

APPENDIX

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

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STATEMENT OF SENATOR DENNIS DeCONCINI, CHAIRMAN

*Helsinki Commission Hearing on
The Yugoslav Conflict: Potential for Spillover in the Balkans
Wednesday, July 21, 1993, 2:00 p.m.
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room #628*

The Helsinki Commission has convened this hearing to take a more thorough look at the potential spillover effects of the Yugoslav conflict, which is today characterized mostly by the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In doing so, I hope that we and our distinguished witnesses can cover three important aspects of this issue:

First, direct spillover. What are the risks for fighting to erupt in areas neighboring or close to Bosnia-Herzegovina? The most likely candidates are the UN protected areas of Croatia, still occupied by Serb militants; the Muslim-inhabited Sandzak region of Serbia and Montenegro and the Albanian-inhabited Kosovo, and Macedonia. The eruption of violence in these and other areas could be either premeditated or spontaneous, and could also potentially trigger the involvement of other countries which neighbor them.

Second, the broader impact of Yugoslavia's violent disintegration on the Balkans. Economically, it has severely disrupted transport, created a massive refugee problem, and, by the need to impose sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, caused some neighboring countries additional economic hardship during a critical time of reform. Socially, aspects of the Yugoslav conflict and crisis are the preoccupation of many neighboring societies, and in all likelihood has encouraged nationalism and ethnic tensions among them as well.

Third, why should we care about either direct spillover or the broader impact. While the fact that genocide is taking place morally and legally obligates us to become involved, it is important to know what U.S. interests, if any, in the Balkans are, and how vital these interests are considered to be. If the conflict does spread, how will these interests be affected? What does the current international policy -- a lot of motion but little real action -- mean for the future of the NATO alliance? What does it mean for new global balances in the post-Cold War world?

Our witnesses today will address these important questions. First, we have Stephen Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who can explain current U.S. policy and what we and the Europeans are doing to contain the conflict, through the CSCE or otherwise. We also hope to hear a description of U.S. interests in the Balkan region as seen by the Clinton Administration.

OVER >>>

Second, we have Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and John Lampe of the Woodrow Wilson Center, who will each present their views on the potential for spillover, directly and broadly. Both have extensive background and firsthand observations of developments in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole. Finally, we have Paul Warnke, who has had a distinguished career in U.S. Government dealing with foreign policy, defense and arms control issues. He is well qualified to look at the potential for spillover in terms of U.S. interests in Europe, and has recently written on the Bosnian conflict from the point of view of NATO's role in a post-Cold War Europe.

To conclude, I must say that as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission I have myself been deeply involved in congressional efforts regarding the Yugoslav conflict, travelling there, holding hearings, meeting with people, and trying to get resolutions on the issue passed. As a result, I come to this hearing with some views on the matter already, and I would sum them up this way. There is considerable risk of spillover, and to some extent it is already occurring. It may not get out of hand, but it easily could. And while the international community have taken considerable efforts to deter the movement of conflict through missions and additional UN force deployments, it has also made the situation worse by rewarding rather than stopping aggression in the first place, specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By rewarding the aggressors through the carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we encourage them to go for more, and our warnings to the contrary increasingly lack credibility. In short, I believe we have hidden behind the veil of multilateralism as an excuse for not exerting strong leadership. Our failure and the absolute failure of our allies to take serious action against the aggressor has made the task of containment all the more difficult. If we feel the risks of spillover are great and our interests are affected by this risk, then our policy is extremely disturbing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding this.

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REPRESENTATIVE STENY H. HOYER
CoChairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe

"The Yugoslav Conflict: Potential for Spillover in the Balkans"
A Hearing before the Helsinki Commission
July 21, 1993

IT IS A PLEASURE TO JOIN OUR CHAIRMAN, SENATOR DECONCINI, IN WELCOMING SUCH A DISTINGUISHED PANEL OF EXPERTS TO THIS HEARING ON THE POTENTIAL FOR SPILLOVER IN THE BALKANS OF THE ONGOING TRAGIC WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, IN MY OPINION, IS A CLASSIC MODEL OF A FAILURE AT COLLECTIVE SECURITY. THIS IS A HUMAN CATASTROPHE OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS THAT WILL HAVE OUR ERA OF HIGH DEMOCRATIC EXPECTATIONS IN EUROPE AND AROUND THE WORLD GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS A RETURN TO BARBARISM. NOR IS THAT THE END OF THE STORY. HISTORIANS WILL FOOTNOTE THAT WE WATCHED IT HAPPEN - WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTENT AND SCOPE OF THE BARBARITY - AND FAILED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO STOP IT. WE HAVE NOT BEEN PREPARED, AS EVENTUALLY WE WERE FOR SOMALIA, TO TAKE ACTION PREMISED ON MORAL IMPERATIVES. NOR DID WE BELIEVE AS WITH THE CASE OF KUWAIT THAT IMPORTANT NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE.

INDEED, THE REEMERGENCE OF SO-CALLED "ANCIENT HATREDS" HAS DONE MORE TO THROW COLD WATER ON THE POST-COLD WAR EUPHORIA THAT I WITNESSED IN 1990 THAN ANYTHING ELSE I CAN THINK OF. BUT WHILE HATREDS MAY BE ANCIENT, IS THEIR REEMERGENCE NOW TRULY INEVITABLE, AS SOME ANALYSTS AND COMMENTATORS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE US BELIEVE? IN FACT, IN MANY PLACES WHERE ETHNIC DISPUTES NOW REIGN, EVEN IN PLACES LIKE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, THERE HAVE BEEN LONG PERIODS OF TOLERANCE AND ACCOMMODATION AMONG DIVERSE GROUPS OF PEOPLE. AFTER ALL IT WAS JUST A FEW YEARS AGO THAT SARAJEVO, A CITY THAT SEEMED TO COMBINE PEACEFULLY DIVERSE RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES, PROVIDED AN ALMOST IDYLIC SETTING FOR THE OLYMPICS. YET THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES OF EASTERN EUROPE IS OFTEN DEFINED, ESPECIALLY OF LATE, BY THEIR PERIODS OF CONFLICT RATHER THAN BY THEIR PERIODS OF HARMONY, THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT REEMERGENCE OF HISTORIC CONFLICTS MAY BE INEVITABLE. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THEY ARE LIKELY, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE INEVITABLE.

THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA HAS BEEN LED BY NATIONALISTS, INTOLERANT OF THOSE NEIGHBORS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES. RELIGIOUS MOTIVES HAVE COME TO PLAY A PART IN THIS BRUTAL WAR AGAINST CIVILIANS - BUT LET THERE BE NO MISTAKE AS TO THE OVERRIDING MOTIVATION - THAT OF POWER. ONE SHOULD NOT UNDERSTATE THE ROLE OF POWER-MAD DEMAGOGUES AND MEGALOMANIACS IN FOSTERING ETHNIC TENSION FOR THEIR OWN ENDS IN MANY OF THE CONFLICTED AREAS IN THE CSCE REGION. JUST AS STALIN AND TITO PROMOTED AN IDEOLOGY OF UNITY IN ORDER TO BETTER ENTRENCH THEIR REGIMES, TODAY'S MILOSEVICS'

PROMOTE AN IDEOLOGY OF HATRED AND DIVISION TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN
DICTATORSHIPS.

AND LET ME POINT OUT HERE THAT YOU DO NOT NEED NATIONALISTS
ON ALL SIDES FOR THIS TO HAPPEN. IT IS SERBIAN NATIONALISM FOLLOWED
BY CROATIAN NATIONALISM - AND NOT MUSLIM NATIONALISM OR ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM -- THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS WAR.

WHILE I RECOGNIZE THAT "ANCIENT HATREDS," HISTORIC ETHNIC
PROBLEMS, OR THEIR RESIDUAL, CONTEMPORARY PREJUDICES EXIST, IT IS
THE CREATION OF A POWER VACUUM WITH THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM
THAT TO A LARGE DEGREE PERMITS THE VIOLENCE UNDERLINING POLICIES
SUCH AS ETHNIC CLEANSING. WITHIN THIS POWER VACUUM OPPRESSIVE
LEADERS HAVE EMERGED WHO ARE ALL TOO HAPPY TO EXPLOIT HISTORIC
FEUDS IN ORDER TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS THE CHAMPIONS OF ONE
ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, OR LINGUISTIC GROUP AGAINST ANOTHER. WHEN THE
COMMUNIST EMPIRE COLLAPSED, LEADERS LIKE MILOSEVIC, LIKE CROATIA'S
TUDJMAN, AND LIKE MANY EXTREMISTS IN RUSSIA, SLOVAKIA, AND
ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, ALL OF
WHOM ARE FORMER COMMUNISTS -- TURNED TO NATIONALIST RHETORIC TO
LATCH ONTO POWER. SEEKING THE EXACT SAME GOALS THEY SOUGHT AS
PARTY LEADERS YET BURDENED BY AN IDEOLOGY TOO DISCREDITED TO DO
THEM ANY GOOD, THEY TURNED TO NATIONALIST RHETORIC TO BOLSTER
THEIR CLAIMS.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS IS THAT WHILE IT'S PERFECTLY FINE FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SEEK TO ADDRESS ETHNIC
INTOLERANCE IN THIS REGION THROUGH EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
DEMOCRACY BUILDING SEMINARS, AND SIMILAR THINGS THAT THE CSCE
COMMUNITY IS INDEED UNDERTAKING, WE MUST ALSO RESPOND TO PEOPLE
LIKE MILOSEVIC AS THE DICTATORS THAT THEY REALLY ARE. IN
CAPITALIZING ON ETHNIC TENSIONS FOR THEIR OWN PERSONAL GAIN IN
MANY OF THE AREAS OF CONFLICT IN THE CSCE REGION THESE PEOPLE ARE
ULTIMATELY CULPABLE FOR THE HAVOC THEY WREAK.

