IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS IN BOSNIA

October 25, 1996

Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC

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CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS IN BOSNIA

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1996

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The briefing was convened at 2:02 p.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Robert Hand, Helsinki Commission staff advisor, moderating.

Mr. **Hand**. My name is Bob Hand, and I'm a staff advisor at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, better known as the Helsinki Commission. I'd like to welcome you all to the latest in a series of Commission briefings, hearings, and other activities relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina being held, this year especially, relating to the elections which have been organized by the OSCE, the international organization that the Commission follows very closely. Indeed, the Commission sent six observers for the country-wide and entity elections which took place in mid-September. We actively follow what has been happening since that time.

We're delighted today to have the head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and also of the Provisional Election Commission that organized the September elections, Ambassador Robert Frowick. The ambassador has been doing a tremendous job in Sarajevo in what is a very difficult situation due to internal divisions and outside pressures. He is here in Washington at a very important time. As I said, the elections at the country-wide and entity level were held just about a month ago, and the new institutions to which people have been elected are now attempting to organize and to do their work. Municipal elections were postponed in August. There was an attempt to hold them in November, but they've been most recently postponed, I believe, until some time in 1997.

Rather than going on any longer, I will give the floor to Ambassador Frowick, who will comment on the election process and where the OSCE mission goes from here into 1997. After he makes his remarks, we will open the briefing to the floor for very brief questions. The ambassador must leave at about 3:00. So, to allow as many questions as possible, we will try to keep them all to the point.

Ambassador Frowick?

Amb. **Frowick**. Thank you, Bob. I think I'll make brief remarks so that we can have mainly a discussion today.

I appreciate the opportunity to talk with all of you about what's happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it truly is a vitally important area of American foreign policy and, I think, Western interests in general.

The elections in September were very controversial, as all of you know, but it seemed to me, as I was there in the OSCE mission through the summer, that we had a chance to hold elections that would be reasonably democratic in the electoral process that we were heading up as OSCE, despite the fact that on the ground, it was clear that the conditions called for in Article I of Annex III—the conditions of freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of expression, politically neutral environment—were not fully realized. I would argue, however, that at the least there was a certain amount of progress on each one of those at least—and to some extent, progress achieved by OSCE itself, along with efforts of other international organizations and NGOs.

When the election day came, it was possible to hold six of the seven levels of elections envisaged in the peace agreement within the outer limit of the timeframe, 9 months after the signing of the peace agreement in Paris. The basic point, it seemed to me, was that by holding those elections, the international community was able to do something constructive by offering the prospect of overcoming the centrifugal political forces on the ground, which had waged war from 1992 to 1995 in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and were continuing to wage a very deep political struggle.

At least these elections created a collective presidency and a house of representatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the country as a whole, pulling all of the ethnic groups back together again in some important activities of governance, in addition to creating a legislative assembly for the Federation and a presidency and legislative assembly for Republika Srpska.

Last week, when I attended the meeting in Banja Luka of the inauguration of the presidency of the Republika Srpska and the National Assembly, it struck me that, despite all the problems, less than a year after the war, here was an Assembly in the Republika Srpska that had 18 Bosnian Muslims elected and present, and one Bosnian Croat member. At one point, 14 of them walked out because of a dispute over the oath and the hymn that was sung. But they came back in. One of those Muslim members went to the podium and gave an excellent speech, Mr. Tokic of the joint list. It seemed to me there was a bit of an exercise of democracy under way. This is a rather short period of time since the 14 September elections.

Also this past week, the installation into the office of the collective presidency inched forward incrementally. Finally (I think it was Tuesday) the three presidents—Izetbegovic, Zubak, and Krajisnik—met at the museum in Sarajevo to sign the oath and to talk together for quite some time.

It's not easy. It's a process that is very tortuous and requires unlimited patience and sustained effort. But if one thinks of where we are now, toward the end of this year, in comparison with where we were when the Dayton Agreement was being negotiated less than a year ago, I think the progress has been rather remarkable, overall.

