UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI COMMISSION) HOLDS HEARING:
"ARMENIA AFTER THE ELECTION"
APRIL 17, 2008
COMMISSIONERS:
REP. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, D-FLA., CHAIRMAN
REP. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, D-N.Y.
REP. MIKE MCINTYRE, D-N.C.
REP. HILDA L. SOLIS, D-CALIF.
REP. G.K. BUTTERFIELD, D-N.C.
REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, R-N.J.
REP. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, R-ALA.
REP. MIKE PENCE, R-IND.
REP. JOSEPH R. PITTS, R-PENN.
SEN. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, D-MD., CO-CHAIRMAN
SEN. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, D-CONN.
SEN. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, D-WIS.
SEN. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, D-N.Y.
SEN. JOHN F. KERRY, D-MASS.
SEN. SAM BROWNBACK, R-KAN.
SEN. GORDON H. SMITH, R-ORE.
SEN. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, R-GA.
SEN. RICHARD BURR, R-N.C.
DAVID J. KRAMER,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
MATTHEW BRYZA,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS
VIGEN SARGSYAN,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
ARMAN GRIGORIAN,
SPOKESMAN FOR
FORMER PRESIDENT LEVON TER-PETROSSIAN
The hearing was held at 2:00 p.m. in Room B-318 of the Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman,
moderating.
[*]
(JOINED IN PROGRESS)
HASTINGS: ... a contest, which will be coming up soon.
Sorry, young lady.
As everyone here knows, the emergence last year into the political arena of
former president Levon Petrossian energized what seemed like a quiet campaign
with a predictable outcome. The unusual circumstances of his departure from
office in 1998 undoubtedly help produce the heated rhetoric that followed his
entry into the race.
Ultimately, according to official tallies, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan won
the February 19th election with almost 53 percent of the vote. Levon
Ter-Petrossian got about 21 percent, the two other leading politicians, who
campaigned as opposition candidates, winning over 16 and 6 percent,
respectively.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's observation mission
noted the need for further improvements, but concluded that the election had by
and large met international standards.
Nevertheless, Mr. Petrossian and his supporters charged fraud and organized an
ongoing demonstration in Yerevan. The protests continued for days, attracting
considerable crowds, until March 1st, and at that point, according to the
authorities, some of the demonstrators sought to stage a coup d'etat, and law
enforcement agencies had to restore order by force.
In the ensuing state of emergency, independent media were shut down, and
rallies were banned. The demonstrators, for their part, reject official
allegations of violent intentions or actions. They accuse the authorities of
brutally attacking a peaceful assembly protesting the theft of the people's
will.
Wherever the truth lies, the confrontation resulted in at least eight
fatalities and many injuries. That was most regrettable.
I understand that in the last few days two more people have died. Allow me to
express my condolences to all the victims' families.
The OSCE chairman in office condemned the violent crackdown. Other
international organizations and foreign capitals followed suit, forcing Yerevan
to defend itself to the skeptical international community.
Subsequently, two prominent opposition candidates reached agreement with Mr.
Sargsyan to join forces. The four parties in this coalition represent,
according to the figures provided by the central election commission, about 75
percent of the electorate.
Nevertheless, tensions remain high. The state of emergency was officially
lifted on March 21st, but restrictions on freedom of assembly continue in
effect, drawing criticism from the Council of Europe and the OSCE. And while
Mr. Sargsyan has been sworn in, some opposition leaders refuse to recognize the
election's outcome.
About 100 people imprisoned after March 1st are still in jail. Perhaps most
important, Armenian society seems to be split into pro-government and fervently
anti-government camps.
This chain of events has caused serious damage to Armenia's reputation. The
purpose of our hearing is to examine the ramifications of these developments
for Armenia and the United States.
What should we conclude about the credibility of the official election results?
In that connection, what can we say about the state of democracy in Armenia?
And how can we in Congress and the executive branch help Armenia overcome the
obvious problems it is encountering on its path to democracy?
Of special interest are the implications for the ongoing OSCE negotiations on
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia's qualifications for U.S. assistance from the
millennium challenge account.
Our three witnesses today, representing the United States government, the
Armenian government and the Armenian opposition, will give us critical
perspectives on these issues.
But now, I'd like to turn to my colleagues for any remarks they may have, and
I'll start with the ranking member, who just came in, my friend, Mr. Smith,
from New Jersey.
C. SMITH: Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this very
timely hearing, especially as things continue to unfold in Armenia.
As someone who has long been involved in Armenian issues and with the
friendship that has built up over the years, especially in working with the
Congress and recognizing the Armenian genocide, I read about the recent events
in Armenia with great sadness.
When OSCE monitors gave last year's parliamentary election an improved grade,
we all hoped for the best from this year's presidential election.
Unfortunately, things took a turn for the worst after the election, and protest
demonstrations have ended in violence.
Here, I want to extend my deep condolences along with you. I know Mr. Cardin
and others on this commission have said very similar things to the families of
the eight people who died so tragically. Families so much grief when one of
their members dies under any circumstances, but I think the grief must be much
sharper when the death comes through a conflict with the authorities of the
country that you love.
As to the elections themselves, the OSCE did not register progress since the
parliamentary elections, but said that the presidential elections were, quote,
"mostly in line with international standards, but that further improvements
were necessary."
And then after the demonstrations ended in tragedy, the Armenian government
imposed restrictions on basic liberties. In his April 9th inaugural address,
President Sargsyan said there must be limitations on fundamental rights of
Armenian citizens, most notably on their freedom of assembly.
Armenian authorities shut down independent media and temporarily took Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty off the air. At the same time, the president
conceded that restrictions cannot be absolute and promised to revisit that
soon.
Despite the president's words of qualification, the restrictions are alarming.
The U.S. government, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Union all
voiced their concerns, just as the OSCE and many international organizations
have been skeptical of the official justification for the attack on the
demonstrators.
Mr. Chairman, much of my involvement in Armenia, as I said, has been in the
fight against the denial of the Armenian genocide. On behalf of the Armenian
people and truth, many of us in Congress have worked to move our government to
acknowledge this horrific crime, this genocide committed against the Armenian
people almost 90 years ago.
I remember that in September of 2000 I had the privilege to chair a hearing on
the Armenian genocide resolution. It was a four-hour hearing, the first
hearing this House ever held on the Armenian genocide. The testimony we heard
that day and many accounts of the atrocities that I have read in articles and
books over the years shocked me deeply.
But it is not only our own government who must hold to a higher standard in
respect to acknowledging the truth. Now, on behalf of the Armenian people, we
must persuade the Armenian government to adhere to the highest standards of
human rights.
I call on our government to energetically press the president of Armenia to
restore full freedom of assembly and full freedom to publish and to broadcast.