IF WE CAN SEE THESE KINDS OF CONFLICTS MORE AS I THINK THEY
REALLY ARE -- STRUGGLES OVER POWER AND MONEY AND LAND, AS WELL AS
AVENUES FOR ADDRESSING REAL OR PERCEIVED HISTORIC GRIEVANCES --
THEN I THINK WE CAN SEE MORE CLEARLY WHAT'S AT STAKE WHEN WE FAIL
TO ACT. THE SLAUGHTER CONTINUES INDEED INTENSIFIES AS THE STAKES
BECOME HIGHER. IT CAUSES TENSIONS TO SPREAD AS OTHERS WONDER IF
THEY WILL BE THE NEXT VICTIMS AS OTHERS ACT TO PROTECT THEIR OWN
INTERESTS WHILE OTHERS SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEW
OPPORTUNITIES THE CHAOS OFFERS. EITHER BY DESIGN OR BECAUSE OF THE

INSTABILITY THESE "UNCHECKED" TENSIONS CAUSE, SOMEONE, SOMEWHERE, LIKELY WILL BE NEXT, POTENTIALLY TRIGGERING A MUCH WIDER INVOLVEMENT OR PERHAPS PRECIPITATING A BALKAN WAR.

IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF MILOSEVIC. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND CEASE-FIRES WERE NOTHING MORE THAN TACTICAL MANEUVERS BY WHICH TIME WAS SOUGHT SO THAT GAINS COULD BE SOLIDIFIED AND ADDITIONAL TERRITORY SECURED. AT THE PRECISE MOMENT THAT AGREEMENT IS REACHED ONE COULD EXPECT SERBIAN MORTAR SHELLS TO FALL. AT SOME POINT WE SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT IN CONFRONTING VIOLENCE CREDIBLE THREATS OF RETALIATION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE.

THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA HAS UNDERMINED THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, SERIOUSLY CALLED INTO QUESTION THE WILLINGNESS OF DEMOCRACIES TO BACK UP STATED COMMITMENTS TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY WITH EFFECTIVE ACTION, AND DILUTED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE LESSON IS A BITTER ONE: AGGRESSION WILL BE TOLERATED.

AND THE QUESTION THE COMMISSION IS EXAMINING TODAY IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF THAT VIOLENCE SPREADING TO OTHER AREAS AND WHAT WILL BE THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

I THINK EUROPE HAS FAILED AND WE HAVE FAILED IN EUROPE.

WE SPEAK OF FORMING THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER -- YET THE EVENTS IN BOSNIA UNQUESTIONABLY INDICATE THAT THE WORST OF THE OLD ORDER HAS BEEN REPLACED BY DEMAGOGUES LIBERATED BY THE END OF THE COLD WAR. IF WE PERMIT THESE PEOPLE TO PREVAIL, THE NEW ERA WILL BE SHAPED BY THE VOICES OF VIOLENCE AND VENGEANCE AND NOT BY THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. IN MY VIEW THIS LAST ASPECT WILL BE THE HALLMARK OF ANY NEW WORLD ORDER, BUT IT IS ONE THAT I FEAR WILL NOT MARK THE ONE THAT IS EVOLVING.

OPENING STATEMENT OF
CONGRESSWOMAN SUSAN MOLINARI
JUNE 21 CSCE HEARING

Co-Chairmen DeConcini and Hoyer,

First, I would like to thank you for allowing me to participate in this hearing, I applaud the efforts of this committee to examine the potential for, and consequences of, a larger Balkan war. Throughout this crisis, your work on behalf of all victims of aggression have been integral to keeping the world focussed on finding a solution.

Like Senator DeConcini, I have had the opportunity to visit the region recently, and was appalled at what I saw there. Throughout Croatia, Bosnia and Kosova, casualties of Serbian ultra-nationalism and militaristic aggression were epidemic. The victims of Serbia's drive for an ethnically pure region which I met during my recent fact-finding mission have compelled me to participate in important events like this today.

While visiting in April, I discovered that the spillover -- whose potential you are now debating -- has really already occurred and is escalating daily. For example, the Serbian government's recent decision

to not renew the mandate of the CSCE human rights monitors in Kosovo and Sandzak (SAN-JACK) is clearly another sign of Belgrade's desire to steadily increase tensions until the local population responds. When this occurs, the Serbians will have an excuse to wipe out those areas not already ethnically cleansed.

To counter this threat, the Clinton Administration has deployed three hundred American troops to the region hoping to send a "signal" to Serbia. It appears the President hopes this "signal" will stop a government that has killed an estimated 200,000 people, left another 2 million homeless, broken most international agreements they have entered into, and whose leaders have been accused of ordering systematic rape, ethnic cleansing and other war crimes.

In my opinion, it has been the Albanian majority in Kosovo leading a campaign of peaceful resistance against Serbian harassment -- and not the half-hearted attempts by the international community -- that has kept the conflict from spreading. While the Serbian government has tried to provoke the Albanians into starting a fight -- to their credit they have resisted -- the CSCE monitors in Kosovo have acted as a pressure valve to relieve tensions on both sides. Serbian expulsion of the monitors now paves the way for ethnic cleansing to be carried out like that in Bosnia.

In June, I introduced two amendments calling on the President to push the U.N. and the CSCE to more than double monitors currently operating in Kosova and to place peacekeepers there. The House of Representatives supported these amendments recognizing the necessary mission of the monitors and that new assaults on the Kosovars could draw Turkey and Albania into the conflict.

I believe that a completely different approach to the Balkan crisis is needed. I believe Serbia will continue to gamble on the lack of Western resolve and that 300 American troops in Macedonia are not going to cross the border to save the people of Kosova. Like the Bosnians, the Kosovars will not survive any more empty gestures. I feel strongly that the Serbians must comply with international monitoring to bring an end to the apartheid system in Kosova, including opening the schools and hospitals, and rehiring workers fired for ethnic reasons. And if the Serbs continue to destabilize the region, there should be consequences including air strikes against strategic targets and supply lines.

I am very interested to hear from the panelists on their insight to what approach we should take regarding this crisis.

Thus far, our approach to dealing with Serbia only gives the green light for instability around the world. Serbia's actions over the past two years in the Balkans have made a mockery of previously unassailable doctrines, such as the non-acceptance of borders changed through force, the defense of democracy over communism, or the even inexcusability of genocide. These doctrines had been the international laws that provided security and stability for the world community. If Serbia's aggression is rewarded and allowed to escalate even further, then international leaders will be forced to deal with dozens of Serbia's throughout the world.

Statement of
Stephen A. Oxman
Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs
Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe

July 21, 1993

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Commission today to discuss with you the potential for spillover of the Bosnian conflict, and more generally the impact that conflict has had in the Balkans.

As you know, prevention of a wider Balkan war has been one of this Administration's principal goals. The Balkans are still the powderkeg of Europe. If the present conflict were to spread to Kosovo, or to Macedonia, or elsewhere, the entire region could be destabilized. Other countries, including NATO allies, might be drawn into the fighting, with grave consequences for European security. Finally, a wider conflict would set back the Balkan countries' efforts to build democracies and market economies.

In my remarks I will first discuss some of the ways in which the present conflict could spread and why a wider conflict could affect important U.S. interests. I will then explain what steps are being taken by the U.S. and the international community to prevent the conflict from spreading. Finally, I will describe what we are doing to encourage the broader trends towards democracy and free markets in this region.

The potential for spillover flows from the ethnic geography of the Balkans. The Balkan nations are not homogeneous, but contain intermingled ethnic, religious, and national groups. As the Serbian nationalists constantly remind us, there are Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia as well as in Serbia. There are Hungarians in Serbia and Romania; there are Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia; and I could give many more examples.

This ethnic tinderbox can ignite if political leaders fan the flames of nationalism and irredentism. Calls for a Greater Serbia, for example, are founded upon the claim that Serbian minorities can only be protected by union with Serbia proper. We believe that the rights of national minorities must be protected and respected, and we oppose any attempts to change national borders by force. But our policy in this troubled region must take account of the powerful emotional impact these calls for ethnic solidarity carry.

Let me give you an update on some of the situations where the conflict might expand:

Croatia

The threat in Croatia does not come from spillover as such but from a possible intensification of the conflict between the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs in the Krajina, who now control approximately one-quarter of the country. As you will recall, in 1991 there was fierce fighting between the Serbs and Croats. The international community has been trying to mediate a settlement, but without much success to date, although international mediation helped to defuse, at least for the moment, a potential crisis last weekend when the Croatian government rebuilt a bridge linking southern Dalmatia to the rest of the country. President Tudjman recently agreed to extend the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia for another three months. The situation remains extremely tense, however, and widespread fighting could erupt at any time.

Kosovo and Macedonia

Our principal concern in Kosovo is that the Serbian government might crack down violently, either in furtherance of a program of "ethnic cleansing," or in reaction to provocative actions by ethnic Albanian nationalists in Kosovo. Fighting could also be generated by extremist Serbian nationalist groups which have bases of operation in the region. Violence could lead to a flow of refugees into Macedonia, upsetting and destabilizing that country. Fighting in Kosovo might also spread to Macedonia and Albania if combatants retreat or seek refuge across the border in those countries, or if ethnic Albanians from the region seek to aid their brethren in Kosovo. Finally, we cannot totally discount the possibility of a Serbian invasion of Macedonia on the pretext of protecting the Serbian minority there.