Now, after the September elections, I thought we should try our best to hold the municipal elections as well, the seventh level, the one that was missing, which we had postponed at the end of August on the grounds that circumstances across the country were too problematic. The circumstances were quite varied from one municipality to another. I thought we needed more time, and if we could forgo the municipal elections for a while, and concentrate on those other six—we had a better chance of an optimal result with them—then we could turn to the municipal elections. My reasoning was rather strategic, in the sense that I thought it'd be best to hold the elections while IFOR was still in the country in maximum strength and so was OSCE and we could perhaps draw

on the momentum that had been built up for the September elections and just keep driving the process forward.

As it turns out, over the past fortnight, I've had a number of discussions with the leadership of the Republika Srpska and Mrs. Plavsic, in particular, and that leadership decided that it would not want to go forward with municipal elections at this time. This was the decisive reason for the postponement. But I would also say that the other two leaders, Presidents Izetbegovic and Zubak, preferred to wait until next year for the elections to take place. President Izetbegovic has often said, let's do this in April instead of now. But they were ready to go along with it if we managed to keep the momentum up.

It also seemed to me that many of our European friends had serious misgivings about driving the process forward before the end of the year. Although all of the OSCE Participating States indicated that, once we'd made a decision in the Provisional Election Commission to go ahead with the elections, they would give full support, some of them really didn't have the heart to give full support.

So this week I decided to go back to Vienna, en route home to Washington, to talk about these things and indicate that, now that the elections are postponed, we must all close ranks and pull together so that we can bring forward a process, a momentum, to prepare optimally for municipal elections when they do take place in 1997.

My recommendation for a time-frame for them would be in the April-to-June period, before the end of the first half of the year, for a number of reasons. One, the weather will have improved by then, so that might be helpful. But mainly I think it wise not to postpone them for too long, because the further one gets into the latter part of 1997 or into 1998, the more likely there would be an effort by the entities to say, "Well, we're going to have elections in 1998, so let's just forgo them at this time," or "If we're going to have them, let's hold them ourselves."

So I think it's important that we try to nail down an extension of the OSCE mandate to supervise these elections as soon as possible and to prepare for them in the timeframe that I've indicated. At the moment, in fact, the number-one priority of the mission is to gain the endorsement of the three parties to an extension of the OSCE mandate for holding these elections, the municipal elections, some time in 1997.

On Monday, I redrafted the original extension of the mandate, which was circulated in September—the one that, in effect, Mrs. Plavsic reneged upon—and rewrote it for next year with a slight rewording to bring it more into line with what I thought was specific in the general framework agreement for peace. The following day, on Tuesday of this week, President Izetbegovic and President Zubak both signed it. But as you will no doubt have known, Assistant Secretary Kornblum, who was in Sarajevo at the time, took those original documents up to Banja Luka on Wednesday and discussed the matter with the Republika Srpska leadership. But it was still not prepared to sign as yet, although it should be noted the Republika Srpska is saying that, in principle, it agrees with the concept of OSCE supervision.

The two reasons given to me by Mrs. Plavsic for holding off at the moment: One, after the events in Jusici and those villages near Mahala, in the zone of separation, the security situation on the ground had been churned up so much that she thought things on the ground need to calm down before the elections took place. I agreed to work on that prospect and have been doing this. Two, she wanted increased consultations between OSCE

and her government in Banja Luka, and I agreed to an arrangement on that score, as well.

I am hopeful that we can manage to achieve her concurrence in an extension of the mandate soon. There are certain things that we have in mind that we can do through diplomacy to bring the Republika Srpska aboard so that by the time the Paris meeting convenes on the 14th of November with Presidents Izetbegovic and Zubak and Krajisnik present, all of them can bless the mandate. Then we will have a situation in which the Lisbon summit of OSCE, on December 2-3, will be able to take account of that situation and elaborate an overall mandate for the mission going into 1997, probably projecting also some thoughts, even through the following year in the context of Foreign Minister De Charette's vision of a 2-year consolidation period, which will be very much emphasized at the Paris summit.

Now, these are some brief thoughts about where we are in the electoral process now and where we're headed in the immediate future. I'd be glad to try to answer your questions.

Mr. **Hand**. I will take the prerogative to ask the first question. To what extent was the postponement of the municipal elections based on the reason you originally postponed them in August, the abuse of the registration of voters in certain categories? Or is there a basic agreement now among the parties on how to register voters for the municipal elections?

