let us go to Israel." Two of the participants, Yuri Chekanovsky and Yuri Rozentsveig, received 10- and 15-day jail terms, respectively.

Around 100 persons, mostly students, demonstrated in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 1983 for the release of two young Georgian men who had been arrested for passing out leaflets protesting the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Russian annexation of Georgia (the men were ultimately sentenced to labor camp terms). Also in Georgia, in late 1985, students in at a teachers' college in the town of Kutassi held a protest demonstration against the arrest and sentencing of a popular teacher who had been jailed for keeping foreign language periodicals in his home.

A demonstration of about 200 parents whose sons had been conscripted for service in Afghanistan took place in front of the Erevan, Armenia enlistment office in May 1985. About 40 were arrested for "hooliganism." According to the same report, a similar demonstration occurred in Tbilisi, Georgia.

Public protests and clashes between citizens and police authorities, or between Balts and Russians, frequently take place in occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Many such manifestations of public unrest frequently begin as parades, concerts, and sporting events. In other cases, they erupt on the anniversaries of the independence days of the formerly free nations. May 1985 saw two major confrontations in Latvia: on May 9, Soviet Victory Day, and May 14, Latvian Independence Day. About 300 young Latvians were detained for staging a demonstration with placards and leaflets demanding an end to Soviet occupation. The resulting clash between Latvians and Russians reportedly led to some deaths. The parents of some of the Latvian youth involved subsequently lost their jobs, and even their teachers suffered penalties. Although the large-scale demonstrations that took place in the early 1980's in Estonia seem to have receded, unrest continues to flare up. As in the case of Latvia, demonstrations frequently coincide with memorable dates in Estonian history. Following celebrations in September 1982 commemorating the founding of the University of Tartu, anti-Soviet demonstrations broke out. At least three young Estonians have been sentenced to labor camp terms for having raised the flag of independent Estonia in public places; three more were sentenced for having torn down a monument to Soviet soldiers of Russian origin. Another student, Valdo Padar, is presently serving a 4-year camp term for having called upon youth at a music concert in June 1984 to "overthrow Soviet power." Several students were thrown out of Tartu University in early 1983 for having lit candles at the grave of Estonian hero Yulius Kuperyanov on Christmas Eve 1982. According to press reports, "hundreds" of Estonian and Russian youths clashed in late September and early October 1985 in connection with preparations for Soviet Constitution Day. Estonians also reportedly demonstrated in middle and late August 1986 against the forced dispatch of approximately 300 Estonian workers to the Chernobyl cleanup operations and against the poor working conditions to which the workers there have been subjected. On February 16, 1983, Lithuanian Independence Day, the Lithuanian national flag was hoisted above a school in the town of Kapciamiestis. Several people were questioned, but the "culprits" were not apprehended.

In Leninabad, Tadzhik SSR, around 70–80 persons demonstrated in front of regional party headquarters in August 1984 to call for the release of Crimean Tatar activist, Smail Bilyanov, who had been arrested for raising the Crimean Tatar question before party officials (see section on Ethnic Rights). The demonstrators remained in front of the building for about 24 hours until they were dispersed by police and KGB.

Another form of quasi-public protest is the distribution of anti-regime leaflets passed around in public places, stuffed into mailboxes, or affixed to walls. As in the case of demonstrations, these leaflets address a variety of topics: support for Solidarity in Poland,

calls to boycott Communist "subbotniks" (i.e., required volunteer work on days off), and opposition to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Two Georgians, Paata Sagaradze and Irakly Tsereteli, are currently serving 3-year strict labor sentences for having distributed leaflets in 1983 calling for a boycott of celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the annexation of Georgia by the Russian Empire. In the autumn of 1982, a Moscow University student named Malinin was sentenced to 2 years strict regime camp for circulating leaflets. Also in the latter part of 1982, five persons were arrested in Dushanbe, Tadzhikistan for circulating leaflets protesting the war in Afghanistan. At least two of the participants, one "Nazarov" and Pavel Airapetov, are thought to be in labor camp as a result. In early 1983, geologist Leonid Kolevatov was arrested in Moscow for pasting up leaflets in Moscow Metro stations. He was sentenced to 3 years general regime camp. Nikolai Volkov of Sverdlovsk is apparently in a psychiatric hospital for having handed out leaflets in Red Square in August 1983 in the form of a letter to the French Ambassador demanding permission to emigrate to France. Vladimir Delidivka of Kiev was sentenced to 6 years strict regime camp and 5 years internal exile for having helped address leaflets that were sent around by post. Many of the pacifist demonstrations in the Soviet Union (noted above) are accompanied by distribution of leaflets and petitions. The demonstration of 1 June 1983 by "Independent Initiative" featured leaflets calling for the abolition of capital punishment and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yuri Popov was accused of being the author of the leaflets and placed under forced psychiatric confinement.

Andrei Sakharov

Dr. Andrei Sakharov, one of the most respected advocates of civil and political rights for Soviet citizens, continues to remain in illegal exile in the Soviet city of Gorky, having been sent there forcibly by Soviet authorities on January 22, 1980. In August 1984, his wife Dr. Elena Bonner was compelled to join him there as an exile, having been sentenced to 5 years internal exile for "dissemination of slander." Bonner's sentence was a severe blow to Sakharov, who had greatly depended on his wife to maintain tenuous contact between himself and his many friends and supporters in the Soviet Union and the West.

The years 1982–86 have proven painfully eventful in Andrei Sakharov's continuing struggle against the Soviet police state. In most cases, the authorities have managed to thwart his efforts to break down the walls of isolation in Gorky. The Soviet media continues to attack him, particularly through attacks on his wife.

Despite the isolation, surveillance, and orchestration of public opinion, Sakharov managed in 1982–83 to produce a modicum of scientific work and issue statements and appeals on human rights topics. In December 1982, in connection with the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sakharov telegraphed the Presidium of the Soviet Union requesting amnesty for 36 political prisoners serving sentences at that time. In March 1983, he appealed to public opinion on behalf of Ivan Kovalev and his wife, Tatiana Osipova, who were serving terms in separate labor camps. And in October 1983, Sakharov

wrote to a meeting of Nobel Laureates in Paris calling upon them to speak out in defense of political prisoners in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and to support Amnesty International's appeal for a universal amnesty for political prisoners.

In February 1983, an anonymous letter from Soviet scientists in defense of Sakharov reached the West. "Western scientists must not allow Sakharov to suffocate in exile," they wrote. The scientists could not sign the letter individually, they wrote, "as it will inevitably entail serious consequences: threats to our families and to our very existence." On the other hand, written denunciations attacking Sakharov and signed by Soviet notables had no trouble making their way into print. The July 3, 1983 issue of *Izvestiya* carried a virulent attack on Sakharov entitled "When One Loses His Honor and Integrity." Written in response to Sakharov's letter to American physicist Sidney Drell on the danger of thermonuclear war, and signed by academicians Dorodnitsyn, Prokhorov, Skryabin, and Tikhonov, the article accused Sakharov of slandering the Soviet people and encouraging the arms race. Following the publication of this article, Sakharov and Bonner received a stream of insulting letters and telegrams. In a June 20, 1983 issue of *Newsweek*, the President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Anatoly Aleksandrov, stated that Sakharov had, unfortunately, undergone "a rather serious psychic shift," meaning that his dissent was a function of psychological problems. This subtle change to a "more in sorrow than in anger" policy regarding their dissident Nobel laureate was strengthened in December 1983, when Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Vitaly Ruben called Sakharov "a talented but sick man" and accompanied his words with a tapping gesture to his forehead. Subsequently, the October 1983 issue of *Cheloveki Zakon* (Man and the Law) carried a chapter from Yakovlev's book *The CIA Against the Nation of Soviets* in which the author referred to Sakharov as "a victim of the Zionist section of the CIA" and portrayed Elena Bonner as an immoral schemer who had lured Sakharov into human rights "intrigues" for her own self-aggrandizement. Attempts by Bonner to bring suit against Yakovlev for slander were rejected by the court.

Despite confirmation by two Academy of Sciences physicians in June 1983 that Sakharov should be admitted to a hospital for his cardiac and prostate problems, Soviet officials repeatedly refused to admit him to the Academy Hospital in Moscow. At the same time, Sakharov began a series of appeals to the Kremlin to secure permission for Elena Bonner to travel to the West for medical treatment.

Meanwhile, the authorities played cat-and-mouse with the issue of Sakharov's own emigration to the West. Although he had previously referred to the issue of his possible emigration as a "hypothetical situation," in early 1983 he accepted an invitation from the Norwegian Government to move there with his family for permanent residence, and asked the Norwegian Government to intercede with Moscow on his behalf. In April 1983, the Soviet Minister of Justice stated to the Swedish press that "If he should ask now to leave, I think he would probably receive permission." This statement was disavowed by Moscow about 1 month later. Similar charades took place in Paris in November 1983, and Copenhagen in

1984. In October 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev stirred up hopes for Sakharov's release during a 4-day visit to Paris, when, in response to a journalist's question on Sakharov, he made mention of "reunification of families . . . and other matters of a humanitarian nature." However, on February 7, 1986 the General Secretary stated flatly that Dr. Sakharov "remains the possessor of state secrets of particular importance, and therefore is not able to leave the country." (*Pravda*, February 8, 1986.)

By May 1984, Dr. Sakharov had despaired of Elena Bonner's receiving permission to travel to the West for medical treatment. When his appeals failed to move the Kremlin, he began a hunger strike on May 2 that lasted until May 27, at which time Sakharov voluntarily took food after doctors at Semashko Hospital had been force feeding him since May 11. Meanwhile, Elena Bonner was confined to their Gorky apartment until her trial on "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" charges on August 9–10. She was sentenced to 5 years exile, but allowed to stay in Gorky. Throughout much of this time, the West was kept in darkness as to Sakharov's fate. Soviet officials repeated statements that their prisoner of Gorky was in satisfactory health and under observation at Semashko, and they peddled doctored tapes showing Sakharov supposedly getting about normally at the hospital. It was not until early August that Elena Bonner was able to contact friends in the Soviet Union to report that her husband had ended his hunger strike and that she was being brought up on criminal charges.

Sakharov briefly resumed his hunger strike on September 8, but abandoned it rather than continue his separation from Bonner, and returned to their apartment. By October 1984, the couples' friends had received several telegrams and postcards indicating that they both were back at their apartment, and a photo to their relatives in the United States followed in November. The couple spent the next 7 months together in their guarded apartment. In December 1984, as General Secretary Gorbachev arrived in London for talks with Prime Minister Thatcher, the Soviets released more hidden-camera photos showing Sakharov and Bonner in apparent good health.

By April 16, 1985, when it became obvious that Soviet authorities were still refusing to grant Elena Bonner travel permission, Dr. Sakharov initiated yet another hunger strike. On April 21, he was again hospitalized and subjected to force feedings. On May 25 Bonner's daughter in the United States, Tatiana, received a postcard dated April 21 that was later shown to be a forgery. Sakharov abandoned the strike on July 11, but resumed it on July 25. Force feeding followed on July 27. According to Elena Bonner, the chief physician told her husband, "we won't let you die, but you will be a complete invalid." In June, a Soviet film shown in the West had featured a doctor stating that Sakharov had never been on a hunger strike, but had been in the hospital for treatment of "various ailments." By this time the desperate Nobel Peace Prize Laureate had also written to Gorbachev stating his desire to "cease completely my public activities, except, of course, in exceptional cases." Finally, in October 1985, Elena Bonner was issued a visa for travel abroad. This was confirmed by Sakharov in a telephone conversa-

tion with his relatives in the United States, the first time he had been allowed to speak with them in 6 years.

In December, Elena Bonner arrived in the West and underwent the heart by-pass surgery she needed. Her 3-month visa was later extended by Soviet authorities for another 3 months. Although she had agreed, as part of the agreement allowing her to leave for the West, not to give news conferences or interviews, she was able to provide details of Sakharov's plight and expose the fabrications produced by Soviet spokesmen during his travails. In February 1986, Sakharov managed to pass to the West an extensive package of letters describing in detail his struggle against his oppressors, confirming the disinformation campaign waged by authorities during his hunger strikes.

Just before her return to the Soviet Union, Elena Bonner spoke before a gathering in the United States House of Representatives to celebrate Andrei Sakharov's 65th birthday on May 21, 1986. In her brief speech, she stated that:

> . . . The times called for someone like Sakharov to appear. . . . Sakharov's scientific brilliance, his profound understanding of the benefits and hazards of progress, place him on the cutting edge. His personal qualities include absolute honesty, courage so natural that it tends to be overlooked, and a morality founded on his innate knowledge of good and evil. All these together have made him Andrei Sakharov, the Andrei Sakharov who is known and respected throughout the world.

Elena Bonner rejoined Sakharov on June 3, 1986. In early September 1986, the Western press reported that Sakharov had written a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev dated February 16, 1986 in which he asked Gorbachev to release all Soviet prisoners of conscience, and specifically named 12 well-known dissidents.

On December 16, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev telephoned Sakharov (a phone had been installed the day before) and informed him that he would be allowed to return to Moscow, and that Elena Bonner's exile sentence had been lifted. Upon his return to Moscow, Sakharov stated that he would resume his scientific work. He also called for the release of all political prisoners, and Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan as part of the resolution of the "tragic blind alley" created by the war.

ECONOMIC RIGHTS

General references to social and economic rights in Principles VII and IX of the Helsinki Final Act were amplified in the 1983 Madrid Concluding Document. For the first time in CSCE, that document referred to independent labor unions:

> The participating States will ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions, the right of trade unions freely to exercise their activities and other rights as laid down in relevant international instruments. They note that these rights will be exercised in compliance with the law of the state and in conformity with the state's obligations under international law. They will encourage, as

appropriate, direct contacts and communication among trade unions and their representatives.

This extensive reference to the right to form and join independent labor unions represents a major step forward in CSCE in the realm of social and economic rights. The reference to domestic laws, which, in the case of the U.S.S.R. are very restrictive, is offset by the reference to international laws.

Until Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, the Soviet press was only rarely critical of Soviet social and economic problems. Articles written in self-congratulatory prose, claiming that the Soviet state provides for the social and economic needs of its citizens, were the norm. Within the past year or so, however, the Soviet media has been increasingly frank about certain deficiencies in Soviet society. Nevertheless, even the most critical articles do not call into question the basic structure of the Soviet state. Such articles also avoid discussing social or economic problems on a national scale, except in vague and general terms.

What follows is an overview of social and economic issues in the Soviet Union, drawn from Soviet, Western and independent sources.

The citations drawn from the Soviet press (via Joint Publications Research Service translations) indicate some of the ways these social and economic issues are currently being discussed in the Soviet Union. These press items, it will be noted, are limited to criticism of local failures; nationwide shortcomings are not discussed.

Representative of Western views on the Soviet socio-economic record is a speech given by Ambassador Richard Schifter on May 22 during the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting. This speech, based on a wide variety of Western sources, is probably the most comprehensive review of this record ever given by an American official.

Standard of living

Ambassador Schifter compared the Soviet standard of living to that of the United States: It is hardly one third of the U.S. level. In fact, the average Soviet citizen does not live as well as someone living at the official U.S. poverty line.

Shortages of consumer goods

"The Soviet economy," Schifter maintained, "is characterized by pervasive shortages of consumer goods and the widespread corruption these shortages generate." He commented that in the U.S.S.R., unlike anywhere in the developed West, "the most basic consumer goods are in continuous short supply and rationing remains a common fact of Soviet life. The situation has been so bad in some localities in recent years that food riots have reportedly occurred."

He characterized the Soviet production and distribution system as "so capricious that it is impossible to tell what will be available from one day to the next. . . . These endless shortages force the average Soviet family to spend 2 hours shopping every day just to obtain the basic necessities of life."

"The chronic shortage of basic consumer goods has fostered the creation of an enormous black market in scarce items, Schifter said. "This in turn has led to widespread official corruption, as persons with administrative control over scarce commodities divert them for personal gain. . . . Some estimate that as much as 25 percent of the Soviet GNP is diverted to the black market every year."

These views receive some confirmation in the Soviet press. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (February 12, 1986) has conducted public opinion polls on various questions. A poll of workers in Chelyabinsk revealed that 25 percent responded negatively when asked if the quality of consumer goods had improved in recent years. Most will no longer tolerate poor quality, although plentiful, goods. The workers gave the following reasons for the slow improvement in quality: irresponsible, sloppy manufacturers; poor labor organization in light industry; technological and technical backwardness; poor quality control.

Consumer services is a related area of chronic weakness in the Soviet economy and it has come under increasing scrutiny. This can be seen in a lead editorial in *Sovet Turkmenistany* (December 15, 1985) which criticizes consumer services in all of the Turkmen Republic. Problems include developing and increasing the variety of consumer services, and recruiting personnel. "Some of the (local executive councils) are not paying enough attention to this. As a result, plans for providing consumer services to the population are rarely fulfilled." Specific sectors singled out include repair and maintenance of housing, and dry cleaning.

Soviet military spending

The Soviet consumer is in a severely disadvantaged position because the military sector is always given precedence, Schifter observed. "Soviet per capita spending for defense, for example, is, in relative terms, at least twice as high as in any developed Western country." Comparing the U.S. and Soviet military spending records, Schifter noted: "Today, the Soviet Union spends at least 14 percent of its GNP on defense, compared to only 7 percent for the United States."

Social stratification

Ambassador Schifter also described the extreme social stratification which characterizes Soviet society:

> A privileged 5 percent of the Soviet population, known as the "nomenklatura," has access to special "closed" stores that are specially stocked with foreign goods not available in regular stores . . . Housing space is allocated by state authorities on the basis of social status.
>
> The Fourth Directorate of the Ministry of Health runs a closed system of hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries for the nomenklatura, providing far better services than those available to the general population.
>
> The Soviet ruling oligarchy also has access to such special benefits as foreign travel, automobiles, admission to the best schools, country houses, access to cultural events

and paid vacations in choice resorts which are not available to the average citizen.

These comments reveal a Soviet ruling elite which is guaranteed its privileges by reason of party rank. The nomenklatura or institutionalized ruling elite dates far back into Soviet rule and shows no sign of disappearing or giving up its privileges.

Status of women

Traditionally, the Soviet media has touted the equal status of women in the U.S.S.R. Recently, however, a few cracks in that official monolith of praise have appeared. An editorial report in *Sovet Turkmenistany* in Turkmen (December 13, 1985) notes that there are very few women workers in the Turkmen *nomenklatura* (high-level party officials.) Furthermore, of 238 cotton brigades (groups of workers assigned to a specific task) only two are headed by women.

"Women occupy a low rung on the Soviet economic ladder," Schifter said. Women usually hold the lowest-status and lowest-paying jobs. One third of all Soviet women workers are agricultural laborers. By contrast, 1.5 percent of American women hold such farm jobs. "Soviet women have no access to effective political power." Only one woman has served on the Politburo. In March 1983, Gorbachev named Aleksandra Biryukova, a trade union official, to the Central Committee Secretariat. Less than 5 percent of Central Committee members are women. In fact, only 25 percent of Communist Party members are female.

Soviet medicine

Serious health problems affect Soviet women and indeed society at large. Soviet publicists emphasize that Soviet women are entitled to liberal maternity benefits. But abortion is the only available method of birth control. Schifter notes, "many women have a history of five or more abortions." Such heavy reliance on abortion as a method of birth control has led to health problems and a significantly reduced birth rate.

In recent years, Soviet officials have shown some concern about inadequate Soviet health care. Although free, it is now recognized to be often of poor quality. An article in *Kommunisti* (January 14, 1986) discusses the results of an opinion poll about a Tbilisi hospital. It offers many examples of disorder, lack of sanitation, poor management, inconsiderate treatment of patients and instances of corruption among doctors and hospital personnel.

Soviet medical personnel, both doctors and nurses, are poorly paid. Medicine is considered a low-status profession and is staffed mostly by women. *Sovetskaya Latviya* (December 25, 1985) points to an urgent need to raise the salaries of personnel in the republic tuberculosis sanitorium for children. "Because pay is so low, older nurses who have worked for 30–40 years are retiring on meager pensions while younger ones are leaving soon after their arrival to find higher paying jobs."

Systematic shortages, Schifter pointed out, are one of the main reasons for the poor state of Soviet medicine. Medical equipment and many medicines are in extremely short supply. For example, in Novosibirsk only 11 percent of 216 standard drugs for specific ill-

nesses were actually available. One third of all Soviet hospitals do not have adequate facilities for blood transfusions. Basic items such as bandages, aspirin, and syringes are often hard to find. Hospital food rations are so meager they must be supplemented privately. Soviet per capita spending on health care is less than one third that of the United States.

Alcoholism

The Soviet Union leads the world in the per capita consumption of hard liquor, Schifter observed. Alcohol consumption in the U.S.S.R. has more than doubled over the last 25 years. The death rate from alcohol poisoning in the Soviet Union is 88 times the U.S. rate. Alcohol is the leading cause of industrial accidents, particularly since some 35 percent of Soviet workers are chronically drunk.

In fact, alcohol and its effects may be the leading cause of death among Soviet males. Alcohol abuse is the third leading cause of illness among Soviet women. It is also a key factor in the alarming rise of birth defects and the higher infant mortality rates. Already by 1980, the net social cost of alcohol abuse in decreased labor productivity in the U.S.S.R. amounted to a startling 8 to 9 percent of the total national income. In conclusion, Schifter referred to a poll cited in a March 1984 *Sovetskaya Rossiya* which showed that half the Soviet population regards drunkenness as the number one social problem in the U.S.S.R.

Thus, Gorbachev's anti-alcoholism drive has strong popular support, and improved medical treatment for alcoholics is an important part of it. An editorial in *Pravda* (January 12, 1986) criticizes the Soviet medical profession for shortcomings in medical treatment for alcoholics, singling out Ukraine, Kirgizia, and Armenia as particularly remiss.

Rising Soviet mortality rates

Rising mortality rates for males and children are a severe problem in the Soviet Union. For the first time since the 1970's, the Soviet authorities have made public figures on mortality rates among children. In a scientific journal titled *Zdravookhraneniye Tadzhikistana*, (No. 6, 1984), an article admits that these rates were 38.3 percent greater in 1984 than in 1970. One major cause of this rise is the shortage of potable water in areas with very inadequate sewage systems.

Numerous factors, such as rampant alcoholism, poor health care, industrial pollution and accidents, have led to this alarming increase in Soviet mortality rates over the last 20 years. Schifter compared Soviet and American data. The life expectancy of Soviet males has decreased from 66, 20 years ago, to 62 years today. In this period, American male life expectancy went from 66 to 71 years. Infant mortality in the U.S.S.R. has risen from 26.2 per 1,000 live births in 1971 to about 40 per 1,000 today. During the same period, in the United States, infant mortality has decreased from 24.7 per 1,000 to 10.7. It should be noted that the Soviet figure on infant mortality is only an estimate, since the Soviet Government stopped publishing such data after 1974 when the rate had risen to

31.9 per 1,000—already much higher than in any developed Western country.

Soviet education

Education is also an area of concern to Soviet officials. In Ukraine, for example, *Pravda Ukrainy* (October 20, 1985) noted certain difficulties in adopting educational reforms which increase the role of vocational education. It comments that "lagging is tolerated in the development of preschool education, especially in the rural areas. Proper attention is not being paid to the organization of training and educational school-kindergarten institutions . . . Local executive committees are not involved enough in assigning the graduates of professional and technical education institutions to industry. The necessary attention is not being paid everywhere to determining long-term labor requirements. Appropriate measures are not being taken to provide the necessary conditions for students residing at school boarding homes, as well as to improve living conditions for the teaching and engineering-pedagogical cadres."

A lead editorial in the *Mugallymlar Gazeta* in Turkmen (January 10, 1986) chronicles both achievements and shortcomings in the school year. It admits that student participation is poor at certain schools, and that the study materials are poor at some schools. Some teachers work outside their specialities.

Illegal university enrollment, usually involving the children of high-ranking party members, is a rather common problem recounted in *Komunisti* in Georgian (September 26, 1985). The son of a Tbilisi MVD Deputy Chief was illegally enrolled in the Tbilisi State University School of Law. This episode is part of a larger scandal of collusion between some high- or mid-level officials and Tbilisi State University administrators and faculty to gain illegal admission to university for the officials' sons. The article concludes that "one law fits all."

Soviet transport

Also under criticism is Soviet transport. Of great concern is that its chronic inefficiency exacerbates the already severe shortcomings in agriculture. Passenger service has also been a subject of discussion. *Kommunisti* (September 15, 1985) describes the current state of rail passenger services on the Transcaucasian railway: dishonest cashiers and dispatchers, double booking, free riders, poor sanitation, rude conductors and porters, and missed schedules. Moreover, the article cites complaints by railway personnel that requests for new passenger trains go unheeded. In one case, new cars that appeared on one line in 1982, disappeared only 2 weeks later—the article hints they were sent to Moscow.

Soviet housing

Official Soviet sources have long pointed to the severe housing shortage in the U.S.S.R. Schifter presented data on this. At least 20 percent of all urban families in the U.S.S.R. must share kitchen and toilet facilities with other families. Another 5 percent live in factory dormitories. In the U.S.S.R., there are about two people for every room, while in the United States there are two rooms for

every person. Soviet statistics show that in 1983, 32 percent of all urban housing lacked hot water, 23 percent was without gas, 19 percent without indoor baths, 12 percent lacked central heating, 11 percent without sewage, and 9 percent without water. In the countryside, the housing situation is much worse: heating is usually on fireplaces, cooking is on wood stoves, outhouses are the usual toilets, and water is often from a well.

City dwellers face major difficulties in housing. A lead article in *Kommunisti* in Georgian (August 11, 1985) describes some of these problems. Tenants complain that newly "finished" apartments are badly built. Doors, windows, flooring and other components are substandard. The Georgian Construction Minister, interviewed in this article, recognizes these chronic problems, but notes that Georgia is not an exception in the Soviet Union.

Construction problems are not limited to apartment buildings—they affect offices as well. On December 16, 1985, Moscow Television broadcast part of a series on reporters' visits to various Soviet cities. The first report is set in Ashkhabad, capital of the Turkmen Republic, and shows a dilapidated construction site. This unfinished 30-story building was supposed to house the Ashkhabad Radio Center—it has not been completed in 20 years. This is not the only unfinished municipal building; next door is the incomplete intercity telephone exchange.

The future does not look bright for Soviet housing. At current rates of construction, Soviets will have as much space per person as their Western counterparts only in 150 years. The Soviet Union spends less than one fifth as much on housing as the United States and under half of what is spent in Spain, Schifter pointed out.

Urban/rural standards of living

The urban population of the Soviet Union enjoys a much higher standard of living than its country cousins. In almost all areas—housing, diet, transportation, roads and access to consumer goods—the rural population fares much worse than urbanites. A lead editorial in *Kommunist* in Azeri (November 14, 1985) reveals that this problem continues:

> One must consider that a number of village residential areas are not meeting contemporary demands; there is a shortage of needed buildings such as kindergartens, public baths. . . . There are serious shortcomings in trade, medical and life services for the rural population. Intervillage roads are in poor shape. Difficulties in electric and gas equipment and drinking water are causing rural workers justifiable dissatisfaction.

An article in *Kommunisti* in Georgian (June 6, 1985) focuses on an agricultural region in the west Georgian highlands. Although First Party Secretary Shevardnadze labelled services "primitive" back in 1983, the state of communications, utilities, medical and trade services, and schools has not improved. Roads, bridges, schools, and sewer systems are dilapidated or nonexistent. The regional hospital is in such poor condition that people go to other areas to get medical help. Telephone, radio and television services work erratically or not at all.

Soviet agriculture

The chronic inefficiency of Soviet collectivized agriculture shows no sign of improvement. Schifter presented some telling statistics on this. Twenty percent of the Soviet work force is in agriculture, compared to 3 percent in the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. usually imports as much as 25 percent of its grain. American farmers are 10 times more productive than Soviet farmers. Soviet private plots, totalling only 4 percent of Soviet arable land, produce 25 percent of Soviet crop output, showing that it is collectivization which leads to low agricultural productivity in the Soviet Union.

In fact, agriculture is the perennial Achilles heel of the Soviet economy. There have been various, mostly unsuccessful, attempts to improve Soviet agriculture. One new effort is the "family contract," introduced in Georgia 3 years ago. An article in *Kommunisti* in Georgian (August 9, 1985) tells how the introduction of the "family contract" has revolutionized the situation of the sovkhoz. Meat deliveries are up 53 percent, and dairy products 43 percent. In 1984, the sovkhoz made a profit of 20,000 rubles, while annual family income has doubled to 2,550. Nevertheless, the state is not complying with all provisions of the "family contract," such as providing enough trucks, tractors and feeds.

A recent Soviet press item revealed that Soviet agriculture even relies on child labor. *Pravda* (March 6, 1985) criticized widespread use of child labor in Uzbekistan to harvest cotton. Rather than being in school, many Uzbek children are planting and picking cotton. In fact, in some areas of Uzbekistan, children are in class only 5 or 6 months of the year—rather than the obligatory 9. Some areas rely heavily on child labor: In one region children collected "almost half" the harvest in 1984. Therefore, decreased reliance on child labor would have serious economic consequences.[4]

Literaturnaya gazeta (July 30, 1986) published a scathing attack on the Soviet Ministry of Health for not banning the use of a very toxic defoliant, Butifos, in the central Asian cotton fields. The Ministry was accused of putting the wishes of the agricultural ministries above the health of the local population. The insecticide is still used—often in mega-doses—though it has long been known to affect the central nervous system, heart, liver and kidneys and to induce dangerous allergic reactions. Doctors also link Butifos to the prevalence of hepatitis in cotton-growing areas. Although the Soviet Ministry of Health forbade the use of Butifos in 1983, a large loophole in the law has allowed continued use of the defoliant.[5]

Industrial crime

The anti-crime and anti-corruption campaign is a hallmark of Gorbachev's new administration. An article in the Russian-emigre newspaper, *Russkaya Mysl* (late 1985), asserts that factory directors are often made scapegoats for systemic flaws. According to this article, thousands of directors are brought to trial: "According to a U.S.S.R. Procuracy report, in 1984 over 18,000 Soviet directors were

[4] [5] See footnotes on p. 234.

involved in criminal or disciplinary proceedings or were held financially responsible."

An article in *Kommunist* in Azeri (May 16, 1986) reveals the scope of some of the crimes committed in Soviet factories. A group of thieves had been stealing "socialist property" at a cotton cleaning factory and also at some cotton plantations. In 4 years, the gang managed to steal about 3 million rubles annually from the factory.

Labor issues

Labor dissatisfaction is also a problem in the Soviet Union—as everywhere in the world. A study of the Ukrainian coal industry, published in *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, (No. 2, 1984) revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the quality and availability of social services. Over one third of the 1,634 surveyed complained about the availability of transportation and the organization of leisure activities; over 24 percent were unhappy with living conditions and work facilities.

There was a reported work stoppage among Estonian cleanup crews at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. A series of articles in August 1986 in *Noorte Hal*, the Estonian-language Komsomol youth newspaper, was meant to quell rumors about Chernobyl labor problems. A group of 200 to 300 Estonian reservists was called up and sent out to wash houses and trees and strip contaminated topsoil. The work day stretched from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. with only 2 days off per month. In June, the conscripts were told that their 2-month tour had been extended to 6. In protest, a work stoppage was organized which went on into July. Exposure to radiation was a major concern; some were sent home early due to health problems. Special exemptions were made: men over 45 and fathers of three under-age children were allowed to return to Estonia.[6]

Sovetskaya Rossiya (February 12, 1986) revealed, "Public opinion demonstrates that the labor remuneration system must be resolutely improved and made fully to accord with a man's labor contribution. . . . A considerable proportion of those questioned at the Chelyabinsk metallurgical combine believe their labor remuneration does not match their individual contribution."

Forced labor

The International Labor Organization (ILO) continued its investigations into Soviet violations of its conventions on forced labor. ILO concern has focused on two Soviet laws which it found to be in violation of its Forced Labor Convention No. 29. The first is the Anti-Parasite law (article 209 RSFSR Criminal Code) because it directly or indirectly compels all citizens to work under menace of criminal penalties, including imprisonment or exile.[7] The second is the law which regulates the conditions for termination of membership for the 12.6 million collective farm households (1969 Model Collective Farm Rules and a 1975 Order).

Contrary to ILO urging, in January 1983 the Soviet authorities put into effect the new and expanded provisions of the "Anti-Para-

[6] [7] See footnotes on p. 234.

sitism" law. Under the new provisions of article 209 the term for first time offenders is increased from 1 to 2 years and for repeat offenders from 2 to 3 years of imprisonment. Furthermore, the definition of the "crime" of parasitism has been broadened: the words "systematic" and "for a protracted period of time" have been left out. In the future, any Soviet citizen who does not work for even a brief period is eligible for prosecution as a parasite for "engaging in vagrancy or begging or leading a parasitic way of life."

According to the official June 1984 report of the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CCACR), the Soviet Government repeated its claims that this law was applied only against gambling and fortunetelling. Despite well-documented cases showing that this law is used in reprisal against Soviet citizens engaging in unorthodox activities, the Soviet official position was: "It was not a question of condemning people for (gambling or fortunetelling) . . ., rather, the concept of the legislator was based on the social value of productive work in Socialist society."

The second law criticized by the ILO is the one which regulates the conditions for termination of membership for the 12.6 million collective farm households (1969 Model Collective Farm Rules and a 1975 order). The ILO found fault with the stipulation that members of a collective farm can leave only if they are given permission by the the kolkhoz (collective farm) managing committee and by a general meeting of the entire membership. Collective farmers who do leave the collective farm without such permission are denied their work records (which are held by the collective farm management.) Without these records, they cannot find other employment and even risk eventual arrest as "parasites." These provisions, according to the ILO, constitute forced labor.

Soviet ILO representatives promised five times that they will resolve the collective farm membership problem. A Soviet official referred to a 1982 decree mandating timely consideration of a member's request to leave the collective farm as evidence of Soviet compliance with ILO provisions.

In a minor ILO victory, the Soviet Government in 1984 modified the conditions under which a collective farmer may leave the farm. In an annex to its Decree No. 139 of February 8, 1984, the Presidium of the Collective Farm Union Council "issued an explanation concerning the application of clause 7 of the model collective farm rules, indicating that requests by collective farm members to leave these farms could not be refused," states the 1984 CCACR report.

The U.S. Government ILO representative noted it had taken 10 years of ILO pressure before the Soviet Government amended its legislation. The U.S. representative went on to inquire how the new law would be publicized so that Soviet collective farmers would learn of it. The Soviet representative responded that "the explanation of the Union Council of Collective Farms and all its decisions, were brought to the attention of the republic and regional bodies as well as the collective farms as a normal practice." (1984 CCACR report.)

Previous CSCE Commission reports have discussed the problem of providing accurate statistics on forced labor in the Soviet Union. Estimates range from 4 million (State Department) to 6 million

(the Independent Interprofessional Workers' Association), with others in the middle. While there is little agreement on the total number of forced laborers in the U.S.S.R. today, there is general agreement that compulsory labor is very important to the Soviet economy. During the November 1983 Helsinki Commission hearing on forced labor in the U.S.S.R., U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Labor Robert Searby stated: "The Soviet Union systematically employs forced labor on a scale larger than any other nation in the world to a point where it is endemic to Soviet society."

When it comes to statistics on forced labor camps, there is little agreement. The State Department, in its November 1982 report, gives a total of 1,100 labor camps. Georgy Davydov, a former Soviet political prisoner, gives a figure of 2,520. In any case, the widespread reliance on prison labor in the U.S.S.R. is clear.

In theory, Soviet prison labor is regulated by laws. In practice, prisoners are often punished for asking that camp administrators observe such regulations. For example, prisoners must work 8 hours a day, 6 days a week—7 hours longer than the usual Soviet workweek. Often, prisoners must work even longer; they never receive overtime pay.

In theory, Soviet prisoners are supposed to be paid at the same rates as other Soviet workers. A Ministry of Internal Affairs order, however, sets prison pay at 5 percent less. When factors such as obsolete equipment (which lowers efficiency) and arbitrary rates set by the administration are included, the wage situation is much bleaker. Half of a prisoner's earnings is automatically deducted for housing; tax and legal fees must be paid from the rest. Only from what is left over can the prisoner buy a meager range of poor quality food at a camp store.

Frequent on-the-job accidents in camp are caused by the prisoners' poor health, inadequate lighting, or by defective or improperly maintained equipment. Of course, the artificially high output norms established by the authorities also force prisoners to work too fast, leading to accidents.[8]

Despite continuing international protest, the Soviet Government shows no sign of lessening its reliance on forced labor. On the contrary, the RSFSR Supreme Court Presidium in October 1982 established a new type of forced labor facility: "These institutions, known by the uplifting title of educational labor prophylaxis centers, apparently will be in an intermediate status between the educational labor colonies for minors and the work therapy prophylaxis centers for alcoholics." [9]

Unofficial labor unions

Previous CSCE Commission reports have described two efforts to establish unofficial labor unions in the U.S.S.R. to serve as real advocates for Soviet workers. Official Soviet trade unions take their cue from Lenin's dictum that they are to function as "party transmission belts." The first was the Association of Free Trade Union Workers (AFTU) formed in late 1977; the second was the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers (SMOT) set up in October

[8] [9] See footnotes on p. 234.

1978. Both the AFTU and SMOT met with unrelenting hostility from the Soviet authorities. Unfortunately, the Soviet state still exhibits a hostile attitude towards AFTU and SMOT members.

The fate of imprisoned Vladimir Klebanov, AFTU founder, speaks volumes about Soviet intentions towards labor activists. Since early 1978, Klebanov has been incarcerated in a series of psychiatric hospitals: Dnepropetrovsk, Makeevka, Donetsk, and, since September 1983, Tashkent Special Psychiatric Hospital.

In 1983, the Soviet authorities mounted a major campaign against 10 SMOT members who were still at liberty. In January, Boris Kanevsky was tried for "anti-Soviet slander" and given a 5-year term of exile; he confessed his "guilt" at the trial. Russian geologist and SMOT founder Vladimir Skvirsky was sentenced in February 1983 to 3 years in camp for "anti-Soviet slander." On February 28, Valery Senderov was sentenced to 7 years camp and 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." SMOT member, Irina Tsurkova, was given a 3-year camp term on March 15 for "anti-Soviet slander." Viktor Yanenko received a 7-year camp term plus 5-year exile term for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" on April 18. Vladimir Gershuni was tried in April and found "nonaccountable" for his actions. Two SMOT supporters, Rostislav Evdokimov and Vyacheslav Dolinin, were sentenced on April 5 to 5 years camp plus 4 years exile, and 4 years camp plus 2 years exile respectively. Former history student Aleksandr Skobov, a SMOT council member, was sentenced on May 4 to compulsory psychiatric treatment for "psychopathic paranoia" for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." SMOT founding member, Lev Volokhonsky, was sentenced on May 24 to 5 years camp plus 4 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." In December 1984, SMOT representative council member Vladimir Sytinsky, went on trial for "anti-Soviet slander" and later was sent for psychiatric incarceration. Despite such reprisals, however, SMOT continues to function.

Initiative Group for the Rights of the Disabled

The Soviet authorities have been just as stern in their reaction to the Initiative Group for the Rights of the Disabled. This group was formed in 1978 to improve the situation of millions of disabled Soviet citizens. Today, despite repression, the Disabled Rights Group still issues bulletins and protests.

One of the main efforts of the group was to form an All-Union Society of Physically Disabled Persons, a nongovernmental association modeled closely on the already existing official All-Union Societies of the Blind and the Deaf. Indeed, the basic purpose of the Disabled Rights Group was very similar to the aims of these legal organizations: to provide members with educational programs, technical training and a network of special industrial enterprises to employ the handicapped. Furthermore, from 1925 until 1956 there had been an official Soviet group for the handicapped: the Invalids' Federation.[10]

[10] See footnote on p. 234.

Official repression directed at a Disabled Rights Group member, war invalid Vasily Pervushin, tells much about Soviet intentions. Arrested at his home in Novosibirsk, 58-year-old Pervushin was severely beaten by the police and taken to a local psychiatric hospital, where he remains today. Officially diagnosed as suffering from "a mania for social justice," Pervushin was sentenced on November 11, 1983 to an indefinite term of psychiatric detention.

Russian Social Fund

The Russian Social Fund, established by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1974 after his expulsion from the U.S.S.R., was concerned with the welfare of prisoners of conscience and their families. Worldwide royalties for *The Gulag Archipelago* provided an average annual income of $120,000 to help about 1,000 families. These royalties were supplemented by contributions from Soviet citizens which amounted to 25 to 40 percent of Fund revenues.[11] The Fund aided people regardless of their religion, nationality, or social background and had branches in many parts of the Soviet Union. Fund chairpersons such as Aleksandr Ginzburg and Malva Landa were imprisoned or exiled, but the Fund continued its work.

But in May 1983, a spectacular trial began in Leningrad. Fund activist Valery Repin, 32-year-old former journalist, went on trial for treason. Arrested in December 1981, the KGB had been working Repin over for many months. There were also dozens of house searches. Indeed, *The New York Times* reported, "the scope of the KGB's efforts and the length of the Repin trial . . . suggest the priority that the authorities here attach to the suppression of the Fund."[12]

At his trial, Repin spent hours confessing that he had become a "thoughtless pawn" of the CIA through his Fund activities and that he tried to get "military-political" secrets.[13] Repin maintained that he would only give money to former prisoners if they supplied him with needed information about the camps and numbers of troops.[14] Several dozen activists were witnesses at the trial, many supporting Repin's new views, while others, such as SMOT activist Lev Volokhonsky, expressed sorrow at Repin's transformation. Repin was sentenced to 2 years camp plus 3 years exile—a very light term for "treason."

One month earlier, Sergei Khodorovich, Fund manager, was arrested in Moscow and charged with "anti-Soviet slander." The KGB claimed in the Soviet press that the Fund was financed by the CIA. In the fall of 1983, Khodorovich's wife was told that her husband had been beaten up in prison and suffered a fractured skull as a result. To protest his treatment, Khodorovich went on several lengthy hunger strikes.

During his December 1983 trial, Khodorovich told the court that he had been beaten over a 2-month period. He rejected the prosecutor's suggestion of bad cellmates, insisting that the man who beat him had been a guard who wanted him to recant. Khodorovich pled not guilty, and was sentenced to 3 years strict regimen camp for "anti-Soviet slander."

---

[11] [12] [13] [14] See footnotes on p. 234.

64-639 O - 87 - 6

After Khodorovich was arrested, art critic Boris Mikhailov and translator Andrei Kistyakovsky, briefly served as Fund administrators. Kistyakovsky wrote a lengthy document rebutting Repin's charges and defending Khodorovich. Both men were subjected to strong KGB pressure to withdraw from the Fund. Kistyakovsky left due to extremely poor health; Mikhailov withdrew due to church influence. Today, Soviet prisoners of conscience and their families—with the exception of Baptist organizations—are assisted through more informal means.

In 1985, in his camp in Norilsk, Siberia—the coldest spot on the globe—Khodorovich was subjected to systematic beatings to force him to confess. When that did not succeed, Khodorovich went on trial in camp for disobeying camp authorities. In April 1985—just as he should have been released—Khodorovich received another 3-year camp term.

Conclusion: Soviet society has long suffered from major social ills—just as all societies do. Under Gorbachev's campaign for *glasnost* or publicity, the Soviet media has begun at least to discuss some of these problems. Alcoholism has been tackled as a major target of Gorbachev's efforts to increase efficiency. The price of vodka has been sharply increased. There is public pressure to imbibe less. Alcoholics and their families are urged to seek medical treatment.

Unlike other social and economic problems, alcoholism bears no ideological baggage. Other major Soviet problems, such as the inherently inefficient collectivized Soviet agriculture, are clearly connected to the Soviet political structure. Still other serious problems, such as increased mortality rates largely caused by deficient medical care, require increased funding. But increased funding for medicine, education, housing, or transport is impossible as long as the Soviet military sector takes up some 14 percent of the Soviet GNP.

The fate of Soviet citizens who independently have called attention to social, economic or labor problems remains grim. Organizers of independent labor unions have faced particularly harsh punishment which shows no sign of easing. Even Soviet war invalids who have asked for an improvement in their situation have not met with success. Ironically, many Soviet citizens currently are imprisoned for criticizing some of the same conditions which now the Soviet leadership is decrying.

CULTURAL RIGHTS

Soviet Legal Provisions: Article 50 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution grants Soviet citizens freedom of speech and press "in accordance with the working people's interests and for the purpose of strengthening and developing the socialist system." Other constitutional provisions make it clear that it is the U.S.S.R. Communist Party which "leads, guides and determines" these interests.

The Soviet Criminal Code has several articles which penalize those who exercise freedom of speech and the press. These two articles are article 70, RSFSR Criminal Code, "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," and article 190.1, RSFSR Criminal Code, "anti-Soviet slander." (See *New Soviet Laws* section.)

In recent years, the Soviet Government has undertaken a battery of measures to restrict communication between the Soviet population and the rest of the world. Taken together, these measures constitute a major effort to isolate the Soviet population in the area of culture.

Soviet Cultural Policy: Pronouncements on Soviet culture make clear that it is the party which is in control. Typical of such statements is a March 16, 1986 *Pravda* editorial, "The Artist's Place is in the Front Line." "The party supports and will continue to support all literary and artistic talent imbued with party mindedness and the popular spirit. Ideological principle and exactingness, respect for talent, and tact constitute the norm for party organizations' work with the artistic intelligentsia." The editorial also defines the role of the artist in society: "The place of literature and art lies in the working lineup."

The role of Soviet culture is still essentially defined as a "transmission belt" for party values—if not commands. Nevertheless, the last several years have seen some changes in Soviet cultural policy, as the Soviet Union has shifted gears under three Kremlin chiefs. Under Andropov, there was relative cultural liberalism, while Chernenko imposed cultural orthodoxy. Under Gorbachev, there has been a return to relative cultural liberalism. Basically, however, the party is struggling to find the most effective way of making culture a convincing propaganda vehicle.

In early 1983, two *Pravda* editorials lashed out at "hackneyed speculations on topical themes," demanding a higher professional and artistic level. Other articles criticized production problems such as defective printing, but also discussed artistic failings. Typical is this exerpt from No. 6, 1983, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*: "Any defective product, even in the artistic field, deserves to be condemned. . . . It is high time . . . to measure successful literary images against the living practice of Communist construction and to propagate them widely, becoming a sort of coauthor with the writer."

A tough new policy on culture was pronounced at the party Congress in July 1983. The pressure on Soviet cultural figures to conform to Soviet orthodoxy intensified in 1984. The new Soviet leader, Konstantin Chernenko, made several speeches exhorting artists to return to the glorious Soviet art of the past. In September 1984, for example, Chernenko addressed the Soviet Union of Writers plenum. He laid down the gauntlet to all independent artists:

> There can be no indulgence of manifestations of lack of principles and ideological rectitude. . . . It is naive to think that one can blacken the moral-political pillars of our system and at the same time expect benefits and recognition from it. And, of course, the people will not forgive anybody who has gone over to the side of our ideological opponents in the bitter struggle that is going on in the world today. There can be no two opinions about that.[15]

Western cultural influences of all kinds were denigrated. Popular music was particularly hard hit. Western albums were removed

[15] See footnote on p. 234.

from record stores and illegal re-recording of imports was banned. Soviet rock groups were forced to disband or sanitize their acts.

This crackdown on Soviet culture may have been a factor in two outstanding Soviet artists' decisions not to return to the U.S.S.R. In 1984, while working in Europe, theater director Yuri Lyubimov and film director Andrei Tarkovsky opted not to go back to the Soviet Union. Indeed, in a September 5, 1983 interview with the London *Times,* Lyubimov asserted that Soviet cultural policy, as implemented by Minister of Culture Pyotr Demichev, was causing dozens of leading Soviet cultural figures to leave the Soviet Union.

Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign for greater *glasnost* or publicity in the Soviet press has had important effects on general Soviet cultural policy. Indeed, in the past year there have been noticeable signs in various areas that the liberalization of Soviet culture is underway.

In an interview with *L'Humanite,* for example, General Secretary Gorbachev even admitted that censorship existed. Even more unusual, on February 8, 1986, *Pravda* ran the complete interview, including Gorbachev's claim that Soviet censorship is limited to data on military secrets, war propaganda, brutality, humiliation of individuals and pornography. Other Soviet media reveal that the range of censored topics extends far beyond Gorbachev's list. The very existence of such discussions, however, bodes well for an improved atmosphere for Soviet culture.

Furthermore, Soviet authorities recently have shown a new attitude towards prominent cultural figures who have stayed in or emigrated to the West. In an interview with Western correspondents at the 27th Party Congress in March 1986, noted Soviet actor Mikhail Ulyanov spoke about Tarkovsky and Lyubimov:

> Lyubimov was an actor at the Vakhtangov Theater, a very good actor. . . . The state entrusted him with the directorship of a theater, out of which he created an interesting collective. Then Lyubimov began to stage productions abroad. All of us, the actors at the Vaganka Theater, consider it a great personal tragedy that he has remained there. . . . The same goes for Andrei Tarkovsky. . . . Those were their personal decisions and tragedies and it was not malicious intent on the part of their country.

This attitude is in stark contrast to the denunciations of other Soviet artists who have opted to stay in the West. It also stands in notable contrast to the Soviet law, "Refusal to Return to the Soviet Union from Abroad," which is considered treason and punishable by imprisonment or death.

Another sign of possible change in Soviet cultural policy was the removal of 21-year veteran Pyotr Demichev, the Soviet Minister of Culture, in June 1986. Demichev, a chemical engineer by training, was noted chiefly for his battle against unorthodox culture in the 1970's and early 1980's.

There are other recent indications that Soviet culture may be moving in a more positive direction: the staging of more lively plays, the release of some previously banned films, and debate and innovation at recent Congresses of the Unions of Writers and Cinematographers (which will be described later).

Nevertheless, the essential dilemma for party ideologues who formulate Soviet cultural policy is summed up in the following Radio Liberty commentary:

> (They) could either seek to raise the quality of and interest in new works by according writers (or other cultural figures) greater artistic independence or (they) could perpetuate the existing division of literature (or other art forms) into the professionally hopeless and unreadable works of party propaganda on the one hand and the gifted works that deviate from "the general line" but are liked by the reading public on the other. It has, however, rejected both these alternatives and opted for a dubious compromise. The goal is to make propagandist literature (or other art forms) more professional and interesting, while binding talented writers (or other cultural figures) closer to the party line.[16]

In other words, the party does not trust artists (or anyone else) enough to give them genuine independence from its dictates. Nevertheless, it recognizes that culture must be made more attractive to the Soviet people to meet its propaganda aims. Thus, Soviet culture remains harnessed to the party, but is enjoined to make its "product" more palatable. Debates at the recent Writers and Cinematographers Union congresses reveal that official Soviet artists are sharply divided over future directions for Soviet culture. Often, divisions are along generational lines.

Soviet censorship

Generally known by its former acronym of *glavlit*, the official title of the main Soviet censorship organization is the "Main Board for the Protection of State and Military Secrets in the Press, State Committee for the Press under the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R." *Glavlit* has divisions all over the Soviet Union with about 70,000 censors. Every publishing house and newspaper has a resident *glavlit* censor. There are other special censorship bodies; the largest, the military, has a staff of about 50. *Glavlit* is under the Central Committee Propaganda Committee, with a major, if tangential, relationship to the KGB.[17]

The procedure for censoring a Soviet publication begins with two copies of the material intended for publication being submitted to the censor who then peruses it for several days; 2 weeks is average for a monthly magazine. When he is finished, the censor invites authorized personnel to visit him for a "chat."

According to *glavlit* regulations, only the chief editor, his deputy, or senior secretary may meet with the censor. In practice, however, the editor in charge of a particular issue is allowed to confer with the censor. One *glavlit* rule is never broken: an author does not meet with the censor directly.

During this "chat," the censor may ask for the sources of specific information in the text, or he may ask if the KGB has given permission for the use of a certain photograph. If the censor has deter-

---

[16] [17] See footnotes on p. 234.

mined that certain information cannot be included, the editor asks for the censor's "suggestion" on how to change the text. The censor usually opts for dropping the entire paragraph. Finally, references in the article are checked.

When the censor has approved the text, he puts his personal stamp on every printer's sheet (which equals 16 pages of text). The head of the printer's shop refuses to print anything which does not have the censor's stamp, for he faces an 8-year prison term for printing over 10 copies of anything without the censor's stamp.

The material is then printed in 10 copies which are sent to the censor, 2 each to the Lenin Library, Agitprop, and the KGB. The censor compares the printed version with a copy of the original text. Only then does the censor give the go-ahead for the publication.

The Soviet censor is guided in making decisions by checking with the latest edition of the "Index of Information Not to be Published in the Open Press"—informally known as the "Talmud." This 300-page book contains the following sections: General Information; Agriculture; Transport; Economics and Finance. The index provides more detailed information on which it is always forbidden to publish:

1. Information about earthquakes, avalanches, landslides, and other natural disasters on the territory of the U.S.S.R.;
2. Information about fires, explosions, airplane, naval and mine disasters, and train crashes;
3. Figures on the earnings of Government and party workers;
4. Comparisons of the budgets of Soviet citizens and the prices of goods;
5. Information on seasonal and local price increases;
6. Reports about improved living standards anywhere outside the socialist camp;
7. Reports of food shortages in the U.S.S.R. (one can only discuss local bottlenecks);
8. Any average statistics on the Soviet Union as a whole not taken from the Central Statistical Bureau reports;
9. The names of any KGB operatives other than the Committee Chairman;
10. The names of the employees of the former Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, other than the Chairman;
11. Aerial photographs of Soviet cities and the precise geographical coordinates of any populated point on Soviet territory;
12. Any mention of *glavlit* organs and the jamming of Western radio broadcasts;
13. Names of political leaders on a special list, including such major figures as Trotsky.

Perhaps the most basic censorship in the U.S.S.R., however, is self-censorship. The officially acceptable norms of cultural expression in the U.S.S.R. are well known. Cultural figures, who know the price for violation of official norms or who desire the perquisites of state rewards, tailor their works to fit party confines. Self-censorship applies to varied aspects of the creative process—writer, playwright, film maker, editor, publisher or cultural bureaucrat. The constraints of official plus self-censorship allow little space for individual expression.

Still there are some holes in the straitjacket of official censorship. Sometimes an editor or censor fails to catch something. And because the censorship mechanism is so complex, it sometimes breaks down. Moreover, Soviet artists have mastered the old technique of Aesopian language and Soviet audiences are adept at getting the message.

The role of artistic unions

Many Soviet cultural figures belong to "creative" or labor unions. Such unions include those for composers, cinematographers, writers and artists. Membership in such unions is a mixed blessing. It is through these unions that the party exerts the greatest pressure for artistic conformity. As Soviet emigre conductor, Maxim Shostakovich noted at an October 29, 1985 Helsinki Commission hearing: "The functioning of censorship begins at the creative union . . . In this way, the creative unions, such as the Composers' Union, are in charge of making sure that the censorship procedures are followed."

Although expulsion from the Writers' Union does not directly affect a writer's income from his publications, because his fees are not paid by this body, there are economic incentives for union members to ensure ideological conformity. For example, members receive passes to "Houses of Creativity" with special polyclinics for advanced medical treatment. There is also special high-quality housing. The unions also sponsor funds, mainly for members, to assist financially needy writers. The most important advantage to union membership, however, is preferential access to publishing houses, studios, and theaters. Although union members are not supposed to get better treatment, a non-union member's work is performed or published only rarely.

Literature

Within the general censorship system described above, the role of the literary editor is particularly important. A key task of the initial editor is to make sure that the literary manuscript conforms to the basic tenets of Socialist Realism. There must be a "positive hero," good (from the party perspective) must defeat evil and the general tone must be optimistic. The editor must also delete criticism of the Soviet system and ensure that Soviet life is portrayed brightly and that Western life is painted gloomily. If works do show negative characters or aspects of Soviet life, they cannot imply any tie to the Soviet system. Editors must also eliminate as many ambiguities as possible.

The laborious Soviet censorship procedure is time consuming, enervating and a waste of talent. A speaker at the Ninth Armenian Writers Union Congress in May 1986, for example, complained that it takes 3 to 4 years after submission to get a manuscript published.[18] Noted Soviet poet Andrei Voznesensky said at the Eighth U.S.S.R. Writers' Congress, as reported in the June 27, 1986 *Pravda*, "It is no secret that the writer spends approximately 10 percent of his life writing a book and 90 percent pushing it."

[18] See footnote on p. 234.

Robert Rozhdestvensky, another well-known poet, added: "The more talented and original a manuscript is, the longer it spends lying in publishers' offices. How long can it stay there? It can be 5 years, 7 years, or even longer."

The Eighth Soviet Writers Union Congress held in June 1986, was marked by frank and heated discussion of the serious problems facing Soviet literature. One complaint raised was the "table of ranks," according to which the content of critical articles, literary prizes, and the size of editions do not depend on the artistic merits of a given writer, but on the author's position in the union.

The Congress examined a whole range of topical issues: "from the destruction of nature to nationality conflicts; from shortcomings in the schoolteaching of literature to falsification of the election results for the Union of Writers leadership; from unwarranted mistrust of young writers, to the excessive number of pensioned-off former members of the *nomenklatura*, who do not write books but influence the atmosphere of the union." [19]

The crucial problem of censorship was also aired at this Congress, not only by individual writers but also by Union officials. As reported in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, (June 27, 1986) Mikhail Nenashev, chairman of the State Publishing Commission, said: "As practice shows, for the authors of new and daring ideas, for pioneers in literature, science and culture our publishing houses are often bleak and uninviting. Conservatives and opportunists feel more comfortable there."

Rectification of longstanding injustice to great Soviet writers of the past was another important theme at the Congress. Evgeny Evtushenko, for example, presented an appeal signed by 40 writers to create a museum to honor Boris Pasternak and called for the "publication of the complete works of (Anna) Akhmatova and (Boris) Pasternak." Stating that "our readers have matured enough to read everything," Andrei Voznesensky called for the publication of Evgeny Zamyatin, Vladislav Khodasevich and Lev Gumilev.

Although Soviet citizens read more than in almost any other country, boring "party-fied" literature and competing technologies such as TV and records have taken their toll. Some recent statistics reveal the sorry state of literature in the U.S.S.R. today. Between 1976 and 1980, Soviet libraries received 700 million new books, but 500 million were later written off as surplus because no one ever checked them out.

Despite the brave words, the recent Writers' Congress ended inconclusively. Andrei Voznesensky summed up the basic unanswered problem facing Soviet literature: "Our main enemy within is not the hard-hitting book, but the monster of bureaucracy and the inertia of the old way of thinking which hampers us now."

Recently there have been some instances of the reinstatement of writers who had been expelled from the Writers' Union. Two writers, Viktor Erofiev and Evgeny Popov, who were expelled for participating in *Metropol*, an unofficial literary almanac published in late 1970's, were reinstated in late 1986. Another writer, Semyon Lipkin, who had withdrawn from the Writers' Union out of solidarity with his two colleagues, also was reinstated.

Some writers who reject official Soviet culture write works of artistic prose or poetry "for the desk drawer." Other writers who

[19] See footnote on p. 234.

refuse to abide by state-imposed restrictions resort to publishing their works in unofficial or *samizdat* journals. In its struggle against dissent, the Soviet state has engaged in a major campaign against all types of *samizdat*, including *belles lettres*. As many as 50 Soviet writers of all kinds of materials are today prisoners of conscience in the U.S.S.R. (Please see attached annex of imprisoned Soviet writers.)

Grigory Aleksandrov, a prisoner in the Stalinist camps, was arrested in Tashkent in February 1983. He is the author of a book about the camps, *I Leave for the Outcast Villages*, and was involved in the Crimean Tatar struggle to return to their homeland. In the summer of 1983, Aleksandrov underwent psychiatric examination at the Serbsky Institute and was sent for forcible "treatment" at the Tashkent Special Psychiatric Hospital.

Nizametdin Akhmetov is a Bashkir poet who received the 1984 Rotterdam Poetry Prize. In 1982, he smuggled out an appeal to the Madrid Follow-up Conference from his Siberian camp. For writing that appeal, Akhmetov was charged with "anti-Soviet slander" in early 1983. In camp he was severely beaten and feared that his legs might have to be amputated due to thrombosis. Ruled "nonaccountable," Akhmetov is now interned in the Talgar Special Psychiatric Hospital.

Literary archivist Aleksandr Bogoslovsky, 47, was sentenced in July 1984 to a 3-year camp term for "anti-Soviet slander." Evidence against him consisted of distribution of some materials in his personal archive, such as *Russia in 1839* by the Marquis de Custine.

Russian nationalist writer, Leonid Borodin, was sentenced on May 19, 1983 to 10 years camp plus 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Awarded the 1983 Freedom Prize by the French PEN Club, Borodin was convicted largely on the basis of his recent poetry and prose works.

Lithuanian Liudas Dambrauskas, a 65-year-old chemist, was sentenced in October 1984 to 3½ years in camp plus 2 years in exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." His crime: memoirs he wrote on his 10 years in Stalin's camps. Dambrauskas suffered a heart attack during the pre-trial investigation and collapsed during his trial.

Jewish worker, Georgy Feldman, was arrested in late 1982. He was charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for his manuscripts of poetry and prose dedicated to Sakharov and to the Jewish people. In June 1983, Feldman was tried and received a 6-year camp sentence.

Electrician Boris Grezin was arrested in Moscow in August 1983, and was charged with writing "pornographic" and "anti-Soviet" poetry. He received a 4-year camp term, although he admitted his guilt.

Lithuanian economist, Vladas Lapienis, 79, was sentenced on March 29, 1985 to 4 years camp plus 2 years exile for his memoirs about a Stalinist labor camp. First jailed in early 1984 on charges of "anti-Soviet slander," Lapienis was then released due to his poor health.

Leningrad linguist, Mikhail Meilakh, was arrested in June 1983 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for possessing and distributing the works of such Russian writers as Osip Mandelshtam

and Vladimir Nabokov. He has also written and edited the works of Anna Akhmatova, A. Vvedensky, and Daniil Kharms.

Poet Irina Ratushinskaya, an honorary PEN member, was tried in March 1983 and sentenced to 7 years camp plus 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." She is the first woman to receive the maximum term under this article—for her poetry and support for an unofficial labor union. During her first 2 years in camp, she was in an isolation cell for a total of 138 days because of her fasts and protests. However, in a surprising move, Soviet authorities released Ratushinskaya from camp on October 9. She has since been given permission to go to England for medical treatment.

Aleksei Razlatsky, deputy director of the Kuibyshev Computer Center, was tried in February 1983 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and received a 12-year term of imprisonment. A member of the Soviet Writers' Union, Razlatsky was active in an unofficial socialist circle, the Vetrov Initiative Group.

Russian religious writer, Feliks Svetov, was tried in January 1985 and sentenced to 3 years in exile for "anti-Soviet slander." A member of the Soviet Writers' Union, Svetov and his wife, Zoya Krakhmalnikova, compiled anthologies of Russian Orthodox writings.

Moscow economist, Lev Timofeev, published articles in such official Soviet publications as *Novy Mir* (*New World*) and *Molodaya Gvardiya* (*Young Guard*). In the late 1970's, Timofeev began to contribute to the Russian emigre press. In 1981, his book, *The Technology of the Black Market or the Peasants' Art of Starving*, came out in the West. On September 30, 1985, he was tried and found guilty of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," receiving a 6-year camp term plus a 5-year exile term.

The performing arts

The performing arts in the U.S.S.R. are all under the control of the "Glavrepertkom" (Main Committee for Control of Spectacles and Repertoire) in the Ministry of Culture. This special branch of the censorship apparatus decides what will be performed in theaters, cinemas, and concert halls.[20]

Theater.—Soviet censorship of theater is very strict. Not only is it limited to banning a production, but, it also restricts the theatrical creative process.

There are three stages in the Soviet censorship of theater. First, the censorship of the text of a new play. Second, approval of the seasonal repertoire of each theater. Third, "acceptance of a production" presided over by a special theatrical censor. This stage of censorship is obligatory and essential. Productions may be banned (or postponed indefinitely for "reworking") on any pretext. Deletions or alterations to the text can also be recommended.

Considered the leading Soviet theater director, Yuri Lyubimov traveled to England in August 1983 to stage Dostoevsky's "Crime and Punishment." In an emotional interview with the London *Times* in September 1983, Lyubimov blamed Soviet censors for

[20] See footnote on p. 234.

blocking his last three productions in Moscow. Eventually, Lyubimov decided to stay in the West, despite regrets at leaving his beloved Taganka Theater.

As the debilitating effects of pervasive censorship of Soviet theater accelerated, a reaction set in. In 1986, for example, several lively plays were staged which dealt with genuine social problems. The hit play for 1986 at the Moscow Art Theater was called "The Silver Anniversary." Directed by Oleg Yefremov, the play dealt with corruption, morality and renewal, and was filled with soul searching and tears.

Recent Soviet press articles attest to the growing realization that Soviet theater is in dire need of new life. In a lengthy piece in *Sovetskaya Kultura*, (January 16, 1986) Peoples Artist of the U.S.S.R., Andrei Goncharov, minces few words in describing some of these problems. He begins by asserting, "Our theater can no longer live the way it does today." Turning to administrative issues, Goncharov notes:

> I must say that in this most important part of our work (the formation of repertoire) we have acquired . . . a collection of absurd cliches and obsolete requirements.
>
> The administrative structure of today's theaters . . . is obviously also obsolete and . . . retards progress. For example, there are nine (!) administrative levels above our Mayakovsky Theater alone.
>
> In order to obtain permission to perform (a new play) it is necessary to knock on dozens of doors . . . When everything is finally completed, . . . either the play is no longer needed or the producer who planned to present it has left the theater, or even worse, fell ill and died.
>
> Today the theater cannot independently take on for a performance a producer, artist or composer . . . (This) must be approved at an endless number of administrative levels. . . . We have almost no rights to initiative, no . . . opportunities for any production or artistic variations. We have only duties. . . . We become dependents, who merely await instructions from higher-ups.

Film and television

An elaborate system of official and informal censorship exists for Soviet cinema. The script department of each film studio develops a "creative" plan for the year. This plan is based on obligatory themes such as various anniversaries and celebrations, the Soviet village and countryside, Soviet industry, and Lenin. Scripts are planned by the studio director, the chief of the scriptwriting department, with the editorial council, the artistic council, and officials from the State Committee for Cinematography.

A film script must pass through about 20 stages of censorship control before actual film production can begin. Various types of censorship agencies may be involved, depending on the type of film. Military censors are usually involved in overseeing documentary films. In a final censorship stage, the U.S.S.R. State Committee of Cinematography submits a working copy of the script to the U.S.S.R. Central Committee.

Once the film is in production, it is again subject to various types of censorship, particularly in the editing stage. Before a film is actually released to the public, it goes through another complex series of censorship measures.

Recognition of the need for major changes in Soviet cinematography emerged during the Fifth Congress of Soviet Cinema Workers in 1986, symbolized by the unprecedented rejection of Sergei Bondarchuk as a Congress delegate. As Radio Liberty put it, "The cinema workers declined to elect as a delegate to their Congress a People's Artist of the U.S.S.R., a Hero of Socialist Labor, a Lenin Prize winner, the most honored and influential member of the Soviet film establishment, and the living incarnation of 20 years of stagnation under Brezhnev." [21]

The refusal to choose Bondarchuk as a delegate was not the only personnel change at the Cinema Workers' Congress. More important, the talented Soviet film director, Elem Klimov, was elected First Secretary. Klimov has spent most of his career unsuccessfully battling censorship. He promised to examine setting up a special board to deal with film censorship. Old time-servers were swept from office; gifted directors and scriptwriters took their places as Union of Cinematographers officers.

Regarding television, the Soviet Union has joined the rest of the world in the "TV revolution." An article in *Zhurnalist* (No. 8, August 1985) notes that the "average" Soviet viewer spends 2½ hours each day watching television, and over 3 hours on nonworkdays. After noting that Westerners spend more time watching TV, the author hastens to add that this is not because Soviet TV programs are any less popular.

Video has also caught the attention of the Soviet people—and the Soviet authorities. *Izvestiya*, (October 15, 1985) for example, asserts that "video is a new and very powerful ideological weapon. If we do not understand this in good time, and underestimate its possibilities, the vacuum will be filled by our enemies." The article goes on to criticize the generally underdeveloped Soviet video industry, and describes an underground video operation which charges young people 10 rubles to see decadent Western films. The ringleader was sentenced to 1½ years imprisonment for distributing pornography and organizing profit-making shows.

Ever vigilant, Soviet officials have introduced new articles in the civil codes of the Soviet Republics to deal with video "piracy." Article 174 Latvian Civil Code provides that:

> The distribution of video cassettes, video disks, and other materials with recording, which by their nature may bring harm to the state and social order, and to the health and morality of the population, and equally the showing of similar recordings, will entail a warning or the imposition of a fine to a citizen in the amount of 50 rubles, and up to 100 rubles to officials, along with the confiscation of materials in the video recording and of the means which reproduce a video recording.

---

[21] See footnote on p. 234.

An article in a Georgian newspaper (*Akhalgazrda Komunisti*, April 8, 1986) mentions two penalties applied against video "bandits." One, article 232 Georgian Criminal Code spells out penalties for making, showing or distributing pornographic material. Another, article 59, was recently introduced in the Georgian Administrative Code. It stipulates legal responsibility for buying and selling video materials for a profit of under 30 rubles, 50 rubles to 100 rubles fine may be imposed and materials confiscated.

Classical music

Music, as Soviet emigre conductor Maxim Shostakovich said at a 1985 Helsinki Commission hearing, is "in an advantageous position because it speaks a language which is not understandable. However, . . . when words are added to music, that's another question. A person will never hear an opera composed to works of Solzhenitsyn, for example, or works by the poet Akhmatova . . . or Aksyonov. Also, music which is connected to anything spiritual, religious, is not allowed," particularly if it is by a Russian composer. And "very contemporary works of music are not performed." In short, the basic aim of Soviet censorship of music literature is to hinder the circulation of works which do not fulfill any propaganda purpose.

The party recognizes only two types of music: the "relevant" (aktualny) and the "irrelevant" (neaktualny). Irrelevant or nontopical music includes music without any words; it is rarely played. Music with words is considered by the party to be relevant, topical and important.

The party criticizes composers for "unhealthy trends" such as neglecting vital contemporary themes of crucial social importance and displaying an exaggerated interest in technical experimentation. Nevertheless, famous Soviet composers such as Shostakovich, Khachaturyan or Kabalevsky were granted somewhat greater flexibility—perhaps in deference to their fame.

Soviet composers, like their literary colleagues, also write for the "desk drawer," playing compositions only for close friends. Sometimes these friends tape-record these works or mimeograph these scores. Thirty or 40 copies of these scores may be reproduced at the Union of Composers to be shown to performers. In this way, these works gain conditional recognition, although they are not performed.

Every Soviet performer has a document called an "Artist's Certificate" to which is attached a list of works he or she is entitled to perform. Whether he or she is a cellist, trumpeteer, pianist, or singer, this list contains the repertoire and a stamp authorizing him or her to perform these works until a certain date. Sometimes the performer is told that a work is forbidden or permitted. In this way, the performer knows what to include in programs. When Soviet artists perform abroad, they have a wider choice since foreign concert agencies have some say in compiling programs.

Popular music

Popular and official attitudes towards jazz in the U.S.S.R. have undergone many changes over the years. Alternately considered the product of the "decadent West" or the "cry of oppressed Ameri-

can blacks," today the Soviet Government allows some jazz groups to tour the United States and many jazz groups to play inside the U.S.S.R.

Jazz is very popular in the Soviet Union; there are about 170 jazz musicians and ensembles. The Latvian-based youth newspaper, *Sovetskaya molodezh*, publishes an annual jazz poll compiled by Soviet critics. Among the perennial winners of this poll are the Ganelin Trio from Lithuania (which went on a successful American tour in mid-1986), Nikolai Levinovsky's "Allegro," and German Lukyanov's "Cadence." Leading musicians include pianist Leonid Chizhik, saxophonist Aleksei Kozlov, and the singer Larisa Dolina.

In the spring of 1984, the U.S.S.R. began a sweep against the "decadent" influence of rock music. Hundreds of Soviet rock groups were disbanded. Forty out of 80 pop/rock groups were disbanded in Ukraine alone. In Estonia, a popular rock group, "Magnetic Band," was disbanded at Moscow's orders. The Soviet press also stepped up its attacks on the nefarious effects of Western rock music on Soviet youth.