The violence following the presidential election occurred in early March. It
is high time things returned to normal.
Democracy is not built by stifling, but by exercising, and I hope that the
president will pay close attention to the well-intended words of his many
friends abroad. Whenever the Armenian government has raised its standards in
respect of human rights and democracy, it has empowered its friends abroad to
support it more effectively. And I certainly count myself as one of Armenia's
great friends.
Mr. Chairman, I must say a word about Nagorno-Karabakh. On March 4th Reuters
reported cease-fire violations that may be the worst in over a decade. At the
same time Azerbaijan is conducting a massive military build-up and escalating
its verbal threats against Nagorno-Karabakh.
None of this bodes well for the Minsk process of negotiations. I look forward
to learning from our witnesses how the U.S. can support Armenian democracy,
especially through this dangerous period.
Again, I thank you for calling a timely hearing.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much, Commissioner Smith.
And we now turn to Commissioner Kramer for any remarks he may want to make.
But I'm sure that, Secretary Bryza, is that seeing you in this kind of
position, that just proves, Matt, that there's hope for you.
(LAUGHTER)
Commissioner Kramer?
KRAMER: Mr. Chairman, my hope just died.
(LAUGHTER)
Matt and I were colleagues for several years in the European region bureau, and
it's a real pleasure to be here with him, and also with you, Mr. Chairman, and
Congressman Smith, too.
I think in the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will forego any further
comments and look forward to the testimony and questions.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much.
This hearing has elicited a great deal of interest, and the commission has
received inquiries from many organizations, especially from Armenian NGOs
wishing to testify.
I'm sorry that the constraints of a hearing format made that impossible, but I
understand that various groups have submitted testimony for the record. I
welcome their submissions and assure you that they will be included in the
hearing record and posted with any report that we go forward with.
Our first witness is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza. As usual, he's been in the thick of things,
most recently dealing with the crisis in Armenia. I'm not going to read off
Secretary Bryza's impressive curriculum vitae or resume. It's available on our
Web site, as well as at the tables outside.
Secretary Bryza, we are very pleased to see you again, and the floor is yours.
BRYZA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It truly is an honor to be here
before you, Chairman Hastings, Commissioner Smith, Commissioner Kramer, to have
a chance to explain not only our view in the U.S. government about what has
transpired and where we need to go from here, but also I'd like to have a
chance to put our views and the events in a broader context of U.S. interests
in Armenia.
Should I wait maybe?
HASTINGS: I don't know if...
BRYZA: Because this is my first sentence, Mr. Commissioner, it's OK. So,
well, that's OK.
HASTINGS: Well, we do take note for the record that the co-chairman of the
commission, Senator Cardin, has arrived.
And, Senator, if you do have any comments, you're certainly welcome to make
them.
CARDIN: I'll defer until after your opening comments.
BRYZA: Thank you very much, Senator.
So I wanted to put what happened and where we're going in a broader context,
perhaps. U.S.-Armenian relations matter primarily for the reason of shared
values. People throw around that phrase loosely very often, but in the case of
U.S.-Armenian relations, that really is what it's all about.
Of course, that has to do with the human beings, the people, the proud members
of the Armenian American diaspora, who have contributed so much to our society.
But of course, it also has to do with our support of the basic human rights,
liberties, democratic values that the citizens of Armenia rightfully deserve
and in fact have enjoyed. And fundamentally, this is a question of human
dignity.
Irregularities in the recent election and the violent aftermath marked a
significant setback for democracy in Armenia, and I just sense from my visits
there both a week ago today -- in fact, when I was last there for the
inauguration, seven and eight days ago, and a month before that -- that there
was a significant shock imposed upon Armenian society.
Unfortunately, tragically, the violence that ensued is unprecedented for the
South Caucasus in a period after an election. And so, of course, it's
completely appropriate to do just what the commissioners did, which was express
condolences for the victims.
Two of them were police officers. Eight of them were civilians not associated
with the security services. Obviously, every single one of those deaths pains
all of us in this room, and there are so many friends. Everyone's a friend of
Armenia in here today. And I also welcome my friend Vigan and also my fellow
graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy here.
A special personal welcome to you, Vigan. Thank you for being here with us.
We simply deplore the killing. And we may never know, and probably will never
know, who started it, how it began, how a peaceful protest devolved into this
level of violence.
We do know, though, that generally in the international community, we, the
international community, hold governments responsible for the use of violence
against civilians and for the use of violence under such political
circumstances.
We are deeply disappointed that dialogue that was ensuing between the
government and the opposition lost out -- lost out in this case to force and to
violence. So as I said, it's a tragedy for all of Armenia.
Our goal now is to work with the government of Armenia and President Sargsyan
to help elicit dramatic steps that will restore a sense of democratic momentum
in the control, not to please us, not to sustain our assistance, but because,
well, we believe it when we hear the elected president of Armenia say this is
what he wants to do.
And we believe it, and we know, that this is the ambition of the people of
Armenia. I felt that overwhelmingly this time during this trip. So many
people came up to me -- be it the wives of detainees or common people on the
street -- urging us to be as clear and constructive as possible in eliciting
those sorts of dramatic steps to restore democratic momentum.
As we think about looking ahead, first it's useful again to place our
relationship with Armenia in a context, the context of our strategic interests
with Armenia. We have security interests. We have regional economic
interests.
And we have, of course, a deep interest in seeing democratic and market
economic reform continue so that all citizens of Armenia have the freedom to
exercise and enjoy their internationally recognized human rights.
On security, we are deeply grateful for Armenia's contributions in Iraq, where
it has 46 soldiers on the ground, serving with our soldiers in the coalition,
as well as in Kosovo, where Armenia has contributed 35 soldiers.
We would welcome even greater contributions. We've had discussions. We hope we
can move forward in a way that only deepens our security partnership.
We have a positive record, a strong record of cooperation on counterterrorism
and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are working
together on border security, with significant assistance from the United
States.
We've responded positively to Armenia's request to work with us to prevent the
flow of pandemics and other biological threats. And we warmly welcome
Armenia's participation in NATO's Individual Partnership Action Plan, IPAP, in
the context of a foreign policy of complementarity, which President Sargsyan
was instrumental in designing.
It essentially says that Armenia will strengthen its relations with the
Euro-Atlantic community, including NATO, at the same time that it enjoys
historically and traditionally strong relations with Russia.
So, in a nutshell, we want to do everything we can to deepen that security
cooperation between the United States and the broader Euro-Atlantic community
and Armenia.
The central question of security matters in Armenia is indeed, as Congressman
Smith pointed out, the question of Nagorno-Karabakh. I speak in my capacity
also as ministry co-chair, and I have spent so much effort and love on this
issue over the last couple of years.