However, the atmosphere in Kosovo today appears stable, although tense. While we do not believe that violence is imminent, an unexpected incident could still trigger an eruption at any time. The number of potentially dangerous incidents has increased in recent weeks since Serbia announced its intention to terminate the CSCE monitoring mission. I will talk later about our efforts to reverse Serbia's decision and have the monitoring mission continue.

Sandjak and Vojvodina

Sandjak and Vojvodina are less immediately explosive than Kosovo and Croatia. However, minority populations in both regions have been subjected to Serbian harassment and intimidation. For example, the Muslim minority in Sandjak has suffered beatings and shootings at the hands of local Serbian officials and paramilitary groups. In Vojvodina, a "quiet" ethnic cleansing campaign has been waged against the ethnic Hungarian population. Because the Serbian authorities have replaced local law enforcement and judicial personnel in Vojvodina with Serbs, ethnic Hungarians in the region feel that they no longer have the protection of the law and are vulnerable to threats and violence.

So far, the Serbs' activities in Vojvodina and Sandjak have not been conducted on a wide scale. However, in both regions, we are concerned that the present activities are merely a prelude to a more aggressive campaign of ethnic cleansing. Indeed many members of the minority population in both regions have already fled.

Any of these situations has the potential to lead to a wider conflict that could more broadly affect European security and American interests in a variety of ways:

Refugees may flee from wider violence to neighboring states. Already there are over 2.5 million refugees from the countries of the former Yugoslavia. A new flood of refugees would strain the limited resources of the Balkan states and could have a destabilizing influence.

Neighboring states may be drawn in to protect their ethnic brethren directly or indirectly, or may be tempted to take advantage of the tumult to press territorial claims. Broader fighting in this region, which includes two of our NATO Allies, would be extremely dangerous for European security.

A widening of the conflict might deal a death blow to the other Balkan nations that are currently trying to make the difficult transition to multi-ethnic democratic states. I will return to this point shortly.

If we are unable to prevent a wider conflict, would-be aggressors, bigots and extreme nationalists will be encouraged to foment violence in other areas, and the credibility of the U.S. and the international community may be damaged.

Because of these dangers, the U.S., acting unilaterally and through international organizations such as the UN and the CSCE, has acted on several fronts to prevent spillover.

In Kosovo:

- We have called upon the Serbian authorities to stop repression of the Albanian minority, to avoid the use of force, and to restore the region's autonomy. We have also met with Dr. Rugova, the Albanian Kosovar leader, to reinforce our publicly stated opposition to full independence for Kosovo.
- We are providing \$5 million in humanitarian aid to Kosovo, for food and other essential commodities.
- We have warned Milosevic that we are prepared to respond to conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian actions.
- We have inspired, supported and participated in the CSCE long duration mission in Serbia-Montenegro. Until recently, there were 10 CSCE monitors in Kosovo, four of whom were American. As you know, in the Joint Action Program we called for an increase in the number of monitors. However, the Serbian government has recently indicated that it will terminate the mission.

The international community is convinced that the CSCE monitoring mission should continue and the number of monitors be increased. The presence of the monitors has caused a substantial reduction in human rights abuses, specifically police harassment and brutality. Because the monitors investigate complaints swiftly and impartially, they defuse tensions and prevent sparks from becoming fires. The monitors have also given the international community its own "eyes and ears" in Kosovo, to verify or disprove alleged abuses.

You are probably aware that Secretary Christopher sent a message to Milosevic urging him to extend the mission and to accept a significant increase in the number of monitors. The Secretary told Milosevic that we viewed his failure to extend the mission with the utmost seriousness. Others, including Russia and the EC, have made similar demarches. The CSCE has met with representatives of Serbia and Montenegro to press for the mission's extension. We are also working with the CSCE to bring this matter before the UN Security Council, because Milosevic's action clearly increases the risk of a wider conflict in the region. We will continue to urge Milosevic to permit the monitors to remain, as a substantial contribution to lessening tension in the area. If he fails to do so, the CSCE will look for other ways to monitor the region.

The CSCE mission has also been operating in Sandiak and Vojvodina. If the mission is terminated, the monitors in those regions will also leave. Our efforts are directed at getting Milosevic to accept an extension of these monitors as well.

Let me now turn to Macedonia. Several weeks ago, I had the privilege of briefing the Congress on the President's decision to offer U.S. forces to augment the United Nations contingent in Macedonia. Deployment of these forces is now complete. Approximately 330 American soldiers have joined the 700 Nordic UNPROFOR troops already in Macedonia.

After a month of training, our troops will be rotated periodically to the border between Macedonia and Kosovo, to monitor the border for destabilizing activity and to watch for sanctions violations. Based upon the current situation, we do not believe that our troops face imminent hostilities. Their presence, however, should serve as a deterrent to a wider conflict.

In addition, since September the CSCE has maintained a long-duration mission in Skopje to defuse tensions and monitor the situation on the ground. The U.S. has provided the chief of this mission since its inception.

In Croatia, approximately 13,000 UN peacekeeping troops have been in place since mid-1992. The mandate of these peacekeeping forces was recently extended, with the consent of the Croatian government, for another three months. While the UNPROFOR troops have been unable to stop the fighting completely or to bring about a peaceful return of Croatian authority in the territories held by Croatian Serbs, they have succeeded in limiting the fighting. Nonetheless, armed conflict and shelling continue from time to time and the situation remains very unstable.

Finally, we are encouraging the parties to the present conflict to reach a negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement agreed upon by all the parties is the best way to end the conflict and prevent it from spreading.

As you noted in announcing this hearing, however, the Yugoslav conflict has already had "a major impact in other Balkan countries economically, politically and socially." The new democracies in the Balkans watch the bloody conflict in Bosnia -- which set out to be a multi-ethnic, democratic state embracing Western values -- at the same time that they themselves are attempting the difficult task of becoming multi-ethnic, democratic states embracing Western values. The conflict in Bosnia encourages the voices of intolerance and reaction throughout the region; a wider conflict would endanger the new democracies in the Balkans when they are most vulnerable.

Turning to the economic effects of the conflict, the Balkan democracies, which border on Serbia, deserve much of the credit for the effectiveness of U.N. sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. But their enforcement of these sanctions costs them dearly -- costs that their economies, which already suffer from underdevelopment and the stultifying effects of four decades of Communism, cannot easily absorb. The sanctions have deprived them of traditional export markets and have isolated them in varying degrees both from each other and from new markets they are trying to develop in Western Europe. And the huge profits available to persons willing to violate the sanctions strain the integrity of law enforcement institutions.

We are supporting the sanctions enforcement efforts of the front-line states through the operation of Sanctions Assistance Missions under the auspices of the CSCE and the European Community. 187 customs officers from 26 countries operate alongside the local customs services to oversee and advise on sanctions enforcement, and to provide technical assistance and training. 27 of the monitors are American. The presence of the sanctions missions gives us the ability to monitor and improve sanctions enforcement and keeps the international community informed of problems. The missions' reports provided the basis for needed UN Security Council action to strengthen and tighten the effectiveness of the embargo.

Apart from the impact of sanctions, the Yugoslav conflict has had other negative economic effects on the region. The bitter war in a neighboring country frightens away prospective foreign investors from the Balkan democracies, which urgently need outside capital to fuel the expansion of their emerging open-market economies. And national insecurity may impel the new democracies to allocate funds to military use which they cannot afford to divert from weakened public administration and social services.

The picture for these emerging Balkan democracies is not entirely gloomy, however. Notwithstanding conditions which would have crushed the spirit of less resilient peoples, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia have shown dogged persistence in pursuing programs of political and economic reform and reconstruction which have already made great progress. This is a face of the Balkans of which many Americans are unaware. But I believe it is central to long-term success for U.S. policy in the region.

The Balkan democracies remind us of a number of important lessons. They show that democratic institutions are the best means to channel ethnic, religious, and other conflicts into the political process. They demonstrate that democratic values

and institutions can take root and flourish even in places where conventional wisdom discounts their prospects. And they provide welcome evidence that democratic development internally can promote cooperative regional relations, even among historic adversaries. These lessons are applicable throughout the world.

The foundation of our policy in the Balkans, therefore, must be to support the continued development of democratic institutions, free-market economies, and open societies, and ultimately to integrate these nations into a European security system. In the immediate future, we intend to foster democratic development in the region through the following mutually reinforcing means:

- We will maintain our engagement and dialogue with the Balkan democracies, both bilaterally and through the CSCE, to continue to nurture the democratic and market reforms they have successfully begun;
- We will work to increase US and European trade with and investment in the Balkan countries. The Administration has proposed that Romania be granted Most Favored Nation status, an important step in helping that country's economy;
- We will promote economic interdependence and integration both among the Balkan democracies and between them and the West;
- Through cultural and educational exchanges and by working with non-governmental groups such as businesses and private voluntary organizations, we hope to mobilize the immense interest and resources present at the grass roots in America in order to link the U.S. and Balkans together in a dense web of relationships;
- Finally, we will continue to use our assistance programs to support our goals in this region. Our principal means for helping the Balkan democracies is the Support for Eastern European Democracies Act, or SEED. Since Congress passed the SEED Act in 1989, we have provided over \$150 million to Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and some countries of the former Yugoslavia, to assist them in developing democratic institutions, changing to free market economies, and improving the quality of life. For example, under the SEED programs support for democracy alone we have provided schoolbooks free of propaganda, equipment and training for independent media, support for new trade unions and political parties, and technical assistance for parliamentary institutions. We must continue the SEED program to help these countries in future years. And we must also encourage our European allies to do their part in providing aid and opening markets to the countries of this region.