In October 1984, the All-Union Scientific Methodological Center, under the Soviet Ministry of Culture, issued an executive order to recording studios and discos recommending that records, compact disks and videos, as well as books and posters of over 100 Soviet and foreign musical groups be banned in Moscow. This order is part of the Center's struggle against the influence of bourgeois ideology and its effort to raise the artistic-ideological level.

Judging by recent Soviet press articles, this repressive campaign did not last long. Valery Sukhorado, general director of the Melodiya Record Firm, in *Komsomolskaya pravda* (November 10, 1985) promised a reader that a double album, "The Beatles' Best Songs," would come out in early 1986. A 14-year-old reader, asked why Melodiya does not release records by such popular foreign groups as Queen, Kiss and Video Kids which "you can hear in the discotheques, and their recordings are sold on the black market." Sukhorado rejected the idea of Melodiya producing such "low-grade, immoral products," saying that Russian classical music (part of traditional Russian culture promoted by the state) would remain its priority.

Ultimately, the Soviet authorities seem to have decided if you can't beat the rock groups, you might as well join them. An item in *Leningradskaya Pravda* (January 19, 1986) proudly describes the Leningrad rock club which "brings together" 40 amateur rock clubs and almost 500 rock fans under the aegis of the Inter-Union House of Amateur Art. This club organizes seminars, "Round Tables," and many concerts—50 in 1985 alone. In addition, there is an annual 3-day Leningrad rock festival-competition.

Not all Soviet musicians have been, however partially, welcomed into the official fold. A devout Baptist musician, Valery Barinov, organized a Christian rock group "Trumpet Call" in Leningrad which was very popular throughout the U.S.S.R. Denied opportunity to perform in public, Barinov's music was recorded and played on Western radio stations. In February 1984, Barinov was sentenced to 2½ years labor camp on false charges of trying to escape across the border into Norway. Barinov's bass player, Sergei Ti-

mokhin, was tried with him and given a 2-year term on the same charges.

Two Georgian Catholic musicians, Tenghiz and Eduard Gudava, formed the "Phantom" musical group with several other believers to call attention to their emigration efforts. The group gave private performances of classical music and songs in various homes in the Tbilisi area since late 1984. In 1985, a repressive campaign against the group intensified; in April, three members were summoned by the KGB and warned to stop their "anti-Soviet activities." On January 23, 1986, Eduard Gudava was sentenced to 4 years camp for "malicious hooliganism" after he hung a sign from his balcony demanding emigration. Eduard's brother, Tenghiz, was sentenced in June 1986 to 7 years strict regimen camp plus 3 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Painting and sculpture

Soviet painters and sculptors are subject to the same pressures to conform as other Soviet cultural figures. Membership in the official painters' union carries the same obligations and advantages as other artistic unions.[22]

After several well-publicized unofficial art shows in Moscow in the mid-1970's, city officials decided to establish a salon for avant garde art. Organized in 1978, the Moscow City Committee of the Graphic Artists' Union (Gorkom) set up a small salon in the basement of an apartment building on Malaya Gruzinskaya Street.

Unlike members of the official U.S.S.R. Artists' Union, Gorkom members could not get any health or other social benefits; they could not get studios and no official salons would accept their paintings for sale. Strict controls on what can be shown in the Gorkom salon has resulted in self censorship and uninspired shows. In late 1981, there were attempts to close the Gorkom, but vigorous protests prevented that. A Gorkom membership purge reduced numbers from 400 to 100.

The Moscow art scene was enlivened by the underground activities of a few art groups, such as *Collective Action, Toadstools*, and *SZ*. Members are young and well informed about Western art, particularly *Art Forum* (U.S.) and *Flashart* (Italy). Performance art is favored by these groups, especially Collective Action.

In late October 1982, one of the most important recent indoor unofficial art shows, *APTART*, was held in the one-room apartment of Nikita Alekseev of *Collective Action*. Artists who showed their work include Anatoly Zhigalov, Natalya Abalakova, Sergei Anufriev of Odessa, Roshal, and Konstantin Zvezdochetov. This show later became the basis of several well-received exhibits in the West. A second *APTART* show, featuring *SZ*, opened in early 1983, only to be closed on February 15 when KGB men came in, tore down some works, confiscated others, and threatened the artists with serious consequences if they continued. The work of these unofficial artists is preserved in an unofficial publication called *M.A.N.I.* (Moscow Archive of New Art); five volumes exist.

---

[22] See footnote on p. 234.

Another exhibit, held outside and known as *APTART v nature*, was held in May 1983. About 150 people attended, viewing the performance art and installations. Two further *APTART* productions were held in September: an outdoor show called *APTART Beyond the Fence* and an indoor show known as *APTART in the Dark*. Other unofficial art performances in September 1983 included *Collective Action*, *Silver Doughnut*, *Vasya*, and *M*.

In February and March 1985, some Moscow unofficial artists were called for a meeting by Savostyuk, party secretary of the Moscow Union of Artists. Eight artists, including Nikita Alekseev and Francesco Infante, were told to cease contacts with the Paris art journal, *A-Ya*. They were asked how their materials had found their way to the West.

Some unofficial artists have been imprisoned for their art. Vyacheslav Sysoev, a well-known Soviet cartoonist who went underground for 4 years to evade arrest, was sentenced on May 12, 1983 to 2 years of imprisonment on charges of pornography. Mikhail Zotov, a self-taught artist, was placed in psychiatric detention in July 1981; his paintings were deemed "anti-Soviet slander." Suffering from poor eyesight, Zotov apparently was released from hospital before November 1984.

Conclusion

Soviet cultural policy in the past few years seems to have followed the zigs and zags of the three Kremlin leaders. Yuri Andropov's brief rule saw a slight easing of cultural constraints. After all, Andropov was rumored to be an admirer of Yuri Lyubimov's famous experimental Taganka theater. Konstantin Chernenko, on the other hand, was an orthodox party man, and this orthodoxy was reflected in his cultural policies. Chernenko's brief tenure was characterized by a crackdown against "decadent" Western cultural influences, particularly in popular culture. Under Chernenko, Soviet cultural life regained the most stagnant features of the Brezhnev reign.

Mikhail Gorbachev seems to have taken his cultural cues from Andropov, as he presides over the limited liberalization of establishment culture. Signs of such tentative liberalization: the staging of more lively plays, releasing previously banned films, and rejuvenating the leadership of Soviet artistic unions. Much of this may be part of Gorbachev's campaign for greater openness in Soviet society. An example is Gorbachev's open reference—unprecented even if misleading—to the existence of censorship in the U.S.S.R.

There are some indications that Soviet cultural policy may continue on a relatively liberal path, including the recent elections in the Soviet Union of Writers and Union of Cinematographers; the softened official statements on Soviet artists who opted to stay in the West; and the greater originality of recently released Soviet films and plays.

Despite these modest signs of liberalization, however, Soviet artists must play by the rules of the Soviet Party game. Evidence of this is all too easy to find: Dozens of Soviet cultural figures who have gone beyond official limits are now in prison. After all, the main aim of Soviet culture is still to make official ideology more

palatable to the Soviet population—not to open Soviet culture to genuine individual talent.

NATIONAL RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BALTIC STATES

The nationality question has been described as the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. In the huge multi-national Soviet Union, tensions among national and ethnic groups are natural. Nevertheless, Soviet officials have usually portrayed the U.S.S.R. as a land of perfect ethnic harmony and equality—though recent official Soviet writings on this issue are more candid, or at least acknowledge the complexity of the issue. But regardless of Soviet representations of the nationality question, Western scholars note that the official policy of the Soviet Government remains linguistic and cultural russification.

Official Soviet attitudes

A comparison of some recent Soviet rulers' views on Soviet nationality issues is instructive. Yuri Andropov in late 1982 and early 1983 called for the development of a "well-thought-out, scientifically substantiated nationalities policy," admitting that "problems of relations among nations have not been removed from the agenda." Although Andropov referred to the "merger" of nationalities as the goal of Soviet society, he also said that "the party knows very well that the path to this goal is a long one." [23]

After a 1982 Riga ideological conference, a series of proposals for improvement of nationality relations were issued. The proposals called for establishment of councils to study nationality relations in all *oblast*, *krai*, and republic party committees. They recognized that violation of Leninist affirmative action programs in party personnel decisions may lead to nationalist tensions. The proposals called for establishing sociological research centers in all republics. They also urged improvement of Russian-language training for non-Russians and "all possible" assistance to nonindigenous nationalities to learn the language of the Republics in which they live.[24]

Konstantin Chernenko, short-lived Soviet leader, also pronounced on the nationality question in the U.S.S.R. In a June 1983 speech at the Central Committee plenum, Chernenko admitted that "the national question as such also exists in the mature Socialist society." Furthermore, at a later Central Committee plenum in April 1984, Chernenko said that nationality relations are not unchanging, since they are subject to new circumstances and the workings of time.[25]

Unlike his predecessors, Mikhail Gorbachev has not made extensive comments on the nationality issue. Gorbachev is also the first Soviet leader since Lenin without any experience in a non-Russian republic. In addition, Gorbachev has made it clear that he is more interested in economic efficiency than ethnic concerns in party staffing and society at large. He made this point abundantly clear when he lumped republics together with purely administrative geographic designations such as *krais* in a speech to a December 1984 ideological conference in Moscow.[26]

---

[23] [24] [25] [26] See footnotes on p. 234.

Most republic First Party Secretaries, however, defend the practice of taking nationality into account in party appointments. Party Secretary Ligachev, as reported in *Kommunist* (No. 12, 1985), said "We must consistently strive to ensure that nationalities represented in party organizations are also properly represented in electoral party organs, including many leaders of these organs." Although he notes that "positive changes" are taking place in most republic organizations, he suggests that more should be done in Belorussia, Lithuania and the Bashkir Autonomous SSR.[27]

One area in which the 15 Union Republics have gained more power is in their foreign ministries. With the exception of United Nations representation for Ukraine and Belorussia, foreign ministry positions used to be almost entirely ceremonial. In the 1970's, however, these ministries became active in the following areas: performing consular work, supervising foreign consulates in their republics, participating in all kinds of exchange negotiations, monitoring co-national emigre groups, and briefing local journalists on foreign policy questions.[28]

A brief examination of the treatment of the nationality issue in the March 1986 party program, the first since 1961, is revealing. "In our multi-national state," the program noted, "with over 100 nations and nationalities living and working together, new tasks for improving nationality relations naturally arise"—which amounts to an acknowledgement that all is not perfect. Moreover in a seeming concession to non-Russian sensibilities, a few formerly ritual references to the Russian people and to "the formerly backward peoples" of the Soviet Union have been dropped.[29]

The discussion on nationalities policy in the new party program, which is included in the section "CPSU Tasks in Perfecting Socialism and the Gradual Transition to Communism," is generally more muted than its 1961 variant. Certain references were dropped: to expand the powers of the Union Republics, to the decreased importance of the internal and international borders of the 15 U.S.S.R. Republics, and to the possible creation of inter-republican economic agencies. The earlier commitment to equalizing levels of economic development throughout the U.S.S.R. has all but disappeared.[30]

Certain hackneyed elements of party nationality policy remain in place, particularly the idea that national groups in the U.S.S.R. should steadily draw together. Although complete national unity is envisaged, this goal will only occur "in the long-range historical perspective." Thus, the party has three main tasks: the general strengthening and development of the single multi-national state, combatting manifestations of localism and national narrow-mindedness, and the enhancement of each republic's material and spiritual potential within the framework of a unified national economic complex. On culture and language issues, the new party program is quite routine. It includes standard phrases on the mutual enrichment of national cultures, and on the need for every non-Russian citizen to master Russian as well as his own native language.[31]

This mixed attitude towards the complex issue of nationality relations in the Soviet Union is also reflected in the writings of influ-

---

[27] [28] [29] [30] [31] See footnotes on p. 234.

ential Soviet scholars on this question. For example, in *Nauchny kommunizm* (No. 5, 1984) G.T. Tavadov outlines three basic approaches to the issue. One group, he notes, feels that the problem has been solved. Another thinks that the national question which was inherited from the Russian Empire has been solved, but that nationality questions nevertheless remain. The third maintains that only the general aspects of the national question in the U.S.S.R. have been resolved.

The author sides with the second group, pointing out that the Twenty Sixth Party Congress had made "a major contribution to the correct understanding of the national question." Tavadov suggests that the growth of national consciousness among the 100 or so nationalities of the Soviet Union may give rise to "national conceit," "a tendency towards isolation," or "a disrespectful attitude towards other nations and nationalities."

Tavadov also describes basic contradictions in the nationality sphere in the U.S.S.R. The first involves problems in keeping in balance the economic interests of the individual state along with those of the entire nation. The second involves economic relations among the national republics. The third derives from conflicts inherent in the multi-national nature of the national-state formations of the Soviet federation. According to Western specialist Solchanyk, "Tavadov's discussion of contradictions in the sphere of national relations may be taken as an indication of a more realistic approach to the national question by certain scholars and party experts."[32]

Confirmation of the "more realistic approach" can be seen in the writings of Academician Yulian Bromlei, chairman of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Scientific Council for Nationality Problems. A recent article by Bromlei in the authoritative journal, *Kommunist*, provides an up-to-date look at party ideas on nationality relations.

Bromlei focuses on the problematic central Asian nationalities. He refers to various economic, social and demographic pressures in central Asia.[33] His solutions are few and far between. He argues that real national equality does not mean identical levels of economic development. Bromlei repeats Gorbachev's suggestion at the recent Party Congress that perhaps "the volume of resources allocated to social needs should be tied more closely to the efficiency of the regional economy." This new stress on economic efficiency may bring about major national dissatisfaction, especially in economically less developed areas such as central Asia.[34]

As to ethnic preferences in party staffing, Bromlei favors a strictly internationalist personnel policy. Bromlei refers to recent party statements which advocate paying more attention to nonindigenous nationalities in the Union Republics. Their needs must be considered not only in regard to language, culture, and daily life, but also to ensure due representation at all social and political levels. Bromlei also supports Central Committee Secretary Ligachev's call for greater inter-republican exchange of party personnel.[35] Despite Gorbachev's silence on this issue, the question of due representa-

[32] [33] [34] [35] See footnotes on p. 234.

tion for all Soviet nationalities, including Russians who live outside the RSFSR, is still on the party agenda.

Language policy

Language policy is one of the most important areas in the Soviet approach to nationality questions. While official Soviet spokesmen stress that nationality relations are built on a principle of strict equality in the Soviet Union, Western observers note that a Soviet governmental policy of linguistic and cultural russification of the non-Russian half of the Soviet population is underway.

A typical statement of official Soviet views on Soviet language policy can be seen in this excerpt from *Sovet Turkmenistany* (September 10, 1985):

> At the present time, Soviet schools operate in 52 languages of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., and radio and television in 67 languages. Our journals are published in 44 languages, newspapers in 56 languages, and books and brochures in 63 languages. By adding to this smaller peoples speaking their own languages who number only in the thousands, language primers are published in 90 languages. A total of 99.6 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s population is actively using their own literary languages, and 0.4 percent is using the languages of the Socialist nations of their own accord, because they live and work in these nations.

One Western expert on Soviet nationality policy, Ann Sheehy, has written:

> The declared aim of current Soviet nationalities policy in the sphere of language is the achievement of what is termed universal "national-Russian bilingualism.". . . (T)his means that Moscow wants all members of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union to be fluent in Russian as well as in their own language. The strenuous efforts made by the party and the Government over the years to promote a knowledge of Russian among the non-Russian nationalities are often perceived by members of these nationalities, as well as by observers outside the Soviet Union, as a policy of linguistic russification. This interpretation is vehemently rejected in the Soviet press.[36]

The success of this bilingual policy varies with the different regions of the U.S.S.R. National-Russian bilingualism is already close to being achieved in the RSFSR (where the non-Russian areas have been receiving most of their schooling in Russian since the late 1950's), Ukraine and Belorussia. Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian are all closely related, although separate, East Slavic languages, and hence easy to learn for speakers of these three languages.[37]

In the other Union Republics, particularly in Transcaucasia, central Asia and Estonia, bilingualism is far from the rule. Only one third of the population in these areas claimed to have a good command of Russian in 1979. In most non-Slavic Republics, most children of the local nationalities go to native-language schools, while

[36] [37] See footnotes on p. 234.

in the Baltic and Transcaucasian Republics most native students also receive higher education in their mother tongue.[38]

Furthermore, genuine bilingualism most often results from daily interethnic contacts—and these are declining. In most Union Republic capitals and many major cities, there has long been a large Russian presence, creating a Russian-language environment. Recently, however, in the Caucasian, central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan, the Russian presence has declined in relative importance—and in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan in absolute terms. This decline in the Russian presence is due to a combination of a high native birth rate and Slavic out-migration.[39]

This change in the language environment has resulted in certain changes in language policy and national rights. In regard to language usage, in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, in 1959 one out of two inhabitants regarded Georgian as his or her native language; by 1979 that number had risen to two out of three. In the area of education, recent decades have seen a proportionally faster increase in the number of students attending native-language schools over Russian-language schools in 11 out of 12 non-Slavic Republics (except Estonia). In fact, attendance in Russian-language schools has actually declined in Uzbekistan and Azerbaidzhan. Earlier, native party officials, who were either uneducated or poorly trained, permitted the Russian language to dominate administration, higher education and industry. Today, non-Russian officials no longer have this attitude.[40]

Partly in reaction to declining or stabilizing Russian language use in most non-Slavic areas of the Soviet Union, academician Bromlei has recommended that Russians and members of other nonindigenous nationalities learn the native languages of the republics to improve personal relations and increase linguistic adaptation. The 1982 Riga All-Union Conference on nationality relations also made this suggestion. Little action has resulted, except in Latvia and Estonia, where steps to improve teaching Estonian to non-Estonians were already underway.[41]

Other leading Soviet scholars on national relations, such as M.N. Guboglo, have clearly shown that Russian is their primary concern. He has written that the language model for "developed socialism" is "national-Russian bilingualism" grounded in "concern for the functional development of the native languages of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and, at the same time, a desire to create conditions for the dissemination of the Russian language among them." In specific areas of language policy, Guboglo advocates: stepping up Russian-language publishing; paying more heed to the needs of the bilingual population in book printing; diminishing "privileges for the national languages" in publishing, languages, media, and education; and considering more the needs of the bilingual population in education and broadcasting.[42]

"The Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R.—Only for Poetry and Memoirs?" is the thought-provoking title of another Solchanyk article. Analyzing the publication output in Ukraine for 1980 (the latest year available), he reveals an initially impressive showing

---

[38] [39] [40] [41] [42] See footnotes on p. 234.

for Ukrainian-language materials: a total of 640 literary works in Ukrainian compared to 200 Russian-language titles.

For specific subject areas, however, a different picture emerges. There were, for example, 298 scientific publications in Ukrainian, and 1,906 in Russian. Favorite propaganda themes in the U.S.S.R., such as works on socio-political topics, show 1,106 in Russian compared to 389 in Ukrainian. More books and brochures were published in Russian than Ukrainian in the following areas: physical culture and sport, culture and education, linguistics, printing, library science and bibliography. Ukrainian-language works outnumbered Russian only in literature and art.[43]

The predominance of the Russian language in the Ukrainian media can be seen in television broadcasting. Data in a number of Ukrainian newspapers in 1983 shows a 2 to 1 ratio of television programming in Russian, although 80 percent of the population of the Ukraine is Ukrainian.

Obviously, language policy is recognized as a key element in the overall Soviet nationality program. As this brief survey of official Soviet positions shows, there is a wide diversity of views on language policy. Western specialists on Soviet nationality questions, not surprisingly, take more critical positions. Roman Solchanyk, for example, has shown that "since about 1976, the authorities have been following a deliberate policy of restricting the circulation of newspapers and journals in languages other than Russian, while promoting unrestricted growth of the Russian press." [44]

Further evidence of restrictive Kremlin policies towards the non-Russian languages of the Soviet Union emerged in a series of new laws in 1981 on the language of legal proceedings. Under the new 1978 Constitutions of Ukraine, Belorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia, legal proceedings could be conducted only in the native language, or in the case of Georgia, in the language of the autonomous republic or *oblast*. In 1984, however, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet ordered the introduction of new articles in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics, "The Language in which Legal Proceedings shall be Conducted." Legal proceedings are now conducted not only in the native language of the republic or state but also "in the language of the majority of the local population." In this way, Russian will make further inroads at the expense of local languages.[45]

The Slavic Republics

There are three Republics in which East Slavic peoples are dominant: RSFSR, Ukraine and Belorussia. Official Soviet russification policies have been most successful in regard to eastern Ukraine, Belorussia and the numerous non-Russian enclaves inside the RSFSR.

Although Ukrainians and Belorussians are subject to intensive linguistic and cultural russification by the Kremlin, they are also viewed as "little brothers" in the Soviet national hierarchy. Even ethnic Russians are not free to develop their culture as they see fit, but must conform to Soviet strictures. Thus, these nationalities are

[43] [44] [45] See footnotes on p. 234.

in the somewhat anomalous position of being more privileged than the non-Slavs, but are still subject to obtrusive cultural and linguistic controls.

The potential nationalist feeling of 40 million Ukrainians has always been a source of concern to the Kremlin. In fact, it was mainly because he lacked the means that Stalin did not deport Ukrainians *en masse* to Siberia—as he had done with numerous smaller nationalities.

One fact points to the particular official repression meted out to expressions of Ukrainian nationalism: although Ukrainians account for 20 percent of the Soviet population, they comprise 40 percent of all Soviet prisoners of conscience. Indeed, the deaths of several leading Ukrainian prisoners of conscience reveal their harsh fate in the U.S.S.R.

Since May 1984, four leading imprisoned Ukrainian activists have died: Valery Marchenko, Vasyl Stus, Yury Lytvyn and Oleksy Tykhy. All four men died while serving 10-year terms in a special regimen labor camp, Perm 36. Notorious for its brutal conditions, Perm camp 36 is the worst category of camp incarceration for political prisoners. These four men promoted Ukrainian national and cultural identity and were imprisoned for their nationalist activities. Three, Tykhy, Stus and Lytvyn, were also members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Belorussian nationalists also face severe penalties for the peaceful expression of their views. For example, Belorussian worker, Mikhail Kukobaka, author of the *samizdat* essay *My Stolen Homeland*, was sentenced in 1985 for "anti-Soviet slander" to a 3-year term—his third on political charges.

Russian national rights advocates encounter major official obstacles in gaining genuine national and cultural rights for the Russian half of the Soviet population. One leading Russian activist, Leonid Borodin, a writer who served a previous 15-year term for his nationalist views, was sentenced on May 19, 1983 to 10 years camp plus 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Another prominent Russian nationalist political prisoner, Igor Ogurtsov, is currently in exile. He has already spent 15 years in imprisonment for his activities. Russian rights advocate, Rostislav Evdokimov, was sentenced on April 5, 1983 to 5 years strict regimen camp plus 3 years exile. Charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," Evdokimov admitted to being a member of the Russian nationalist-emigre organization, the People's Labor Alliance (NTS).

The Caucasus

The Caucasus, meaning language mountain, is aptly named. It is home to hundreds of ethnic and language groups scattered throughout its three Republics, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaidzhan. Not surprisingly for such a diverse area, interethnic tension often runs high—sometimes directed as much at neighboring ethnic groups as Russians or Slavs.

One current example of interethnic tension in the Caucasus is the plight of the Saingilo Georgians in Azerbaidzhan. This small group of Georgian Orthodox Christians lives on the Azerbaidzhan-Georgian border among the Muslim Turkic population of Azer-

baidzhan. Discrimination by Azerbaidzhani authorities is chronicled in 1983 *samizdat* documents: a policy of forcible assimilation including the closing of Georgian-language schools and refusing to issue birth certificates with Georgian names; the destruction of Georgian houses and fields; anti-Georgian discrimination in hiring and promotion; the closing and destruction of Georgian Christian churches; cutting contacts between Saingilo Georgians and the Georgian Republic by embargoing Georgian-language textbooks and even jamming Soviet Georgian TV broadcasts.[46]

In addition to such overt signs of interethnic tension, there are also more indirect expressions of nationalism. For example, support of Republic soccer teams is one of the few officially sanctioned outlets to vent nationalism. Occasionally, such feelings flare up in soccer violence—as in other countries. For example, when the Baku Oilmen of Azerbaidzhan lost to a visiting Armenian soccer team on May 7, 1985, some Azerbaidzhani and Armenian fans got in fisticuffs. Disorders spilled out of the stadium, "causing damage to shops and kiosks on the streets nearby." (*Bakinski rabochi*, May 19, 1985)[47]

In recent years, anti-Soviet nationalism found expression in Georgia. The year 1983 was key for Georgian nationalists: it was the 200th anniversary of the Treaty of Georgievsk under which Georgia became a protectorate of the Russian tsars. Ten people are known to have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment for protesting this treaty. On March 12, Zakarii Lashkarashvili, a taxi driver, and Tariel Ghviniashvili and Guram Gogopaidze (factory workers) were arrested for preparing protest leaflets.

A group of Georgian students and intellectuals publicly opposed the celebration of the Georgievsk anniversary, including two students, Irakli Tsereteli and Paata Sagharadze. Arrested on June 15, they were charged with "anti-Soviet slander" for printing and distributing leaflets calling for a boycott of the official celebrations and claiming that the Treaty of Georgievsk was a "tragedy" for Georgia. Some 100 to 200 people demonstrated in Tbilisi on July 11 calling for their release; arrests followed. In August, five others went on trial with the two students: Zurab Tsintsadze, a historian; Tamara Chkheidze and Mariam Baghdavadze, students; Gia Chanturi, a student; and L. Shakishvili, a TV editor. All the defendents received 3-year camp sentences, except Tsereteli who got a 4-year term.[48]

In the last few years, there have been no known dramatic instances of internationality conflict in Georgia. Nevertheless, official Soviet statements indicate that serious problems remain. For example, in a speech to the 14th Georgian Central Committee plenum in July 1983, then Georgian First Party Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze said "in future we must show greater concern for the development of nationality languages, nationality cultures, and for the training of teaching cadres."[49]

Armenian nationalists continue to feel the heavy hand of the Soviet state. One leading Armenian nationalist, Paruir Airikyan, was sent to the Irkutsk region of Siberia to serve out his term of

---

[46] [47] [48] [49] See footnotes on p. 234-235.

exile, due to end in January 1987. According to unconfirmed reports, Airikyan was told in September 1986 that he will be allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. by the end of the year. In April 1984, three Armenian activists, Eduard Arutunyan, Sirvard Avagyan, and Rafael Oganyan, were each sentenced to 3-year terms of imprisonment. At the trial, Sirvard Avagyan announced that she had been tortured. Although the trial was postponed, it later reached the same decision. Eduard Arutunyan, a member of the Armenian Helsinki Group, died in camp in late 1984.

The Baltic States

The three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were illegally annexed by the Soviet Union in the closing days of World War II. To this day, the United States Government does not recognize the incorporation of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia into the U.S.S.R. References to these three states within the Soviet sections of this report do not alter long-standing Helsinki Commission support for the U.S. Government position of nonrecognition of their incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

Expressions of nationalism in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are harshly treated by the Soviet authorities. For example, in 1982 Janis Paucitis and Ojars Vitins were arrested for tearing down a flag from the City Party Committee Building in Latvia. Paucitis later received a 1½-year camp sentence, while Vitins got a 2-year camp term. In another incident in Estonia, on the night of October 4, 1985 two twin brothers, Tiit and Yaan Valk, raised the flag of independent Estonia above a theater, after clashes between Estonian and Russian youths. The next day, troops were called in to quell any further disturbances. The Valk brothers and nine other people were arrested.

The year of 1983 was particularly difficult for national rights activists in the three Baltic States. In March 1983, for example, Latvian nationalist Gunnar Freimanis was arrested in Riga. He was accused of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for writing nationalist poetry. Maris Oss, a collector of Latvian folklore, was tried in January 1983 and received an unknown term of imprisonment for "hooliganism." A third Latvian activist, Ints Calitis, received a 6-year term of imprisonment in 1983 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." In a highly unusual move, Calitis was released in the summer of 1986 before the end of his sentence.

In nearby Estonia, authorities conducted a major anti-nationalist sweep: Lagle Parek was arrested on March 5, 1983, while Heiki Ahonen and Arvo Pesti were arrested on April 15. Parek was sentenced on December 19, 1983 to 6 years camp plus 3 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Pesti and Ahonen were both sentenced on December 19, 1983 to 5 years camp plus 2 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Unfortunately, repressive moves against Baltic nationalists did not ease in the next few years. Well known Estonian political prisoner, Johannes Hint, died in a prison camp on September 5, 1985 shortly before his 71st birthday. Winner of a 1962 Lenin prize for his scientific inventions, Hint was a highly successful and innovative manager of a silicalcite plant. In the early 1970's, Hint developed contacts with the Estonian Democratic movement. In 1981,

the KGB discovered Hint had written a 40-page anti-Marxist tract, *The Fate of Some Honest Individuals of the 20th Century*. In 1983, Hint, already in very poor health, received a 15-year camp sentence on false charges of economic crimes.

Estonian Enn Tarto received a 10-year camp plus 5-year exile sentence on April 19, 1984 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Latvian dissident, Zaigis Balodis, was arrested in 1985 and charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for the alleged creation of a secret "Free Latvia" organization. Balodis was sentenced to 3 years camp; his father later died under mysterious circumstances, and his mother was reportedly arrested.

Expressions of nationalist sentiment are not only on the individual level in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. On May 9 (the anniversary of Soviet "liberation" of Latvia in 1940) and May 14 (former Latvian Independence Day) of 1985, two riots took place in Riga, Latvia. Several hundred Latvian youths walked along the Komsomol embankment demanding that the U.S.S.R. withdraw from Latvia. Apparently, three Russians were thrown into the Daugava River where they drowned. Some 300 Latvians were arrested and later released. In late September and on October 25, 1985, hundreds of Estonian and Russian youths clashed on the streets of Tallinn, according to an October 25, 1985 Associated Press report.

In March 1986, a group of Estonian scientists wrote an anonymous open letter which reached the West in the summer. The letter is primarily concerned with environmental issues. But they also voiced concern over russification through large new Russian settlements in Estonia. They point out that northeastern Estonia is almost completely russified and that planned construction of a new city near Rakvere which would have a population of 20,000 mostly Russian workers would extend russification further west.

Conclusion

Outspoken national and ethnic rights advocates continue to be imprisoned. A disproportionate number of political prisoners who have died in recent years are non-Russians. This indicates not only the harsh treatment of non-Russian prisoners of conscience, but also their high rate of incarceration, often for peaceful nationalist activity.

Major non-Russian nationalities are still subjected to an intense campaign of russification. However, in some areas, most notably the army, new attention is paid to meeting the needs of the non-Russian soldier—at least now in his free time he can speak his native language. It should also be noted that Russians who advocate a return to traditional Russian culture, with its strong emphasis on Russian Orthodox values, are also subject to official repression along with other national rights advocates.

It is clear that nationality policy will long continue to be one of the most sensitive areas for the Soviet regime. A judicious policy of bilingualism for the Soviet Union would be a welcome development. Unfortunately, the Soviet rulers still seem more interested in using draconian methods of russification.

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

There are 103 nationalities represented in the 1979 all-union census, 22 of which have over 1 million members, 49 with fewer than 100,000. Many of these ethnic minorities are Siberian peoples whose national cultures and languages were well on their way to extinction before the Bolshevik Revolution. Although the Soviet Government maintains regional ethnic museums, supports ethnic artistic ensembles, and devotes considerable energy to seminars and studies of ethnic minorities, their languages and cultures, one fact remains clear—ethnic heritage and culture is retained and promoted to the extent that the rule of Moscow is not threatened. Preserving the ethnic heritage of the approximately 13,000 Chukchis of eastern Siberia presents no threat to the authorities' political hold on the Chukotsky Peninsula. Allowing 40 million Ukrainians the same leeway, with their rich cultural heritage and historical opposition to russification, is clearly not in Moscow's interest.

The ethnic minorities described below have suffered ethnic discrimination that arises from political, and to a certain degree, historical factors.

Jews

According to the last Soviet census in 1979, there are approximately 1.8 million Jews living within the Soviet Union, although some observers believe the number may be closer to 2.5 million.

Among the many state-imposed barriers to full enjoyment by Jews of cultural and minority rights stipulated by the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document are the following (based on an outline provided by the Institute of Jewish Affairs in London):

There is no Jewish education, no Jewish schools, nor schools in which Jewish subjects are taught. Neither are there private teaching facilities. Hebrew is taught only at a handful of Soviet academic institutions (to which access is reserved only for the politically reliable), and at the only remaining yeshiva in the U.S.S.R., part of the Choral Synagogue in Moscow. Despite the statement in *Izvestia* of December 24, 1976, that "no one in the Soviet Union is forbidden to study any language, including Hebrew and Yiddish," private courses in Hebrew and Jewish culture and history are suppressed and the teachers harassed and criminally prosecuted. In September 1985, at hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the U.S. House of Representatives, Morris Abram of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry testified that under General Secretary Gorbachev "Soviet Jewish Hebrew teachers continue to be arrested at an average rate of one per month."

Neither Yiddish nor Hebrew have been taught in Soviet schools since 1948. The only exception is Birobidzhan, where Yiddish has been an optional course since 1980. Birobidzhan is the Jewish Autonomous Oblast area on the Siberia-Chinese border established by Stalin in 1934. Out of the roughly 200,000 residents, only about 10,000 are Jews.

There are only two Jewish periodicals published in the entire U.S.S.R. Both are in Yiddish, a language understood by a dwin-

dling minority of older Soviet Jews, yet persistently touted by Soviet propaganda as the "mother tongue" of Soviet Jews. Russian is the first language of the vast majority of Soviet Jews, and Hebrew the language to which years of study are devoted by many Jewish cultural activists. The Yiddish language literary monthly—*Sovetish Heimland*—is published in Moscow with a print run of 7,000 (characterized as "massive" by *Leningradskaya Pravda*). According to the American Jewish Committee, "approximately half (of its print run) are exported to the West to prove to a skeptical West the existence of a Soviet Jewish culture." The other is *Birobidzhaner Stern*, the Yiddish language weekly of Birobidzhan, which "only reprints articles from the local Soviet newspapers and contains no Jewish content." According to TASS, "broadcasting is also done in Yiddish" in Birobidzhan. If absolutely desperate for other Yiddish reading material, a Soviet Jewish reader might avail him/herself of *Der Weg*, the organ of the Israeli Communist Party, which is sold on some newsstands. A miniscule number of books by Yiddish authors is published in the U.S.S.R. (eight in 1981 and six in 1982).

Books in any language on Jewish subjects are usually confiscated from visitors or the mail. For example, Hebrew translations of *Treasure Island, Call of the Wild, Pinocchio, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*, to name a few, have been confiscated from mail to Soviet Jews. The same fate even met Shapiro's *Hebrew-Russian Dictionary*, published in the Soviet Union. Jewish books published abroad are not translated into Russian in the U.S.S.R.

There is one Jewish library in the whole of the U.S.S.R.—in Birobidzhan. There is a Jewish section in one Moscow library, the Nekrasov Public Library. There exists only one Jewish museum, at the birthplace of Shalom Aleichem in Pereiaslav-Khelmnitsky, Ukraine SSR. There is no Jewish art gallery or exhibition hall anywhere in the Soviet Union. Only one specifically Jewish Holocaust memorial exists outside a cemetery, in Latvia.

There are only two professional Jewish theater companies in the U.S.S.R. They are traveling companies, presenting a limited number of performances, with no premises of their own. A few amateur companies exist, and there are occasional concerts of Jewish music. There is no Jewish club, reading room or similar communal cultural institution in the U.S.S.R.

This lack of opportunity for Jewish cultural expression is accompanied by an ever-present Government policy of anti-Semitism. Officially, it is expressed in discrimination against Jews in employment and educational opportunities. Unofficially it takes on more ominous manifestions, such as physical attacks by "unknown assailants" against Jewish cultural activists. In addition, there are the numerous newspaper articles, brochures, such as "The Poison of Zionism" (Moscow 1984), and television films devoted to "exposing Zionist intrigues," the latter complete with film footage of various Jewish cultural activists who are accused of meeting with Zionist agents from abroad (read: Jewish tourists) and spreading anti-Soviet slander.

An example of anti-Semitism in print can be seen in the 19–20 April 1983 edition of *Leningradskaya Pravda*, which ran an article entitled "Caution: Zionism! : Culturebearers with a Skeleton Key:"

> We have Philistines, money-grubbers, consumers who strive to enrich themselves by any means. By exerting an influence upon them through the use of any means—from massive broadcasts of the Voice of Israel and other subversive radio stations, to the transporting of Zionist literature from "lectures" by various emissaries at illegal meetings of nationalists, to clubs for the study of the ancient-Jewish Hebrew language and "Jewish" culture—the Zionists attempt to incite nationalist moods, to encourage people to immigrate to Israel or, in any case, having created around them a kind of spiritual ghetto, to form from them a Fifth Column of Zionism in our country.

Another favorite theme of "anti-Zionist" propaganda is the charge that during World War II, highly placed Jewish leaders conspired with the Nazis to round up Jews for the death camp.

On April 21, 1983, the creation of the "Soviet Public Anti-Zionist Committee" was announced. Ostensibly formed by eight Soviet Jews to "intensify the struggle against Zionism," the Committee acts as an apologist for Soviet foreign policy, defends the regime's internal policy toward Jews and emigration, while at the same time seeking to deflect charges of anti-Semitism against the Soviet Government. While not specifically attacking Jewish refuseniks and cultural activists, the Committee provides a groundwork for public antagonism against Jews who are not "loyal" to the regime line or wish to emigrate. For instance, in 1985, the Committee co-authored with the Soviet Association of Soviet Jurists the second volume of the "White Book," a compilation that included accounts of alleged Zionist conspiracies against the Socialist bloc, the travails of unfortunate Jews lured to Israel and the West, and of Israeli "atrocities" in Lebanon. The "White Book" also attacks Jewish Hebrew teachers in the Soviet Union, specifically Yakov Gorodetsky (subsequently allowed to emigrate) and Grigory Wasserman, as carriers of "Zionist propaganda." The chapter asserts that: "all these ulpani (Jewish schools) or 'circles', and 'clubs,' are used by Zionist activists as their bases of operations in the U.S.S.R. and are mouthpieces for reactionary ideology."

In early 1984, there was a brief spate of Government-sponsored activities connected with Jewish culture in the Soviet Union, including the publication of a Russian-Yiddish dictionary, considerable press coverage and ceremonies marking the 125th anniversary of the birth of Sholom Aleichem in 1859 (and who shares a birthdate, March 2, with current General Secretary Gorbachev) and two performances in Moscow by the Chamber Jewish Musical Theatre of Aleichem's "Tevya from Anatevka"—known in the West as "Fiddler on the Roof." The play was performed in Yiddish, which, as noted above, is spoken by few Soviet Jews. Less notable ceremonies were accorded the 50th anniversary of the founding of Birobidzhan—perhaps the authorities were less willing to expend the efforts on such an obviously failed enterprise.

The summer of 1984 saw a wave of arrests of Jewish cultural activists throughout the Soviet Union. During this time, a Jewish cemetery in Chernovtsy was desecrated and Jewish school children were attacked by their fellow-pupils. In Leningrad, refuseniks were

called into KGB headquarters and interrogated in connection with an alleged plot by the "Leningrad section of the Jewish Defense League" to blowup public buildings in the city.

The Jews of Tbilisi, Georgia, perhaps aided by publicity in the West, have been successful in temporarily dissuading city officials from demolishing the Ashkenazi synagogue, the site of which had been slated for a city square. The Ashkenazi synagogue is one of only about 60 that are left standing in the Soviet Union. As of August 1986, there were five rabbis in the Soviet Union, and no Jewish seminary.

In Leningrad, a Jewish womens' study circle has been established to meet to exchange ideas on topics such as Jewish cooking and traditions. Although denied official recognition as requested by the members, the group has apparently been able to continue its existence.

On November 16, 1985 a TASS broadcast in English noted the compilation by one Shimon Yakerson, keeper of the Hebrew collection of the Leningrad Institution of Oriental Studies, of a book of collected articles on "the first Hebrew books and their authors." In the broadcast, Yakerson is quoted as "refuting 'lies' of Westerners who claim that obstacles are put up in the U.S.S.R. in the way to the study of the (sic) Hebrew." Furthermore, notes Yakerson, Yiddish has always been the mother tongue of Russian Jews, and "claims that Jewish culture can be really developed only in Hebrew is profoundly erroneous." He also asserts, incorrectly, that Hebrew has not become the official tongue of Israel. All of this is an attempt to attach an intellectual justification to the regime's policy of harassment and persecution of independent Hebrew teachers.

During the reporting period, approximately 24 Soviet Jews were sentenced to labor camp or exile for their emigration/cultural activities. As of this writing there are at least 18 currently incarcerated, almost two thirds of whom were sentenced from mid-1984 to mid-1986. In many cases, Jewish cultural material, Hebrew books, information on Israel, and other Jewish objects have been seized by police and used as "evidence" of "slander" against the defendants. Other charges have been "hooliganism," "resisting arrest," and "draft evasion." In three cases, "possession of drugs" were the charges. Probably the best known of these "Prisoners of Zion" is Iosif Begun, who first applied to emigrate in 1971. Having served two internal exile sentences, Begun was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" in October 1983. Yuli Edelshtein, Evgeny Koifman, and Aleksei Magaryk were framed on drug charges, and Aleksandr Kholmyansky was set up on an illegal weapons charge. Edelshtein is presently reported to be in poor health as a result of inadequate medical attention stemming from an accident at the Vydrino labor camp. Vladimir Lifshitz, sentenced in March 1986 to 3 years labor camp for "dissemination of slander" was badly beaten by criminals in his cell prior to his trial. Yakov Mesh (subsequently emigrated) and Iosif Berenshtein were sentenced for "assaulting police officers;" Berenshtein and another imprisoned refusenik, Zahar Zunshine, were also beaten in jail. Berenshtein is almost completely blind as a result. Authorities claim that he injured himself while peeling potatoes.

And the children suffer. In a letter to First Lady of the United States, Nancy Reagan, 25 refusenik women wrote in 1985 that:

> Our children experience the same overwhelming feeling of uncertainty and fear. . . . They are called names, they are called "Fascists". . . . There have been occasions on which our children were severely beaten. A Jewish child wearing a skullcap, missing classes on Saturday, saying a prayer before eating bread, is ostracized from the administration, teachers, and classmates. Our children turn to their mothers each time they see a militia man on the street. . . .

Crimean Tatars

The situation of the Crimean Tatars, forcibly relocated to central Asia (primarily Uzbekistan) during World War II, has changed little since the previous report. In 1945, all cemeteries and mosques in Crimea were demolished. At the same time, party authorities ordered all names of Tatar origin to be changed. Out of a population of approximately 500,000, an estimated 5,000 have been given permission to return to their homeland in Crimea since the Tatars were officially exonerated by the Soviet Government in 1967 for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. Another 3,000 are thought to reside there illegally. Attempts by deputations of Crimean Tatars to discuss repatriation with authorities in Moscow have continued to meet with failure.

A letter from 25 Crimean Tatars to the Islamic Conference in 1983 called attention to the persecution of those Crimean Tatars within Crimea and accused the Kremlin of "openly proclaiming a policy of Slavicization" of Crimea. A later *samizdat* report dated fall 1985 reported that:

> The persecution of Crimean Tatars (in Crimea) continues unabated as before. Without permission of the KGB, they cannot get jobs or register for residence. Marriages are not registered if one of the spouses is registered outside of Crimea. Men whose families have miraculously managed to register for residence are forced to leave . . .

Authorities have also interfered with the burial of deceased Crimean Tatars in their homeland if they were not registered for residence there.

An extensive *Bulletin No. 2* of the Musa Mamuta Action Group of Crimean Tatars (Musa Mamuta immolated himself in 1978 in protest against Soviet policy toward Crimean Tatars), dated August 1983, noted extensive efforts by Soviet authorities in Uzbekistan to establish new regions for settlement by Crimean Tatars, to replace Tatar language instruction with Russian, and, in general to impress upon the Crimean Tatars a feeling of permanence regarding their presence in Uzbekistan. The *Bulletin* also points out efforts by party authorities to co-opt Crimean Tatars into this plan by appointing them to substantial party positions, but suggests that even among well-placed Crimean Tatars, these efforts have enjoyed little success.

According to the *Bulletin*, censors in Uzbekistan have prohibited the Tatar language newspaper in the Republic from using Tatar terms for the major cities of Crimea: Sevastapol, Simferopol, and Evpatoria, as well as the term "Tatar ASSR." On the other hand, "Crimean Tatar"—as opposed to the larger language group designation "Tatar," has been permitted for identification of newspaper and radio services in Uzbekistan since July 1984.

Of the four Crimean Tatars imprisoned on political charges and for their efforts to repatriate, probably the best known is Mustafa Dzhimelev, "the personification of the tragic destiny of the Crimean Tatar people" in the words of Zinaida Grigorenko. Dzhimelev was re-arrested in camp in September 1986 for "habitual disobedience to the demands of camp authorities but given a suspended sentence and allowed to return home."

In March 1983, repatriation activist Nurfet Murakhas was sentenced in Tashkent to 2½ years strict regime camp for "dissemination of slander. . . ." Yuri Osmanov was imprisoned from 1982–85 on similar charges. In June 1984, Smail Bilyanov, a Crimean Tatar activist from the Tadzhik SSR, was expelled from the party for having raised the Crimean Tatar issue before party officials. He was arrested in August 1984; as of February 1986, his fate was unknown. In April 1986, the Rishat Ablaev and Sinaver Qodirov were tried on political charges in Tashkent. At this writing, their sentences are unknown.

Germans

As noted in our previous report, Soviet Germans were deported from their former homeland in the lower Volga region at the outset of World War II, and are now scattered throughout the Soviet Union. About half of the almost 2 million Soviet Germans are now located in central Asia, the other half throughout the RSFSR. Efforts made by the Soviet Government to retain the prewar heritage of the original Volga Germans have been limited and insufficient. According to available information, German cultural institutions allowed by the Government include only the following: three German language newspapers, brief radio broadcasts in German from four major cities in central Asia, a dramatic theatre established in 1980 in Kazakhstan, and one bimonthly literary/publicist journal. The German language is taught in many schools with large ethnic German concentrations, but for only 2 or 3 hours a week. Eduard Becker states in *Russia* (Vol. II, 1985):

> Even the cursory retrospective comparison with the prewar cultural life of the German population . . . gives the graphic impression that from the past rich cultural inheritance of the Germans today almost nothing remains . . . the intensive forty-year assimilation rooted out of the Germans many substantial signs of a nation: language, culture, psychology, and a distinctive tenor of life.

In addition, the constant stream of "anti-Fascist" materials—films, newspapers articles, etc.—has had a negative psychological effect on young Soviet Germans, who reject their national heritage rather than be identified with the German invaders of the 1940's.

About 70,000 Soviet Germans have emigrated to the Federal Republic from 1970 to 1983, with approximately another 1,300 leaving in the following 2 years. Estimates of the number who wish to leave range from 100,000 to 500,000. As a result of various forms of protest against emigration refusals, there are about 10 Soviet Germans currently imprisoned. Many of the Soviet Pentecostals who have been attempting to emigrate from the Soviet Union since the signing of the Helsinki accords are of German ethnic background.

One concession to the German minority may be the election of one Andrei Georgievich Braun to the position of First Secretary of the Tselinograd Oblast Party Committee in September 1986. If Braun is indeed an ethnic German, it would be the first such elevated party position for a member of that minority since 1941.

Poles

According to the 1979 all-union census, there are about 1.1 million members of the Polish minority in the Soviet Union, primarily as a result of Soviet territorial acquisitions resulting from the Treaty of Riga in 1921 and World War II. There are a total of 46 elementary and 3 secondary schools in Ukraine and Lithuania where Polish is the language of instruction; however there are none in the RSFSR, Moldavia, or the Asian Republics. Graduates of these Polish-language schools encounter discrimination in employment upon completion of schooling. Emigres from the Soviet Union have reported that in the 1970's institutes of higher learning were told not to admit Poles as well as Jews. It has been claimed that there are around 60,000 Poles in Soviet labor camps and another 100,000 in internal exile.

There is a Polish-language party newspaper published in Lithuania, with a circulation claimed to be almost 50,000. The Lithuanian press also claims the existence of other Polish printed publications and "Polish amateur ensembles and theatres." The Catholic Church, a vital component of Polish ethnic heritage, is severely repressed; at present there are only 50 churches or chapels in existence. All the dioceses were abolished following World War II.

Meskhetians

In January 1985, it was reported by the Georgia press that between April and September 1984, 14 Meskhetian families from central Asia, 73 persons in all, were being allowed to return to western Georgia. The Meskhetians were among the peoples of the Caucuses area who were deported to central Asia by Stalin during World War II. The article claimed that an unspecified number had been allowed to return previously and that the process is continuing, although no specific figures were offered. It is not clear, however, whether these new returnees are being allowed to return to the areas where they resided prior to the war. There is also concern, given the fact that the Georgian heritage of the people in question was stressed in the article, that Meskhetians of Armenian and Kurdish background may not be included in the repatriation process. It has been suggested that permission for the Meskhetians to return to the Georgian SSR is prompted less by a sense of justice than concern for the existing labor shortage in Georgia. One in-

64-639 O - 87 - 7

formed source wrote in 1976 that there were 300,000 Meskhetian exiles in various areas of central Asia and the RSFSR.

"Saingilo" Georgians

The Saingilo Georgians are ethnic Georgians of predominately Christian background living in Azerbaizhan near the border of that Republic and Georgia. According to *samizdat* reports, these Georgians have been subjected to educational, employment, and religious discrimination by Azerbaizhani authorities; their houses and fields have been destroyed, and villages flooded to provide water for Azerbaizhanis. Georgian-language textbooks have been seized by local authorities, and Georgian-language television signals are deliberately jammed.

Others

Finally, sporadic reports of active resistance by lesser known ethnic groups to sovietization and russification were received during the reporting period: clashes betwen Yakuts and Russians in Yakutia, resistance by Gypsies, who according to the *Ukrainian Catholic Chronicle* are considered by Soviet authorities the "pariahs" of Transcarpathia.

RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS

There has been no discernible improvement in the situation of religious believers in the Soviet Union since the last CSCE Implementation Report. Continuing the post-1979 pattern, the rate of arrests of religious activists has doubled in recent years. According to Keston College, as of November 1986 there were 392 known religious prisoners of conscience in the U.S.S.R. Soviet laws on religion remain largely unchanged, despite granting religious groups the legal status of persons under the law. Discrimination against religious believers in daily life, accompanied by frequent attacks in the Soviet press, also continues.

Soviet legal provisions

The restrictive nature of Soviet legislation on religion—which contravenes Helsinki and Madrid pledges—has been described in previous reports. There have been no major improvements in the legal status of religious believers in the U.S.S.R.

Soviet legal experts have several times recently referred to a planned comprehensive revision of legislation on religion. The most authoritative exposition of this revision is contained in *The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchiate*, No. 1, 1986. Probably the most important revelation is confirmation of a new legal status for religious groups in the Soviet Union:

> A religious community enjoys the rights of a person in law so that, when the need arises, it can, acting within the limits of this status and in accordance with the procedure laid down by law, construct and purchase buildings for its own needs and acquire means of transport, church uten-

sils, and objects of the religious cult at its own expense, and exercise its right to ownership of them.[50]

This new status for religious organizations is a rather significant change in Soviet law, replacing two previous formulations: a decree signed by Lenin in 1918 and a 1929 resolution "On Religious Associations." Both of these documents state that "religious communities and groups of believers do not enjoy the rights of a person in law." [51]

In practice, however, there is evidence that Soviet religious groups over the years did in fact retain some limited rights as persons under the law. Thus, the new law, while an ostensible minor improvement, may be seen as legalizing a situation which had existed *de facto* for many years.[52]

Official Soviet attitudes

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev opened the 27th Party Congress on February 25, 1986 with a 5-hour speech which delved into all areas of party policy. There were few references to religion and no indications of any major shift in policy. Atheist education was described as an important part of party ideological work. Gorbachev did raise religion in the context of nationality questions, criticizing artistic and literary trends which "under the guise of national originality idealize(d) reactionary nationalist and religious survivals."

A standard formulation of official Soviet views on religion is included in the party program adopted by the 27th Party Congress: "The party will use all forms of ideological influence for the wider propagation of a scientific understanding of the world, for the overcoming of religious prejudices without permitting any violation of believers' feelings." [53]

Soviet authorities put great stock in the development of new Communist rites to supplant religious ones. Such rites include prefestival day shifts, mass demonstrations, peoples' outdoor fetes, Komsomol youth weddings, solemn registrations of newborn children, evenings of labor glory, the Hammer and Sickle spring festival, livestock breeders' days, and special "sending off" ceremonies for young military conscripts.

An article in *Nauka i Religiya* (*Science and Religion*, September 1985) described the scope of atheist propaganda in the U.S.S.R. The All-Union Secretariat of the *Znanie* (*Knowledge*) society runs 40 "houses" of scientific atheism. In addition, the Central Soviet Trade Union Body and the Ministry of Culture run other atheist programs. Six bodies have their own atheist propaganda arms: *Znanie*, Ministries of Culture and Education, Higher Education, Committee for Professional Technical Education and the Trades Union Central Executive.

Every year, over 200 speakers from the Central House organize some 9,000 individual lectures, 314 series of lectures, 46 "people's universities," 320 symposia, 85 lectures plus films, 220 question-and-answer evenings, and 130 Round Table discussions on atheism at 1,500 enterprises and Government departments. Training

[50] [51] [52] [53] See footnotes on p. 235.

courses for lecturers on atheism have annual enrollments of 1,000 students.[54]

A lead article in *Pravda* (October 18, 1984) is fairly typical of frequent calls in the Soviet press for vigilance and efficacy in the struggle against religion. Entitled "Atheist Convictions for the Youth," the article says that the Soviet people, particularly young people, must be on guard against subversion by Western imperialist circles. The best way of doing this is to observe the Leninist dictum that "we should struggle against religion . . . armed by our ideology . . . making use of our press and the power of the written word." Several areas are singled out for criticism of their poor atheist education. The town of Vladimir, an ancient Russian Orthodox center, was targeted. Two traditionally Catholic areas near Poland—and the possible influence of the Polish Pope—were also mentioned: The Lvov area of western Ukraine and Lithuania.

On the republic level, an article ominously titled "Dark Trance" appeared in the *Komsomolets Kirgizii* (*Kirgiz Komsomol*, September 4, 1984), written by S. Vishnyakov, deputy religious affairs official for Kirgizia in Central Asia. Berating local believers of various faiths for conducting religious propaganda in public, he referred to singing and chanting religious songs in public and holding outdoor services. (Since these unregistered groups do not have any sanctioned place of worship, they are forced to meet under open skies.) He warned that such actions violate regulations:

> Citizens using their rights and freedoms must not damage the interests of society and the rights of fellow citizens. (Article 39 of the Constitution) Members of unregistered, "illegal" religious groups are also ignoring article 19 of the Law on Religious Associations which restricts the practice of religion to the house of worship.

Vishnyakov closed by warning these unruly believers that they are breaking the law and may end up serving sentences of up to 5 years. Citizens were told that it is their duty to report such activities to the authorities at once.[55]

Nevertheless, the official Soviet line on religion is still up-beat. Some comments by Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia at a Moscow press conference in December 1985 illustrate this. After citing the constitutional rights of Soviet believers, Filaret claimed there are over 20,000 diverse religious communities in the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet media usually avoids mentioning precise figures on believers and churches. Information, however, occasionally surfaces, as for example, an article in *Sovetskaya Belorussia* (November 27, 1985), which refers to the "unsatisfactory situation which has developed in the (Miory) region with a total of 13 working churches, Catholic churches and sectarian (houses of prayer.)" [56]

A book entitled *Religion and the Church in Soviet Society*, written in 1984 by the then-chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council on Religious Affairs, Vladimir Kuroedov, provides some useful—even if unreliable—official Soviet statistics on religion in the Soviet Union. Kuroedov claims that the Russian Orthodox Church has 8,500

[54] [55] [56] See footnotes on p. 235.

churches, the Roman Catholics have 1,120 (of which 650 are in Lithuania), the Lutherans 690, Baptists and Adventists over 2,000, and the Jews 120 synagogues. He also describes the opening of new houses of worship since 1977: 33 new Orthodox churches, 129 Lutheran churches, 40 Catholic ones, 69 mosques, and about 300 small Baptist, Mennonite and Pentecostal churches. According to his figures, 850 new "communities" were registered with state officials, while 1,305 were denied registration.

Western statistics, however, suggest a different reality. Estimates by Keston College researchers indicate a range of 6,500 to a maximum of 7,500 Russian Orthodox parishes—compared to over 50,000 in 1914 in the Russian Empire. Moreover, official permission to register a church is often hard to obtain and authorization to build a church is a slow and far from automatic process.[57]

There have been some personnel changes in the leadership of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) in the U.S.S.R. (The CRA is the official Soviet organization which controls official religious life in the Soviet Union.) Vladimir Kuroedov, 79, stepped down as CRA chairman in January 1985 "at his request for reasons of health." His successor is Konstantin Kharchev, 50, formerly Soviet Ambassador to Guyana, who has no known experience in the area of religion.

More revealing of the real CRA function—namely, restrictive control—is the biography of a leading CRA official. Vladimir Fitsev, CRA deputy chairman, died suddenly on March 10, 1985. Fitsev had been a "meeter and greeter" of foreign church dignitaries. Probably few of these dignitaries realized that Fitsev's previous assignment, with KGB colonel rank, had been as head of the KGB church affairs department.[58]

Russian Orthodox Church

The Russian Orthodox Church, which under Soviet rule has subsumed the Ukrainian and Moldavian (Rumanian) Orthodox Churches, has some 40 million adherents. Soviet state officials claim lower church membership, while Western experts say there are some 50 million members of the Russian Orthodox Church. But even with the low figures provided by the Soviets, the Orthodox Christian community in the U.S.S.R. numbers in the tens of millions.

High-level Russian Orthodox churchmen, who are usually official spokesmen for the regime, always put the best face on Russian Orthodox religious life. Metropolitan Filaret's comments are typical: "The Russian Orthodox Church alone publishes more than 10 periodicals, and liturgical books are printed in editions of several thousands."

In a modest advance of materials available to the Russian Orthodox community in the U.S.S.R., TASS announced on December 10, 1985 the publication of the 1986 *Orthodox Church Calendar*. In addition to the liturgical calendar, lists of the church hierarchy, reproductions of icons, and the 26th collection of *Liturgical Works*,

[57] [58] See footnotes on p. 235.

there are special articles on the 1988 celebrations planned for the millenium of the conversion of Kievan Rus to Christianity.[59]

The continued Soviet crackdown against authors and distributors of religious *samizdat* shows that believers continue to risk imprisonment to gain access to scarce religious materials. The Service Orthodoxe de Presse reported in May 1986 that a group of Orthodox believers in the U.S.S.R. have managed clandestinely to reproduce and distribute thousands of copies of prayer books, New Testaments and theological works.

Many involved in Russian Orthodox *samizdat* have had to pay dearly. A Russian Orthodox priest, Father Vladimir Fedorenko, arrested before 1982, was later sentenced to 5 years in camp. He is now in a labor camp in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. Another Russian Orthodox priest, Father Aleksandr Pivovarov, was arrested in early 1983 in the Krasnoyarsk area of Siberia for duplicating and circulating religious literature. In the fall of that year, Pivovarov was charged with "engaging in a forbidden trade" and "speculation." Although the trial did not prove that Father Aleksandr had circulated religious literature for profit, he was sentenced to 3½ years camp.

One Moscow couple, the writers, Zoya Krakhmalnikova and Feliks Svetov, compiled a Russian Orthodox journal, *Nadezhda* (*Hope*), for which they were imprisoned. Zoya was sentenced to 1 year in prison and 5 years of internal exile on April 1, 1983 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Feliks was sentenced on January 8, 1986 to 5 years exile (later reduced to 3 years) for "anti-Soviet slander." Mikhail Bombin, an Orthodox Christian from Latvia, was sent to the Serbsky Institute for Forensic Psychiatry in early January 1986; he had earlier been searched and detained for possession of religious literature. Russian Orthodox believer, Sergei Markus, was sentenced on July 18, 1984 to 3 years camp for "anti-Soviet slander." During a house search, a wide variety of religious materials were confiscated from him. In late 1985, TASS made public an open letter from Sergei Markus in which he expressed "regret;" Markus made a public confession on Soviet TV on January 4, 1986.

Another chronic difficulty facing the Russian Orthodox community is the shortage of churches. Jane Ellis, author of a recent book on the Russian Orthodox Church, estimates "no more than 6,500 Orthodox churches in the U.S.S.R., for at least 50 million worshippers—or would-be worshippers—and of those churches, many are tiny village churches which have only one service a month." [60]

The national shortages for Russian Orthodox Churches are reflected in Leningrad. Although the Chapel of the Blessed Xenia in the Smolensk Cemetery was renovated in Leningrad,[61] the Leningrad Russian Orthodox Old Believer sect apparently faces the demolition of one of their two churches.[62]

The sorry state of Russian Orthodox monasteries is another area of grave concern. Even according to official Soviet data, in 1917 there were some 1,200 monasteries on the territory of Russia. At

[59] [60] [61] [62] See footnotes on p. 235.

present, there are only some 20 functioning monasteries in the U.S.S.R.[63]

Forced curtailment of monastic life is a major problem for the Russian Orthodox Church because *all* Orthodox bishops are drawn from its ranks. State control over monastic life—shown in the decreased number of monasteries, and the declining number and quality of monastics—allows the state to shape the Russian Orthodox Church episcopate.[64]

One encouraging action in this respect is the 1984 return of the 700-year-old Danilovsky Monastery to Russian Orthodox Church control. The Danilovsky will become a new church administrative center. Confiscated by the state soon after the 1917 Revolution, the venerable monastery was used as an orphanage, a prison, an umbrella and a refrigerator factory. This is only the second time in Soviet history that a monastery has been returned to the church.

Since the Danilovsky Monastery is in such bad condition, it will cost many millions of rubles to repair. In early 1986, the Moscow Patriarchate launched an appeal abroad for restoration funds. Apparently, the Soviet state has even made a special arrangement to ease the collection of hard currency for this purpose.[65]

Another Russian Orthodox monastery scheduled for restoration is the Solovetsky Monastery, one of the first—and most notorious—Soviet prison camps. In August 1984, the Soviet Council of Ministers passed a special decree to expedite the restoration and preservation of the Solovetsky Monastery so that "during the 12th 5-year plan, the unique Solovetsky sanctuary will become ever more beautiful and *attract more and more tourists* (italics added)."[66] In another action aimed at preserving the cultural value of monasteries, *Sovetskaya kultura* (September 1985) reported that a former monastery worker in Pskov, northern Russia, was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment for stealing and selling icons—considered valuable state property.

The case of Father Pavel Lysak reveals how Soviet authorities are fearful of signs that religion is attracting a growing following among young people. A Russian Orthodox monk, Father Pavel Lysak, was forced by state authorities in 1975 to leave the St. Sergius Monastery. Denied the right to live in the Moscow area, Lysak was arrested in September 1984 for staying in Moscow without a residence permit. Tried in December 1984, Lysak was sentenced to 10 months of imprisonment for "violation of passport regulations." The real reason for Lysak's imprisonment was his dynamic personality which attracted many young people in Moscow.

In one small city, Krasnovodsk in the Islamic Republic of Turmenia, two Russian Orthodox priests have been imprisoned. The first was Father Pavel Adelheim who was sentenced in the early 1970's for his religious activism. The second is Father Nikolai Temirbaev, sentenced in June 1984 to 2 years imprisonment on charges of "hooliganism." Little is known about the case except that Temirbaev supported Adelheim's actions.

There have been at least two recent slanderous attacks on priests in the Soviet press. The first, in the Soviet trade union newspaper,

---

[63] [64] [65] [66] See footnotes on p. 235.

Trud (June 6, 1984) claims that Father Temirbaev imposed very hard penances on his parishioners, that he beat his wife and tried to strangle one of his parishioners. A second article in the Uzbekistan *Pravda Vostoka* (*The Truth of the East*, May 20, 1986) attacks another Russian Orthodox priest, Father Vasily Kravchenko. The article, written in an offensive style, indirectly accuses the priest of immorality and directly accuses him of embezzlement of church funds. The author calls for Father Vasily's arrest, asking why he is still the priest at the Almalyk Church of The Dormition and recommending that the regional Procurator examine this matter.

Russian Orthodox believer, Pavel Protsenko, was arrested in Kiev on June 4, 1986 and charged with "anti-Soviet slander." Essentially, Protsenko's "slander" consisted of defending the reputation of well-known Russian Orthodox priest, Father Dmitri Dudko. Another believer, historian Ivan Martynov, lost his job at the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad and was charged with "parasitism" after he accused Soviet media and academia of anti-Semitism. In January 1985, he was sentenced to 6 months compulsory labor and a 20 percent cut in wages. In a recent open letter to the West, Martynov complained of poor health due to his subsistence diet.

Opportunities for believers to meet and discuss religious topics are very limited in the U.S.S.R. Some Russian Orthodox believers decided to organize an unofficial Christian Seminar and met in Moscow from 1974 until 1980. Members of this seminar have been harassed and imprisoned: Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, the founder, was first sentenced in 1980 to 6 years camp plus 5 years exile, and in 1986 he received an additional 2-year term for violation of "camp discipline." (His wife was told that he will not receive any family visits or mail until the end of his sentence.) Sergei Ermolaev, who served a 4-year camp term, was told that new charges may be brought against him at any time. Vladimir Poresh, after serving the 4-year camp portion of his term, was tried in October 1984 for "malicious disobedience" of camp officials and got a new 3-year camp term—though in February 1986 Poresh was inexplicably released from camp early. Boris Razveev, sentenced on September 3, 1984 to 3 years camp, later recanted on Soviet TV in April 1986, virulently attacking Ogorodnikov and Father Gleb Yakunin.

Father Gleb Yakunin is the leader of the Christian Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers, established in 1977. The Committee collected and publicized the problems of thousands of religious believers of various denominations throughout the Soviet Union, writing and compiling hundreds of pages of reports. But the Committee soon fell afoul of Soviet officialdom, leading to various repressive actions. After Father Gleb received a 10-year term of imprisonment in 1979, the Committee continued its work in a low-key way. In late 1984, Father Gleb began his 5-year term of exile in a remote and particularly cold corner of Yakutia, Siberia.

The most notable recent example of Committee activity was Father Vladimir Rusak's appeal on the Russian Orthodox Church to the July 1983 World Council of Churches (WCC) general assembly session in Vancouver. Father Vladimir also called attention to the plight of the Christian and Catholic Committees. Appealing to the WCC delegates as "the last and most authoritative church organization,"[67] Rusak asked that the WCC General Assembly con-

[67] See footnote on p. 235.

sider the difficult situation of believers in the U.S.S.R. Although the Archbishop of Canterbury supported this idea, WCC representatives refused to include it on the agenda—although they promised "to respond to it through official channels."[68]

Three years after making this appeal, Rusak was arrested. He graduated from the Moscow Theological Academy and for many years worked in the editorial offices of the official *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*. But when it was learned that he was writing a history of the Russian Orthodox Church under Soviet rule, he was dismissed from his job. After Rusak refused to prevent publication of his work in the West, the KGB confiscated his archive in 1983. Rusak was forbidden to work in the church unless he recanted. To avoid imprisonment for "parasitism," Rusak worked as a street sweeper until his arrest on April 22, 1986. On September 27, 1986 Deacon Rusak was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and sentenced to 7 years strict regimen camp plus 5 years exile.

As can be seen, it is a dismal fate for those who step outside the narrow bounds of what is permitted to religious believers in the U.S.S.R. In exchange for some advantages given it by the state in recent years, the Russian Orthodox hierarchy pays a heavy price: It must ignore believers who defend the church and it must deny repression of the church. Despite this slightly advantaged position *vis a vis* the state, the Russian Orthodox Church still faces severe shortages—in clergy, churches, Bibles, monasteries, and literature.

The Orthodox Church in Ukraine

Since the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was forcibly subsumed into the Russian Orthodox Church, any statistics—even official Soviet ones—are difficult to obtain. Indicative of the religious vacuum in Ukraine—created by the merging of the Ukrainian with the Russian Orthodox Church and the banning of the Ukrainian Catholic Church—is the fact that about half of the converts to underground evangelical Protestant groups come from Ukraine.

The Cathedral of the Assumption (in the famous Monastery of the Caves) in Kiev will be rebuilt, according to Kathpress. First established in 1078, the cathedral was destroyed on November 3, 1941 during the German occupation of Kiev. Plans for its reconstruction, based on photographs and sketches collected by a commission of experts, were announced on Radio Moscow. Scheduled for completion in 1991, the cathedral will form part of the state cultural-historical complex. Apparently, the new cathedral is intended for tourists—not worshippers.

The situation of the 13th-century Pochaev Monastery in Ternopol, western Ukraine continues to concern believers. A 1984 *samizdat* document describes the situation of this ancient monastery. On May 20, 1984, a group of drunken militiamen burst in on pilgrims in the Cathedral of the Assumption, demanding they show their documents. Several pensioners who work for the monastery were put in the nearby psychiatric hospital as "inducement" to stop associating with the monks. No construction is allowed in the monas-

[68] See footnote on p. 235.

tery, while anyone who wants to work at the monastery is required to obtain the permission of an authorized official. This procedure has no basis in law. This document also mentions the demolition brick-by-brick of a church in Rovno, Ukraine.

Georgian Orthodox Church

The Georgian Orthodox Church, one of the most ancient autocephalic churches in the world, faces similar difficulties as other religious denominations—severe shortages of clergy, literature, churches and oppressive Soviet laws on religion. The church is strengthened, however, by firm support from the Georgian nation, since the church is considered important not only as a religious entity but also as a bulwark of national identity.

The Bible was first translated into Georgian in the fifth or sixth century. Under Soviet conditions, however, there is a large pent-up demand for religious literature in Georgian. In June 1985, the Institute for Bible Translation in Sweden announced the third edition of its Georgian translation of the New Testament and Psalms in a print run of 10,000 copies for distribution in Georgia. (The 7,000 issued since 1980 have all been distributed.)

An October 1982 *samizdat* document on the Georgian Orthodox Church finally reached the West 2 years later. Written by 80 church laymen and addressed to Ilya II, the Georgian Orthodox patriarch, it is a clear statement of the strong nationalist attachment to the church. Here are some excerpts:

> Our Church is separated from the State by law but it is not, and cannot be, separated from the nation. It is a gathering of our people's finest sons and should exist to direct the nation, encourage its people, educate and set the moral tone of our life. The nation and the Church are as one indivisible flesh. The Church's pain is the nation's pain and the Church must react to its people's suffering and cure it. Our nation has fought for its faith and it is with this in mind that we feel we should inform you of our worries.
>
> The Church cannot survive without its law, the instrument of protection for the Church against anarchy and penetration by criminal elements. The 1920 Holy Church synod stated that the Church law was the basis of our life for its moral teaching. Those who break that law must be punished by that law.

A statement, signed by Bishops Shio, Amvrosi and Khristofor, is appended saying that the church should be seen as a respectable authority in the eyes of the whole nation and that the authority of good priests is being eroded by the actions of a tiny minority of deviants. (Believers have long complained that there are a few homosexual priests and bishops.) [69]

A Georgian Orthodox priest, Teimuraz Chikhladze, 33, was executed in August 1984. Falsely accused of hijacking, Chikhladze was found guilty by the Georgian SSR Supreme Court of Criminal Justice of "banditry" and "hijacking" (articles 78 and 42 Georgian Criminal Code). Chikhladze did not take part in the hijacking—he

[69] See footnote on p. 235.

did not even know that an attempt was being made. Nevertheless, he was portrayed as its "spiritual leader"—even though he had last met the rest of the accused in 1981. Portions of the 13-day trial were shown on a 3-hour TV show on August 23. The priest was described as a "hippy" and leading a "spiritually deprived" life under the protection of the Georgian Church. At the trial, Chikhladze assumed all the blame for the incident. Chikhladze may have been made a sacrificial lamb on false charges of "hijacking." His execution may have been intended to damage the church's reputation with the Georgian public.