I can say, following our meetings my fellow co-chairs and I had in Bucharest
two weeks ago with Presidents Sargsyan and Aliyev, we hope that there will soon
be a meeting between those two presidents to rejuvenate a negotiation process
that has made, I would argue, a dramatic amount of progress in the last two and
a half years toward finalizing a set of basic principles that would essentially
become a framework agreement for the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
Again, this would be a framework agreement. It's not the final agreement.
That would have to be negotiated in the form of a peace treaty that will take
some time -- hopefully, not too much time -- but if and when these basic
principles are agreed, Armenia and Azerbaijan together will have made a
dramatic step forward -- in fact, changed the political, diplomatic and
economic map in the Caucasus and in Europe in a profound way.
Officially, our policy is to support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,
but to hold that a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
requires a negotiated compromise on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's future
status.
In a broader strategic sense, Armenia is obviously at a crucial crossroads,
situated as it is between Russia in the north, Iran in the south, and then
between Azerbaijan and Turkey to the east and west, where Armenia suffers from
closed borders.
So in our second set of interests, regional economic cooperation and
integration of Armenia into regional economic structures, I emphasize how much
we look forward to and work toward full normalization of Armenia's relations
with Turkey, and of course, then with Azerbaijan.
We're focusing a lot on the Turkey-Armenia relationship now. We hope there
will soon be restoration of full diplomatic relations, opening of borders,
restoration of electricity and transportation links, and greater access to
regional markets that that will bring for Armenia.
There are questions about the possibility of commissions to take another look
at the tragic, horrible historical questions of 1915, which I know we'll get
into in the question and answer session.
In summary, we know that all of these issues are interrelated and are of
profound importance to Armenians and all of their friends around the world,
whether we're talking about history or about the current plight and current
conditions of our Armenian friends in Armenia today.
Eventually, and hopefully quickly, we will see normalization of Armenia's
relations with Azerbaijan, and as that happens, or when that happens, we hope
that that will provide Armenia an impetus to scale back its energy cooperation
with Iran.
Armenia finds itself in a very difficult situation when it comes to energy. It
is cut off from the energy flows from the Caspian region, beginning in
Azerbaijan. It is largely dependent on flows of natural gas from Russia and
has expanded its natural gas flows to include Iran.
And we understand the difficult situation that Armenia finds itself in due to
these restrictions -- energy imports and general trade -- that it suffers from
the East and West.
At the same time, though, we hope Armenia will continue to work with us to
fulfill the international community's demands that Iran abide by U.N. Security
Council resolutions demanding that Iran ceases its nuclear enrichment programs.
Finally, the third area that is clearly the most germane to today's discussion
and really is at the foundation of everything we do with Armenia is our effort
and our assistance and our commitment to helping Armenia advance its democratic
and market economic reform to strengthen individual rights, human rights, and
political and economic freedoms.
Our assistance programs, working with the government of Armenia, have made some
important progress over the years. And we are grateful to the United States
Congress for always being so generous and encouraging us and helping us and
facilitating our work with Armenia that has produced some significant results.
For example, there has been strong reduction in rural poverty. We have now
seen again Armenia restore double-digit economic growth, which it enjoyed back
in the late 1990s. We have worked very actively with civil society to promote
democracy and protect fundamental rights.
And maybe garnering the most attention in the last few years has been Armenia's
successful completion of an agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation
to launch a compact that should come to a total of $235 million over the next
few years.
In President Bush's administration, I think it's fair to argue that when a
country enters into the Millennium Challenge program, it has received in many
ways the ultimate seal of approval or commendation from our government that the
country is on the right track, because the program aims to reward commitment to
reform and is sustained if that commitment to reform is sustained and
demonstrated through progress.
So let's go back, then, for a little while, then, to the elections, now that
I've painted a broader picture in the context for our relations with Armenia.
In the lead-up to the February 19th presidential election, we did see some
initial positive signs. We encouraged then Prime Minister Sargsyan to invite
observers from the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the
OSCE to come to Armenia to observe the election. And he did that. And they
came.
We also encouraged the parliament and the government to advance electoral
reforms, and some of those were passed. And we welcome those.
At the same time, already in the pre-election period, our concerns began to
increase about the overall electoral environment. We observed that the media
environment was definitely not free from bias, to put it gently. We sensed
that independent media outlets faced intimidation and harassment in many cases,
unfortunately.
Examples of that include Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Gala TV. And
there were widespread allegations of misuse of administrative resources, a
problem that is not unique by any means to Armenia. In fact, none of these
problems are unique to Armenia in an election context. But they were there and
began to raise our concerns.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights of OSCE initially assessed that the February 19th election was conducted
mostly in line with OSCE standards. Those were initial reports based on
initial flows of information.
Unfortunately, as more information came in over ensuing days, we saw there were
credible claims of ballot stuffing and intimidation, some reports of beatings
of poll workers and proxies, and significant reports of vote buying and other
irregularities.
Again, these are not problems that are unique to Armenia by any means. Many
friends here of Armenia in the room have helped me remember how similar things
have happened elsewhere in South Caucasus countries in recent elections. But
nonetheless, we're talking about Armenia today.
Speaking of which, there were recounts in Armenia, in which, as the OSCE
observed, there were discrepancies and mistakes, which raised questions over
the impartiality of the electoral commissions. And OSCE observers reported
there was harassment against them.
In the wake of these sorts of concerns, we saw mass protests for 10 days in
Armenia in Yerevan. As I noted in the beginning, we in the U.S. government and
others in the international community and in Europe pressed the government of
Armenia to maintain the negotiations, refrain from violence, allow the protest
to continue on Opera Square.
On March 1st, however, the police and military forces entered the square. We,
again, will never know what exactly happened, but the police entered the
square, as then President Kocharian told me, to collect weapons that the
government of Armenia had believed were being gathered in some of the tents
there on the square.
Clashes broke out -- some, perhaps, there on the square, it appears, although
many in the government of Armenia will deny that any clashes took place on the
square. I don't know. We weren't there. We did not have witnesses there on
the square.
But we do know that later in the day near the French embassy in the environs,
there was a truly tragic clash, as we said, that left 10 dead, two of them
police and eight of then civilians. Again, we express our deepest condolences.
Former president and opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrossian appeared to be
under conditions of de facto house arrest, although that's disputed by the
government. I myself visited Mr. Ter-Petrossian at his residence.
When we drove the security -- it was heavy security -- there was no way to tell
whether or not Mr. Ter-Petrossian was free to leave or not, but there was very
heavy security. And I did talk to then Prime Minister Sargsyan about the
appearance of such heavy security outside Mr. Ter-Petrossian's residence, and I
understand that that level of security was subsequently reduced.