These policies can greatly advance our goal of bringing long-term stability to the Balkans. The best vaccine against the plague of war is prosperity and democracy. I want to underscore the Administration's conviction that the Balkans tomorrow need not look like Bosnia today. The future will not be dictated by the gun barrels of violent nationalists or aggressors. It is being made now by those individuals and groups who are working with patience and determination for democracy, open markets, and ethnic tolerance. Working together with international organizations, we hope to contain the present conflict so as to permit these forces of moderation to triumph throughout the region.

Thank you. I'd be pleased to answer any questions that you have.

Statement of Paul C. Warnke
for the Helsinki Commission
Hearing, July 21, 1993

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

You have asked for my views regarding American interests in the post-Cold War Europe and how these interests might be affected if the present Balkan conflict were to spread. You have also asked me to comment on the role the NATO alliance should play in ending the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia.

Back in November, 1991, at a meeting in Rome, the NATO foreign ministers gave what I believe to be the proper analysis of these questions. They declared that, with the end of the Soviet threat, the real risks to allied security would arise from "the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe." However, when confronted with the actuality of this anticipated post-Cold War threat, NATO has failed to respond with anything other than rhetoric.

Ironically, the NATO defense ministers, meeting in Brussels on May 26 of this year, called for an end to reductions in the military budgets of alliance members, noting that: "A stabilization of defense expenditures, as well as a more effective use of our national and collective resources, are necessary to enable.

the alliance to respond in a timely and effective way to the challenges of the future." But if NATO refuses to put its muscle where its mouth is, it's hard to see what we are spending our money for and why the Alliance should survive. We are now confronted with just the sort of security threat for which NATO action is the best, if not the only, solution.

The Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, to a lesser extent, Croatian complicity in it, has left NATO inert. The proposals that have been advocated, such as safe havens for the Muslim population, or the partition of Bosnia into ethnic enclaves, are no solution at all and could readily lead to further ethnic purges in an area of Europe characterized by states with a dazzling ethnic mix. Kosovo is an Albanian-populated enclave in Serbia. Macedonia is inhabited by Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs and other ethnic minorities. Hungarians are dispersed all over what were the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.

Outside of the former Yugoslavia, in various of the former Soviet republics, people of differing cultural and genetic roots will either learn to live together or will massacre one another for reasons that have nothing to do with any pragmatic conflicts of interests. The very concept of the ethnic state is inconsistent with any sensible or sustainable world order.

In a recent speech here in Washington, Richard von Weizsacker, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, contrasted what is happening today in former Yugoslavia with the proper concept of a nation in today's world: "Cultural competition in a free society and across open frontiers works as a stimulating and unifying element. As we are sadly observing, it can, when used as an instrument for pretended superiority, exclusiveness and power turn into a cause for separation, hatred and even extermination. Culture guarded, defined and enshrined by national frontiers is a contradiction in terms to the culture we know and cherish: open, alive and international."

Nor is it true that the incalculable human tragedy in Bosnia is the inevitable consequence of ancient hatreds. For generations, Serbs, Croats and Muslims have been able to live together in peace. What we are seeing today is the product of divisive and deceitful propaganda by rapacious leaders bent on enlarging their own spheres of domination regardless of the cost in human lives and misery.

NATO, led as necessary by strong U.S. prodding, must make it clear that murderous thuggery will not be tolerated and will instead be punished. Unless it does so, the alliance is a costly anachronism. It is, in my view, absurd to contend, as some of its members do, that NATO can do nothing because it was not intended to engage in military action "out of area." What used

to be Yugoslavia has NATO countries to the east and to the south as well as to the west. If ethnic homogeneity is to be accepted as a prime criterion for statehood, then Europe can never be at peace and western European economic integration will not be sufficient to bring about prosperity and progress. For the western nations, including the United States, the resulting chaos will prevent the development of lucrative markets for our products and our technology.

I can take no comfort in the suggestions that Bosnia is a distant land or that this is a pot-and-kettle war where every one is at fault. We have seen in the past -- as when Nazi Germany invaded Czechoslovakia -- that such assertions only succeeded in postponing action to stop aggression until the task of doing so had become exponentially more difficult.

It is, regrettably, quite late in the game. With the advantage of hindsight, the international recognition of states seceding from Yugoslavia was premature and should have been preceded by negotiations designed to protect minority rights. Even then, a strong warning by the United States and its western allies against Serbian aggression might have frightened off that country's bully boys at an early stage. I can sympathize with the reluctance to initiate military action that may result in a long-term and even escalating engagement. But if aggression is allowed to go unchecked and unpunished in Europe, then NATO

members, including the United States, will find themselves at some point down the line involved in a wider war that might have been stifled in its incipiency.

I believe we should call on NATO's military leaders to prepare, and pronounce a program for military intervention including, if necessary, the virtual occupation of Bosnia. Isolated or token military action is unlikely to help and could further endanger the United Nations peacekeeping forces. The more substantial the NATO military forces are, the less military opposition they will encounter and the greater the chance that political opposition within Serbia and Croatia may lead to more responsible governments. The program should be designed to break the siege of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities and, if NATO forces meet with Serbian or Croatian resistance, to attack military targets of the aggressors within their own national borders.

The moral imperative is clear. The security threat is real. The time for action is now.

**YUGOSLAV SPILLOVERS: PROSPECTS OF A WIDER WAR
AND PROBLEMS WITH SANCTIONS**

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The arrival of 320 U.S. troops in Macedonia has helped, one hopes, to refocus American attention on the fateful consequences that the tragic war in the former Yugoslavia holds for the international community if left to proceed on its own. This meeting reflects the possibility, rather than the widespread perception here or in Southeastern Europe, that the United States has placed this small unit in Macedonia with the larger purpose of serving as a trip wire that will bring further forces to bear on any Serbian effort to move against the Albanian population of Kosovo (over 90 percent of the total) or of Macedonia itself (some 30-35 percent of the total).

Recent visits to Sofia and to Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana in the former Yugoslavia combine with the recent reporting on Macedonia by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Research Institute to convince me that this small U.S. contingent will not now have the deterrent effect that any U.S. presence would have had earlier in the conflict. No one I met in the region expects any decisive military intervention under any circumstances from the U.S., the U.N., or NATO. That is the bad news. The good news, at least for the time being, is that no one expects a wider war in Kosovo or Macedonia either. Let me spell out the reasons for such "optimism" before going on to the way in which sanctions against Serbia are hurting rather than helping the prospects for peace and democracy throughout the region. I will conclude by arguing that those sanctions be

both tightened and relaxed.

The reasons that no wider war impends may be found in Belgrade and also in Macedonia. The Milošević regime itself has not turned more toward radical nationalism nor lost ground to the Radical Party of Vojislav Šešelj. The regime's difficulties with Radovan Karadžić and the Bosnian Serbs over the latter's failure to accept the Vance-Owen Plan were real and reflect a loss of close control, maybe even of close relations. The subsequent dismissal of Dobrica Čosić as President by Milošević's parliament and the arrest and vicious beating of opposition leader Vuk Drašković and his wife by Milošević's police, probably by a special unit called up from Kosovo for the occasion, were not concessions to Šešelj or other radicals. They were a calculated effort to tighten Milošević's own hold on political power, his primary aim all along. They reflect a growing reliance on the police, now reportedly 70,000, rather than the army, perhaps 80,000 and of doubtful capacity to fight, even in Kosovo. The pretext for Čosić's long-awaited removal was reportedly a remark he made to army leaders questioning the growing size of the police.

Why would Milošević risk using that doubtful army force in Kosovo when his police already hold its population under strict martial law? Why would the disciplined Albanian political organization of Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo risk the fate of the Bosnian Moslems when no serious prospect of Western assistance impends? Turning to Macedonia, why would Milošević respond to the Šešelj-led efforts to demand rights for the Serbian minority there when his regime already receives the one valuable commodity that Macedonia can provide - oil shipments in defiance of U.N. sanctions? The Macedonian government does not encourage or condone these

shipments but their movement is out of its limited control. Neither the ethnic Macedonian majority nor the large Albanian minority in Macedonia would accept a Serbian invasion without a fight, and as poorly armed as they are, they would provide real opposition to Serbian forces whose morale and training is questionable.

I therefore reject not only the tight link that is presumed and once did bind the Bosnian Serbs to Belgrade but also the corollary that the pending partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a victory for Greater Serbia West that will now prompt the pursuit of Greater Serbia South. I do not however accept the idea that there is nothing for the United States to do, given the clear popular and also military mandate not to commit ground troops to one side in an ongoing civil war. We can begin by helping the Bosnian Moslems to drive the hardest, best protected bargain they can with Serb and Croat forces that cannot be trusted to honor agreements without fear of military punishment, air strikes included. The Croatian military presence in Herzegovina started too soon and included too many misdeeds against civilians, first Serbs and now Muslims, to be called opportunism or to qualify as potential allies in a mythical multinational force. Instead the U.S. should consider seconding the warning of trade sanctions against Croatia, to be delivered this week by the EC Foreign Ministers, as economic pressure to encourage the Croatian government to do what many people in Zagreb want it to do: end the presence of Croatian army units in Herzegovina and cut off support for a regime that has dirtied its hands with ethnic cleansing. Such a step would surely strengthen Croatia's case for international support in negotiations over its own Serb-occupied territory.