After the sentencing, a petition circulated in Georgia calling for the four death sentences to be commuted. In late September, 3,000 signatures, including two from Georgian Supreme Soviet members, were collected. Reportedly, many signatories were summoned by the KGB for questioning.[70] The other three condemned to death were from prominent Georgian families—their sentences reportedly were commuted to 15-year terms. In light of the three commuted sentences, Chikhladze may have been made the "fall guy" for the guilty parties.

At least two Georgian prisoners of conscience have been active in defense of the Georgian Orthodox Church: Valentina Pailodze and Merab Kostava. Choir director Pailodze was arrested in March 1983; it was her third arrest for religious activities. Falsely charged with receiving bribes, Pailodze was sentenced on May 25, 1983 to 8 years camp plus 3 years exile.

Merab Kostava has also been an active defender of the Georgian Orthodox Church. First sentenced in 1978 for his role in the Georgian Helsinki Group, Kostava got a 5-year term of imprisonment. While in exile, Kostava was given another 5-year camp term. Kostava got his third term—3 years—in June 1985 for "malicious disobedience of camp authorities." Kostava is reportedly in very poor health. In the spring of 1985, Kostava's 25-year-old son was found hanged in his Tbilisi apartment in circumstances which cast doubt on official claims that he committed suicide.

A few recent articles in the Georgian press attest to the continuing popularity of religion. *Komunisti* (April 30, 1986) carried a lengthy analysis of people's need for faith, contrasting materialist and religious approaches. Another item in this newspaper on September 27, 1985, complained about the failure of atheism campaigns, promising that future efforts will be more effective and better matched to individual interests and needs.

Armenian Apostolic Church

The Armenian Apostolic Church is another ancient church, dating back to the fourth century. The position of this church is relatively strong due to the financial and moral support of the large Armenian diaspora.

A recent article in the Erevan *Kommunist* (May 12, 1985) attests to the renewed strength of religious faith in Armenia. Entitled "Illicit Crosses," it describes a "peculiar renaissance of reverence for holy places." Indignant mention is made of "illegally operating un-

[70] See footnote on p. 235.

registered churches" (evangelical Protestant) and the "sale of homemade candles, crosses, saints." The author also points to the operation of "illegal temples in Erevan" and exhorts the local party organs to increase their vigilance. He concludes that unless atheist propaganda and the "norms of community life" are followed, religious holidays would be observed and crosses and Virgin Marys produced *en masse.*

An Armenian Apostolic archdeacon, Garnik Tsarukyan, was arrested by the police in February 1984. He had spoken out about church corruption and its links with the KGB. In March, Tsarukyan was sent to the Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital in Erevan.

Soviet Islam

The Soviet Union is the fifth largest Muslim country in the world. As usual, reliable statistics are difficult to find on this question. That 40 million people in the Soviet Union profess some adherence to Islam is a generally accepted figure. As with Orthodox Christianity the concepts of Islam and nationality are closely linked and often difficult to distinguish. Soviet Islam faces the same difficulties as other religions in the U.S.S.R.: chronic shortages, legalized restrictions, and daily discrimination.

The party expends many resources in its struggle against the Muslim religion. For example, *Pravda Vostoka* (May 8, 1986) describes a high-level conference—attended by Central Committee official, E.I. Lisavtsev—on improving atheist education in the Namangan *oblast* of Uzbekistan. Yet a mere 5 days later in the Saraisk region of Uzbekistan, authorities deployed 150 lecturers and 120 agitators to halt the activities of pilgrims and unofficial mullahs.

The vitality of Islam in its traditional areas in Soviet central Asia and Azerbaidzhan in the Caucasus is reflected in numerous Soviet press items. Two articles refer to increased private financial support for mosques in recent years. An atheist training conference in Namangan, Uzbekistan noted that since 1983 such private support has increased (*Pravda Vostoka*, March 24, 1985). A 1985 conference revealed that income for mosques in the Tadzhik towns of Kurgan-Tyube and Pyandzh had increased by 250 percent in a 4-year period. *Pravda* (November 16, 1985) contrasted this situation with that of often inactive official clubs and houses of culture. In short, popular support for Islam in the U.S.S.R. is growing, despite Soviet Government efforts to foster atheism.

One article, in a Turkmen teachers' publication, *Mugallymlar Gazeti*, (January 19, 1986) admits the close connection between national and religious identity. The author discusses methodology for a course, "The Ethics and Psychology of Family Life," newly introduced in Turkmen language schools. Atheist education is one of its main goals, and the author advises:

> It is important that teachers consider the characteristics of national psychology and forms of life which have become tradition, the level and nature of the population's religious belief. Religious holidays and traditions exert a powerful influence on some children and they are drawn into participating in such holidays through family life.

> Teachers must not forget that the close relationship between religious and national traditions in our republic is one of the reasons for the preservation of harmful religious remnants among a certain segment of the population.

Another article, in the Russian-language Uzbek newspaper *Pravda Vostoka* (*Truth of the East*, May 24, 27, 1986), notes that atheist education must "expose the falsity of the believer's view that only through religion may a person satisfy his natural desire to overcome suffering." In a back-handed way, such comments are an admission of the deep-seated popular appeal of religion.

Newspapers in central Asia are replete with articles decrying the widespread activities of unofficial (unregistered) mullahs. An article in the Russian-language *Pravda Vostoka* (August 26, 1984) criticizes the party committee in the Uzbek town of Margilan in the Fergana Valley for allowing mullahs to become more active, gaining influence with young people. "A criminal group was active in the town for some time, sowing religious fanaticism among adolescents." *Sovet Turkmenistany* (January 4, 1986) carried a lengthy article assailing Islamic modernists. The author also notes the work of "young pseudo-mullahs" in various Turkmenistan regions: Vekilbazar, Tagta, Telman, Bayramaly, Yylany, Kalinin and Murgab. Party members are also criticized for participating in religious services.

In another area of Uzbekistan, pilgrims are discouraged from visiting the "holy sites" of Samarkand (*Yosh Leninchi*, February 5, 1986):

> Because of the great activity of false mullahs interested in earning easy profit, people have been talking about these graves in the last 10 or 15 years as "holy pilgrimage sites" which can solve any hardship. . . . Every Wednesday, adult men and women of various ages as well as youth come to a religious ceremony in view of passers-by and spectators. . . . These three "holy" places lie at the intersection of three quarters. The weekly income which false shiekhs earn for themselves thanks to generous pilgrims generosity and belief reaches 1,500 rubles.

As can be seen from this citation, these holy sites have considerable popular following—and they generate rather large sums of money for unofficial Muslim religious leaders.

Other recent articles in the Uzbekistan press (*Sovet Uzbekistani*, May 16, 1986) single out Namangan as a place in which "religious charlatans" are active. One man, Amatkhan Azizkhodzhaev, allegedly collected money from naive people who believed this payment could replace making the *haj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca. Moreover, two Communists, Artikbay Nazarov and Zulaykha Rakhimova, were involved in religious activities.

Unofficial mullahs are also active in Adjaria, an Islamic area of Georgia. The Tbilisi *Kommunisti* (April 22, 1986) describes several such people: Shaban Abuladze, who allegedly earned money by reading the *Mavlud* (Mawlad in Arabic, Mohammed's biography) in various villages until "this self-styled clergyman . . . was un-

masked;" Daut Beridze of Batumi wrote the Arabic text of the Mavlud with Georgian letters, "bound it into a book and began calling at believers' houses. Daut was caught in the act and his Mavlud confiscated."

For a long time, it seemed that traditional types of Soviet dissent among Soviet Muslims were rare (or simply unknown in the West)—with the notable exception of the Crimean Tatars. In the 1980's, however, instances such as the printing of Islamic *samizdat* or the conducting of unofficial religious schools were more frequently discussed in the Soviet press. Usually, they are labeled as "crimes."[71]

Two known cases involving Islamic *samizdat* and an unofficial Koranic school occurred in 1982. In Tashkent, Uzbekistan, a large group, including Abuzakar Rakhimov, Eldash Mukhammedov, Makhmudzhan Roziev, A. Saidkharikkhodzhaev, were arrested for printing and disseminating a brochure, *The Islamic Faith*, a compilation of Koranic writings. Later that year, Saidkarim Azamov was arrested for holding an "illegal" Koran school in a Tashkent suburb. Early in 1983, Niglyuk Rakhimov in Tadzhikistan received a 4-year camp sentence for unofficial printing—and he ended up in a political camp in Mordovia.

In the spring of 1985, two members of the Gulistan collective farm in the Samarkand *oblast* of Uzbekistan were arrested. Mardan Pulatov and his daughter, Dzhamiliya Kambarova, were accused of "speculation" for selling religious literature, *Namazlik* ("The Book of Prayers") and *Islam dini nima*? ("What is Islam?"). Apparently, they got this literature from a young mullah, Zakir Tadzhibaev, in Namangan who organized a religious school at home. Four of the mullah's students from Tashkent and the Samarkand *oblast* also distributed Islamic literature.

Unlike "classical" *samizdat*, Muslim *samizdat* is more often printed than typed. Usually printers use state print shops illegally, or they make underground presses. Two 1986 trials of Muslim *samizdat* printers held in Baku, Azerbaidzhan are illustrative.

The first trial involved two Russians, A. Glukhov, fitter at the Ministry of Petrochemicals, and L. Belyaeva, print shop manager, who oversaw the mass printing of Muslim religious literature. Also involved was M. Mutsologov, from the city of Nazran in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (traditional center of the Sufi brotherhood, Batal-Khadzhi), who provided the two Russians with Arabic-language texts. He then distributed these materials in the north Caucasus. Mutsologov and Belyaeva each received 4-year camp terms, while Glukhov got a 7-year term.

The second Baku trial also involved a Russian printer, A. Galkin, an electrician at Baku Tunnel Construction, and a Muslim text-provider-and-distributor G. Suleimanov, of the city of Khasavyurt in north Dagestan. They were charged with "selling literature" totaling a value of 63,930 rubles from 1981 until 1984. This large sum suggests that there are thousands of Arabic readers—and most likely devout Muslims—in Dagestan.

---

[71] See footnote on p. 235.

The Ukrainian (Byzantine Rite) Catholic Church

The Ukrainian Catholic Church, also known as the Byzantine Rite or Uniate Church, is the largest banned denomination in the Soviet Union. Based in western Ukraine, this church is associated with strongly nationalist views. Therefore, the Soviet authorities view this church with particular hostility. If this church were to be legalized today, it would likely have some 4 million adherents.

After the Soviet Union occupied western Ukraine in 1945, the Soviet authorities persuaded a few Ukrainian Catholic priests to "reunite" their church with the Russian Orthodox Church and sever its ties to the Vatican. The 1946 Synod of Lvov, seen as uncanonical and unrepresentative by most Uniates, duly approved the reunification.

All bishops and many Uniate priests, faced with either accepting the synod or a 10-year camp term, chose the latter. Indeed, as Cardinal Slipyj said in 1977 at the International Sakharov Hearings, "all our bishops except myself died in prison or exile." One thousand five hundred priests died, and hundreds of thousands of believers went to the camps.

Of the pre-war total of 4,195 Ukrainian Catholic churches and chapels, none remains open today. Nevertheless, the Uniate Church survives in the U.S.S.R., albeit in a persecuted and underground form. Reliable sources estimate that its clandestine existence is served by at least three secret bishops and 300–350 secret priests.

Parallel to this underground Uniate Church, a radical secret group known as the *Pokutnyky* (Penitant) sect appeared in 1954. Members of this group avoided participation in Soviet society. According to the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*, the sect was infiltrated by the KGB in the late 1950's. Thereafter, most of its members returned to the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Repression of the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic Church is a standard feature of Soviet rule in Ukraine. After the highly respected exiled Uniate leader, Iosif Cardinal Slipyj, died on September 7, 1984, the Soviets appeared to step up repression of the church.[72] Shortly after Slipyj's death, Ukrainian Party First Secretary Shcherbitsky called for a new drive against religious "fanaticism" in an apparent reference to the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

A secret decree from the Transcarpathian Regional Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, dated July 3, 1984, has recently come to light. Entitled, "On the Improvement of the Methods of Combating Manifestations of Nationalism and Zionism," the decree calls for improving atheist education, while lauding KGB successes in destroying Catholic and Baptist printing presses and confiscating religious materials.

The decree recommends the following measures: that the repentance of former anti-Soviet clerics should be turned to the party's advantage by creating anti-nationalist propaganda; that two-thirds of the Uniate activists should be sent for compulsory psychiatric treatment, without being put on trial; that efforts to discredit the church and its members should be made, particularly in villages

[72] See footnote on p. 235.

where Uniate influence is strong; and that the state should ban Sunday Masses in state farms.

At the fourth synod of Ukrainian Catholic bishops in Rome on October 5, 1985, Pope John Paul II said in Ukrainian, "I have often repeated my desire that this Catholic community be able to enjoy religious liberty, to which it has a right like other religious denominations." The Pope also referred to the Vatican's efforts at the Helsinki Comference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to secure recognition of the Ukrainian Catholic Church's "civil right to existence."[73] In a secret report to this synod, Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky revealed that there are 10 underground Uniate bishops active in the U.S.S.R., as well as hundreds of priests and monks and about 1,000 nuns.

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of activity among Ukrainian Catholics. The Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics and the Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine were formed in Ukraine on September 9, 1982. Uniate activist, Iosyp Terelya, was the Action Group leader, and the moving spirit behind the Central Committee, and the priest Hryhorii Budzinsky was Action Group secretary. Two other priests, Father Dionisy and Father Ignaty, as well as Stefaniya Petrash-Sichko, wife of political prisoner Petr Sichko, also joined the Action Group. In its opening statement, the Action Group said: "(A)ll information about the Ukrainian Catholic Church will be made available for worldwide public scrutiny. Catholics the world over must know and remember under what conditions we exist. We have a single goal—legalization."[74]

The Action Group also made nine practical proposals for legalization of the Uniate Church. Free elections should be held in all western Ukrainian dioceses. Church properties should be returned to believers. Uniate seminaries should be opened in Lvov and Uzhgorod. If legalized, the Ukrainian Catholic Church "pledges to observe all precepts and laws of the state and instruct its parishioners to do likewise," but since the Pope is the Uniate sovereign leader, "no subordination to Soviet authorities is possible." The law on the separation of church and state should be observed.[75]

Faced with this new Uniate activism, the Soviet authorities decided to act quickly. Iosyp Terelya, arrested on February 8, 1985 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," was replaced as chairman of the Action Group by Vasyl Kobryn. Shortly thereafter, Kobryn also was arrested and sentenced on March 22, 1985 to 3 years camp on charges of "anti-Soviet slander." Another Group member, 85-year-old priest Hryhorii Budzinsky, was held incommunicado for over 6 weeks in a local hospital in late October 1984.

Iosyp Terelya has a long and tragic history of conflicts with the Soviet regime. At the age of 41, Terelya has spent over 18 years in Soviet camps, prisons and psychiatric hospitals. Shortly after the formation of the Action Group, Terelya was arrested in December 1982, tried in April 1983, and sentenced to a 1-year camp term. After his most recent arrest, Terelya went on trial in August 1985

[73] [74] [75] See footnotes on p. 235.

and was sentenced to 7 years camp plus 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Terelya's wife, Olena, is a doctor but she is unable to find work; she and their two children live in Dolgoe, Transcarpathia, Ukraine. Elena Sannikova, a Russian Orthodox believer, was arrested on January 19, 1984 after she publicly defended Terelya; she was later sentenced to 4 years exile.

Other Uniate prisoners of conscience are also facing great hardships. Pavlo Kampo, 57, is nearly blind and suffers from other ailments; the camp authorities refuse to allow doctors to prescribe medicine for him. Sofya Belyak, sentenced to 5 years camp plus 5 years exile in October 1983, is in poor health. Her friends fear she may not survive her term. Other imprisoned Uniates include Ilya Ulihanynets, Aleksandr Oros and Ivan Smetana.

In at least one instance, the Soviet authorities have resorted to violent methods against Uniate believers. On September 29, 1982, Soviet police killed a Ukrainian Catholic nun, Maria Shved, on a street in Lvov. Near the end of 1984, a Uniate nun, whose name is not known, was murdered by drunks in the main train station of Lvov. Reportedly, the nun was involved in preparing children for their first communion.[76]

For Ukrainian Catholic *samizdat,* 1984 was a productive year. Two publications, both concerned with the plight of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, appeared in that year: *The Ukrainian Catholic Herald* (produced by the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics) and *The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church* (put out by the Action Group.) The first issue of the *Ukrainian Catholic Herald* appeared in April 1984 and reported on Government control of the Russian Orthodox Church, arrests, religious rites, and Uniate prisoners. After eight issues of *The Chronicle* appeared in 1984, production was suspended; the ninth appeared in mid-1985. During a search when Kobryn was arrested, the 10th issue was confiscated as was material for future issues.

Thanks to these *samizdat* publications, we have a more complete picture of the present-day life of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In mid-1984, three churches were destroyed in the Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk regions. One hundred young Uniates marched to protest the demolition of a former monastery in the Carpathian village of Borynya in June 1984. *The Chronicle* reports that 81 Uniate priests were secretly ordained in Transcarpathia (western Ukraine) since 1981. In Transcarpathia, the area of greatest Uniate strength, there is a 3-year underground monastery school. In addition, dozens of Uniate missionary priests have been active in eastern Ukraine.

Iosyp Terelya, in a reported conversation with Soviet officials on April 23, 1984, informed them that since 1983, 30 Uniate churches were closed because parishioners refused to accept Russian Orthodox priests. For example, on April 5, 1984, 40 militiamen battled the villagers of the Rogatin district of western Ukraine who were defending their Uniate chapel. The militiamen were forced to withdraw; during the night, a crane was brought in to destroy the chapel. In another instance, Ukrainian Catholics refused to accept a Government-imposed Russian Orthodox priest in the village of Bobrka; on March 23, 1984, soldiers arrived to destroy the church.

---

[76] See footnote on p. 235.

The Roman Catholic Church

Roman Catholicism is the traditional religion for some 4 million Lithuanians, almost 2 million dispersed Poles, and some 1 million scattered Germans. In 1982, the Soviet authorities mounted a major campaign against Roman Catholic activists in Lithuania. For the first time in over 10 years, Lithuanian Catholic priests were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The KGB particularly targeted priests active in the Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers as well as was contributors to and distributors of the unofficial *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church.*

Typical of recent Soviet media attacks on "extremist priests" in Lithuania was a 1985 Radio Vilnius broadcast by the Lithuanian Commissioner of Religious Affairs, Petras Anilionis. He was hostile to the elected diocese council of priests since it included members of the Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers.

Insight into Soviet methods of combatting the Catholic Church in Lithuania emerged in four reports by the Lithuanian Council for Religious Affairs that were reprinted in the *Chronicle* in 1985. These documents, including a report by Petras Anilionis, describe the situation of religious denominations in Lithuania, evaluating their observance of Soviet Laws on Religious Cults. For the first time, a Soviet official admitted there are special "surveillance commissions" attached to local soviets to "observe the activities of the clergy and religious associations." The report severely criticizes the anti-religious work by the local district authorities, alleging they are too lax in registering priests without first consulting the Council for Religious Affairs.

Catholics, who have six out of seven "prayer houses" in Lithuania, are seen as the most uncooperative by the Soviet authorities. Some Catholic priests are said to be "manifesting extremism:" openly praying for "state criminals" (three imprisoned Catholic priests); recruiting altar boys; organizing children's choirs; and planning charitable activities. Religious education of youth, forbidden under Soviet law, is on the increase, with priests saying that the Catholic Church is the "only bearer and disseminator of virtue and high morality." The report also alleges that some priests urged their flocks to pray for "a free Lithuania."

Official warnings were issued to 118 priests, one-sixth of the Lithuanian Catholic clergy, and also to 44 church "extremists." The activities of 10 "illegal" Catholic priests—graduates of the unofficial Catholic theological course—are deemed "subversive" in the report. This unofficial course is needed because of Soviet restrictions on the official seminary, from which only 12 priests graduate per year. Today, there are 144 Catholic churches without their own priests. Nevertheless, church attendence has not declined, with as many as 37,000 people visiting the shrines of Siluva and Varduva on Catholic festivals.[77]

Although there still is a shortage of priests in Lithuania, there has been an improvement in the number of bishops. The Pope elevated Lithuanian Bishop Liudas Povilonis to the rank of Archbishop in 1985 and named a new Auxiliary Bishop, Juozas Preiska, to

[77] See footnote on p. 235.

assist him. As a result, the total number of bishops in Lithuania is now six. All Lithuanian dioceses, except Vilnius and Vilkasviskis, now have resident bishops.[78]

In accordance with Soviet law, state authorities continue to oppose catechism of Catholic youth. For example, in Gargzdai, Klaipeda district, 413 parents and parishioners protested to the Klaipeda District Committee and the Lithuanian Council of Ministers about the behavior of local officials in their church. When children were brought to church before the evening service so that the priest could test their knowledge before their admission to first confession and Holy Communion, three local officials entered the church and threatened to file a complaint against the priest and tried to identify the children.[79]

The 35-year struggle for control of the Catholic Church in Klaipeda continues. The church was built and financed by local Catholics in 1960–61 with official permission. As soon as it was completed, state authorities confiscated the church for use as a concert hall. *The Chronicle* mentions a 1984 petition for return of the church signed by 22,539 people. It was preceded by eight other petitions; one such appeal was signed by 148,149 people in 1979.

The year 1982 saw an intensified campaign of repression against Lithuanian Catholics active in unofficial organizations, particularly priests in the unofficial Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers. When the founding of the Committee was announced in Moscow in 1978, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas said it had been inspired by the election of Pope John Paul II. In 1983, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas and Father Sigitas Tamkevicius were arrested and subjected to 10-year terms of imprisonment.

In February 1982, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas was warned by Soviet authorities not to allow minors to gather at his home. In July, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas welcomed the new Bishop Vaicius in the name of the Catholic Committee. In November, he signed a petition, along with most other Lithuanian priests, rejecting the restrictive Regulations for Religious Associations. Finally, on January 26, 1983, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas was arrested and charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda;" on May 6, 1983, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas was sentenced to 7 years strict regimen camp plus 3 years exile.

Father Sigitas Tamkevicius' apartment was subjected to an exhaustive search in April 1980; the KGB accused him of editing *The Chronicle* and speaking against the Soviet Government in his sermons. During Father Alfonsas Svarinskas' trial, Father Sigitas Tamkevicius was arrested for conducting "illegal and unlawful activity, the main purpose of which was to discredit the Soviet state." On December 2, 1983, Father Sigitas Tamkevicius was sentenced to 6 years strict regimen camp plus 4 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Knowing of his impending arrest, Father Sigitas Tamkevicius wrote his "spiritual testament" on February 6, 1982, which was later published in the January 1984 *Chronicle*. He wrote:

> I thank God for allowing me to spend the last decade in fruitful work for my Church and thus for my Country. If I would have to start everything anew, I would do the same,

[78,79] See footnotes on p. 235.

only perhaps with greater zeal. My only regret is that I could have certainly accomplished even more.

I am at peace as I face prison, which may be the crown of my activity. My years of imprisonment I offer as penance for my errors and as an offering for the future of my Church and Country.

A third activist priest, Father Jonas Matulionis, was given a 3-year sentence in January 1985 for "impersonating a priest." Father Jonas Matulionis was first arrested and imprisoned for 9 months in 1976 on suspicion of distributing *The Chronicle*. Shortly thereafter, he began to study for the priesthood at the unofficial correspondence course organized after 1972 by some Catholic clergy. Father Jonas Matulionis was ordained in 1981 and worked as an assistant to Father Sigitas Tamkevicius. In fact, after Father Sigitas Tamkevicius' arrest, Father Jonas Matulionis played a leading role in organizing a popular campaign for his release.

These imprisoned Lithuanian Catholic priests have received much popular support from their fellow Lithuanians. The unofficial *Chronicle*, dated January 1984, recounts protests at Father Sigitas Tamkevicius' and Father Alfonsas Svarinskas' trials. For example, four Lithuanians went to Moscow in a vain effort to meet with party leader Yuri Andropov in August 1983. They carried with them a declaration noting that some 123,000 Lithuanian Catholics had signed protest petitions and appeals for the two priests.[80]

Lithuanian Catholic laymen were also subjected to various official pressures. Jonas Kazionis, who was released in 1978 after serving a 25-year camp term for partisan activities, was denied a residence permit in his home town. In 1983, Kazionis was refused an exit visa to go to England to live with his brother.

Jonas and Nijole Sadunaite are in difficulties. Nijole is in hiding, after serving a 6-year camp term. Jonas was first interned in a psychiatric hospital in 1982, and then in 1983 was sentenced to a 1½-year camp term. Jonas, unable to find work, fears the family will lose their Vilnius apartment.

Vladas Lapienis, a 79-year-old economist, was sentenced in March 1985 to 4 years camp plus 2 years exile for involvement with *The Chronicle*; in 1981, he was released after serving a 5-year term of imprisonment on the same charges. Arrested in February 1984 after the KGB found a handwritten copy of his *Memoirs of a Soviet Prisoner*, Lapienis was released until his trial (very unusual in the U.S.S.R.) due to his poor health.

Catholic activists in the Soviet Union have also been imprisoned in recent years. Aleksandr Riga, a Latvian Catholic involved in an unofficial Moscow ecumenical group which promoted contacts among Orthodox, Catholic and Baptist believers, was sentenced to indefinite psychiatric detention on August 29, 1984. Riga, sent to the Blagoveshchensk Special Psychiatric Hospital on the Soviet Pacific coast, was in such poor health in spring 1985, that his ill mother was officially advised to come to see him.

---

[80] See footnote on p. 235.

Kirill Popov, a Moscow Catholic active in *samizdat* and aiding prisoners of conscience, was sentenced on April 18, 1986 to 6 years camp plus 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Another Moscow Catholic activist, mathematician Vladimir Albrekht, was first sentenced in 1983 to 3 years camp for "anti-Soviet slander;" shortly before the end of his term, he was given a new 3½-year term for alleged "hooliganism." Reportedly, however, Albrekht was released from camp in the spring of 1986. The circumstances of his release are not known, but it is a highly unusual occurence for a Soviet political prisoner.

Protestant Churches

Introduction.—There are several Protestant denominations in the Soviet Union. Some are registered with the state through the Council of Religious Affairs, while others maintain a tenuous existence outside the bounds of Soviet law. Registration, while providing a veneer of legal protection for worship within the constraints of the Law of Religious Associations, does not guarantee exemption from repression, and harassment and imprisonment of members of registered churches occur. The Jehovah's Witnesses remain completely outside the law, although the Soviet press has claimed recently that they are free to register with the authorities.

Lutherans and Methodists

There are approximately 580,000 Lutherans in the Soviet Union, mostly in Estonia and Latvia, with a few German Lutheran parishes in central Asia as a result of the deportations of World War II. The latest figures for Methodists (attributed to a church official in Estonia) show at least 3,200. One Western newspaper report in 1985 quoted a Lutheran bishop in Estonia as stating that "we have complete freedom to do all necessary for the faith," while a Methodist minister stated that "there is no persecution, but there are limitations. Authorities have removed some popular Lutheran priests from their parishes for preaching 'anti-Soviet' or 'nationalistic' sermons."

Two specific incidents of repression of Lutherans came to light during the reporting period. Yakov Rein, a lay leader of a Lutheran Church in Tselinograd, Kazak SSR, was arrested in June 1984 for conducting religious services and teaching religion to youth. Sentenced to 5 years in camp, he was apparently released on appeal after agreeing not to leave town. Estonian pastor Harry Motsnik was arrested in April 1985 on the basis of sermons he had given in a local church. Convicted for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," Motsnik reportedly recanted and was released. About 5 years earlier, Estonian pastor Vello Salum (see previous report) recanted upon release from a psychiatric facility and announced that "the spirit has been cured."

Jehovah's Witnesses

As noted, Jehovah's Witnesses continue to be persecuted in the Soviet Union, and members of the sect have been imprisoned on various charges. In connection with the trial of five Jehovah's Witnesses in Donetsk Oblast, the atheist journal *Argumenty i fakty* claimed that Jehovah's Witnesses are free to register for worship,

although there has been no indication that any have done so. The Soviet press is particularly vehement in its vilification of Jehovah's Witnesses, claiming the Soviet Witnesses are crusading against Socialist countries through dissemination of materials received from world headquarters in Brooklyn, New York. Even Soviet propaganda does not attempt to hide the Witnesses' real "crimes"—refusal to participate in state-organized social and political activity, to vote in state elections, and to serve in the military. By mid-1985, at least 20 Jehovah's Witnesses had been sentenced to labor camp sentences, and another 7 arrested. Sometime in 1985 or 1986, 5 others reportedly were arrested in Kazakh SSR, apparently for refusing military service. A Witnesses leader in Moldavia, Yakov Gozhan, was tried in June 1986. His sentence is presently unknown. In September 1986, Witness Yevgeni Wolf was sentenced to 3 years strict regime camp for evasion of military service. He had served a sentence from 1982–84 on similar charges. At least two members of the sect are at last report confined in psychiatric facilities. One, surnamed Adakov, has been in Blagoveshchensk Special Psychiatric Hospital since 1976. The other is Viktor Neznanov, who was arrested in 1979 for organizing an underground publishing house, and remanded to the SPH in Mogilev.

Adventists

The True Remnant of the Adventist Church in the Soviet Union continues its underground existence (see previous report) rather than submit to Government restrictions on its worship. The reporting period saw a strong press campaign against the True Remnant. As of November 1986, there were at least 15 Seventh-Day Adventists in prison or labor camp. One of these is Aleksei Murkin, who replaced the late Vladimir Shelkov (died in camp, 1980) as leader of the True Remnant. In 1984, Murkin was tried together with his brother Mikhail, Vladimir Vasichenko, Gennady Bedarev, Ivan Cheremisov, and R. Chernolikova in Tashkent, where they all apparently received sentences of approximately 3 years. Pavel Raksha received 5 years general regime in 1983 for "infringing on citizens rights under the guise of performing religious ceremonies." Vladimir Shelkov's son, Vladimir, was sentenced in March–April 1984 to 5 years intensified regime camp for "speculation" (economic crimes). Richard Spalin, who had been serving a 7-year sentence since 1978, was not released upon completion of sentence in 1985, but re-arrested "for disobeying the demands of labor camp authorities" (article 188–3).

Baptists

Baptist churches existed in the former Russian Empire at least as early as 1867. At present, there are an estimated 600,000 Soviet Baptists belonging to congregations who have registered with civil authorities, and 100,000 belonging to unregistered congregations.

As noted in the previous report, unregistered "Reform" Baptists are persecuted by authorities for worshipping in accordance with their conscience and refusing to conform to the provisions of the "Legislation Concerning Religious Cults" of 1929 which remains in force to this day with certain amendments. According to numerous reports of persecution that continue to reach the West, Baptists

face house raids and searches, confiscation of Bibles, tape recorders, cassette recordings of sermons and music, disruption of worship services by the police and KGB with subsequent fines levied against the participants, and slander campaigns. An example of this slander can be found in the March 7, 1984 edition of *Trud*, which offered an explanation of the circumstances surrounding an unregistered Baptist's murder of his wife:

> "Things of the flesh—drunkenness, murder—God forgives, if you repent. The most dire sin is lack of faith in God." The words and meaning of this sermon, once so well learned by Yagnov and firmly embedded in his mind, unloosed his hands, placed a knife in them, and allowed him to take the life of a person close to him.

Weddings and evening funeral services have been disrupted. In at least five reported cases, the homes of believers where private worship services had been held were destroyed and/or confiscated by authorities. Children have been interrogated in the absence of their parents, the latter threatened with loss of parental rights should they continue to raise their children in the faith.

Most of these Reform Baptists are adherents of the Council of Evangelical Baptist Churches, established in 1965 in protest against the conciliatory position toward Government controls on religious practice adopted by the leadership of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists. Their position was emphasized in a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev from the Evangelical Baptist Council of Prisoners' Relatives in the Soviet Union, the organization of Reform Baptist women whose husbands have been imprisoned for practicing their faith:

> We state once again that this legislation is in direct contradiction to the teachings of Jesus Christ. While the Constitution makes the practice of our faith legal, at the same time you deprive us of our rights through the 1929 Legislation, and we are sentenced to lengthy prison terms, not for violating the Constitution, which is the foundation for the laws of our country, but rather for violations of the Legislation Governing Religious Cults. Believers cannot fulfill the requirements of this legislation without departing from the teachings of Jesus Christ. To conform to the legislation we have to stop being Christians.

Soviet authorities are still seeking Council President Gennady Kryuchkov, who has been forced to go into hiding to continue his ministry. In their efforts to find Kryuchkov, it has been reported that KGB officials disguised as doctors drugged Council member and prisoner Grigory Kostuichenko and questioned him about Kryuchkov's whereabouts during what was supposedly a physical examination at the camp infirmary.

As of May 1986 there were 170 Baptist activists in labor camp or exile, according to Keston College. During the reporting period, two Reform Baptist ministers died while under sentence. In 1984, Boris Artiushenko died at the Kursk prison; Yakov Durksen died in June 1986 in a camp in the Altai Region of Siberia. In addition, many Baptist ministers and activists have been re-sentenced while in

camp, either for "dissemination of slander" or under article 188-3, introduced in 1983, for "willful disobedience of the demands of camp authorities." By September 1986, there were at least 12 cases of Reform Baptists being re-sentenced while in camp.

General Secretary of the Council of Evangelical Baptist Pastor Nikolai Baturin was re-sentenced in 1984 to an additional 2 years labor camp, and in August 1986 to another 3 years. This is the first documented instance whereby a political prisoner has been twice re-sentenced while in camp. Baturin has spent over 25 of his 58 years in the labor camps for his faith. On the day prior to his scheduled release in January 1985, new charges were pressed by camp authorities against Pastor Mikhail Khorev, and he was sentenced to a further 2 years strict regime camp. Khorev's wife and son had traveled from their home in Kishinev, Moldavia to Omsk, western Siberia, to attend the trial but were not allowed to do so. Another long-term Baptist prisoner, Pastor Pyotr Rumachik, was arrested 6 days before his scheduled release in 1985 and charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." He received an additional 5 years. The cruel treatment generally accorded religious believers by camp authorities was particularly refined in Rumachik's case. Prior to his release date, the authorities went through the motions of preparing him for life on the outside: inquiries were made concerning his family's place of residence and acquisition of the necessary residence permit, and he was allowed a 3-day meeting with his relatives. Pastor Nikolai Boiko, was re-arrested in 1985, having been sentenced in 1980 to 5 years labor camp and 5 years internal exile. An additional 2½ years were tacked onto his original term. When Boiko began serving his term, he was a healthy man. Six years later, camp conditions have turned him into a class II disabled person, with high blood pressure and heart problems. Other victims of re-sentencing were Yakov Skornakov, who received 3 more years in October 1983; Aleksei Kalyashin, who received 2½ years in 1984; and Ivan Shidych, who received 2 more years in 1985. Rudolph Klassen was briefly freed after 10 years imprisonment, only to be re-sentenced in 1983 to 3 more years. At this writing, authorities are reportedly preparing to initiate new charges against Ivan Antonov, who was sentenced in 1982 to 5 years labor camp and 5 years internal exile.

Yakov Ivaschenko of Kiev completed a 4-year camp term and, despite poor health necessitating a warm climate, was sent to exile in Yakutia, one of the coldest areas of Siberia. Veniamin Markevich, serving a camp term in Yakutia, has had his correspondence from his family curtailed due to Biblical references in the letters. Permission to possess a Bible is denied routinely to prisoners. (A former prisoner at Blagoveshchenko Special Psychiatric Hospital, now in the West, has stated that even atheist literature was denied to the inmates at the Blagoveshchensk facility, because the atheist tirades against religion contained so many quotes from Scripture that one could almost put together an entire Bible from the various quotations.) Since he began to petition for a Bible, Vladimir Vlasenko has been denied family meetings and correspondence. When Dmitri Enns made the same request he was told by an official in the prosecutor's office that "Convicted criminals are not allowed to possess Gospels." Mikhail Khorev (see above) was informed by

camp director Vlasov that "that's the same as giving vodka to a drunk." Nikolai Shepel, serving his term at a labor camp in Cherkasskaya Oblast, is reportedly under intense pressure to collaborate with the KGB; he has been denied at least one meeting with his family and mail is not reaching him. Aleksei Kozorezov was resentenced in 1983 to 1½ years labor camp, and upon release, warned by the police in his home town of Voroshilovgrad against attending Evangelical Baptist worship services, as they were meetings of "mobs disturbing the peace." When long-time political prisoner Dmitri Minyakov finally returned to his home in Estonia after his fourth camp term, police broke up a thanksgiving prayer meeting to mark the occasion.

Soviet authorities have also undertaken a crackdown on the Council of Prisoners' Relatives. Ulyana Germaniuk, was sentenced to 3 years labor camp in September 1985; Serafima Yudintseva, to 2 years in March of the same year. Aleksanda Kozorezova has been forced to go into hiding as a result of a variety of charges. Two young Baptist women, Lyudmila Andryushchenko and Olga Kryuchkova, were arrested in Ordzhonikidze in April 1986 for producing issues of the Bulletin of the Council of Baptist Relatives (see section on *Samizdat*). Their sentences are presently unknown. Galina Vilchinskaya, who had already served a 3-year term for organizing a childrens' Bible study camp, served another 2-year term beginning in November 1982. Another woman, Lidiya Kupriyanova, had her nose broken when police broke up a prayer meeting in Magnitogorsk.

During the reporting period, Soviet authorities broke up two operations of the underground Christian Publishing House (see *Samizdat* section of present report). The Moldavian Baptists were printing Bibles in Moldavian, having been refused permission to acquire them legally.

Another well-known case is that of Valery Barinov, a Baptist musician from Leningrad who had gained a wide following among youth for his amalgamation of rock music and Gospel preaching. Having composed and recorded a Christian rock opera, "Trumpet Call," Barinov sought permission in January 1983 to perform the work in public. The response was loss of employment, detention and confiscation of his tapes, and brief confinement to a psychiatric hospital. In March 1984, Barinov and his bass player, Sergei Timokhin, were arrested at a train station in Murmansk Oblast, and charged with "attempting to illegally cross the Soviet-Finnish border." In a letter that reached the West in 1985, Barinov did not deny that he and Timokhin were attempting to cross the border, but claimed that they had intended to record "Trumpet Call" and return, inasmuch as "this is impossible to do in our country on account of the persecution against us as active Christians." Barinov was sentenced to 2½ years labor camp, Timokhin to 2 years. In commenting on the case, TASS reported:

> The just-concluded trial has vividly shown the true visage of those people and their unscrupulousness, hypocrisy, and avarice. It is precisely such renegades that certain circles of the West try to use in the conduct of subversive propaganda against the Soviet Union.

Psychiatric facilities are frequently used to deal with religious activists. At this writing, three Reform Baptists are known to be in psychiatric facilities as a result of their religious activities. Vladimir Khailo had been at Dnepropetrovsk SPH since 1980. In November 1985, he was transferred to Blagovenshchesk SPH on the Chinese border, thousands of kilometers from his family in Ukraine. Anna Chertkova, who has spent 13 years in psychiatric confinement, is still being held in Kazan SPH. Anatoly Runov was committed to the ordinary psychiatric facility at Komsomolets in January 1983.

Pentecostals

While some Soviet Pentecostals, approximately 33,000, have registered with the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, there are many communities that continue to demand their right to worship outside of state control. This number is estimated to be from 125,000 to 300,000. In many cases, these Pentecostals have lost hope of securing the freedom to worship according to the dictates of their conscience, and are pressing the Soviet Government for the right to emigrate. The two Pentecostal families, seven persons in all, who took refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow in 1978 were allowed to emigrate in August 1983. Twenty-five more of their family members followed soon thereafter.

Pentecostals have also been imprisoned for refusing, on grounds of conscience, to serve in the armed forces. Due to the geographical isolation of many Pentecostal communities (some of whom retreated to eastern Siberia from central Asia in order to practice their religion more freely), figures on Pentecostal prisoners of conscience are difficult to obtain. Calculations based on reports of trial and arrests would indicate that about 30 Pentecostals were sentenced to labor camp terms during the reporting period. In addition, others have been fined, sentenced to labor assignments without incarceration, warned against continuing their activities, and fired from jobs. In December 1982, 392 Pentecostals from Ukraine signed a petition describing beatings and threats they had been subjected to for their beliefs.

Among the Pentecostal conscientious objectors is Anatoly Kabinov, sentenced in 1981 for refusing call-up to the army, and re-sentenced in camp in December 1982 to an additional 2 years for alleged possession of drugs. In November 1984, Kabinov was briefly confined to a psychiatric hospital, apparently to prevent his meeting with a delegation of religious dignitaries from abroad. Petr and Aleksandr Stepanov were sentenced for the same reason in 1985 to 3 and 2 years, respectively. Petr Stepanov had already served a 2 year term beginning in 1980.

Eduard Bulakh, a Pentecostal activist from Vilnius, Lithuania, was sentenced in 1981 for refusing call-up to the army, and re-sentenced in camp in February 1983 to an additional 2½ years for "dissemination of slander. . . ." Among the charges against Bulakh was that he had sent a "slanderous" autobiography of himself and other Pentecostal documents to the Madrid Conference of the CSCE.

As noted under "Civil and Political Rights" (see above), Pentecostal and "Rights to Emigrate" activists Vasily Barats and his wife

Galina were, respectively, sentenced in 1983 to 5 years strict regime camp, and 6 years strict regime camp with 5 years exile. Vasily Barats had previously been held in a psychiatric facility. He suffers from a number of serious physical ailments.

In August 1983, Vladimir Zhuravel, was summoned to the village council for a passport check, where officials demanded that he cease his attempts to emigrate. When Zhuravel refused, he was beaten, as was his son, who attempted to come to his aid. The next month, Zhuravel was sentenced to 2 years labor camp for "resisting a policeman" and "threatening and using violence towards an official."

In October 1983, Ivan Fedorchuk from the Rovno region was sentenced to 5 years strict regime camp and 5 years exile. Fedorchuk is a bishop of the church and a leader of the emigration movement.

Nikolai Matsyuk was interned in a psychiatric hospital in 1981, and subsequently tried in December 1983 for "blackmail" and "giving bribes." He received 5 years general regime camp.

Two leaders of the Pentecostal community in Moscow, Stepan Kostyuk and Richard Zimmerman, were tried in April 1984. The former received 4 years internal exile, the latter, a suspended 2-year camp sentence. They had been accused of "infringing on the person and rights of citizens under the guise of conducting religious rituals." Another Pentecostal from the Moscow oblast, Evgeny Gul, was sentenced in August 1984 to 5 years general regime camp for alleged "refusal to register the congregation," "bringing children into the congregation," and "encouraging young persons to refuse military service."

Petr Golikov was sentenced in late 1982 to 5 years strict regime and 2 years internal exile. His wife Valentina, another activist and friend of Galina Barats, was herself sentenced to 3 years general regime camp in October 1984.

Also in late 1984, a Pentecostal pastor from the Donetsk region of Ukraine, Vladimir Loboda, was sentenced to 4 years strict regime camp and 3 years internal exile for "parasitism." Another Ukrainian pastor, Afanasy Melnik from Vinnitsa, received 3 years strict regime camp at roughly the same time.

Also toward the end of 1984, around 150 male members of the Pentecostal congregation of the eastern Siberian village of Chuguyevka began a series of hunger strikes to persuade authorities to allow them and their families to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany. Their children had been under pressure at school, and their schoolmates called them "fascists" and "brown pestilence" (the community is ethnic German). In response, several families had taken their children out of the public schools. They were subsequently promised that their applications would be approved, but authorities later went back on their word. As a result of this protest, the leader of the community, Pastor Viktor Walter, was sentenced to 5 years general regime camp for "violation of the laws separating church and state," "illegal assembly," and "infringing on the rights." Eventually, 10 other male members of the Chuguyevka community were imprisoned on a variety of charges stemming from their protest activities.

At approximately this same time, 17 Pentecostal families from Nakhodka and Vladivostok wrote to President Reagan appealing

for his aid in securing permission to emigrate. They noted that they had been attempting to emigrate since the signing of the Helsinki accords, and they described the repressive conditions to which they were subjected as a consequence of official restrictions on their religious practices. A similar letter from the Pentecostals of Vilnius was sent to President Reagan and the U.S. Senate in mid-1986. They pointed out that they had contributed to the construction of the church building used by the registered Baptists of Vilnius, but had not been allowed to use the building. At the same time, the homes of two church leaders in the area, Pavel Romanchik and Petr Grigalchik, were subjected to searches, and both men warned against continuing their "slanderous" activities. The Vilnius Pentecostal community has also been actively seeking permission to emigrate. Four members of the community appealed to the Vienna CSCE Conference in November 1986 for aid in emigrating. Seven members of the Gorelkin family of Vilnius did succeed in "emigrating" by crossing the Soviet-Turkish border in the spring of 1984.

In May 1986, there were reports that other Pentecostal communities in various parts of the Soviet Union, in particular the lower Don region and Petrovpalovsk-Kamensky in eastern Siberia, have renewed their efforts to emigrate. A month earlier, it was reported that around 100 persons thought to be Pentecostals were arrested in Belorussia.

Two Pentecostal activists and their families were permitted to legally emigrate from the Soviet Union during the reporting period—Lydia Staskevich and her family in September 1985, and her brother Pavel Timokhin and his wife in mid-1986.

Krishna movement

From a chance meeting on the streets of Moscow in 1971 between a young Russian, Anatoly Pinyayev, and the secretary for a visiting Krishna scholar from India, the Hare Krishna movement in the Soviet Union has grown to include at least 200 fully initiated members and over 10,000 practitioners, according to the International Society for Krishna Consciousness.

By 1980, the movement had attracted the attention of the "competent authorities." A meeting of followers in Riga featuring a lecture by a spiritual master from abroad was broken up by police and KGB officials. When a Hare Krishna congregation in Moscow applied in 1981 for permission to register as an official church, the application was refused with the explanation that the movement was "idelogically deviant." The Moscow leaders, Vladimir Kritski and Sergei Kurkin, were sentenced in December 1982 to 4 and 2½ years labor camp, respectively. Released conditionally in the second half of 1984 for "compulsory labor on a national project," Kritsky was re-arrested and sentenced to 4 more years of strict regime camp. Yevgeny Tretyakov was sentenced to 1½ years camp in 1981 for organizing a branch of the Hare Krishna movement in Krasnoyarsk. In a case that authorities attempted to link with that of Tretyakov, physiotherapist Valeriya Sukhova was sentenced in February 1983 to 4 years general regime camp for "infringing on the person" for having founded a club to study the Orient. She was later released ahead of schedule. Maya Kolyada, a geologist, re-

ceived 2 years general regime in March 1983 in connection with her leadership of a discussion group on Yogi and Indian philosophy. She was accused of distributing to her students a philosophical manuscript written by one Leonid Galkin. The document was devoted primarily to Hindu philosophy, but contained criticism of the United States and Soviet Union, including the occupation of Afghanistan. Galkin himself was sentenced to 3 years general regime camp in summer 1983. In April 1983, Aleksandr Levin, a Hindu, was sentenced to 4½ years general regime camp, where he went blind.

In June 1983, the Soviet weekly "Nedelya" accused the Krishna movement of being funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the journal "Science and Religion" ran a 13-page, 2-part article criticizing the movement. There followed a massive roundup of Krishna followers, one of whom was Olga Kiseleva, pregnant at the time. Sentenced to 4 years camp, Kiseleva delivered in camp and lost her child after 11 months.

In October 1984, police searched the homes of nine Krishna followers in the Stavropol krai of the north Caucus region. Eventually five persons were arrested and sentenced to camp terms. The indictment accused the movement of being linked to the Sakharov Committee (for human rights), the Jewish movement, and other "subversive groups."

By November 1986, there were at least 15 members of the Hare Krishna movement in psychiatric facilities or labor camps. One was under a compulsory labor sentence, without confinement. The initiator of the movement in the Soviet Union, Anatoly Pilyayev, was arrested in the summer of 1983 and sent to the Special Psychiatric Hospital at Smolensk, where he has been subjected to heavy drug treatment. His wife was told that "Anatoly's view of the world would not be easy to cure."

Conclusion: The legal recognition that religious organizations are persons under Soviet law is a minor improvement which should ease their dealings with the Soviet authorities on some practical matters. Also, the Russian Orthodox Church has been granted better facilities in Moscow for holding conferences. In return, however, the Russian Orthodox hierarchy must be prepared to follow state dictates on matters of foreign and religious policies.

In the main, unfortunately, the situation of religious believers in the Soviet Union has not improved in recent years. In the post-1979 general crackdown on dissent of all kinds, Soviet religious believers have been imprisoned twice as often as previously. Whereas Soviet evangelical Protestants, particularly Baptists, are still arrested in large numbers, the Soviet authorities apparently have increased repression against Lithuanian Catholics and Russian Orthodox. More instances of Islamic *samizdat* and unofficial religious activity are now known in the West. Also in western Ukraine, a Ukrainian Catholic defense movement was organized for the first time. Although legalization of their church was one of its main demands, Soviet authorities continue to treat the Ukrainian Catholic Church as an outlaw.

"EXTRAJUDICIAL" PUNISHMENT

As noted in the previous report, various means of "prophylactic measures" are employed by Soviet officials to discourage the expression by Soviet citizens of independent viewpoints before charges are officially lodged.

Telephone service for human rights activists is frequently cutoff under the pretext that the subscribers are "abusing" the service. During the reporting period, numerous refuseniks and independent peace activists experienced this treatment. When the Moscow independent peace group solicited calls from abroad on proposals for establishing trust between East and West, the phone service to the number they had published was immediatedly cutoff. After nonconformist artist Georgi Mikhalov was arrested in Leningrad, his mother could call out but could not receive incoming calls. In July 1985, refusenik Vladimir Lifshitz was detained in the Leningrad Post Office from where he was speaking with friends overseas. He was informed that the entire conversation was being recorded and transcribed.

Congressional hearings in the United States have documented a continuing practice of interfering with mail addressed to and from human rights activists and refuseniks (one source has stated that when a Soviet citizen begins to receive a large amount of mail from the West, postal authorities place a yellow marker on his/her mail slot for future reference). By July 15, 1985, U.S. Congressman Ben Gilman reported that the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee had accumulated over 2,500 pieces of evidence supporting charges that the Soviet Government deliberately interferes with mail service between its citizens and the West. Prior to the cutoff of *all* private prepaid packages to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1984, authorities had presented Western firms with lists of Soviet citizens, primarily relatives of political prisoners, for whom such packages would not be accepted.

Human rights activists and persons who apply to emigrate can count on losing their jobs and having difficulty obtaining others. Employers are warned by the local prosecutors office that "the employee is unreliable" and dismissal usually follows. This is also used to create a "Catch-22" situation for former political prisoners, who are prevented from getting jobs and then threatened and/or re-sentenced for "parasitism."

"Suspects" are detained on the street and taken to a police station for "discussions," where they are frequently warned on the basis of a Supreme Soviet decree of December 25, 1972 (the text of which has apparently never been published) that their activities are being noted and they are liable to be brought up on criminal charges.

Family members and children of human rights and religious activists and refuseniks, imprisoned or otherwise, are harassed. Tamara Grigoryants, wife of political prisoner Sergei Grigory Grigoryants, was called into KGB headquarters in Kaluga, where it was suggested that she "aid" the KGB lest her husband's situation in prison get worse. When she refused, her home was broken into and trashed. The attackers left a threatening note signed "The Avengers;" a month later her windows were broken and someone

tried to set fire to outbuildings nearby. After Mykola Horbal's wife left an appointment with the Prosecutor's office in Moscow, she was picked up by police, held for 2 days, and then put back on the train to Kiev. Also pulled off trains were Tatyana Zunshaine, wife of imprisoned refusenik Zachar Zunshaine, and Raisa Uvarov, mother of imprisoned Georgian Helsinki Monitors Tenghiz and Eduard Gudava. Valentina Golikova's (see Pentecostal section) adopted son has been threatened with psychiatric incarceration for supporting his mother. The KGB suggested to Larisa Bogoraz, wife of the late Helsinki Monitor Anatoly Marchenko, that she should write a statement renouncing her human rights activities. When she refused, she was told that her husband had been deprived of all his visiting rights at camp for 1984. Yuri Orlov's wife Irina Valitova was slandered by the KGB, who told Orlov's acquaintances that she was a bad influence on him, and that he would have been better off with a different wife. Praskovya Smaly, the sister of Ukrainian psychiatric political prisoner, Hanna Mykhailenko, and the only person allowed to visit her, was dismissed from her job in 1985.

As mentioned previously, newspaper articles and television films are employed to attack human rights activists. If the target is old enough and lived in the area of the Soviet Union occupied by Nazi troops during World War II, he can be assured of being painted with the "collaborator" brush. Jews are accused of ties with "Zionist centers of reaction" and by extension, with the atrocities committed in Lebanon. Jehovah's Witnesses supposedly take orders from the Witnesses' international headquarters in New York City. Evangelical Christians are pictured as unsociable, unstable individuals whose devotion to their religion leads them to neglect their family and civic responsibilities. Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists, along with their fellow countrymen abroad, allegedly wish to turn the clock back to the "bourgoise-nationalist past." When Yuri Andropov became General Secretary the press began to assert that all the participants in the human rights movement were agents of American intelligence. The victims of these attacks, of course, have no opportunity to reply through the same media.

Another method of intimidations pressure is the meeting of the collective at one's workplace to discuss the "behavior" of a fellow worker. For instance, the following item appeared in *Russkaya Mysl'* (Paris) in April 1985:

> In June, at the "Transselkhoztekhnik" plant in the village of Bortnichi, Borispol Raion, Kiev Oblast, there was a meeting in which they discussed the behavior of the leader of the local Pentecostal community, the truckdriver, Yakov Spirodonovich Gavrishov. Gavrishov was warned that if he continued to meet with representatives of foreign religious centers, papers on him will be filed with the prosecutors offices.

Physical attacks

One of the most ominous developments over the reporting period in the authorities' treatment of human rights activists is an appar-

ent decision to return to the use of physical force to discourage dissent, obtain confessions, and punish resisters in camp.

Although clearly not all deaths of dissidents or physical attacks on human rights activists on the street can be shown to be the work of the police and KGB, the strictures against physical abuse have been relaxed in favor of the attacker.

The November 1, 1982 issue of *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* reported an attack on the rector of St. Joseph's Church in Riga, Latvia in April 1982. The Rev. Valfrids Vainbergs was beaten so badly that he required an operation. Previously, he had been followed by KGB agents in automobiles.

An active Soviet feminist and poet, Kari Unksova, was struck by an automobile on a Leningrad street in June 3, 1983, under very suspicious circumstances. Unksova and her family had been given permission to leave the Soviet Union in May of that year. After analyzing an account of the incident given by Kari's sister Marina, who was seriously injured at the same time, Kari's husband wrote that "This was not an unfortunate accident, it was murder, very blunt and impudent. They didn't even try to make up at least (a) somewhat believable version. I think that they wanted for it to be clear to everybody."

In May 1983, Soviet Pentecostal Ivan Luchko was attacked by a group of "unknown persons" in Rovno, Ukraine. During the assault, he was told by his assailants that next time they would kill him unless he stopped his efforts to emigrate.

Yuri Burda, a Soviet Christian serving in the army died on October 31, 1983 allegedly from an electric shock. When his parents opened, his casket at home, they discovered that his eyes had been burned out, his hands stained, and his fingers crushed.

Another Christian soldier, Vyacheslav Minkov was beaten by fellow soldiers at least three times, and ultimately placed in a psychiatric facility in April 1984 for "talking about God." Yevgeny Minyakov, the son of Baptist pastor Dmitri Minyakov, was beaten by soldiers in his army unit, and he was put in the hospital with a broken jaw.

Evgeny Balter, a Jewish refusenik from Leningrad, was badly beaten on February 24, 1984. The same fate met another Leningrad refusenik, Leonid Kelbert in October 1985 as he was walking along a street with two Western tourists. The "hooligans" made no move toward the tourists, and concentrated exclusively on Kelbert.

The previous report noted that Lithuanian priests had been frequent victims of physical violence, particularly in the years 1980–81. In August 1985, Father Vaclovas Stakenas, a member of the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, was lured out of his rectory on false pretexts. He was attacked by two men who bound and gagged him, drove him out of town and left him there. This incident was followed by the violent death of Father Juozas Zdebskis, killed in an auto accident. Zdebskis was a founding member of the Catholic Committee and had been persecuted by authorities in the past. In 1981, he suffered suspicious chemical burns while riding in his automobile. The KGB ordered attending physicians to diagnose the priest's condition as "venereal disease," but they refused.

In February 1986, it was reported that Irina Tsurkova, the wife of political exile Arkady Tsurkov, was assaulted by a stranger on the street where she had gone to join her husband in exile.

In August 1986, former political prisoner Nikolai Pavlov was severely beaten in the village of Alekseeva by KGB agents who demanded that he refuse parcels from abroad.

Police use the slightest pretext to inflict physical retribution on dissidents during arrests. Yakov Mesh was beaten on the street in October 1984, although witnesses stated that he did not resist arrest. When police in Odessa, Ukraine arrested Yakov Levin, they beat him and twisted his fingers with a warning that henceforth he would have to write his complaints with his left hand.

During the reporting period, reports of beatings in pre-trial detention became more widespread, even in Moscow (the practice had previously been limited to the provinces). Alexandr Smirnov, arrested in late December 1982, was reportedly beaten 30 times while in investigative prison prior to his conviction in May 1983 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Sergei Khodorovich, administrator of the Solzhenitsyn Fund, was badly beaten following his arrest in April 1983. Refusenik Yakov Mesh had his liver damaged as a result of beatings administered while under investigation. Usually beatings are administered by criminal prisoners coopted by the administration, but Khodorovich insisted at his trial that a guard beat him and demanded that he recant or he would be beaten again. In early 1986, refusenik Vladimir Lifshitz was beaten by fellow prisoners while awaiting trial and hospitalized for 10 days. Tatyana Zunshaine (see above) described this scene in the common cell for prisoners:

> . . . In the common cells, violence reigns. Some of them there beat, rob, steal (others') clothes, humiliate, destroy morally, corrupt. . . . Others are required to catch flies. The quota is 50 flies per day, for each one not caught, you get 12 blows in the press. For hours they stand on their knees, wait on others, wash someone else's underwear, drink, wash themselves and the floor from one bucket.

Zunshaine had requested transfer out of the common cell so to protect himself from "re-education" tactics by other prisoners.

Removal of children from parental custody

While threats to take children away from their parents continue to be made against religious believers, no such cases during 1982–86 were documented. However, In April 1986, a court in Moscow denied Larisa Chukayeva, independent Soviet peace activist, custody of her 3-year-old son, and ruled that he should be turned over to a state institution. Chukayeva is divorced from Alexandr Chukayev, who is serving a labor camp sentence for political activity. Shortly after the court decision on her child, she was sentenced to 3 years labor camp for "dissemination of slander."

64-639 O - 87 - 8

Pre-trial detention

After arrest, when the formal investigation is initiated, the suspect is placed in a pre-trial detention that generally lasts about 3 months, but can go up to 9 months with permission of the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R. Even this legal limit has been breached by edict of the Supreme Soviet. Yuri Shikhanovich, for instance, was arrested on November 17, 1983, and kept in detention until his trial on September 5–6, 1984. Depending on the nature of the charges, the investigation is conducted by the prosecutor's office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the KGB (for "grave crimes against the State"). During that time, the prisoner is isolated from his friends, family and defense counsel. Visits by family members are only permitted by the investigating officer, but such instances are very rare, usually as a reward for "cooperation." Shikhanovich's wife was allowed to visit him during the investigatory period in an attempt to persuade him to retain his defense counsel. At one point, the investigator conducting Sergei Markus's case threatened to shoot him. The accused's attorney may only visit the detainee after the prosecutor has prepared the case. A close relative is permitted to visit only between conviction and the trip to the "place of deprivation of liberty." However, there are occasions when such visits are not permitted. Anna Lifshitz, wife of convicted refusenik Vladimir Lifshitz, was not allowed to visit her husband. Attendance by family members and friends at trial is severely limited, and the defendant often finds himself alone in facing the full force of the Soviet judiciary. Authorities usually pack the courtroom for the occasion, or issue passes (nowhere stipulated by law) for entrance.

Confinement

Confinement for protesting human rights violations over the reporting period ranged from administrative arrest of 10 to 15 days (including work details) to a maximum sentence—on political charges—of 10 years camp (strict or special regime), 5 years internal exile (e.g. Volodymir Andrushko, September 1982; Leonid Borodin, May 1983, and Enn Tarto, April 1984). Refusenik Lazar Rulyov-Kagan received a 12-year strict regime sentence for alleged speculation.

As for the overall conditions in the labor camps and the transit process thereto, authorities have made the conditions even more arduous by reducing the opportunities for prisoners to communicate with one another. Barriers between barracks have been built, the length of time that one may be confined to solitary confinement has been increased, and prisoners are beaten. New legislation enacted in October 1983 is specifically directed toward prisoners for "repeated disobedience of the demands of the camp authorities," with a penalty of up to 3 or 5 years, depending upon the circumstances.

Although it is difficult to ascertain at times precisely the charges upon which a prisoner has been re-sentenced, the following prisoners are reported to have been victims of this new law: Russian Orthodox activists Vladimir Poresh, receiving 3 more years in Octo-

ber 1984 (later overturned), and Alexandr Ogorodnikov, receiving 3 more years in April 1986; Baptist minister Mikhail Khorev, receiving 2½ years in January 1985; Viktor Grinev, receiving 1½ more years in March 1985; Georgian Helsinki Monitor Merab Kostava, receiving 2 more years in June 1985; Solzhenitsyn Fund administrator Sergei Khodorovich, receiving 3 more years in April 1986. The new law has not prevented authorities from re-sentencing prisoners on the standard political charges. Among the many such victims are SMOT activist Vladimir Skvirsky, who received 3 more years in June, 1984; Ukrainian Helsinki Monitor Mykola Horbal, receiving 8 years strict regime camp and 3 years exile in October 1984; Russian psychiatrist Anatoly Koryagin, receiving 2 more years in February 1986; Belorussian worker Mikhail Kukobaka, receiving 7 years strict regime camp and 5 years exile in 1984, Galina Maximova (a Russian woman who has been attempting with her son to emigrate), receiving 5 more years strict regime labor camp in May 1985 (see also Helsinki Monitors and Baptists).

As additional punishment, prisoners in labor camps are sometimes transferred for a particular period of time to the more stringent conditions of prisons. The prison to which political prisoners are specifically assigned is at Chistopol, in the Tatar ASSR. This occurred to Mart Niklus in July 1983, the late Mark Morozov in December 1983, and Mikhail Kazachkov sometime before December 1984. In addition, the standard procedure of denying family visits to prisoners for the slightest provocation continues to be applied. Natalia Petkus, wife of Lithuanian Helsinki Monitor Viktoras Petkus, did not have any communication from her husband for over 6 months and was prevented from visiting him for 2 years. When Mart Niklus' mother was permitted to meet with him at Chistopol Prison, authorities broke up the meeting because Niklus refused to speak Russian instead of his native Estonian.

In January 1984, the *Wall Street Journal* published a letter from the late Anatoly Marchenko, incarcerated at one of the three Perm camps for political prisoners. It read in part:

> . . . On May 4, 1983, the political prisoner Zurab Gogiya noticed a maggot in his bowl of soup. He told two friends, Stepan Khmara and S. Uvarov, about it and expressed his dissatisfaction to the senior cook. The camp commander Maj. Osin sent all three to punishment cells for 15 days (for slandering the kitchen). Two additional punishments were added: the three prisoners were deprived of canteen privileges and of family visits.
>
> . . . The following day, Ivan Kovalev fished out with his spoon another such "fact" . . . Kovalev addressed a complaint to Osin. The next day Kovalev was deprived of canteen privileges. Soon thereafter he was sent to a punishment cell for 15 days. When his term expired on Aug. 2, Kovalev was not released. He was sentenced to 12 more days in the punishment cell; . . .
>
> "We will starve you and freeze you not because you are Ivan Kovalev but because you are not fulfilling your quotas," Kovalev was told in the camp prison by Ponomarev, the camp doctor!

Zachar Zunshaine described the criminal camp in Bozoi to which he had been assigned:

> Underwear is not changed for 20 days at a time—the camp is being starved—they feed us worse than in prison. Despite the fact that there are double window frames in the bathhouse, the insides of the windows are covered with snow and ice.
>
> . . . The cold is terrible. It forces the inmates to cling to radiators like sheep near a shepherd. For 3 days in a row, the central heating did not function, and I am frozen to the bone. . . .
>
> The last 2 months, the regular water supply was cut off in the camp. We got water from the radiators, drinking it out of watering cans.

Zunshaine was taunted with anti-Semitic epithets and beaten by inmates when he arrived at Bozoi.

Among many victims of beatings in camp have been Helsinki Monitors Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Marchenko, and independent peace activist Alexandr Shatravka. By August 1986, Marchenko had declared his ultimately fatal hunger strike in protest against such abuse. Irina Ratushinskaya, considered one of the greatest poets of her generation and sentenced to 7 years strict regime camp and 5 years internal exile, had her head beaten against the cell floor while she was being force-fed. She was later refused medical care in camp for "not standing up when the doctor came to her cell." Iosif Berenshtein is almost blind as the result of a beating received in prison. In 1986, it was reported that Naum Yefremov was being systematically beaten by inmates at the camp in Tyumen oblast where he was sent. Arkady Tsurkov's lungs have been injured as a result of beatings suffered in camp. In January 1986, Yuri Edelshtein fractured his pelvis and thigh bone at the Vidrino labor camp where he was working and was denied adequate treatment. It is feared he may be permanently disabled as a result. Mykola Horyn suffered his second heart attack in camp in the spring of 1984. His wife Olga has been attempting for 2 years to have him transferred to the Leningrad hospital for prisoners, but without results.

In some camps, homosexual prisoners are used to break other prisoners' resistance to authorities' demands; in the investigative prisons political prisoners may be thrown into "press-huts" to be physically worked over by vicious criminals or psychiatric patients. Exiled political activist Georgi Vladimov wrote in *Russkaya Mysl* in July 1983:

> Pressure-cells are now in vogue. Prisoners awaiting trials are put in cells together with convicted criminals—usually two of them—who attack them, as they did Aleksei Smirnov-Kosterin. Sometimes they rape them. And each time the investigator summons them and says, "Well now, are we going to confess?"—(Quoted from RFE/RL 329/83.)

These "press-cells" or "press-huts" have become accepted as standard features of the prison system.

As of December 1985, there were at least 77 female political prisoners in the Soviet Union. Of those for whom reliable information is available, the majority were imprisoned for religious beliefs. Women convicted on political charges are kept in a separate strict regime facility at Barashevo, Mordovia. The others are scattered in criminal camps throughout the Soviet Union.

The women at the Mordovian camp have been particularly active in resisting malfeasance by the authorities, staging numerous hunger strikes and writing letters to newspapers and higher authorities, as well as a letter of congratulations to President Reagan upon his re-election. Keston College has quoted the head of this camp, Maj. Shorin, as saying "We don't shoot you any more now, but we have other methods to ensure that you won't leave this camp alive." A camp doctor certified Tatyana Osipova, one of the prisoners in the womens' zone, fit to spend 15 days in the isolation cell right after prescribing 5 days treatment for an illness.

As incidents of physical abuse and medical neglect have become more prevalent, there has been an increase in reported deaths within the camps. A *samizdat* appeal addressed to the Vienna CSCE Meeting in late 1986 stated that in the last 30 months 10 men had died in Perm Camp 36-1 alone. Although the law provides for early release for critically ill prisoners (art. 100, RSFSR Code), it is seldom used.

Three Ukrainian Helsinki Monitors died while in camp between 1982-86: Oleksy Tykhy died of malnutrition in May 1984, Yuri Lytvyn apparently committed suicide in late August 1984, and Vasyl Stus succumbed to poor health and deplorable camp conditions in September 1985. The Ukrainian human rights movement suffered another tragic loss October 1984 with the death of poet and journalist Valery Marchenko, who died in the hospital for prisoners in Leningrad. Marchenko was in desperate need of a kidney dialysis machine and doctors had wanted to transfer him to a civilian hospital but the KGB refused. Just prior to his death, Marchenko's wife had received a report from the Gulag medical authorities that her husband's health was satisfactory and that "he is being provided with the necessary medical treatment."

Viktor Tomachinsky, who had been imprisoned in 1981 for his attempts to emigrate and re-sentenced in camp in May 1983, died of complications following pneumonia soon after his second conviction.

Ishkan Mkrtchyan, an Armenian activist imprisoned at Perm Labor Camp No. 35, died under mysterious circumstances on the 70th anniversary of the genocide of the Armenian people in 1915.

Independent labor union activist Aleksei Nikitin died of stomach cancer in April 1984 following his release from a special psychiatric hospital when doctors realized that his condition was incurable. By this time, Nikitin was reportedly almost blind due to forced drug injections at the psychiatric hospital by alleged doctors.

Mikhail Dyukarev, a former Soviet border guard who had defected to Iran in 1974, killed himself at Perm Camp No. 35 in September 1984. Dyukarev had returned voluntarily to the Soviet Union in 1982, only to be sentenced to 12 years for "treason."

Eduard Arutyunyuan, founder of the Armenian Helsinki Group, died of cancer 8 days after being released from camp in early December 1984.

Mark Morozov, a mathematician and one of the founders of the SMOT independent labor union movement, died on August 3, 1986 of a heart attack at Chistopol Prison. He had suffered from a number of serious illnesses. The first SMOT press conference in 1978 had taken place at Morozov's Moscow apartment.

Anatoly Marchenko dies in early December 1986 following a hunger strike that he had initiated on 4 August 1986. Marchenko had demanded an end to abuse of prisoners, punishment of guards who had beaten him, and resumption of visits with his wife.

Internal exile

The practice of appending a period of internal exile to a labor camp sentence has become standard for prisoners convicted of "especially dangerous crimes against the states" (i.e., art. 64–72 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, and the analogous statutes of the other Republics). Internal exile without camp sentence, or with perhaps a year of confinement, is also frequently meted out to first-time "offenders"—usually a 5-year term. Exile is almost always to Siberia or a similarly distant and/or barely inhabitable location. Exiles frequently are assigned rooms in workers' dormitories. The few fortunate ones may rent a small place of their own. Under the system known as administrative surveillance, exiles are not allowed to travel outside certain limits, and must report regularly to the local police—although local police check on them at all hours of the day and night.

The late Vasyl Stus was assigned during his exile in the late 1970's to work in a coal mine in the Kolyma area of Siberia. In a letter published in the West in July 1985, Stus wrote:

> . . . The dust in the mine was terrible because there was no ventilation. Blind vertical shafts were being drilled. The hammer weighed 50 kilograms, the bar 85. The respirator (a gauze mask) would become wet and covered with a layer of dust within half an hour. Then you could take it off and work without protection. . . .
>
> . . . I had to fight a real war with the KGB over my letters. Dozens of letters just disappeared. My complaints were answered in a particular way: the mailbag at the Magadan airport had a hole. . . .

A little over a month after this was published, Stus died.

Russian religious and national rights activist Igor Ogurtsov completed 15 years of labor camp and took up exile residence in Komi, ASSR, in March 1984. Attempts have been made to compromise him. At one point, the SMOT *Bulletin* reported that the KGB had offered Ogurtsov and his elderly parents the opportunity to leave the Soviet Union (which they have attempted to do for several years) if Ogurtsov would promise not to "cooperate with NTS" (the Russian nationalist, anti-Communist organization with headquarters in the Federal Republic of Germany) and "other anti-Soviet organizations." Ogurtsov refused.

Helsinki Monitor Yuri Orlov began his 5-year exile term in May 1984. A friend of his from Moscow wrote about Orlov's situation in 1985.

> Compared to other exile situations, I know of none that are hard as Yuri's. It is complete isolation in a village which is itself isolated. . . . Rumors are spread that he is a spy, a traitor, a war-monger. The climate, both in winter and summer, is harsh, even for a healthy young man. The locals are aggressive, and it is impossible to find a permanent place to live. . . .
>
> . . . On the night of April 21, Yuri Orlov was severely beaten in the street by two drunken toughs. "What is your name?" said one. And then: "Beat him up!" When Yuri fell down, they went on beating and kicking him.

Orlov was released from exile and allowed to emigrate to the West in October 1986.