And finally, there was a state of emergency imposed that was the most serious
step -- suspended freedom of assembly, suspended freedom of the media -- and in
that vacuum the government of Armenia filled that vacuum with all sorts of news
reports that, well, attacked the opposition.
There afterward, there were large numbers of arrests, mass arrests of
opposition activists and demonstration organizers. Well, there are 100 to 110
people or so still in prison. Many people went into hiding and fled. And many
people were imprisoned on charges that seemed to have a political tint.
We don't know exactly why all the people were arrested, but the point to keep
in mind is under such circumstances, such political tension and allegations of
irregularities in the election, the standard is very, very high, when people
are arrested, to make clear that the arrests were committed for non-political
reasons, for truly criminal reasons.
In response, our charge was very actively engaged with all of the political
leaders. I myself made a couple of trips to Yerevan, spent several days
initially in March, meeting with everyone I could find, with the then
president, with the president-elect, with all of the opposition leaders.
The goal was to stimulate a dialogue that would restore of speech and freedom
of assembly and secure the opposition's pledge that their protests would remain
lawful and peaceful.
We remain clearly sharply critical of the steps the government of Armenia took
in restricting freedoms, suspending freedoms. And we then, and we do now, call
for the immediate release of all those people detained for any political
charges.
Also, Ambassador Danilovich, the CEO of the MCC, issued a public letter to then
President Kocharian, warning that absent the resumption of democratic momentum
and democratic reforms, Armenia was putting it in a position that called into
question the ability to sustain the Millennium Challenge program in Armenia.
That's a decision, obviously, that the board of MCC will take, which is chaired
by the secretary of state. I'm not here to issue empty threats or to sound
threatening, but the reality is MCC is a performance-based program. The
indicators that are not compiled by the U.S. government reflect performance.
And so the best point to make is that we hope to see Armenia and President
Sargsyan take dramatic steps that restore the democratic momentum so that the
Millennium Challenge program can continue.
We saw some progress in that the state of emergency was expired 20 days after
it was imposed, in accordance with Armenia law. And we saw the
re-establishment of most media freedoms in the lead-up to the inauguration of
President Sargsyan.
At the same time, however, we still see that the law on demonstrations and
parades and protests is restrictive. It has prompted an outcry from the Venice
Commission and from the OSCE ODIHR.
We, unfortunately, have seen tax authorities of Armenia conducting
investigations of four opposition newspapers that those newspapers find
intimidating.
And we have seen some very surreal scenes on Yerevan streets in recent weeks,
large numbers of people gathering, not doing anything, talking to each other in
a silent protest, and then subsequently getting arrested by the police.
The good news is the military presence has reduced. The bad news, though, is
that some arrests have continued of opposition activists.
So, finally, in this context how do we move forward? Number one, I think it
should be clear how sharply the United States government has condemned the
March violence, by whoever committed that violence. It's difficult to tell, as
I said before, who started it. And we would roundly criticize and condemn
anybody who would use violence for political gain.
But at the same time, the burden of responsibility in such situations rests on
the shoulders of elected governments.
Therefore, it's important that there be an impartial investigation and
prosecution of anyone who used violence on March 1st, on either side, whether
they're in the opposition or whether they're in the government.
Now, we hope to see full restoration of all basic freedoms, both in law and in
practice. We hope there will be further investigations and prosecutions of
those people who violated election law.
And we very much hope to see a national dialogue between the government,
opposition, civil society, that pursues some sort of an agreement or a contract
for democracy, again, that allows and ensures full freedom of assembly in
exchange for a pledge that all protests will be lawful and non-violent.
We call on our friends in the government of Armenia to release all of those
people, as I've said, who have been incarcerated for political reasons. And we
urge the government to restore those democratic reforms that President Sargsyan
has talked so eloquently about in the past and even during his inaugural
address, despite those comments about the possible need for restrictions on
some freedoms.
To wrap it all up, we observe that banning demonstrations will not quell the
anger of the aggrieved people in Armenia. Silencing the votes of dissent will
not achieve unity of opinion. And undermining the institutions of democracy
will not achieve lasting stability.
And in the long run, stability comes from legitimacy, which can only derive
from democracy and democratic freedom.
Of course, we've reiterated these fundamental truths to President Sargsyan.
I've done it myself. Our charge in Yerevan has done it. Ambassador Danilovich
has done it. Other senior officials have done it as well.
I did attend President Sargsyan's inauguration in a spirit of our shared values
and commitment to doing everything we can with all of Armenia to help it get
through this difficult period and get back on the track of democratic reform.
We hope Armenia's new president will hear and address the grievances of his
citizens. He has said many of the right things in the past, and again at his
inauguration, so we look forward to working with him and all the people of
Armenia to make sure that the democratic foundation of the country is solid and
therefore provide the only real foundation for long-term stability.
Thank you again. I apologize for going on so long. It's a very complex
question, and I look forward to your questions.
HASTINGS: Well, not only complex. I feel that you've been comprehensive, Mr.
Secretary, and it's deeply appreciated. I note that you indicated that you
attended the inauguration. Did President Bush send a letter of congratulations
to Mr. Sargsyan?
BRYZA: No, Mr. Chairman. President Bush did not send a letter of
congratulations, no.
HASTINGS: Does he plan to? Or do you know?
BRYZA: That's actually a question for President Bush. I don't know what he
plans to do. I do sense from my colleagues at the White House that we all
share the desire to see dramatic steps to restore democratic momentum in
Armenia.
And we are committed to do everything we can both to elicit and support such
steps, but beyond that, I do not know what the president is considering.
HASTINGS: I'm not trying to parse your words, but your exact comment was that
we will never know what happened on March 1st. Many in the international
community have called for an investigation. Has the United States supported?
I heard you in your comments indicating very strong condemnation, and you went
on in that regard. But have we joined the international community, those who
have called out for an investigation?
BRYZA: We have, Mr. Chairman. You'll see that in my written testimony. I
passed over that point very quickly. And I hereby absolutely, explicitly
reiterate that, yes, we call on the government of Armenia to work with the
international community to conduct an impartial investigation into the events
of March 1st.
I want to make clear when I said we'll never know what happened on March 1st,
what I mean is we will never know who initiated the violence. But in any case,
when it comes to an investigation in all of these steps I outlined, we have
been working in lockstep with our European allies.
And Peter Semneby, the special representative of the European Commission for
the South Caucasus, and I actually do a lot of traveling together. We were
together twice, and in fact, every time I've been to Armenia in recent months,
we've been there together, and we've thought through these steps together.
HASTINGS: I deeply appreciate it.