What would help to drive a harder bargain with the Bosnian Serbs, who still bear the responsibility for starting the war and for committing the most misdeeds? My answer may be surprising; I will also argue that it is far reaching, promising to affect neighboring countries in a positive way. We urgently need to reexamine the effect of the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro and to change them in two ways. First, the restrictions on petroleum products and any attendant financial transactions need to be tightened. This is the one military supply on which the Bosnian Serbs depend on breaking the sanctions. A chance was lost when the international community did not make the Milošević regime an offer it could not refuse in joining to seal the Serbian-Bosnian border to such shipments this past spring. Let us now seal the Macedonian-Serbian border to such supplies. There are already rumors in Belgrade that the U.S. troops are in Macedonia to prepare for just such a process. The West will indeed have to help. But such a process is conceivable for Macedonia authorities only if a second sort of change is made in the sanctions that affect not only the former Yugoslavia but also all the surrounding countries.

That second change is to lift sanctions on every manufacture, raw material or spare part even remotely connected to supply of food and medicine. Their present supposed exemption of food and medicine per se is resulting instead in the near total exclusion of medicine from Serbia and the blockade of Bulgarian, Greek and Macedonian foodstuffs from reaching the European markets on which they depend. Recently, an extraordinary congress of Serbian doctors convened in Belgrade to detail the horrors that the absence of spare parts, medical equipment and pharmaceutical raw materials are visiting on the local population. (Three clinics in Belgrade are

completely out of medicine, food, and detergent.) The doctors lamented not only the needless deaths, including babies needing operations, and empty hospital beds that now ensue, but also the comfort that regime propaganda takes from publicizing the "unjust sanctions" that cause them. Now winter is coming and hospitals heated to 45 degrees Fahrenheit as the rest of Belgrade is promised after November will only fuel more propaganda. The rest of the sanctions plus the bankruptcy of the regime's own economic policies will serve to keep plenty of economic pressure on the regime, most easily seen in an inflation rate of 500 percent since last month.

I conclude with some comment on the benefits that would accrue to the democratic transitions underway in neighboring countries if sanctions were lifted in every area related to medicine or foodstuffs. While Hungary has already lost an estimated \$500 million in exports and imports because of present sanctions, Bulgaria has lost a minimum of one billion dollars according to an International Claims Commission and over two billion dollars by the estimates of its own government. I offer the Committee several official Bulgarian statements plus a study of the losses to both Bulgaria and Romania prepared in March by Sofia's Center for the Study of Democracy. Bulgaria's Prime Minister Liuben Berov told me in Sofia that he does not expect that Bulgaria will receive the compensation it should for these losses but still affirmed his government's efforts, exemplary within the region in my opinion, to honor the sanctions. The lifting of all-food related sanctions would provide at least some partial repair to an economy whose private sector has exploded in the past year and deserves all the encouragement we can provide to grow more and to pay taxes on legally recorded activity in the process.

We can say the same for Macedonia's private sector, but should add that it is still more involved in breaking sanctions and pays even less taxes. Immediate U.S. recognition of Macedonia would allow us to take advantage of the presently constructive relations between the governments of Macedonia and Bulgaria and work with them in closing off the major source of petroleum supplies to the Bosnian Serbs. If Serbia wants more relief from sanctions, let its regime invite outside help in closing off its own border to Bosnia. If Greece wants greater security from any potential Turkish threat in the region, let its government also recognize Macedonia and encourage the economic connections that have helped its relationship with Bulgaria.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY

**THE WARS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND
THEIR IMPACT ON BULGARIA AND ROMANIA**

**Andrey Georgiev
Emil Tzenkov**

SOFIA, MARCH 1993

3. The Impact of The Sanctions

3.1. General impact

Without being extreme and bearing in mind the *many-sidedness* of the problem, it can be pointed out that the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia have had a very negative effect - albeit to differing degrees - on the economies of Bulgaria and Romania. The introduction of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro by UN Security Council resolution 757 of May 1992 and 787 of November 1992 had also had a negative impact on these countries.

3.1.1. Bulgaria

Because of its geographic location and active economic relations with former Yugoslavia, and particularly with Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria found itself among the countries most badly affected by the regime of sanctions. It has found itself effectively cut off from its former Central and West European industrial partners.

However, it is not only a question of direct losses that can be calculated and compensated by the international community. What is more disturbing is the accumulation and intensification of unfavorable processes of various kinds and origins which, taken together, outline dramatic short- and medium-term prospects for the national economy.

Apart from the financial crisis with its well-known parameters, we can also mention: the political conflicts and the possibility of early elections; the lack of clearly pronounced interest by foreign partners and the lack of foreign capital; the disrupted communication system which paralyzes the usual outlets to foreign markets.

Together with the evident difficulties that the wars in former Yugoslavia and the sanctions cause, they also generate problems of broader social and economic scope. Examples of these are the reduction of production, the closing down of enterprises, disorder in the delivery of supplies, growth of inflation and unemployment.

According to unofficial data provided by the Bulgarian institutions, the country's GNP has dropped by 14%, industrial production - by 18%, building and construction - by 19%, transport - by 8%. The unemployment rate is 17% and the rate of inflation is 80%. The foreign debt of the country amounts to 12.9 billion dollars.

Against the background of such considerable difficulties, the inescapable (and additional) sharpening of the economic crisis resulting from the wars and the sanctions undermines the process of Bulgaria's transition to democracy and market economy.

5.1.2. Romania

Given the absence of reliable and detailed statistics, it is rather difficult to come up with an exact estimate of the various aspects of the economic consequences. There can be hardly any doubt, however, that the negative impact of the Yugo crisis blends with Romania's own financial and economic difficulties.

Preliminary data proves that its GNP has decreased by 15%, industrial and agricultural production - respectively by 22% and 9%. The unemployment rate is nearly 9% and the rate of inflation is above 150%. The foreign debt of the country is 2.9 billion dollars.

The dimensions and degree of Romania's losses are very much determined by the fact that during the 80s Yugoslavia was its most stable and indeed strategic economic partner on the Balkans. Although as a rule long-term agreements were *not fully accomplished*, by the end of the decade the turnover was never less than 300 million dollars per year. Of major importance were the cooperative enterprises and projects - the water power station Zhelezni Vrata I and II, the chemical industry and diesel engine projects.

In the period ranging from the beginning of the conflicts and the introduction of the economic sanctions Romania's export - mostly fuels - to the Yugoslav republics became very active (data on the exact amounts is not available). Part of the Central Europe-Turkey-Middle East freight and passenger traffic was transferred to Romania. This resulted in an increased income flow into the Romanian treasury but it also triggered off some problems at the Romanian border. In 1992 the Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian transport authorities launched a series of consultations and took some measures to overcome the difficulties.

Yugoslavia's disintegration appeared as the last link in the chain of the major disruption of markets and Romania's links with Eastern Europe. Although Romania maintained its previous, relatively separate trade relations with the different former Yugoslav republics, Serbia had the largest share in the trade and cooperation with Romania. The figures vary with the various sources - from about 66% to nearly 80%.

5.2. Direct Losses

5.2.1. Bulgaria

Bulgaria joined resolution 757 immediately and proclaimed a strict adherence to the sanctions.

The immediate and the indirect losses to the Bulgarian economy for the last eight months (up to January 1993) after the introduction of sanctions amount to more than 1.4 billion dollars.

The sanctions' negative effect has had an impact on such significant branches of the economy as:

a) Industry, where due to damaged and discontinued links in the production process, the freezing of supplies of raw material and components, and to unsold products, the losses amount to about 800 million dollars;

b) Trade, where due to cancelled agreements, produced but not exported industrial output, annulled barter, terminated imports and exports under current agreements and delays in the fulfillment of old obligations, the damages inflicted on Bulgarian state and private companies amount to 400 million;

c) Transport, where due to cancelled or extended Balkan Bulgarian Airline flights, disorder in the rail transport of passengers and freight, blockages of navigation along the Danube, road transport and shipping from and to Europe, the immediate losses amount to 80 million dollars;

d) Power production, where disrupted links between Bulgarian and Serbian power systems have caused losses of 22 million dollars;

e) Tourism, where the immediate losses, the penalties for broken contracts and unfulfilled orders only of state tourist companies exceed 5 million dollars;

f) Building and construction, where the negative impact of the sanctions amounts to 5 million dollars.

These figures do not include losses and missed benefits due to the termination of financial operations and transactions and from the hindered Bulgarian telecommunications (which in most cases pass through former Yugoslavia). Not included also are the constantly increasing indirect expenses needed to secure the strict adherence to the sanctions.

At present it is not possible to estimate and classify in a separate category Bulgaria's additional damages resulting from the 787 resolution restrictions on the transit transportation of strategic freight through Serbia and Montenegro. The only rail link between Bulgaria and Macedonia goes through Serbia and Montenegro. The same applies for transport along the Danube - one of the country's most important roads to Europe. Preliminary data proves that losses of this kind probably amount to some 100 million dollars per month.

5.2.2. Romania

Romania kept a negative attitude towards the introduction of sanctions for a relatively long period of time, with the only exception being arms restrictions. Romania considered the first appeals of the European Security and Cooperation Council for restraint from arms deliveries a potential contribution to the termination of the war and announced its readiness to accept the ban on the export of arms and other military supplies.