Tatyana Velikanova, a Moscow mathematician whose arrest in 1979 is considered one of milestones in the crackdown on dissent in the Soviet Union, arrived at her assigned place of exile in rural Kazakhstan in November 1983 after 4 years of camp. Her living conditions in the village of Beineu are as follows:

> She had to move into an empty, dirty and abandoned room that needs major repairs. The floor sags, the stove doesn't work. Meanwhile the container that held all (her) belongings (clothes, undergarments, dishes) disappeared without a trace. (She) had to ask for a table from a neighbor. On the trash heap, she found a couple of chairs. That's all the furniture she has now. . . . The room . . . is in a barracks, next to (the room) is a small, 6-meter space, the kitchen. There's no water in the building. One has to go to a well for it. The toilet is also outside. One for several barracks. There's no door on the toilet. A simple beaded curtain takes its place. . . .

Travel restrictions

Upon release from labor camp or exile, political prisoners are frequently prevented from rejoining their families in their home town, almost always if they were convicted for "especially dangerous crimes against the state" (see *Internal Exile*). In August 1985, new regulations were issued by the Council of Ministers, which prohibited anyone who has been refused a housing permit in Moscow, or convicted of any so-called "premeditated crimes," to visit Moscow or certain of its surrounding towns. Permission to enter those areas may only be granted under exceptional circumstances by the head of the local Ministry of Internal Affairs. Besides the obvious limitations that the new regulations place on those who wish to visit Moscow, they also place obstacles before those whose travel plans would take them through Moscow by rail, whether or not they wished to stop in Moscow. In commenting on this new law, Moscow Helsinki Monitor and former political prisoner Malva Landa estimated that it affected no less than 4 or 5 percent of the Soviet population, and pointed out the hardship that it

would cause to those who require quality medical care available only at Moscow "pay" clinics.

Public confessions for dissidents

Soviet authorities constantly attempt to secure public recantations to intimidate the public and to discredit the human rights movement. Physical and psychological pressure are applied, appeals to the patriotic feelings of the prisoners are made, and concerns for his or her family are played upon. During the reporting period, such "confessions" invariably contained references to having been used by "hostile Western propaganda centers," such as "foreign radio voices."

Some recantations are pried out of suspects prior to trial; however, if this is not successful, the efforts continue in the camp. Ideally, the optimum use of the recantation involves a staged television address, such as that given in February 1983 on Leningrad television by former administrator of the Solzhenitsyn Fund Valery Repin.

About a month later, Repin's wife followed with her own television interview in which she claimed that she and her husband had become "victims of the infamous 'Solzhenitsyn Fund.' "

Over the reporting period, three Ukrainian Helsinki Monitors apparently recanted. In February 1983, a letter appeared in "Prikarpatskaya Pravda" in which Father Vasyl Romanyuk allegedly repented for his "anti-Soviet past" and pledged to work in the future for "peace and for the good of our people." In April 1984, a Soviet Ukrainian-language weekly published for overseas readership alleged that Ivan Sokulsky "condemns his behavior and speaks of wishing to repent of his wrongdoing before the people." Approximately a month later, Oles Berdnyk read a statement on Kiev radio in which he condemned his past human rights activities, thanked the authorities for having given him his freedom, and said that he had finally "(broken) all ties with those who wish to harm my fatherland." A similar newspaper article followed in *Literaturnaya Ukraina*. Berdnyk later repeated his recantation in a national television broadcast entitled "Conspiracy Against the Nation of Soviets." Soviet authorities have claimed that Ukrainian Helsinki Monitor and virtual prisoner-for-life Yuri Shukhevych had recanted while in exile. Subsequent contact with Shukhevych indicates that this is not the case.

A recantation by an unregistered Baptist minister, Anatoly Petrenko, was reported in the Ukrainian newspaper *Robitnycha Hazeta* in September 1984. According to the newspaper, Petrenko recanted (at his third trial) for his past religious activities, and strongly criticized other leaders of the unregistered church.

In July 1985, refusenik Dan Shapiro, in an apparently recantation, appeared on Moscow television to air an entire laundry list of other refuseniks, foreign tourists, Western Embassy officials and journalists allegedly carrying out anti-Soviet campaigns and provocations in the Soviet Union.

In November 1985, "Ukrainian Pravda" published an article entitled "Repentance of Someone Deceived," together with the text of a letter in which refusenik Evgeny Koifman expresses his deep regret for having gotten involved with Zionism and promises in the

future "never to commit any actions causing harm to the Soviet Union."

Refusenik Lazar Rulyov-Kagan repented on Leningrad television in December 1985, following a 12-year sentence for "speculation." At the Burepolom camp in the Gorky Region, his ribs had been reportedly broken by beatings and he had been placed on minimal rations.

Sergei Markus, a Russian Orthodox historian and theology specialist, recanted on Moscow television in January 1986. He denied that religious persecution existed in the Soviet Union, and claimed that had been in contact with "religious centers abroad which had also undertaken a mission of subversion." In a letter to the Soviet media a month earlier, Markus had charged that the "American adminstration" was carrying on a "hostile struggle" against the Soviet Union, "with the involvement of the church in that struggle."

Boris Razveev, a former participant in the Christian Seminar, reportedly recanted on a German-language Soviet radio broadcast on April 14, 1986.

PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE

The Soviet Government continues the practice of using involuntary psychiatric incarceration as a means of dealing with dissidents and persons "unacceptable to the authorities." In April 1985, it was reported that another Special Psychiatric Hospital run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs was opened in Erevan, Armenia, bringing the total of such facilities to 13. There are two basic types of psychiatric hospitals: Special psychiatric hospitals under the administration of the Ministry of Interior, theoretically designated for criminal offenders; general psychiatric hospitals for other "patients." Political prisoners are found in both types of institution. In addition, there are now at least five "Special Psychiatric Colonies" for persons who show signs of mental disturbance while serving labor camp sentences. In 1985, it was reported that a branch of the infamous Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry had been established in Kiev, Ukraine. These developments would indicate that the Soviet Government continues to rely on psychiatric incarceration as a means of dealing with political dissent.

A list of victims of political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union published by the International Association on the Political Use of Psychiatry, contained 133 names as of November 1985. In March 1983, Professor Harvey Fireside, a specialist on Soviet psychiatric abuse, was cited in the *Christian Science Monitor* as estimating that there may be some 1,000 persons held in psychiatric facilities for political activity. Moreover, he noted, another 10,000 are being held merely for complaining about the system: about official malfeasance, job loss and discrimination, or housing problems, among others. With regard to political dissidents, Professor Fireside testified before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in September 1983, that:

> . . . dissidents who show no evidence of massive agitation or violent behavior are nonetheless treated with neuroleptics. Typically, they are directly or indirectly advised

that the only way they can avoid being forced to take these drugs is to renounce their political or religious views. They are also threatened with higher drug doses or with the renewal of previously discontinued medications if they protest their mistreatment.

In the opinion of former psychiatric abuse victim Alexandr Shatravka, the abuse of drug treatment is actually more brutal in ordinary psychiatric hospitals than in special psychiatric hospitals as there is less time to "cure" the patient in the former, while in the latter facilities, "the doctors know they have longer to work with such patients."

As a result of the worldwide condemnation of Soviet psychiatric abuse, the official Soviet All-Union Society of Psychiatrists and Neurologists withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association in February 1983. There had been plans by delegations of several other countries to censure or expel the Soviet Union at the World Psychiatric Association Congress in Vienna in July 1983.

Among the numerous victims of the political abuse of psychiatry during the reporting period are the following:

Gederts Melngailis, a Latvian worker, was arrested for "dissemination of slander" in January 1983, but his mother was persuaded by a lawyer to sign a statement stating that her son had been suffering from schizophrenia since childhood. Melngailis was eventually sentenced to 3 years labor camp, but remanded to Blagoveshchensk Special Psychiatric Hospital.

Aleksandr Vorona, a Russian dissident and signatory to the "Appeal to the Governments and Publics of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A." (see Independent Peace Movement), was arrested in January 1983 and remanded to the Dnepropetrovsky Special Psychiatric Hospital. Vorona had also been held in an ordinary psychiatric hospital in 1980 to prevent him from meeting with foreigners during the Olympics.

Vladimir Gershuni, a SMOT activist who was first arrested in 1949, and has been in and out of psychiatric facilities for most of his adult life, was sent to the Special Psychiatric Hospital in Tashkent in early spring 1983.

Nizametdin Akhmetov, a Bashkir poet, originally was sent to labor camp in 1979 for dissident activities, but was transferred in early 1983 to the Special Psychiatric Hospital at Alma-Ata.

Egor Volkov, a Russian worker from Nakhodka, Siberia, had been sent to the Special Psychiatric Hospital in Blagoveshchensk in 1968 for his labor agitation. In early 1983, doctors recommended that he be released, but the court refused to allow it (he had earlier been convicted on criminal charges).

Vasily Pervushin, a war invalid and activist for handicapped rights, was arrested in June 1983 and sent to the Alma-Ata Special Psychiatric Hospital in November of the same year.

Garnik Tsarukyan, an archdeacon of the Armenian Church, was picked up by police in February 1984 for making a speech criticizing the corruption of the Armenian Church and its links with the KGB. In March, he was remanded to the Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital in Erevan.

Viktor Bezzubenko, a Ukrainian Baptist, was sent to an ordinary psychiatric hospital in early 1984 for refusing on religious grounds to serve in the armed forces.

Viktor Rafalsky, a Ukrainian school teacher, was first arrested in 1954, and has been in special psychiatric hospitals for most of the time since 1968. He escaped briefly from an ordinary psychiatric hospital in 1983, and was returned to Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital in April 1984. In that year, an appeal from Rafalsky reached the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in which he described his circumstances and asked that everything be done to secure his release. "I'm still holding on," he wrote. "Give me your hand."

Anna Mikhailenko, a Ukrainian librarian and human rights activist, had her treatment continued by order of a psychiatric commission in July 1984.

Dr. Algirdas Statkevicius, himself a Lithuanian psychiatrist, was sent to the Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital in 1980, and put in a cell with four murderers. In early 1985 he was transferred to the Special Psychiatric Hospital in Tashkent.

According to another former psychiatric prisoner, Victor Davidov, political prisoners in special psychiatric hospitals were asked in April 1983 to sign statements promising they would refrain from further political activity; if the "patients" signed, they were transferred to ordinary hospitals or released.

FOOTNOTES AND SOURCES

VOLUME I

CHAPTER THREE

*Source—NATO, *Tables of Notifications of Military Manoeuvers Made Under Provisions of CSCE Final Act During the Period 1975-1985*, ISD/373 (Revised), June 9, 1986.

CHAPTER FOUR

Bulgaria

[1] *Keston News Service*, May 16, 1985.
[2] *Keston News Service*, Sept. 5, 1985.
[3] Janice Broun, "Religious Survival in Bulgaria," *America*, vol. 153, p. 325
[4] Keston No. 240, December 12, 1985.
[5] "New Line in Bulgaria—Turks? What Turks?" *New York Times*, April 20, 1986 p. 8.
[6] *Destroying Ethnic Identity—The Turks of Bulgaria*, Helsinki, Watch Report, June 1986, p. 12.
[7] "Bulgaria's Turks tell of Terror in Forced Assimilation Drive," Jackson Diehl, *Washington Post*, April 8, 1986.

Czechoslovakia

[1] English translations of *Charter 77 Document No. 5/85*, "The Prague Appeal," and subsequently cited Charter documents and VONS communiques provided by Anna Faltus of the Czechoslovak National Council.
[2] *Charter 77 Document No. 7/86*, "Space for the Young Generation" (Prague, March 6, 1986).
[3] *Charter 77 Document No. 20/84*, "The Right to Information' (December 1, 1984).
[4] *Keston News Service* No. 239, 28 November 1985.
[5] William Echikson, "Religious Revival in Czechoslovakia Sparks Crackdown" in *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 2, 1986.
[6] Burkhard Bischof, "Unrest Under the Surface" in *Die Presse* (Vienna), April 5-6, 1986 translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Europe Report*, May 19, 1986, p. 71.
[7] This interview was reprinted in *Reference Point—Reality* (July 1986), pp. 8-10.
[8] Information provided by Keston College.
[9] *Keston News Service* No. 208 (13 September 1984).
[10] *Keston News Service* No. 251. (29 May 1986).
[11] *Keston News Service* No. 247 (3 April 1986).
[12] *Charter 77 Document No. 5/85*, "The Prague Appeal," *op. cit.*
[13] Based on a translated account of a participant in the demonstration, "Report on the Peace Demonstration of the Young People in Prague" provided by Anna Faltus of the Czechoslovak National Council.
[14] *Charter 77 Document No. 20/84*, "The Right to Information," *op. cit.*
[15] *Charter 77 Document No. 9/85* (Prague, April 26, 1985).
[16] *Document of Charter 77 No. 24/1985*, "Writers and Charter 77 to the Budapest Forum" (Prague, September 25, 1985).

German Democratic Republic

[1] U.S. Embassy, Berlin.
[2] Martin N. Walton, "The Evangelical Church in the G.D.R.: A Church in Socialism" in *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, Vol. 4, October 1984, pp. 1-11.
[3] *Keston News Service*, No. 225 (16 May 1985), p. 16.
[4] For text of the Pastoral Letter, see "Pastoral Letter of GDR Catholic Bishops on Peace" in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 11, Summer 1983, pp. 214-217.
[5] Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Violations of the Helsinki Accords Since Madrid*, Vol. I (Vienna, May 1985), p. 46; Lawrence Klippenstein, "Exercising a Free Conscience—the

Conscientious Objectors of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic" in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 5, No. 13 (winter 1985), p. 289.

[6] *Keston News Service*, No. 248 (17 April 1986).

[7] "East Germany's Democratic Movement—Human Rights GDR" (translated and introduced by Boria Sax) in *Across Frontiers* (spring 1986), pp. 13-14; see also "The World Youth Festival Petition—Birth of an East German Charter?" (translation and introduction by Boria Sax) in *Across Frontiers* (winter 1985), pp. 10-12.

Hungary

[1] Bill Lomax, "Independent Publishing in Hungary," *Index on Censorship*, vol. 12, No. 2, February 1983, pp. 3-4.

[2] Judith Pataki, Harassment of Dissidents Continues," *Radio Free Europe Research*, SR/6, April 22, 1983.

[3] Edith Markos, "Police Harassment of Dissidents Intensifies," *Radio Free Europe Research*, SR/3, March 8, 1985, pp. 9-10.

[4] AP Report, April 2, 1986.

[5] *Magyar Nemzet*, August 9, 1986, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report/Eastern Europe*, August 13, 1986, pp. F1-2.

[6] Alfred Reisch, "Controversial Periodical Again Incurs Wrath of Cultural Watchdogs," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Hungarian SR/4, October 17, 1986.

[7] International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Violations of the Helsinki Accords Since Madrid*, vol. 1, May 1985, pp. 53-56.

[8] Rudolf L. Tokes, "Hungarian Reform Imperatives," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984, pp. 6-8.

[9] Helsinki Watch, "New Legislation," *Recent News From Hungary*, March 1986, p. 2.

Poland

Sources—U.S. Department of State Semiannual Reports Fourteen through Twenty-One (covering the period December 1, 1982 through October 1, 1986) on *Helsinki Final Act Implementation*, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Department of State annual *Country Report on Human Rights Practices* for the years 1982-85, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

The Use of Political Imprisonment In The Polish People's Republic—A Partial List of Political Prisoners, August 1985-1986, prepared by the Committee in Support of Solidarity, New York, N.Y., July 23, 1986.

A Report from the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights—Violations of the Helsinki Accords since Madrid, Volume on Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Vienna, May 1985.

No Mention of Solidarity—U.N. Report on Human Rights in Poland, U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, New York, N.Y., September 1984.

Violations of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in the Polish People's Republic from 1983 to 1986—Report of the Helsinki Committee in Poland to the Participating States in the Vienna Review Conference of the CSCE (manuscript), 1986.

A Report for the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights—Culture in Poland, prepared by the Commission of Culture of Underground Solidarity, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Vienna, 1985.

Unclassified Briefing Book, U.S. Delegation to the CSCE Cultural Forum, 1985.

Poland Watch Digest, No. 2 (September 30), "Poland's Cultural Policy," Poland Watch Committee, Washington, D.C.

Information Provided by the United States Government Regarding the Request of the International Labor Organization Commission of Inquiry on Poland, November 15, 1983.

Report of the Commission Instituted Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization to Examine the Complaint on the Observance by Poland of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) Presented by Delegates of the 68th Session of the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 1984.

The Commission is grateful to the Poland Watch Committee of Washington, D.C. for its assistance in the preparation of this section of the report.

Romania

[1] *Amnesty International Report 1985* (London, 1985), pp. 279-282.

[2] "Repression Worsens Against Writers in Romania," a PEN American Center Report (June 1986), p. 3.

[3] *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.

[4] *Keston News Service* No. 251 (29 May 1986), pp. 14-16.

[5] Information provided by Keston College.

[6] Helsinki Watch, *Ten Years Later—Violations of the Helsinki Accords* (New York, August 1985), p. 124; *The Economist*, September 17, 1983, p. 60.

[7] *The Economist, Ibid.*

[8] "Romanian Trade Policy Questioned," *Journal of Commerce*, November 1, 1983, p. 23B.

[9] Excerpts from the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly "Report on the Situation of Minorities in Romania" appeared in *Carpathian Observer*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (winter 1984-85).

[10] Hungarian ethnic poet Geza Szocs cited in Z. Michael Szaz, "Oppression of the National Minorities in Romania" in Philip S. Cox, *Sources of Human Rights Violations in Romania* (Washington, D.C., 1986), p. 73.

Soviet Union

[1] *U.S.S.R. News Brief*, February 15, 1983.
[2] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is based on a July, 1984 U.S. Department of State *Foreign Affairs Note*, "New Soviet Legislation Restricts Rights, Strengthens Internal Security."
[3] Julia Wishnevsky, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 181/86, May 2, 1986, "A Secret Decree Banning Former Prisoners from Visiting Moscow."
[4] *Radio Liberty Research*, August 28, 1986, Ann Sheehy, "Cotton at Any Price or a Fair Price?"
[5] *Soviet Nationality Survey*, No. 9, November 7, 1985, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
[6] James Markham, "Estonians Resist Chernobyl Duty, Paper Says," *New York Times*, August 27, 1986.
[7] Unless otherwise noted, this section on the ILO is drawn from "Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R.," *Russia*, No. 10, 1984.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] Walter Parchomenko, "Vasily Pervushin: Disabled Veteran, Soviet Prisoner," *Wall Street Journal*, May 21, 1985.
[11] Serge Schmemann, "KGB Suppressing a Dissident Group," *New York Times*, May 22, 1983.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *U.S.S.R. News Brief*, May 31, 1983.
[15] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 371/84, September 28, 1984, Sergei Yurenen, "Chernenko's 'Literary' Policy and the Reality of Literature."
[16] RL 145/83, *op. cit.*
[17] Unless otherwise noted, the information on *glavlit* in this section, is drawn from *The Soviet Censorship*, edited by Martin Dewhirst and Robert Farrell, The Scarecrow Press, 1973.
[18] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 258/86, June 23, 1986, Elizabeth Fuller and Anoush Petrossian, "The Ninth Congress of the Armenian Union of Writers."
[19] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 264/86, July 15, 1986, Julia Wishnevsky, "the Eighth Congress of Soviet Writes: An Appraisal."
[20] Unless otherwise noted, most of the information on censorship in this section is from *Index on Censorship*, § 4, 1980.
[21] *Radio Liberty Background Report*, RL 211/86, May 30, 1986, Vladimir Matusevich, "Whirlwind of Change in Soviet Cinema."
[22] Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is drawn from *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 364/84, October 2, 1984, Todd Bludeau, "*APTART v NATURE* and the Exhibitions of 1974."
[23] *Soviet Nationality Survey* § 1, January 1–March 31, 1983, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Radio Liberty Research* 416/84, October 30, 1984, Roman Solchanyk, "Soviet Author on Contradictions in the National Question."
[26] *Soviet Nationality Survey* § 9, November 7, 1985, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
[27] *Soviet Nationality Survey* § 10, February 28, 1986, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Radio Liberty Research* 366/85, October 29, 1985, Ann Sheehy, "The New Edition of the Party Program and the National Question."
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] RLR 416/84, *op. cit.*
[33] *Radio Liberty Research* 242/86, June 26, 1986, Ann Sheehy, "Academician Bromlei Writes About Nationality Relations."
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Radio Liberty Research* 121/85, April 17, 1985, Ann Sheehy, "Call for More Education and Publications in Russian in the Non-Russian Republics."
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] RLR 242/86, *op. cit.*
[42] RL 121/85, *op. cit.*
[43] As cited in *Ibid.*
[44] *Radio Liberty Research* 376/84, October 3, 1984, Roman Solchanyk, "The Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R.—Only for Poetry and Memoirs?"
[45] *Radio Liberty Research* 395/84, October 15, 1984, Julia Wishnevsky, "The Language of the Legal Proceeding in the Union Republics."
[46] *Soviet Nationality Survey* § 7, September 30, 1984, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
[47] *Soviet Nationality Survey* § 10, *op. cit.*

[48] *Radio Liberty Research* 129/84, March 26, 1984, Elizabeth Fuller, "Ten Georgians Sentenced for Protesting Against Celebrating the Bicentennial of Russian-Georgian Treaty."

[49] *Radio Liberty Research* 65/84, Elizabeth Fuller, "Expert on Nationality Relations Appointed Georgian Minister of Culture."

[50] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 332/86, July 17, 1986, Oxana Antic, "Some Changes in Legislation on Religion."

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] This discussion is based on Keston News Service (KNS) § 246, March 20, 1986, "Gorbachev Signals no Change in Religious Policy."

[54] This section is based on KNS § 239, November 28, 1985, 'The Scope of Atheist Propaganda."

[55] KNS § 212, November 8, 1984, "Soviet Press Intensifies Propaganda."

[56] KNS § 241, "Metropolitan Filaret Speaks at Human Rights Conference."

[57] KNS § 240, December 12, 1985, "Too Many Churches?"

[58] KNS § 235, October 3, 1985, "Death of Council on Religious Affairs Official."

[59] *Soviet Nationality Survey*, § 9, November 7, 1985, State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[60] KNS § 241, September 1, 1986, "Western Responses to the Situation of the Russian Orthodox Church."

[61] KNS § 207, August 30, 1984, "News of Rebuilding of Leningrad Chapel."

[62] KNS § 224, May 2, 1985, "Threat of Demolition."

[63] KNS § 221, March 21, 1985, "The Fate of Some Orthodox Monasteries After the Revolution" (based on Radio Liberty Research, December 20, 1984).

[64] KNS § 208, September 13, 1984, Alyona Kozhevnikova, "Guard My Sheep.: A Personal Viewpoint."

[65] KNS § 251, May 29, 1986, "Danilovsky Monastery Restoration Account."

[66] *Op. cit.*, Keston News Service, § 221.

[67] Radio Liberty Research, RL 319/84, August 22, 1984, Oxana Antic, "The Russian Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches."

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] KNS § 210, October 11, 1984, "Severe Crisis for Georgian Orthodox Church."

[70] KNS § 212, November 8, 1984, "Georgian Priest Sentenced to Death."

[71] "Muslim *Samizdat*," *Strana i Mir* § 10, October 1985. (translated by Joint Publications Research Service, July 21, 1986)

[72] KNS § 208, September 13, 1984, "Cardinal Slipyi: The Man and His Church."

[73] KNS § 236, October 17, 1985, "Pope Calls for Religious Liberty for Ukrainian Catholics."

[74] Radio Liberty Research § 220/83, June 6, 1983, Ivan Hvat, "Group Formed to Defend Catholics' Rights in the Ukraine."

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] KNS § 236, October 17, 1985, "Ukrainian Catholic Nun Murdered in Lvov."

[77] KNS § 235, October 3, 1985, "Secret Document Published by Lithuanian Catholics."

[78] KNS § 219, February 21, 1985, "Another Bishop and Archbishop for Lithuania."

[79] KNS § 223, March 21, 1985, "Catechism Classes Harassed."

[80] Radio Liberty Research, RL 354/84, September 19, 1984, Jonas Papartis, "The Sixty-First Issue of the Lithuanian Chronicle."

*Information on individual cases is mostly drawn from Keston News Service, with occasional assists from the *U.S.S.R. News Brief*.

APPENDIX A

Chronology of Major Terrorist Events

November 1982—September 1986

LATE 1982

12/7/82—Northern Ireland

A bomb blast in a crowded bar near a military barracks in Ballykelly killed and injured scores of people. Police said no warning had been given. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a Marxist offshoot of the Irish Republican Army, claimed responsibility for the attack. The bombing, which represented execution of a November threat by INLA to widen its targeting operations to include commercial establishments linked to British security forces, prompted the Irish Government to ban the group.

TERRORIST ACTS IN 1983

2/22/83—Spain

Warehouses belonging to the French-owned Michelin Tire Company were destroyed in an arson attack perpetrated by the Basque Anticapitalist Autonomous Commandos; damage was estimated at $8 million.

2/28/83—West Germany

In Duesseldorf, a fire extinguisher bomb exploded in a building owned by a U.S. subsidiary, causing $400,000 damage.

3/25/83—Spain

In Madrid, ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) terrorists kidnapped a wealthy Spanish businessman; a large ransom was paid for his release.

4/10/83—Portugal

An observer from the PLO to the International Conference of Socialists was assassinated by a gunman from the Abu Nidal Group.

6/16/83—Turkey

In an incident that signaled a shift to indiscriminate, random attacks in Turkey, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) killed 2 and injured 23 in a grenade and machinegun attack at an Istanbul bazaar.

7/14/83—Belgium

The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide claimed credit for the assassination of a Turkish administrative attache in Brussels.

7/15/83—France

In Toulouse, the offices of two firms involved in building a nuclear reactor in southwest France were severely damaged by explosions.

In Paris, the ASALA claimed credit for the bombing of the Turkish Airlines counter at Orly Airport that killed 6 and injured more than 60.

7/27/83—Portugal

Five members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army (probably an ad hoc name) attacked the Turkish Embassy and Ambassador's residence; several hostages were held for 3 hours before an accidental explosion destroyed the building and killed the terrorists.

8/27/83—Austria

Arabic-speaking hijackers, possibly Lebanese, diverted an Air France flight enroute to Paris to a number of European and Middle Eastern cities before landing in Tehran. The hijackers demanded a change in France's military and political support for Chad, Lebanon, and Iraq and the release of a number of Lebanese prisoners in French prisons.

11/12/83—Spain

In Bermeo, ETA/M claimed responsibility for killing a Spanish naval officer; he was the 37th victim of a terrorist assassination in Spain in 1983.

11/15/83—Greece

The 17 November Revolutionary Organization assassinated Navy Capt. George Tsantes, assigned to the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group in Greece.

12/2/83—Spain

Eight U.S. facilities located in the Spanish Basque country were the target of bomb attacks, believed to be the work of the Basque separatist group, Iraultza, in protest against U.S. involvement in Central America.

12/4/83—West Germany

Four individuals broke into a U.S. Army camp near Mutlangen and used sledgehammers to damage a Pershing II transporter. Mutlangen was widely believed to be the site for the first INF deployment.

12/8/83—Northern Ireland

In Belfast two Provisional Irish Republican Army guerillas shot and killed Edgar Graham, the legal and security spokesman for the Official Unionists—the province's largest party representing the Protestant majority.

12/16/83—United Kingdom

In London, the Provisional Irish Republican Army detonated a large vehicle bomb behind Harrods department store, killing 5 people, including 1 American, and wounding 91 others.

TERRORIST ACTS IN 1984

1/2/84—Spain

In Madrid, October First Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) claimed responsibility for the murder of two policemen. The killings were in retaliation for the death of GRAPO's leader, who had been killed by police in a gun battle in Barcelona in December.

1/9/84—Northern Ireland

Two Royal Ulster Constabulary officers were injured when a remote-controlled bomb exploded in Londonderry. Although no group claimed responsibility, police believed the Provisional Irish Republican Army was responsible.

2/8/84—West Germany

The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility for a bombing at the Turkish Consulate in Cologne. The bombing shattered windows and caused other damage, but no injuries.

2/15/84—Italy

Leamon Hunt, U.S. head of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, was shot to death in Rome. The Italian Red Brigades and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction have claimed responsibility.

3/26/84—France

U.S. Consul General Robert Homme was shot and wounded in Strasbourg by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction.

3/28/84—Greece

British diplomat Kenneth Whitty and a Greek employee of the British Council were both killed when an assassin fired shots into

the diplomat's car. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims claimed credit.

4/3/84—Greece

U.S. Army M. Sgt. Robert Judd was shot and wounded by two men on a motorcycle. The Revolutionary Organization 17 November claimed responsibility for the murder attempt.

4/17/84—United Kingdom

A British policewoman was killed, and 11 anti-Qadhafi demonstrators wounded by gunfire from the London Libyan People's Bureau. After a siege, British authorities found weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated embassy.

6/20/84—Austria

A car bomb killed the Turkish labor attache and seriously injured other persons. The Armenian Revolutionary Army claimed responsibility.

7/12/84—France

Action Directe began a terrorist offensive by bombing the Atlantic Instititute.

8/2/84—France

Action Directe bombed the European Space Agency.

8/22/84—France

Action Directe attempted a car bomb attack outside the Western European Union building in Paris.

9/11/84—Spain

In Madrid, two gunmen carrying Lebanese passports wounded a Libyan Embassy employee. In Beirut, an anonymous telephone caller told a foreign news agency that the Lebanese Shia group Musa Sadr Bridage was responsible. Another caller in London claimed credit in the name of the little-known Libyan exile group Al Burkan (Volcano).

10/2/84-10/8/84—Belgium

The Communist Combatant Cells conducted three bombings against firms it claimed were associated with INF deployment—Litton Data Systems, the West German truck manufacturer MAN, and Honeywell-Europe.

10/12/84—United Kingdom

In Brighton, Prime Minister Thatcher escaped injury when a bomb planted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army exploded at her hotel, killing at least 4 persons and injuring 34.

10/29/84—Portugal

In Lisbon, two rocket-propelled grenades mounted on improvised launchers and aimed at the new U.S. Embassy were discovered in a field about 65 meters away. They had failed to fire because of a malfunction.

11/25/84—Portugal

In Lisbon the U.S. Embassy was hit by four 60-mm mortar rounds fired by the Popular Forces of 25 April on the ninth anniversary of the abortive leftwing coup against the Portuguese democratic government installed after the revolution in 1974. There were no injuries, and damage was slight.

11/26/84—Belgium

At Beirset Military Airfield near Liege, two bombs damaged an antenna tower and a communications station. The Communist Combatant Cells claimed credit.

12/9/84—Portugal

Members of the Popular Forces of 25 April claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on NATO's Iberian headquarters in Oeiras.

12/11/84—Belgium

Six bombs were detonated on the NATO pipeline by the Communist Combatant Cells.

12/18/84—West Germany

The Red Army Faction attempted a bombing of the NATO officers school in Oberammergau.

TERRORIST ACTS IN 1985

1/15/85—Belgium

The Communist Combatant Cells set off a car bomb in front of the U.S. NATO Support Activity building outside Brussels. The bomb heavily damaged the building and blew out windows as far away as 100 meters. One U.S. military policeman was injured.

1/25/85—France

Gen. Rene Audran, the French Defense Ministry official in charge of international arms sales, was assassinated by an unknown assailant outside his home in Paris. An anonymous telephone caller claimed credit for the attack in the name of "Commando Elizabeth Van Dyck of Action Directe."

1/28/85—Portugal

Popular Forces of 25 April launched a mortar attack at NATO warships anchored in Lisbon harbor. None of the vessels was actually struck.

2/1/85—West Germany

In Munich, two terrorists forced their way into the home of West German industrialist Ernst Zimmermann, tied him to a chair, and shot him in the head. He died 12 hours later. The Red Army Faction claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of Commando Patrick O'Hara, a member of the Irish National Liberation Army who died in a hungerstrike in 1981.

2/21/85—Greece

The leftist terrorist organization 17 November gunned down a conservative Greek publisher on a busy Athens street and critically wounded his driver. Leaflets found at the scene strongly denounced Greece's Socialist Government.

2/22/85—France

In Paris, terrorists exploded a bomb near the rear entrance of the Marks and Spencer department store shortly after the store opened, killing 1 and injuring 15. In May 1986, French police arrested a Tunisian suspect linked to Middle Eastern terrorists in connection with this and other bombings.

2/28/85—Austria

The former Libyan Ambassador to Austria was severely wounded by two shots fired from a car outside his home in Vienna. The victim had supported Qadhafi's seizure of power in 1969, but resigned his position in disgust at the regime in 1980.

3/1/85—Northern Ireland

The Provisional Irish Republican Army launched nine mortar rounds at a Royal Ulster Constabulary compound in Newry. Several rounds made direct hits on a trailer serving as a temporary canteen for the police station. Nine officers were killed, and 37 other persons, including 25 civilians, were wounded.

3/12/85—Canada

In Ottawa, three members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army seized the Turkish Embassy, killing a guard. Turkish Ambassador Coskum Kirca escaped by jumping out of an upper story window, but was severely injured by the fall. After 4 hours, the terrorists surrendered.

3/21/85—Greece, Italy, Cyprus

In Athens, Rome, and Nicosia, Jordanian airline offices were the targets of grenade attacks that injured five persons. In telephone calls to press agencies, claims of responsibility were made in the name of Black September.

3/27/85—Italy

In Rome, the Red Brigades assassinated Rome University professor Enzo Tarantelli, an eminent labor economist involved with the Christian-Democratic-oriented Confederation of Italian Labor.

4/6/85—West Germany

In Bonn, an anti-Qadhafi Libyan student was killed by a Libyan gunman. The assassin also wounded two German passers-by, one seriously. The Libyan victim had been a target of the Qadhafi regime for at least 2 years.

4/12/85—Spain

The El Descanso restaurant outside Madrid was bombed, killing 18 Spaniards and wounding another 82 persons, including 15 Americans. Individuals claiming to represent several terrorist groups—including the First of October Antifascist Resistance, and Islamic Jihad—claimed responsibility. Middle Eastern terrorists are among the prime suspects.

5/11/85, 5/15/85—France

In Corsica, the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica is suspected of setting off 15 bombs on the 11th and 17 more on the 15th. The blasts damaged cars, banks, and shops of mainland Frenchmen, but caused no casualities.

6/14/85—Greece

Lebanese Shia gunmen hijacked TWA Flight 847 enroute from Athens to Rome and forced it to land in Beirut after two round-trips from Beirut to Algiers. The hijackers released the hostages 17 days later but, before they did, [had] killed U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem.

6/19/85—West Germany

A bombing of the international terminal at Frankfurt's Rhein-Main airport left 4 persons dead and 60 injured. Among the groups that claimed responsibility were the Arab Revolutionary Organization, the Red Army Faction, and the so-called Peace Conquerors.

6/23/85—North Atlantic

A Shannon-bound Air India flight from Toronto was bombed over the North Atlantic, killing 329 passengers and crewmembers. Two Sikh organizations and a Kashmir separatist group claimed responsibility, but Sikh extremists probably carried out the attack.

7/1/85—Spain

In Madrid, a bomb exploded at the British Airways ticket office, killing 1 person and injuring 27 others. The blast gutted the premises and also wrecked a TWA office located directly above. Minutes later, a grenade was lobbed into the nearby offices of Royal Jordanian Airlines, and the front of the building was raked with small-

arms fire. The Organization of the Oppressed, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, and Black September claimed responsibility.

7/22/85—Denmark

In Copenhagen, simultaneous bombings damaged the Northwest Orient Airlines office and a synagogue, injuring 32 persons. A caller claiming to represent Islamic Jihad took responsibility.

7/29/85—Spain

The Basque Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing claimed credit for the machinegun attack that killed Vice Admiral Fausto Escrigas Estrada, the Director General of Defense Policy, as he drove to work in Madrid.

8/8/85—West Germany

A car bombing at Rhein-Main airbase near Frankfurt killed 2 Americans and wounded 17 other persons. The West German Red Army Faction and the French Action Directe both claimed responsibility.

9/3/85—Greece

Two grenades were thrown into the lobby of a Greek hotel in Glyfada, wounding 19 Britons. A caller to an Athens newspaper stated that Black September would conduct numerous attacks in Athens if Greek authorities did not release one of its members.

9/9/85—Spain

In Madrid, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing claimed responsibility for a remote-controlled car bomb attack that injured 18 Spanish Civil Guardsmen and an American passerby; the American later died of his injuries.

9/16/85—Italy

Terrorists lobbed grenades into the Cafe de Paris restaurant in Rome, wounding 38 tourists, including 9 Americans. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, a cover name used by the Abu Nidal Group, claimed responsibility.

9/25/85—Italy

In Rome, a bomb exploded in the British Airways office, injuring 15 persons. An Arab was arrested fleeing the scene who claimed to be a member of the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, a cover name used by the Abu Nidal Group.

10/7/85—Mediterranean Sea

The Italian cruise ship "Achille Lauro" was seized as it departed Alexandria, Egypt, for Port Said. Before surrendering to Egyptian authorities on 9 October, the terrorists killed U.S. tourist Leon

Klinghoffer. Abu Abbas' Palestine Liberation Front was responsible.

11/24/85—West Germany

A car bomb exploded in a parking lot adjacent to a U.S. military shopping center in Frankfurt, wounding 32, mostly U.S. military personnel and dependents. No group claimed responsibility, but Middle Eastern terrorists are suspected.

12/7/85—France

The bombing of two department stores in Paris left about 35 holiday shoppers wounded. The Palestine Liberation Front, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and Islamic Jihad all claimed responsibility.

12/27/85—Italy and Austria

Near-simultaneous machinegun and grenade attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports left more than 20 persons dead, including 5 Americans, and some 120 wounded, including 20 Americans. Both incidents were carried out by the Abu Nidal Group.

TERRORIST ACTS IN 1986

2/3/86-2/5/86—France

Within 3 days the Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners bombed three separate shopping areas in Paris, the Hotel Claridge arcade on the Champs Elysees, the Gibert Jeune bookstore on the left bank, and the FNAC store in Forum des Halles shopping center. Twenty-one persons were injured in these attacks.

2/18/86—Portugal

A car bomb exploded outside the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon. No one was injured.

3/20/86—France

A bomb exploded at Point Show shopping gallery on the Champs-Elysees killing 2 and wounding 28. The Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners was responsible.

4/2/86—Italy/Greece

A bomb exploded on TWA Flight 840 enroute from Rome to Athens. Four Americans were killed and nine others injured in the explosion.

4/5/86—West Germany

An American Army Sgt., Kenneth T. Ford, and a Turkish woman were killed and 200 injured when a bomb exploded in a

West Berlin discotheque. U.S. intelligence linked the bombing to Libyan agents.

4/18/86—Turkey

Four Libyans were arrested while trying to plant a bomb in a U.S. officers' club in Ankara. Links were found between these four and Libyan diplomats in Turkey.

4/25/86—France

Kenneth Marston, managing director in Lyon of the U.S. company, Black & Decker, was killed by unidentified gunmen.

4/26/86—France

One person was injured when an explosion occurred at the American Express office in Lyon.

5/6/86—West Germany

A bomb exploded at U.S. barracks near Kirchheinbolanden. There were no injuries, but property damage was estimated at $45,000.

7/21/86—France

Action Directe claimed responsibility for a car bomb which exploded outside the headquarters of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

8/11/86—Greece

The Paleo Faliro office of U.S. owned Citibank was heavily damaged by a fire bomb. The Revolutionary Popular Struggle is thought to have been the perpetrator.

9/6/86—Turkey

Terrorists entered a Jewish synagogue in Istanbul, barred the main doors, and opened fire on the worshipers killing 22. Several groups claimed responsibility including Islamic Resistance, Islamic Holy War, and Palestine Revenge Organization.

9/8/86-9/15/86—France

The Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners unleashed a wave of attacks on Paris. The City Hall post office was bombed on Sept. 8, killing 1 and wounding 18. Four days later, a bomb at La Defense wounded 41. Three more people were wounded, one fatally, when a bomb exploded in the basement of a Champs Elysee parking garage. On Sept. 15, the city police headquarters was bombed.

[NOTE.—Listing of 1986 events is incomplete.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources for 1982–1985:

Department of State. "Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982," September 1983.

Department of State. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983," September 1984.

Department of State. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984," November 1985.

Department of State. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985," (not yet published).

Sources for 1986

Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Issue Brief No. IB86096. James P. Wootten, "Terrorist Incidents Involving U.S. Citizens or Property, 1981–1986—A Chronology," updated 9/26/86.

"Jewish Targets: Recent Attacks," New York Times, 7 September 1986.

"The Terror Demolishes Sang Froid," New York Times, 16 September 1986.

APPENDIX B

Update on the Status of Political Activists in Czechoslovakia

The following is a list compiled by Anna Faltus of the Czechoslovak National Council detailing the current status of political prisoners in Czechoslovakia. This listing is intended as an update to Appendix A of the Commission's Implementation Report of November 1982. The listing consists of eight categories:

A. *Those presently in prison or detention*, including Charter 77 signatories, members of VONS and other human rights activists;

B. *Those presently serving terms of protective supervision*, all Charter 77 signatories and ex-political prisoners;

C. *Those subject to the abuse of psychiatry*, including independent political and religious activists;

D. *Those harassed despite their nominal freedom from prosecution*, including human rights activists and those involved in independent activities;

E. *Those sentenced to prison or detained for religious activities*;

F. *Those detained, harassed and otherwise persecuted for religious activities*;

G. *Those detained, sentenced and otherwise harassed for independent cultural activity*; and

H. *Those sentenced for inscribing or placing slogans and inscriptions in public places.*

The information in the list is based on documentation provided by Charter 77 and VONS, the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted. Because Charter 77 signatories and VONS members work under difficult conditions, it is impossible for them to document every case of harassment and persecution. Thus the following is necessarily only a partial accounting of the status of political prisoners and other individuals persecuted for their beliefs or their independent activities.

Presently imprisoned or detained for expressing their views

CHROMY, Herman (b. 2/19/47), Charter 77 signatory, detained 4/9/86, charged under paragraph 100/1a/c (incitement against the system or against the Republic's allied or friendly relationship with other countries) for expressing his views in an open letter. Detained during a house search. Tried 7/8/86 under paragraph 98 (subversion). Trial adjourned because defense requested Jan Dus be called to testify.

FILO, Stanislav (b. 1926), psychologist. Sentenced in 9/85 to 11 months imprisonment, conditionally, under paragraph 100 (incitement) after house search uncovered *samizdat* materials. After several deferments, re-sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, unconditionally. Started to serve sentence in 6/86.

HAUPTMAN, Petr (b. 8/7/46), emigrated to West Germany and returned to Czechoslovakia for family reasons. Sentenced 2/9/84 to 10 years imprisonment in the second (stricter) prison category under paragraph 109/1 (illegal departure from the Republic) and paragraph 105/2 (espionage).

HEJLEK, Josef (b. 8/10/22), construction worker, now pensioner. Detained 2/27/86, subjected to house search 2/28/86. Reportedly sentenced to 2 years imprisonment under paragraph 100 (incitement) for something he said in public. Appeal reportedly entered 6/27/86. No other details available.

HORAK, Pavel (b. 4/8/54), detained 1/23/86 for distributing leaflets contained information on the funeral of Nobel Prize Laureate Jaroslav Seifert. Home searched by the police; duplicating devices and personal correspondence confiscated.

KANIA, Walter (b. 1940), Charter 77 signatory. Sentenced in 1981 to 2-year imprisonment under paragraph 112 (harming the interests of the Republic abroad). Sentence later extended because Kania tried to write to his relatives in the Federal Republic of Germany about Czechoslovak prison conditions. Presently in Valdice Prison, in strictest prison category. Poor health.

KOLAR, Stanislav (b. 11/15/55). Detained 3/13/75, sentenced 4/76 to 13 years imprisonment in the third (strictest) prison category for espionage, allegedly committed when he discussed military barracks with local citizens. In Valdice Prison.

KRIVKA, Pavel, (b. 7/12/60), ecologist. Arrested 4/29/85 under paragraph 112 for writing to a friend in the Federal Republic of Germany about the ecological situation in Czechoslovakia. Sentenced 11/20/85 to 3 years imprisonment under paragraph 98 (subversion). In Plzen-Bory Prison.

PITAS, Stanislav (b. 12/12/57), Charter 77 signatory. Detained under paragraph 202/1 (hooliganism) for drawing a caricature of the Czechoslovak President. Sentenced to 8 months imprisonment 7/3/85 under paragraph 103 (demeaning the dignity of the President of the Republic).

ROMER, Josef (b. 10/7/55). Arrested 1/1/77 under paragraph 109 (unauthorized preparation for departure from the Republic). Sentenced under paragraph 105 (espionage) to 11 years imprisonment. In Valdice Prison. Poor health.

SEVEC, Ladislav (b. 7/15/59). Sentenced in 1979 to 9 years imprisonment in second category under paragraphs 109 and 180/1 (attempt to endanger the security of an air transport vehicle). No evidence suggests the charge was justified. In Valdice Prison.

SKODA, Pavel, scientific assistant, friend of Pavel KRIVKA, with whom he co-authored a parody on a Czech Christmas Mass defaming the Czechoslovak President, sentenced 11/21/85 under paragraph 100 (incitement) to 20 months imprisonment.

SVESTKA, Jaroslav (b. 4/20/42), woodcutter. Detained 7/17/84 under paragraph 112 for sending a letter containing references to Orwell's *1984* to a friend in the Federal Republic of Germany. Released from detention 9/19/84. Tried 4/28/86 under paragraph 98 and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment, unconditionally and to 3 years protective supervision.

VACEK, Eduard (b. 4/20/40), mechanic. Detained 1/22/86 after a house search revealed what the police termed "ideologically objec-

tionable literature" (including a copy of the *samizdat* cultural journal, *Vokno*). Detained under paragraph 202 (hooliganism), tried 6/3/86, sentenced to 1 year imprisonment. Began to serve sentence 9/29/86.

VEIS, Frantisek (b. 1932), Charter 77 signatory. Sentenced for alleged espionage to 12 years imprisonment. Still has more than 6 years to serve.

WOLF, Jiri (b. 1/5/52), Charter 77 signatory. Imprisoned since 5/17/83 under paragraph 98/2a (subversion of the Republic) for informing the Austrian Embassy in Prague about conditions in Minkovice Prison. Sentenced 12/21/83 to 6 years imprisonment in third (strictest category) and to 3 years protective supervision. In Valdice Prison. Very poor health.

WONKA, Jiri (b. 4/8/50) and WONKA, Pavel (b. 1/13/53), detained 5/26/86 after house search during which police confiscated written materials, on charges of incitement. Charge against Pavel Wonka included paragraph 155/1 (attacking a public official). Indictment against Pavel Wonka changed 10/9/86 to subversion.

Presently under terms of protective surveillance

The Law on "Protective Surveillance" No. 44, enacted on April 25, 1973, was introduced for the "protection of society" and was to be meted out to hardened criminals and repeat offenders after their release from prison.

Persons under protective supervision are required to: report to police at set intervals, allow police to enter their homes at any and all times, and inform the police in advance about any anticipated absence from their home. The law also requires that such persons stay in the asssigned district and not visit certain public places or gatherings.

For the past several years, the Czechoslovak courts have been meting out this sentence on prisoners who have expressed independent views differing from those of the regime.

CIBULKA, Petr (b. 1950), Charter 77 signatory and member of VONS, sentenced in Prague on 9/27/85 to 7 months imprisonment under paragraphs 202 (hooliganism) and 198 (defaming the nation, race and convictions) in second (stricter) prison category. Appeals Court on January 15, 1986 confirmed sentence and added to it 3 years protective supervision and a 3-year ban on Cibulka's presence in Prague. Imprisoned for expressing his views in a restaurant. Began protective supervision regimen after release from prison 7/21/86, detained 9/11/86 for violating terms of protective supervision. Sentenced on 10/7/86 to 2 months imprisonment in second prison category.

GRUNTORÁD, Jiri (b. 9/21/52), Charter 77 signatory. Detained 12/17/80 under paragraph 98/1 (subversion) for possessing and distributing Charter 77 materials. Sentenced 7/9/81 to 4 years imprisonment in the second category and to 3 years protective supervision. Released 12/17/84.

JIROUS, Ivan Martin (b. 9/23/44), Charter 77 signatory and VONS member. On 11/10/81, accused under paragraph 202/2 (hooliganism) for publishing, distributing the *samizdat* cultural magazine *Vokno* ("Window"). Sentenced on 7/9/82 to 3½ years impris-

onment and 3 years protective supervision. Released from prison 5/9/85.

LIS, Ladislav (b. 4/24/26), Charter 77 signatory and former spokesman, VONS member. Detained 1/5/83 under paragraph 100/1 (incitement) for distributing printed materials. Sentenced 7/21/83 to 14 months imprisonment and 3 years protective supervision. Seriously ill. Released from prison 3/5/84. Then accused under paragraph 7 of Public Law 150/69/Sb (obstructing the execution of an official decision) and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment on 5/10/84. After release from prison, Lis returned to protective supervision.

LITOMISKY, Jan (b. 8/19/43), Charter 77 signatory, VONS member. Sentenced 2/17/81 to 3 years imprisonment under paragraph 98/1 (subversion) and 2 years protective supervision for involvement in VONS. Released from prison 2/18/84.

STAREK, Frantisek (b. 12/1/52), Charter 77 signatory. Detained and charged 11/10/81 under paragraph 202 (hooliganism) for publication and distribution of *samizdat* cultural magazine *Vokno* ("Window"). Sentenced 7/9/82 to 2½ years imprisonment and 2 years protective supervision. Released from prison 5/10/84.

Abuse of Psychiatry

KORINEK, Karel and his wife Jindra, forced since 1974 to undergo regular treatment in psychiatric institutions because Korinek had disagreement with a local functionary. Deprived of custody of children.

PUKALIK, Jan (b. 7/24/63), on disability pension, persecuted since 5/11/84 under paragraph 100 (incitement) for collecting signatures on petition protesting deployment of Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia. Ordered 1/28/85 by Court into ambulatory protective psychiatric treatment.

SVORCIK, Karel (b. 4/26/50), friend of Vaclav Havel. Home searched, books, *samizdat* literature, personal correspondence confiscated. Detained for 48 hours, later taken to a psychiatric clinic in Nove Mesto for a 3-week stay, during which he was treated with drugs and interrogated by police for up to 10 hours a day. Released 10/17/84.

NAVRATIL, Augustin (b. 12/20/28), detained under paragraph 100 (incitement) on 11/11/85 for distributing materials concerning the mysterious death of Catholic layman Premysl Coufal. Police conducted house search, confiscated books, papers, and religious literature. Transferred from Brno-Bohunice Prison 12/84 to special psychiatric facility in Prague-Bohnice for observation. Was to be released from detention 3/18/86 but instead was transferred against his will to a psychiatric institution in Kromeriz. Ordered 4/12/86 to undergo long-term psychiatric preventive treatment with no time limit set. Released into ambulatory treatment 10/21/86.

Harassed while "free"

During the past 3 years, the following people have been released from prison or detention, or they had to undergo lengthy interrogations and other forms of harassment—including surveillance, house searches, etc.—for expressing their views.

BEDEIOVA, Jirina (b. 8/3/51), detained for several months, for copying and distributing material directed against the Socialist system.

BENDA, Vaclav (b. 8/8/46), philosopher, mathematician, computer programmer, Charter 77 signatory and former spokesperson, member of VONS. Arrested 5/29/79, sentenced 10/23/79 to 4 years imprisonment under paragraph 98/1,2 (subversion), released 5/29/83. Charter 77 spokesperson in 1984, when he was detained on several occasions during visits of foreign statesmen in Czechoslovakia. Presently working as stoker; fired and re-hired several times due to police pressure and interrogations.

CARNOGURSKY, Jan, Dr., lawyer, under surveillance, defended several human rights activists.

DEVATY, Stanislav (b. 4/25/54), beaten and dragged out of a room in handcuffs for asking a policeman, in accordance with Public Law No. 42/1974 Sb, to identify himself. Required hospital treatment.

DIENSTBIER, Jiri (b. 4/20/37), Charter 77 signatory and former spokesperson, under constant surveillance during visits of foreign dignitaries in Czechoslovakia and detained during the anniversary of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.

DOMBEK, Petr, driver, interrogated after attending a seminar on philosophy in Opava.

DUDR, Pavel (b. 12/2/49) detained for several months for copying and distributing material directed against the Socialist system.

GALSKY, Desider, President of Czechoslovakia's Jewish community, forced by authorities to withdraw candidature for re-election to this post, to be replaced by "more cooperative" person.

HAVEL, Vaclav (b. 10/5/36), playwright, Charter 77 signatory and former spokesperson, under constant surveillance during visits of foreign dignitaries in Czechoslovakia, detained during the anniversary of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, frequently harassed.

HEIM, Kamil, student, interrogated for attending a seminar on philosophy in Opava.

HEJDANEK, Ladislav (b. 5/10/27), professor and philosopher, Charter 77 signatory and former spokesperson, organizer of seminars in private homes. Under constant surveillance, frequently interrogated regarding the seminars.

HROMADKA, Oldrich and HROMADKOVA, Marie, Charter 77 signatories, and former spokesperson (Marie Hromadkova). Subjected to house search 11/14/85, during which police confiscated books published abroad.

INGR, Zdenek, Charter 77 signatory. Detained 7/4/86 in front of home of Anna SABATOVA and Petr UHL, subjected to personal search and taken away by security police after confiscation of petition on behalf of Herman CHROMY, translation of article on the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and Charter 77 materials. Interrogated and placed in a cell overnight; released on 7/5/86.

IVOS, Petr, employee of Opava Municipal Libary, interrogated after attending a seminar on philosophy in Opava.

JABLONICKY, Jozef, Dr. (b. 1/3/33), historian, interrogated for several hours on 10/17/85 and warned about keeping up contacts with Dr. Miroslav KUSY and Dr. Milan SIMECKA.

JANECEK, Jaroslav (b. 6/5/54), detained 4/25/85 for doing a caricature of the Czechoslovak President, released after 80 hours detention. Criminal prosecution continues.

JIROUSOVA, Vera (b. 2/25/44), Charter 77 signatory. Subjected to house search 8/19/86 in connection with persecution of the Jazz Section, during which police confiscated a typewriter and *samizdat* materials. Accused 10/24/86 of "demeaning the nation, race and convictions."

KOTRLY, Zdenek (b. 6/21/45), husband of poet Iva Kotrla. Sentenced 7/2/85 under paragraph 112 (harming the interests of the Republic abroad) to 10 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, for giving his wife's poems to Petr KOZANEK to take to Austria.

KOZANEK, Petr (b. 5/8/49), sentenced 7/2/85 under paragraph 112 (harming the interests of the Republic abroad) to 10 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, for attempting to take to Austria a collection of Iva Kotrla's poems.

KUSY, Miroslav (b. 12/1/31), philosopher, Charter 77 signatory. Advised not to keep up contacts with other Charter 77 signatories, detained 8/17/85 after arrival from Prague of Vaclav HAVEL, subjected to house search.

MALY, Vaclav (b. 1950), Catholic priest, Charter 77 signatory and former spokesperson. Under constant surveillance, harassed and interrogated during trips to visit Charter 77 signatories.

MARVANOVA, Anna, former Charter 77 spokesperson. Interrogated in home in 8/86 and 10/86. In poor health.

NEMEC, Jaromir (b. 1/16/35), Charter 77 signatory. Released from several months detention under paragraph 98 (subversion) for possessing and distributing Charter 77 materials, criminal prosecution continues. In poor health.

PALOUS, Martin, one of 1986 Charter 77 spokespeople. Deprived of passport (good for trips to G.D.R., Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary) 10/15/86.

PAVLICEK, Jiri (b. 11/18/45), subjected to house search and 48-hour detention for possessing *samizdat* literature and sending complaints to various Government departments.

PETRIVY, Tomas (d. 5/22/86), Charter 77 signatory, detained in the apartment of Dr. Miroslav KUSY on 8/16/85 during visit of Vaclav HAVEL.

PISKOR, Jaromir, interrogated after attending a seminar on philosophy in Opava.

PISKOR, Jiri, student, interrogated after attending a seminar on philosophy in Opava.

SABATOVA, Anna, Charter 77 signatory, present spokesperson, constantly under surveillance during visits to Czechoslovakia of foreign dignitaries.

SAVRDA, Jaromir, Dr. (b. 5/25/33), Charter 77 signatory, writer. Prevented from going to Prague, taken from the railway station for interrogation.

SIMECKA, Milan (b. 3/6/30), philosopher and publicist. Subjected to interrogations, house searches because of his writings on the situation in Czechoslovakia and contacts with Charter 77. Simecka's wife, unable to cope with constant harassment, has attempted to commit suicide.

64-639 O - 87 - 9

SIMECKOVA, Eva (b. 10/8/41), employee of the Opava Municipal Library, interrogated after attending a seminar on philosophy in Opava.

SKALA, Dusan (b. 1955), Charter 77 signatory, attacked on street 10/4/85, after leaving the apartment of Dr. Jaroslav SABATA, left unconscious. Required hospital treatment.

STERN, Jan (b. 1924), one of current Charter 77 spokespeople. Deprived of passport (good only for travel to other East European countries) in 9/86.

UHL, Petr (b. 10/8/41), Charter 77 signatory, responsible editor of "Information about Charter 77," under constant surveillance, detained and searched on 4/14/86 on way to present lecture in a seminar. Detained again for 7 hours in 9/86.

VEVER A, Otakar, Charter 77 signatory. Deprived of Polish *Solidarnosc* pin by member of security police 11/86.

VODNANSKA, Jitka, friend of Vaclav HAVEL and Miroslav KUSY. Detained in Dr. KUSY's Bratislava apartment during visit 8/16/85, ordered to leave Bratislava.

Sentenced or detained for religious activities

ADAMIK, Frantisek (b. 4/17/32), worker. Accused 11/11/85 under paragraph 178 (obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies) for duplicating and distributing religious literature. Charge reclassified 4/86 to attempting to subvert the Republic on a large scale. Trial commenced 10/23/86, was postponed until 11/86. Sentenced 11/6/86 to 2 years imprisonment in first prison category.

BADZA, Pavel, MILEN, Juraj and SANDOR, Gejza, sentenced to 2, 4, and 5½ years imprisonment, respectively, for smuggling religious material from Poland into Czechoslovakia.

BUNKA, Eduard (b. 1933), on disability pension, Catholic layman. Subjected to house search 11/11/85, during which police confiscated religious literature and duplicating devices. Charged under paragraph 178 of Penal Code, sentenced 8/11/86 to 7 months imprisonment, suspended for 18 months. (Sentence unconfirmed as of this writing.)

DUS, Jan (b. 7/19/31), Evangelical priest, Charter 77 signatory, detained 5/20/86 under paragraph 112 (harming the interests of the Republic abroad) after 22-hour search in his apartment, during which a typewriter, tapes, religious literature and personal correspondence were confiscated. Charge extended on 6/20/86 under paragraph 98 (subversion).

JANIK, Bystrik (b. 1.5.52), member of Franciscan Order. Sentenced under paragraph 250/1a/2b (fraud) on 2/4/86 unconditionally to 28 months imprisonment (for allegedly eliciting funds). Also prosecuted under paragraph 178 (obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies).

KOTRISOVA, Marie (b. 8/20/53), research assistant. Subjected to apartment search 11/5/85, during which translation of Sebastian Laba's book, *Das Attentat* (dealing with the attempted assassination of Pope Paul John II) and other religious material confiscated. Charged 4/4/86 under paragraph 112 (harming the interests of the Republic abroad) and paragraph 100 (incitement). Sentenced 6/6/86 to 10 months imprisonment, suspended 10/86 for 2 years.

MRTVY, Jan (b. 6/19/64), electromechanic, Catholic layman, seriously ill. Detained 7/24/86 in house search, during which police confiscated duplicating machine, stencils, paper, Charter 77 materials and religious literature. Sentenced 10/29/86 to 13 months imprisonment, suspended for 3 years. In detention until prosecutor appeals.

NECHALOVA, Mane (b. 2/23/48), religious activist. Subjected to house search 11/18/85, during which religious literature and other materials were confiscated. Charged under paragraph 7/1 to paragraph 100/11a (preparation for the criminal offense of incitement). Sentenced 10/15/86 to 14 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years.

Harassed for religious activity, under paragraph 178, obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies

ADAMEK, Josef (b. 8/27/14), retired printer, Charter 77 signatory. Imprisoned 1981–83 for producing and distributing religious literature and obstructing state supervision over churches. Detained and interrogated for 5 hours 8/20/86 about anti-abortion petition he helped to distribute. Suffered nervous breakdown.

ADAMIK, Frantisek, worker. Detained for 3 days, subjected to house search, police confiscation of religious literature and duplicating devices.

BOROVSKY, Bonislav (b. 1966), GABAJ, Alojz (b. 1962) and KONC, Tomas (b. 1965), students, arrested on Czechoslovak-Polish border, detained for several months for crossing illegally into Poland and smuggling Bibles, expelled from their higher educational institutions.

DAMBROWSKI, Antonin (b. 1955), persecuted since 11/20/84 for membership in Franciscan Order.

DANHELOVA, Jitka, persecuted since 11/20/84 for membership in Franciscan Order.

DVORAK, Vaclav (b. 1/6/37), detained 4/11–5/15/85 for distributing religious literature.

FUCIK, Vladimir (b. 7/13/34), detained 4/11/85, released 5/22/85, sentenced 5/28/86 to 8 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years.

GOSSEL, Gabriel (11/17/43), Charter 77 signatory, interrogated about the publication of *Edice-Expedice* (*samizdat* literature).

HLOZANKA, Radim (b. 1/4/23), Catholic priest without a state permit, detained 4/11–14/85 for distributing religious literature.

HOLECEK, Michal (b. 10/29/56), detained 4/11–15/85 for distributing religious literature.

HRESKO, Michal (b. 2/13/30), Evangelical priest, persecuted since 10/24/85 for meeting with a group of believers to sing religious songs.

JAVORSKY, Stefan, Catholic priest without a state permit, persecuted for taking confessions and celebrating a private Mass, ordered by police to have a psychiatric examination.

JANOSIKOVA, Alena (b. 1945), persecuted since 11/20/84 for membership in the Franciscan Order, distributing religious literature.

JUHASCIK, Jan (b. 1963) and JUHASCIK, Jan, Sr. (b. 1932), detained for several weeks in 1984 for possessing a large number of Bibles (some in Russian) and other religious literature.

KAPLANOVA, Marie, religious activist, detained 9/20/86 and interrogated for several hours in connection with anti-abortion petition.

KELLER, Jan, priest, Czech Brethren Evangelical Church. Detained 11/83 for 24 hours, since 1/1/84 without state permit, tried 1/31 and 2/3/86, charges withdrawn. Remains without state permit.

KOUTNY, Bedrich, subjected to house search during police campaign against believers, detained for several hours.

KUZELOVA, Kvetoslava (b. 4/13/23), detained 4/11/85, released 2 days later, sentenced 5/28/86 to 8 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years for distributing religious literature.

MACHALEK, Jakub (b. 1914), subjected to house search 11/12/85 during police campaign against believers in Gottwaldov, Kromeriz and Prerov.

NEMETH, Matej, Catholic priest. Subjected to house search, confiscation of religious literature, sentenced 5/14/85 to 1-year imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, permit withdrawn for 1 year.

NOVOSAD, Jaroslav, Catholic priest. Persecuted since 9/19/84 for permitting parishioners' children to use his recreational facilities in summer 1984.

OCENASEK, Karel, Bishop, apostolic administrator in Hradec Kralove. Interrogated several times in 9/86 about anti-abortion petition.

POSPISIL, Ctirad (b. 1958), persecuted since 11/20/84 for membership in the Franciscan Order.

RAZEK, Adolf (b. 11/30/30), detained 4/11/84 to 5/20/85, sentenced 5/28/86 to 6 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, for distributing religious literature.

ROHACEK, Marek, persecuted for transporting 100–150 books of Biblical historical stories for children.

TROJAN, Ladislav (b. 1912), pensioner, Catholic priest without state permit, persecuted for membership in the Franciscan Order.

VECAN, Jan, detained for several months for transporting books of Biblical historical stories for children.

ZALESKY, Pavel, subjected to house search during police campaign against believers, during which police confiscated religious literature, persecuted for false testimony concerning a typewriter allegedly used to produce anti-state statements.

ZAN, Jan (b. 1954), member of Franciscan Order, detained 11/20/84 to 1/4/85 for distributing religious literature.

Those detained, sentenced or harassed for independent cultural activity

BILA, Benata, KOZDON, Bohumil, KUBICEK, Petr, KUBIS, Lubomir, LACINA, Zdenek, MATULA, Roman, PROCHAZKA, Miroslav and UHAREK, Ladislav, sentenced 12/2/85. Sentences ranged from 6 months "correctional measures" to 12 months unconditional imprisonment (with varying sentences in between) for objecting to a police order to end a concert for which an official permit had been obtained.

MAREK, Vlastimil (b. 1948), member of the Jazz Section of the Czechoslovak Union of Musicians. Detained and charged 8/5/86 and charged under paragraph 112 (harming the interests of the Republic abroad) after house search. Released from detention on 10/3/86. Prosecution continues.

NOS, Josef (5/16/49), teacher of English and French, nonconformist musician. Sentenced 10/5/84 to 2 years imprisonment, suspended for 5 years, and to a fine under paragraph 203 (parasitism) for performing music publicly and charging unauthorized fees without a permit. Charge later withdrawn because the official musicians agency did not protest his performances.

SRP, Karel, SKALNIK, Josef, KRIVANEK, Tomas, KOURIL, Vladimir, HUNAT, Cestmir, DRDA, Milos, and DRDA, Vlastimir, Chairman, Deputy to the Chairman, and members of the Jazz Section, respectively, detained 9/2/86 under article 118/1,2a of the Czechoslovak Penal Code, on unauthorized business enterprises. Harassed and persecuted since early 1980's for independent cultural activities.

Criminal proceedings had been instituted 7/26/85 on same charges, and house searches of SRP and SKALNIK were searched. Each was ordered to pay 3,000-crown fine for continuing the Jazz Section's activities after its supposed dissolution.

Sentenced or otherwise punished for inscribing slogans in public places

GAVLAS, Tomas, HELSTYN, Dalibor, KANTOS, Ivo, KOHUT, Igo, OBODA, Milan and SKUTA, Petr, sentenced 4/28/86 to prison terms from 6 to 20 months on "correctional measures" (deductions in pay) as well as fines ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 crowns for "damage cause to property in Socialist ownership." Slogans included the following: "People, be vigilant, 1968-1983," "Jan Palach 1968," "Jan Palach lives," "We want freedom," "Socialism yes—but in a different form," "Give citizens rights," 'SS 22—death," etc. (Jan Palach was a student who immolated himself to protest the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.)

APPENDIX C

38 IMPRISONED MEMBERS
OF THE HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS
IN THE USSR AND LITHUANIA
(Update: Dec. 1986)

MOSCOW HELSINKI GROUP

1. Elena Bonner -- sentenced on August 17, 1984 to five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet slander." -- currently living in Gorky, RSFSR, with husband, Dr. Andrei Sakharov.

2. Ivan Kovalev -- sentenced on April 2, 1982 to five years of strict regimen camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

3. Viktor Nekipelov -- sentenced on June 13, 1980 to seven years in labor camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (Sentenced in October 1982 to prison for three years.)

4. Tatiana Osipova -- Sentenced on April 2, 1981 to five years general regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Re-sentenced in camp to five years strict regime camp in May 1985 for "habitual disobedience to the demands of camp authorities".

5. Feliks Serebrov -- sentenced on July 21, 1981 to four years strict regimen camp plus five years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Also a member of the Psychiatric Working Group. (Sentenced in 1977 to one year in camp).

Died in Camp

Anatoly Marchenko -- sentenced on September 4, 1981 to ten years of special regimen camp plus five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (death in camp reported in early December 1986. Had been on hunger strike from August 4, 1986. Was in poor health)

UKRAINIAN HELSINKI GROUP

6. Mykola Horbal -- sentenced April 10, 1985 to eight years strict regimen camp plus three years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (Sentenced on January 21, 1980 to five years of camp for "resisting a representative of authority" and attempted rape).

7. Iosif Zisels -- sentenced on April 10, 1985 to three years strict regimen camp for "anti-Soviet slander." (Sentenced in 1979 to three years camp for "anti-Soviet slander.")

8. Vitaly Kalynychenko -- sentenced on May 18, 1980 to 10 years in special regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

9. Ivan Kandyba -- sentenced on July 24, 1981 to 10 years special regimen camp plus five years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

10. Vasyl Kornylo -- arrested in February 1981 and sentenced to ten years special regime camp plus five years internal, most probably for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

11. Levko Lukyanenko -- sentenced on July 20, 1978 to 10 years in special regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

12. Myroslav Marynovych -- sentenced on March 29, 1978 to seven years in strict regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

13. Mykola Matusevych -- sentenced on March 29, 1978 to seven years in strict regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (Sentenced in October 1980 to prison).

14. Mykola Rudenko -- sentenced on July 1, 1977 to seven years in strict regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

15. Vasyl Striltsiv -- sentenced in October 1981 to six years in camp on unknown charges. (In 1979, he got two year term for "violation of internal passport laws.")

LITHUANIAN HELSINKI GROUP

16. Viktoras Petkus -- sentenced on July 13, 1978 to three years in prison, seven years in special regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (Petkus also joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1983).

17. Vytautas Skuodys -- sentenced on December 22, 1980 to seven years strict regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (U.S. citizen. Also member of the Catholic Committee).

18. Algirdas Statkevicius -- sentenced on August 11, 1980 to forcible psychiatric treatment after being arrested on February 14, 1980, reportedly for "anti-Soviet activities." (U.S. citizen).

GEORGIAN HELSINKI GROUP

Sentenced

19. Merab Kostava -- sentenced in June 1985 to two years in camp for "malicious disobedience of the demands of the camp administration". (Before completion of previous term of five years camp).

20. Eduard Gudava -- sentenced in November 1985 to four years strict regime camp for "hooliganism".

21. Tenghiz Gudava -- sentenced in June 1986 to seven years strict regime camp plus three years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

22. Valentina Pailodze -- sentenced on May 25, 1983 to eight years strict regimen camp plus three years exile for "giving bribes" and for "giving false testimony." (In 1978, she got a three year term for "anti-Soviet slander.")

23. Emmanuel Tvaladze -- sentenced in June 1986 to five years strict regime camp plus three years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

CHRISTIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BELIEVERS

24. Father Gleb Yakunin -- sentenced on August 20, 1980 to five years in strict regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

WORKING COMMISSION ON PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE

25. Anatoly Koryagin -- sentenced on June 5, 1981 to seven years strict regimen camp plus five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and for "illegal possession of a firearm." Sentenced to two additional years for "resisting camp authorities" in February 1986.

Feliks Serebrov -- (See Moscow Helsinki Group).

GROUP FOR THE LEGAL STRUGGLE OF THE FAITHFUL AND FREE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS

26. Rostislav Galetsky -- sentenced on March 25, 1981 to five years in camp plus five years in internal exile for "anti-Soviet slander" and violation of laws separating church and state.

CATHOLIC COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BELIEVERS

27. Alfonsas Svarinskas -- sentenced on May 6, 1983 to seven years labor camp and three years internal exile for "anti-state activities," "slandering the Soviet state," and "encouraging believers to violate laws and defy authority."

28. Sigitas Tamkevicius -- sentenced on December 2, 1983 to six years strict regimen camp and four years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."
Vytautas Skuodys -- (See Lithuanian Group).

INITIATIVE GROUP FOR UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC RIGHTS

29. Vasyl Kobryn -- sentenced on March 22, 1985 for "anti-Soviet slander" to three years standard regimen camp .

30. Yosyp Terelya -- sentenced on August 20, 1985 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" to seven years camp plus five years exile.

INITIATIVE GROUP FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED

31. Nikolai Pavlov -- sentenced on September 22, 1981 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" to five years exile.

32. Vasily Pervushin -- sentenced on November 11, 1983 to an indefinite term of psychiatric detention.

MEMBERS SENTENCED BEFORE JOINING

Ukrainian Group

33. Vasyl Ovsienko -- sentenced in August 1981 to 10 years strict regimen camp plus five years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." (In 1979, he got a three year term for "resisting a representative of authority.")