I hope Commissioners Smith and Kramer won't mind. I'll go from my final
question to Senator Cardin for any opening and/or questions that he may have.
But before doing so, I'd like to place into the record, and I'll do so orally
and in writing, just so as how it's clearly understood by some very
occasionally the efforts of the United States monetarily are not clearly
understood by all.
In this case the sources that I cite are the Armenian Assembly of America and
the United States Department of State for those funds that have been allocated
over a period of time.
You, Mr. Secretary, rightly pointed to the Millennium Compact, and starting in
'06, I believe, for a five-year period, it's $235.6 million. Overall
assistance to Armenia since 1992 through '02 is $1,493,760,000, and actual
monies on the commission sheet of foreign aid of total yearly assistance in
'06, $74.5 million; in '07, $56 million; in '07, $63.6 million; and in '08 the
request for $38.9 million.
I do that for the reason that many -- particularly, those of us in the
legislative body, as well as the executive branch -- often are accused of not
doing enough, and not just in the case of Armenia, but in lots of places around
the world.
And I'd just like folks to take cognizance that a substantial effort is and
will, I believe, continue to be made to assist in democracy development, as
well as full economic development for the Armenia government.
The final question in this round is you, Mr. Secretary, are co-chair of the
Minsk Group. In your testimony you cited to some positives, particularly with
reference to negotiating the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh.
I serve on a working group in the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, and we,
until the now president, continued to refer to that as a frozen conflict. But
you also cited to the hope that the two presidents would get together --
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
But my recollection is that Baku roundly refused to support the resolution in
the United Nations that supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. And
since they reacted so strongly, some people are hinting that maybe the Minsk
Group has outlived its usefulness.
I'm not in that category of people, largely for the reason that you are there
on a regular basis. But I have confidence that it will make substantial
progress. And I also am not one to believe that we should continue to push and
not expect that others will push back in certain arenas.
So how do you react to the statements about whether or not the Minsk Group has
outlived its usefulness?
BRYZA: Well, first of all, I think, if you look at the press and at the
statements of the government of Armenia in recent days, weeks, that sort of
line of argument is gone. And I know that our friends and colleagues in
Azerbaijan, as well as in Armenia, realize that the Minsk Group has played more
than a catalytic role. It has guided the parties to the verge of a framework
agreement.
So it has great value. In general, international regimes have value. The
world is a better place, usually, if there's an international regime in place
that fosters cooperation than when those regimes go away, although there are
some international regimes that aren't so useful.
The Minsk Group is a very useful one. And so I think you're going to see very
soon the two presidents come together, and the foreign ministers before that
will come together.
We have spent a lot of time and effort explaining our vote on that resolution,
and I'd like to just take one moment to clarify that. It was not a vote
against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity at all. We do support Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity, but as I said in my statement, we also hold that a
compromise solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has to be a compromise.
And that means there has to be a compromise on the future status of Karabakh.
I can't outline what that compromise will be, and as the Minsk Group co-chair,
that's not my job. My job is to help the two parties formulate what that
compromise might be.
And so in the case of this resolution that was in the General Assembly, we the
co-chair countries voted no, so voted against that resolution, rather than
simply abstaining, because we felt that resolution was so one-sided that we
would have been sending the wrong single.
And one-sided -- by that I mean that it identified principles, or elements of
our basic principles, that are the subject of such intensive negotiations, but
only the ones that were favorable to the Azerbaijani side, and didn't mention
the ones that are favorable to the Armenian side.
So to maintain our status as an honest broker, we felt -- and I felt -- we had
to send a very clear signal that we don't want to see the negotiations bent to
either side's favor in any place other than at the negotiating table. It's
fair game to do that at the negotiating table. It's not so fair to bend the
negotiations outside of the negotiating arena.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much.
Could I ask the staff and those persons that are seated near those temperature
gauges -- it's a little warm here, and I don't know whether we have the
capacity to make it cooler -- but if someone would just check to see can they
placed down, it would be deeply appreciated.
Senator Cardin?
CARDIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank you for, first,
conducting this hearing. I think it's critically important that the Helsinki
Commission hold a hearing on the extremely conditions in Armenia.
Our focus has been on many aspects of the Helsinki commitments, but human
rights has clearly been our trademark, and the circumstances today are
extremely serious, and I thank you for holding this hearing.
Secretary Kramer, it's wonderful to have you here. I thank you very much. We
look forward to your active participation on this commission.
Listening to the testimony today reinforces an observation that many of us make
that in the work of this commission there is rarely a sharp difference between
the executive and legislative branches. We usually work very closely together,
and rarely is there a difference on a party line.
This is one of the entities that I think reflects the strength of America and
the commitments of America to the OSCE principles. So it's wonderful to have
you with us today.
And, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate very much your testimony. I'm in complete
agreement with what you said. Armenia is a close friend of the United States.
We have very close ties with the Armenian community here in the United States
and in my state of Maryland. And it's been real, it's been genuine, and the
relationship between our countries is extremely important.
I think it's for that reason that we are so concerned about the recent
developments in Armenia. And I just want to put a sense of urgency on this.
I was glad to hear you clarify that we are seeking an independent review of
what happened. There have been many rumors about coups and other things that,
quiet frankly, there's no indication of any basis behind those rumors.
I think it's important that we know exactly what happened. And for those who
are looking -- the citizens of Armenia that are looking -- at their government
providing a fair administration of justice, I think this is a major test, that
we find out what happened, and those that are accountable are held accountable
for their acts.
So I think this is not only calling for an independent investigation, but one
in which I hope the United States will lead international efforts to make sure
that we find out what happened that day in Armenia.
Moving forward, first of all, the results of the elections are very
troublesome. Secondly, the restrictions of basic rights cannot be tolerated.
There's no indication that the response of the government was at all
commensurate with the problems in the country.
And I think we've got to be clear about that. As friends, we've got to be
clear when we see things that we believe are wrong. And we need to express
ourselves in the strongest possible way to restore the basic rights to people
of Armenia. And I think we can be very helpful in that regard.
I'd just like to add one more dimension to it. During February, in a
pro-government TV station, there were anti-Semitic comments that were made. I
have not heard it condemned by the leaders of Armenia. There aren't many Jews
that live in Armenia today, but it's an area that I think we also need to see
leadership in dealing with that type of irresponsible conduct.
So I just really wanted to encourage you to continue to point out the urgency
of Armenia getting back on the right track. It certainly affects their
relationship as it relates to the credibility of their government.
And I just look forward to developing a strategy, working with the
administration and Congress, so that we can effectively bring about the type of
action in Armenia that is really fitting with the tradition of that country.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time. I do
apologize. I've been informed the Senate will start voting soon, so I'm going
to have to leave to get back. And as you know, it's not always safe for Senate
members to spend a lot of time on this time.