CSCE Hearing, Dirksen Senate Office Building, July 21, 1993

BALKANS: PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATION AND CONTAINMENT
Janusz Bugajski

General Observations

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Western responses to that war, have set some potentially unsettling precedents for the East European and post-Soviet region:

1. They have demonstrated to demagogues and xenophobes how to manufacture ethnic conflicts in order to seize territory and forcibly separate ethnic and religious communities.
2. They have demonstrated that the international community, despite its military and economic potential, simply cannot be relied upon to defend the sovereignty and integrity of unstable states, regardless of whether they are U.N. members, if they fail to meet the criteria commonly referred to as Western "national interests": strategic location; strategic resources; and possession of strategic weapons.
3. They have demonstrated that in order to ensure survival, states and minority groups facing disputes with neighbors have to prepare to defend themselves by acquiring appropriate weapons, and in some cases undertaking pre-emptive actions against potential or perceived aggressors.

Scenarios Of Escalation

With these observations in mind, one can envision three potential armed conflicts in the Balkans over the next year, aside from the continuing three-sided conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1. The Second Serb-Croat War

a. Either a provocative local incident or a sustained offensive by Zagreb or Belgrade could precipitate a renewed conflict over the Krajina region of Croatia, currently occupied by Serb forces. The UN peacekeeping mandate in Krajina was provisionally renewed for three months in June 1993. It remains unclear whether the Croatian side will willingly prolong the UN mission without firmer assurances that several key criteria will be fulfilled: disarming of local militia; return of refugees and displaced people to home villages; and a timetable for the restoration of Croatian authority in the region.

b. Much depends on the military capability of Croatian forces and whether Tudjman calculates that a military offensive at this time will be successful or politically advantageous. Zagreb has so far calculated that Croatian capabilities will do not match those of the Serbs. However, Tudjman is under pressure from hard-liners in the government, party, and military, as well as from an increasingly restless public, to solve the Krajina issue and restore Croatia's territorial integrity. Attention has been distracted during the past year by the Bosnian war, by conflicts

with Muslims, and by some local collaboration with Serbs in Bosnia. This is unlikely to continue after the *de facto* partition of Bosnia.

c. Serb leaders in Krajina remain intransigent that they will not surrender territory or allow for the restoration of Zagreb's authority in the region. Indeed, a referendum on eventual unification with the quasi-independent Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina was successfully held in June. Belgrade and Knin held off on announcing unification pending the conclusion of the Bosnian conflict. Although negotiations between Zagreb and Belgrade have taken place over possible territorial exchanges, it remains unclear whether this simply concerns territory in Bosnia and whether any loss of territory in Croatia will be acceptable to the two protagonists. During the past year, Zagreb has been busy rearming and training for a new offensive, while for Serbs the partition of Bosnia and the consolidation of the Serb Republic (in Bosnia) will free substantial numbers of troops to assist the Krajina militias.

2. The South Balkan War:

a. The spark to ignite a wider war could be Kosovo or Macedonia, or both. Armed conflicts in either area could rapidly internationalize the war by embroiling various neighbors either intent on defending co-ethnics or in pursuit of their own territorial ambitions.

b. Several potentially dangerous scenarios could materialize in Kosovo: Milosevic may engineer a military crackdown to rally Serbs behind their most sacred cause and expel thousands of Albanian residents; Milosevic's rivals in the Serbian Radical Party may provoke a crisis in the province to strengthen their position or even unseat Milosevic; radicalization and frustration among the Albanian population could precipitate wide-scale violence regardless of the policies of either the Serb or Albanian leadership.

c. Any armed confrontations in Kosovo would have a devastating effect on neighboring states, particularly on Albania and Macedonia: an exodus of tens of thousands of refugees would seriously strain local resources; border clashes could be expected between Serbian and Albanian troops; irregular Albanian forces from Albania and Macedonia will offer military assistance to Kosovo Albanians; an escalation would then be almost inevitable.

d. Belgrade has tried to keep Macedonia destabilized, with Greek assistance, and eventually reincorporated into a new Yugoslavia. But Serb-Yugoslav forces are unlikely to intervene in the republic through a massive unilateral military intervention. However, alternative scenarios of destabilization are possible: provocation of Albanian-Macedonian confrontations within Macedonia leading to "civil war," outside intervention, government collapse, and eventual partition between two or more neighboring states. This could provoke a wider regional crisis, including bilateral clashes (Albania-Greece, Bulgaria-Serbia), emergence of hostile alliances (Albania and Turkey, Serbia and Greece), intra-NATO confrontations (Greece-Turkey), and a wider Christian-Islamic conflict.

3. The Yugoslav Implosion:

a. Tensions are rising in several parts of the rump Yugoslavia, in addition to Kosovo: Sandzak (with a large Muslim population); Vojvodina (with a large Hungarian and Croatian population), and in the republic of Montenegro. These are exacerbated by economic decline, the mafiaization of the economy, the provocative activities of ultra-nationalist Serb paramilitary units, and the rise of local autonomist or separatist forces.

b. In Montenegro even the loyalist regime ensconced by Milosevic in 1989 has shown signs of dissatisfaction and recently formed a coalition government with pro-independence forces. If there is comprehensive economic collapse or if Belgrade moves to restrict Montenegro's republican status and create some new "federation of Serbian states," pressures for secession will increase in Montenegro. This in turn could precipitate a violent crackdown by the army and a civil war in the republic.

c. Armed conflict in Serbia itself cannot be discounted as a result of economic collapse, social disorder, violent demonstrations, food riots, and armed confrontations between paramilitaries, army, and police. If Radicals and others hyper-nationalists decide that Milosevic is selling out Krajina to Croatia or calculate that a purge by the Socialists to undercut their operations is imminent, they could manufacture armed conflicts. Splits in the military are possible and even civil war cannot be excluded.

d. There is one additional overarching danger from such developments: facing internal conflict and economic collapse, Milosevic may deliberately engineer an international crisis vis-a-vis Kosovo or Macedonia to recreate the myth of the outside threat for the Serbian population and, by provoking a regional war, gain new international allies.

Containment Strategies

None of the above conflicts are inevitable. Indeed, some may be resolvable (south Balkans); some may be containable (Serb-Croat); and some may actually be desirable (inside Serbia) if they do not provoke a wider regional war. The pursuit of the following policies could mitigate against escalation and reduce potential for armed conflicts:

1. Security:

a. Preparations for a credible and swift military response to any planned international aggression, including the emplacement of NATO troops and military equipment in strategic points (Macedonia, Albania, Italy, Greece, Turkey).

b. A clear statement by the Allies that any cross-border military actions vis-a-vis Macedonia or Albania, on whatever pretext, will trigger an immediate and devastating NATO military response against the Yugoslav military.

2. Political:

a. Initiate a package of steps to reduce tensions in the region, including immediate US recognition of Macedonia in return for full compliance with international embargo against Yugoslavia and a clear statement from Skopje concerning the inviolability of borders; despatch of sizable contingents of human rights monitors, drawn from all CSCE states, to potential flashpoints (Sandzak, Vojvodina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia); the launching of a pre-emptive Balkan peace conference to involve all regional powers and addressing key issues: minority rights, border questions, regional cooperation.

b. Issuing a clear set of conditions to Belgrade, within a specified timetable, to enter into negotiations with Albanian leaders in Kosovo, to restore minority rights and political autonomy; otherwise, moves will be undertaken to recognize Kosovo's sovereignty and the legitimacy of

the unrecognized government.

c. Upgrade program of political assistance to democratic forces in Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, through party and coalition building, training of young democrats, free media activities.

3. Economic:

a. Increase humanitarian and refugee assistance to neighboring states, as well as credits for infrastructural reconstruction and stimulating market reform, privatization, and free enterprise.

b. Channel economic assistance through democratic forces in Serbia-Montenegro, to increase their visibility and credibility among public during the economic collapse (democratic parties, free trade unions, citizens groups).

c. Announce a set of conditions for easing sanctions on Belgrade or avoiding an even more stringent embargo: full cooperation in apprehending war criminals, disbanding paramilitary formations, recognizing Macedonian independence and territorial integrity, terminating siege of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities.

4. The Bosnian Precedent:

Having failed to protect innocent civilians and the independence and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a *de-facto* partition should be hastened to prevent further bloodshed and loss of Muslim territory. This must be accompanied by a comprehensive program of protection and assistance to the rump Bosnian state. The primary losers in the war must become the primary beneficiaries of peace:

a. Provide rump Bosnia with security guarantees and military assistance to protect borders, restore law and order, and punish any Serb or Croat incursions. Belgrade and Zagreb will now become wholly responsible for the military actions of Serb and Croat separatists and surrogates.

b. Commit resources to large-scale economic reconstruction of predominantly Muslim entity in central Bosnia, with Islamic assistance and development aid, including infrastructure, towns, agriculture, and small industry, while for the time being purposively ignoring Serb and Croat-held areas.

c. Launch a substantial program of political assistance to preclude radicalism and build a tolerant, secular, multi-party state in preparation for future elections.

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**THE BALKANS: SPILLOVER POSSIBILITIES,
BROADER IMPACT OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES**

Immediate Spillover Potential

Belgrade: Nationalist Serbian politics have become more extreme, with the rise of Vojislav Seselj, the removal of Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic and the severe beating and detention by police of opposition leader Vuk Draskovic (since released). Montenegrin unease over Belgrade's policies, including decision not to renew CSCE Missions, grows, while non-Serbs and moderates in Vojvodina become uneasy over the course of developments (for Kosovo and Sandzak, see below).

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The potential 3-way carve-up of the republic will be seen as acquiescence to aggression. Continued fighting is the main cause of regional tension, but the end of the conflict could cause paramilitary groups to move activity to, or increase activity in, neighboring areas (Croatia, Vojvodina, Sandzak and Kosovo in particular).