34. Oksana Popovych -- sentenced in 1974 to eight years in strict regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

35. Yuri Shukhevych -- sentenced in September 1972 to five years in prison, five years in special regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

36. Danylo Shumuk -- sentenced on July 7, 1972 to 10 years in special regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

37. Mart Niklus -- sentenced in January 1981 to 10 years in special regimen camp and five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Transferred from camp to prison in July 1983. (Niklus, an Estonian human rights activist, joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1983).

Lithuanian Helsinki Group

38. Balys Gajauskas -- sentenced on April 14, 1978, to 10 years in special regimen camp and five years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Imprisoned Soviet Peace Activists

Group of Trust

1. Larisa Chukaeva - Arrested on May 21, 1986 and sentenced to three years general labor camp for "dissemination of slander...."

2. Oleg Radzinsky - Arrested on October 28, 1982 in Moscow and sentenced to one year camp, five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

3. Lydia Doronina - Supporter of Trust Group, planned to form branch in Latvia. Arrested on January 6, 1983 and sentenced in August to five years strict regime camp and three years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agititation and propaganda". Trust documents were found in her house. Previously served 12-year term on political charges.

4. Vladimir Gershuni - Signatory of Trust Group document. Arrested in June 1982, and charged with "dissemination of slander....". Found "non-accountable" and sent for forced psychiatric treatment at Alma-Ata Special Psychiatric Hospital. Had previously spent fifteen years in labor camps and psychiatric facilities.

5. Aleksandr Vorona - Signatory of Trust Group document. Arrested in early 1983 and sent for forced psychiatric treatment in September 1983 to the Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital. Had previously spent over nine years in psychiatric confinement for political activities.

6. Valery Senderov - Signatory of Trust Group document. Arrested on June 12, 1982, and sentenced in February 1983 to seven years camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

7. Vadim Yankov - Signatory of Trust Group document. Arrested in August 1982 and sentenced in January 1983 to four years camp plus three years exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

8. Nina Kovalenko - Place in psychiatric hospital in early 1986, and reconfined as of September 27, 1986.

9. Viktor Smirnov - Held in psychiatric confinement from late January 1986 to late March. Reportedly reconfined and still being held as of early October 1986.

10. Kirill Popov - Sentenced in April 1985 to six years strict regime camp and five years internal exile. Had been held in psychiatric facilities previously for human rights activity.

11. Yuri Popov - Placed under forced psychiatric confinement in March 1985. Present whereabouts unknown.

Baltic Nuclear-Free Zone Group

12. Heiki Ahonen - Arrested in April 1983 and sentenced in December 1983 to five years strict regime labor camp and two years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

13. Lagle Parek - Arrested in March 1983 and sentenced in December 1983 to six years strict regime camp and three years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

14. Arvo Pesti - Arrested in April 1983 and sentenced in December 1983 to five years strict regime camp and two years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

16. Enn Tarto - Arrested in September 1983 and sentenced in April 1984 to ten years prison and five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda". Had previously served two five-year camp terms on political charges.

Representative list of imprisoned Soviet writers

1. Nizametdin Akhmetov - Bashkir poet first arrested on political charges in 1969. Currently at Special Psychiatric Hospital in Alma-Ata.

2. Pavel Akhterov - Author of autobiograph "On the Road to Immortality". Tried December 1981. Sentence: seven year strict labor camp, five years internal exile.

3. Grigory Aleksandrov - Author of "I Leave for the Outcast Villages" and the poem "The Torch Over Crimea". Tried August 1983. Held at Tashkent Special Psychiatric Hospital

4. Miroslav Andreyev - Participated in samizdat religious-literary journal "May". Arrested January 1984. Sentence unknown

5. Yuri Badzo - Author of "The Right to Live". Tried December 1979. Sentence: seven years strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

6. Aleksandr Bogoslovsky - Literary specialist. Tried July 1984 for possession and dissemination of unofficial literature. Sentence: three years general regime camp.

7. Leonid Borodin - Tried May 1983 for works published abroad. Sentence: ten years special regime camp, five years internal exile.

8. Boris Chernykh - Creator of independent literary seminar "Tovarishchestvo" (Fellowship). Sentenced in March 1983 to five years strict regime camp.

9. Lyudas Dambrauskas - Author of memoirs. Sentenced in October 1984 to three and a half years strict regime camp, two years internal exile.

10. Vyacheslav Dolonin - Tried in April 1983 for participating in samizdat almanac "Chasi" (Hours). Sentence: three years strict regime camp and two years internal exile.

11. Gintautas Eshmantis - Tried December 1980 for editing journal "Alma Mater". Sentence: six years strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

12. Georgy Feldman - Author of short stories devoted to Dr. Andrei Sakharov. Tried June 1983. Sentence: six year strict regime camp

13. Balys Gajauskas - Translated Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago into Lithuanian. Tried April 1978. Sentence: ten years special regime camp, five years internal exile

14. Vladimir Gershuni - Participated in literary journal "Poiski" Tried April 1983. Held in Special Psychiatric Hospital (Alma-Ata or Blagoveshchensk)

15. Boris Grezin - Poet. Sentenced November 1983 to four years strict regime camp.

16. Mykola Horbal - Poet. Sentenced April 1985 to eight years strict regime camp, three years internal exile; had been serving five year sentence from 1979.

17. Zoya Krakhmalnikova - Religious writer. Edited journal "Nadezhda" (Hope). Sentenced April 1983 to one year strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

18. Vladas Lapenis - Author of memoirs and religious essays. Sentence March 1985 to four years strict regime camp and three years internal exile.

19. Anatoly Lupinos - Poet. Tried December 1971. Confined to ordinary psychiatric hospital.

20. Mikhail Meilakh - Literary specialist. Sentenced April 1984 to seven years strict regime camp and five years internal exile.

21. Aleksei Murkin - Religious writer. Arrested in 1984. Sentence unknown.

22. Viktor Nekipelov - Poet and translator. Sentenced June 1980 to seven years strict labor camp, five years internal exile.

23. Anatoly Nesterov - Arrested in December 1983 for participating in religious-literary journal "May". Sentence unknown.

24. Aleksandr Ogorodnikov - Participant in religious-literary journal "Obshchina" (the Community). First arrested in 1978. Resentenced in camp to three more years in May 1986.

25. Igor Panachev - Arrested in December 1983 for participating in religious-literary journal "May". Sentence unknown.

26. Povilas Pechelyunas - Participant in philosophical journal "Alma Mater". Sentenced in December 1980 to three years strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

27. Viktor Rafalsky - Poet. Arrested in 1968. Confined to Dnepropetrovsky Special Psychiatric Hospital.

28. Aleksei Razlatsky - Member of USSR Writers Union. Tried February 1983 for participation in Social-Democratic Circle. Sentence: seven years strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

29. Aleksandr Riga - Tried August 1984 for participation in religious journal "Privyv" (the Call). Confined to Blagoveshchensk Special Psychiatric Hospital.

30. Vasily Ruban - Poet. Arrested in 1972 for authorship of "An Independent Communist Ukraine". Confined to psychiatric hospital.

31. Mykola Rudenko - Member of USSR Writers Union. Founder of Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Sentenced July 1977 to seven years strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

32. Gregory Rybak - Prose writer. Arrested in October 1982 for attempting to emigrate. Held in psychiatric hospital.

33. Lev Shefer - Author of poems and articles. Sentenced April 1982 to five years strict regime camp.

34. Yuri Shukhevych-Berezinsky - Author of memoirs. First arrested in 1948. Sentenced September 1972 to ten years special regime and five years internal exile.

35. Danylo Shumuk - Author of memoirs. Tried July 1972. Sentence: ten years strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

36. Semen Skalych - Member of religious sect "Penitents", poet. Arrested January 1980. Sentence: ten years strict regime, five years exile.

37. Feliks Svetov - Religious writer. Sentenced January 1986 to one year strict regime labor camp, five years internal exile.

38. Lev Timofeev - Essayist. Sentenced September 1985 to six years strict regime camp, five years internal exile

39. Vladimir Vasilev - Poet. Arrested in 1969. Held in Smolensk Special Psychiatric Hospital.

40. Viktor Zinovyev - Author of novel and other works. Arrested in 1979 or 1981. Held at Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital.

Representative List of Imprisoned Soviet Religious Activists

1. Alexandr Ogorodnikov - Russian Orthodox. Sentenced to three more years in camp in April 1986. Had been sentenced in 1980 to six years camp, five years internal exile. Third arrest.

2. Igor Ogurtsov - Russian Orthodox. Sentenced in 1967 to ten years camp, five years prison, five years internal exile.

3. Father Gleb Yakunin - Russian Orthodox. Sentenced in 1980 to five years strict regime camp, five years internal exile.

4. Valentina Pailodze - Georgian Orthodox. Sentenced in 1983 to eight years camp plus three years internal exile. Second arrest.

5. Garnik Tsarukyan - Armenian Apostolic Archdeacon. Interned in Erevan psychiatric hospital since March 1984. Third arrest.

6. Ignati Lapkin - Russian "True Orthodox". Sentenced in September 1986 to two and a half years labor camp. Second arrest.

7. Ivan Antonov - Baptist pastor. Sentenced in 1982 to five years camp, five years internal exile. Fifth arrest. New charges reportedly pending.

8. Mikhail Khorev - Baptist pastor. Sentenced in 1985 to two more years camp. Fourth arrest.

9. Pyotr Rumachik - Baptist pastor. Sentenced in 1986 to five years camp. Fourth arrest.

10. Aleksandr Krugovich - Baptist pastor. Sentenced in 1984 to four years camp.

11. Rostislav Galetsky - Adventist. Sentenced in 1981 to five years camp, five years internal exile.

12. Semyon Bakhodin - Adventist. Sentenced in 1979 to seven years camp, three years internal exile.

13. Timofei Krivoberets - Adventist. Sentenced in 1979 to eight years camp, five years internal exile.

14. Vasily Barats - Pentecostal. Sentenced in 1983 to five years camp.

15. Vladimir Loboda - Pentecostal. Sentenced in 1984 to four years camp, three years internal exile.

16. Afanasy Melnik - Pentecostal. Sentenced in 1985 to three years camp. Third arrest.

17. Balys Gajauskas - Roman Catholic. Sentenced in 1978 to ten years camp, five years internal exile. Second arrest.

18. Viktoras Petkus - Roman Catholic. Sentenced in 1978 to seven years camp, three years prison, five years internal exile.

19. Iosif Swidnicki - Roman Catholic priest. Sentenced in 1985 to three years camp.

20. Iosif Terelya - Ukrainian Catholic. Sentenced in 1985 to seven years camp, five years internal exile.

21. Hanna Mikhailenko - Ukrainian Catholic. Interned in special psychiatric hospital since 1980.

22. Iosif Begun - Jewish. Sentenced in 1983 to seven years camp, five years internal exile.

23. Iosif Berenshtein - Jewish. Sentenced in 1984 to four years camp....

24. Annasoltan Kekoliva - Muslim. Interned since 1971 at the Ashkhabad psychiatric hospital.

25. Mustafa Dzhemilev - Muslim. Sentenced in 1983 to three years camp. Seventh arrest. Reportedly resentenced at camp to additional three years in November 1986.

26. Olga Kiseleva - Krishna. Sentenced in 1984 to four years camp.

27. Anatoly Pinyaev - Krishna. Interned in special psychiatric hospital since 1983. Interned twice previously.

28. Vladimir Kustrya - Krishna. Sentenced in 1985 to five years camp.

29. Ivan Starovoit - Jehovah's Witness. Sentenced in 1983 to five years camp.

30. A.L. Vishkovsky - Jehovah's Witness. Sentenced in 1983 to five years camp.

CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX D

Page

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki, 1975.. 270

The Belgrade Follow-up Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, October 4, 1977–March 9, 1978 297

Report of the meeting of experts representing the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, foreseen by the Final Act of the CSCE in order to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods 332

Report of the meeting of experts representing the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, foreseen by the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977 to consider, within the framework of the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act, the possibilities and means of promoting concrete initiatives for mutually beneficial cooperation concerning various economic, scientific and cultural fields, in addition to other initiatives relating to the above subjects already under way..... 334

Report of the "Scientific Forum" of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 342

CSCE Follow-up Meeting concludes in Madrid, September 1983 370

Report of the meeting of experts representing the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, foreseen by the Final Act of the CSCE and the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, in order to pursue, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods 382

Report of the CSCE Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean within the framework of the results of the Valletta Meeting of Experts 383

Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 389

APPENDIX D

The Department of State

Bulletin Reprint

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: FINAL ACT, HELSINKI, 1975

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta; Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.

During the opening and closing stages of the Conference the participants were addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as their guest of honour. The Director-General of UNESCO and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe addressed the Conference during its second stage.

During the meetings of the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard, from the following non-participating Mediterranean States on various agenda items: the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.

Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world,

Determined, in consequence, to give full effect to the results of the Conference and to assure, among their States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results and thus to broaden, deepen and make continuing and lasting the process of détente,

The High Representatives of the participating States have solemnly adopted the following:

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

The States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

Reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security;

Convinced of the need to exert efforts to make détente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope, and that the implementation of the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will be a major contribution to this process;

Considering that solidarity among peoples, as well as the common purpose of the participating States in achieving the aims as set forth by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should lead to the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations, and to better mutual understanding;

Mindful of their common history and recognizing that the existence of elements common to their traditions and values can assist them in developing their relations, and desiring to search, fully taking into account the individuality and diversity of their positions and views, for possibilities of joining their efforts with a view to overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving the problems that separate them and co-operating in the interest of mankind;

Recognizing the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development of co-operation throughout Europe and among themselves and expressing their intention to pursue efforts accordingly;

Recognizing the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and conscious of the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all peoples;

Have adopted the following:

1.

(a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

The participating States,

Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security

and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation;

Recognizing that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;

Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States;

Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

I. *Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty*

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

II. *Refraining from the threat or use of force*

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State. Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

III. *Inviolability of frontiers*

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

IV. *Territorial integrity of States*

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.

V. *Peaceful settlement of disputes*

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice.

They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of co-operation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law.

For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.

In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully.

Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

VI. *Non-intervention in internal affairs*

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

VII. *Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief*

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practise, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

VIII. *Equal rights and self-determination of peoples*

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

IX. *Co-operation among States*

The participating States will develop their co-operation with one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In developing their co-operation the participating States will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in conditions of full equality.

They will endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavour, in developing their co-operation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their co-operation.

They will strive, in increasing their co-operation as set forth above, to develop closer relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.

X. *Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law*

The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those

obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them which in turn would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.

(b) Matters related to giving effect to certain of the above Principles

(i) The participating States,

Reaffirming that they will respect and give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force and convinced of the necessity to make it an effective norm of international life,

Declare that they are resolved to respect and carry out, in their relations with one another, inter alia, the following provisions which are in conformity with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States:

—To give effect and expression, by all the ways and forms which they consider appropriate, to the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with one another.

—To refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

—To refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

—To refrain from any act of economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

—To take effective measures which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

—To promote, by all means which each of them considers appropriate, a climate of confidence and respect among peoples consonant with their duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression or for any threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State.

—To make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe, and to seek, first of all, a solution through the peaceful means set forth in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.

To refrain from any action which could hinder the peaceful settlement of disputes between the participating States.

(ii) The participating States,

Reaffirming their determination to settle their disputes as set forth in the Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes;

Convinced that the peaceful settlement of disputes is a complement to refraining from the threat or use of force, both being essential though not exclusive factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security;

Desiring to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes;

1. Are resolved to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods, and to continue to this end to work upon the "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" submitted by Switzerland during the second stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as other proposals relating to it and directed towards the elaboration of such a method.

2. Decide that, on the invitation of Switzerland, a meeting of experts of all the participating States will be convoked in order to fulfil the mandate described

in paragraph 1 above within the framework and under the procedures of the follow-up to the Conference laid down in the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference".

3. This meeting of experts will take place after the meeting of the representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating States, scheduled according to the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference" for 1977; the results of the work of this meeting of experts will be submitted to Governments.

2.

Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament

The participating States,

Desirous of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world;

Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

Determined further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in this Final Act;

Recognizing the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities;

Taking into account considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament;

Recognizing that the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres will help to promote contacts and mutual understanding;

Having studied the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

Recognizing that there are other ways in which individual States can contribute further to their common objectives;

Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realization of these objectives;

Recognizing that this measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis;

Have adopted the following:

I

Prior notification of major military manoeuvres

They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State, the participating State need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State.

Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

Prior notification of other military manoeuvres

The participating States recognize that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

To the same end, the participating States also recognize that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them.

Exchange of observers

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards

all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

Prior notification of major military movements

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations the participating States studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating States recognize that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

Other confidence-building measures

The participating States recognize that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

* * *

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence-building, the participating States, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

II
Questions relating to disarmament

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

III
General considerations

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

—The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;

—The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;

—Respect for the security interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe inherent in their sovereign equality;

—The importance that participants in negotiating fora see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest of any of those States in having their views considered.

CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The participating States,

Convinced that their efforts to develop co-operation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole,

Recognizing that co-operation in these fields would promote economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of life,

Aware of the diversity of their economic and social systems,

Reaffirming their will to intensify such co-operation between one another, irrespective of their systems,

Recognizing that such co-operation, with due regard for the different levels of economic development, can be developed, on the basis of equality and mutual satisfaction of the partners, and of reciprocity permitting, as a whole, an equitable distribution of advantages and obligations of comparable scale, with respect for bilateral and multilateral agreements,

Taking into account the interests of the developing countries throughout the world, including those among the participating countries as long as they are developing from the economic point of view; reaffirming their will to co-operate for the achievement of the aims and objectives established by the

appropriate bodies of the United Nations in the pertinent documents concerning development, it being understood that each participating State maintains the positions it has taken on them; giving special attention to the least developed countries,

Convinced that the growing world-wide economic interdependence calls for increasing common and effective efforts towards the solution of major world economic problems such as food, energy, commodities, monetary and financial problems, and therefore emphasizes the need for promoting stable and equitable international economic relations, thus contributing to the continuous and diversified economic development of all countries,

Having taken into account the work already undertaken by relevant international organizations and wishing to take advantage of the possibilities offered by these organizations, in particular by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for giving effect to the provisions of the final documents of the Conference,

Considering that the guidelines and concrete recommendations contained in the following texts are aimed at promoting further development of their mutual economic relations, and convinced that their co-operation in this field should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document,

Have adopted the following:

1. Commercial Exchanges

General provisions

The participating States,

Conscious of the growing role of international trade as one of the most important factors in economic growth and social progress,

Recognizing that trade represents an essential sector of their co-operation, and bearing in mind that the provisions contained in the above preamble apply in particular to this sector,

Considering that the volume and structure of trade among the participating States do not in all cases correspond to the possibilities created by the current level of their economic, scientific and technological development,

are resolved to promote, on the basis of the modalities of their economic co-operation, the expansion of their mutual trade in goods and services, and to ensure conditions favourable to such development;

recognize the beneficial effects which can result for the development of trade from the application of most favoured nation treatment;

will encourage the expansion of trade on as broad a multilateral basis as possible, thereby endeavouring to utilize the various economic and commercial possibilities;

recognize the importance of bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental and other agreements for the long-term development of trade;

note the importance of monetary and financial questions for the development of international trade, and will endeavour to deal with them with a view to contributing to the continuous expansion of trade;

will endeavour to reduce or progressively eliminate all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade;

will foster a steady growth of trade while avoiding as far as possible abrupt fluctuations in their trade;

consider that their trade in various products should be conducted in such a way as not to cause or threaten to cause serious injury—and should the situation arise, market disruption—in domestic markets for these products and in particular to the detriment of domestic producers of like or directly competitive products; as regards the concept of market disruption, it is understood that it should not be invoked in a way inconsistent with the relevant provisions of their international agreements; if they resort to safeguard measures, they will do so in conformity with their commitments in this field arising from international agreements to which they are parties and will take account of the interests of the parties directly concerned;

will give due attention to measures for the promotion of trade and the diversification of its structure;

note that the growth and diversification of trade would contribute to widening the possibilities of choice of products;

consider it appropriate to create favourable conditions for the participation of firms, organizations and enterprises in the development of trade.

Business contacts and facilities

The participating States,

Conscious of the importance of the contribution which an improvement of business contacts, and the accompanying growth of confidence in business relationships, could make to the development of commercial and economic relations,

will take measures further to improve conditions for the expansion of contacts between representatives of official bodies, of the different organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with foreign trade, in particular, where useful, between sellers and users of products and services, for the purpose of studying commercial possibilities, concluding contracts, ensuring their implementation and providing after-sales services;

will encourage organizations, enterprises and firms concerned with foreign trade to take measures to accelerate the conduct of business negotiations;

will further take measures aimed at improving working conditions of representatives of foreign organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with external trade, particularly as follows:

—by providing the necessary information, including information on legislation and procedures relating to the establishment and operation of permanent representation by the above mentioned bodies;

—by examining as favourably as possible requests for the establishment of permanent representation and of offices for this purpose, including, where appropriate, the opening of joint offices by two or more firms;

—by encouraging the provision, on conditions as favourable as possible and equal for all representatives of the above-mentioned bodies, of hotel accommodation, means of communication, and of other facilities normally required by them, as well as of

suitable business and residential premises for purposes of permanent representation;

recognize the importance of such measures to encourage greater participation by small and medium sized firms in trade between participating States.

Economic and commercial information

The participating States,

Conscious of the growing role of economic and commercial information in the development of international trade,

Considering that economic information should be of such a nature as to allow adequate market analysis and to permit the preparation of medium and long term forecasts, thus contributing to the establishment of a continuing flow of trade and a better utilization of commercial possibilities,

Expressing their readiness to improve the quality and increase the quantity and supply of economic and relevant administrative information,

Considering that the value of statistical information on the international level depends to a considerable extent on the possibility of its comparability,

will promote the publication and dissemination of economic and commercial information at regular intervals and as quickly as possible, in particular:

—statistics concerning production, national income, budget, consumption and productivity;

—foreign trade statistics drawn up on the basis of comparable classification including breakdown by product with indication of volume and value, as well as country of origin or destination;

—laws and regulations concerning foreign trade;

—information allowing forecasts of development of the economy to assist in trade promotion, for example, information on the general orientation of national economic plans and programmes;

—other information to help businessmen in commercial contacts, for example, periodic directories, lists, and where possible, organizational charts of firms and organizations concerned with foreign trade;

will in addition to the above encourage the development of the exchange of economic and commercial information through, where appropriate, joint commissions for economic, scientific and technical co-operation, national and joint chambers of commerce, and other suitable bodies;

will support a study, in the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, of the possibilities of creating a multilateral system of notification of laws and regulations concerning foreign trade and changes therein;

will encourage international work on the harmonization of statistical nomenclatures, notably in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Marketing

The participating States,

Recognizing the importance of adapting production to the requirements of foreign markets in order to ensure the expansion of international trade,

Conscious of the need of exporters to be as fully familiar as possible with and take account of the requirements of potential users,

will encourage organizations, enterprises and firms concerned with foreign trade to develop further the knowledge and techniques required for effective marketing;

will encourage the improvement of conditions for the implementation of measures to promote trade and to satisfy the needs of users in respect of imported products, in particular through market research and advertising measures as well as, where useful, the establishment of supply facilities, the furnishing of spare parts, the functioning of after sales services, and the training of the necessary local technical personnel;

will encourage international co-operation in the field of trade promotion, including marketing, and the work undertaken on these subjects within the international bodies, in particular the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

2. Industrial co-operation and projects of common interest

Industrial co-operation

The participating States,

Considering that industrial co-operation, being motivated by economic considerations, can

—create lasting ties thus strengthening long-term overall economic co-operation,

—contribute to economic growth as well as to the expansion and diversification of international trade and to a wider utilization of modern technology,

—lead to the mutually advantageous utilization of economic complementarities through better use of all factors of production, and

—accelerate the industrial development of all those who take part in such co-operation,

propose to encourage the development of industrial co-operation between the competent organizations, enterprises and firms of their countries;

consider that industrial co-operation may be facilitated by means of intergovernmental and other bilateral and multilateral agreements between the interested parties;

note that in promoting industrial co-operation they should bear in mind the economic structures and the development levels of their countries;

note that industrial co-operation is implemented by means of contracts concluded between competent organizations, enterprises and firms on the basis of economic considerations;

express their willingness to promote measures designed to create favourable conditions for industrial co-operation;

recognize that industrial co-operation covers a number of forms of economic relations going beyond the framework of conventional trade, and that in concluding contracts on industrial co-operation the partners will determine jointly the appropriate forms and conditions of co-operation, taking into account their mutual interests and capabilities;

recognize further that, if it is in their mutual interest, concrete forms such as the following may be useful for the development of industrial co-

operation: joint production and sale, specialization in production and sale, construction, adaptation and modernization of industrial plants, co-operation for the setting up of complete industrial installations with a view to thus obtaining part of the resultant products, mixed companies, exchanges of "know-how", of technical information, of patents and of licences, and joint industrial research within the framework of specific co-operation projects;

recognize that new forms of industrial co-operation can be applied with a view to meeting specific needs;

note the importance of economic, commercial, technical and administrative information such as to ensure the development of industrial co-operation;

Consider it desirable:

—to improve the quality and the quantity of information relevant to industrial co-operation, in particular the laws and regulations, including those relating to foreign exchange, general orientation of national economic plans and programmes as well as programme priorities and economic conditions of the market; and

—to disseminate as quickly as possible published documentation thereon;

will encourage all forms of exchange of information and communication of experience relevant to industrial co-operation, including through contacts between potential partners and, where appropriate, through joint commissions for economic, industrial, scientific and technical co-operation, national and joint chambers of commerce, and other suitable bodies;

consider it desirable, with a view to expanding industrial co-operation, to encourage the exploration of co-operation possibilities and the implementation of co-operation projects and will take measures to this end, *inter alia*, by facilitating and increasing all forms of business contacts between competent organizations, enterprises and firms and between their respective qualified personnel;

note that the provisions adopted by the Conference relating to business contacts in the economic and commercial fields also apply to foreign organizations, enterprises and firms engaged in industrial co-operation, taking into account the specific conditions of this co-operation, and will endeavour to ensure, in particular, the existence of appropriate working conditions for personnel engaged in the implementation of co-operation projects;

consider it desirable that proposals for industrial co-operation projects should be sufficiently specific and should contain the necessary economic and technical data, in particular preliminary estimates of the cost of the project, information on the form of co-operation envisaged, and market possibilities, to enable potential partners to proceed with initial studies and to arrive at decisions in the shortest possible time;

will encourage the parties concerned with industrial co-operation to take measures to accelerate the conduct of negotiations for the conclusion of co-operation contracts;

recommend further the continued examination—for example within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe—of means of improving the provision of information to those concerned on general conditions of industrial co-operation and guidance on the preparation of contracts in this field;

consider it desirable to further improve conditions for the implementation of industrial co-operation projects, in particular with respect to:

—the protection of the interests of the partners in industrial co-operation projects, including the legal protection of the various kinds of property involved;

—the consideration, in ways that are compatible with their economic systems, of the needs and possibilities of industrial co-operation within the framework of economic policy and particularly in national economic plans and programmes;

consider it desirable that the partners, when concluding industrial co-operation contracts, should devote due attention to provisions concerning the extension of the necessary mutual assistance and the provision of the necessary information during the implementation of these contracts, in particular with a view to attaining the required technical level and quality of the products resulting from such co-operation;

recognize the usefulness of an increased participation of small and medium sized firms in industrial co-operation projects.

Projects of common interest

The participating States,

Considering that their economic potential and their natural resources permit, through common efforts, long-term co-operation in the implementation, including at the regional or sub-regional level, of major projects of common interest, and that these may contribute to the speeding-up of the economic development of the countries participating therein,

Considering it desirable that the competent organizations, enterprises and firms of all countries should be given the possibility of indicating their interest in participating in such projects, and, in case of agreement, of taking part in their implementation,

Noting that the provisions adopted by the Conference relating to industrial cooperation are also applicable to projects of common interest,

regard it as necessary to encourage, where appropriate, the investigation by competent and interested organizations, enterprises and firms of the possibilities for the carrying out of projects of common interest in the fields of energy resources and of the exploitation of raw materials, as well as of transport and communications;

regard it as desirable that organizations, enterprises and firms exploring the possibilities of taking part in projects of common interest exchange with their potential partners, through the appropriate channels, the requisite economic, legal, financial and technical information pertaining to these projects;

consider that the fields of energy resources, in particular, petroleum, natural gas and coal, and the extraction and processing of mineral raw materials, in particular, iron ore and bauxite, are suitable ones for strengthening long-term economic co-operation and for the development of trade which could result;

consider that possibilities for projects of common

interest with a view to long-term economic co-operation also exist in the following fields:

—exchanges of electrical energy within Europe with a view to utilizing the capacity of the electrical power stations as rationally as possible;

—co-operation in research for new sources of energy and, in particular, in the field of nuclear energy;

—development of road networks and co-operation aimed at establishing a coherent navigable network in Europe;

—co-operation in research and the perfecting of equipment for multimodal transport operations and for the handling of containers;

recommend that the States interested in projects of common interest should consider under what conditions it would be possible to establish them, and if they so desire, create the necessary conditions for their actual implementation.

3. Provisions concerning trade and industrial co-operation

Harmonization of standards

The participating States,

Recognizing the development of international harmonization of standards and technical regulations and of international co-operation in the field of certification as an important means of eliminating technical obstacles to international trade and industrial co-operation, thereby facilitating their development and increasing productivity,

reaffirm their interest to achieve the widest possible international harmonization of standards and technical regulations;

express their readiness to promote international agreements and other appropriate arrangements on acceptance of certificates of conformity with standards and technical regulations;

consider it desirable to increase international co-operation on standardization, in particular by supporting the activities of intergovernmental and other appropriate organizations in this field.

Arbitration

The participating States,

Considering that the prompt and equitable settlement of disputes which may arise from commercial transactions relating to goods and services and contracts for industrial co-operation would contribute to expanding and facilitating trade and co-operation,

Considering that arbitration is an appropriate means of settling such disputes,

recommend, where appropriate, to organizations, enterprises and firms in their countries, to include arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and industrial co-operation contracts, or in special agreements;

recommend that the provisions on arbitration should provide for arbitration under a mutually acceptable set of arbitration rules, and permit arbitration in a third country, taking into account existing intergovernmental and other agreements in this field.

Specific bilateral arrangements

The participating States,

Conscious of the need to facilitate trade and to promote the application of new forms of industrial co-operation,

will consider favourably the conclusion, in appropriate cases, of specific bilateral agreements concerning various problems of mutual interest in the fields of commercial exchanges and industrial co-operation, in particular with a view to avoiding double taxation and to facilitating the transfer of profits and the return of the value of the assets invested.

4. Science and technology

The participating States,

Convinced that scientific and technological co-operation constitutes an important contribution to the strengthening of security and co-operation among them, in that it assists the effective solution of problems of common interest and the improvement of the conditions of human life,

Considering that in developing such co-operation, it is important to promote the sharing of information and experience, facilitating the study and transfer of scientific and technological achievements, as well as the access to such achievements on a mutually advantageous basis and in fields of co-operation agreed between interested parties,

Considering that it is for the potential partners, i.e. the competent organizations, institutions, enterprises, scientists and technologists of the participating States to determine the opportunities for mutually beneficial co-operation and to develop its details,

Affirming that such co-operation can be developed and implemented bilaterally and multilaterally at the governmental and non-governmental levels, for example, through intergovernmental and other agreements, international programmes, co-operative projects and commercial channels, while utilizing also various forms of contacts, including direct and individual contacts,

Aware of the need to take measures further to improve scientific and technological co-operation between them,

Possibilities for improving co-operation

Recognize that possibilities exist for further improving scientific and technological co-operation, and to this end, express their intention to remove obstacles to such co-operation, in particular through:

—the improvement of opportunities for the exchange and dissemination of scientific and technological information among the parties interested in scientific and technological research and co-operation including information related to the organization and implementation of such co-operation;

—the expeditious implementation and improvement in organization, including programmes, of international visits of scientists and specialists in connexion with exchanges, conferences and co-operation;

—the wider use of commercial channels and activities for applied scientific and technological re-

search and for the transfer of achievements obtained in this field while providing information on and protection of intellectual and industrial property rights;

Fields of co-operation

Consider that possibilities to expand co-operation exist within the areas given below as examples, noting that it is for potential partners in the participating countries to identify and develop projects and arrangements of mutual interest and benefit:

Agriculture

Research into new methods and technologies for increasing the productivity of crop cultivation and animal husbandry; the application of chemistry to agriculture; the design, construction and utilization of agricultural machinery; technologies of irrigation and other agricultural land improvement works;

Energy

New technologies of production, transport and distribution of energy aimed at improving the use of existing fuels and sources of hydroenergy, as well as research in the field of new energy sources, including nuclear, solar and geothermal energy;

New technologies, rational use of resources

Research on new technologies and equipn. nt designed in particular to reduce energy consumption and to minimize or eliminate waste;

Transport technology

Research on the means of transport and the technology applied to the development and operation of international, national and urban transport networks including container transport as well as transport safety;

Physics

Study of problems in high energy physics and plasma physics; research in the field of theoretical and experimental nuclear physics;

Chemistry

Research on problems in electrochemistry and the chemistry of polymers, of natural products, and of metals and alloys, as well as the development of improved chemical technology, especially materials processing; practical application of the latest achievements of chemistry to industry, construction and other sectors of the economy;

Meteorology and hydrology

Meteorological and hydrological research, including methods of collection, evaluation and transmission of data and their utilization for weather forecasting and hydrology forecasting;

Oceanography

Oceanographic research, including the study of air/sea interactions;

Seismological research

Study and forecasting of earthquakes and associated geological changes; development and research of technology of seism-resisting constructions;

Research on glaciology, permafrost and problems of life under conditions of cold

Research on glaciology and permafrost; transportation and construction technologies; human adaptation to climatic extremes and changes in the living conditions of indigenous populations;

Computer, communication and information technologies

Development of computers as well as of telecommunications and information systems; technology associated with computers and telecommunications, including their use for management systems, for production processes, for automation, for the study of economic problems, in scientific research and for the collection, processing and dissemination of information;

Space research

Space exploration and the study of the earth's natural resources and the natural environment by remote sensing in particular with the assistance of satellites and rocket-probes;

Medicine and public health

Research on cardiovascular, tumour and virus diseases, molecular biology, neurophysiology; development and testing of new drugs; study of contemporary problems of pediatrics, gerontology and the organization and techniques of medical services;

Environmental research

Research on specific scientific and technological problems related to human environment.

Forms and methods of co-operation

Express their view that scientific and technological co-operation should, in particular, employ the following forms and methods:

—exchange and circulation of books, periodicals and other scientific and technological publications and papers among interested organizations, scientific and technological institutions, enterprises and scientists and technologists, as well as participation in international programmes for the abstracting and indexing of publications;

—exchanges and visits as well as other direct contacts and communications among scientists and technologists, on the basis of mutual agreement and other arrangements, for such purposes as consultations, lecturing and conducting research, including the use of laboratories, scientific libraries, and other documentation centres in connexion therewith;

—holding of international and national conferences, symposia, seminars, courses and other meetings of a scientific and technological character, which would include the participation of foreign scientists and technologists;

—joint preparation and implementation of programmes and projects of mutual interest on the basis of consultation and agreement among all parties concerned, including, where possible and appropriate, exchanges of experience and research results, and correlation of research programmes, between scientific and technological research institutions and organizations;

—use of commercial channels and methods for identifying and transferring technological and scien-

tific developments, including the conclusion of mutually beneficial co-operation arrangements between firms and enterprises in fields agreed upon between them and for carrying out, where appropriate, joint research and development programmes and projects;

consider it desirable that periodic exchanges of views and information take place on scientific policy, in particular on general problems of orientation and administration of research and the question of a better use of large-scale scientific and experimental equipment on a co-operative basis;

recommend that, in developing co-operation in the field of science and technology, full use be made of existing practices of bilateral and multilateral co-operation, including that of a regional or sub-regional character, together with the forms and methods of co-operation described in this document;

recommend further that more effective utilization be made of the possibilities and capabilities of existing international organizations, intergovernmental and non-governmental, concerned with science and technology, for improving exchanges of information and experience, as well as for developing other forms of co-operation in fields of common interest, for example:

—in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, study of possibilities for expanding multilateral co-operation, taking into account models for projects and research used in various international organizations; and for sponsoring conferences, symposia, and study and working groups such as those which would bring together younger scientists and technologists with eminent specialists in their field;

—through their participation in particular international scientific and technological co-operation programmes, including those of UNESCO and other international organizations, pursuit of continuing progress towards the objectives of such programmes, notably those of UNISIST [World Science Information System] with particular respect to information policy guidance, technical advice, information contributions and data processing.

5. Environment

The participating States,

Affirming that the protection and improvement of the environment, as well as the protection of nature and the rational utilization of its resources in the interests of present and future generations, is one of the tasks of major importance to the well-being of peoples and the economic development of all countries and that many environmental problems, particularly in Europe, can be solved effectively only through close international co-operation,

Acknowledging that each of the participating States, in accordance with the principles of international law, ought to ensure, in a spirit of co-operation, that activities carried out on its territory do not cause degradation of the environment in another State or in areas lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,

Considering that the success of any environmental policy presupposes that all population groups and social forces, aware of their responsibilities, help to protect and improve the environment, which necessitates continued and thorough educative action, particularly with regard to youth,

Affirming that experience has shown that economic development and technological progress must be compatible with the protection of the environment and the preservation of historical and cultural values; that damage to the environment is best avoided by preventive measures; and that the ecological balance must be preserved in the exploitation and management of natural resources,

Aims of co-operation

Agree to the following aims of co-operation, in particular:

—to study, with a view to their solution, those environmental problems which, by their nature, are of a multilateral, bilateral, regional or sub-regional dimension; as well as to encourage the development of an interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems;

—to increase the effectiveness of national and international measures for the protection of the environment, by the comparison and, if appropriate, the harmonization of methods of gathering and analyzing facts, by improving the knowledge of pollution phenomena and rational utilization of natural resources, by the exchange of information, by the harmonization of definitions and the adoption, as far as possible, of a common terminology in the field of the environment;

—to take the necessary measures to bring environmental policies closer together and, where appropriate and possible, to harmonize them;

—to encourage, where possible and appropriate, national and international efforts by their interested organizations, enterprises and firms in the development, production and improvement of equipment designed for monitoring, protecting and enhancing the environment.

Fields of co-operation

To attain these aims, the participating States will make use of every suitable opportunity to co-operate in the field of environment and, in particular, within the areas described below as examples:

Control of air pollution

Desulphurization of fossil fuels and exhaust gases; pollution control of heavy metals, particles, aerosols, nitrogen oxides, in particular those emitted by transport, power stations, and other industrial plants; systems and methods of observation and control of air pollution and its effects, including long-range transport of air pollutants;

Water pollution control and fresh water utilization

Prevention and control of water pollution, in particular of transboundary rivers and international lakes; techniques for the improvement of the quality of water and further development of ways and means for industrial and municipal sewage effluent purification; methods of assessment of fresh water resources and the improvement of their utilization, in particular by developing methods of production which are less polluting and lead to less consumption of fresh water;

Protection of the marine environment

Protection of the marine environment of participating States, and especially the Mediterranean Sea,

from pollutants emanating from land-based sources and those from ships and other vessels, notably the harmful substances listed in Annexes I and II to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters; problems of maintaining marine ecological balances and food chains, in particular such problems as may arise from the exploration and exploitation of biological and mineral resources of the seas and the sea-bed;

Land utilization and soils

Problems associated with more effective use of lands, including land amelioration, reclamation and recultivation; control of soil pollution, water and air erosion, as well as other forms of soil degradation; maintaining and increasing the productivity of soils with due regard for the possible negative effects of the application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides;

Nature conservation and nature reserves

Protection of nature and nature reserves; conservation and maintenance of existing genetic resources, especially rare animal and plant species; conservation of natural ecological systems; establishment of nature reserves and other protected landscapes and areas, including their use for research, tourism, recreation and other purposes;

Improvement of environmental conditions in areas of human settlement

Environmental conditions associated with transport, housing, working areas, urban development and planning, water supply and sewage disposal systems; assessment of harmful effects of noise, and noise control methods; collection, treatment and utilization of wastes, including the recovery and recycling of materials; research on substitutes for non-biodegradable substances;

Fundamental research, monitoring, forecasting and assessment of environmental changes

Study of changes in climate, landscapes and ecological balances under the impact of both natural factors and human activities; forecasting of possible genetic changes in flora and fauna as a result of environmental pollution; harmonization of statistical data, development of scientific concepts and systems of monitoring networks, standardized methods of observation, measurement and assessment of changes in the biosphere; assessment of the effects of environmental pollution levels and degradation of the environment upon human health; study and development of criteria and standards for various environmental pollutants and regulation regarding production and use of various products;

Legal and administrative measures

Legal and administrative measures for the protection of the environment including procedures for establishing environmental impact assessments.

Forms and methods of co-operation

The participating States declare that problems relating to the protection and improvement of the environment will be solved on both a bilateral and a multilateral, including regional and sub-regional, basis, making full use of existing patterns and forms of co-operation. They will develop co-operation in the field of the environment in particular by taking into consideration the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Prague symposium on environmental problems.

The participating States are resolved that co-operation in the field of the environment will be implemented in particular through:

—exchanges of scientific and technical information, documentation and research results, including information on the means of determining the possible effects on the environment of technical and economic activities;

—organization of conferences, symposia and meetings of experts;

—exchanges of scientists, specialists and trainees;

—joint preparation and implementation of programmes and projects for the study and solution of various problems of environmental protection;

—harmonization, where appropriate and necessary, of environmental protection standards and norms, in particular with the object of avoiding possible difficulties in trade which may arise from efforts to resolve ecological problems of production processes and which relate to the achievement of certain environmental qualities in manufactured products;

—consultations on various aspects of environmental protection, as agreed upon among countries concerned, especially in connexion with problems which could have international consequences.

The participating States will further develop such co-operation by:

—promoting the progressive development, codification and implementation of international law as one means of preserving and enhancing the human environment, including principles and practices, as accepted by them, relating to pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of their States affecting other countries and regions;

—supporting and promoting the implementation of relevant international Conventions to which they are parties, in particular those designed to prevent and combat marine and fresh water pollution, recommending States to ratify Conventions which have already been signed, as well as considering possibilities of accepting other appropriate Conventions to which they are not parties at present;

—advocating the inclusion, where appropriate and possible, of the various areas of co-operation into the programmes of work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, supporting such co-operation within the framework of the Commission and of the United Nations Environment Programme, and taking into account the work of other competent international organizations of which they are members;

—making wider use, in all types of co-operation, of information already available from national and international sources, including internationally agreed criteria, and utilizing the possibilities and capabilities of various competent international organizations.

The participating States agree on the following recommendations on specific measures:

—to develop through international co-operation an extensive programme for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transport of air pollutants, starting with sulphur dioxide and with possible extension to other pollutants, and to this end to take into account basic elements of a co-operation programme which were identified by the experts who met in Oslo in December 1974 at the invitation of the Norwegian Institute of Air Research;

—to advocate that within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe a study be carried out of procedures and relevant experience relating to the activities of Governments in developing the capabilities of their countries to predict adequately environmental consequences of economic activities and technological development.

6. Co-operation in other areas

Development of transport

The participating States,

Considering that the improvement of the conditions of transport constitutes one of the factors essential to the development of co-operation among them,

Considering that it is necessary to encourage the development of transport and the solution of existing problems by employing appropriate national and international means,

Taking into account the work being carried out on these subjects by existing international organizations, especially by the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,

note that the speed of technical progress in the various fields of transport makes desirable a development of co-operation and an increase in exchanges of information among them;

declare themselves in favour of a simplification and a harmonization of administrative formalities in the field of international transport, in particular at frontiers;

consider it desirable to promote, while allowing for their particular national circumstances in this sector, the harmonization of administrative and technical provisions concerning safety in road, rail, river, air and sea transport;

express their intention to encourage the development of international inland transport of passengers and goods as well as the possibilities of adequate participation in such transport on the basis of reciprocal advantage;

declare themselves in favour, with due respect for their rights and international commitments, of the elimination of disparities arising from the legal provisions applied to traffic on inland waterways which are subject to international conventions and, in particular, of the disparity in the application of those provisions; and to this end invite the member States of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, of the Danube Commission and of other bodies to develop the work and studies now being carried out, in particular within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe;

express their willingness, with a view to improving international rail transport and with due respect for their rights and international commitments, to work towards the elimination of difficulties arising from disparities in existing international legal provisions governing the reciprocal railway transport of passengers and goods between their territories;

express the desire for intensification of the work being carried out by existing international organizations in the field of transport, especially that of the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and express their intention to contribute thereto by their efforts;

consider that examination by the participating States of the possibility of their accession to the different conventions or to membership of international organizations specializing in transport matters, as well as their efforts to implement conventions when ratified, could contribute to the strengthening of their co-operation in this field.

Promotion of tourism

The participating States,

Aware of the contribution made by international tourism to the development of mutual understanding among peoples, to increased knowledge of other countries' achievements in various fields, as well as to economic, social and cultural progress,

Recognizing the interrelationship between the development of tourism and measures taken in other areas of economic activity,

express their intention to encourage increased tourism on both an individual and group basis in particular by:

—encouraging the improvement of the tourist infrastructure and co-operation in this field;

—encouraging the carrying out of joint tourist projects including technical co-operation, particularly where this is suggested by territorial proximity and the convergence of tourist interests;

—encouraging the exchange of information, including relevant laws and regulations, studies, data and documentation relating to tourism, and by improving statistics with a view to facilitating their comparability;

—dealing in a positive spirit with questions connected with the allocation of financial means for tourist travel abroad, having regard to their economic possibilities, as well as with those connected with the formalities required for such travel, taking into account other provisions on tourism adopted by the Conference;

—facilitating the activities of foreign travel agencies and passenger transport companies in the promotion of international tourism;

—encouraging tourism outside the high season;

—examining the possibilities of exchanging specialists and students in the field of tourism, with a view to improving their qualifications;

—promoting conferences and symposia on the planning and development of tourism;

consider it desirable to carry out in the appropriate international framework, and with the co-operation of the relevant national bodies, detailed studies on tourism, in particular:

—a comparative study on the status and activities of travel agencies as well as on ways and means of achieving better co-operation among them;

—a study of the problems raised by the seasonal concentration of vacations, with the ultimate objective of encouraging tourism outside peak periods;

—studies of the problems arising in areas where tourism has injured the environment;

consider also that interested parties might wish to study the following questions:

—uniformity of hotel classification; and

—tourist routes comprising two or more countries;

will endeavour, where possible, to ensure that the development of tourism does not injure the environment and the artistic, historic and cultural heritage in their respective countries;

will pursue their co-operation in the field of tourism bilaterally and multilaterally with a view to attaining the above objectives.

Economic and social aspects of migrant labour

The participating States,

Considering that the movements of migrant workers in Europe have reached substantial proportions, and that they constitute an important economic, social and human factor for host countries as well as for countries of origin,

Recognizing that workers' migrations have also given rise to a number of economic, social, human and other problems in both the receiving countries and the countries of origin,

Taking due account of the activities of the competent international organizations, more particularly the International Labour Organisation, in this area,

are of the opinion that the problems arising bilaterally from the migration of workers in Europe as well as between the participating States should be dealt with by the parties directly concerned, in order to resolve these problems in their mutual interest, in the light of the concern of each State involved to take due account of the requirements resulting from its socio-economic situation, having regard to the obligation of each State to comply with the bilateral and multilateral agreements to which it is party, and with the following aims in view:

to encourage the efforts of the countries of origin directed towards increasing the possibilities of employment for their nationals in their own territories, in particular by developing economic co-operation appropriate for this purpose and suitable for the host countries and the countries of origin concerned;

to ensure, through collaboration between the host country and the country of origin, the conditions under which the orderly movement of workers might take place, while at the same time protecting their personal and social welfare and, if appropriate, to organize the recruitment of migrant workers and the provision of elementary language and vocational training;

to ensure equality of rights between migrant workers and nationals of the host countries with regard to conditions of employment and work and to social security, and to endeavour to ensure that migrant workers may enjoy satisfactory living conditions, especially housing conditions;

to endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, that migrant workers may enjoy the same opportunities as nationals of the host countries of finding other suitable employment in the event of unemployment;

to regard with favour the provision of vocational training to migrant workers and, as far as possible, free instruction in the language of the host country, in the framework of their employment;

to confirm the right of migrant workers to receive, as far as possible, regular information in their own language, covering both their country of origin and the host country;

to ensure that the children of migrant workers established in the host country have access to the education usually given there, under the same conditions as the children of that country and, furthermore, to permit them to receive supplementary education in their own language, national culture, history and geography;

to bear in mind that migrant workers, particularly those who have acquired qualifications, can by returning to their countries after a certain period of time help to remedy any deficiency of skilled labour in their country of origin;

to facilitate, as far as possible, the reuniting of migrant workers with their families;

to regard with favour the efforts of the countries of origin to attract the savings of migrant workers, with a view to increasing, within the framework of their economic development, appropriate opportunities for employment, thereby facilitating the reintegration of these workers on their return home.

Training of personnel

The participating States,

Conscious of the importance of the training and advanced training of professional staff and technicians for the economic development of every country,

declare themselves willing to encourage co-operation in this field notably by promoting exchange of information on the subject of institutions, programmes and methods of training and advanced training open to professional staff and technicians in the various sectors of economic activity and especially in those of management, public planning, agriculture and commercial and banking techniques;

consider that it is desirable to develop, under mutually acceptable conditions, exchanges of professional staff and technicians, particularly through training activities, of which it would be left to the competent and interested bodies in the participating States to discuss the modalities—duration, financing, education and qualification levels of potential participants;

declare themselves in favour of examining, through appropriate channels, the possibilities of co-operating on the organization and carrying out of vocational training on the job, more particularly in professions involving modern techniques.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The participating States,

Conscious of the geographical, historical, cultural, economic and political aspects of their relationship with the non-participating Mediterranean States,

Convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area,

Believing that the strengthening of security and the intensification of co-operation in Europe would stimulate positive processes in the Mediterranean region, and expressing their intention to contribute towards peace, security and justice in the region, in which ends the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States have a common interest,

Recognizing the importance of their mutual economic relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States, and conscious of their common interest in the further development of co-operation,

Noting with appreciation the interest expressed by the non-participating Mediterranean States in the Conference since its inception, and having duly taken their contributions into account,

Declare their intention:

—to promote the development of good-neighbourly relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, on which their relations are based, and with the United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and accordingly, in this context, to conduct their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States;

—to seek, by further improving their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States, to increase mutual confidence, so as to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole;

—to encourage with the non-participating Mediterranean States the development of mutually beneficial co-operation in the various fields of economic activity, especially by expanding commercial exchanges, on the basis of a common awareness of the necessity for stability and progress in trade relations, of their mutual economic interests, and of differences in the levels of economic development, thereby promoting their economic advancement and well-being;

—to contribute to a diversified development of the economies of the non-participating Mediterranean countries, whilst taking due account of their national development objectives, and to co-operate with them, especially in the sectors of industry, science and technology, in their efforts to achieve a better utilization of their resources, thus promoting a more harmonious development of economic relations;

—to intensify their efforts and their co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the non-participating Mediterranean States directed towards the improvement of the environment of the Mediterranean, especially the safeguarding of the biological resources and ecological balance of the sea, by appropriate measures including the prevention and control of pollution; to this end, and in view of the present situation, to co-operate through competent international organizations and in particular within the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);

—to promote further contacts and co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States in other relevant fields.

In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace, reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the region, and widening the scope of co-operation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives.

The participating States would seek, in the framework of their multilateral efforts, to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes.

CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

The participating States,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Conscious that increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these aims,

Determined therefore to co-operate among themselves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create better conditions in the above fields, to develop and strengthen existing forms of co-operation and to work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims,

Convinced that this co-operation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document,

Have adopted the following:

1. Human Contacts

The participating States,

Considering the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples,

Affirming, in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations,

Desiring in this spirit to develop, with the continuance of détente, further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field

And conscious that the questions relevant hereto must be settled by the States concerned under mutually acceptable conditions,

Make it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether

privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connexion,

Declare their readiness to these ends to take measures which they consider appropriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be needed, and

Express their intention now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

(a) Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties

In order to promote further development of contacts on the basis of family ties the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.

Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt with without distinction as to the country of origin or destination: existing requirements for travel documents and visas will be applied in this spirit. The preparation and issue of such documents and visas will be effected within reasonable time limits; cases of urgent necessity—such as serious illness or death—will be given priority treatment. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the fees for official travel documents and visas are acceptable.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning contacts on the basis of family ties will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

(b) Reunification of Families

The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family, with special attention being given to requests of an urgent character—such as requests submitted by persons who are ill or old.

They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.

They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connexion with these applications to ensure that they are at a moderate level.

Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonably short intervals by the authorities of the country of residence or destination, whichever is concerned; under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are granted.

Persons whose applications for family reunification are granted may bring with them or ship their household and personal effects; to this end the participating States will use all possibilities provided by existing regulations.

Until members of the same family are reunited meetings and contacts between them may take place in accordance with the modalities for contacts on the basis of family ties.

The participating States will support the efforts of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies concerned with the problems of family reunification.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning family reunification will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

The receiving participating State will take appropriate care with regard to employment for persons from other participating States who take up permanent residence in that State in connexion with family reunification with its citizens and see that they are afforded opportunities equal to those enjoyed by its own citizens for education, medical assistance and social security.

(c) Marriage between Citizens of Different States

The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.

The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family reunification.

In dealing with requests from couples from different participating States, once married, to enable them and the minor children of their marriage to transfer their permanent residence to a State in which either one is normally a resident, the participating States will also apply the provisions accepted for family reunification.

(d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons and to this end they intend in particular:

—gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry;

—to ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from the other participating States in their territory, with due regard to security requirements.

They will endeavour gradually to lower, where necessary, the fees for visas and official travel documents.

They intend to consider, as necessary, means—including, in so far as appropriate, the conclusion of multilateral or bilateral consular conventions or other relevant agreements or understandings—for the improvement of arrangements to provide consular assistance.

* * *

They confirm that religious faiths, institutions and organizations, practising within the constitutional framework of the participating States, and their representatives can, in the field of their activities, have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.

(e) Improvement of Conditions for Tourism on an Individual or Collective Basis

The participating States consider that tourism con-

tributes to a fuller knowledge of the life, culture and history of other countries, to the growth of understanding among peoples, to the improvement of contacts and to the broader use of leisure. They intend to promote the development of tourism, on an individual or collective basis, and, in particular, they intend:

—to promote visits to their respective countries by encouraging the provision of appropriate facilities and the simplification and expediting of necessary formalities relating to such visits;

—to increase, on the basis of appropriate agreements or arrangements where necessary, co-operation in the development of tourism, in particular by considering bilaterally possible ways to increase information relating to travel to other countries and to the reception and service of tourists, and other related questions of mutual interest.

(f) Meetings among Young People

The participating States intend to further the development of contacts and exchanges among young people by encouraging:

—increased exchanges and contacts on a short or long term basis among young people working, training or undergoing education through bilateral or multilateral agreements or regular programmes in all cases where it is possible;

—study by their youth organizations of the question of possible agreements relating to frameworks of multilateral youth co-operation;

—agreements or regular programmes relating to the organization of exchanges of students, of international youth seminars, of courses of professional training and foreign language study;

—the further development of youth tourism and the provision to this end of appropriate facilities;

—the development, where possible, of exchanges, contacts and co-operation on a bilateral or multilateral basis between their organizations which represent wide circles of young people working, training or undergoing education;

—awareness among youth of the importance of developing mutual understanding and of strengthening friendly relations and confidence among peoples.

(g) Sport

In order to expand existing links and co-operation in the field of sport the participating States will encourage contacts and exchanges of this kind, including sports meetings and competitions of all sorts, on the basis of the established international rules, regulations and practice.

(h) Expansion of Contacts

By way of further developing contacts among governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations and associations, including women's organizations, the participating States will facilitate the convening of meetings as well as travel by delegations, groups and individuals.

2. Information

The participating States,

Conscious of the need for an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating States,

Acknowledging the contribution of this process to the growth of confidence between peoples,

Desiring, with the development of mutual understanding between the participating States and with the further improvement of their relations, to continue further efforts towards progress in this field,

Recognizing the importance of the dissemination of information from the other participating States and of a better acquaintance with such information,

Emphasizing therefore the essential and influential role of the press, radio, television, cinema and news agencies and of the journalists working in these fields,

Make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, and

Express their intention in particular:

(a) Improvement of the Circulation of, Access to, and Exchange of Information

(i) *Oral Information*

—To facilitate the dissemination of oral information through the encouragement of lectures and lecture tours by personalities and specialists from the other participating States, as well as exchanges of opinions at round table meetings, seminars, symposia, summer schools, congresses and other bilateral and multilateral meetings.

(ii) *Printed Information*

—To facilitate the improvement of the dissemination, on their territory, of newspapers and printed publications, periodical and non-periodical, from the other participating States. For this purpose:

they will encourage their competent firms and organizations to conclude agreements and contracts designed gradually to increase the quantities and the number of titles of newspapers and publications imported from the other participating States. These agreements and contracts should in particular mention the speediest conditions of delivery and the use of the normal channels existing in each country for the distribution of its own publications and newspapers, as well as forms and means of payment agreed between the parties making it possible to achieve the objectives aimed at by these agreements and contracts;

where necessary, they will take appropriate measures to achieve the above objectives and to implement the provisions contained in the agreements and contracts.

—To contribute to the improvement of access by the public to periodical and non-periodical printed publications imported on the bases indicated above. In particular:

they will encourage an increase in the number of places where these publications are on sale;

they will facilitate the availability of these periodical publications during congresses, conferences, official visits and other international events and to tourists during the season;

they will develop the possibilities for taking out subscriptions according to the modalities particular to each country;

they will improve the opportunities for reading and borrowing these publications in large public libraries and their reading rooms as well as in university libraries.

They intend to improve the possibilities for acquaintance with bulletins of official information issued by diplomatic missions and distributed by those missions on the basis of arrangements acceptable to the interested parties.

(iii) *Filmed and Broadcast Information*

—To promote the improvement of the dissemination of filmed and broadcast information. To this end:

they will encourage the wider showing and broadcasting of a greater variety of recorded and filmed information from the other participating States, illustrating the various aspects of life in their countries and received on the basis of such agreements or arrangements as may be necessary between the organizations and firms directly concerned;

they will facilitate the import by competent organizations and firms of recorded audio-visual material from the other participating States.

The participating States note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of this process, so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference.

(b) Co-operation in the Field of Information

—To encourage co-operation in the field of information on the basis of short or long term agreements or arrangements. In particular:

they will favour increased co-operation among mass media organizations, including press agencies, as well as among publishing houses and organizations;

they will favour co-operation among public or private, national or international radio and television organizations, in particular through the exchange of both live and recorded radio and television programmes, and through the joint production and the broadcasting and distribution of such programmes;

they will encourage meetings and contacts both between journalists' organizations and between journalists from the participating States;

they will view favourably the possibilities of arrangements between periodical publications as well as between newspapers from the participating States, for the purpose of exchanging and publishing articles;

they will encourage the exchange of technical information as well as the organization of joint research and meetings devoted to the exchange of experience and views between experts in the field of the press, radio and television.

(c) Improvement of Working Conditions for Journalists

The participating States, desiring to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, intend in particular to:

—examine in a favourable spirit and within a suitable and reasonable time scale requests from journalists for visas;

—grant to permanently accredited journalists of the participating States, on the basis of arrangements, multiple entry and exit visas for specified periods;

—facilitate the issue to accredited journalists of the participating States of permits for stay in their country of temporary residence and, if and when these are necessary, of other official papers which it is appropriate for them to have;

—ease, on a basis of reciprocity, procedures for arranging travel by journalists of the participating States in the country where they are exercising their profession, and to provide progressively greater opportunities for such travel, subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons;

—ensure that requests by such journalists for such travel receive, in so far as possible, an expeditious response, taking into account the time scale of the request;

—increase the opportunities for journalists of the participating States to communicate personally with their sources, including organizations and official institutions;

—grant to journalists of the participating States the right to import, subject only to its being taken out again, the technical equipment (photographic, cinematographic, tape recorder, radio and television) necessary for the exercise of their profession;*

—enable journalists of the other participating States, whether permanently or temporarily accredited, to transmit completely, normally and rapidly by means recognized by the participating States to the information organs which they represent, the results of their professional activity, including tape recordings and undeveloped film, for the purpose of publication or of broadcasting on the radio or television.

The participating States reaffirm that the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor otherwise penalize them. If an accredited journalist is expelled, he will be informed of the reasons for this act and may submit an application for reexamination of his case.

---

*While recognizing that appropriate local personnel are employed by foreign journalists in many instances, the participating States note that the above provisions would be applied, subject to the observance of the appropriate rules, to persons from the other participating States, who are regularly and professionally engaged as technicians, photographers or cameramen of the press, radio, television or cinema. [Footnote in original.]

3. Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture

The participating States,

Considering that cultural exchanges and co-operation contribute to a better comprehension among people and among peoples, and thus promote a lasting understanding among States,

Confirming the conclusions already formulated in this field at the multilateral level, particularly at the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe, organized by UNESCO in Helsinki in June 1972, where interest was manifested in the active participation of the broadest possible social groups in an increasingly diversified cultural life,

Desiring, with the development of mutual confidence and the further improvement of relations between the participating States, to continue further efforts toward progress in this field,

Disposed in this spirit to increase substantially their cultural exchanges, with regard both to persons and to cultural works, and to develop among them an active co-operation, both at the bilateral and the multilateral level, in all the fields of culture,

Convinced that such a development of their mutual relations will contribute to the enrichment of the respective cultures, while respecting the originality of each, as well as to the reinforcement among them of a consciousness of common values, while continuing to develop cultural co-operation with other countries of the world,

Declare that they jointly set themselves the following objectives:

(a) to develop the mutual exchange of information with a view to a better knowledge of respective cultural achievements,

(b) to improve the facilities for the exchange and for the dissemination of cultural property,

(c) to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements,

(d) to develop contacts and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture,

(e) to seek new fields and forms of cultural co-operation,

Thus *give expression to* their common will to take progressive, coherent and long-term action in order to achieve the objectives of the present declaration; and

Express their intention now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

Extension of Relations

To expand and improve at the various levels co-operation and links in the field of culture, in particular by:

—concluding, where appropriate, agreements on a bilateral or multilateral basis, providing for the extension of relations among competent State institutions and non-governmental organizations in the field of culture, as well as among people engaged in cultural activities, taking into account the need both for flexibility and the fullest possible use of existing agreements, and bearing in mind that agreements and also other arrangements constitute important means of developing cultural co-operation and exchanges;

—contributing to the development of direct communication and co-operation among relevant State institutions and non-governmental organizations, including, where necessary, such communication and co-operation carried out on the basis of special agreements and arrangements;

—encouraging direct contacts and communications among persons engaged in cultural activities, including, where necessary, such contacts and communications carried out on the basis of special agreements and arrangements.

Mutual Knowledge

Within their competence to adopt, on a bilateral and multilateral level, appropriate measures which would give their peoples a more comprehensive and complete mutual knowledge of their achievements in the various fields of culture, and among them:

—to examine jointly, if necessary with the assistance of appropriate international organizations, the possible creation in Europe and the structure of a bank of cultural data, which would collect information from the participating countries and make it available to its correspondents on their request, and to convene for this purpose a meeting of experts from interested States;

—to consider, if necessary in conjunction with appropriate international organizations, ways of compiling in Europe an inventory of documentary films of a cultural or scientific nature from the participating States;

—to encourage more frequent book exhibitions and to examine the possibility of organizing periodically in Europe a large-scale exhibition of books from the participating States;

—to promote the systematic exchange, between the institutions concerned and publishing houses, of catalogues of available books as well as of pre-publication material which will include, as far as possible, all forthcoming publications; and also to promote the exchange of material between firms publishing encyclopaedias, with a view to improving the presentation of each country;

—to examine jointly questions of expanding and improving exchanges of information in the various fields of culture, such as theatre, music, library work as well as the conservation and restoration of cultural property.

Exchanges and Dissemination

To contribute to the improvement of facilities for exchanges and the dissemination of cultural property, by appropriate means, in particular by:

—studying the possibilities for harmonizing and reducing the charges relating to international commercial exchanges of books and other cultural materials, and also for new means of insuring works of art in foreign exhibitions and for reducing the risks of damage or loss to which these works are exposed by their movement;

—facilitating the formalities of customs clearance, in good time for programmes of artistic events, of the works of art, materials and accessories appearing on lists agreed upon by the organizers of these events;

—encouraging meetings among representatives of

competent organizations and relevant firms to examine measures within their field of activity—such as the simplification of orders, time limits for sending supplies and modalities of payment—which might facilitate international commercial exchanges of books;

—promoting the loan and exchange of films among their film institutes and film libraries;

—encouraging the exchange of information among interested parties concerning events of a cultural character foreseen in the participating States, in fields where this is most appropriate, such as music, theatre and the plastic and graphic arts, with a view to contributing to the compilation and publication of a calendar of such events, with the assistance, where necessary, of the appropriate international organizations;

—encouraging a study of the impact which the foreseeable development, and a possible harmonization among interested parties, of the technical means used for the dissemination of culture might have on the development of cultural co-operation and exchanges, while keeping in view the preservation of the diversity and originality of their respective cultures;

—encouraging, in the way they deem appropriate, within their cultural policies, the further development of interest in the cultural heritage of the other participating States, conscious of the merits and the value of each culture;

—endeavouring to ensure the full and effective application of the international agreements and conventions on copyrights and on circulation of cultural property to which they are party or to which they may decide in the future to become party.

Access

To promote fuller mutual access by all to the achievements—works, experiences and performing arts—in the various fields of culture of their countries, and to that end to make the best possible efforts, in accordance with their competence, more particularly:

—to promote wider dissemination of books and artistic works, in particular by such means as:

facilitating, while taking full account of the international copyright conventions to which they are party, international contacts and communications between authors and publishing houses as well as other cultural institutions, with a view to a more complete mutual access to cultural achievements;

recommending that, in determining the size of editions, publishing houses take into account also the demand from the other participating States, and that rights of sale in other participating States be granted, where possible, to several sales organizations of the importing countries, by agreement between interested partners;

encouraging competent organizations and relevant firms to conclude agreements and contracts and contributing, by this means, to a gradual increase in the number and diversity of works by authors from the other participating States available in the original and in translation in their libraries and bookshops;

promoting, where deemed appropriate, an increase in the number of sales outlets where books by authors from the other participating States, imported in the original on the basis of agreements and contracts, and in translation, are for sale;

promoting, on a wider scale, the translation of works in the sphere of literature and other fields of cultural activity, produced in the languages of the other participating States, especially from the less widely-spoken languages, and the publication and dissemination of the translated works by such measures as:

encouraging more regular contacts between interested publishing houses;

developing their efforts in the basic and advanced training of translators;

encouraging, by appropriate means, the publishing houses of their countries to publish translations;

facilitating the exchange between publishers and interested institutions of lists of books which might be translated;

promoting between their countries the professional activity and co-operation of translators;

carrying out joint studies on ways of further promoting translations and their dissemination;

improving and expanding exchanges of books, bibliographies and catalogue cards between libraries;

—to envisage other appropriate measures which would permit, where necessary by mutual agreement among interested parties, the facilitation of access to their respective cultural achievements, in particular in the field of books;

—to contribute by appropriate means to the wider use of the mass media in order to improve mutual acquaintance with the cultural life of each;

—to seek to develop the necessary conditions for migrant workers and their families to preserve their links with their national culture, and also to adapt themselves to their new cultural environment;

—to encourage the competent bodies and enterprises to make a wider choice and effect wider distribution of full-length and documentary films from the other participating States, and to promote more frequent non-commercial showings, such as premières, film weeks and festivals, giving due consideration to films from countries whose cinematographic works are less well known;

—to promote, by appropriate means, the extension of opportunities for specialists from the other participating States to work with materials of a cultural character from film and audio-visual archives, within the framework of the existing rules for work on such archival materials;

—to encourage a joint study by interested bodies, where appropriate with the assistance of the competent international organizations, of the expediency and the conditions for the establishment of a repertory of their recorded television programmes of a cultural nature, as well as of the means of viewing them rapidly in order to facilitate their selection and possible acquisition.

Contacts and Co-operation

To contribute, by appropriate means, to the development of contacts and co-operation in the various fields of culture, especially among creative artists

and people engaged in cultural activities, in particular by making efforts to:

—promote for persons active in the field of culture, travel and meetings including, where necessary, those carried out on the basis of agreements, contracts or other special arrangements and which are relevant to their cultural co-operation;

—encourage in this way contacts among creative and performing artists and artistic groups with a view to their working together, making known their works in other participating States or exchanging views on topics relevant to their common activity;

—encourage, where necessary through appropriate arrangements, exchanges of trainees and specialists and the granting of scholarships for basic and advanced training in various fields of culture such as the arts and architecture, museums and libraries, literary studies and translation, and contribute to the creation of favourable conditions of reception in their respective institutions;

—encourage the exchange of experience in the training of organizers of cultural activities as well as of teachers and specialists in fields such as theatre, opera, ballet, music and fine arts;

—continue to encourage the organization of international meetings among creative artists, especially young creative artists, on current questions of artistic and literary creation which are of interest for joint study;

—study other possibilities for developing exchanges and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture, with a view to a better mutual knowledge of the cultural life of the participating States.

Fields and Forms of Co-operation

To encourage the search for new fields and forms of cultural co-operation, to these ends contributing to the conclusion among interested parties, where necessary, of appropriate agreements and arrangements, and in this context to promote:

—joint studies regarding cultural policies, in particular in their social aspects, and as they relate to planning, town-planning, educational and environmental policies, and the cultural aspects of tourism;

—the exchange of knowledge in the realm of cultural diversity, with a view to contributing thus to a better understanding by interested parties of such diversity where it occurs;

—the exchange of information, and as may be appropriate, meetings of experts, the elaboration and the execution of research programmes and projects, as well as their joint evaluation, and the dissemination of the results, on the subjects indicated above;

—such forms of cultural co-operation and the development of such joint projects as:

international events in the fields of the plastic and graphic arts, cinema, theatre, ballet, music, folklore, etc.; book fairs and exhibitions, joint performances of operatic and dramatic works, as well as performances given by soloists, instrumental ensembles, orchestras, choirs and other artistic groups, including those composed of amateurs, paying due attention to the organization of international cultural youth events and the exchange of young artists;

the inclusion of works by writers and composers from the other participating States in the repertoires of soloists and artistic ensembles;

the preparation, translation and publication of articles, studies and monographs, as well as of low-cost books and of artistic and literary collections, suited to making better known respective cultural achievements, envisaging for this purpose meetings among experts and representatives of publishing houses;

the co-production and the exchange of films and of radio and television programmes, by promoting, in particular, meetings among producers, technicians and representatives of the public authorities with a view to working out favourable conditions for the execution of specific joint projects and by encouraging, in the field of co-production, the establishment of international filming teams;

the organization of competitions for architects and town-planners, bearing in mind the possible implementation of the best projects and the formation, where possible, of international teams;

the implementation of joint projects for conserving, restoring and showing to advantage works of art, historical and archaeological monuments and sites of cultural interest, with the help, in appropriate cases, of international organizations of a governmental or non-governmental character as well as of private institutions—competent and active in these fields—envisaging for this purpose:

periodic meetings of experts of the interested parties to elaborate the necessary proposals, while bearing in mind the need to consider these questions in a wider social and economic context;

the publication in appropriate periodicals of articles designed to make known and to compare, among the participating States, the most significant achievements and innovations;

a joint study with a view to the improvement and possible harmonization of the different systems used to inventory and catalogue the historical monuments and places of cultural interest in their countries;

the study of the possibilities for organizing international courses for the training of specialists in different disciplines relating to restoration.

* * *

National minorities or regional cultures. The participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to co-operation among them in various fields of culture, intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members.

4. Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Education

The participating States,

Conscious that the development of relations of an international character in the fields of education and science contributes to a better mutual understanding and is to the advantage of all peoples as well as to the benefit of future generations,

Prepared to facilitate, between organizations, institutions and persons engaged in education and science, the further development of exchanges of

knowledge and experience as well as of contacts, on the basis of special arrangements where these are necessary,

Desiring to strengthen the links among educational and scientific establishments and also to encourage their co-operation in sectors of common interest, particularly where the levels of knowledge and resources require efforts to be concerted internationally, and

Convinced that progress in these fields should be accompanied and supported by a wider knowledge of foreign languages,

Express to these ends their intention in particular:

(a) Extension of Relations

To expand and improve at the various levels co-operation and links in the fields of education and science, in particular by:

—concluding, where appropriate, bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for co-operation and exchanges among State institutions, non-governmental bodies and persons engaged in activities in education and science, bearing in mind the need both for flexibility and the fuller use of existing agreements and arrangements;

—promoting the conclusion of direct arrangements between universities and other institutions of higher education and research, in the framework of agreements between governments where appropriate;

—encouraging among persons engaged in education and science direct contacts and communications, including those based on special agreements or arrangements where these are appropriate.

(b) Access and Exchanges

To improve access, under mutually acceptable conditions, for students, teachers and scholars of the participating States to each other's educational, cultural and scientific institutions, and to intensify exchanges among these institutions in all areas of common interest, in particular by:

—increasing the exchange of information on facilities for study and courses open to foreign participants, as well as on the conditions under which they will be admitted and received;

—facilitating travel between the participating States by scholars, teachers and students for purposes of study, teaching and research as well as for improving knowledge of each other's educational, cultural and scientific achievements;

—encouraging the award of scholarships for study, teaching and research in their countries to scholars, teachers and students of other participating States;

—establishing, developing or encouraging programmes providing for the broader exchange of scholars, teachers and students, including the organization of symposia, seminars and collaborative projects, and the exchanges of educational and scholarly information such as university publications and materials from libraries;

—promoting the efficient implementation of such arrangements and programmes by providing scholars, teachers and students in good time with more detailed information about their placing in universities and institutes and the programmes envisaged for them; by granting them the opportunity to use relevant scholarly, scientific and open archival materials; and by facilitating their travel within the receiving State for the purpose of study or research as well as in the form of vacation tours on the basis of the usual procedures;

—promoting a more exact assessment of the problems of comparison and equivalence of academic degrees and diplomas by fostering the exchange of information on the organization, duration and content of studies, the comparison of methods of assessing levels of knowledge and academic qualifications, and, where feasible, arriving at the mutual recognition of academic degrees and diplomas either through governmental agreements, where necessary, or direct arrangements between universities and other institutions of higher learning and research;

—recommending, moreover, to the appropriate international organizations that they should intensify their efforts to reach a generally acceptable solution to the problems of comparison and equivalence between academic degrees and diplomas.

(c) Science

Within their competence to broaden and improve co-operation and exchanges in the field of science, in particular:

To increase, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the exchange and dissemination of scientific information and documentation by such means as:

—making this information more widely available to scientists and research workers of the other participating States through, for instance, participation in international information-sharing programmes or through other appropriate arrangements;

—broadening and facilitating the exchange of samples and other scientific materials used particularly for fundamental research in the fields of natural sciences and medicine;

—inviting scientific institutions and universities to keep each other more fully and regularly informed about their current and contemplated research work in fields of common interest.

To facilitate the extension of communications and direct contacts between universities, scientific institutions and associations as well as among scientists and research workers, including those based where necessary on special agreements or arrangements, by such means as:

—further developing exchanges of scientists and research workers and encouraging the organization of preparatory meetings or working groups on research topics of common interest;

—encouraging the creation of joint teams of scientists to pursue research projects under arrangements made by the scientific institutions of several countries;

—assisting the organization and successful functioning of international conferences and seminars and participation in them by their scientists and research workers;

—furthermore envisaging, in the near future, a "Scientific Forum" in the form of a meeting of leading personalities in science from the participat-

ing States to discuss interrelated problems of common interest concerning current and future developments in science, and to promote the expansion of contacts, communications and the exchange of information between scientific institutions and among scientists;

—foreseeing, at an early date, a meeting of experts representing the participating States and their national scientific institutions, in order to prepare such a "Scientific Forum" in consultation with appropriate international organizations, such as UNESCO and the ECE;

—considering in due course what further steps might be taken with respect to the "Scientific Forum".

To develop in the field of scientific research, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the co-ordination of programmes carried out in the participating States and the organization of joint programmes, especially in the areas mentioned below, which may involve the combined efforts of scientists and in certain cases the use of costly or unique equipment. The list of subjects in these areas is illustrative; and specific projects would have to be determined subsequently by the potential partners in the participating States, taking account of the contribution which could be made by appropriate international organizations and scientific institutions:

—*exact and natural sciences*, in particular fundamental research in such fields as mathematics, physics, theoretical physics, geophysics, chemistry, biology, ecology and astronomy;

—*medicine*, in particular basic research into cancer and cardiovascular diseases, studies on the diseases endemic in the developing countries, as well as medico-social research with special emphasis on occupational diseases, the rehabilitation of the handicapped and the care of mothers, children and the elderly;

—*the humanities and social sciences*, such as history, geography, philosophy, psychology, pedagogical research, linguistics, sociology, the legal, political and economic sciences; comparative studies on social, socio-economic and cultural phenomena which are of common interest to the participating States, especially the problems of human environment and urban development; and scientific studies on the methods of conserving and restoring monuments and works of art.

(d) Foreign Languages and Civilizations

To encourage the study of foreign languages and civilizations as an important means of expanding communication among peoples for their better acquaintance with the culture of each country, as well as for the strengthening of international co-operation; to this end to stimulate, within their competence, the further development and improvement of foreign language teaching and the diversification of choice of languages taught at various levels, paying due attention to less widely-spread or studied languages, and in particular:

—to intensify co-operation aimed at improving the teaching of foreign languages through exchanges of information and experience concerning the development and application of effective modern teaching methods and technical aids, adapted to the needs of different catagories of students, including methods of accelerated teaching; and to consider the possibility of conducting, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, studies of new methods of foreign language teaching;

—to encourage co-operation between institutions concerned, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, aimed at exploiting more fully the resources of modern educational technology in language teaching, for example through comparative studies by their specialists and, where agreed, through exchanges or transfers of audio-visual materials, of materials used for preparing textbooks, as well as of information about new types of technical equipment used for teaching languages;

—to promote the exchange of information on the experience acquired in the training of language teachers and to intensify exchanges on a bilateral basis of language teachers and students as well as to facilitate their participation in summer courses in languages and civilizations, wherever these are organized;

—to encourage co-operation among experts in the field of lexicography with the aim of defining the necessary terminological equivalents, particularly in the scientific and technical disciplines, in order to facilitate relations among scientific institutions and specialists;

—to promote the wider spread of foreign language study among the different types of secondary education establishments and greater possibilities of choice between an increased number of European languages; and in this context to consider, wherever appropriate, the possibilities for developing the recruitment and training of teachers as well as the organization of the student groups required;

—to favour, in higher education, a wider choice in the languages offered to language students and greater opportunities for other students to study various foreign languages; also to facilitate, where desirable, the organization of courses in languages and civilizations, on the basis of special arrangements as necessary, to be given by foreign lecturers, particularly from European countries having less widely-spread or studied languages;

—to promote, within the framework of adult education, the further development of specialized programmes, adapted to various needs and interests, for teaching foreign languages to their own inhabitants and the languages of host countries to interested adults from other countries; in this context to encourage interested institutions to co-operate, for example, in the elaboration of programmes for teaching by radio and television and by accelerated methods, and also, where desirable, in the definition of study objectives for such programmes, with a view to arriving at comparable levels of language proficiency;

—to encourage the association, where appropriate, of the teaching of foreign languages with the study of the corresponding civilizations and also to make further efforts to stimulate interest in the study of foreign languages, including relevant out-of-class activities.

(e) Teaching Methods

To promote the exchange of experience, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in teaching methods at

all levels of education, including those used in permanent and adult education, as well as the exchange of teaching materials, in particular by:

—further developing various forms of contacts and co-operation in the different fields of pedagogical science, for example through comparative or joint studies carried out by interested institutions or through exchanges of information on the results of teaching experiments;

—intensifying exchanges of information on teaching methods used in various educational systems and on results of research into the processes by which pupils and students acquire knowledge, taking account of relevant experience in different types of specialized education;

—facilitating exchanges of experience concerning the organization and functioning of education intended for adults and recurrent education, the relationships between these and other forms and levels of education, as well as concerning the means of adapting education, including vocational and technical training, to the needs of economic and social development in their countries;

—encouraging exchanges of experience in the education of youth and adults in international understanding, with particular reference to those major problems of mankind whose solution calls for a common approach and wider international co-operation;

—encouraging exchanges of teaching materials—including school textbooks, having in mind the possibility of promoting mutual knowledge and facilitating the presentation of each country in such books—as well as exchanges of information on technical innovations in the field of education.

* * *

National minorities or regional cultures. The participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to co-operation among them in various fields of education, intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members.

FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

The participating States,

Having considered and evaluated the progress made at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

Considering further that, within the broader context of the world, the Conference is an important part of the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe and that its results will contribute significantly to this process,

Intending to implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference in order to give full effect to its results and thus to further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe,

Convinced that, in order to achieve the aims sought by the Conference, they should make further unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts and continue, in the appropriate forms set forth below, the multilateral process initiated by the Conference,

1. *Declare their resolve,* in the period following the Conference, to pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference:

(a) unilaterally, in all cases which lend themselves to such action;

(b) bilaterally, by negotiations with other participating States;

(c) multilaterally, by meetings of experts of the participating States, and also within the framework of existing international organizations, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO, with regard to educational, scientific and cultural co-operation;

2. *Declare furthermore their resolve* to continue the multilateral process initiated by the Conference:

(a) by proceeding to a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the development of the process of détente in the future;

(b) by organizing to these ends meetings among their representatives, beginning with a meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This meeting will define the appropriate modalities for the holding of other meetings which could include further similar meetings and the possibility of a new Conference;

3. The first of the meetings indicated above will be held at Belgrade in 1977. A preparatory meeting to organize this meeting will be held at Belgrade on 15 June 1977. The preparatory meeting will decide on the date, duration, agenda and other modalities of the meeting of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

4. The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses of the Conference will, *mutatis mutandis,* be applied to the meetings envisaged in paragraphs 1 (c), 2 and 3 above. All the above-mentioned meetings will be held in the participating States in rotation. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

The original of this Final Act, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, will be transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Finland, which will retain it in its archives. Each of the participating States will receive from the Government of the Republic of Finland a true copy of this Final Act.

The text of this Final Act will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

The Government of the Republic of Finland is requested to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the text of this Final Act, which is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view

to its circulation to all the members of the Organization as an official document of the United Nations.[1]

The Government of the Republic of Finland is also requested to transmit the text of this Final Act to the Director-General of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Wherefore, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance which they attach to the results of the Conference, and declaring their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts, have subscribed their signatures below:[2]

The Federal Republic of Germany:
HELMUT SCHMIDT, *Federal Chancellor*

The German Democratic Republic:
ERICH HONECKER, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany*

The United States of America:
GERALD R. FORD, *President of the United States of America*

The Republic of Austria:
BRUNO KREISKY, *Federal Chancellor*

The Kingdom of Belgium:
LEO TINDEMANS, *Prime Minister*

The People's Republic of Bulgaria:
TODOR JIVKOV, *First Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria and President of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria*

Canada:
PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, *Prime Minister*

The Republic of Cyprus:
His Beatitude Archbishop MAKARIOS III, *President of the Republic of Cyprus*

Denmark:
ANKER JORGENSEN, *Prime Minister*

Spain:
CARLOS ARIAS NAVARRO, *Head of the Government*

The Republic of Finland:
URHO KEKKONEN, *President of the Republic*

The French Republic:
VALÉRY GISCARD D'ESTAING

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
The Rt. Hon. HAROLD WILSON, O.B.E., M.P., F.R.S., *First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*

The Hellenic Republic:
CONSTANTIN CARAMANLIS, *Prime Minister*

The Hungarian People's Republic:
JANOS KADAR, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Member of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic*

Ireland:
LIAM COSGRAVE, *Prime Minister*

Iceland:
GEIR HALLGRIMSSON, *Prime Minister*

The Italian Republic:
ALDO MORO, *Prime Minister of the Italian Republic and in his capacity as President in office of the Council of the European Communities*

The Principality of Liechtenstein:
WALTER KIEBER, *Head of Government*

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
GASTON THORN, *Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs*

The Republic of Malta:
DOM MINTOFF, *Prime Minister, Minister for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs*

The Principality of Monaco:
ANDRE SAINT-MLEUX, *Minister of State, President of the Government Council, Representing H.S.H. the Prince of Monaco*

Norway:
TRYGVE BRATTELI, *Prime Minister*

The Kingdom of the Netherlands:
J.M. DEN UYL, *Prime Minister*

Polish People's Republic:
EDWARD GIEREK, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Worker's Party*

Portugal:
FRANCISCO DA COSTA GOMES, *President of the Republic*

The Socialist Republic of Romania:
NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, *President of the Socialist Republic of Romania*

---

[1] Journal no. 80/*bis* of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, July 18, 1975, reported that the delegate of Finland had on that day informed the committee of the intention of his government to send the following letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

"SIR, I have the honour to inform you that the High Representatives of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have requested the Government of the Republic of Finland to transmit to you the text of the Final Act of the Conference signed at Helsinki on [1 August 1975].

"I have also been asked to request you, Mr. Secretary General, to arrange for the circulation of this Final Act to Member States of the Organization as an official document of the United Nations, and to draw your attention to the fact that this Final Act is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement, under the aforesaid Article.

"Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration."

[2] The final act was signed in alphabetical order according to the French spelling of the names of the countries.

San Marino:
GIAN LUIGI BERTI, *Secretary of State for Foreign and Political Affairs*

The Holy See:
Son Excellence Monseigneur AGOSTINO CASAROLI, *Secretary of the Council for Church Public Affairs, Special Delegate of His Holiness Pope Paul VI*

Sweden:
OLOF PALME, *Prime Minister*

The Swiss Confederation:
PIERRE GRABER, *President of the Confederation, Head of the Federal Political Department*

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:
GUSTAV HUSAK, *Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic*

The Republic of Turkey:
SULEYMAN DEMIREL, *Prime Minister*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
L. BREJNEV, *General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU*

The Socialist Federal Republic of Jugoslavia:
JOSIP BROZ TITO, *President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Jugoslavia*

Reprinted from *The Department of State Bulletin* of September 1, 1975.

The Department of State

Special Report

No. 43
June 1978

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication

The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

October 4, 1977—March 9, 1978

CONTENTS

Summary 3
Introduction 5
The CSCE and Belgrade 6
The CSCE Process 6
U.S. Objectives at Belgrade 7
The Summer Preparatory Meeting 9
Working Procedures at Belgrade 10
Basket One: Questions Relating to Security in Europe 11
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States 11
Human Rights 12
Principle Six versus Principle Seven 13
Other Principles 13
New Proposals 14
Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament 15
Review of Implementation 16
New Proposals 17
Basket Two: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment 20
Review of Implementation 20
New Proposals 22
Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean 28
Basket Three: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields 24
Human Contacts 24
Information 25
Culture and Education 26
New Proposals 28
Followup to the Conference 29
Negotiation of the Concluding Document 31
Conclusions 34
Appendix: Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 35

Summary

This report presents an overview of the major goals and accomplishments of the Belgrade followup meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This meeting provided CSCE states the first opportunity to conduct a full, joint review of progress in implementing the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, signed by 35 heads of state at Helsinki on August 1, 1975. The Belgrade meeting was not primarily a negotiation and did not look toward a revision of the Helsinki Final Act. Its major task was to conduct an exchange of views on the CSCE implementation record of the last 2 years and to examine means of improving implementation in the future.

Because the CSCE is a process involving 35 sovereign states, views of implementation progress and shortcomings varied at Belgrade. While all states had made some efforts to meet their commitments and no country's record could be regarded as perfect, the Western and many of the neutral/nonaligned states viewed the record of the Soviet Union and its allies with particular concern. Many Eastern countries had since Helsinki sought to advance procedural arguments and interpretations clearly aimed at diminishing the full obligation of important CSCE comments, and the rate of Eastern implementation remained slow or had in some cases even deteriorated.

This was particularly evident in the human rights area where in the year prior to Belgrade a number of Eastern governments, but particularly the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, reacted to human rights activists in their countries in a manner contrary to the letter and spirit of Helsinki. Such actions determined that human rights would be an important agenda item at Belgrade and that the meeting would be a watershed for establishing precedents to the future course of the CSCE. Together with other Western and neutral/nonaligned states, the United States believed it important to conduct an implementation review which would uphold the accountability of all states in fulfilling commitments jointly agreed upon and which would make clear that words cannot substitute for deeds in making the CSCE process a success.

The implementation review conducted by the West and supported by many of the neutral/nonaligned states spanned all three baskets of the Final Act but emphasized in particular the areas where Eastern implementation had been poorest: specifically, the human rights provisions of Basket One and the human contacts and information provisions of Basket Three. The United States raised such matters as the arrest and harassment of the Helsinki monitoring groups in the Soviet Union and Charter '77 signers in Czechoslovakia, as well as issues relating to religious freedom, family reunification, freedom of personal and professional travel, working conditions for journalists, scientists, and businessmen, and exchange of informational and cultural materials. Among the most important accomplishments of the review was demonstration that:

- Full CSCE implementation is essential to the successful development of detente;
- Human rights and humanitarian issues are an integral aspect of CSCE as well as of detente;
- Individual states will be held accountable for their implementation performance in all aspects of the Final Act;
- The United States will not hesitate to point out specific examples of implementation failures;
- The invocation of the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs will not deflect legitimate criticism of a country's implementation record.

The review of implementation was the major objective of the United States at Belgrade. Nonetheless, like other Western and neutral/nonaligned countries, the United States also hoped that the Belgrade meeting would build upon the Final Act by adopting certain new measures to promote CSCE objectives and enhance Final Act implementation. The United

States tabled and supported proposals to this end in all baskets of the Final Act and worked assiduously to gain their acceptance by other participating states. The ideas submitted or supported by the United States included:

- a proposal recognizing that institutions, organizations and individuals have a right to assist governments in promoting and monitoring CSCE implementation;
- a proposal calling upon all signatories to improve implementation of the human rights principle of Basket One;
- several proposals to facilitate procedures for emigration, family reunification, and personal travel between East and West; and
- several proposals to facilitate the free flow of information, the working conditions of journalists, scientists, and businessmen, and access to archives.

While Western states recognized even before Belgrade began that not all Western proposals were likely to be acceptable to the East, it was hoped that at least some initiatives would be incorporated in a substantive and balanced concluding document. The level of Eastern resistance to serious consideration of most Western and neutral/nonaligned proposals, however, soon indicated that there was little likelihood of obtaining such a text. The Soviet Union and its allies refused consensus to all substantive language pertaining to the human rights and the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act. Since Western negotiators considered it of primary importance that the concluding document reflect a balance among all sections of the Final Act, they could not accept Eastern texts which emphasized the security and economic aspects of detente while ignoring its human dimension.

Although the final document agreed upon did not incorporate any Western or Eastern new proposals, discussion of new proposals was not a needless exercise. Western proposals served as an additional means of showing Eastern states areas of particular Western concern and emphasizing in concrete fashion the points raised in the implementation review. In pointing out to Eastern states the issues vital to future CSCE implementation and likely to emerge again at Madrid, the West achieved one of its most important Belgrade objectives.

In addition, the concluding document includes several points of major importance to the West and the future of the CSCE. In particular, it:

- assures the continuation of the CSCE process through agreement to a further followup meeting in Madrid in 1980;
- affirms the resolve of all states to implement CSCE provisions fully—a commitment which clearly encompasses Eastern implementation of the human rights and humanitarian provisions;
- recognizes that CSCE implementation is essential for the development of detente; and
- recognizes tacitly the propriety of the review of implementation conducted by the West at Belgrade.

Because the CSCE is a long-term process, the influence of the Belgrade meeting cannot be judged in the short term or in isolation from the events which preceded and will follow it. Belgrade was an important but single step on the long road to full implementation of the pledges given at Helsinki. The United States is determined to continue along this road. While the CSCE is not the only element of detente, its particular importance is in the recognition it accords to the human dimension of the process. The Belgrade meeting reiterated to all signatory states the central fact that successful detente cannot be selective and that the problems of people as well as of power remain firmly on the East-West agenda.

Introduction

This report presents an overview of the major goals and accomplishments of the Belgrade followup meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Belgrade meeting convened in the Yugoslav capital on October 4, 1977 and continued, with interruption only by a winter holiday recess, until March 9, 1978. It provided CSCE states the first opportunity to conduct a full, joint review of progress in implementing the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, signed by 35 heads of state at Helsinki on August 1, 1975.

The mandate for the Belgrade meeting derived from the followup provisions—sometimes referred to as Basket Four—of the Helsinki Final Act. Under these provisions, the 35 participating states agreed to meet at Belgrade in 1977 in order to have a "thorough exchange of views" both on the implementation of the Final Act and on the development of cooperation and the process of detente in the future. The Belgrade meeting was thus not primarily a negotiation but rather an effort to review progress on commitments negotiated previously. The participating states recognized that the meeting could not alter or revise the Final Act, which had already been signed at the highest political level at Helsinki. They sought instead to enhance implementation of existing provisions by conducting a thorough review of the record and by considering new initiatives which might enhance implementation in the future.

The U.S. delegation to the Belgrade meeting was headed by the distinguished jurist and diplomat Arthur J. Goldberg, whom President Carter appointed as Chairman of the U.S. delegation and Ambassador-at-large for CSCE. Deputy chairmen of the delegation were Representative Dante Fascell of Florida, who is Chairman of the joint legislative-executive Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Ambassador Albert W. Sherer Jr., an experienced career diplomat who led the American delegation during negotiation of the Final Act. The Belgrade delegation also included all of the members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe plus members of the Commission staff,[1] a number of distinguished public members from business, academia, the labor movement, and other walks of life,[2] plus representatives of several Government departments and agencies, including the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense. The broad and high-level composition of the delegation thus reflected the importance which both the legislative and executive branches of Government as well as the American people attach to the CSCE process and its worthy objectives.

In preparing for the Belgrade meeting, the U.S. delegation called upon the resources of all relevant Government departments and heard the views of numerous private individuals and organizations with particular interest in the Final Act. Information derived from extensive

[1] The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe was created by Public Law 94-304, signed June 3, 1976. Chaired by Representative Dante B. Fascell of Florida and co-chaired by Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, the Commission is composed of six members of the Senate, six members of the House of Representatives and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. In addition to Representative Fascell and Senator Pell, the following were members of the CSCE Commission at the time of the Belgrade meeting and members of the U.S. delegation: Senators Dick Clark of Iowa, Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Richard Stone of Florida, Clifford Case of New Jersey, Robert Dole of Kansas; Representatives Sidney Yates of Illinois, Jonathan Bingham of New York, Paul Simon of Illinois, John H. Buchanan, Jr. of Alabama, Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey; executive branch members were Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian of the Department of State, Assistant Secretary David McGiffert of the Department of Defense, and Assistant Secretary Frank Weil of the Department of Commerce. Mr. R. Spencer Oliver, Staff Director and General Counsel of the Commission, and Mr. Alfred Friendly, Jr., Deputy Staff Director, were also delegation members together with others on the Commission staff.

[2] The public members and advisers to the U.S. delegation during the course of the Belgrade meeting included Mr. John Borbridge Jr., President, Sealaska Corporation; Mr. Jose Cabranes, Legal Adviser and Director of Government Relations, Yale University; Mr. Sol Chaikin, President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union; Professor David Filvaroff, University of Texas School of Law; Mr. John Lawrence Hargrove, Director of Studies, American Society of International Law; Reverend Monsignor George G. Higgens, Secretary for Research, National Conference of Catholic Bishops; Professor Joyce Hughes, Northwestern University School of Law; and Professor Andrzej Korbonski, Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles.

hearings conducted by the CSCE Commission and from several State Department meetings with nongovernmental organizations was made available to delegation members and assembled together with other material in comprehensive background papers on each section of the Final Act. The delegation received initial instructions approved personally by the President and during the course of the meeting operated under instructions from the Secretary of State, while maintaining close contact with the White House and the CSCE Commission. During the course of the meeting, the delegation also received—either directly or through the State Department and the CSCE Commission—hundreds of letters and appeals from individuals and private groups emphasizing the importance of the humanitarian and human rights provisions of the Final Act and often documenting examples of their nonimplementation. These letters served as a continuing reminder of the vital human dimension of the CSCE process and its direct relevance to the lives of people in both East and West. Some of the cases mentioned in these letters were cited in formal conference session by the U.S. delegation as evidence of how much remained to be done to fulfill the hopes raised at Helsinki.

The following chapters discuss the background to the Belgrade meeting and the major activities at Belgrade pertaining to each of the subject areas of CSCE concern. The chapters are based upon initial reports from the U.S. delegation and thus include contributions from members of the CSCE Commission and a number of Government departments and agencies. The report should provide interested readers with a detailed understanding of U.S. objectives at Belgrade and the context in which they were pursued.

The CSCE and Belgrade

THE CSCE PROCESS

The CSCE is a relatively recent venture in the history of East-West relations, and the Belgrade meeting, as its first followup conference, was thus largely without precedent. Although the idea of a European conference on security and cooperation had been proposed by the Soviet Union in as early as 1954, it was not until the early 1970's that the international climate gave promise of useful results. After the Warsaw Pact accepted certain Western pre-conditions, such as the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of September 3, 1971 and agreement to engage in talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe, multilateral preparatory discussions on the CSCE began in November 1972. The conference formally opened at the foreign minister level in July 1973 in Helsinki, where participants adopted an agenda and agreed on the basic rules of procedure to be followed. Work then shifted to Geneva where, between September 1973 and July 1975, delegations negotiated the text of a concluding document—the CSCE Final Act. This document was signed on August 1 at Helsinki by the national leaders of the United States, Canada, and 33 European states. President Ford signed for the United States.

The Final Act which emerged from the CSCE is a political statement of intent. It is neither a treaty nor a legally binding document, and there is no established mechanism for enforcement of its provisions. The Final Act does, however, carry considerable moral and political weight since it was signed at the highest level and presents the consensus view of all 35 participating states. The United States, both at Helsinki and subsequently, has emphasized that it attaches great importance to the full implementation of Final Act provisions by all participating states, and that the ultimate success of the CSCE depends upon the extent to which its promises are put into practice.

The Final Act is a lengthy document touch-

ing on almost all aspects of East-West relations. Because of the broad range of CSCE concerns, negotiators at Geneva organized their work into what came to be called "baskets," and the name has remained to identify the three main sections of the Final Act. These are:

- "Questions Relating to Security in Europe" (Basket One), a section consisting of two documents. The first, a "Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States," contains 10 principles by which states pledged to conduct their relations with one another. The second document relates to confidence-building measures designed to reduce military tensions in Europe and also touches on certain aspects of security and disarmament.
- "Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment" (Basket Two), a section which outlines ways of promoting commercial exchanges, industrial cooperation, and cooperation in several other fields such as scientific exchanges, protection of the environment, and promotion of tourism; and
- "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields" (Basket Three), a section which seeks to promote the freer movement of people, ideas, and information among participating states by facilitating travel, reunification of divided families, marriage between citizens of differing states, dissemination of information through books, newspapers, films, and radio, improved working conditions for journalists, and increased cultural and educational exchanges.

The Final Act also contains a section on followup (sometimes referred to as Basket Four) and a short section on cooperation in the Mediterranean area with certain littoral, non-CSCE states.

The Final Act is important not only because it expresses the common will of the 35 participating states to work together to overcome the barriers that have divided Europe for more than 3 decades. The unique quality of the Final Act is that it goes beyond general principles and formulates a program of specific steps in many fields which, if fully implemented, can produce tangible benefits for the peoples of East and West. During the CSCE negotiations, the Soviet Union and its allies sought to emphasize primarily the security aspects of detente, but Western negotiators insisted that the human dimension of the process must receive equal attention and prominence. Accordingly, the West succeeded in including a strong endorsement of classical human rights in Principle Seven of Basket One and a detailed exposition of practical East-West humanitarian concerns in Basket Three. In retrospect, these sections have proved to be among the most innovative and significant of the Final Act, because they firmly established humanitarian issues as a legitimate aspect of East-West relations and an important component of the process of detente.

Because the Final Act is a broad and ambitious document, the CSCE states recognized that its implementation would require sustained effort and perseverence after Helsinki. They also hoped that the Final Act might serve as a foundation for further multilateral steps to expand security and cooperation in Europe. Followup provisions were thus included in the Final Act to ensure that the CSCE did not end with the Helsinki Summit, but rather that a "CSCE process" of implementation and cooperation would ensue. The Belgrade meeting, 2 years after signature of the Final Act, was designated as the first of possibly a series of meetings to motivate the CSCE process and gauge the measure of its progress. Because participating states recognized, however, that the CSCE process could make little headway unless its basic premise—the implementation of the Final Act itself—was progressing satisfactorily, the Final Act made clear that a major task of the Belgrade meeting was to be a thorough exchange of views on the implementation record.

U.S. OBJECTIVES AT BELGRADE

U.S. objectives at the Belgrade meeting, as outlined by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in testimony before the CSCE Commission on June 6, 1977, were to:

- examine fully the experience with the

Helsinki Final Act and assess the failures and successes in past implementation;

- seek full implementation of all the commitments contained in the Final Act; and
- seek improvements in relations between East and West on all fronts.

U.S. emphasis on assessing and improving the implementation record was shared by most of the Western and neutral/nonaligned CSCE states and reflected our position, already stated at the Helsinki Summit, that the success of the CSCE would hinge upon the implementation of its provisions. In stressing a review of implementation, the United States recognized that its own record would be subject to careful scrutiny at Belgrade. Accordingly, after the Helsinki Summit, the United States began reviewing its own record of compliance and seeking improvements wherever possible. A number of specific implementation steps resulted, including modification of our visa-issuing procedures, a call by President Carter for U.S. ratification of the U.N. covenants on human rights, and steps to establish a Presidential commission to study means of expanding foreign language study in the United States. While our record still could not be considered perfect, we approached Belgrade confident of our performance and willing to discuss it in all aspects. Indeed, we were proud of the fact that the standards of the United States and most other Western nations were already in basic accordance with the objectives of the CSCE even prior to signature of the Final Act.

The countries of the Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, had the furthest to go in meeting the standards set by Helsinki, particularly in the important human rights and humanitarian areas. The United States, together with its Western allies, began to monitor Warsaw Pact implementation of the Final Act shortly after Helsinki. U.S. embassies in Eastern capitals were required to submit to Washington regular, detailed reports on the performances of individual countries. In addition, the joint legislative-executive Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, established in June 1976, also pursued its mandate of monitoring CSCE implementation through extensive public hearings, research projects, reports, and study trips.

The picture of Eastern implementation which emerged gave cause for optimism as well as concern. While the performances of individual countries varied, and while most Eastern countries had made some efforts to improve their records, the rate of implementation remained slow and in some cases even deteriorated. Moreover, while having accepted all provisions of the Final Act at the Helsinki Summit, the Soviet Union and its allies subsequently sought to advance procedural arguments and interpretations clearly aimed at diminishing the full obligation of a number of important commitments. This was particularly evident in the human rights area where publication of the Final Act had its greatest public impact in both East and West.

Human rights advocates in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and a number of other countries saw the Final Act as a promising sign that long-denied rights and freedoms would soon be respected. Through groups such as the Helsinki monitoring group in the Soviet Union and the Charter '77 movement in Czechoslovakia, they began to monitor the implementation performances of their governments and to urge full implementation of Final Act commitments. Rather than welcoming such public interest and involvement in the CSCE process, some governments, but particularly the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, reacted by arresting or in other ways persecuting citizens associated with these efforts. The United States, together with many other countries, deplored such actions and made clear that they would inevitably become a major agenda item at Belgrade. The Eastern countries, on the other hand, denounced expressions of Western concern regarding Eastern human rights implementation as "interference in internal affairs."

The United States resolutely rejected the notion that criticism of implementation failures could constitute interference in internal affairs, since the Final Act makes clear that CSCE implementation is a joint concern of all participating states. Nonetheless, differing Eastern and Western interpretations on this and other

points determined that the Belgrade meeting would be a watershed for establishing precedents to the future course of the CSCE process. If the Eastern interpretation of the Final Act prevailed, the process threatened to become little more than a talk shop in which the commitments of states bore small relationship to their actual behavior. The Western interpretation, on the other hand, was consistent with the principle of accountability of all states in fulfilling commitments jointly agreed upon. The United States was determined to conduct a detailed and honest implementation review which would make clear that past commitments were to be taken seriously and that words could not substitute for deeds in making the CSCE process a success.

The United States attached particular importance to a thorough review of the human rights and humanitarian provisions of the Final Act because these provisions stood most in need of improved implementation. We considered all sections of the Final Act of equal importance, however, and hoped that they would also be given detailed review at Belgrade. While the review of implementation was the major U.S. objective at Belgrade, the United States, like other Western and neutral/nonaligned countries, also hoped that the Belgrade meeting would build upon the Final Act by adopting new measures to promote CSCE objectives and improve East-West relations. The United States tabled and supported proposals to this end in all baskets of the Final Act and worked assiduously to gain their acceptance by all participating states. In our list of priorities, however, the negotiation of new commitments was not as important as the implementation of those negotiated previously, and we emphasized to Eastern states that a positive implementation record was thus the key to a constructive and productive Belgrade meeting.

THE SUMMER PREPARATORY MEETING

The Final Act left the specific structure and organization of the Belgrade meeting to be decided upon at a preparatory meeting, held in Belgrade from June 15 to August 5, 1977. Because of the lack of precedent in CSCE followup, the preparatory meeting was of pivotal importance in determining the nature of the main Belgrade meeting and became, in effect, the first formal meeting ground of differing Eastern and Western interpretations of the followup.

The Soviet Union and several of its allies came to the preparatory meeting aware of the fact that their implementation records would be subject to criticism. Their positions at the preparatory meeting indicated that they favored a short meeting with a firm cutoff date and a work program which would limit the scope and nature of the implementation review. They resisted the establishment of committees which would allow detailed discussion of implementation and sought to restrict this subject primarily to the large and unwieldy plenary sessions. They also sought to blur the agenda distinction between implementation review and discussion of new proposals in a manner which would allow them to give emphasis to future promises rather than past commitments. And finally, they tried on several occasions to insert language into the fall agenda which would have served to restrict discussion only to positive forward-looking issues.

The U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, worked with the delegations of other Western and neutral/nonaligned states to assure that the organization of the Belgrade meeting would be fully equal to its mandate. In often painstaking negotiations, Western delegates insisted on an organizational structure conducive to a detailed and thorough implementation review which could not be stifled by either procedural arguments or delaying tactics. In addition, they placed high priority on language which would assure the continuity of the CSCE process after Belgrade.

The final decisions of the preparatory meeting, published in what was referred to for its cover as "the Yellow Book," largely supported the Western and neutral/nonaligned conception of the main Belgrade meeting. Work was to be divided between a plenary body and five subsidiary working bodies—one for each of the three baskets, one on the Mediterranean decla-

ration of the Final Act, and one on further CSCE followup. Specific mention was made in the agenda of a "thorough exchange of views" on implementation, and the organizational framework stipulated that this was to be done "in an organized way in accordance with all the corresponding provisions of the Final Act." In addition, while the preparatory meeting called upon delegations to make every effort to end the main meeting by December 22, provision was made for an extended session into 1978, with closure of the meeting contingent upon the adoption of the concluding document and agreement on the date and place of the next Belgrade-type meeting. The preparatory meeting thus assured the continuation of the CSCE process beyond Belgrade and laid the foundations for a detailed and substantive exchange of views on the full spectrum of CSCE concerns.

WORKING PROCEDURES AT BELGRADE

While the preparatory meeting negotiated the organization and agenda of the main Belgrade meeting, most of the working procedures and rules were adopted from previous CSCE meetings. Thus, for example, the Belgrade meeting was conducted in closed session except for the opening and closing speeches of all 35 delegations, No verbatim record was kept of closed deliberations, and no persons could be admitted to closed discussions other than delegates, official guests, or members of the host country secretariat. In addition, in conformity with established CSCE procedure, any decisions of the meeting required the unanimous consent of all 35 participating states.

This principle of consensus by which the CSCE has always operated is of particular importance in understanding the limitations as well as advantages of the process. Because the CSCE is an undertaking of 35 countries with differing histories, social systems, and points of view, participating states required assurances that the conference would not oblige them to take actions to which they had not previously given their full consent. The principle of consensus was thus a prerequisite to discussion of the important issues which the CSCE sought to address. To be sure, in practice the rule often opens the door to frustration and delay. One country can veto a measure supported by 34 others, and progress at a meeting can sometimes be held hostage to the particular interests of a single state. On the other hand, the rule of consensus has the advantage of assuring that all countries have an equal voice in CSCE decisionmaking and that no single state or group of states can dominate the process. This accounts for the particular interest which many of the smaller countries of Europe have in the CSCE, since the process allows them to have a voice in the future of Europe which is no less than that of their larger neighbors. In addition, the rule of consensus has advantage in bolstering the legitimacy and motivating the implementation of decisions once they are made. Because no state is compelled to accept a decision, it has no excuse for not implementing it once it is adopted. Thus each decision reflects the voluntary commitment of every CSCE participant to a specific course of action.

A final important aspect of CSCE which characterized the Belgrade meeting no less than previous CSCE meetings was the process of consultation. Although the CSCE is a joint effort of 35 sovereign states, most countries have found it advantageous to consult and coordinate on tactics with others who share their viewpoints and to exchange views in general outside of formal conference session. Thus, the NATO countries engaged in regular consultations with one another at Belgrade, as did the EC-9, the neutral/nonaligned states, and the Warsaw Pact. For the United States, a major aspect of preparation for Belgrade was continuation of the close and detailed consultations with NATO Allies which had proved so important to the success of previous CSCE efforts. These consultations helped facilitate the effective presentation of Western views and concerns. While the United States consulted as well with the neutral/nonaligned and some of the Eastern states, NATO consultations remained throughout the meeting an important factor in the formulation of our strategy and tactics.

The Belgrade meeting was thus a complex assembly at which nations interacted on many levels and business was conducted in a variety of formal and informal settings. In addition, the meeting progressed through a number of stages agreed upon in the Yellow Book to provide an organizational framework to proceedings. Thus, the first week of the meeting consisted of plenary sessions, open to the press, at which opening speeches were presented by Yugoslav officials, representatives of the United Nations, and each of the 35 participating states. The plenary then moved into closed session for a week of general discussion on the tasks before the meeting and a week of addresses by the nonparticipating Mediterranean states. While the plenary met almost daily for the first 3 weeks of the meeting, from the 3d to the 12th week much of the work shifted to the committees or—as they were technically called—subsidiary working bodies agreed upon at the preparatory meeting.

The working bodies for each of the three main baskets met five times weekly from the 3d to the 12th week of the meeting, while the groups discussing followup and the Mediterranean averaged two to three sessions per week. It was in these working groups that the detailed review of implementation and initial discussion of new proposals was conducted. Beginning in the 8th week, the working bodies were expected to submit reports to the plenary on agreed language for a concluding document, although the three weekly sessions of the plenary were often cut short when no such reports were forthcoming. Indeed, because of the difficulty of agreeing on texts for the concluding document, the plenary agreed to reconstitute the working bodies as "drafting groups" when their mandate expired on December 16.

The second phase of the Belgrade meeting, after the holiday recess, thus again saw alternation of plenary and drafting group sessions on much the same model as in the fall. During the concluding weeks, however, the formal drafting groups were replaced by informal contact groups in which much of the actual drafting was conducted. Once a concluding document had been adopted, the plenary was again opened to the press for closing speeches by all 35 delegations and the formal conclusion of the meeting.

The following chapters provide detailed descriptions of the substantive activities of the Belgrade meeting throughout this complex process in each of the major subject areas of CSCE concern.

Basket One: Questions Relating to Security in Europe

DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES

The Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States is the first half of the first chapter of the Final Act dealing with "Questions Relating to Security in Europe." It was originally conceived by the Soviet Union as the centerpiece of the Final Act, a quasi-peace treaty that would, in a general and nonexplicit fashion, ratify the territorial changes produced in Europe by the Second World War. In the immediate post-Helsinki Summit days, the Soviet Union and its allies accordingly gave pride of place to the Declaration as the most important part of the Final Act and to the Third Principle, "Inviolability of Frontiers," as the most significant element of the Declaration. The West, however, during the Geneva negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Summit and subsequently, safeguarded its legal position that neither the Third Principle nor the Declaration as a whole affected Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole nor legitimized Soviet acquisition of the Baltic States. The West also made clear that the Final Act, although not a treaty but rather a solemn international political undertaking, emphasized the signifi-

cance of human rights and humanitarian cooperation by virtue of the Seventh Principle and the so-called Basket Three. By the time the Belgrade meeting convened, the human rights and human contacts portions of the Final Act had assumed a practical and symbolic importance only dimly perceived when the Final Act was signed.

Human Rights

These elements of the Final Act, which produced remarkable manifestations of interest in the Soviet Union and in many of the states of Eastern Europe, are of two sorts. The classical statement of human rights is contained in the Declaration as the Seventh Principle, "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief." In addition, the third chapter, "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," contains commitments to practical measures intended to effect a freer flow of people and ideas throughout Europe. The unique aspect of the Final Act's treatment of these matters was to move them from an isolated, theoretical concept into the center of a major political document. By October 4, 1977, when the Belgrade meeting opened, the West had succeeded in establishing that the progress of the CSCE process, and thus to an important extent the long-term viability of the detente process of which CSCE is an integral part, would be tested by how well the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies fulfilled their human rights and humanitarian commitments.

Ambassador Goldberg made this clear in his statement to the open plenary held October 6, 1977. He asserted that:

> The issue of human rights represents the widest gap between the ideals and practices of East and West. It is a sensitive subject on the international agenda, but one which can be dealt with in an understanding manner, and which must be discussed in order to facilitate further progress under the Final Act.

In this statement, Ambassador Goldberg emphasized that the United States would not hesitate to direct its constructive criticism at individual countries and to deal with individual violations of human rights. In an initial reference to the fate of the Helsinki monitoring groups in the Soviet Union and to the signers of the Charter '77 document in Czechoslovakia, he asserted that:

> All the more, then, we are also obliged to register vigorous disapproval of repressive measures taken in any country against individuals and private groups whose activities relate solely to promoting the Final Act's goals and promises. Any such repression is contrary to the spirit and the letter of our common pledge. Rather, at this meeting, we should all reaffirm the valuable role to be played by individuals and organizations, in their own countries and in international associations, to help make that pledge a reality.

Throughout the detailed working body discussions of the Declaration, which lasted through much of October and November, the U.S. delegation emphasized not only the well-known cases of the Helsinki monitoring groups, Charter '77 and individuals such as Shcharanskiy, Orlov, Ginsberg, Rudenko, and Tikhiy, but also the problems faced by religious minorities in the Soviet Union, the difficult situation of Ukrainian and other ethnic dissidents in the Soviet Union, and the misuses of psychiatric medicine in that country. While the U.S. delegation was the most consistently outspoken, other Western countries and many of the neutral delegations followed in expressing dissatisfaction with the human rights records of the Soviet Union and several members of the Warsaw Pact. It was clear that many countries felt strongly about these matters but were concerned that they could not take upon themselves the burden of initially raising matters that obviously touched Eastern sensitivities. The U.S. leadership role made it possible for these subjects to be aired and for others to demonstrate that they shared our concerns.

The initial Soviet position on the implementation review in general and on human rights in particular was that each state should express views only about its own record in order to maintain a "positive" conference atmosphere. In his initial public plenary address October 6, for example, the Soviet representative detailed Soviet achievements and asserted that "In our country human rights and fundamental freedoms are more than just proclaimed and laid down in laws, they are guaranteed by our socio-economic system itself." The Soviet

Union also sought to establish a perspective that deemphasized the significance of human rights at Belgrade and in the CSCE process. During the week of October 9, when all delegations made general statements about the various chapters of the Final Act in closed plenary, the Soviet representative devoted virtually all of his remarks on Basket One to disarmament matters which are the subject of prolonged and intensive negotiations in other forums. Further, throughout the meeting the Soviet Union returned to the theme that the real task of Belgrade was to concentrate on security issues in order to "complement political detente with military detente." The corollary to this misleading argument was that the West was distracting the meeting from its real purposes by focusing attention on human rights.

Principle Six versus Principle Seven

The U.S. delegation came to Belgrade prepared to engage in a candid discussion of implementation flaws in our own country as well as elsewhere. Ambassador Goldberg said that the United States sought to discuss human rights from the point of view that no nation had yet achieved their full implementation and that "We have much to learn from that exchange of views."

The full dialogue that the U.S. delegation desired was never achieved. Soviet and other Eastern speakers adopted the line that any discussion of the implementation deficiencies of another state was barred by the sixth of the Declaration's principles, that of "Nonintervention in internal affairs." This debate continued throughout the conference. Ambassador Goldberg addressed himself to both the legal and political aspects on a number of occasions. In a detailed statement on the Sixth Principle in committee October 20, for example, he explained that:

> The language of Principle Six is explicit, and the reasons underlying it are abundantly clear. Principle Six embodies a commitment by all participating States to abjure from military action, use of force and coercion in order that peace, security, and cooperation in Europe may be assured.

Ambassador Goldberg explained in that statement, and again in more detail on November 17, that the raising of an appropriate subject in normal diplomatic discourse, such as the United States was doing at the Belgrade meeting, could not be regarded as coercion. He also pointed out that the commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms embodied in the Seventh Principle is a legitimate subject for diplomatic discourse, either bilaterally or, as at Belgrade, multilaterally. This is because human rights, as embodied in such documents as the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Convenants and the Final Act, are an accepted topic of international concern and, more specifically, because a state has a general right to raise questions about the fulfillment by another state of commitments which both have undertaken.

Their theoretical nonintervention defense made it logically difficult for the Soviet delegates to engage in criticism of the U.S. human rights record. Occasionally, when they felt themselves under particularly telling attack, they and the Czechoslovak representatives did criticize aspects of U.S. society, including the racial situation, unemployment, and the status of women. This criticism was an implicit recognition that human rights implementation was a legitimate topic for Belgrade review. Notwithstanding the Eastern speakers continued to argue the nonintervention defense.

Other Principles

In a statement to the closed plenary on October 11, Professor Joyce Hughes, a public member of the delegation, explained that the United States considers that the 10 principles in the Declaration constitute "solemn moral and political undertakings drawn from the body of established international law."

It has commonly been the Soviet position that the Declaration of Principles is meant to apply between East and West but not necessarily between the Soviet Union and other Socialist states. A great deal of effort was put in by the Western negotiators of the Final Act to ensure that it had adequate language to refute this point. The specific intent of the Western negotiators of this language was that it would make untenable any claim to a special order of

international behavior applicable within Eastern Europe—as was claimed by the Soviet Union at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Ambassador Sherer, Deputy Chairman of the Delegation, emphasized the U.S. position in his statement of October 19:

> In other words, these are not the principles of coexistence for application between East and West, between states with differing political, economic, or social systems. The Declaration of Principles itself mandates that these principles are to be applied by *each state* in its relations to *each other state*, regardless of political or military alliance. The United States delegation considers that all the governments represented here recognize that too often this bloc-free aspect of the Declaration of Principles has been ignored. The Europe envisaged by the Declaration of Principles is one in which each state feels secure in its basic interests without the need to assert special hegemonic rights or intra-alliance reservations. We have not yet reached that day. We must continue to work toward it.

The U.S. delegation built upon this theme in several subsequent statements dealing explicitly with the Eighth Principle, "Equal rights and self-determination of peoples." These included the statement delivered by delegation member Robert Frowick on November 14 which referred indirectly but clearly to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and to Soviet claims to a hegemonic role in Eastern Europe, and the statement of Senator Robert Dole on November 25 which referred explicitly to the concerns of ethnic organizations in the United States about misapplication of the Principle in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Other major statements on individual principles included Ambassador Sherer's discussion of the first five principles—"Sovereign equality," "Refraining from the threat or use of force," "Inviolability of frontiers," "Territorial integrity of States," and "Peaceful settlement of disputes," on October 19; Senator Claiborne Pell's statement on human rights and fundamental freedoms, November 23; the discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Principles, "Cooperation among States," and "Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law" respectively by Public Member Sol Chaikin, who criticized the Soviet Union for apparent failure to deliver an invitation from George Meany to Nobel Prize Laureate Andrei Sakharov and for refusal to allow Mr. Sakharov to attend an AFL-CIO convention; and additional statements on the Tenth Principle by Congressman John Buchanan, November 16, and Professor Hughes, October 11.

New Proposals

The subsidiary working body and, after December 22, the relevant drafting group considered 14 "new proposals" put forward by one or more delegations for inclusion in the concluding document of the meeting. Proposals tabled by Western states sought, on the basis of the implementation review, to stimulate practical progress in those areas most in need of improved implementation and thus to give renewed impetus to the CSCE process as a whole. The major Western proposals on human rights were thus designed to both reaffirm commitments in the Final Act and to enhance their practical application by the participating states. One important proposal, sponsored jointly by the United States and by 14 other delegations of EC-9 or NATO countries, was introduced November 4 by Ambassador Goldberg and other Western speakers in plenary and supported in a supplementary statement later in the day in the working body by public member John Borbridge.

This proposal called for the participating states to "reaffirm the relevant and positive role which institutions, organizations and persons as well as governments have to play in the process of developing cooperation between governments and peoples and in the process of securing the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act." In a clear reference to the situation of the Helsinki monitoring groups in the Soviet Union and to the signers of Charter '77 in Czechoslovakia, it would also have recognized "that the right of institutions, organizations, and persons to assist governments in the task of ensuring the full implementation of the provisions of the Final Act, including where necessary to point out instances of nonimplementation, should be universally respected." (Technically this proposal was introduced as based on the Ninth rather than the Seventh Principle because the former contains

language acknowledging the role of individuals in working for Final Act implementation.)

Another proposal was introduced by Ambassador Goldberg in plenary on December 2: This proposal was intended to record the resolve of the participating states "to implement the Principle of Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally, and to fulfill their international obligations in the human rights field including those arising under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenants on Human Rights." This proposal was returned to by the United States on a number of occasions, including a December 12 intervention on human rights by R. Spencer Oliver, staff director of the CSCE Commission.

Throughout the debate and negotiation on these proposals, the U.S. delegation explained the practical reasons for their introduction, including our concern that specific cases of nonimplementation in the Soviet Union and certain other countries demonstrated the importance of obtaining specific human rights-related commitments in the Belgrade concluding document. The immediate Eastern tactical reaction was to introduce three proposals on December 2:

- A Hungarian proposal on the right to work;
- A proposal on the rights of women, sponsored by Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic; and
- A proposal calling on all participating states to accede to the International Covenants on Human Rights, sponsored by Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic.

The U.S. delegation indicated a willingness to consider the proposals in a positive spirit and suggested that either a way might be found to merge them into our more general proposals, or, if it was preferred to detail individual aspects of human rights, that further specific proposals dealing with, for example, civil and political rights, might be advanced. It quickly became apparent, however, that these Eastern proposals were advanced for the tactical purpose of demonstrating that the Eastern delegations were interested in human rights of an economic and social character, but that there was no intention to negotiate seriously on texts. The Eastern proposals were not included in the draft concluding document introduced by the Soviet Union on January 17, 1978, and nothing more was heard of them subsequently. Indeed, the negotiation of the final document indicated that the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept any proposal which made direct mention of human rights. Even a listing in the final document of the 10 principles of Basket One proved to be unacceptable to the East, apparently because this would have meant direct reaffirmation and mention of Principle Seven on human rights.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The section of Basket One entitled "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament" contains three sections. The first establishes a number of specific obligations, of varying detail and strength, concerning the prior notification of major military maneuvers, the notification of smaller military maneuvers, the exchange of observers at maneuvers, the notification of major military movements, and military exchanges. Section two of the document is a brief general statement of commitment to lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament, and section three notes certain general considerations bearing upon security in Europe.

The specific confidence-building measures (CBM's) contained in section one of the document, committing states to greater openness about certain military activities, form the principal content of the Final Act in the field of military security. While no part of the Final Act is legally binding and CBM's are explicitly "voluntary," and commitment to prior notification of major military maneuvers (exceeding 25,000 troops) is clear, and the implementation

record, involving specific events and numbers, lends itself to objective assessment. The Final Act also encourages the notification of smaller military maneuvers (of 25,000 troops or less) and recommends invitations to observers to attend maneuvers. In addition, the Final Act also recognizes that notification of major military movements can also contribute to confidence building.

This structure reflects the West's successful effort at Helsinki to develop a modest and pragmatic CSCE contribution to military security which would neither deflect attention from other novel aspects of the CSCE process such as Basket Three humanitarian cooperation nor duplicate existing arms control negotiations carried out in more appropriate forums such as SALT and MBFR by the states immediately concerned. The performance of states in implementing these measures provided the material for the Belgrade review.

U.S. objectives at Belgrade in the CBM's area were similar to those regarding other sections of the Final Act. Specifically, these were a thorough review of the implementation record since Helsinki and consideration of new initiatives which might build upon the specific and practical CBM provisions already in the Final Act. The Soviet Union sought throughout the Belgrade meeting, however, to dilute emphasis on uncongenial human rights-related topics by emphasizing the role which it considered CSCE should play in major military security issues. Accordingly, it sought to concentrate upon and expand the limited general security mandate in the Final Act at the expense of its practical CBM provisions.

Review of Implementation

In his opening statement in the subsidiary working body concerned with CBM's, the U.S. representative, Robert Strand, called attention to the main features of the record of implementation between Helsinki and Belgrade. He noted that:

- No participating state had failed to live up to its obligation to notify its major military maneuvers; all major maneuvers had been notified the requisite 21 days in advance, some longer.
- NATO and neutral/nonaligned countries had given prior notification of smaller scale maneuvers on a voluntary basis; the Warsaw Pact states had not;
- The degree to which notification texts had incorporated more than the bare minimum of data required, giving an informative picture of the maneuver being notified, had varied widely;
- Of the maneuvers notified within the context of the Final Act, observers had been invited to more than half; however, exercise of this voluntary confidence-building measure had varied importantly with respect to the degree to which observers had been given a satisfactory opportunity to understand the scenario and follow the maneuver's development, the geographic spread of the states invited to observe a given maneuver, and the record of states in accepting invitations received (Warsaw Pact states having until just before Belgrade refused all invitations to NATO country maneuvers);
- No state had yet exercised its option to notify a major military movement, although some, including the United States, had reported troop movements connected with maneuvers when notifying the latter;
- There had been wide participation in military exchanges.

Commenting on this record, the U.S. representative concluded:

> It is evident . . . that much has been done to give life to confidence-building measures and there has been no breach of the obligations agreed to. It is equally evident that there is ample room for states, by their voluntary implementation of the discretionary elements. . . . to contribute further to openness about their military activities and hence to confidence among them.

In ensuing meetings of the subsidiary working body on security, Allied and neutral/nonaligned representatives looked more closely at how each of the confidence-building measures had been implemented. The Soviet Union and its allies took little part in the detailed review of implementation of CBM's. They neither engaged in examination of such ques-

tions as how observer treatment might be improved or notification texts made more informative, nor answered questions put to them by other delegations about their own implementation plans (When, for example, might they begin to notify smaller scale maneuvers?).

Instead, they pursued a quite separate course, ranging generally over the problems of disarmament and military detente, commending their own record in the field, accusing the West of disinterest in reducing military confrontation, and assigning CBM's to a small and distant corner of the detente agenda. They also insisted that there had been too little time and experience since Helsinki for them to implement CBM's more liberally.

In reply to Eastern criticism, the United States and other Western speakers defended their governments' commitment to disarmament and their practical efforts to achieve it in appropriate forums. They pointed out, however, that though it might give periodic impetus to arms negotiations elsewhere through general expressions of political will, CSCE was not itself a disarmament forum. Rather, as the U.S. representative stated:

> In the field of military security, the special contribution of CSCE has been to create a set of obligations to openness in the conduct of certain military activities whose full and consistent performance can enhance confidence among states and lessen the mistrust which makes the negotiation of arms control agreements so difficult. It is our task at this meeting to explore how those obligations can be performed more fully and consistently.

New Proposals

Four omnibus proposals were put forward in the military field, two limited to CBM's, two comprised largely of measures of a different character.

Four NATO Allies—Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom—sponsored a proposal, developed through consultations within the Alliance in which the United States took a leading role, designed to help correct the shortcomings revealed during the review of implementation by:

- prescribing additional information to be included in maneuver notifications;
- defining smaller scale maneuvers as those involving 10,000–25,000 troops and strengthening the obligation to notify them;
- establishing a detailed code for treatment of observers; and
- establishing a clearly defined requirement for notification of major ground force movements (the provision in the Final Act is undefined and purely voluntary, but commits states to give further consideration to the question).

The Allied proposal also set 30 days as the preferred period of advance notice and established a commitment to increase observer exchanges and to extend invitations to a greater number of participating states. The U.S. delegation gave this proposal strong and immediate support and joined the four sponsors in explaining and defending its principal elements. Noting that the United States would be one of those primarily affected, the U.S. representative devoted special attention to the formula for notification of major movements, showing how it would contribute to confidence while taking account of legitimate security requirements.

Seven neutral/nonaligned delegations (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia) submitted a CBM's proposal conceptually close to that of the four NATO Allies. It contained similar provisions for treating observers and improving the content of notifications, a less detailed movements notification requirement, and a weaker provision for notification of smaller scale maneuvers. It also contained a number of elements not included in the proposal of the four NATO sponsors, principally:

- a commitment to notify, as if they were a single major maneuver, those smaller maneuvers taking place close to each other in time and space and cumulatively involving more than 25,000 troops;
- agreement to consider further the question of notification of naval maneuvers and movements near territorial waters;
- a commitment to greater openness with respect to military matters in general and military budgets in particular.

The delegation of Romania submitted a proposal providing for prior notification of major ground force movements and of air and naval maneuvers. It also included other measures which, by restricting military activity rather than simply enhancing openness, differed conceptually from the CBM's in the Final Act. These included a ban on multinational maneuvers in border areas; a ban on new bases (including "nuclear weapon sites") in Europe and on increases in troops stationed there; and a freeze on military budgets (submitted as a separate proposal).

The fourth omnibus proposal was presented by the Soviet Union and entitled, "Programme of Action with a View to the Consolidation of Military Detente in Europe." It was based on a passage in a speech delivered by President Brezhnev on the eve of the Belgrade meeting. Unlike the other proposals, the "Programme of Action" was cast not in draft resolution language to be agreed upon at Belgrade, but rather as a list of measures to be "discussed in detail in the near future—in parallel with the continuation of the Vienna negotiations—at special joint consultations by all states participating in CSCE." These measures included:

- a treaty on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons;
- a treaty prohibiting the enlargement of political and military alliances in Europe;
- limitation of the size of maneuvers to "say 50,000–60,000 men."

Discussion of the various omnibus proposals proceeded, like the horses of a Russian troika, side-by-side along three separate paths. The first path, taken by Allied and neutral/nonaligned speakers and by Romania, involved detailed consideration of the substance of the confidence-building measures contained in the Allied, neutral/nonaligned, and Romanian proposals. Except for occasional nitpicking about words or phrases, or suggesting that some elements of the neutral/nonaligned proposal (which ones, they declined to say) were "interesting," the Warsaw Pact countries, with the already noted exception of Romania, took no part in the substantive discussion of any of these proposals. Pleas from neutral delegates that discussion of proposals could be productive only if all groups participated had no effect.

While evading substantive discussion of specific CBM proposals, the Soviet Union and its allies challenged them on general grounds. Their arguments, and the counter arguments of the representatives of other participating states, constituted a second, separate course of debate.

Warsaw Pact speakers argued that the new CBM proposals would constitute amendments to the Final Act. Alternatively, they claimed that there had been too little experience with existing CBM's to justify further measures at this time but that all the proposals put forward at Belgrade could be considered later at the Soviet-proposed "special joint consultations." They also argued that CBM's were of minor consequence and that the conference should concentrate on more important disarmament questions. At the same time, however, they warned that too great a flow of information in notifications would create public anxiety and that new measures would upset the fine balance of CBM's in the Final Act. Finally, Warsaw Pact delegates insisted that progress in CBM's could only go hand-in-hand with progress in military detente in general. They intimated that the real object of the new proposals put forward by the four NATO sponsors was military intelligence, not confidence building.

The United States, with other Allied speakers and a number of neutral and nonaligned participants, challenged both the consistency and the substance of these arguments. They argued that the proposals sponsored by the four NATO countries and the neutral/nonaligned group would build upon existing CBM's and improve their implementation. They point to inconsistencies in implementation as establishing the need for new measures and to the Final Act language on "developing and enlarging" of CBM's as providing their justification. They noted also that the Final Act specifically enjoins the participating states to give "further consideration" to notification

of major military movements. As for experience, they argued that 2 years of implementation practice since Helsinki had given a far better basis for moving forward than there had been for agreeing to CBM's in the Final Act. They denied espionage as an ulterior motive and argued that increased openness about military activity would enhance public confidence, contributing to an atmosphere of greater trust in which the chances for agreement on arms limitations would be improved.

The third focus of discussion was the Soviet "Programme of Action." Warsaw Pact delegates presented a picture of Europe beset by threatening NATO maneuvers, rising Western military budgets, and a general increase in military activity. Against this background, they espoused the main elements of the "Programme of Action" as essential to reducing military confrontation and lessening the risk of war.

The non-first-use and alliance-freeze proposals were not new. They had been put forward by the Warsaw Pact a year earlier and rejected by NATO as discriminatory and destabilizing. Several neutral/nonaligned delegates pointed out that the issues they raised were issues between Europe's military blocs and, therefore, out of place in the discussion in Belgrade. These proposals received no support from delegations outside the Warsaw Pact. One neutral delegate expressed puzzlement at the contrast between the Soviet Union's willingness to accept such momentous new commitments outside of CSCE and its opposition to even modest enlargement of CBM's.

The United States and other NATO Allies pointed out that alliances were a reflection, not the cause, of tensions and that sovereign states have the right to join in alliances of collective self-defense. The United States and its allies also submitted that the most likely source of war on the continent, carrying with it the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange, was the destabilizing imbalance in conventional ground forces in central Europe in favor of the Warsaw Pact, and imbalance which could be corrected by agreement in the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), but which would be emphasized by a non-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge. The U.S. representative cited independent, published force figures and analyses for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to illustrate the existing imbalance and NATO's defensive character. He quoted President Carter's pledge that the United States would not use nuclear weapons except in self-defense, but also said that NATO could not renounce the defensive use of any means available, including nuclear weapons.

As explained by the Soviet delegate, the Soviet-proposed "special joint consultations" would involve all 35 CSCE participants, meet at a political level higher than Belgrade and consider "all constructive proposals" concerning military security. It bore the stamp of a propaganda platform, or "talk shop" as one delegate described it, rather than a forum for serious, focused negotiations. It, too, found no support outside Warsaw Pact delegations.

On the final day of work of the security drafting body, the German Democratic Republic tabled a proposal to ban production of the so-called neutron bomb. This followed a number of earlier polemical statements on the same subject by Eastern delegates in both working-body and plenary debate. The U.S. representative rebutted Eastern charges and observed that those who spoke so passionately against the neutron bomb never mentioned new and destabilizing Soviet theater nuclear weapons, like the SS-20 missile. He called attention to President Carter's call for consideration of the problem of theater nuclear weapons as a whole.

In the final week of negotiations, when it had become apparent that the Soviet Union would not agree to concrete progress in any area of the Final Act, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Sweden made a last effort to sustain momentum in the military security area of CSCE by again proposing a post-Belgrade working group, this time without agreement on any substantive measures in Belgrade. Various mandates were suggested, some restricted to CBM's, some comprising disarmament as well. The Soviets showed little interest in a meeting restricted to CBM's. The United States and other NATO Allies also were cool to these

initiatives. To include provision for such a working group without equivalent progress in other important areas, such as human rights, would produce, they argued, a seriously unbalanced document. The United States pointed out that since no agreement in principle had been achieved on any of the substantive security measures discussed in Belgrade, there was no basis for work by experts. It also warned that parcelling out work to experts' groups where substantive argument was stymied could threaten the coherence of the CSCE process.

Basket Two: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment

The section of the Final Act dealing with cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment is comprehensive and far reaching. It establishes a set of principles and guidelines for the development of economic and commercial relations between the participating states, and in particular between states with differing economic systems. Thus, a thorough review of implementation of these provisions at Belgrade held the promise of presenting a picture not only of implementation progress since Helsinki but also of the current state of commercial relations between East and West.

Although the Basket Two dialogue at Belgrade did not prove as far reaching or constructive as Western countries would have wished, certain common themes emerged and reflected consensus on the general state of implementation. Participants agreed that some progress had been achieved but that much more remained to be done to implement the Final Act fully. There was also agreement that a high potential for growth in East-West trade remained and that further efforts should be made to expand and strengthen commercial relations between participating states. Although a number of new proposals was examined in this context, no consensus on the adoption of any emerged, primarily because of persistent stalemate on the broader issues of the meeting.

REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

The U.S. position on review of Basket Two implementation was outlined by members of the U.S. delegation. Ambassador Sherer reaffirmed dedication to the principles of free trade and emphasized the mutual benefit which can derive from trade between Eastern and Western countries. He noted that economic and commercial relations can, with their development, smooth contacts and understanding in other East-West endeavors. The delegation made clear, however, that persistent obstacles to the expansion of economic relations, such as the inadequate provision by Eastern countries of information vital to Western businesses interested in commercial agreements, were a major U.S. concern at Belgrade.

The issue of Eastern provision of economic and commercial information was returned to by the U.S. delegation in the subsidiary working body on Basket Two. U.S. representatives emphasized that even the simplest form of trade, the buying and selling of products between two countries, cannot take place without some basis of understanding, and information alone can provide such a basis. Because full information is particularly crucial for expansion of trade between countries with differing economic systems, the United States regretted that Eastern implementation of the economic and commercial information sections of Basket Two had been less than satisfactory. Although small improvements were discernible in the practices of some countries, in other cases there had been retrogression. U.S. representatives stressed in particular three categories of economic and commercial information crucial to the development of East-West trade: foreign trade statistics, balance-of-payments informa-

tion, and Five-Year-Plan details, especially in the area of foreign trade. In each of these categories, considerable room for improvement by Eastern countries remained.

Similar obstacles to expanded trade were noted in the area of business contacts and facilities by the United States and other Western countries. Western speakers pointed out that when business concerns lack direct contact with the end-users of their products, frustration, together with costly and time-consuming negotiations, often ensues. While Western businessmen do not wish to change or bypass Eastern trade institutions, they do wish to find ways to improve and make more efficient the process through which goods and services move from producer to consumer. Other hindrances to expanded commercial relations mentioned by U.S. representatives included the lack of multiple entry/exit visas for Western businessmen in Eastern countries and closure of parts of these countries to business travel; the lack of appropriate business facilities and living quarters as well as the existence of burdensome regulations for the establishment of permanent business representation; and inadequate efforts to improve business opportunities for small and medium-size firms. The United States made clear that it wished to play a constructive role in the elimination of such obstacles and that it was prepared to discuss, for example, reciprocal agreements to facilitate the issuance of business visas.

In the area of industrial cooperation, the United States emphasized that such ventures must be commercially justifiable in order to mutually benefit the expansion of trade. Industrial cooperation is one of several types of normal economic interchange and should be facilitated to the same degree as are other forms of trade—but not singled out for preferential treatment. U.S. representatives pointed out, however, that conditions and facilities for onsite foreign employees should be improved and contracts should be drawn with greater care if industrial cooperation between Eastern and Western countries is to prosper.

During the course of the review of implementation, a number of Eastern countries faulted the West, and especially the United States, for allegedly perpetuating barriers to the expansion of East-West trade. U.S. policy in regard to Most-Favored-Nation tariff status (MFN) was specifically pointed to by some Eastern speakers. The United States made clear in responding to these charges that effective reciprocity is an essential element for the reduction or removal of existing trade barriers. In replying on the MFN issue, the senior U.S. representative to the Basket Two subsidiary group, Alton Jenkens, stated specifically:

> The United States Trade Act of 1974 provides the legislative authority for the granting of MFN. It does not deny MFN to any country but sets the minimum conditions that must be met before negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement can proceed. If these conditions are satisfied and a trade agreement is negotiated, MFN is extended. Our Trade Act reflects the interests and concerns of the American people. MFN is but one part of a "normal" commercial relationship. Before MFN can be granted, we have to be assured that adequate reciprocity is available.

Two other important areas of Final Act cooperation—science and technology, and protection of the environment—were also examined by the subsidiary working body on Basket Two. In the former category, the United States noted that considerable progress in scientific cooperation had been made through both bilateral and multilateral channels since the signing of the Final Act. However, notwithstanding progress achieved, U.S. representatives made clear that difficulties persisted in the areas of availability of unpublished technical information, reciprocity in the exchange of published information, mailing of scientific periodicals and papers, and exit and entry visas for scientists and technicians. The United States emphasized in particular that direct contact and communication between Eastern and Western scientists continued to be impeded in many Eastern countries in direct contradiction to the provisions of the Final Act.

In the area of environmental cooperation, the United States stated that it would continue to emphasize environmental protection both within its own boundaries and on issues that affect transboundary pollution. The United States expressed its support in this regard for the work being carried out by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

NEW PROPOSALS

Over 25 new proposals to undertake specific commitments to implement the Final Act more effectively were submitted in the Basket Two area. Covering the broad range of topics dealt with in the Final Act, they reflected the major concerns of their sponsors, in particular with regard to the conduct of East-West commercial relations. Western proposals, which emerged from Western views of implementation since Helsinki, emphasized the need for improvements in the availability of information and in business conditions and facilities for firms engaged in East-West commercial transactions. The major Eastern proposal focused on issues of trade policy.

The United States joined the EC-9 countries in co-sponsoring three proposals calling for (1) easing of conditions for the participation in East-West trade of small and medium-size firms, (2) facilitating direct contacts between scientists and technical personnel, and (3) provision of timetables for completion of industrial cooperation projects to assist firms in bidding for such projects. The U.S. delegation strongly supported the remaining EC-9 proposals for improvements in the availability of reliable economic and commercial information, better communications facilities, and improved conditions for onsite personnel in foreign countries.

While the West offered a series of modest, yet specific and practical recommendations for future action, the Eastern effort focused on a single, comprehensive proposal. Its four provisions formed a broad assault on Western trade policies by calling for full application of MFN, elimination of other tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, and favorable treatment for products resulting from industrial cooperation. In addition, the Soviet delegation tabled its proposal reflecting President Brezhnev's standing call to convene all-European, high-level meetings on the environment, energy, and transportation.

Discussion of new proposals followed the positions expressed during the review of implementation, with Western delegations pointing to the difficulties still encountered by Western firms in dealing with Eastern economic organizations. In this regard, the West sought improvements in two priority areas—the availability of timely, complete, and reliable economic information and facilitation of direct contact among scientists and businessmen. Eastern reaction to the Western proposals was largely negative. Though not rejecting them in substance, the East belittled them as too insignificant, when set against Eastern proposals on trade policy, to warrant inclusion in a concluding document.

Western efforts to engage the East in serious negotiations to draft a Basket Two chapter for the concluding document on the basis of tabled proposals were generally unsuccessful. Resisting Soviet efforts to extract minor and uncontroversial texts which could form the basis of an outwardly substantive document, the West sought by means of compromise language to obtain a balanced and substantial economic text. Although it appeared that a satisfactory outcome in the economic area might have been possible, Eastern inflexibility in the conference as a whole precluded meaningful negotiations in the Basket Two area.

Despite a lack of agreement on new Basket Two proposals, the full and frank exchange of views on implementation shortcomings served to alert the participating states to each other's views and provided a benchmark against which future implementation progress could be measured. All participating states were put on notice that the process initiated at Helsinki is subject to multilateral scrutiny and that states will be held responsible for their implementation failures. This proved to be the major achievement and success of the Belgrade CSCE meeting in the Basket Two area.

64-639 O - 87 - 11

Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean

In the Mediterranean section of the Final Act, the participating states affirmed the importance of their relations with the nonparticipating, non-European, Mediterranean states and declared their intention to improve relations with these states. This section was not intended to shift the basic European and East-West focus of CSCE discussions, but rather to acknowledge in a positive manner contributions made by the representatives of the six nonparticipating Mediterranean littoral states—Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia—during the course of the CSCE negotiation.