HASTINGS: We got lucky. We finished early. Thank you very much, Senator.
I turn now to Congressman Smith.
And I thank whoever helped us to get the air conditioner working. I hope it
doesn't offend those who like heat better than air.
C. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. President, Secretary, for your testimony and for your very
extensive knowledge and hands-on in this entire process. It's deeply
appreciated.
You mentioned a moment ago that the two presidents were likely to meet very
soon, and hopefully there might be some progress in resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh ongoing dilemma.
But I would just note, and I would appreciate your response to this, 16 months
ago, January '07, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty reported President Aliyev
saying, and I quote him, "We are at talks, but the enemy should know that
Azerbaijan can liberate native lands by any means at any time, and we shall
liberate it," he said.
On October 22nd, just a few months ago, '07, Reuters reports that Azerbaijan is
increasing its defense budget by nearly 30 percent and that Aliyev vows, and I
quote, "Azerbaijan must be ready to liberate its lands by any means."
On January 4th of this year, a very similar statement, almost identical, "We
are reinforcing our army because we must be ready to free our lands at any
moment and by any means."
And then there was the Reuters piece. And it looks like the Kosovo crisis, or
the liberation or the naming of Kosovo as an independent state, gave additional
credence to Aliyev's concerns about individuals -- in this case, the Armenian
separatists, as Reuters reported sound, that he linked his comments to the
newly declared independence that he was ready to take the break-away republic
-- this is the Reuters writing -- Nagorno-Karabakh by force, if needed be, and
was buying military equipment and arms in preparation.
My question is, while talk can be helpful and may lead to a nonviolent
solution, I for one, and I'm sure you do, too, because you're there on the
ground, dealing with this every day, take those statements, and they've been
month after month after month. There's also a statement by the Azerbaijani
defense minister, where he said the chance of war was close to 100 percent, and
that was on November 27th, 2007.
The war drums are beating, and there's now some chaos on the ground in Armenia.
The situation in Kosovo has left a very, very bitter taste in the minds of
some, especially because territorial integrity, if you look at it in a purist
form, was not respected.
I felt, when Rambouillet occurred, myself -- and I actually held a hearing on
it at the time -- it seemed to me that it was inevitable that independence, not
autonomy, would occur there. It was a matter of when and not if.
And frankly, I had real criticisms about it, because at some point it was the
Kosovar Albanians who were subjected to human rights abuse of the highest
order, and at times it was the Serbs in Kosovo, who also would get to
retaliation, like in Mitrovica and other places.
So the concern is, from my point view, that you get Azerbaijan looking at this
and saying, "Hmm. We've got Kosovo now." And he has talked war over and over
again.
I guess the question is how seriously are we taking those threats of war? And
what are we doing to mitigate that as a country? What's the Minsk doing? Our
allies? What's the U.N. doing? NATO? Any responsible partner in this?
And what do you really expect? You said, "Very soon." How do you define "very
soon?" Is that talks are imminent? And how do we get this threat of war to be
mitigated and hopefully pulled off the table for the community?
HASTINGS: Would the gentleman yield?
Just as a follow-up to what he's saying, despite the cease-fire agreement in
1994, there has been an increase in the hostilities in that area, or at least
there have always been situations where firing has taken place, but it seems to
have increased recently. And I guess that goes into the same question that the
congressman has just asked.
And that is, is there that possibility of renewed hostility on a higher level?
BRYZA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Commissioner Smith.
It's a complex question, but it shouldn't be a very complex answer. There's no
military solution, we believe, for the Karabakh problem. God forbid, if
military conflict ensued again...
C. SMITH: Does Azerbaijan know that, do you think?
BRYZA: Well, I hope so. I spend a lot of time in my capacity as a mediator
having that very discussion with President Aliyev and others, as well as with
Minister of Defense Abiyev and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov and the whole team,
Deputy Minister Azimov as well.
But we truly believe there is no possible military solution for the following
reason. It's even a question of logic.
God forbid, if military conflict ensued, there would just be another group of
several hundred thousand displaced persons, who would in the same way be
dreaming about, demanding, lamenting the loss of, and getting ready to return
to the territories that they have lost.
It would just be another cycle of conflict, loss, retaliation. So that will
never end.
The only way out of both the conflict, and the only way to reduce the risk of
war, is to finalize these basic principles that are on the table that have been
negotiated. They're not imposed upon anybody.
They're negotiated by the parties with our help, as Minsk Group, so that the
conflict in Karabakh will transform itself from one in which resumption of
military hostilities is a significant risk to one in which -- it's still
politically difficult, as they negotiate the peace treaty, but it's clear that
military forces are separating, internally displaced persons are returning, and
the fundamental needs of the population are taken care of.
I very much share your level of concern about the possible resumption of
hostilities. I was on the line of contact in January, and it's a powerful
experience, traveling through areas that have been devastated by war, that are
completely flattened. People talk about it like Hiroshima in the Caucasus.
Perhaps it's not exactly that bad, but it's dramatic how much destruction was
wrought.
And when you get to the line of contact, the other side is 100 meters away in
some places. They're visible. The soldiers look at each other. They're
watching each other, observing.
Tragically, there are over 30 people that were killed in sniper events even
before the terrible exchange of fire that occurred in early March. That was a
very serious exchange of fire, the most serious loss of life along the line of
contact since the cease-fire, as far as I could remember.
I happened to be in Baku that day and met with the defense minister immediately
and met with the president as well that day, and the foreign minister, and
expressed how tragic it would be if this cycle of violence didn't end.
I was on the phone as well with their Armenian counterparts. And the good news
is that the defense minister has established contact -- or the generals did, at
least. The military commanders established contact and were able to bring the
tension down.
What that shows is that not knowing how it all began, in that one case things
got very heated, and fortunately the sides were able to de-escalate. But you
can't just bank on the de-escalation working every time. We need a settlement.
Now, let's get to the question that you first asked about the rhetoric. I
myself have a couple of times, in my capacity as the coach here, raised this
issue with President Aliyev. One time, in fact, even Congressman Knollenberg
asked us to do it, and I happened to be meeting with President Aliyev that very
day and was able to deliver Congressman Knollenberg's points. In fact, twice I
was able to do that.
Leverage bargaining is a part of the negotiation. Belligerent military threats
are something nobody wants to hear. We complain about them. We urge President
Aliyev to reduce tension to make it easier for there to be a solution.
His statements reflect politics in Azerbaijan. There are a large number of
Azerbaijani citizens who favor potentially armed conflict to regain
Nagorno-Karabakh. Whether we like that or not, people think that way. And
many of the statements of President Aliyev reflect that sentiment.