Croatia: Frustration over the inability or unwillingness of UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) to compel Serbs controlling 1/4 of the country to implement the agreed Vance plan – by surrendering their arms, ceasing to force non-Serbs to leave controlled areas and permitting the hundreds of thousands of displaced to return – could lead Croatian forces to seek to retake territory by force, or embolden militant Serbs to consolidate territorial gains. Croatia reestablished Maslenica bridge linking north and south coastal areas, following up on attacks initiated in January 1993.

Kosovo: A continued stand-off between Serbia, which denies Kosovo its earlier autonomy and severely represses the majority Albanian population, and Kosovar Albanians, who claim Kosovo to be an independent republic. Violence could arise spontaneously from existing tensions, or as a result of a more aggressive policy to force Albanians to leave. Conflict in Kosovo could cause Albania to become involved, and destabilize neighboring Macedonia with massive refugee flows and Macedonian Albanian involvement in the fighting as well.

Sandzak: Serb paramilitary units, a heavy military presence and discrimination against ethnic Muslims which inhabit this region of Serbia and Montenegro, between Bosnia and Kosovo, have caused considerable societal friction in Sandzak that is directly affected by the war in neighboring regions of Bosnia, to which its population has many ties.

Broader Impact of Yugoslav Conflict

Economic: The conflict has severely disrupted transport links in the Balkans. The need to enforce sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro add to disruptions, breaking regional trade ties with those republics, and enabling sanctions-busting black markets to flourish. Heavy refugee burden of many countries has caused additional difficulties. Conflict comes at a time when most economies in the region were undergoing difficult transformation from controlled to free-market operations. Former Yugoslav republics further hurt by the collapse of the federation's economic integrity.

Social: Nationalism in one country often plays on nationalism in others. Rewarding nationalist demagogues in the former Yugoslavia could inspire activities of nationalist demagogues nearby and throughout Europe, including the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Those with multi-ethnic populations become increasingly distrustful of minority groups, and perhaps discriminatory as well, while those that have affinities with minorities in neighboring countries become more vocal in raising their concerns and perhaps forming direct links with the minority of concern. Recent Albanian-Greek recriminations cause increased concern in region already torn by ethnic strife.

Broader Impact of Yugoslav Conflict (continued)

Correlation of Forces: Conflict has strained existing alliances and European institutions, including the EC, NATO and CSCE, as countries in the region, and powers historically interested in the Balkans base policy-responses on traditional friendships, commonalities and affinities, rather than on Helsinki principles. Globally, presents a picture of a Europe that is uncaring about its Muslim peoples, and fears the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe and links to the Islamic world.

Challenge to UN: The inability of the United Nations to compel implementation of ceasefire and other agreements, and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief in the former Yugoslavia, the organization's largest peacekeeping and humanitarian challenge to date, brings into question its abilities in a post-Cold War world.

Arguments Given Against Spillover Concerns

Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Spillover becomes likely only to the extent that concerns about it are constantly raised, spreading fear and exacerbating existing tensions.

Civil War, Not Aggression: What is happening is the result of inter-ethnic feuds and is a civil war in which all are to blame, rather than aggression by one side. As a result, fighting will stop when Serbia controls territory inhabited by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (and Croatia gains territory in Herzegovina as well).

No U.S. Interests Affected: The United States has no post-Cold War interests in the Balkans, regardless of whether the conflict spreads throughout the region or not. U.S. interests in Europe as a whole need to be reevaluated.

International Responses to Date

UN peacekeeping: About 14,000 peacekeepers in Croatia (Croatian Government reconsidering their presence), 8-9,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 1,000 in Macedonia (including new U.S. deployments of 300 troops).

Preventive Diplomacy: CSCE Missions of Long-Duration in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina; recently told by Belgrade their presence will not be extended. CSCE Monitoring Mission in Macedonia. CSCE-operated Sanctions Assistance Missions in all countries neighboring Serbia and Montenegro (except Bosnia-Herzegovina). European Community Monitoring Missions in certain former Yugoslav republic and neighboring countries as well.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia

Secretary Christopher, Joint Action Program

Secretary Christopher

Opening statement at joint news conference with French Foreign Minister Juppe, UK Foreign Secretary Hurd, Spanish Foreign Minister Cotano, and Russian Foreign Minister Kozirev, Washington, DC, May 22, 1993.

Good morning. I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd of the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozirev of Russia, Foreign Minister Javier Solana of Spain, and Foreign Minister Alain Juppe of France. I have been asked by my colleagues to make a short summary statement with respect to our deliberations.

We are determined that the international community will act together—based upon shared responsibilities and common purpose—to bring increased pressure to bear on those engaged in the conflict in Bosnia. Each of us—along with our colleagues in other capitals and at the United Nations—has worked hard to find a common approach that will work to stop the killing in Bosnia, to prevent the conflict from spreading, and to bring concerted pressure on the parties to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. This international pressure will be brought especially to bear on the Bosnian Serbs, who stand solely isolated from the community of civilized nations.

During the last 3 days, we have agreed on a Joint Action Program of further steps which we are announcing today. This Joint Action Program describes the steps we'll be pursuing to extinguish this terrible war and achieve a lasting and equitable settlement. We understand, collectively, that there is an urgent need for action. Taken together, the course of action we outline today is designed to directly affect the environment in Bosnia and escalate the pressure on those still

fighting so that a political settlement to this crisis—which must be achieved—will be more likely.

Let me now, on behalf of my colleagues, summarize the specific, concrete steps that we have agreed to take and which are presented in the joint document which you have received.

- We will continue our program of humanitarian assistance to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to save lives, and we will insist that all parties allow this aid to pass without hindrance.

- We will rigorously enforce the tight and tough regime of sanctions that isolate and pressure Serbia and Montenegro. This pressure will be unrelenting until the necessary conditions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions are met, including the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops from territories occupied by force.

- Each of us will contribute in our own way—for instance, through monitors, technical assistance, or surveillance—to a joint effort that will ensure that Belgrade's promise to close its border with Bosnia is not a shallow one.

- We will work in the United Nations for early adoption of measures that will implement certain "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of our nations will make appropriate contributions to securing these "safe areas." In this context, the United States is prepared to meet its commitment to help protect United Nations forces in the event they are attacked and request such action by the United States.

- We will continue to enforce vigorously the *no-fly* zone established over Bosnia.

- We support the rapid establishment of a war crimes tribunal so that those guilty of atrocities may be brought to justice.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

• We will remain intensively involved in efforts to achieve a durable, negotiated settlement to this crisis. To the extent that the parties decide to implement mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen agreement, that is something we would encourage.

• We are putting Croatia on notice that assistance to the Bosnian Croatian forces engaged in fighting and in "ethnic cleansing" could result in international sanctions against Croatia.

• Grave consequences would arise from violence spreading elsewhere in the Balkans. Accordingly, we support an increased international presence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which we will do in consultation with the authorities in Skopje, and we support an increased presence of international monitoring in Kosovo.

• In addition, we will keep other options open for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.

Each of us will work—individually and collectively—to define operational plans to carry out these measures promptly.

It is a testimony to the strength of our alliances and our new partnership with the Russian Federation that we have arrived at this mutual course of action that I am announcing on behalf of my colleagues and myself today. The actions we announce today will save lives, keep the conflict from spreading, and increase pressure for a negotiated settlement.

As our statement says, we are firmly united and committed to protecting and pursuing this course of action.

Joint Action Program

Text of Joint Action Program released by the Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, May 22, 1993.

France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America are profoundly concerned that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is continuing despite the strenuous efforts of the international community and the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which they strongly support, to bring an end to it.

We shall continue to work urgently to help extinguish this terrible war and to achieve a lasting and equitable settlement.

We also have common views on the most productive immediate steps to take. These should lead to implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions as well as the elaboration of further steps.

1. **Humanitarian Assistance.** We will continue providing humanitarian assistance for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and will insist that all parties allow humanitarian aid to pass without hindrance.

2. **Sanctions.** The economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council against Serbia and Montenegro must be rigorously enforced by all members of the UN until the necessary conditions set out in Security Council Resolution 820, including the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops from territories occupied by force, are met for lifting the sanctions.

3. **Sealing Borders.** We note the pledge of the Belgrade authorities to close the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. We are watching to see if the border closure is effective. Although the primary responsibility for enforcing this step belongs to Belgrade, we can assist, for instance by placing monitors on the borders or providing technical expertise or conducting aerial surveillance. We also note the willingness expressed by the Zagreb authorities for monitoring to take place along the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. **"Safe Areas."** The concept of "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as France and others have proposed, could make a valuable contribution. We will work to secure early adoption of the new UN Security Council resolution now under discussion. The United Kingdom and France along with other nations already have forces serving with UNPROFOR in "safe areas." Troops from other countries, including Spain and Canada, are playing an important role on the

ground. The Russian Federation is considering making forces available in Bosnia in addition to its forces presently in Croatia. The United States is prepared to meet its commitment to help protect UNPROFOR forces in the event they are attacked and request such action. Further contributions from other countries would be most welcome.

5. **No-Fly Zone.** The No-Fly Zone should continue to be enforced in Bosnia.

6. **War Crimes Tribunal.** We support the rapid establishment of the War Crimes Tribunal, so that those guilty of atrocities may be brought to justice.

7. **Durable Peace.** Negotiated settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, building on the Vance-Owen process and intensified international cooperation and effort, is the way a durable peace can be established. France, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States will assist and actively participate in a continued political process to this end. To the extent that the parties decide to implement promptly mutually-agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan, this is to be encouraged.