The nonparticipating Mediterranean states were again invited to present their views at the Belgrade meeting, both in plenary and in the subsidiary working body dealing with the Mediterranean section of the Final Act. The six above-named states and Lebanon made contributions. Libya did not accept the invitation. While the United States welcomed constructive contributions relevant to the appropriate provisions of the Mediterranean Declaration, it regretted the efforts of some countries to introduce the Arab-Israeli dispute into the CSCE, since such efforts could contribute neither to the CSCE nor to the negotiation of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Likewise, the United States successfully resisted a proposal formally tabled by the Soviet Union to allow representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization to address the Belgrade meeting.

During the course of discussions, much of the attention of the subsidiary working body on the Mediterranean focused on a proposal submitted by the delegation of Malta. This proposal called for the creation of a "Permanent Committee on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean" which was to be located in Malta and include the nonparticipating Mediterranean states as full members. The mandate for the Committee, as initially proposed by the Maltese delegation, was broad and included a range of political and security issues which virtually all delegations considered inappropriate for the CSCE and unlikely to be constructively addressed in this forum.

As other delegations, including that of the United States, made known their reservations regarding the Maltese proposal, attention turned toward consideration of an experts' meeting, of limited duration and mandate, as a more promising and practical means of promoting the objectives of the Mediterranean section of the Final Act. Agreement in principle on such a meeting, which would consider the possibility of promoting concrete initiatives for economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean area and to which the nonparticipating Mediterranean states could make contributions in the same manner as they had at Belgrade, was arrived at in early March by all delegations except that of Malta, which used the rule of consensus to delay adoption of a final document because of this issue. Negotiations regarding the Maltese desire for a broader mandate for the meeting continued until March 8, when the Maltese delegation accepted a formulation affirming that Mediterranean security questions could be discussed at the next CSCE followup meeting in Madrid, as, indeed, they had been in Belgrade. Agreement on this point paved the way for the unanimous adoption of the concluding document which had been a prerequisite for the closing of the Belgrade meeting.

Basket Three: Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Basket Three is the most innovative section of the Final Act, and the one which was most difficult to negotiate at Geneva. While all Final Act provisions seek to benefit the peoples of the CSCE states, Basket Three relates directly to the concerns and aspirations of private individuals. Its varying provisions share the common objective of promoting the freer flow of people, ideas, and information among the signatory states. They stem from the recognition of the CSCE that genuine security and cooperation in Europe cannot be achieved without lowering of the artificial barriers which—for example—prevent the reunification of divided families, hinder personal and professional travel, restrict the free interchange of cultural and informational materials, or serve generally to impede contact and communication between the peoples of East and West.

Because Eastern implementation of Basket Three had since Helsinki shown itself to be slow, uneven, and at times retrogressive, the United States and most other Western countries considered a thorough implementation review the major Basket Three objective of the Belgrade meeting. The purpose of such a review, from the Western viewpoint, was to stress areas of Western concern and seek to motivate improved Eastern implementation in the future. Although there was little prospect that specific cases in areas such as family reunification could be resolved in the Belgrade forum, the United States raised a number of such cases during the implementation review to illustrate in concrete fashion the types of problems encountered. In addition, Western states advanced a number of new proposals designed to supplement the implementation review by calling attention to specific areas of needed improvement.

The Soviet Union and its allies, on the other hand, approached the implementation review hesitantly and sought from the beginning to limit its scope and duration. Early in the meeting, a number of Eastern states let it be known than an "unconstructive" approach to implementation review could have serious consequences. An "unconstructive" approach was understood as entailing criticism of other participating states' practices. This, the East intimated, would ruin the business-like atmosphere of the meeting and have detrimental effects on detente as well.

In the substantive review, the Soviet Union and its allies generally sought to set the tone with lengthy interventions extolling the virtues of their own implementation and citing statistical data designed to support their assertions. Allied representatives, on the other hand, voiced the need to discuss problems as well as successes and sought to focus discussion on practices not in compliance with the Final Act.

Although the United States took the lead in speaking out on cases of Final Act noncompliance, other Western countries and many neutral/nonaligned states joined in with firm statements. This concerted approach enabled the Western and neutral/nonaligned states to conduct a thorough review of implementation shortcomings despite the evasive tactics of many of the Eastern countries.

HUMAN CONTACTS

In the area of human contacts, the senior U.S. representative to the Basket Three subsidiary working body, Guy Coriden, placed particular stress on the important issue of family reunification and emigration procedures in Eastern countries. In making these points, he used specific cases in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to illustrate the very real problems facing family reunification applicants, and he noted the onerous burden which present Soviet emigration procedures place on applicants. Other Western delegates raised problems ranging from the Eastern practice of harassing emigration applicants to the frequent refusal of permission for Romanian citizens to marry nationals of other countries.

Throughout the discussion, attempts were

made to bring Eastern countries into a serious dialogue on these issues. To bolster this approach, Western delegates attempted to give credit where it was due, and they credited certain Eastern states for improved procedures and increased emigration totals. The West also showed itself ready to discuss its own shortcomings in the human contacts area, as, for example, when the U.S. representative explained the improvements made and administrative problems yet to be solved in the U.S. visa-issuing system.

To draw out the East, Western delegates addressed specific questions to various Eastern delegations. Could the Soviet representative explain what was meant by refusing visas for reasons of state security? Why were family reunification applicants dismissed from their jobs? What were the terms of the Czechoslovak program for normalization of "illegal" status abroad? Did Romania plan to change its policy with regard to binational marriages? Why was the Polish definition of family so restrictive?

Eastern responses to Western questioning varied. Some Eastern countries reproached the West and argued that sovereign states should not attempt to put one another in the dock. As the debate progressed, Eastern states criticized Western practices more directly and claimed that family reunification matters were better dealt with bilaterally. In addition, Eastern delegations argued that further progress in promoting the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act was linked to the improvement of detente.

The end result of all such exchanges was often Eastern invocation of Principle Six of the Final Act regarding interference in internal affairs. This defense was first heard in the second session of the Basket Three working group when Ambassador Goldberg raised the Czechoslovak refusal to grant a French *Humanite* correspondent a visa to cover the trial of Charter '77 signers in Prague. This intervention was attacked vigorously by the Czechoslovak and Soviet delegates as interference in an area solely within the purview of a state's internal affairs. The interference argument was rebutted repeatedly by Western and neutral/nonaligned delegates who maintained that any topic treated in the Final Act constituted a legitimate subject for discussion if any review of implementation was to be meaningful. The remarks of the senior U.S. representative to the Basket Three subsidiary body reflected the U.S. position:

> Yesterday, the delegates of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union stated that my delegation's remarks concerning the trial in Czechoslovakia of Charter '77 signers were an intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. One of those delegates then referred unfavorably to my country's visa policies. Does that mean that the delegate was interfering in our internal affairs or does it mean that they feel there is a double standard on intervention in internal affairs? For our part we believe that our purpose here can be fulfilled only by asking questions, seeking clarifications, and generally inquiring further into actions relating to the Final Act. We have answered questions about our visa policies and stand ready to discuss that or any other aspect of U.S. implementation. We do not consider questions or comments as interventions in internal affairs and believe that there is no ground for any other delegation doing so.

Despite repeated exchanges, East and West did not resolve their differences with regard to the proper interpretation of the principle on nonintervention in internal affairs. This divergence of views became even more apparent as debate turned to the information chapter of Basket Three.

INFORMATION

Eastern delegates insisted that the kind of information disseminated by journalists and other professionals must serve the goals outlined in the Basket Three preamble: the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and the spiritual enrichment of the human personality. Governments, they argued, had to take responsibility to insure that information media met these criteria in their work. Soviet and other Eastern representatives also engaged in statistical analyses designed to give the impression of a high level of CSCE implementation in their states. Western delegates heard that journalists' working conditions in the East were in full accordance with the Final Act, that this historic document had been printed in the Eastern, but not in the Western,

press, and that Eastern states imported more information materials from the West than was reciprocally the case.

Western delegates countered by stressing that the free flow of information would in itself lead to the furthering of understanding in Europe and that Western governments had neither the mandate nor the wish to attempt to control the dissemination of information. The West also pointed out that statistical comparisons were an inadequate basis for assessing Final Act implementation; qualitative analyses led to more accurate conclusions The important aspect of implementation remained that Western, unlike Eastern, citizens had free access to choose what they wished to read, hear, or see.

Debate on these topics became the focal point for spirited exchanges in the Basket Three implementation review. Abandoning the defensive line taken during the human contacts review, Eastern delegations responded to Western criticism by insisting on their ideological interpretation of the information provisions and directing sharp criticism toward Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe which, they claimed, were solely concerned with interfering in the East's internal affairs.

Noting restrictive Czechoslovak and Soviet practices, the U.S. delegate protested the expulsion of UPI correspondent George Krimsky from the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet interrogation of *Los Angeles Times* reporter Robert Toth. These comments led the Soviet delegate to raise the interference argument and cite two U.S. actions—the expulsion of a *Pravda* correspondent in response to the Krimsky affair and a reciprocal visa refusal to a Soviet politican—as alleged violations of the Final Act.

In response to attacks against Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, the U.S. delegate explained the policies of the radios and defended their right to broadcast as fully consistent with the information provisions of the Final Act. When the Soviet representative persisted in his denunciations, the U.S. representative responded:

> I reject the contention of the Soviet, Polish and GDR representatives that the United States is hiding these radios. I explained in fair detail how their policy is made. I talked about the Board for International Broadcasting, about the funding for the radios. It is perfectly clear that no one is hiding anything.
>
> What really bothers our colleagues is not that these radios are located on foreign territory or that they broadcast in foreign languages. I can't believe that these countries are so weak, or so unsure of themselves that they really think the activity of these radios will cause their governments to fall or cause them lots of internal difficulties. I think what they fear rather is what their people learn from the radios—that 22 men have been imprisoned for years because they insisted on their right to emigrate, men such as Joseph Begun who was fired in 1972 after he applied to emigrate, and another man since 1970 constantly fears being labeled a parasite because he has been denied his right to work.
>
> This is what really bothers our colleagues and rather than hiding it behind charges of psychological warfare they might as well admit it.

CULTURE AND EDUCATION

While the major U.S. focus in Basket Three was on those sections most in need of improved implementation, specifically those relating to human contacts and information, the U.S. delegation sought as well to promote a thorough exchange of views on experience since Helsinki with Basket Three cultural and educational provisions. The objectives were again to identify the strengths and weaknesses of past implementation and discuss initiatives which might improve implementation in the future.

U.S. concern with certain implementation shortcomings was put on record at the very beginning of the Belgrade meeting. Ambassador Goldberg, in his opening address to the plenary, called for fuller opportunities for exchange scholars and researchers to engage in their professional activity and cited the example of an American student in one Eastern country who was admitted to an essential archive one day and denied admission, while having his notes confiscated, the next. In a plenary address in mid-October, Ambassador Goldberg returned to this theme by pointing out that in one exchange program with Eastern countries less than 20 percent of the American participants were satisfied with their access to archival and scholarly material. As Ambassador Goldberg stated: "We are pledged in the Final Act to facilitate—not control—cultural and educational exchanges. Yet, practices contrary

to both the letter and spirit of the Final Act still persist."

Detailed examination of these practices was conducted by the Basket Three working body during the first weeks of November. On the general theme of cultural exchange, Eastern delegations cited numerous statistics claiming that their countries import more books, films, and other cultural materials from the West than vice versa, and they faulted Western countries with not working more actively to correct the imbalance.

In a November 2d intervention on the subject of cultural exchange, the senior U.S. representative to the Basket Three working body responded to the charges. He stressed that cultural activity in the United States is determined by a free play of forces responding to interests and tastes not controlled by the Government. Because the United States prefers to leave room for private initiative in this area, it enjoys a large and very competitive cultural market. This competitiveness extends to all cultural media, and foreign cultural products must compete against other foreign materials as well as against domestic culture. Other Western delegations also emphasized the limited influence of government on Western cultural markets and stressed that the objectives of the Final Act were to remove artificial obstacles to the free flow of cultural materials rather than to assure a statistical balance in cultural exchange. In a subsequent intervention, the U.S. representative spoke of the Moscow Book Fair as an example of Soviet efforts in this area. While agreeing that the fair was in many ways a success, he regretted that problems of censorship had arisen and certain books had been barred by Soviet authorities. He described this as a small example of the types of obstacles under discussion.

The U.S. delegation made clear, however, that the U.S. Government plays a strong supportive role in the nonmarket area of cultural exchange. Citing Government support for organizations such as the American Film Institute and the New York Museum of Modern Art, the U.S. representative showed that the United States is receptive to worthwhile cultural exports and seeks, to the extent possible, to facilitate their entry into the United States. In discussing cultural dissemination and exchanges, the U.S. representative also stated that the United States understands that certain countries prefer to operate under government-controlled agreements, but he stressed that the United States looks forward to the day when such agreements could make way for private initiative.

In the implementation review dealing with Basket Three educational provisions, the United States and other Western countries, as well as a number of neutral/nonaligned states, placed particular emphasis on the importance of improving and facilitating educational exchanges. Professor Andrzej Korbonski of the University of California at Los Angeles, a public member of the U.S. delegation, spoke on this subject in the Basket Three working body on November 7. While expressing satisfaction with the large expansion of exchanges with the East since the signing of the Final Act, he pointed out that, as in the cultural field, the United States believes that such activities should be facilitated rather than regulated by governments. He stated that more money would be available for substantive exchange programs if fewer funds were necessary for coping with the bureaucratic and administrative problems which plague many exchanges with Eastern countries. Among the problems specifically enumerated were restrictions on access to archives, limited possibilities of conducting research trips in some countries, last minute rejection of American candidates—sometimes for political reasons—and difficulties faced by Eastern scholars seeking permission of their governments to conduct research in the West.

The U.S. delegation returned to the educational provisions of the Final Act on several occasions during the implementation review, raising such issues as continued obstruction of informal contact and collaboration between Eastern and Western scientists. While discussing the implementation shortcomings of other countries, however, the United States sought as well to present a critical analysis of its own implementation record. In one intervention, for example, Congressman Paul Simon conceded that the United States lags behind its European partners in the area of foreign language study.

He attributed this, in part, to the relative geographical isolation of the United States and to the fact that the National Government is unable to prescribe what courses local school systems or private universities should require. Congressman Simon pointed out, however, that in an effort to improve our CSCE record in this area, President Carter had on Congressional urging agreed to appoint a commission to study ways of promoting foreign language study in the United States.

NEW PROPOSALS

The more than 30 new proposals tabled in the Basket Three subsidiary working body indicated the wide range of interests of participating states. Western delegations, seeking to stimulate improvements in the areas in which they found implementation most lacking, put forward proposals related to family reunifications, family visits, binational marriages, and working conditions for journalists. Eastern delegations, on the other hand, sought to offset these proposals by matching them with an equal number in other fields, such as culture and education, or proposing action the West was likely to find unacceptable, such as state control of the mass media. The neutral/nonaligned countries advanced initiatives which they hoped would not only gain general acceptance but also broaden cooperation and improve Final Act implementation.

One of the objectives of Western proposals—which were developed in NATO and EC-9 consultations—was to clarify Final Act provisions differently interpreted in East and West. One of these attempted to ease Eastern family reunification practices and read in part:

> Consideration of applications for the purpose of family meetings "favorably," for the purpose of family reunification "in a positive and humanitarian spirit," and for the purpose of marriage between citizens of different states "favorably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations," should be interpreted as meaning that such applications should normally be granted . . . .

Others would have lowered emigration application costs, cut waiting periods, and insured that applicants would not be "disadvantaged in respect of their employment, housing, or access to other social services as a consequence of their having submitted the application concerned." Still other proposals sought to ease access to foreign embassies and missions and to facilitate travel of citizens for personal and professional reasons.

In the information area, Western initiatives were directed to further improving working conditions for journalists and facilitating access to foreign publications. The most significant of these sought to protect journalists from expulsion or harassment as a result of their work or reports carried by news organizations they represented. It stated that:

> The participating states . . . confirm that journalists will not be expelled, or otherwise acted against, as a result of news or opinions, published or broadcast in the media they represent, whether or not they are the authors.

The final Western proposal was designed to facilitate work of scholars in educational exchanges by calling for publication of lists of materials in open archieves.

In tabling their new proposals, Eastern states sought to create the impression that they paid equal attention to all Basket Three provisions. As a result, Eastern initiatives touched on numerous subjects but tended to focus on suggestions for new undertakings rather than on improving implementation of existing provisions. The Soviet Union and its allies took care to offer proposals linked to human contacts, but limited their suggestions to such minor fields as sports and youth exchanges. In the information area, the East advanced proposals which implied a degree of state control and censorship of mass media clearly unacceptable to the West. One Czechoslovak proposal, for example, called for state action to insure that "information disseminated . . . serve the lofty goals of peace and mutual confidence established in the Final Act . . . ."

Not all Eastern proposals were tabled in response to Western initiatives, however. One Polish proposal titled "Education for Peace" sought to encourage educational activities to promote disarmament, detente, and mutual knowledge and respect for the history and culture of other CSCE nations. Although the proposal assigned governments an advocacy role

the West found unacceptable, it was actively pursued by Poland as an effective means of furthering CSCE cooperation. A Hungarian proposal designed to stimulate the study of less widely spoken languages represented another more serious Eastern initiative.

Neutral/nonaligned delegations also came forward with a limited number of proposals reflecting their interests. The Yugoslavs proposed that a year of cultural cooperation in Europe be designated—an undertaking they had advocated in Geneva and which they hoped would promote a better acquaintance with smaller participating states' cultures. The Swiss delegation tabled a proposal calling for an experts' meeting to discuss means of promoting the wider circulation of information and the establishment of an international code for the treatment of journalists.

In negotiating new proposals, the West placed top priority on a substantive and balanced program for future Basket Three implementation. A document that proposed major undertakings in the area of cultural and educational exchange while ignoring human contacts and information initiatives was thus unacceptable to Western states.

The level of Eastern resistance to serious consideration of Western and many neutral/nonaligned proposals, however, indicated that there was little likelihood from the beginning of obtaining a substantive and balanced document. As simple a Western proposal as promoting the publication of lists of open archival materials was rejected by Eastern delegations as an alleged attempt to gain access to archives containing classified information. In comparison, the more ambitious human contacts proposals stood even smaller chance of acceptance.

While Western states recognized even before Belgrade began that not all Western proposals were likely to be accepted by the East, many Western countries hoped that at least one or two initiatives would serve as a basis for serious negotiation and agreement. Even if not adopted, however, the proposals were tabled to serve as one additional means of showing Eastern states areas of particular Western concern and reiterating in concrete fashion the points raised during the implementation review. In pointing out to Eastern states the issues vital to future Basket Three implementation and likely to emerge again at Madrid, the West achieved one of its most important Belgrade objectives.

Followup to the Conference

Negotiations on followup to the Belgrade meeting centered around several basic issues: the date and place of the next meeting similar to the Belgrade one,[3] the determination of the appropriate modalities for that meeting, and the relationship between experts' groups and the next similar meeting. At the beginning, however, discussion was of a more theoretical, nonsubstantive nature, involving efforts by various neutral/nonaligned countries to define the broader ramifications of followup, with particular reference to the role and function of experts' groups and the idea of periodicity.

The first basic issue to be resolved was the site of the next similar meeting. From the beginning of negotiations, the United States as well as most of the Western and neutral countries supported Madrid, while the Warsaw Pact countries reserved their position. Austria and Malta also proposed their capitals as sites for the next Belgrade-type meeting in the event that consensus could not be reached on Madrid. However, by the time the meeting adjourned for the holiday recess, Madrid had received support from 22 of the 35 participating states. The matter was resolved on January 17 when the Soviet delegation tabled the first verson of its proposed draft concluding document in which Madrid was inserted in the followup section as the site of the next similar meeting.

[3] One of the most important issues at Belgrade was to a large extent decided at the summer preparatory meeting which agreed that the main meeting would have to set a date and place for another followup meeting; it then became a question of when and where—not whether—the followup process could continue.

The issue of the timing of the Madrid meeting was not so easily resolved. The delegations of neutral/nonaligned countries desired a provision in the concluding document that would have confirmed the idea of periodicity in the followup process, by which they meant that it should be determined at Belgrade that future meetings should take place at more or less regular intervals over the long term. The initial position of the U.S. delegation was that at least the interval between Madrid and Belgrade should be approximately the same as between the start of the Belgrade meeting and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, i.e., approximately 2 years. The Soviet delegation intimated prior to the holiday recess that it preferred the Madrid preparatory meeting to be held in early 1981 with the main meeting in the middle of the year or even as late as 1982. Therefore, it came as a moderate surprise when the initial draft of the Soviet concluding document called for the followup in Madrid in 1980, beginning with a preparatory meeting in September followed by the main meeting from October-December.

The draft concluding document tabled by the United States, its 14 NATO Allies and Ireland on February 21 called for the preparatory meeting in January 1980 followed by the main meeting in February. The year 1980 was considered attractive not simply because it provided an appropriate interval after Belgrade but also because it marked the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Towards the end of the negotiations, substantial pressure developed from many delegations for holding the Madrid meeting in late 1980 on the grounds that this would provide a more adequate interval in which to prepare. Finally, in the last days of the negotiations, a formula suitable to everyone was reached: a preparatory meeting beginning in early September 1980 with the main meeting to begin on November 11.

Obtaining an exact date for the start of the main meeting was important for both Western and neutral/nonaligned negotiators. Initially, the Soviet Union steadfastly maintained that while the Belgrade meeting could set the precise date of the opening of the Madrid preparatory meeting, the date of the opening of the main meeting would necessarily have to be determined at the preparatory meeting. The inherent danger in this formulation, particularly in view of the experience at the Belgrade preparatory meeting, was that the preparatory meeting could be stalled indefinitely unless a precise date for the start of the main meeting existed.

The other key controversial issue confronted during the followup deliberations was the problem of determining suitable modalities for the Madrid meeting. At the start of the Belgrade meeting it had been widely hoped that the Decisions of the Belgrade Preparatory Meeting (the Yellow Book) which had outlined the modalities for the main Belgrade Meeting could be adopted with minimal changes to other followup meetings, thereby obviating the need for further preparatory meetings. As the Belgrade meeting progressed, however, it became increasingly obvious that another, but relatively short, preparatory meeting would be needed to make adaptions in the Yellow Book procedures which experience at Belgrade had shown to be necessary. The NATO and neutral/nonaligned delegations considered that the appropriate modalities for the Madrid meeting could be adopted from the Yellow Book procedures *mutatis mutandis,* a flexible formula meaning that the essentials would remain the same with the necessary changes being made in light of differing time and venue.

The Warsaw Pact, however, adopted a firm position against the adoption of the Yellow Book procedures *mutatis mutandis* for the Madrid meeting. Eastern countries argued that the Madrid meeting did not necessarily have to be bound by precedents set at Belgrade. During the final month of negotiations, the Soviet Union toughened its position even further by insisting that, while Belgrade procedures would have to be taken into account in determining the modalities of the next similar meeting, the Madrid meeting, due to the passage of time and altered perspectives, would have to be free to determine its own modalities without regard to the Belgrade experience. As a consequence, the Soviet Union attempted to block

any specific reference to the Yellow Book in the followup section of the concluding document.

The NATO and neutral/nonaligned delegations viewed this Soviet position as a potentially ominous development for the entire CSCE process. They perceived that the major motivation behind the Soviet position was an effort both to downgrade the significance of the Belgrade proceedings and to provide greater flexibility and leverage to an apparent desire to reduce the role and scope of the review of implementation at Madrid. U.S. negotiators, however, were able to preserve an explicit citation of the Yellow Book as one of the primary determinants of the modalities for the Madrid meeting.

During the course of the negotiations, the EC-9 countries as well as many neutrals expressed the desire that the Madrid meeting be held at a higher level than the Belgrade meeting. This initiative was met with sympathy by the U.S. delegation. The Soviet Union, however, forced postponement of a decision on the issue by insisting that only the Madrid preparatory meeting could decide on the level at which the main meeting would be held. It was agreed to leave 2 months between the start of the preparatory and main meetings, not only to provide enough time to work out the appropriate modalities for the main meeting but also to permit the necessary preparations to be made if it was decided to hold the Madrid meeting on a higher level.

While many important aspects of the Madrid meeting thus remain to be negotiated in 1980, the Belgrade meeting succeeded in assuring the continuation of the CSCE process and of joint multilateral review of progress in implementing Final Act commitments.

Negotiation of the Concluding Document

Negotiations on the concluding document occupied the last phase of the Belgrade meeting from mid-January until early March. Western and neutral/nonaligned delegations were prepared to negotiate seriously on a substantive concluding document containing new measures in all areas of the Final Act. The Soviet Union and its allies, on the other hand, appeared determined to block the inclusion of any substantive human rights provisions. Since Western negotiators considered it to be of primary importance that the concluding document reflect a balance among all the sections of the Final Act, they could not accept a document dwelling on the security aspects of the detente process or on Basket Two matters while neglecting human rights and humanitarian concerns.

The Soviet version of a "realistic" concluding document became known at the first plenary meeting after the winter recess when the Soviet Union tabled a brief 3-page draft and called for its adoption. The draft focused almost entirely on Eastern proposals in Baskets One and Two and neglected to include some Basket Three proposals which even Eastern countries had tabled. The lack of balance and substance in the draft was criticized by almost all delegations except the Soviet Union's closest allies in the Warsaw Pact. The only forthcoming aspect of the document was its short, one paragraph followup section which envisaged that the next Belgrade-type meeting would take place in Madrid in November 1980. Mention of humanitarian issues was reduced to one sentence which referred to the readiness of the participating states "to continue the expansion of cooperation in humanitarian fields, as provided for in the Final Act: human contacts, information, culture, and education."

In response to the Soviet statement, Ambassador Goldberg set forth 11 points which he said should be taken into account in producing a satisfactory concluding document. These included: the Final Act should in no way be revised or changed, and should in all its aspects be reaffirmed; the concluding document should be substantive and should contain an

objective account of the implementation review; it should give appropriate recognition to those proposals designed to improve implementation of the Final Act; it should make appropriate reference to Principle Seven, Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; it should recognize, as the Final Act provides, the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights without penalty; it should call upon all states to refrain from repressive measures; it should represent an honest reconciliation of varying viewpoints; and finally, it should be a balanced document dealing with all aspects of the Final Act, including human rights. In a speech 10 days later, Justice Goldberg offered a detailed analysis of the inadequacies of the Soviet document and stressed that "it does not even approach the minimum requirements as the formal expression and summation of the 4 months of work we have undertaken here in Belgrade."

The month of February was devoted to repeated efforts to produce a document with balance and at least some substance. Resuming the broker role they have played numerous times during the history of CSCE, the neutral/nonaligned delegations circulated on February 1 a compromise document which the Western nations supported as a good basis for negotiation despite difficulties with certain passages. The neutral/nonaligned delegations even organized sessions of informal contact groups so that Eastern and Western representatives could discuss the document in an informal atmosphere. The West strongly supported such constructive efforts by the neutral/nonaligned states. The Eastern countries, however, refused to consider the neutral/nonaligned draft as a realistic effort to find the middle ground and rejected the bulk of it out of hand. A particular Soviet objection appeared to be that the draft contained a substantive section on human contacts and referred specifically to the human rights principle in a listing of the 10 principles of Basket One.

Between February 10 and 17, the Soviet Union proceeded to table three revisions of its original draft, each adding general, detente-related language and a few paragraphs and phrases to the original text. These drafts continued to be unacceptable to most other delegations. On February 16, the French delegation, in a further effort to break the impasse, tabled its version of a concluding document which endeavored to combine some of the language of the Soviet texts with Western and neutral/nonaligned ideas, including a reference to the importance of "the human dimension of CSCE." It was summarily rejected by the Soviet Union. Likewise, high-level efforts by France, Yugoslavia, and the Federal Republic of Germany to prevail upon the Soviet Union to adopt a more forthcoming attitude at Belgrade also proved of no avail.

On February 21, the NATO countries plus Ireland decided to put forth their own version of a concluding document which could put on record the Western stand on issues raised at Belgrade. This 18-page text was not intended as the West's version of the optimum concluding document, but was meant to set forth what, in the Western view, could realistically have been achieved in serious negotiation. The Western document was substantive and included proposals in all baskets of the Final Act. It noted that divergent views were expressed as to the degree of implementation reached by each of the participating states and stressed that much remained to be done in order to give full effect to the Final Act. In support of the Helsinki monitoring groups in the U.S.S.R. and other countries of Eastern Europe, it also underlined the positive role that individuals and organizations, in addition to governments, have to play in insuring the full implementation of the Final Act, and it specified that individual groups have a right "where necessary, to point out instances of nonimplementation."

While the Western paper contained substantive language on human rights and humanitarian issues, it give equal consideration to other CSCE issues and sought to strike a balance among the three baskets. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union attacked the Western paper as an effort to interfere in the internal affairs of the Socialist countries and to distort the Final Act by giving unwarranted attention to certain provisions at the expense of others.

By the beginning of March, most delegations

were resigned to the prospect that little of substance could be agreed upon outside of provisions for another similar meeting in Madrid in 1980 and for a limited number of experts' groups. The Western delegations had long before agreed that if a substantial, balanced concluding document proved unobtainable, the only suitable alternative would be a brief, factual one. A document which was substantive but unbalanced or long only on rhetoric would have established dangerous precedents to the CSCE and damaged its credibility. Accordingly, the United States and its NATO Allies developed a brief document which, with the eventual assent of all delegations, formed the basis of the document accepted by consensus on March 9.

Although the results of the extended negotiations proved disappointing, the document adopted contained a number of important points which Western negotiators had sought. The document reaffirmed the political importance of the CSCE and the resolve of the participating states to implement unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally all the provisions of the Final Act. This obviously included Eastern implementation of Final Act human rights and humanitarian provisions. The document also recognized the propriety of the West's thorough review of implementation by stating that the exchange of views "in itself" constituted a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE.

While acknowledging the importance of detente, the concluding document underlined the role of CSCE and particularly the implementation of the Final Act as essential for the development of the detente process. Making the growth of detente contingent upon the implementation in good faith of all provisions of the Final Act marked the reversal of one of the main Soviet themes at Belgrade: that progress in implementation was contingent upon the favorable development of detente.

Despite Soviet reluctance to agree to language admitting difficulties and differences, the concluding document acknowledged that there were genuine disagreements about the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far. Given the consensus principle, this admission of disagreement was the most effective means available to Western negotiators to register dissatisfaction with the state of Eastern implementation of Final Act provisions. The concluding document also contained a frank admission that consensus could not be reached on any of the substantive new proposals submitted to the meeting.

By providing for another similar, Belgrade-type meeting in Madrid in the fall of 1980, the concluding document assured the continuation of the CSCE process. In addition, by obtaining reference to the decisions of the preparatory meeting of the Belgrade Meeting (the Yellow Book) as being one of the primary determinants of the modalities of the meeting in Madrid, Western negotiators were able to assure that the Madrid meeting, even if not identical in form to Belgrade, would include the same kind of full and thorough review of implementation.

The concluding document also provided for three experts' meetings between Belgrade and Madrid, two of them mandated by the Final Act itself. One of these, to be convened on October 31, 1978 in Switzerland, will consider methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The second, to prepare a "Scientific Forum," will be held in Bonn in June 1978. The third meeting will be held in February 1979 in Valletta to discuss economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean area.

Conclusions

In evaluating the results of the Belgrade meeting, it is important to keep in mind its mandate. Belgrade was a new venture in the history of East-West relations. It was not primarily a negotiation, and it did not look toward a revision of the Helsinki Final Act. Its major task was to conduct an exchange of views on CSCE implementation during the last 2 years and to examine means of deepening cooperation in the future. The views exchanged during the course of the meeting, and the precedents and issues which derive from them, are thus the most important legacy of the meeting itself.

As Ambassador Goldberg stated in his closing remarks to the Belgrade plenary, the United States considers the Belgrade meeting to have been successful. The frank and thorough review of implementation conducted by the United States and other countries raised issues and established precedents which are certain to influence the future development of the CSCE process and of which all participating states are likely to take careful note. Among the most important accomplishments of the review was demonstration that:

- The full implementation of all provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is essential to the successful development of detente and of security and cooperation in Europe;
- Human rights and humanitarian issues are a major, integral aspect of the CSCE process—and of detente;
- Individual states will be held accountable for their implementation failures, both at future CSCE meetings and in the eyes of world opinion;
- The United States and other CSCE states will not hesitate, and indeed consider it important, to point out specific examples of implementation failures which threaten the health and credibility of the CSCE process;
- Efforts to mask implementation shortcomings with the cloak of nonintervention in internal affairs constitute an ineffectual position which will not deflect legitimate criticism of a country's implementation record.

While the United States would have preferred to conclude the Belgrade meeting with a substantive document which reflected fully the views and proposals expressed at Belgrade, the negotiation of new commitments was not as important as the implementation of those already agreed upon. As President Carter stated in his June 1977 report to the CSCE Commission: "The United States and most Western states regard the Belgrade meeting primarily as an occasion for a serious review of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act." Indeed, the attitudes of the Soviet Union and its allies, and particularly their insistence that the concluding document could have no mention of human rights or implementation shortcomings, made clear at an early stage of the meeting that a substantive concluding document was unlikely. The United States thus directed its efforts toward its primary objective—a thorough review of implementation—and offered proposals which further underscored implementation problems and emphasized major U.S. concerns. The discussion of new proposals, while a frustrating experience, was not a needless one. The strenuous attempts of Western and neutral/nonaligned countries to gain Eastern acceptance of a balanced, substantive document raised issues which are likely to emerge again in CSCE discussions and which established necessary precedents for future efforts to build upon the Final Act, in particular at the 1980 meeting in Madrid.

While the concluding document actually agreed upon does not provide a full description either of the Belgrade meeting or of the state of CSCE implementation, it incorporates a number of important points insisted upon by Western delegations. In particular, the final document:

- assures the continuation of the CSCE process through agreement to convene another

followup meeting in Madrid in 1980, with several experts' meetings in the interim;

- affirms the resolve of all participating states "to implement fully, unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally, all the provisions of the Final Act"—a commitment which clearly encompasses Eastern implementation of CSCE human rights and humanitarian provisions;
- recognizes that implementation of the provisions of the Final Act is "essential for the development" of detente; and
- recognizes tacitly the propriety of the review of implementation conducted at Belgrade by stating that "the exchange of views constitutes in itself a contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE."

Because the CSCE is a long-term process, the influence of the Belgrade meeting cannot be judged in the short term or in isolation from the events which preceded and must follow it. Belgrade was an important but single step on the long road to full implementation of the pledges given at Helsinki.

Ambassador Goldberg affirmed in his concluding remarks to the Belgrade meeting that the United States is determined to continue along this road. In the period leading up to the Madrid meeting, we will work closely with other signatories in both East and West to seek means of improving implementation. We will also continue to examine our own policies to make sure that they are in compliance with the goals of CSCE. While the CSCE is not the only element of detente, one particular element of importance is in the recognition it accords to the human dimension of this process. The Belgrade meeting reiterated to all signatory states the central fact that successful detente cannot be selective and that the problems of people as well as of power remain firmly on the East-West agenda.

Appendix

CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE BELGRADE MEETING 1977 OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, HELD ON THE BASIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of these states, met at Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act relating to the follow-up to the Conference.

The participants received a message from the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito and were addressed by Mr. Milos Minic, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Contributions were made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

The representatives of the participating States stressed the importance they attach to detente, which has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered. In this context they underlined the role of the CSCE, the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act being essential for the development of this process.

The representatives of the participating States held a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of cooperation in Europe, and the development of the process of detente in the future.

The representatives of the participating States stressed the political importance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and reaffirmed the resolve of their governments, to implement fully, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, all the provisions of the Final Act.

It was recognized that the exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE, although different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far.

They also examined proposals concerning the above questions and the definition of the appropriate modalities for the holding of other meetings in conformity with the provisions of the chapter of the Final Act concerning the follow-up to the conference.

Consensus was not reached on a number of proposals submitted to the meeting.

In conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Act and with their resolve to continue the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE, the participating States will hold further meetings among their representatives. The second of these meetings will be held in Madrid commencing Tuesday 11 November 1980.

A preparatory meeting will be held in Madrid commencing Tuesday 9 September 1980 to decide on appropriate modalities for the main Madrid meeting. This will be done on the basis of the Final Act as well as of the other relevant documents adopted during the process of the CSCE.[4]

It was also agreed to hold, within the framework of the follow-up to the CSCE, the meetings of experts of the participating States indicated below.

In conformity with the mandate contained in the Final Act and according to the proposal made to this effect by the Government of Switzerland a meeting of experts will be convened at Montreux on October 31, 1978 charged with pursuing the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods.

Upon the invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Meeting of Experts envisaged in the Final Act in order to prepare a "Scientific Forum" will take place in Bonn starting on June 20, 1978. Representatives of UNESCO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe shall be invited to state their views.

Upon the invitation of the Government of Malta, a meeting of experts on the Mediterranean will be within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act, convened on February 13, 1979 in La Valletta. Its mandate will be to consider the possibilities and means of promoting concrete initiatives for mutually beneficial co-operation concerning various economic, scientific and cultural fields, in addition to other initiatives relating to the above subjects already under way. The non-participating Mediterranean States will be invited to contribute to the work of this meeting. Questions relating to security will be discussed at the Madrid meeting.

The duration of the meetings of experts should not exceed 4-6 weeks. They will draw up conclusions and recommendations and send their reports to the governments of the participating States. The results of these meetings will be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Madrid Meeting.

All the above-mentioned meetings will be held in conformity with paragraph 4 of the Chapter on "Follow-up to the Conference" of the Final Act.

The government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is requested to transmit the present document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Director-General of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is also requested to transmit the present document to the governments of the Mediterranean non-participating States.

The representatives of the participating States expressed their profound gratitude to the people and government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the excellent organization of the Belgrade Meeting and the warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the meeting.

Belgrade, March 8, 1978

[4] The other relevant documents adopted during the process of the CSCE are: The Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations; The Decisions of the Preparatory Meeting to Organize the Belgrade Meeting 1977; this Concluding Document.

REPORT

OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, FORSEEN BY THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE EXAMINATION AND ELABORATION OF A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AIMED AT COMPLEMENTING EXISTING METHODS

In accordance with the mandate of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place at Montreux from 31 October to 11 December 1978 in order to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods.

At the opening meeting the participants were addressed by Mr. Pierre Aubert, Head of the Federal Political Department, on behalf of the Government of Switzerland.

The participants adopted an agenda and proceeded to a general exchange of views after which several proposals aimed at complementing existing methods for peaceful settlement of disputes were submitted and discussed. A working paper based on the "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" was submitted for consideration which put forward the following subsidiary and compulsory procedures: negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Another working paper was submitted for consideration which put forward a proposal of mandatory consultations as a possible method for peaceful settlement of disputes. A further paper was submitted which put forward the concept of a comprehensive method for peaceful settlement of disputes within specific subject areas, including appropriate mandatory features. Other proposals and ideas were put forward for consideration. Divergent views were expressed and no consensus was reached on specific methods.

The participants stressed the importance their governments attach to détente, which has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered. In this context they underlined the role of the CSCE, the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act being essential for the development of this process.

The participants reaffirmed the adherence of their governments to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Final Act of the CSCE. They also stressed the significance of elaborating, in accordance with the mandate contained in the Final Act, a method for peaceful settlement of disputes.

The participants agreed on a common approach to the elaboration of a method for peaceful settlement of disputes between or among the participating States which should be based on the following:

— consistency with the principles and the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Final Act of Helsinki, especially principle V of the latter document;

— consistency with sovereign equality of States and the free choice of means;

— experience and the treaty and diplomatic practice and the views of all the participating States in this field;

— acceptability to all participating States irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development;

— subsidiarity to existing methods and institutions for the peaceful settlement of international disputes;

— complementarity to existing methods so as to promote, in good faith and a spirit of co-operation, a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law;

— flexibility of the method;

— capacity for progressive development of the method.

The method to be elaborated should contribute to peace, security and justice in Europe, to the further development of détente and co-operation among the participating States.

The participants recommended that the participating States consider the possibility of promoting and extending the existing practice of including in appropriate treaties among and between them, provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The participants recommended to the governments of States participating in the CSCE that they consider, at the Madrid Meeting, the possibility of convening another Meeting of Experts in order to pursue, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods, taking into account the common approach set forth above, as well as the various proposals and ideas discussed at the Montreux Meeting.

The participants recommended that contacts between the governments of participating States continue in order better to acquaint themselves with each other's views on the subject of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of Switzerland for the excellent organization of the Meeting and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay at Montreux.

REPORT

OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, FORESEEN BY THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE BELGRADE MEETING 1977 TO CONSIDER, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT, THE POSSIBILITIES AND MEANS OF PROMOTING CONCRETE INITIATIVES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL CO-OPERATION CONCERNING VARIOUS ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS, IN ADDITION TO OTHER INITIATIVES RELATING TO THE ABOVE SUBJECTS ALREADY UNDER WAY.

In accordance with the mandate of the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place at Valletta upon the invitation of the Government of Malta, from 13 February to 26 March 1979 in order to consider within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the possibilities and means of promoting concrete initiatives for mutually beneficial co-operation concerning various economic, scientific and cultural fields, in addition to other initiatives relating to the above subjects already under way.

During the opening session of the Meeting, a message was received from Dr. Anton Buttigieg, President of the Republic of Malta, and the participants were addressed by Mr. Wistin Abela, Minister of Development, Energy, Port and Telecommunications of the Republic of Malta.

The participants adopted an agenda and agreed on modalities appropriate to this Meeting.

The participants had a general exchange of views.

In accordance with the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977 all the non-participating Mediterranean States were invited to contribute to the work of the Meeting. Egypt and Israel accepted and made their contributions in plenary on 21 February. Syria addressed the plenary on 27 February. The representatives of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), UNESCO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) made contributions relating to the work of the Meeting.

Two working bodies concerned with co-operation in the economic and in the scientific and cultural fields respectively were established by the plenary and pursued their work under its guidance. The non-participating Mediterranean States which made contributions participated in the discussions of the working bodies. Upon the invitation of the plenary, the representatives of the ECE and UNESCO made additional contributions in the working bodies.

The participants stressed the will of their governments to promote the development of good-neighbourly relations and co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States and reaffirmed the importance their governments attach to the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Final Act of the CSCE by implementing all of its provisions, as well as their readiness to pursue their efforts accordingly.

The participants considered many measures and activities already under way or envisaged, both bilateral and multilateral, relating to mutually beneficial co-operation in the fields of economics, science and culture; in doing so, they drew attention to certain current problems in the above-mentioned fields and examined ways of solving them. The participants were of the opinion that the exchange of views which took place in this context was a useful outcome of the Meeting.

The Meeting of Experts noted that particularly useful and concrete work in the fields specified in the mandate of the Valletta Meeting is being done by competent international organisations, notably by ECE, UNESCO and UNEP.

In accordance with the mandate of the Meeting and taking into account the contributions made at the Meeting by non-participating Mediterranean States and by the representatives of ECE, UNESCO and UNEP, the participants considered ideas and proposals for further initiatives intended to promote mutually beneficial co-operation in sectors falling within the fields identified for consideration by the Meeting.

The Meeting of Experts concluded that for many of those sectors ECE, UNESCO and UNEP provided a framework for investigating and developing further co-operation among the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States, whereas in other sectors unilateral efforts, or bilateral or other forms of multilateral co-operation were more suitable.

Accordingly, the participants, having examined the ideas, considerations and proposals which had been submitted, recommended to Governments of the participating States that they envisage within their possibilities and interests, through their participation in international organisations and in their bilateral and multilateral relations with the participating States and with the non-participating Mediterranean States, the following:

ECONOMICS

Continuing their efforts to contribute to the diversified development of the economies of the States concerned, including the non-participating Mediterranean States, taking due account of their national development objectives.

Developing the exchange of statistical data, including with the non-participating Mediterranean States, among national statistical institutes, and considering the convening of a meeting of experts within the framework of ECE, with a view to drawing up an inventory of existing data and considering further actions in the fields of data concerning national accounts, labour, agricultural and industrial production, trade, transport, tourism, the environment, education and health.

Examining within the framework of UNEP, the possibilities of participating States being provided with information and advice on relevant environmental programmes and activities with a view to achieving better harmonization between Mediterranean and other international programmes; contributing to the efforts to reduce pollution of the Mediterranean; and considering the possibility of developing co-operation initiated within the framework of the Barcelona Convention.

Considering the holding of meetings at a technical level, within the framework of the appropriate international organisations, in order to determine the most suitable criteria for making the best possible use of tourist resources and promoting further co-operation among interested countries in the fields of vocational training, in-service training and scholarships.

Intensifying the exchange, bilaterally as well as in co-operation with the competent international organisations, of the results of studies on the conservation and rational use of energy and developing their co-operation in the area of solar energy, including with the non-participating Mediterranean States, by supporting the activities of UNEP and taking due account of the outcome of the CSCE "Scientific Forum".

Considering the expansion of trans-European and Mediterranean transport networks and promoting with a view to facilitating trade, the further application in these areas of the TIR Convention as well as other instruments and recommendations elaborated within the framework of ECE relating to international transport of goods.

Considering co-operative efforts, within the competent international organisations, to adapt agricultural production in the Mediterranean to meet existing needs.

Urging better co-operation among the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States in the field of fisheries in the Mediterranean, and supporting further studies within competent international organisations on fish processing.

Supporting the programme sponsored by UNEP for the development of aquaculture in the Mediterranean as a co-operative project between all interested countries.

Promoting co-operation in the field of telecommunications technology among appropriate institutions or firms of interested participating States and non-participating Mediterranean States through the carrying out of joint research, including on new equipment and current technology, the exchange of information, the organisation of training courses for specialists, in co-operation with the International Telecommunications Union. Studying the possibility of convening a meeting of experts of interested countries on telecommunications in the Mediterranean.

Recommending the host countries and the countries of origin to intensify their contacts with a view to finding solutions to the problems which exist in the field of migrant labour. While fully implementing the existing agreements to which they are parties, they should also continue, by all appropriate means, their efforts to improve the situation of migrant workers in conformity with the provisions of the Final Act on migrant labour, including the solution of the problems in the economic, social, human and other fields.

SCIENCE

Practising more widely the holding, within the framework of the competent international organisations mentioned in the Final Act, of conferences, symposia and meetings on the most pressing scientific and technical problems of the Mediterranean that are of general interest.

Reinforcing their co-operation in controlling and eradicating certain diseases prevalent in the Mediterranean (e.g. thalassaemia), facilitating studies and conferences, particularly under the aegis of the World Health Organisation, with a view to establishing programmes for the prevention, detection and treatment of these diseases and for the training of specialized personnel, on the basis of the expertise which some participating States could share with other countries.

Urging further exchanges of views within the competent international organisations, on co-operative studies on gerontology, including environmental geriatric care.

Considering the convening under the aegis of the competent international organisations of a scientific conference on the protection of the Mediterranean ecosystem, particularly with a view to studying co-operative projects in the fields of afforestation, forest management, management of water resources, reclamation of arid and semi-arid areas, and drawing up an inventory of the technical centres for research existing in these areas.

Developing co-operation in the field of seismology, increasing the exchange of information on seismic phenomena in the Mediterranean and adjacent areas, and considering the convening, under the aegis of UNESCO, of a symposium on seismicity in the Mediterranean and its repercussions in Europe and Africa.

Studying, in co-operation with other particpating States and with non-participating Mediterranean States, the possibility of the drafting of a comprehensive history of the Mediterranean utilizing the valuable experience of UNESCO and under its aegis.

Encouraging studies relevant to the needs of the Mediterranean, particularly in the fields of science and technology.

CULTURE

Supporting the holding of congresses and conferences by existing international organisations in the field of culture, both in the participating States and in the non-participating Mediterranean States.

Increasing their co-operation, both at the bilateral and multilateral level, including within the competent international organisations in the field of scientific research and in the protection and preservation of the cultural and historical heritage of the Mediterranean, notably archaeological and architectural remains, with a view to developing in particular underwater archaeological research and harmonizing the legal and technical modalities for the protection and preservation of this heritage.

Considering the preparation of a study on the relationship between the development of tourism in the Mediterranean and the protection, preservation and presentation of the cultural and historical heritage, with the participation of interested participating and non-participating States, and in collaboration with competent international organisations.

Expanding their co-operation in the field of the dissemination of scientific and cultural knowledge through radio and television; increasing the exchanges of scientific and cultural radio and television programmes; studying the possibilities, in collaboration with the competent international organisations, of using radio and television for vocational and adult training.

Promoting the exchange of films among the film libraries of the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States and the holding of Film Weeks.

Encouraging the efforts of UNESCO to help Mediterranean countries establish a Mediterranean Cultural Centre.

The participants recommended to the Governments of the participating States of the CSCE that they take into account, as appropriate, at the Madrid Meeting, the results of the Valletta Meeting and that they be mindful in the interim of the outcome achieved by unilateral efforts and within the framework of competent international organisations and in bilateral or multilateral co-operation, in the fields of the mandate for the Valletta Meeting.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government and the people of Malta for the excellent organisation of the Meeting and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Valletta.

Valletta, 26 March 1979

REPORT

of the "Scientific Forum" of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and of the report of the meeting of experts representing the participating States and their national scientific institutions held in Bonn from 20 June to 28 July 1978, the "Scientific Forum" took place in Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, from 18 February to 3 March 1980. It was held in the form of a meeting of leading personalities in science from the participating States.

During the opening session of the "Scientific Forum" the participants were welcomed by Hans-Ulrich Klose, Lord Mayor of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, and were addressed by Dr. Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

During the first working session of the Plenary representatives of UNESCO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) made their contributions. Opening statements were made by representatives of delegations of the participating States.

Four subsidiary working bodies were established by the Plenary on alternative energy sources, food production, medicine, and the humanities and social sciences. Representatives of UNESCO and the ECE were invited to make additional contributions in these working bodies.

The "Scientific Forum" discussed interrelated problems of common interest concerning current and future developments in science, and promotion of expansion of contacts, communications and the exchange of information between scientific institutions and among scientists.

In this context the subsidiary working bodies considered the following areas and subjects:

Exact and Natural Sciences
Scientific research, in particular fundamental research, in the field of alternative energy sources

Exact and Natural Sciences
Scientific research, in particular fundamental research, in the field of food production

Medicine
Current trends in medical research, in particular in basic research and primarily on cardiovascular, tumour and virus diseases, taking into consideration the influence of the changing environment on human health

The Humanities and Social Sciences
Comparative studies on the social, socio-economic and cultural phenomena, especially the problems of human environment and urban development.

The subsidiary working bodies also reviewed written contributions submitted to the "Scientific Forum".

On the basis of their deliberations they drew up reports which were reviewed by the Plenary and are included, as amended, in Annexes 1-4.

As a result of its proceedings the "Scientific Forum" concluded the following:

- Since the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE, there has been a significant expansion of international co-operation in research and training and in the exchange of information. Progress, however, has been greater in some areas than in others. It is observed that the present state of international scientific co-operation still requires improvements in various respects. Such improvements should be achieved bilaterally and multilaterally at governmental and non-governmental levels through intergovernmental and other agreements, international programmes and co-operative projects, and by providing equitable opportunities for scientific research and for wider communication and travel necessary for professional purposes.

  This goal can, however, be reached only by respect for all the principles and by full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act. All participating States are, therefore, urged to observe the spirit and the letter of the Final Act, particularly with respect to conditions essential for international scientific co-operation.

  It is furthermore considered necessary to state that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms by all States represents one of the foundations for a significant improvement in their mutual relations, and in international scientific co-operation at all levels.

  Appropriate support should be given to arrange advanced seminars and training courses for young scientists from participating and other States that would enable them to study new scientific methods for shorter or longer periods. Information about these activities and arrangements should be disseminated as widely as possible.

- The different levels of scientific development in particular fields in the participating States should be taken into account when pursuing scientific co-operation.
- It is recommended that the participating States study the possibility of convening a new "Scientific Forum", at a suitable date, depending on developments in science and in scientific co-operation among the participating States. The results of the "Scientific Forum" in Hamburg may be taken into account, as appropriate, by the participating States at the Madrid Meeting, scheduled for November 1980.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the excellent organization of the "Scientific Forum" and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Hamburg.

ANNEX 1: Alternative Energy Sources

1. Introduction

The working body examined the problems created by the rapid dwindling of easily accessible reserves of fossil energy — and reviewed alternative solutions provided by other energy sources.

During the discussions it became apparent that delegates - from different countries interpreted the term "alternative energy sources" in different ways. However, it was agreed that the following four main categories should be discussed as energy options for the future:

Advanced utilization of fossil energy, nuclear energy (fission and fusion), solar energy (direct and indirect forms), and - energy conservation. The working body made no attempt to give priorities to the different options.

2. Need for fundamental research on various alternative energy - sources

2.0 General

The working body noted that the questions of developing energy resources are today of vital importance. The - further development of civilization in the economic as well as in the political field depends on the possibility of satisfying demand for energy in industry, in the residential and service sectors, in transport, in food production, and in the mining and processing of minerals.

In spite of the necessity for and possibility of the more economical use of energy, the demand for energy will continue to rise. The problem demands especially urgent solutions because of the diminishing energy resource represented by oil and gas.

That is why the task of scientific research in the field of energy is to supply during the next decade a reliable scientific basis for planning and use of all basic resources of energy. Such a basis should include forecasts of the environmental effects of the various types of energy, and in particular improved assessments of the effects on the global and regional climate.

The working body recommends governments to use international co-operation for the fulfilling of this task.

It is not possible to give universal priorities for any research objectives, as many countries have already found and applied technological solutions to problems relevant to their situation, whose relevance for other countries has yet to be investigated.

2.1 Problems of utilization of fossil fuels: efficiency and safety

The urgent need to increase utilization of low-quality fossil energy resources -coal, brown coal, oil shale and tar sand, lignite, peat, etc.- as well as at the same time to tighten the environmental requirements, make it necessary to develop ever more advanced combustion and conversion methods. In spite of the need for an intensified interest in more efficient and cleaner combustion methods, as well as in the use of synthetic liquid and gaseous fuel from coal, oil shale and tar sands, and considering that several large demonstration projects exist, synthetic fuel production is still on a rather narrow basis. Both fundamental and applied research are needed on a broad front before synthetic liquid or gaseous fuels are capable of substituting for natural hydrocarbons on a commercial scale.

Particular attention must be given to the problems of safety in deep mining and to the efficiency of production methods in both deep and open-cast mining.

2.2 Nuclear energy

The problem of energy supply for the majority of participating countries cannot be solved without using nuclear energy for producing electricity and heat. The economic efficiency of nuclear fission technology has been established, the reliability has been shown to be good, and the environmental aspects are becoming well understood. All aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle will require continuing efforts to assure its full reliability and safety, in order to ensure public acceptability.

For the guarantee of further nuclear prospects the development of breeder reactors is necessary.

The working body states that insufficient effort has so far been made in the development of unconventional types of reactors.

The working body notes that research in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion is nearing the level of scientific demonstration. Great efforts are necessary, however, to demonstrate even more urgently the technological feasibility of fusion.

2.3 Solar energy and other renewable energy sources

Many ways exist for the wider application of solar energy through direct and indirect methods, and in decentralized and centralized forms. In the long term they could contribute significantly to the solution of energy problems. Some of these solar technologies are already in use, some are under development and some are still in the research stage. The same is true for geothermal and tidal sources of energy.

Apart from the scientific and technical problems, however, there are also a number of other open questions pertaining to the wider application of solar energy. Among those questions are economic, infrastructural, environmental, legal and administrative considerations. It is important that these problems are treated together with the scientific problems within a common framework in order to ensure a balanced and optimal use of solar energy.

The tentative suggestions for promising solar energy research areas in the list below do not assign priorities. Further, the selection of areas to a certain extent reflects the specialities of individual scientists in the working body. The list is therefore only indicative and is subject to revision.

- Energy storage, crucial to the small and large-scale use of solar energy and also of great general importance.
- Solar heating, including systems for integration into local or district heating schemes.
- Energy from biosystems, especially production and conversion of fuels from wood, cultivated biomass, etc.
- Solar electricity based on the industrial development of existing photovoltaic or photothermal techniques and on research on novel approaches
- Basic research in photochemistry and photobiology.
- Scientific evaluation of future solar energy prospects on a national or regional scale.
- Integration of solar energy into existing energy systems, for different forms of energy and end-use requirements.

2.4 Energy conservation

Energy consumption and economic activity are very closely related. The principal way to optimize this relationship is conservation. Conservation should be aimed at minimizing energy losses, elimination of ineffective energy use, recycling of materials as well as development of energy-saving processes and technologies. Much research and development activity is needed continuously for efforts in energy conservation in industry, in transportation, in buildings and in appliances and services of many kinds and in improvements in technology. This can be achieved through fundamental as well as applied research.

In this context the working body would stress the vital role of technological innovation.

3. International co-operation

Special attention must be paid to the problems of exchange and assessment of scientific and technical data. Individual and institutional scientific contacts are seen here as the best means. Strengthening of existing information centres is another, e.g. within the framework of ECE and UNESCO.

The working body supports the existing forms of international and regional co-operation, increased contacts amongst research organizations, including the United Nations special organizations, e.g. International Atomic Energy Agency, UNESCO, Economic Commission for Europe etc., and non-governmental organizations e.g. International Council of Scientific Unions.

Forms of co-operation can include the organization of international conferences, symposia, schools, exchange of scientists between different countries and bodies, discussion of research programmes on a regional or bilateral

scale, and the working out and realization of joint international projects. The working body notes with approval examples of international activity such as INTOR, (International Fusion Project) carried out under the aegis of IAEA, and the energy project of IIASA.

The working body especially asks international organizations to take initiatives to promote co-operation in fields of advanced coal utilization technology, deep coal mining safety and solar energy.

The working body on alternative energy sources considers its meetings to have been useful. Since the energy problem is important and of a long-term nature, the working body proposes the continuation of this type of interdisciplinary scientific meeting.

The working body had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

ANNEX 2: Food Production

The future demand, and for many the present demand, for food and feed in the world, emphasized by the "Scientific Forum" of the CSCE, requires sustained research and development efforts in all aspects of the food system.

The need became evident, during the discussions of the Working Body, for more integrated multidisciplinary research, training at undergraduate und postgraduate level, exchanges of scientists and their interaction. Although the Working Body recognised the limits of the mandate of the "Scientific Forum it agreed that food production was of world importance.

In plant genetics and breeding there is a need for international co-operation on the development of more productive plants with higher photosynthetic capacity, more efficient capability to use available mineral nutrients, and better ability to withstand environmental stresses. In this research, scientists should make effective use of modern plant-breeding techniques, including haploid breeding and various tissue culture techniques in addition to standard methods to obtain crosses, noting the importance of wide crosses. In research on crop production, there is a need for co-operation on the development of energy-efficient management systems based on biological nitrogen fixation and other ecological means as well as the conservation and management of natural resources. The importance of plant protection was stressed as a means of reducing losses.

In the area of animal production, there is a need for more co-operative research on the genetic improvement of farm livestock; the control of infectious diseases, metabolic disorders and infertility; the increased use of non-protein nitrogen in the ruminant diet; animal housing, nutrition and improvement of the efficiency of management systems; and elimination of stress susceptibility and improvement of products of animal origin.

Special attention is drawn to the need for international co-operation in identifying and preserving germ plasm of plants and animals in their natural ecosystems. This should include more, and more comprehensive, gene banks to preserve genetic materials for the benefit of plant and animal production in the future.

Fisheries contribute substantially to the food system. International attitudes should facilitate rather than hinder fisheries research. Continued international vigilance must be maintained on the effects on the stock of the size of catch and of pollution to ensure long-term benefits from this important natural resource.

Attention is drawn to the significant contribution that technology can make to the diminution of post-harvest losses and to the maintenance of the wholesomeness and nutritional quality of foods. More research is needed on alternative sources and economic production of basic food components such as proteins, essential amino acids, etc. Collective efforts should be expanded in the fight against all forms of malnutrition through the assurance of the natural quality of foods and protection against introduction of harmful contaminants during production, processing, storage and distribution. Intensified efforts are needed in the area of nutrition education both at academic and consumer levels and should include multidisciplinary behavioural studies on eating habits and food acceptance. In the final analysis, it is health and nutritional status that is the prerequisite for the well-being of all mankind.

The Working Body expressed confidence that existing governmental and non-governmental international organizations will be able to help in expanding research on the subjects to which attention is drawn in this report.

The Working Body thus had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

ANNEX 3 : Medicine

The outcome of the work of the subsidiary working body is presented in the following sections on cardiovascular, neoplastic and viral diseases. The working body had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

Cardiovascular Diseases

The various reports presented to the "Scientific Forum", and other information available, underline that cardiovascular diseases, where atherosclerosis and/or hypertension are involved, are of major concern in most participating countries. These two main and interrelated ailments with their complications - ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease and peripheral vascular disease together show a high level of incidence and account for a high death rate.

Therefore it seems imperative that special efforts of basic research should be focused on the mechanisms of atherogenesis and causal mechanisms in essential hypertension. On the other hand, it emerges from the reports that there is also great need for help from the behavioural sciences in order to improve compliance both of doctors and the public especially with respect to advice in the interest of prevention and treatment. Preventive measures in childhood are worth a special research effort.

From the various reports it is seen that marked and diverse research efforts are already being made in most countries towards illuminating the mechanisms that lie behind these groups of diseases. A main effort also appears to be directed towards their prevention and treatment.

Since the etiology and pathogenesis of these diseases are far from being fully understood and since these ailments dominate the disease pattern in so many countries, it appears that they must be looked upon as fields for international concern and that fruitful patterns of international co-operation should be encouraged. Such co-operation should be looked upon as an effort additional to the widespread research already going on in the different countries.

In order to identify projects and fields related to cardiovascular diseases where international co-operation might be fruitful one could use the following list of 'indications'.

'Indications' for making a bi- or multinational co-operative effort in the cardiovascular field 1/

1. Co-operative research

1.1 international studies that exploit the transcultural differences in exposure to known or presumed risk factors (for instance in connexion with migration) to draw conclusions about causality either in a qualitative or a quantitative sense.

1.2 studies that require such large numbers of patients, in order to come to a conclusion, that these cannot be found in one single country. Large and complicated drug trials might be an example in point.

1.3 studies that are so costly that they can only be financed by a collaborative effort.

1.4 studies in which there is an abundance of patients of a certain kind, say with rheumatic heart disease, in one country and resources such as interested experts and/or financial support available in another country.

1/ Here efforts are meant that are distinct from research activities on a local or international co-operative basis, the results of which are then reported to audiences of scientific meetings and in the international literature.

1.5 study projects that can only succeed if expertise in different fields from different countries is pooled.

1.6 study of occurrence, natural history and/or treatment of uncommon cardiovascular diseases that necessitates pooling of observations from different countries.

2. Evaluation

Comparative studies of the efficiency and effectiveness of different health care systems and health care practices in the fields of prevention, clinical medicine and rehabilitation.

3. Co-operative surveillance

Examples:

- a co-operative early warning system for the side effects of drugs.
- a co-operative early warning system for failures of certain types of electronic pacemakers.

4. Standardization of nomenclature

Examples:

- coronary angiogram
- congenital heart disease
- level of rehabilitation after myocardial infarction and cerebrovascular disease.

5. Standardization of procedures

Examples:

- determination of all blood lipids and lipoproteins used in epidemiological research.
- determination of prostaglandins.
- collection of epidemiological data.

6. Transfer of techniques

Examples:

- a systematic programme of practical courses in new and/or difficult biochemical determinations with an updated listing of such courses that is made internationally available.

- exchange of computer software in the field of epidemiology and clinical cardiology.
- facilitation of transfer of new or difficult techniques in the cardiovascular field.

7. Co-operative moves by scientists in the field of prevention
Example:
- simultaneous urging against cigarette consumption or in favour of food habits that can promote prevention.

CANCER

The group stresses that international co-operation in cancer research is necessary in order to achieve progress in the cancer problem.

Such international co-operation exists in Europe and throughout the world, and is carried out by a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations and societies.

The group urges governments and other appropriate bodies to increase support for such organizations, so that existing programmes of international co-operation can be continued and enlarged. Due care should be taken to avoid unnecessary duplication. Progress of international collaboration in cancer research should be monitored periodically by the appropriate bodies.

The group requests that special emphasis should be devoted to the following:

(1) Free dissemination of regional and local data on cancer and related etiological factors, and assistance for field studies.
(2) Extension of cancer registries to include new regions and countries.

(3) Extension of information exchange in cancer treatment, including data on screening, testing, toxicity, drug interactions and, where applicable, exchange of drugs. Elaboration of ethical principles.

(4) Standardization of reagents, diagnostic methods and test systems.

(5) Access to research facilities and data from health care systems.

(6) Training courses, especially for young scientists in oncology and appropriate basic biology, including new methods.

(7) Increased opportunities, especially for young scientists to learn new approaches in cancer research, by short-term and long-term fellowships.

(8) Direct and rapid contact between working scientists in collaborating laboratories, by all available means of communication.

VIROLOGY

In spite of great achievements in the prevention of some of the most severe virus diseases, the relative and absolute importance of viruses as causes of acute and chronic infectious diseases has increased.

For this reason, and being aware of the utmost importance of international co-operation, for example in the eradication of smallpox, the virologists feel that such co-operation is necessary in trying to solve some of the many important problems in virology. International co-operation exists already in the field of virology both in Europe and in the world and is carried out by several governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The virologists urge that the existing programmes in the field of virology should be continued and enlarged. Unnecessary duplication should be avoided.

Although partly covered by existing organizations and arrangements further international co-operation is required in the following :

- Rapid dissemination of information on epidemiology of virus diseases in the different regions.
- Some fields of molecular virology,as for example recombinant DNA,including safety regulations and evaluation of benefits.
- Promoting channels for information on new methods in diagnostic procedures, especially rapid diagnosis of virus diseases.
- Standardization of material for diagnostic tests as well as for materials used for prevention and treatment of virus diseases.
- Study and prevention of some of the common and especially important diseases such as respiratory infections and hepatitis.
- Obtaining access to research facilities in different institutions, especially for young scientists, including training courses, and long or short-term fellowships, for example in regional institutions prepared to give training in applied clinical and epidemiological virology.
- Direct and rapid contact between working scientists in collaborating laboratories by all available means of communication.

ANNEX 4: Humanities and Social Sciences

1. The Main Issues to be Faced

A. General Issues

The main issues to be faced include such general phenomena as rapid demographic, social, cultural and psychological changes, the impact of the increasing sophistication of technology, the shifting role of women in society, alterations of values concerning the environment, and limitations imposed by a growing energy shortage. (A more detailed list of the problems to be faced appears in the Appendix.)

B. Urbanization

The process of urbanization has brought new possibilities and problems which have affected rural areas and open spaces as well as cities and their inhabitants. Among them are effects of internal and external migration, problems of crowding, disorder and crime, alterations to the natural environment, and pollution of the atmosphere, water resources and the land. All of this calls for an improved understanding of the processes of urbanization and their relationship to regional development.

C. Environmental Quality

There has been a growing consciousness of the importance of environmental protection, but there are practical problems due to imperfect understanding of the environment. In addition, economic accounting should to an increasing extent take into consideration not only economic activity but also the social, cultural and ecological values of the environment.

D. Research Methodology

The highly complex problems of urban development and environmental protection require the use of multi-disciplinary approaches, comparative studies and the development of mathematical, simulation or other kinds of models. Some of the difficulties in research on these matters is due to differences in the collection, analysis of data and other materials in the various countries.

2. The Tasks Ahead

Based on the above considerations, six major areas of research were identified:

1. Changes in population structures and characteristics.
2. Present and future social, cultural, behavioural, economic and spatial problems of the process of urbanization.
3. Preservation of national patrimony and environment.
4. Impact of new technologies on human behaviour, natural environment and urban ecosystems.
5. Organization of ecologically orientated urban and regional planning and management.
6. Education, training, preparation and diffusion of information.

These areas were drawn from the detailed list of topics presented in the Appendix.

To ensure that such research is undertaken, and that its results will be put to use, two developments are needed. One is a larger allocation of funding than is presently characteristic in the social sciences and humanities, especially in the lesser developed countries with smaller resources. The other is the creation of closer co-operation between scientists, planners, the public and policy-makers.

It was emphasized that the necessary research efforts can be attained by existing institutions with the support of governments and administrative authorities. There was also agreement that promotion and expansion of international co-operation and collaboration are needed in research as well as in the training of scientists and in the exchange of information

3. Recommendations

(a) Scientific conferences and seminars should be organized during the coming years on the problems of urban development, cultural changes and the quality of the environment. These meetings could focus particularly upon problems in comparative studies and methodology in the interdisciplinary approach to investigations of social, socio-economic, ecological and cultural aspects of urban development and environmental change. These conferences or

seminars could be organized by UNESCO or ECE, and where appropriate in co-operation with existing international scientific bodies including the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (known as the Vienna Centre) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). A consultative body of experts should prepare the meetings on the basis of results of national studies. The latter might focus upon a number of special pilot projects on urban and/or environmental issues, the results of which would then be discussed in the international forum.

(b) International, national and regional organizations operating in Europe should be encouraged by CSCE, within their field of competence, to arrange advanced training courses and seminars for scientists from states participating in the CSCE. In particular, provision should be made for young scientists to attend training courses arranged in participating states.

(c) An inventory of recently completed and ongoing studies on the problems of urban development and of the human environment should be organized. A review of experience in international co-operation in research and in the exchange of information should be undertaken. These reviews could be compiled by one of the existing international bodies, for example through UNEP, ECE or UNESCO.

d) Eco-toxicological studies connected with relevant methods in the social and health sciences should be supported and improved on an international basis, especially within the relevant projects of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) of ICSU, and WHO.

e) A series of comparative studies should be strengthened on the procedure in integrated urban and regional planning and management in order to determine the most effective way to link research to the process of decision-making.

f) The impact of science and technology on society; the methodology of interdisciplinary studies with special reference to behavioural, social and natural sciences; research and policy-making in social fields; the decision-making process including the involvement of the public; research in political sciences relevant to the CSCE countries; science policy and improved and more efficient forms of co-operation including the institutional framework, are themes which should be further explored in future meetings.

The working body had a thorough discussion on all tasks on agenda item number 2. The content of these discussions is reflected both in this Annex and in the general conclusions contained in the Report of the "Scientific Forum".

APPENDIX

GENERAL ISSUES

1. The impact of increasingly sophisticated technology on urban development, life-styles and the environment, compared with "appropriate" technology which may be less sophisticated but more closely adapted to the environment and the preservation of social values.

2. The impact of an ageing population on the economy; requirements for social services, housing and transportation

3. The effects of the changing role of women in the work force.

4. The effects of shifts in social values on the role the individual plays in planning and policy-making.

5. The gap between the perceptions of various groups of professionals as to what society needs and how this should be provided, and the perceptions of the public at large.

6. Finding effective means for including in planning and policy-making the results of research on human dimensions of urbanization and environmental quality.

7. Problems of undertaking and implementing truly comprehensive planning.

8. How to make research in social sciences and the humanities more relevant for planning and policy-making.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

1. The impact of environment on human health.
2. How to tackle the problems of environmental hazards and technological risks.
3. How to develop comprehensive environmental plans into which plans for industrial, transportation, urban and social development might be fitted.
4. Determination of the values which individuals attach to particular environments, and the extent to which such values vary over space and time.
5. Impediments to the improvement of environmental quality.
6. How to investigate objectively changes in the quality of life.
7. How to develop a broader perspective in planning so that more intensive use may be made of existing resources rather than bringing in new supplies from elsewhere, e.g. the introduction of wastewater renovation and re-cycling as opposed to development of water supplies at progressively further distances from the city.
8. The impact of economic development on environmental quality.
9. Sustaining an interest in the environmental question at the political level.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

1. The circumstances in which an inter-disciplinary approach is especially appropriate, and the ways in which it can be most successfully pursued.
2. The integration of non-technical and non-economic factors in models relating to urban development and environmental quality management.
3. Problems of undertaking comparative studies, especially where cultural traits make data collection difficult, or where meanings and values attached to given phenomena are unique to a particular area.
4. How to take account of shifts in social values and new developments in technology in planning and policy-making.
5. Provision of opportunities for education on the environment.
6. How to cope with decision-making under uncertainty.
7. Inclusion of predictions of shifts in social values and development of technologies in plans and policies.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

1. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS OF URBANIZATION

Changes in population structures and their impact on urban life and development. (Professional structure, the impact of women entering the work force, new family models, youth-adult correlations, increasing ratio of old people).

2. URBAN MIGRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Social effects of migration to and from cities and its impact on areas of immigration and emigration. Increasing diffusion of urban population from cities to countryside leading up to levelling of differences between urban and rural life. The role of small and medium-sized cities. The process of concentration and of deconcentration of urban activities.