Amb. **Frowick**. On August the 27th, when I originally postponed them, I did it for political reasons, and I did cite at the outset—that day—concern over abuse of the regulations; that is to say, on refugee voting prerogatives, primarily, as far as the Republika Srpska was concerned. But that day I also went on to say that one problem wasn't the only thing on my mind. I was also concerned about the predilection toward violence in Bihac and the resistance of people to follow through on commitments in the pilot project cities, such as in Stolac. There were problems all across the country.

In a sense, the reasons now are quite similar. In the meantime, of course, the Provisional Election Commission has taken action to reform the refugee voting through measures that we decided upon a week ago. These clamp down very severely on the opportunities for refugee voting within, let's say, an entity where the refugees did not live before. They are not disenfranchised because they still have the opportunity, if they wish, to vote where they were before the war, in the municipalities where they lived in 1990 and 1991, and exceptionally, to be able to apply to the Commission even to vote in some other residence.

I know that this issue of refugee voting reform is a difficult one at the moment. It will be a part, no doubt, of the diplomacy involved with bringing the Republika Srpska aboard. We probably will have to find some kind of compromise on the question.

Mr. **Hand**. OK. We do have a roving microphone. So if I call on you, a microphone will be brought to you. You speak into the microphone, because this is being transcribed. As you can see from the signs, today's briefing is now on the record. We appreciate Ambassador Frowick's willingness to speak on the record. Also just briefly identify yourself before asking your question.

Yes?

Questioner. My name is Galina Schneider. I'm asking this for BOSNRT—Steven Albert. We would like to know what the relationship is between what you're planning now

and the municipal elections within Serbia under its various names. For example, we have the possible imminent return of 135,000 Albanian Kosovars. How would these people vote in the elections? How is the refugee situation being coordinated with the voting situation? Is the refugee situation being considered, at all? We're reading nothing about it. How is it going to be implemented? Over 20,000 people returning to the Sandjak—when? Are they having to return from Bavaria? Is diplomacy being exercised to prevent them from having to return before winter?

Mr. **Hand**. So the question is regarding the return of the refugees. How——

Questioner. We have huge returns.

Mr. **Hand**. ——It will be specifically——

Questioner. If they're returning, are they being registered to vote? One of the reasons that these people are returning, in the Sandjak for example, is to be part of the plebiscite for the first time——

Mr. **Hand**. Although that's in Serbia——

Questioner [continuing]. —after being separate. That's in Serbia, and that's another question entirely.

Mr. **Hand**. OK.

Questioner. How can we see these elections as bringing the country together, when we've essentially established a situation in which they can be viewed separately?

Mr. **Hand**. OK. As I said, I want to keep them short.

Amb. **Frowick**. Well, I can't really speak to refugee flow within Serbia. As far as the refugees vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, of course OSCE works very closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees people because they are in charge of refugees and the movement of refugees. We try to be aware, generally, of their plans.

For example, with regard, for example, to the recent turmoil over some of the returns of people into the zone of separation; we have in the principals' meetings in Sarajevo, chaired by Carl Bildt, UNHCR representatives, myself, IFOR, and others, been looking at how best to orchestrate events that are in the spirit of the peace agreement, to enable people to do this without being shot up for something, and obstructed forcibly.

And the principal constructive event there, I think, has been the diplomacy led by Ambassador Michael Steiner, who has worked out with the various sides, at authoritative levels, procedures that will enable people to go back to villages—theoretically, at least—in safety. I think these movements, demographically, are going to take quite some time. But at least there's a base.

Questioner. That's where we have to be—[off-microphone]—so we're—[off microphone]—to go—for the situation in Kosovo, where we have Krajina Serbs located in previous Kosovar Albanian housing. So they have nowhere to go, and neither do the Krajina Serbs—[off-microphone]——

Amb. **Frowick**. I have very deep sympathy for the situation of the people in Kosovo. In 1992, I was there in Skopje as head of the first OSCE monitor mission in Macedonia, often dealing with the ethnic Albanian problem. I was more concerned about Kosovo than anything else in that job. I met frequently with both President Gligorov and Albanian President Berisha. Just after taking on this assignment, I went incidentally to Skopje and Tirana to talk with the leaders to express concern about Kosovo so people didn't lose sight

of that while we were concentrating so much attention on Bosnia. The peace agreement is imperfect. It is——

Questioner. The obverse of that is——

Mr. **Hand**. Excuse me, we have to move on.