We are committed to doing everything possible publicly to counter any belief
that there's a military solution and privately to make sure that we do all we
can to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
C. SMITH: Let me just ask the following. What clear and totally broadcast in
advance penalty would Azerbaijan suffer, if it initiated hostilities?
And secondly, when Kosovo declared its independence, and our government and
other governments very quickly embraced that, was it a subject of active review
and scrutiny within your department and other departments as to what --
everyone knew that this would have an impact on Srpska.
It would have an impact on Serbia itself, in Belgrade, in Bosnia. And Russia,
obviously, would become very deeply distressed over it. So there are other
consequences in other places.
But was the Nagorno-Karabakh situation on the table discussed as to what might
happen there, especially as it relates to Azerbaijan's now seemingly enhanced
belligerency, or state of potential belligerency? And again, the penalty
issue.
And you didn't say when. Or is that just not set up yet?
BRYZA: Oh, sorry. Sorry. Yes, I'm sorry. I forgot about that.
In terms of when, let me go back to that one, because you asked that in the
last round. It could be a matter of months, if the two presidents decide that
they are ready to make some tough political compromises, compromises that carry
political risk for them at home.
As in any negotiation like this, you go a long way down the road, you work out
the easier issues, you get to the harder ones, and then there's a very, very
tough one at the very end. And that's where we are right now.
So there's no way to predict. If the two presidents were ready -- let's say
their foreign ministers meet, who knows, in a month or so, and they got
together, and they decided we feel trusting toward each other, we're ready to
take a political risk and reach an agreement -- it would be very quick.
In a matter of weeks, months, they could work out the final details. I hope
they do, but I don't know. It depends on them. We can only facilitate the
communication.
In terms of penalty, I wouldn't want to speculate on that, because all the
various scenarios are so unpredictable. What I can say is I think it's clear
that any resumption of armed hostility in and around Nagorno-Karabakh would be
tragic, tragic for everybody, absolute disaster.
I don't know who the heck knows what the outcome would be of the fighting, but
as I said before, I think any fighting would lead to a perpetuation of the
current situation.
C. SMITH: If I could just interrupt for one second, my sense was -- and all of
us who were members of the Congress, and Ben was a member of it, and Steny
Hoyer -- and when hostilities were initiated against Slovenia at first, and
then followed up by Croatia and then Bosnia, the feckless response by the
European Union and the countries of Europe, the United States, was appalling.
BRYZA: Yes.
C. SMITH: You do it. You do it. Everybody was pointing. And I undertook --
as did the chairman, as did Steny and I and many of us -- multiple trips and
kept coming to the conclusion that Milosevic keeps probing with bayonets, and
everyone says, "Now, you can do better. It's going to be chaos if you continue
this."
And then an arms embargo under Bush-1 was put into effect that was, I think, a
colossal failure, because it, as you know, froze an inability of Bosnia and
Croatia to defend themselves.
I think a predictable penalty at least needs to be on the drawing board, if
hostilities are instigated by Azerbaijan. And I think the early March killing
of eight soldiers -- I believe it was -- was another shot across the bow.
There seems to be a not of tinder in this tinderbox. He's making these
statements. And if somebody says they're going to hit me, I get ready and get
into a more defensive mode, because they're not going to sucker punch me.
And I'm very worried about what's going on here, and I know you are, too.
BRYZA: Yes.
C. SMITH: But I don't think the idea that there will be all out chaos and
bloodshed -- maybe that's not as meaningful to Azerbaijan at this point. They
look at Kosovo again and say, "Hmm. We don't like what happened there."
So I'm very, very concerned about this. In the end, was it discussed? I
weighed in when the Kosovo deal was being considered and wanted ramifications
really looked at more carefully, and I'm not sure this one was.
BRYZA: OK. It was actually. At least I was thinking it through with my team,
the Caucasus team, and the fact of the matter, as you were leading to, is that
actually their territorial integrity is an international legal principle. It
is a legal principle. So there is...
HASTINGS: To whom?
BRYZA: Yes, yes, no, right, exactly. But what I'm getting at is we very much
understood and appreciate why Azerbaijan has reacted as negatively as it has to
Kosovo.
Yes, we anticipated it. We didn't know exactly how that reaction would
manifest itself. But what we're looking for in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh is
not a legal agreement. It has to be a political agreement. There's a legal
principle of territorial integrity of states. There is a political principle
of self-determination of peoples.
Both of these principles are enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, along with
non-use of force, and what we've been trying to do as mediators is to help the
parties come up with a compromise between that legal right of territorial
integrity and that political right or principle of self-determination of
states.
So we thought about Kosovo in that light, but our ultimate decision makers
nonetheless decided to proceed with Kosovo as we did, understanding that it
will create difficult for us in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also Abkhazia
and South Ossetia conflicts in Georgia, for which I also carry some mediating
authority.
Life has gotten more complicated as a result of the Kosovo outcome. I very
much agree with you.
One more point I'd like to make about military force and maybe time or
intentions. It's impossible to know exactly what the intentions are of all
these leaders -- impossible. But what is clear is that time really is not on
either country's side.
If you are in Armenia, you might express the concerns that you raised about a
large-scale military build-up in Azerbaijan and statements about the possible
use of force. You wonder could that ever happen. So I would hope that the
leaders of Armenia realize, "OK. We need to move forward expeditiously towards
a settlement."
The same goes for Azerbaijan, though. As we've seen all of this concern
manifested about territorial integrity, following up Kosovo, in Azerbaijan
people are very anxious, impatient. They want to make sure that they're able
to influence the negotiations in a way that does as much as it can to preserve
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
And unless the parties get together and reach that political compromise as
quickly as possible, then the dangers of these large-scale exchanges of fire,
and the danger of a larger exchange will simply smolder out there until
potentially something terrible happens.
So we have to move forward.
KRAMER: Mr. Chairman, I would just note -- first of all, I'd like to associate
myself with my friend and colleague Matt Bryza's comments in his testimony here
today.
It is my hope to reinforce the principles of the OSCE that all three countries
in the Caucasus signed on to, to make a trip there -- Matt and I talked about
this -- over the next few months to all three countries to certainly address
concerns that Matt and each of you have identified in light of the latest
developments in Armenia, also to engage in further discussions with Azerbaijan,
but also to go to Georgia after the elections that will take place, I think, on
May 21st there.
So I certainly look forward to going to build on the excellent work Matt has
already done and to certainly carry out the commission's mandate and stress the
importance of abiding by democratic principles, respect for human rights, free
and fair elections, free media. And certainly I look forward to reporting back
to each of you on that.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much, and also -- I'm sorry.