3. THE FUTURE OF URBANIZATION

Human adaptation to changes in urban life. The impact of technical progress on the functional and spatial structure of urbanization from the ecological point of view. Prognosis of new forms of urbanization. Environment and technology. Optimum size of cities. The "human scale" in urban development.

4. TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY CONFRONTED WITH HUMAN, SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND ECOLOGICAL NEEDS

Human perception of urban environment. Economic value of ecological and social factors. How to integrate ecological, social, cultural and economic criteria.

5. PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL PATRIMONY AND ENVIRONMENT

Interdisciplinary environmental research. Preservation of the national patrimony on a local and national scale (architectural and cultural and traditional values, urban structures). Adaptation of old cities to new needs. Revalorisation of old housing system.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (continued)

6. INTERRELATION OF URBAN AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Correlation between urban and regional growth and national development. Urban and rural development. Structural forms of the net of settlements. Process of urban concentration and deconcentration.

7. METHODS OF ECOLOGICALLY-ORIENTATED INTEGRATED URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING

Principles of integrated planning. Methodolgy of long-term urban and regional planning presenting several strategies of development. How to compare them from economic and ecological points of view (mathematical models). The territorial integration of planning and implementation. Systems of urban management.

8. PROBLEMS OF BIG CITIES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS

Comparision of various cities' growth. Internal structures of metropolia, their complex problems: housing, recreation, traffic, places of work, etc. Special problems of highly industrialized cities and regions, harbour cities and coastal urbanization.

9. ECUCATION, TRAINING AND INFORMATION

Methodology of comprehensive environmental training and education of undergraduate and postgraduate specialists. Special training of young scientists. Information on the importance of ecological, social and cultural aspects of urban development and environmental protection for decision-makers and the general public. New means: mass media, etc.

Public participation in planning and implementation decisions. Public control of the mode of implementation of the results of planning based on scientific research.

Bulletin Reprint

CSCE Followup Meeting Concludes in Madrid

September 1983

United States Department of State

CSCE Followup Meeting Concludes in Madrid

The final session of the followup meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was held in Madrid September 7–9, 1983. Secretary Shultz represented the United States.

Following are the Secretary's remarks made to that session on September 9 and the text of the concluding document agreed to by the 35 participating countries.

SECRETARY'S REMARKS[1]

Spain, our gracious and creative host, has made a successful—and inspiring—transition to democracy. That success reminds us by its example that the light of freedom can never be extinguished and that the aspiration to human dignity is basic to all peoples. This is what the Helsinki process is all about. That is why the United States supports continuation of the process, strengthened as it is by what has been accomplished here at Madrid.

But we also meet at a time when basic human rights remain widely denied and in the immediate aftermath of a brutal tragedy, shocking to the conscience of mankind. The Korean airline massacre reminds us all of the extent to which the objectives of the CSCE process remain to be achieved. Our meeting here must, therefore, mark—as statement after statement of ministers have done—renewed determination in the pursuit of these fundamental objectives.

The Helsinki Process

The Helsinki process was launched with great hopes 10 years ago. It was born at what seemed to be an encouraging moment in East-West relations: the United States and the Soviet Union had just reached the first agreements on strategic arms limitation. Broad vistas of economic cooperation appeared open. Progress seemed possible on human rights. There was an awareness that lasting peace required us to look at the totality of our relations. And so Helsinki was an attempt to deal comprehensively with the problems of security, economic relations, contacts between our peoples, their basic freedoms, and standards of international conduct.

The Helsinki Final Act is an eloquent statement of aspirations, to which the United States gladly subscribed because we subscribe to every one of its principles.

- It affirms the most fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience, and faith; the exercise of civil and political rights; the rights of minorities.
- It calls for a freer flow of information, ideas, and people; greater scope for the press; cultural and educational exchange; family reunification; the right to travel and to marriage between nationals of different states; protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.
- And it reaffirms the basic principles of relations between states: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of frontiers other than through peaceful change.

The United States has always been realistic about the Helsinki process. We did not expect it to resolve all of the difficult security issues we face in an era of ideological conflict and military competition. We knew, from the beginning, that some would distort it to reinforce the division of the continent and the domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union, despite the Final Act's clear reaffirmation of freedom, political independence, sovereignty, self-determination, and noninterference.

Thus, when heads of state and government met in Helsinki in 1975 to conclude the first conference and sign the Final Act, the United States took the position that hope had to be tempered by realism and backed up by effort. President Ford expressed it well on that occasion: "History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep."

Since 1975

Reflecting on the experience of the last 8 years, we must be disappointed, but we cannot be surprised, that the years since then have seen many setbacks for our efforts to strengthen security, expand cooperation, build mutual confidence, and protect human rights. The record speaks for itself.

- There are governments in the East which have from the outset treated their commitments to human rights under the Final Act with open contempt. The Helsinki monitoring groups that citizens created to gauge their governments' performance have been systematically suppressed. Emigration, after an initial rise, has fallen dramatically. Dissidents have been subjected to ever more brutal treatment. And courageous men and women who dared to assert their human rights—or demonstrate for peace and arms control—are rotting in prison or condemned to mental hospitals.
- Similarly, within 2 years of signing the document pledging a commitment to the pursuit of peace, the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles with multiple warheads on each, aimed at the peoples of Europe and Asia, endangering the balance of power and creating an enormous security problem.
- Six years after signing a document pledging a commitment to sovereignty, independence, and self-determination, the Soviet Union coerced Poland into suppressing a free trade union movement whose only crime was to take workers' rights seriously in what claims to be a workers' state.
- And most recently, just days after accepting here a new document of still stronger commitments than those of the Final Act, the Soviet Union has ruthlessly taken the lives of 269 innocent people on a defenseless civilian airplane. And from this rostrum, its foreign minister shamelessly insisted that the Soviet Union would do so again, thus again demonstrating its callous disregard for human life.

The Basis for Security and Cooperation in Europe

These blatant acts of Soviet defiance against the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki accords have presented this Madrid meeting with its basic challenge. By accepting that challenge and insisting on injecting an element of accountability into the process, Madrid has saved the act from becoming an historic irrelevancy.

Let us look at the ideals of Helsinki as they relate to the realities of today. In the security field, we and our allies seek to enhance European security at the lowest possible level of arms. We are energetically involved in all ongoing

negotiations. We welcome the newly scheduled conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament. We know that the essence of security is mutual security. Unfortunately, as the fate of Korean Air Lines #007 once again reminds us, the Soviet Union defines its security in a way so absolute, self-centered, and cynical that it poses a danger to all other countries.

The SS-20s targeted on Western Europe and Asia dramatize the danger to us all. These missiles threaten international confidence and international stability. They are part of a steady and continuing Soviet aim for global military power far beyond any conceivable defensive needs. Their deployment began in 1977. On November 2, 1977, after about a dozen of these weapons had been deployed, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev declared: "We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium at present . . . between East and West in central Europe, or between the U.S.S.R. and the United States."

Whether or not one agreed on the precise nature of the military balance at that point, a natural question arises as to why the Soviet Union has proceeded since 1977 to deploy more SS-20s at a feverish pace, for a present total of over 350 launchers and over 1,050 warheads. If there was balance then with a dozen or so weapons, it is difficult to deny that, today, there must be an imbalance that requires redress.

That balance will be redressed by the Atlantic alliance in the absence of an equal, verifiable agreement to limit them. The Soviet response to this, unfortunately, has been less genuine negotiation and more unilateral threats. The democratic nations will resist such threats, which poison the atmosphere and are inconsistent with the genuine pursuit of security and cooperation. If no agreement is reached by the end of this year, NATO counterdeployments will begin. But we, for our part, are willing to keep on trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Union.

In addition to tipping the military balance, the Soviet Union and its allies embarked—in the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki Final Act—on a course of geopolitical aggression in Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. Cuban armies under Soviet direction intervened in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen; Vietnamese armies invaded Kampuchea, pioneering in the technology of chemical and toxin warfare against civilians; and the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan.

The United States is fully aware that the Final Act stresses the "the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole." We will work with those who seek peaceful solutions in regional conflicts, consistent with the desires and interests of the peoples concerned in Southeast and Southwest Asia, in southern Africa, and in Central America and the Caribbean.

We support that provision of the Final Act which treats economic relations as "an essential sector" of cooperation. But "their cooperation in this field," says the Final Act, "should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating states." The steady growth in East-West economic exchanges that marked the early 1970s has slowed and leveled off. The geopolitical developments I have just mentioned have contributed to this drop. But it is partly the result, as well, of the oil crisis and world economic recession and partly the result of the structural inefficiencies of the East's central economic planning.

It is ironic that a system claiming to exemplify the principles of the world's only truly "scientific" economic theory should have to resort to emulating Western methods, borrowing Western funds, and purchasing Western food and technology in order to sustain its performance. Nevertheless, we continue to hope that nonstrategic trade, proceeding on sound commercial terms, can make at least some long-range contribution to constructive East-West relations.

In reaching the vital question of human rights, the central point to make is that they are not just a separate "basket" of issues but an integral part of the whole subject of security and cooperation. As the Final Act declares, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is "an essential factor for the peace, justice, and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation."

Here we arrive at the heart of the matter. What is the real reason that progress in the Helsinki process is such an uphill struggle? What is it that security and cooperation in Europe fundamentally depend upon? What are the real, basic obstacles to security and cooperation in Europe?

It all comes down to the question: Why is Europe divided? We all know the answer. Europe was divided by force, and it remains divided by force—the force of a system that as a matter of both principle and practice is opposed to the free movement of people and ideas. This is a system that built a wall to keep ideas out and people in. This is a system that fears foreign radio broadcasts even more, perhaps, than it fears missiles.

Yet experience has shown that no wall is high enough, no jamming station strong enough, to keep out ideas or to keep down the hopes of men and women who yearn for freedom. The division of Europe is today, as it always was, unnatural and inhuman. Therefore, the attempt to keep Europe divided by raw power is inevitably a source of instability. There can be no lasting security or cooperation in Europe as long as one government is afraid of its own people and seeks reassurance in imposing a system of force on its people—and on its neighbors.

There will always be heroes who will not let us forget and who give their would-be masters no rest: Polish workers, Czech intellectuals, East German clergy and peace demonstrators, and Soviet dissidents of all faiths and from all walks of life who risk life and livelihood for the cause of liberty. The Soviet Union would earn great credit for itself in the spirit of Helsinki if it allowed these heroes who want to leave the Soviet Union to do so. The right to emigrate is a vital principle acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As this Jewish New Year begins, let us hope that the coming year will see major progress toward freer emigration. Yet our concern is not only for those who wish to leave but those who remain. The condition of their lives, in the spirit of Helsinki and Madrid, is an important barometer of the true condition of security and cooperation in Europe.

In the most profound sense, the Helsinki process represents an historic effort to erode the cruel divisions between East and West in Europe. It is an effort that must continue because it embodies the most basic interests, deepest convictions, and highest hopes of all the peoples of Europe. Though this conference is coming to a close, our concern for human rights is enduring, and we will continue to advance this cause in every appropriate forum. We will continue to speak the truth. The struggle for human rights is unstoppable, and it remains a priority of American foreign policy.

Madrid and the Future

As the Madrid review meeting nears its end, I want to pay tribute here to the able leadership of the distinguished head of our delegation, Ambassador Max Kampelman. In speaking to this meeting, he spoke for a united country, for an American people united in support of peace and united in its commitment to human dignity. And he helped with others to forge the unity among the Western democracies without which even the modest progress we have made would have been impossible.

After almost 3 years of patient negotiation, we have a document that will expand and improve upon the 1975 Final Act. It adds important new commitments with respect to human rights, trade union freedoms, religious liberties, reunification of families, free flow of information, and measures against terrorism. It also provides, significantly, for followup in the human rights and security fields.

• A human rights meeting is scheduled in Ottawa in 1985, a meeting on human contacts in Bern in early 1986, and a full review conference in Vienna in late 1986. We hope that the Soviet Union will at long last pay heed to the concerns frequently expressed by many of us in Madrid and respond to those concerns.

• A conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament will convene in Stockholm in early 1984. The United States will negotiate seriously to reach agreement on militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable measures applicable to the whole of Europe. We also looked forward to the meeting of experts on the peaceful settlement of disputes scheduled for Athens in 1984.

The presence here of a distinguished congressional delegation signifies the dedication of my country to the Helsinki process and to the quest for security and cooperation in Europe.

We challenge the Soviet Union to undertake a serious dialogue on the full range of outstanding issues, with the goal of settling problems and reducing tensions. For our part, we will continue to negotiate patiently in good faith and will consider any proposals that meet our basic objective of enhancing true security and cooperation.

As sober realists, we are—and must be—prepared for continued and often arduous competition. Yet we also believe that this competition can—and must be—conducted in a way that leaves room for practical agreements that push back the specter of major conflict. In the nuclear age, this is our mutual responsibility. It is my government's solemn commitment.

As President Reagan declared last July 15:

> We will not flag in our continued determination to work with all governments and peoples whose goal is the strengthening of peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, dialogue, when based on realistic expectations and conducted with patience, can produce results. These results are often gradual and hard won, but they are the necessary building blocks for a more secure and stable world.

CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

1. The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe met in Madrid from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, as well as the basis of the other relevant documents adopted during the process of the CSCE.

2. The participants were addressed on 12 November 1980 by the Spanish Prime Minister.

3. Opening statements were made by all Heads of Delegations among whom were Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of a number of participating States. Some Ministers of Foreign Affairs addressed the Meeting also at later stages.

4. Contributions were made by representatives of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and UNESCO.

Contributions were also made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia.

5. The representatives of the participating States stressed the high political significance of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and of the process initiated by it as well as of the ways and means it provides for States to further their efforts to increase security, develop co-operation and enhance mutual understanding in Europe. They therefore reaffirmed their commitment to the process of the CSCE and emphasized the importance of the implementation of all the provisions and the respect for all the principles of the Final Act by each of them as being essential for the development of this process. Furthermore, they stressed the importance they attach to security and genuine detente, while deploring the deterioration of the international situation since the Belgrade Meeting 1977.

Accordingly, the participating States agreed that renewed efforts should be made to give full effect to the Final Act through concrete action, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, in order to restore trust and confidence between the participating States which would permit a substantial improvement in their mutual relations. They considered that the future of the CSCE process required balanced progress in all sections of the Final Act.

6. In accordance with the mandate provided for in the Final Act and the Agenda of the Madrid Meeting, the representatives of the participating States held a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the development of the process of detente in the future.

7. It was confirmed that the thorough exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE. In this context, it was agreed that these aims can only be attained by continuous implementation, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, of all the provisions and by respect for all the principles of the Final Act.

8. During this exchange of views, different and at times contradictory opinions were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far by participating States. While certain progress was noted, concern was expressed at the serious deficiencies in the implementation of this document.

9. Critical assessments from different viewpoints were given as to the application of and respect for the principles of the Final Act. Serious violations of a number of these principles were deplored during these assessments. Therefore, the participating States, at times represented at a higher level, considered it necessary to state, at various stages of the Meeting, that strict application of and respect for these principles, in all their aspects, are essential for the improvement of mutual relations between the participating States.

The necessity was also stressed that the relations of the participating States with all other States should be conducted in the spirit of these principles.

10. Concern was expressed about the continued lack of confidence among participating States.

Concern was also expressed as to the spread of terrorism.

11. The implementation of the provisions of the Final Act concerning Confidence-Building Measures, Co-operation in the field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of Environment, as well as Co-operation in Humanitarian and other fields was thoroughly discussed. It was considered that the numerous possibilities offered by the Final Act had not been sufficiently utilized. Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean were also discussed.

12. The participating States reaffirmed their commitment to the continuation of the CSCE process as agreed to in the chapter on the Follow-up to the Conference contained in the Final Act.

13. The representatives of the participating States took note of the reports of the meetings of experts and of the "Scientific Forum," and in the course of their deliberations took the results of these meetings into account.

14. The representatives of the participating States examined all the proposals submitted concerning the above questions and agreed on the following:

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

The participating States express their determination

- to exert new efforts to make detente an effective, as well as continuing increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope, as undertaken under the Final Act;
- to seek solutions to outstanding problems through peaceful means;
- to fulfil consistently all the provisions under the Final Act and, in particular, strictly and unreservedly to respect and put into practice all the ten principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems, as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, including their commitment to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of these principles;
- to develop relations of mutual co-operation, friendship and confidence, refraining from any action which, being contrary to the Final Act, might impair such relations;
- to encourage genuine efforts to implement the Final Act;
- to exert genuine efforts towards containing an increasing arms build-up as well as towards strengthening confidence and security and promoting disarmament.

Principles

1. They reaffirm their determination fully to respect and apply these principles and accordingly, to promote by all means, both in law and practice, their increased effectiveness. They consider that one such means could be to give legislative expression—in forms appropriate to practices and procedures specific to each country—to the ten principles set forth in the Final Act.

2. They recognize it as important that treaties and agreements concluded by participating States reflect and be consonant with the relevant principles and, where appropriate, refer to them.

3. The participating States reaffirm the need that refraining from the threat or use of force, as a norm of international life, should be strictly and effectively observed. To this end they stress their duty, under the relevant provisions of the Final Act, to act accordingly.

4. The participating States condemn terrorism, including terrorism in international relations, as endangering or taking innocent human lives or otherwise jeopardizing human rights and fundamental freedoms, and emphasize the necessity to take resolute measures to combat it. They express their determination to take effective measures for the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, both at the national level and through international co-operation including appropriate bilateral and multilateral agree-

ments, and accordingly to broaden and reinforce mutual co-operation to combat such acts. They agree to do so in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and the Helsinki Final Act.

5. In the context of the combat against acts of terrorism, they will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization or commission of terrorist activities, including those directed against other participating States and their citizens. This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups or organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism.

6. The participating States confirm that they will refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State. Accordingly, they will refrain, *inter alia*, from financing, encouraging, fomenting or tolerating any such activities.

7. They express their determination to do their utmost to assure necessary security to all official representatives and persons who participate on their territories in activities within the scope of diplomatic, consular or other official relations.

8. They emphasize that all the participating States recognize in the Final Act the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves, as among all States.

9. The participating States stress their determination to promote and encourage the effective exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development, and to assure constant and tangible progress in accordance with the Final Act, aiming at further and steady development in this field in all participating States, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems.

They similarly stress their determination to develop their laws and regulations in the field of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other human rights and fundamental freedoms; they also emphasize their determination to ensure the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms.

They recall the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as embodied in the Final Act, and will take the necessary action in their respective countries to effectively ensure this right.

10. The participating States reaffirm that they will recognize, respect and furthermore agree to take the action necessary to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practise, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

In this context, they will consult, whenever necessary, the religious faiths, institutions and organizations, which act within the constitutional framework of their respective countries.

They will favourably consider applications by religious communities of believers practising or prepared to practise their faith within the constitutional framework of their States, to be granted the status provided for in their respective countries for religious faiths, institutions and organizations.

11. They stress also the importance of constant progress in ensuring the respect for and actual enjoyment of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as protecting their legitimate interests as provided for in the Final Act.

12. They stress the importance of ensuring equal rights of men and women; accordingly, they agree to take all actions necessary to promote equally effective participation of men and women in political, economic, social and cultural life.

13. The participating States will ensure the right of workers freely to establish and join trade unions, the right of trade unions freely to exercise their activities and other rights as laid down in relevant international instruments. They note that these rights will be exercised in compliance with the law of the State and in conformity with the State's obligations under international law. They will encourage, as appropriate, direct contacts and communication among such trade unions and their representatives.

14. They reaffirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing towards the achievement of the above-mentioned aims of their co-operation.

15. They reaffirm the particular significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and other relevant international instruments of their joint and separate efforts to stimulate and develop universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; they call on all participating States to act in conformity with those international instruments and on those participating States, which have not yet done so, to consider the possibility of acceding to the covenants.

16. They agree to give favourable consideration to the use of bilateral round-table meetings, held on a voluntary basis, between delegations composed by each participating State to discuss issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with an agreed agenda in a spirit of mutual respect with a view to achieving greater understanding and co-operation based on the provisions of the Final Act.

17. They decide to convene a meeting of experts of the participating States on questions concerning respect, in their States, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in all aspects, as embodied in the Final Act.

Upon invitation of the Government of Canada, the meeting of experts will be held in Ottawa, beginning on 7 May 1985. It will draw up conclusions and recommendations to be submitted to the governments of all participating States.

The meeting will be preceded by a preparatory meeting which will be held in Ottawa upon the invitation of the Government of Canada, starting on 23 April 1985.

18. In conformity with the recommendation contained in the Report of the Montreux Meeting of Experts, another meeting of experts of the participating States will be convened, at the invitation of the Government of Greece. It will take place in Athens and will commence on 21 March 1984, with the purpose of pursuing, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods. The meeting will take into account the common approach set forth in the above-mentioned report.

19. Recalling the right of any participating State to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance, and also the right to neutrality, the participating States take note of the declaration of the Government of the Republic of Malta in which it stated that, as an effective contribution to detente, peace and security in the Mediterranean region, the Republic of Malta is a neutral State adhering to a policy of non-alignment. They call upon all States to respect that declaration.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

The participating States,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Act according to which they recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament.

Have agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

1. The aim of the Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

2. Thus the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

3. The first stage of the Conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17 January 1984.

4. On the basis of equality of right, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interest of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole as well as the adjoining sea area[3] and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area[3] and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.

5. Taking into account the above-mentioned aim of the Conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating States of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4 November 1986, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the Conference.

6. Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the Conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

7. A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, time-table and other organizational modalities for the first stage of the Conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25 October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

8. The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

1. The participating States consider that the implementation of all provisions of the Final Act and full respect for the principles guiding relations among them set out therein are an essential basis for the development of co-operation among them in the field of economics, of science and technology and of the environment. At the same time they reaffirm their conviction that co-operation in these fields contributes to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole. In this spirit they reiterate their resolve to pursue and intensify such co-operation between one another, irrespective of their economic and social systems.

2. The participating States confirm their interest in promoting adequate, favourable conditions in order further to develop trade and industrial co-operation among them, in particular by fully implementing all provisions of the second chapter of the Final Act, so as to make greater use of the possibilities created by their economic, scientific and technical potential. In this context and taking into consideration the efforts already made unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally in order to overcome all kinds of obstacles to trade, they reaffirm their intention to make further efforts aimed at reducing or progressively eliminating all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade.

Taking account of the activities of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) already carried out in the field of all kinds of obstacles to trade, they recommend that further work on this subject be directed in particular towards identifying these obstacles and examining them with a view to finding means for their reduction or progressive elimination, in order to contribute to harmonious development of their economic relations.

3. On the basis of the provisions of the Final Act concerning business contracts and facilities the participating States declare their intention to make efforts to enable business negotiations and activities to be carried out more efficiently and expeditiously and further to create conditions facilitating closer contacts between representatives and experts of seller firms on the one hand and buyer as well as user firms on the other at all stages of transaction. They will also further other forms of operational contacts between sellers and users such as the holding of technical symposia and demonstrations and after-sales training or requalification courses for technical staff of user firms and organizations.

They also agree to take measures further to develop and improve facilities and working conditions for representatives of foreign firms and organizations on their territory, including telecommunications facilities for representatives of such firms and organizations, as well as to develop these and other amenities for temporarily resident staff including particular site personnel. They will endeavour further to take measures to speed up as far as possible procedures for the registration of foreign firms' representations and offices as well as for granting entry visas to business representatives.

4. The participating States declare their intention to ensure the regular publication and dissemination, as rapidly as possible, of economic and commercial information compiled in such a way as to facilitate the appreciation of market opportunities and thus to contribute effectively to the process of developing international trade and industrial co-operation.

To this end and in order to make further progress in achieving the aims laid down in the relevant provisions of the Final Act they intend to intensify their efforts to improve the comparability, comprehensiveness and clarity of their economic and commercial statistics, in particular by adopting where necessary the following measures: by accompanying their economic and trade statistics by adequately defined summary indices based wherever possible on constant values; by publishing their interim statistics whenever technically possible at least on a quarterly basis; by publishing their statistical compilations in sufficient detail to achieve the aims referred to above, in particular by using for their foreign trade statistics a product breakdown permitting the identification of particular products for purposes of market analysis; by striving to have their economic and trade statistics no less comprehensive than those previously published by the State concerned.

They further express their willingness to co-operate towards the early completion of work in the appropriate United Nations bodies on the harmonization and alignment of statistical nomenclatures.

The participating States further recognize the usefulness of making economic and commercial information existing in other participating States readily available to enterprises and firms in their countries through appropriate channels.

5. The participating States, conscious of the need further to improve the conditions conducive to a more efficient functioning of institutions and firms acting in the field of marketing, will promote a more active exchange of knowledge and techniques required for effective marketing, and will encourage more intensive relations among such institutions and firms. They agree to make full use of the possibilities offered by the ECE to further their co-operation in this field.

6. The participating States note the increasing frequency in the economic relations of compensation in all their forms. They recognize that a useful role can be played by such transactions, concluded on a mutually acceptable basis. At the same time they

recognize that problems can be created by the linkage in such transactions between purchases and sales.

Taking account of the studies of the ECE already carried out in this field, they recommend that further work on this subject be directed in particular towards identifying such problems and examining ways of solving them in order to contribute to a harmonious development of their economic relations.

7. The participating States recognize that the expansion of industrial co-operation, on the basis of their mutual interest and motivated by economic considerations, can contribute to the further development and diversification of their economic relations and to a wider utilization of modern technology.

They note the useful role bilateral agreements on economic, industrial and technical co-operation, including where appropriate, those of a long-term nature can play. They also express their willingness to promote favourable conditions for the development of industrial co-operation among competent organizations, enterprises and firms. To this end and with a view to facilitating the identification of new possibilities for industrial co-operation projects they recognize the desirability of further developing and improving the conditions for business activities and the exchange of economic and commercial information among competent organizations, enterprises and firms including small and medium-sized enterprises.

They also note that, if it is in the mutual interest of potential partners, new forms of industrial co-operation can be envisaged, including those with organizations, institutions and firms of third countries.

They recommend that the ECE pursue and continue to pay particular attention to its activities in the field of industrial co-operation, *inter alia* by further directing its efforts towards examining ways of promoting favourable conditions for the development of co-operation in this field, including the organization of symposia and seminars.

8. The participating States declare their readiness to continue their efforts aiming at a wider participation by small and medium-size enterprises in trade and industrial co-operation. Aware of the problems particularly affecting such enterprises, the participating States will endeavour further to improve the conditions dealt with in the preceding paragraphs in order to facilitate the operations of these enterprises in the above-mentioned fields. The participating States further recommend that the ECE develop its special studies pertaining to these problems.

9. The participating States recognize the increasing importance of co-operation in the field of energy, *inter alia* that of a long-term nature, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. Welcoming the results so far achieved through such endeavours and in particular the work carried out by the ECE they express their support for continuing the co-operation pursued by the Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Energy aiming at the fulfilment of all parts of their mandate.

10. The participating States reaffirm their interest in reducing and preventing technical barriers to trade and welcome the increased co-operation in this field, *inter alia* the work of the Government Officials Responsible for Standardization Policies in the ECE. They will encourage the conclusion of international certification arrangements covering where appropriate the mutual acceptance of certification systems providing mutually satisfactory guarantees.

11. The participating States recommend that appropriate action be taken in order to facilitate the use and enlarge the scope of arbitration as an instrument for settling disputes in international trade and industrial co-operation. They recommend in particular the application of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 as well as a wider recourse to the arbitration rules elaborated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. They also advocate that parties should, on the basis of the provisions of the Final Act, be allowed freedom in the choice of arbitrators and the place of arbitration, including the choice of arbitrators and the place of arbitration in a third country.

12. The participating States recognize the important role of scientific and technical progress in the economic and social development of all countries in particular those which are developing from an economic point of view. Taking into account the objectives which countries or institutions concerned pursue in their bilateral and multilateral relations they underline the importance of further developing, on the basis of reciprocal advantage and on the basis of mutual agreement and other arrangments, the forms and methods of co-operation in the field of science and technology provided for in the Final Act, for instance international programmes and co-operative projects, while utilizing also various forms of contacts, including direct and individual contacts among scientists and specialists as well as contacts and communications among interested organizations, scientific and technological institutions and enterprises.

In this context they recognize the value of an improved exchange and dissemination of information concerning scientific and technical developments as a means of facilitating, on the basis of mutual advantage, the study and the transfer of, as well as access to scientific and technical achievements in fields of co-operation agreed between interested parties.

The participating States recommend that in the field of science and technology the ECE should give due attention, through appropriate ways and means, to the elaboration of studies and practical projects for the development of co-operation among member countries.

Furthermore, the participating States, aware of the relevant part of the Report of the "Scientific Forum," agree to encourage the development of scientific co-operation in the field of agriculture at bilateral, multilateral and sub-regional levels, with the aim, *inter alia*, of improving livestock and plant breeding and ensuring optimum use and conservation of water resources. To this end, they will promote further co-operation among research institutions and centres in their countries, through the exchange of information, the joint implementation of research programmes, the organization of meetings among scientists and specialists and other methods.

The participating States invite the ECE and other competent international organizations to support the implementation of these activities and to examine the possibilities of providing a wider exchange of scientific and technological information in the field of agriculture.

13. The participating States welcome with satisfaction the important steps taken to strengthen co-operation within the framework of the ECE in the field of the environment, including the High-Level Meeting on the Protection of the Environment (13–16 November 1979). Taking due account of work undertaken or envisaged in other competent international organizations, they recommend the continuation of efforts in this field, including, *inter alia*,

- giving priority to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Resolution on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution adopted at the High-Level Meeting;
- the early ratification of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollution signed at the High-Level Meeting;
- implementation of the Recommendations contained in the Declaration of Low and Non-Waste Technology and Reutilization and Recycling of Wastes;
- implementation of Decisions B and C of the thirty-fifth session of the ECE concerning the Declaration of Policy on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, including transboundary pollution;
- support in carrying out the programme of work of the ECE concerning the protection of the environment, including, *inter alia*, the work under way in the field of the protection of flora and fauna.

14. In the context of the provisions of the Final Act concerning migrant labour in Europe, the participating States note that recent developments in the world economy have affected the situation of migrant workers. In this connection, the participating States express their wish that host countries and countries of origin, guided by a spirit of mutual interest and co-operation, intensify their contacts with a view to improving further the general situation of migrant workers and their families, *inter alia* the protection of their human rights including their economic, social and cultural rights while taking particularly into account the special problems of second generation migrants. They will also endeavour to provide or promote, where reasonable demand exists, adequate teaching of the language and culture of the countries of origin.

The participating States recommend that, among other measures for facilitating the social and economic reintegration of returning migrant labour, the payment of pensions as acquired or established under the social security system to which such workers have been admitted in the host country should be ensured by appropriate legislative means or reciprocal agreements.

15. The participating States further recognize the importance for their economic development of promoting the exchange of information and experience on training for management staff. To this end they recommend the organization, in an appropriate existing framework and with the help of interested organizations such as, for example, the ECE and the International Labour Organisation, of a symposium of persons responsible for services and institutions specializing in management training for administrations and enterprises with a view to exchanging information on training problems and methods, comparing experiences and encouraging the development of relations among the centres concerned.

16. The participating States welcome the valuable contribution made by the ECE to the multilateral implementation of the provisions of the Final Act pertaining to co-operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environment. Aware of the potential of the ECE for intensifying co-operation in the fields, they recommend the fullest use of the existing mechanisms and resources in order to continue and consolidate the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act in the interest of its member countries, including those within the ECE region which are developing from an economic point of view.

17. The participating States, bearing in mind their will expressed in the provisions of the Final Act, reiterate the determination of each of them to promote stable and equitable international economic relations in the mutual interest of all States and, in this spirit, to participate equitably in promoting and strengthening economic co-operation with the developing countries in particular the least developed among them. They also note the usefulness, *inter alia*, of identifying and executing, in co-operation with developing countries, concrete projects, with a view to contributing to economic development in these countries.

They also declare their readiness to contribute to common efforts towards the establishment of a new international economic order and the implementation of the Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, as adopted. They recognize the importance of the launching of mutually beneficial and adequately prepared global negotiations relating to international economic co-operation for development.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. The participating States, bearing in mind that security in Europe, considered in the broader context of world security, is closely linked to security in the Mediterranean areas as a whole, reaffirm their intention to contribute to peace, security and justice in the Mediterranean region.

2. They further express their will

- to take positive steps towards lessening tensions and strengthening stability, security and peace in the Mediterranean and, to this end, to intensify efforts towards finding just, viable and lasting solutions, through peaceful means, to outstanding crucial problems, without resort to force or other means incompatible with the Principles of the Final Act, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region;
- to take measures designed to increase confidence and security;
- to develop good neighbourly relations with all States in the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States of the Final Act;
- to study further the possibility of *ad hoc* meetings of Mediterranean States aimed at strengthening security and intensifying co-operation in the Mediterranean.

3. In addition the participating States will, within the framework of the implementation of the Valletta report, consider the possibilities offered by new transport infrastructure developments to facilitate new commercial and industrial exchanges, as well as by the improvement of existing transport networks, and by a wider co-ordination of transport investments between interested parties. In this context they recommend that a study be undertaken, within the framework of the ECE, in order to establish the current and potential transport flows in the Mediterranean involving the participating States and other States of this region taking account of the current work in this field. They will further consider the question of introducing or extending, in accordance with the existing IMO regulations, the use of suitable techniques for aids to maritime navigation, principally in straits.

They further note with satisfaction the results of the Meeting of Experts held in Valletta on the subject of economic, scientific and cultural co-operation within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act. They reaffirm the conclusions and recommendations of the report of this Meeting and agree that they will be guided accordingly. They also take note of efforts under way aiming at implementing them as appropriate. To this end, the participating States agree to convene from 16 to 26 October 1984 a seminar to be held at Venice at the invitation of the Government of Italy, to review the initiatives already undertaken, or envisaged, in all the sectors outlined in the report of the Valletta Meeting and stimulate, where necessary, broader developments in these sectors.

Representatives of the competent international organizations and representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean States will be invited to this Seminar in accordance with the rules and practices adopted at the Valletta Meeting.[5]

CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

The participating States,

Recalling the introductory sections of the Chapter on Co-operation in Humanitarian and other Fields of the Final Act including those concerning the development of mutual understanding between them and detente and those concerning progress in cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people and the solution of humanitarian problems,

Resolving to pursue and expand co-operation in these fields and to achieve a fuller utilization of the possibilities offered by the Final Act,

Agree now to implement the following:

Human Contacts

1. The participating States will favourably deal with applications relating to contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, reunification of families and marriage between citizens of different States and will decide upon them in the same spirit.

2. They will decide upon these applications in emergency cases for family meetings as expeditiously as possible, for family reunification and for marriage between citizens of different States in normal practice within six months and for other family meetings within gradually decreasing time limits.

3. They confirm that the presentation or renewal of applications in these cases will not modify the rights and obligations of the applications or of members of their families concerning *inter alia* employment, housing, residence status, family support, access to social, economic or educational benefits, as well as any other rights and obligations flowing from the laws and regulations of the respective participating State.

4. The participating States will provide the necessary information on the procedures to be followed by the applicants in these cases and on the regulations to be observed, as well as, upon the applicant's request, provide the relevant forms.

5. They will, where necessary, gradually reduce fees charged in connection with these applications, including those for visas and passports, in order to bring them to a moderate level in relation to the average monthly income in the respective participating State.

6. Applicants will be informed as expeditiously as possible of the decision that has been reached. In case of refusal applicants will also be informed of their right to renew applications after reasonably short intervals.

7. The participating States reaffirm their commitment fully to implement the provisions regarding diplomatic and other official missions and consular posts of other participating States contained in relevant multilateral or bilateral conventions, and to facilitate the normal functioning of those missions. Access by visitors to these missions will be assured with due regard to the necessary requirements of security of these missions.

8. They also reaffirm their willingness to take, within their competence, reasonable steps, including necessary security measures, when appropriate to ensure satisfactory conditions for activities within the framework of mutual co-operation on their territory, such as sporting and cultural events, in which citizens of other participating States take part.

9. The participating States will endeavour, where appropriate, to improve the conditions relating to legal, consular and medical assistance for citizens of other participating States temporarily on their territory for personal or professional reasons, taking due account of relevant multilateral or bilateral conventions or agreements.

10. They will further implement the relevant provisions of the Final Act, so that religious faiths, institutions, organizations and their representatives can, in the field of their activity, develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.

11. The participating States will encourage contacts and exchanges among young people and foster the broadening of co-operation among their youth organizations. They will favour the holding among young people and youth organizations of educational, cultural and other comparable events and activities. They will also favour the study of problems relating to the younger generation. The participating States will further the development of individual or collective youth tourism, when necessary on the basis of arrangements, *inter alia* by encouraging the granting of suitable facilities by the transport authorities and tourist organizations of the participating States or such facilities as those offered by the railway authorities participating in the "Inter-Rail" system.

Information

1. The participating States will further encourage the freer and wider dissemination of printed matter, periodical and non-periodical, imported from other participating States, as well as an increase in the number of places where these publications are on public sale. These publications will also be accessible in reading rooms in large public libraries and similar institutions.

2. In particular, to facilitate the improvement of dissemination of printed information, the participating States will encourage contacts and negotiation between their competent firms and organizations with a view to concluding long-term agreements and contracts designed to increase the quantities and number of titles of newspapers and other publications imported from other participating States. They consider it desirable that the retail prices of foreign publications are not excessive in relation to prices in their country of origin.

3. They confirm their intention, according to the relevant provisions of the Final Act, to further extend the possibilities for the public to take out subscriptions.

4. They will favour the further expansion of co-operation among mass media and their representatives, especially between the editorial staffs of press agencies, newspapers, radio and television organizations as well as film companies. They will encourage a more regular exchange of news, articles, supplements and broadcasts as well as the exchange of editorial staff for better knowledge of respective practices. On the basis of reciprocity, they will improve the material and technical facilities provided for permanently or temporarily accredited television and radio reporters. Moreover, they will facilitate direct contacts among journalists as well as contacts within the framework of professional organizations.

5. They will decide without undue delay upon visa applications from journalists and re-examine within a reasonable time frame applications which have been refused. Moreover, journalists wishing to travel for personal reasons and not for the purpose of reporting shall enjoy the same treatment as other visitors from their country of origin.

6. They will grant permanent correspondents and members of their families living with them multiple entry and exit visas valid for one year.

7. The participating States will examine the possibility of granting, where necessary on the basis of bilateral arrangements, accreditation and related facilities to journalists from other participating States who are permanently accredited in third countries.

8. They will facilitate travel by journalists from other participating States within their territories, *inter alia* by taking concrete measures where necessary, to afford them opportunities to travel more extensively, with the exception of areas closed for security reasons. They will inform journalists in advance, whenever possible, if new areas are closed for security reasons.

9. They will further increase the possibilities and, when necessary, improve the conditions for journalists from other participating States to establish and maintain personal contacts and communication with their sources.

10. They will, as a rule, authorize radio and television journalists, at their request, to be accompanied by their own sound and film technicians and to use their own equipment.

Similarly, journalists may carry with them reference material, including personal notes and files, to be used strictly for their professional purposes.[4]

11. The participating States will, where necessary, facilitate the establishment and operation, in their capitals, of press centres or institutions performing the same functions, open to the national and foreign press with suitable working facilities for the latter.

They will also consider further ways and means to assist journalists from other participating States and thus to enable them to resolve practical problems they may encounter.

Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture

1. They will endeavour, by taking appropriate steps, to make the relevant information concerning possibilities offered by bilateral cultural agreements and programmes available to interested persons, institutions and non-governmental organizations, thus facilitating their effective implementation.

2. The participating States will further encourage wider dissemination of and access to books, films and other forms and means of cultural expression from other participating States, to this end improving by appropriate means, on bilateral and multilateral bases, the conditions for international commercial and non-commercial exchange of their cultural goods, *inter alia*, by gradually lowering customs duties on these items.

3. The participating States will endeavour to encourage the translation, publication and dissemination of works in the sphere of literature and other fields of cultural activity from other participating States, especially those produced in less widely spoken languages, by facilitating co-operation between publishing houses, in particular through the exchange of lists of books which might be translated as well as of other relevant information.

4. They will contribute to the development of contacts, co-operation and joint projects among the participating States regarding the protection, preservation and recording of historical heritage and monuments and the relationship between man, environment and this heritage; they express their interest in the possibility of convening an inter-governmental conference on these matters within the framework of UNESCO.

5. The participating States will encourage their radio and television organizations to continue developing the presentation of the cultural and artistic achievements of other participating States on the basis of bilateral and multilateral arrangements between these organizations, providing *inter alia* for exchanges of information on productions, for the broadcasting of shows and programmes from other participating States, for co-productions, for the invitation of guest conductors and directors, as well as for the provision of mutual assistance to cultural film teams.

6. At the invitation of the Government of Hungary a "Cultural Forum" will take place in Budapest, commencing on 15 October 1985. It will be attended by leading personalities in the field of culture from the participating States. The "Forum" will discuss interrelated problems concerning creation, dissemination and co-operation, including the promotion and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the different fields of culture. A representative of UNESCO will be invited to present to the "Forum" the views of that organization. The "Forum" will be prepared by a meeting of experts, the duration of which will not exceed two weeks and which will be held upon the invitation of the Government of Hungary in Budapest, commencing 21 November 1984.

Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Education

1. The participating States will promote the establishment of governmental and non-governmental arrangements and agreements in education and science, to be carried out with the participation of educational or other competent institutions.

2. The participating States will contribute to the further improvement of exchanges of students, teachers and scholars and their access to each other's educational, cultural and scientific institutions, and also their access to open information material in accordance with the laws and regulations prevailing in each country. In this context, they will facilitate travel by scholars, teachers and students within the receiving State, the establishment by them of contacts with their colleagues, and will also encourage libraries, higher education establishments and similar institutions in their territories to make catalogues and lists of open archival material available to scholars, teachers and students from other participating States.

3. They will encourage a more regular exchange of information about scientific training programmes, courses and seminars for young scientists and facilitate a wider participation in these activities of young scientists from different participating States. They will call upon the appropriate national and international organizations and institutions to give support, where appropriate, to the realization of these training activities.

4. The representatives of the participating States noted the usefulness of the work done during the "Scientific Forum" held in Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, from 18 February to March 1980. Taking into account the results of the "Scientific Forum," the participating States invited international organizations as well as the scientific organizations and scientists of the participating States to give due consideration to its conclusions and recommendations.

5. The participating States will favor widening the possibilities of teaching and studying less widely spread or studied European languages. They will, to this end, stimulate, within their competence, the organization of and attendance at summer university and other courses, the granting of scholarships for translators and the reinforcement of linguistic faculties including, in case of need, the provision of new facilities for studying these languages.

6. The participating States express their readiness to intensify the exchange, among them and within competent international organizations, of teaching materials, school textbooks maps, bibliographies and other educational material, in order to promote better mutual knowledge and facilitate a fuller presentation of their respective countries.

FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

1. In conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Act and with their resolve and commitment to continue the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE, the participating States will hold further meetings regularly among their representatives.

The third of these meetings will be held in Vienna commencing on 4 November 1986.

2. The agenda, working programme and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the main Vienna Meeting, unless other decisions on these questions are taken by the preparatory meeting mentioned below.

For the purpose of making the adjustments to the agenda, working programme and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting, a preparatory meeting will be held in Vienna commencing on 23 September 1986. It is understood that in this context adjustments concern those items requiring change as a result of the change in data and place, the drawing of lots, and the mention of the other meetings held in conformity with the decisions of the Madrid Meeting 1980. The duration of the preparatory meeting shall not exceed two weeks.

3. The participating States further decide that in 1985, the tenth Anniversary of the signature of the Final Act of the CSCE will be duly commemorated in Helsinki.

4. The duration of the meetings mentioned in this document; unless otherwise agreed, should not exceed six weeks. The results of these meetings will be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting.

5. All the above-mentioned meetings will be held in conformity with Paragraph 4 of the Chapter on "Follow-up to the Conference" of the Final Act.

6. The Government of Spain is requested to transmit the present document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Director-General of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The Government of Spain is also requested to transmit the present document to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States.

7. The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

8. The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the people and Government of Spain for the excellent organization of the Madrid Meeting and warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the Meeting.

ANNEX I

Chairman's Statement: Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Co-operation in the Mediterranean within the Framework of the Results of the Valletta Meeting of Experts

1. The Seminar will open on Tuesday, 16 October 1984 at 10 a.m. in Venice, Italy. It will close on Friday, 26 October 1984.

2. The work of the Seminar, guided by a Co-ordinating Committee composed of the delegations of the participating States, will be divided among three Study Groups devoted to Economics, Science and Culture respectively.

3. The first three days of the Seminar will be devoted to six sessions of the Committee.

4. The first session of the Committee will be public and will be devoted to the opening of the Seminar, to be followed by an address by a representative of the host country.

5. The second session of the Committee will decide whether to hold further sessions of the participating States to guide the work of the Study Groups and to take any other decisions necessary for the Seminar.

6. The following four sessions of the Committee will be public and will be devoted to introductory statements by the representatives of the participating States which so desire (in an order selected by lot in advance) and to introductory statements by the representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean States and the international organizations invited. The statements should not exceed 10 minutes per delegation.

7. Beginning on the fourth day and for the following three and a half working days, simultaneous meetings of the three Study Groups will be held.

8. The last one and a half days will be devoted to three sessions of the Committee. Two sessions will decide upon the most appropriate use for the documentation presented in the course of the work concerning the specific sectors indicated in the Valletta Report, such as publication of the introductory statements and distribution of the studies to the relevant international organizations, and will take any other necessary decisions.

The final session of the Committee will be public and will be devoted to the official closing of the Seminar with an address by a representative of the host country.

9. The Chair at the opening and closing sessions of both the Committee and the Study Groups will be taken by a representative from the delegation of the host country. Selection of the successive chairmen by lot

will then ensure daily rotation of the Chair, in French alphabetical order, among the representatives of the participating States.

10. Participation in the work of the Seminar by the non-participating Mediterranean States (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) and the international organizations (UNESCO, ECE, UNEP, WHO, ITU) invited will follow the rules and practices adopted at Valletta. This means, *inter alia*, that they will take part in the work of the three Study Groups and of the four sessions of the Committee on the second and third day as well as its opening and closing sessions.

11. Contributions, on the subjects for consideration in one more of the working languages of the CSCE, may be sent through the proper channels—preferably not later than three months before the opening of the Seminar—to the Executive Secretary, who will circulate them to the other participating States, and to the non-participating Mediterranean States and to the international organizations which have notified their intention of taking part.

12. The Italian Government will designate the Executive Secretary of the Seminar. The designation should be agreed to by the participating States. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

13. Other rules of procedures, working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses of the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Seminar.

14. The arrangements outlined above will not constitute a precedent for any other CSCE forum.

ANNEX II

Chairman's Statement: Bern Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts

The Chairman notes the absence of objection to the declaration made by the representative of Switzerland on 15 July 1983 extending an invitation by the Swiss Government to hold a meeting of experts on human contacts. Consequently, the Chairman notes that there is agreement to convene such a meeting to discuss the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations, with due account for the introductory part of the Chapter of the Final Act entitled *Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields* and for the introductory part of section one (Human Contacts) of that Chapter, which reads *inter alia* as follows:

"The participating States,

Considering the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples,

Affirming, in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations,

Desiring in this spirit to develop, with the continuance of détente, further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field; . . . ."

The meeting will be convened in Bern, on 15 April 1986. Its duration will not exceed six weeks. The meeting will be preceded by preparatory consultations, which will be held in Bern commencing on 2 April 1986. The results of the meeting will be taken into account, as appropriate, at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting.

The Swiss Government will designate the Executive Secretary of the meeting. This designation should be agreed to by the participating States. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

Other rules of procedure, working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses of the CSCE will be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Bern meeting.

The Chairman notes further that this statement will be an annex to the concluding document of the Madrid Meeting and will be published with it.

---

[1]Press release 341 of Sept. 12, 1983.

[2]In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe [text in original].

[3]The organization of the Venice Seminar is set forth in the Chairman's statement of 9 September 1983 (see Annex I) [text in original].

[4]In this context it is understood that import of printed matter may be subject to local regulations which will be applied with due regard to the journalists' need for adequate working material [text in original]. ■

Published by the United States Department of State · Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Public Communication · Editorial Division · Washington, D.C. · December 1983 Editor: Colleen Sussman · This material is reprinted from the *Department of State Bulletin* of October 1983. It is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.

REPORT

OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS REPRESENTING THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, FORESEEN BY THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING, IN ORDER TO PURSUE, ON THE BASIS OF THE FINAL ACT, THE EXAMINATION OF A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE METHOD FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AIMED AT COMPLEMENTING EXISTING METHODS.

In accordance with the mandate of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in conformity with the recommendation contained in the Report of the Montreux Meeting of Experts, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting 1980, a Meeting of Experts representing the participating States took place in Athens from 21 March to 30 April 1984 in order to pursue, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods. The participants took into account the common approach set forth in the Report of the Montreux Meeting of Experts.

At the opening session the participants were addressed by Mr. Yiannis Capsis, Deputy Foreign Minister, on behalf of the Government of Greece.

The participants adopted an agenda and proceeded to a general exchange of views after which a number of proposals were submitted and discussed. A thorough discussion was held. Some progress was made in the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods. Particular emphasis was put on ways and means of including a third party element in such a method. Divergent views were expressed and no consensus was reached on a method. It was recognized that further discussions should be pursued in an appropriate framework within the CSCE process.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of Greece for the excellent organization of the Meeting and for the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Athens.

Athens, 30 April 1984

REPORT
OF THE CSCE VENICE SEMINAR ON ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESULTS OF THE VALLETTA MEETING OF EXPERTS

In accordance with the mandate of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of Representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), a Seminar was held at Venice, at the invitation of the Government of Italy, from 16 to 26 October 1984, to review the initiatives already undertaken, or envisaged, in all the sectors outlined in the report of the Valletta Meeting and to stimulate, where necessary, broader developments in these sectors.

Representatives of the participating States of the CSCE took part in the Seminar. Representatives of the non-participating Mediterranean States and of UNESCO, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) were invited to participate in the Seminar in accordance with the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting.

Egypt and Israel accepted the invitation and participated in the work of the Seminar in the manner provided for in the above invitation. UNESCO, ECE, UNEP, WHO and ITU took part in the Seminar in the same manner.

The work of the Seminar was organized in accordance with the Chairman's statement at Annex I of the Madrid Concluding Document.

Written contributions to the Seminar, as provided for in the Chairman's statement, were submitted in advance.

The participants in the Seminar were addressed on 16 October 1984 by H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, on behalf of the host country.

The participants in the Seminar had a general exchange of views in the Co-ordinating Committee on questions relating to their economic, scientific and cultural co-operation within the framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of the Final Act.

Recalling their existing economic, scientific and cultural co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Valletta Meeting of Experts, the representatives of the CSCE participating States reaffirmed their wish to develop further co-operation in these fields.

The representatives of the CSCE participating States stressed the importance attached by their Governments to the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Final Act by implementing all of its provisions, as well as their readiness to pursue their efforts accordingly.

The three Study Groups met to consider respectively the economic, scientific and cultural aspects of co-operation in the Mediterranean. The Groups reviewed the initiatives already undertaken, or envisaged, in these sectors aimed at implementing the conclusions and recommendations of the report of the Valletta Meeting of Experts.

The participants discussed certain current problems in the field of international economic co-operation. They acknowledged that such co-operation should take into account the interests of those countries which are developing from an economic point of view. In particular, co-operation should stimulate the production and marketing of goods and services of such countries. The participants reaffirmed the will of their Governments to intensify such co-operation.

The Seminar noted that as well as bilateral and multilateral co-operation, a constructive and positive role is played by the competent international organizations, notably UNESCO, ECE, UNEP, WHO and ITU, in carrying out useful and concrete work in the development of co-operation in the areas covered by the Valletta report.

The representatives of the participating States of the CSCE, having examined the ideas and proposals put forward in the course of the Seminar, decided to recommend to their Governments the following specific fields where broader developments could be envisaged, within their possibilities

and interests, whether through their participation in international organizations or in bilateral and multilateral relations with the participating States and with the non-participating Mediterranean States:

The promotion of bilateral and multilateral co-operation among participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States in the field of environment protection of the Mediterranean region within the appropriate frameworks, in order to contribute, in particular, to the implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), keeping in mind the provisions of the Final Act and the activities already included in the recommendations of the Meeting of Experts held at Valletta and the possibility of new initiatives in other fields of common interest, such as study programmes on jellyfish.

The strengthening, through the MAP, of actions aimed at better harmonization of national legislation on the protection of Mediterranean waters from pollution, in implementation in particular of the Barcelona Convention and its related protocols signed by the parties to the Convention.

The improvement of methodologies within the appropriate framework for evaluating economic damage caused by pollution in the Mediterranean and for determining means to protect the Mediterranean environment.

Co-operation in concrete actions aimed at ensuring compliance with standards laid down in the MARPOL Convention 73/78, for the prevention of pollution of the Mediterranean Sea resulting from maritime traffic.

Support for increasing efforts towards the preservation of the Mediterranean environment undertaken also within and beyond the framework of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP).

Co-operation among international organizations on the Mediterranean environment notably by the ECE and UNEP.

The promotion of a better cohesion between sea and land transport infrastructures and their methods of use, taking due account of new transport techniques; with this in view, giving due consideration to initiatives taken in the framework of the ECE related to: co-ordination of infrastructures, in connection with the Trans-European Motorway project (TEM) and studies on other European transport projects; harbour infrastructure and organization questions; and transport facilitation and training in the field of transport.

The encouragement of the more effective use of trans-shipment facilities with the aim of reducing costs, improving the timely distribution of goods, facilitating storage and thereby enhancing economic benefits.

The encouragement of more extensive participation by the countries bordering the Mediterranean in research and experiments aimed at providing coastal assistance to maritime navigation; and in joint studies on intra-Mediterranean maritime traffic and on the requirements of advanced types of maritime carriers.

The development and co-ordination of existing exchanges of statistical data, identification of the economic and social areas of priority interest for the further exchange of such data with due account taken of national legislation, and the promotion of research projects concerning social factors affecting economic development.

The continuation of efforts to solve problems in the field of migrant labour, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document.

Participation in national programmes of theoretical and applied scientific research on topics of Mediterranean interest by teachers and students from as large a number of interested countries as possible.

Greater access to libraries and archives of scientific institutions for research workers engaged in research on problems of Mediterranean interest, taking into account national legislation regulating the conditions of such access.

The extension and improvement where appropriate of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the scientific field, both at the intergovernmental level and between relevant institutions.

An increase in efforts to combat thalassaemia and other diseases in the Mediterranean; encouraging research including appropriate statistical research, particularly under the auspices of the WHO with the objective of enhancing programmes for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of those diseases prevalent in the Mediterranean region.

Joint research on the effects on human health of olive oil and leguminous plants, with particular reference to ascertaining the function of olive oil in the reduction of cholesterol.

Encouragement for the activities of the Community of Mediterranean Universities within which specific co-operation projects which appear to deserve support have been identified.

The identification of significant areas for cultural co-operation such as the conservation, protection, safeguarding and enhancement of the cultural heritage in the fields of archaeology, architecture, arts and crafts; the investigation of underwater archaeological remains; the training of professional staff and cultural personnel; cinematography; audiovisual media, with particular reference to their use in teaching activities; the dissemination of historical knowledge and the promotion of dialogue between historians of different traditions.

Recognition of the value and usefulness of instruments of cultural co-operation such as: cultural agreements; links between universities and institutes of higher education for the exchange of information and for the conduct of joint research projects; national and international cultural institutions, whether governmental or other, operating in the area; more contacts and co-operation among persons engaged in the field of culture from different countries.

Encouragement for efforts to deepen cultural co-operation in the Mediterranean in particular through a broader use of radio, television and publications, and through the collection of material and the data required for these specialized activities, as well as the training of personnel.

The representatives of the participating States of the CSCE took note of the document of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe detailing activities of co-operation which are of interest to the countries in the Mediterranean. It was agreed that such opportunities should be kept in mind.

The participants expressed their deep gratitude to the Government and people of Italy for the excellent organization of the Seminar and the warm hospitality extended to them during their stay in Venice.

Venice, 26 October 1984

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

(1) The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE.

(2) The participants were addressed by the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof Palme, on 17 January 1984.

(3) Opening statements were made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Heads of Delegation. The Prime Minister of Spain as well as Ministers and senior officials of several other participating States addressed the Conference later. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden addressed the Conference on 19 September 1986.

(4) The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed the Conference on 6 July 1984.

(5) Contributions were made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

(6) The participating States recalled that the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.

(7) The participating States recognized that the set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures which are adopted in the present document and which are in accordance with the Madrid mandate serve by their scope and nature and by their implementation to strengthen confidence and security in Europe and thus to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.

(8) Consequently the participating States have declared the following:

REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

(9) The participating States, recalling their obligation to refrain, in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, accordingly reaffirm their commitment to respect and put into practice the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force, as laid down in the Final Act.

(10) No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

(11) They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

(12) They will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing any other State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

(13) As set forth in the Final Act, no occupation or acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force in contravention of international law, will be recognized as legal.

(14) They recognize their commitment to peace and security. Accordingly they reaffirm that they will refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

(15) They will abide by their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any State, regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that State relations of alliance.

(16) They stress that non-compliance with the obligation of refraining from the threat or use of force, as recalled above, constitutes a violation of international law.

(17) They stress their commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force, both being essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security. They recall their determination and the necessity to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They reaffirm their resolve to make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them.

(18) The participating States stress their commitment to the Final Act and the need for full implementation of all its provisions, which will further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

(19) They emphasize their commitment to all the principles of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States and declare their determination to respect and put them into practice irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development.

(20) All these ten principles are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

(21) Respect for and the application of these principles will enhance the development of friendly relations and co-operation among the participating States in all fields covered by the provisions of the Final Act.

(22) They reconfirm their commitment to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States and stress that all States have equal rights and duties

(23) They reaffirm the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Respect for and the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms are essential factors for international peace, justice and security, as well as for the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States, as set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.

(24) They reaffirm that, in the broader context of world security, security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole; in this context, they confirm their intention to develop good neighbourly relations with all States in the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act.

(25) They emphasize the necessity to take resolute measures to prevent and to combat terrorism, including terrorism in international relations. They express their determination to take effective measures, both at the national level and through international co-operation, for the prevention and suppression of all acts of terrorism. They will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization or commission of terrorist activities. This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities, including subversive activities, of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, including those directed against other States and their citizens.

(26) They will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law; they also stress that strict compliance with their commitments within the framework of the CSCE is essential for building confidence and security.

(27) The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(28) The participating States have adopted the following measures:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(29) The participating States will give notification in writing through diplomatic channels in an agreed form of content, to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable* military activities in the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).**

(30) Notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.

(31) Each of the following military activities in the field conducted as a single activity in the zone of application for CSBMs at or above the levels defined below, will be notified:

(31.1) The engagement of formations of land forces*** of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

(31.1.1) This military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:

- at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or
- at least 300 battle tanks

if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

---

* In this document, the term notifiable means subject to notification.

** See Annex I.

*** In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.

(31.1.2) The participation of air forces of the participating States will be included in the notification if it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.

(31.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(31.2.1) These military activities will be subject to notification whenever the amphibious landing involves at least 3,000 troops or whenever the parachute drop involves at least 3,000 troops.

(31.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated.

(31.3.1) The arrival or concentration of these forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves, at any time during the activity:

- at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or
- at least 300 battle tanks

if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

(31.3.2) Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed CSBMs when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(32) Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.

(32.1) Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.

(33) Notification will be given in writing of each notifiable military activity in the following agreed form:

(34) A - General Information

(34.1) The designation of the military activity;

(34.2) The general purpose of the military activity;

(34.3) The names of the States involved in the military activity;

(34.4) The level of command, organizing and commanding the military activity;

(34.5) The start and end dates of the military activity.

(35) B - Information on different types of notifiable military activities

(35.1) The engagement of land forces of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:

(35.1.1) The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e., ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each State involved, if applicable;

(35.1.2) Number and type of divisions participating for each State;

(35.1.3) The total number of battle tanks for each State and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armoured vehicles;

(35.1.4) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre or above);

(35.1.5) The total number of helicopters, by category;

(35.1.6) Envisaged number of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters;

(35.1.7) Purpose of air missions;

(35.1.8) Categories of aircraft involved;

(35.1.9) The level of command, organizing and commanding the air force participation;

(35.1.10) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire;

(35.1.11) Indication of other naval ship-to-shore support;

(35.1.12) The level of command, organizing and commanding the naval force participation.

(35.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs:

(35.2.1) The total number of amphibious troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings, and/or the total number of airborne troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults;

(35.2.2) In the case of a notifiable amphibious landing, the point or points of embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(35.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:

(35.3.1) The total number of troops transferred;

(35.3.3) Number and type of divisions participating in the transfer;

(35.3.4) The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;

(35.3.4) Geographical co-ordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration.

(36) C - The envisaged area and timeframe of the activity

(36.1) The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic co-ordinates, as appropriate;

(36.2) The start and end dates of each phase (transfers, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise phase, recovery phase) of activities in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations, the tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas (delimited by geographical co-ordinates) for each phase;

(36.3) Brief description of each phase.

(37) D - Other information

(37.1) Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity;

(37.2) Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities.

OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(38) The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to the following notifiable military activities:

(38.1) - The engagement of formations of land forces* of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

(38.2) - The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(38.3) - In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security-building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(38.4) The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 17,000 troops, except in the case of either an amphibious landing or a parachute assault by airborne forces, which will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops.

(39) The host State will extend the invitations in writing through diplomatic channels to all other participating States at the time of notification. The host State will be the participating State on whose territory the notified activity will take place.

(40) The host State may delegate some of its responsibilities as host to another participating State engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State. In such cases, the host State will specify the allocation of responsibilities in its invitation to observe the activity.

(41) Each participating State may send up to two observers to the military activity to be observed.

(42) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian observers, including members of its personnel accredited to the host State. Military observers will, normally, wear their uniforms and insignia while performing their tasks.

(43) Replies to the invitation will be given in writing not later than 21 days after the issue of the invitation.

(44) The participating States accepting an invitation will provide the names and ranks of their observers in their reply to the invitation. If the invitation is not accepted in time, it will be assumed that no observers will be sent.

(45) Together with the invitation the host State will provide a general observation programme, including the following information:

(45.1) - the date, time and place of assembly of observers;

(45.2) - planned duration of the observation programme;

(45.3) - languages to be used in interpretation and/or translation;

(45.4) - arrangements for board, lodging and transportation of the observers;

(45.5) - arrangements for observation equipment which will be issued to the observers by the host State;

(45.6) - possible authorization by the host State of the use of special equipment that the observers may bring with them;

(45.7) - arrangements for special clothing to be issued to the observers because of weather or environmental factors.

(46) The observers may make requests with regard to the observation programme. The host State will, if possible, accede to them.

(47) The host State will determine a duration of observation which permits the observers to observe a notifiable military activity from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.

(48) The host State will provide the observers with transportation to the area of the notified activity and back. This transportation will be provided from either the capital or another suitable location to be announced in the invitation, so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation programme.

(49) The invited State will cover the travel expenses for its observers to the capital, or another suitable location specified in the invitation, of the host State, and back.

(50) The observers will be provided equal treatment and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions.

(51) The observers will be granted, during their mission, the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(52) The host State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.

(53) In order to allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification, the host State will:

(53.1) - at the commencement of the observation programme give a briefing on the purpose, the basic situation, the phases of the activity and possible changes as compared with the notification and provide the observers with a map of the area of the military activity with a scale of 1 to not more than 500,000 and an observation programme with a daily schedule as well as a sketch indicating the basic situation;

(53.2) - provide the observers with appropriate observation equipment; however, the observers will be allowed to use their personal binoculars, which will be subject to examination and approval by the host State;

(53.3) - in the course of the observation programme give the observers daily briefings with the help of maps on the various phases of the military activity and their development and inform the observers about their positions geographically; in the case of a land force activity conducted in combination with air or naval components, briefings will be given by representatives of these forces;

(53.4) - provide opportunities to observe directly forces of the State/States engaged in the military activity so that the observers get an impression of the flow of the activity; to this end, the observers will be given the opportunity to observe major combat units of the participating formations of a divisional or equivalent level and, whenever possible, to visit some units and communicate with commanders and troops; commanders or other senior personnel of participating formations as well as of the visited units will inform the observers of the mission of their respective units;

(53.5) - guide the observers in the area of the military activity; the observers will follow the instructions issued by the host State in accordance with the provisions set out in this document;

(53.6) - provide the observers with appropriate means of transportation in the area of the military activity;

(53.7) - provide the observers with opportunities for timely communication with their embassies or other official missions and consular posts; the host State is not obligated to cover the communication expenses of the observers;

(53.8) - provide the observers with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the observation programme and, when necessary, medical care.

(54) The participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours. The continuation of these activities beyond this time will be subject to observation while the agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded. The observation programme will follow as closely as practically possible all the provisions for observation set out in this document.

ANNUAL CALENDARS

(55) Each participating State will exchange, with all other participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification*, within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. It will be transmitted every year, in writing, through diplomatic channels, not later than 15 November for the following year.

(56) Each participating State will list the above-mentioned activities chronologically and will provide information on each activity in accordance with the following model:

(56.1) - type of military activity and its designation;

(56.2) - general characteristics and purpose of the military activity;

(56.3) - States involved in the military activity;

(56.4) - area of the military activity, indicated by appropriate geographic features and/or defined by geographic co-ordinates;

(56.5) - planned duration of the military activity and the 14-day period, indicated by dates, within which it is envisaged to start;

(56.6) - the envisaged total number of troops* engaged in the military activity;

(56.7) - the types of armed forces involved in the military activity;

(56.8) - the envisaged level of command, under which the military activity will take place;

(56.9) - the number and type of divisions whose participation in the military activity is envisaged;

---

* as defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

(56.10) - any additional information concerning, inter alia, components of armed forces, which the participating State planning the military activity considers relevant.

(57) Should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other participating States no later than in the appropriate notification.

(58) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in an annual calendar will be communicated to all participating States as soon as possible, in accordance with the model provided in the annual calendar.

CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

(59) Each participating State will communicate, in writing, to all other participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning military activities subject to prior notification* involving more than 40,000 troops*, which it plans to carry out in the second subsequent calendar year. Such communication will include preliminary information on each activity, as to its general purpose, timeframe and duration, area, size and States involved.

(60) Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 75,000 troops, unless they have been the object of communication as defined above.

(61) Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.

(62) If military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

---

* as defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military

COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

(63) According to the Madrid Mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon "will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content."

(64) The participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.

(65) In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(66) Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State on whose territory, within the zone of application for CSBMs, compliance with the agreed confidence- and security-building measures is in doubt.

(67) No participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

(68) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating State.

(69) An inspection will not be counted if, due to force majeure, it cannot be carried out.

(70) The participating State which requests an inspection will state the reasons for such a request.

(71) The participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs (67 and 68).

(72) Any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons for a request will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.

(73) The participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area". The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place. The specified area will be defined and limited by the scope and scale of notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an army level military activity.

(74) In the specified area the representatives of the inspecting State accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.

(75) Within the specified area, the forces of participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection conducted by the inspecting State.

(76) Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.

(77) The representatives of the receiving State will accompany the inspection team, including when it is in land vehicles and an aircraft from the time of their first employment until the time they are no longer in use for the purposes of inspection.

(78) In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:

(78.1) - the reasons for the request;

(78.2) - the location of the specified area defined by geographical co-ordinates;

(78.3) - the preferred point(s) of entry for the inspection team;

(78.4) - mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the specified area;

(78.5) - where in the specified area the inspection will begin;

(78.6) - whether the inspection will be conducted from the ground, from the air, or both simultaneously;

(78.7) - whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter, or both;

(78.8) - whether the inspection team will use land vehicles provided by the receiving State or, if mutually agreed, its own vehicles;

(78.9) - information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State.

(79) The reply to the request will be given in the shortest possible period of time, but within not more than twenty-four hours. Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State.

(80) Any request for inspection as well as the reply thereto will be communicated to all participating States without delay.

(81) The receiving State should designate the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the specified area. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team will be able to reach the specified area without delay from the point(s) of entry.

(82) All participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.

(83) Within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area, the inspection will be terminated.

(84) There will be no more than four inspectors in an inspection team. While conducting the inspection the inspection team may divide into two parts.

(85) The inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel, will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(86) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the inspection, and, when necessary, medical care; however this does not exclude the use by the inspection team of its own tents and rations.

(87) The inspection team will have use of its own maps, own photo cameras, own binoculars and own dictaphones, as well as own aeronautical charts.

(88) The inspection team will have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment of the receiving State, including the opportunity for continuous

communication between the members of an inspection team in an aircraft and those in a land vehicle employed in the inspection.

(89) The inspecting State will specify whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between the inspecting and receiving States. Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team a continuous view of the ground during the inspection.

(90) After the flight plan, specifying, inter alia, the inspection team's choice of flight path, speed and altitude in the specified area, has been filed with the competent air traffic control authority the inspection aircraft will be permitted to enter the specified area without delay. Within the specified area, the inspection team will, at its request, be permitted to deviate from the approved flight plan to make specific observations provided such deviation is consistent with paragraph (74) as well as flight safety and air traffic requirements. Directions to the crew will be given through a representative of the receiving State on board the aircraft involved in the inspection.

(91) One member of the inspection team will be permitted, if such a request is made, at any time to observe data on navigational equipment of the aircraft and to have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew for the purpose of determining the exact location of the aircraft during the inspection flight.

(92) Aerial and ground inspectors may return to the specified area as often as desired within the 48-hour inspection period.

(93) The receiving State will provide for inspection purposes land vehicles with cross country capability. Whenever mutually agreed taking into account the specific geography relating to the area to be inspected, the inspecting State will be permitted to use its own vehicles.

(94) If land vehicles or aircraft are provided by the inspecting State, there will be one accompanying driver for each land vehicle, or accompanying aircraft crew.

(95) The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all participating States without delay.

(96) The inspection expenses will be incurred by the receiving State except when the inspecting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles. The travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry will be borne by the inspecting State.

(97) Diplomatic channels will be used for communications concerning compliance and verification.

(98) Each participating State will be entitled to obtain timely clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of agreed confidence- and security-building measures. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.

* * *

(99) The participating States stress that these confidence- and security-building measures are designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities and emphasize that their implementation will contribute to these objectives.

(100) Reaffirming the relevant objectives of the Final Act, the participating States are determined to continue building confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all. They are also determined to achieve progress in disarmament.

(101) The measures adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1987.

(102) The Government of Sweden is requested to transmit the present document to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in Vienna and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Government of Sweden is also requested to transmit the present document to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States.

(103) The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

(104) The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the Government and people of Sweden for the excellent arrangements made for the Stockholm Conference and the warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the Conference.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, the zone of application for CSBMs is defined as follows:

"On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

---

*In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe."

Wherever the term "the zone of application for CSBMs" is used in this document, the above definition will apply.

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

It is understood that, taking into account the agreed date of entry into force of the agreed confidence- and security-building measures and the provisions contained in them concerning the timeframes of certain advance notifications, and expressing their interest in an early transition to the full implementation of the provisions of this document, the participating States agree to the following:

The annual calendars concerning military activities subject to prior notification and forecast for 1987 will be exchanged not later than 15 December 1986.

Communications, in accordance with agreed provisions, concerning military activities involving more than 40,000 troops planned for the calendar year 1988 will be exchanged by 15 December 1986. Participating States may undertake activities involving more than 75,000 troops during the calendar year 1987 provided that they are included in the annual calendar exchanged by 15 December 1986.

Activities to begin during the first 42 days after 1 January 1987 will be subject to the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE. However, the participating States will make every effort to apply to them the provisions of this document to the maximum extent possible.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986 .

CSCE/SC.9
ANNEX III

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

It is understood that each participating State can raise any question consistent with the mandate of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe at any stage subsequent to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

It is understood that the participating States recall that they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right of neutrality. In this context, they will not take advantage of these rights to circumvent the purposes of the system of inspection, and in particular the provision that no participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

Appropriate understandings between participating States on this subject will be expressed in interpretative statements to be included in the journal of the day.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986