Amb. **Frowick**. My focus on Krajina Serbs is mainly those that are within Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are a number of them, for example, in the Banja Luka area. I have been taking the position, up to now, that they cannot have the right to vote because they're not on the 1991 census. That's been the view this year of implementing the Dayton Agreement.

But I have also tried, on humanitarian grounds, to draw attention to their problem, too, that they need help because they're a special case, uprooted by the war in a rather dramatic way, so that no one loses sight of them. I think that AID and others have been trying to be helpful to them on humanitarian grounds. But so far, we don't have a way for them to exercise a right to vote.

One last comment. Large-scale return of refugees seems quite tough at the moment because the infrastructure isn't there. Frankly, in my personal view, the international community's performance this past year on trying to build up economic reconstruction on anything like the scale that's needed has been rather disgraceful.

Mr. **Hand**. Next question. Over there.

Questioner. That was a very tantalizing comment. What can you tell us about your disappointment with the international community and reconstruction aid?

Amb. **Frowick**. Well, I say it mainly with respect to my concerns over the electoral process. Now OSCE, it should be recalled, is also working on democratization and human rights questions and military regional stabilization measures, confidence- and security-building measures, arms control, and so on.

But it seemed to me (in fact, I've mentioned to authorities that are involved in that process) how important it would be, during an electoral process, for the citizens of the country to be able to see real action on the ground; of large-scale activity, paid for by the international community, as seemed to be the prospect when we entered this year. I don't see it. I mean, most of the progress, which has been astounding in Sarajevo and in some parts of the country, has come from the natural entrepreneurial spirit of the people, going back to open up their little shops and their cafes and all of that. But you just don't see action on the large-scale projects that is needed to do something significant about the staggering problem of unemployment. That really needs attention.

Mr. **Hand**. Yes, over here. Since you're so far over, use the mike right on the dais. It might be a little bit easier.

Questioner. Thanks. Tom Gjelton, from NPR. Two questions, Ambassador. First, what kind of international security presence in the way of IFOR, or "I-FIVE" as some people call it, will be needed for the municipal elections? Second, as far as arms reduction is concerned, do you know of any under-reporting by the Serb side in terms of their heavy weaponry?

Amb. **Frowick**. Well, I'm glad to speak a little bit about that issue, because I think that the activity of OSCE in this area is very little noted and underestimated. It's important, as far as our effort to help create stability in the country is concerned so that diplomacy has a chance to take hold.

My own view has been for some time that—and I speak here naturally as the representative of all the OSCE countries, one-fifty-fifth American—French Foreign Minister De Charette was right in saying at the Florence mid-term assessment meeting in June that there needed to be a 2-year period of consolidation once we reached the post-major-election period this fall. Inevitably, there needs to be a strong continuing international commitment over that 2-year period. It needs to be done both in the military dimension and in the civil implementation dimension.

With respect to what may actually happen on IFOR, this is beyond OSCE's purview, but my assumption is that within NATO the discussions that have been ongoing for some time now will result in, as you say "I-FIVE," or "FOFOR", "Follow-On Forces"—something like this—of substantial strength, even if it were to be one-third of what we've had this past year. I think it's essential that the international community support this approach, for at least the next year or two, as an insurance policy.

You had a second question there, too.

Questioner. Do you know of any under-reporting by the Serb side in terms of their heavy weaponry?

Amb. **Frowick**. Yes, there has been a certain amount of under-reporting of weaponry as far as the Republika Srpska is concerned, and according to the best estimates. But generally, I've been impressed with the amount of progress that has been achieved this year, both on implementing the confidence- and security-building measures, which require on-the-ground inspections and on the initial sub-regional arms control agreement, which was reached in June. It was bound to be very difficult.

The OSCE approach is to emphasize build-down, to agree on reductions, and create a balance that way, rather than the buildup of the train and equip option. But whatever approach is used, this has to be a result of a balance in order to maintain a hope for stability in the region.