8. **Central Bosnia-Herzegovina.** We are deeply concerned about the fighting between Bosnian Croatian and Bosnian Government forces and the related "ethnic cleansing," and we agree that Croatia should be put on notice that assistance to Bosnian Croatian forces engaged in these activities could result in the international community imposing sanctions on Croatia.

9. **Containment.** We will cooperate closely to enhance efforts to contain the conflict and prevent the possibility that it will spill over into neighboring countries. We would regard such a development with the utmost seriousness.

10. **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.** It is essential that everyone in the region understands that aggression against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would have grave consequences. We will support an increase in the international presence there in consultation

with the authorities in Skopje. The United States is considering a contribution to this effort.

11. **Kosovo.** We favor an increase in the international monitoring presence in Kosovo. International standards of human rights should be strictly respected in the formerly-autonomous region of Kosovo, although we do not support declarations of independence there.

12. **Croatia.** The same considerations apply to the Serb-populated areas of Croatia. We will work for the renewal and strengthening of UNPROFOR's mandate. The Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities should maintain the cease-fire and constructively pursue their dialogue leading to settling practical, economic, and, eventually, political problems between them.

13. **Further Measures.** We will keep open options for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.

We five members of the United Nations Security Council are firmly united and firmly committed to taking these immediate steps. We will work closely with the United Nations and the involved regional organizations as we carry out these efforts. ■

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July 21, 1993

THE CSCE MUST CARRY OUT ITS DECISIONS

I.

The CSCE has, for some time, been seized with the question of Kosova in one way or another. International political leaders and human rights organizations have concluded that in Kosova, the international community must act with the urgency that such an explosive situation warrants. Perhaps due to the hesitancy of stance and action vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CSCE, in contrast, has at last invested some of its reputation in a new era of prevention of upcoming conflicts. Kosova, as well as Sandjak and Voivodina, has been an area targeted by this preventive diplomacy.

As a result of these policies of preventive diplomacy, Kosova has been a CSCE priority, both overtly and covertly, since the Fourth Meeting of the CSO. The 11th Meeting of the CSO "discussed reports of the grave situation of ethnic Albanians in Kosova and the denial of fundamental freedoms to them..." and accordingly, "entrusted the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre to dispatch a fact-finding mission in view of determining the military situation in Kosova..."

Later, the 12th Meeting decided to create a task force which "would also prepare recommendations, for consideration by the CSO at its Meeting on 29 June 1992, on the role that further CSCE missions, of either short or long duration, might play in promoting peace, averting violence and restoring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosova, Voivodina and Sandjak, and in support of the efforts of the EC Peace Conference. To help prepare such a recommendation the CSO has decided to send an exploratory mission to the above regions within the next two weeks."

The Helsinki Summit Declaration on the Yugoslav Crisis notes that, "The situation in Kosova remains extremely dangerous and requires immediate preventive action. We call upon the 'Yugoslav' authorities to refrain from further repression and engage in serious dialogue with the representatives in Kosova, in the presence of a third party".

The 13th Meeting of the CSO reiterated that "the exploratory mission...will be dispatched as soon as possible...";

Finally the 16th Meeting, considering the report of the exploratory mission of 9 August 1992, decided to send long term missions to Kosova, Sandjak and Voivodina, with a certain mandate to carry out. Further CSO Meetings decided to increase the numbers of the CSCE missions.

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Pursuant to preventive efforts, and cognizant of the deteriorating situation on the ground in Kosova, the Stockholm Council Meeting concluded that, "The human rights and fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of Kosova must be respected. The Ministers called upon all parties, notably the Serbian authorities, to show the necessary restraint. They believed that a United Nations presence in Kosova would be a positive step." This decision, in full conformity with the UN Secretary General's "An Agenda for Peace" on preventive deployment of UN forces, marks, in our view, the culmination of CSCE involvement in Kosova so far.

As compared to other bodies, namely the EC, UN, NATO, and the International Conference on former Yugoslavia, the CSCE has tended to be more active, and not only on paper. The Mission of Long Duration has been seen by the people of Kosova as the only permanent and substantial international presence on the ground. They feel it is the only guarantee to their immediate future, and, as such, the deterrent can easily be imagined.

II.

What, as CSCE's decisions continue to be flouted, is happening in Kosova today? The Mission has been ordered out, and its presence conditioned upon CSCE's re-admission of the so-called "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." There is quite clear language in the relevant decision of the 13th meeting of the CSO on suspension, and the memorandum of understanding on the activities of the mission does not go that far. The CSCE, however, has maintained the political momentum by reiterating its resolve not be blackmailed by a communist clique in Belgrade and passing a formal decision during its 22nd Meeting to increase of the size of the missions. But, in point of fact, Belgrade called its bluff. The Missions, reduced to the minimum, are still awaiting to pack off and, therefore, have suspended their activities.

On the other hand, the Stockholm decision on the UN presence in Kosova, which we have been advocating as the only way to save the region from a literal catastrophe, has remained a piece of paper, with the UN hardly involved in Kosova at all. The UN Commission on Human Rights, during the last session in Geneva in March 1993, remains the only international body to pass a resolution about Kosova and our grievances.

It occurs, therefore, that in the activities of the CSCE so far, as regards Kosova, there are three tendencies: lack of strong and timely response; delay; and forgetfulness. The CSCE is indeed a 52 member body whose vitality rests upon the willingness or unwillingness of the member states, and, by operating upon the consensus principle, action sometimes becomes difficult to take. It is all too obvious that the CSCE depends upon the YES of the member states. I repeat, the member states. For the time being, the so-called "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" is not a member. Why, therefore, has the CSCE got to ask Belgrade what to do? In my opinion, the whole groundwork of conception is wrong. Serbia has as little to do with Kosova as Albania has. Kosova was part of a federation which no longer exists.

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Neither Milosevic, nor the CSCE for that matter, can determine its new status unilaterally. We have insisted that it be done through negotiation, and, indeed, as stipulated in the Helsinki Summit Meeting, in the presence of a third party.

Another point of consideration is the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a state. On a daily basis, international law and practice are being adapted to post-cold war life, and in this realm, at least in regard to gross and uncorrected violations of human rights, interference in order to enforce their respect and promotion, has become a norm. What would one say to the fact that out of 30 articles of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Serbia has broken at least 27 with regard to Kosova? Why, then, doesn't the CSCE have the necessary enforcement power of will to live up to its own decisions? Can such a body mar its reputation and, more importantly, expose peoples to continual threat and repression, only because communism and ultra-nationalism choose to stand in its way? I think it's high time the record was set straight.

III.

While taking a new decision and enforcing it is still a matter of time in the CSCE, the situation in Kosova continues to deteriorate. Harassment and provocation are threatening daily to spark what we believe to be the next phase of a well-known scenario. Last week, my deputy's home was stormed and his brother badly beaten in a blitzkrieg of alleged arms searches. Radical extremists threaten to wreak havoc and remind us of what was done in Bosnia while the world condoned their barbarism. The government of Serbia, encouraged by the international community's proclivity for unfulfilled enforcement threats, is poised to again spread its military ultra-nationalism to yet another part of the Balkans. Sanctions directed at Belgrade weigh heavily upon us as well, but we have supported them so long as they are aimed at curbing aggression. Still, businesses in Kosova are being closed down, bringing an already suffering people to the point of starvation. In the Serbian parliament, proposals are forwarded to eradicate the last remnants of autonomous power which Kosova has always had. In short, the situation in Kosova is going from bad to worse.

Under these circumstances, we have called for the UN forces to come to our aid and to the aid of the region. We have tried, and so far managed, to keep the situation under control. We fear, however, that if tensions are raised, or even maintained at their present high levels, we will not be able to contain the conflict.

International organizations and governments agree that the Serbian Government is punctuated throughout with radical extremists engaging in systematic aggression. The Group of the Seven renewed its call to stop repression in Kosova. Stronger action needs to be taken. It is common knowledge that peace can only be achieved by adopting an uncompromising attitude with those who disdain peaceful efforts.

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We are determined to pursue our goals peacefully. In this pursuit, and with these intentions, we continue to believe that the CSCE has done a good job in Kosova and that the mandate of the Mission of long duration must be renewed. President Rugova has appealed to the CSCE Chairman-in-office, and I have also sent two letters to the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Madam Af Ugglas, to the same effect. We feel that, in this case, enforcement must be undertaken. The CSCE and its values must not be let down to be undermined and nullified by obstinacy, be it of whatever origin. Double standards won't save faces or people's lives. Not in Kosova. The situation in Kosova must be declared a threat to international peace and security and relevant action must be undertaken in the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In the meantime, while all preventive mechanisms are available, the CSCE must by all means carry out its own decisions, for if there is the will to take them, there should also be the will to implement them.

IV.

The United States of America, in its capacity of the most powerful member of the CSCE, has a lot to say and do in regard to Kosova. While it has already done much, I will not list its accomplishments for fear that I would miss one. The citizens of Kosova appreciate all efforts on our behalf by the U.S. and call upon the Clinton Administration to support our peaceful endeavors and exercise intense pressure upon the criminals who disdain them.

Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the US must continue to play a leading role in the service of peace and democracy. The "Friends of Bosnia" Group has hitherto played an invaluable role in the decision-making process for this organization. Its impact has given an encouraging message to the people of Kosova, and, in this way, helped keep the tensions from rising any further. The United States should take enforcement action and the initiative of not only making the CSCE and its mechanism more operative, but also undertaking concrete preventive action in that framework and with the same intentions.



Bujar Bukoshi
Prime Minister

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