Incidentally, after I began to speak, a colleague walked in this room who is the true hero of what was achieved in those September elections, which were, I think—as you may have noted, I've often described them as such the most complicated in history. I'd like to have Jeff Fischer just stand up so everybody can see him, because he was director-general of those elections, which were done the hard way. We all owe him a great debt of gratitude.

Mr. **Hand**. Next question? Yes, back there?

Questioner. My name is Steven Tronis. I work for an AID contractor. I was one of the supervisors for the elections in September. I was very surprised to find that in the Republika Srpska, the candidates are actually different, all being Serbian, as opposed to the candidates on the ballots of the Bosnia-Herzegovina's central region.

I don't know if you covered this one before I came, but what is going to be the relationship between the coming municipal elections and those candidates? Are they going to reflect the partition of the candidates from the very start? Or, in what way is that going to enable the voters to have a selection from across the board?

Amb. **Frowick**. Well, it should be said that the elections in the Republika Srpska actually had a rather striking result in terms of political contest and some pluralism, when one looks at what happened with the National Assembly, where 18 Muslims representing Muslim political parties were voted into office. Now, this came about not because of votes within the Republika Srpska but through the absentee ballot system, or

the prerogative of people to be able to go back to their original municipalities to vote, which was the general rule for the voting.

When we approach the municipal elections, we will have those dynamics even more in play. There wasn't much of a return of people directly to their original municipalities, as you know, despite the fact that there was a rather elaborate plan, which I supported. I thought it was a logical and effective approach by IFOR and the International Police Task Force, with the Ministers of Interior of the respective sides, for the recommended routes that would take busloads of voters back to their original municipalities. I think not many of them did it in September, precisely because the municipal elections were not taking place. They were voting for higher levels of authority, so they didn't see the necessity of it. When we get to the time of municipal elections, I suspect there will be quite a lot more crossing the inter-entity boundary line.

The prospect generally, as we look at the electoral map that's likely to emerge, would be of a Republika Srpska in which those municipalities up in the Brcko area, going both directions through that corridor, into either side of the Republika Srpska; that's the area where there could be a fair number of villages that vote in Muslim political leadership in strength through absentee ballot, or being able to go back there to vote, if they do exercise that right to do so. This is what's worrying the Republika Srpska so much and why it has resisted any change in the refugee voting arrangement that offered the famous P2 prerogative, which we've now addressed and almost entirely eliminated.

Mr. **Hand**. Yes. Back there?

Questioner. Good afternoon. I'm a former U.N. civil affairs officer with UNPROFOR. I had a question regarding the state of the Federation, itself.

When I was working there, the interim municipal assemblies were to be forming. When I left in November of last year, about 12 of them still had not formed. I was wondering if you could comment, please, on the dismantling of Herceg-Bosna's municipal authorities, particularly in Skopje, where they're running the Croat side of Gornij Vakuf—or if you call it Gornij Vakuf if you're Bosniac side?

Amb. **Frowick**. Well, everything is, as I said, advancing incrementally, a bit at a time. The Herceg-Bosna institutions have been a special case all year. But it seemed to me, after the 30 June elections in Mostar and the insistence of the European Union, strongly supported by the United States and the international community in general, to accept those results, despite the efforts of the Croat side to resist them, that in that context, particularly when President Tudjman came here to Washington and met with President Clinton, there was a rather effective chain of events diplomatically, that led to the agreement to dissolve the Herceg-Bosna institutions. It was subsequent to that, they did dissolve. This does not mean that there still isn't a will, on the part of many of the Bosnian Croats, to emphasize their separateness and their nation within Herzegovina, as well as the national links with the Croats across the border in Croatia.

All of the changes take time. The installation now into office of the cantons is moving along rather slowly. But, on the other hand, as I think about it, the amount of time that's passed from the 14th of September up to now isn't very long in terms of installing people into office. In a way, we have these two entities, and there are people in each entity that almost want to make these as countries unto themselves, in addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, in some ways, one thinks of dealing with three countries trying to take shape. Beyond that, 10 cantons in one half of the country, before we even get to the

municipal elections—the fact that Mostar has taken place. That was a prominent municipality, a very difficult one.

So we have one municipal election behind us. I would have had to postpone elections in Brcko anyway until the arbitration is over. There's another special case. If you think of all of these factors, it seems to me that we're moving along really better than could have been anticipated last spring.

Mr. **Hand**. Could I just ask quickly, as a practical follow-up question, how many of the cantonal assemblies have actually met?

Amb. **Frowick**. I can't tell you exactly, Bob. But they have been jockeying. Some of them have been meeting, but they haven't really pulled together the way they're supposed to.

Mr. **Hand**. OK.

Amb. **Frowick**. There have been preliminary kinds of gatherings.

Mr. **Hand**. Yes, over here?

Questioner. I'm with a coalition of groups supporting the War Crimes Tribunal. I'd be interested in getting your comments on reports that persons indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal were actively involved in the elections in September. I'm interested further in knowing whether within the OSCE there's been discussion of the need to apprehend or get them out of the country into The Hague before the municipal elections?

Amb. **Frowick**. The apprehension of the war criminals is another issue beyond the scope of OSCE. It's up to the forces of law and order. One thinks of military forces or police forces of some kind.

But there is one thing OSCE could do, and that we did, as you may know, last summer. We took the position that, since the peace agreement states that no one indicted for war crimes may hold public office, that we should insist that Dr. Karadzic, who was conspicuously holding the office of the presidency of the Serbian Democratic Union, the SDS, that he would have to leave that post, because I argued it was a public office. Although many lawyers said "public" office means governmental office, I said in the Republika Srpska, that's the office that really counts.

So we took a stand. We insisted that either he leave the position or the SDS was going to be removed from the whole electoral process and not be able to compete in it. I think we had powerful leverage on that party. As you know, in his dramatic visit to the theater on the 18th of July, Mr. Holbrooke and his colleagues succeeded in getting agreement that Karadzic would relinquish that position on the eve of the commencement of the political campaign on the 19th of July—not only the SDS, but he was also leaving the leadership of the country as president. He had transferred his powers, allegedly, to Mrs. Plavsic as the acting president, but he was still holding the title. That seemed untoward as well. Mr. Holbrooke succeeded in removing him from these public offices and gaining a commitment, as a third point, that Karadzic would not actively engage in political life, go before the cameras on television or proselytize on the stump.

Now, my own view of the way this has worked out—he's the classic case really. My view is that the letter of the agreement has been respected, because he left those offices, and he has not been visible. But the spirit of it is very much in question, because I suspect he has been involved, probably, behind the scenes. I can't prove it. But one senses that, as long as he's there, he has some role of this kind to play. At some point, as soon as it's propitious, there has to be some action to bring him to The Hague, it seems to me.

There are others, too, on the Croat side and elsewhere, who need to be brought to justice for terrible crimes against the people during the war. In OSCE, all we can do is cite our concerns, and I would think, particularly before we get well into the municipal elections campaign, it is something that should be addressed.

I think one more question.

Mr. **Hand**. This will be the last question.

Questioner. The question may be a bit premature, but assuming that the municipal elections go off well in the spring or summer of next year, there will, or should be, attempts to normalize and get back to former patterns of trading, import, and export business, for all the entities of the former Yugoslavia. I wonder if Ambassador Frowick could perhaps give us a ballpark estimate as to when those things may begin to take effect.

Amb. **Frowick**. This is a very important point. I think everybody should pay attention to it and see what might be done to contribute to reestablishing normal patterns of commerce. I would hope in the months ahead increasingly this can build up. There are isolated pockets of normal commerce. We read every now and then of an area near Brcko where a considerable amount of commerce goes back and forth between all three sides, and there's a vitality to it. The more we can move in that direction, the more we will help deepen the prospects for peace, along with the political initiatives that we have.

OSCE is not so much engaged in this, but I might tell you that in our democratization program we have undertaken efforts to stimulate dialogue among several strata of society—religious leaders and veterans' groups, intellectuals, women, youth, and so on. More recently, I've been talking with our democratization people about this, to try to stimulate as much contact as possible back and forth among business people.

I think it's one of the most promising areas and needs a good deal more attention. I hope somehow it takes hold; that it might be, in some ways, the next big wave of positive activity after this year's political thrust.

Thank you very much for your attention.

[Whereupon at 2:46 p.m., the briefing ended.]

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