CARDIN: Mr. Chairman, my apologies. I know we have two more witnesses coming.
I have to go back to a meeting at 3:30, so I don't want to indicate any
disrespect to our other witnesses, but I have to walk out.
HASTINGS: All right. Thank you very much.
I also am hopeful of being able to visit the region. It's interesting that
these matters continue to be on the table. I'm 13 years now in the OSCE, as my
colleague, Congressman Smith. And it seems that we've been talking about these
issues all that period of time, including as recently as Monday in Copenhagen,
where I was at the bureau meeting and had this same discussion with two of my
colleagues.
But I won't persist in asking additional questions. You've been generous with
your time, Mr. Secretary. I do hope, just as an aside, that the ambassador to
Kyrgyzstan, Ms. Jovanovich, who has been nominated by the president -- I didn't
get a chance to say to Senator Cardin, but I hope that nomination will be taken
up soon, because I do believe that it is important, when we have as complicated
situations as exist in this region, that we do have an ambassador on the
ground.
I don't know Ms. Jovanovich, but if she has survived Kyrgyzstan, she probably
will do extremely well in Armenia, and it would be my hope that the Senate
would recognize the need to expedite it. That's not your prerogative, of
course. I will say what I have said here to Senator Cardin at the appropriate
time.
But thank you, Secretary Bryza. I will have maybe a one or two follow-up on
matters, particularly interested in the implications on the Millennium
Challenge. And we can either discuss that, or I can do so in writing and have
you respond.
Yes, Congressman Smith says he may have a few questions to put in writing as
well.
Thank you so very much.
Our next witnesses are, one -- if they would come forward at this time -- Mr.
Sargsyan and Mr. Grigorian.
I was told that both you gentlemen may very well choose to use videography of
some kind. I would like to get through your testimony, and if we have the
time, and if you are desirous, maybe we can try to hook up the equipment. This
is not our hearing room, as it were, but anyway.
Our next witness represents the government of Armenia, and as is our custom, we
invited Armenia's ambassador, offering him the option of selecting someone
else. Arman has chosen Mr. Vigen Sargsyan, who was an adviser on foreign
policy and national security to President Kocharian, and he continues to
fulfill those responsibilities under President Sargsyan, as well as teaching at
the American University in Armenia.
We also invited former President Levon Ter-Petrossian to testify. He chose to
designate as his spokesperson Arman Grigorian, who is a sitting lecturer in
government at the College of William and Mary. And Mr. Grigorian waited tables
at the Duke of Gloucester at Chow-Ling's tavern many, many moons before he got
to William and Mary.
He's also a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Columbia University. He
previously was an analyst for President Ter-Petrossian during his tenure in
office and was a member of his team during the recent election campaign,
working on foreign policy and national security matters.
I'll start with you.
SARGSYAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, with regard just for the
record, we didn't have further information that will be available to be
distributed, so we don't have material. That's why we haven't provided any.
But obviously, because it is important, we'll forward some to your office
tomorrow, because there are some videotapes which are very relevant and could
share some light on this.
HASTINGS: I don't mean to quarrel with you, but we did make it known that we
would try, but go ahead.
SARGSYAN: OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I recall with great warmth and
respect my first meeting with you some 11 years ago in my capacity as a
secretary to the Serbian national delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
when you challenged the OSCE to assume a greater role in advancing democracies
in the new independent states.
As you referred, the topic is still actually on today, and you were referring
to it a few days ago again.
I am happy to be here with you, Chairman. I thank you and co-chairman Cardin
on behalf of the president and the people of the Republic of Armenia for
offering this hearing, because for us in the Armenian government who on a daily
basis work towards establishing and advancing democracy in our country, it's
important to know that we're not alone and that we have friends internationally
who care about the status and state of democracy in our country.
I am pleased to be joined here by Secretary Matthew Bryza, a long-time friend,
who has distinguished himself as a thoughtful and constructive partner in the
development of deeper bilateral cooperation between our two countries.
And I am pleased to be here with Arman Grigorian, who reflects a deeply held
set of views, and he can speak eloquently on behalf of his party's views and
perspectives.
I'm here, Mr. Chairman, because the people of Armenia believe that this great
nation across the Atlantic is a friend. And Armenians around the world keep
very warm memories of the assistance and support of U.S. Congress and American
people from times of the genocide, which was referred to today, and all the way
through the new days of reverse of our independence.
That friendship, as Secretary Bryza mentioned, is based on a solid foundation
of shared values and interests. And it was obvious from the context in which
this discussion started today that this incident, and this very important
development that took place in Armenia, are watched in a much wider context of
U.S.-Armenian relations bilaterally and multilaterally within OSCE.
The heart of the challenges we are confronted with today, Mr. Chairman, have
less to do with the conduct, or even the outcome, of the February 19th election
in our view, which, while imperfect, reflected the will of the Armenian
electorate, and more to do with efforts by an element of the opposition that,
having lost at the ballot box, sought to challenge this outcome through illegal
and ultimately extra-constitutional means.
The Armenian government holds a solemn responsibility to safeguard the full
range of democratic rights of each of our nation's citizens and in equal
measure bears the burden of scrupulously protecting minority rights, which are
the cornerstone of any democracy.
But votes count, and it is a fundamental right of an electoral majority to have
its vote respected. Our constitution does provide for legal challenges to
electoral outcomes when one of the parties disagrees with the result of the
elections. But once they are exhausted, they must give way to the work of
governance.
Now that the election has ended, our president is, as he should be, the
president of all his fellow citizens. It was a highly charged environment
following the February 19th vote, so use of force by the police, a decision
taken as a last resort, resulted in outcomes that all sides deeply regret.
A state of emergency, despite its justification, obviously cannot be watched in
an OSCE membership state as business as usual, and we will recognize that and
understand that.
In my remarks today, I will seek to first of all place recent events in the
context of wider democratic advancement of Armenians in the last period;
second, to assure you that reconciliation efforts are under way; and third,
that the government of Armenia is committed to move forward in constructive
participation and in an inclusive manner.
There are some key steps, Mr. Chairman, that are already taken. We are notably
addressing the law of rallies, as was mentioned by Secretary Bryza. In his
inaugural address, President Sargsyan devoted a great deal of attention to this
issue, and as a matter of fact, as recently as yesterday, consultations were
completed with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe in reviewing the
law of rallies of the Republic of Armenia.
Experts, on their review, recommend that by these amendments the law falls
short of Armenia's international treaty obligations under OSCE or Council of
Europe instruments. It goes without doubt that the law will be reviewed very
quickly and will be restored in the way that would allow free assembly of
citizens and expression of roll.
Mr. Chairman, the prosecutor general of the Republic of Armenia, when he
learned that I was leading for this hearing, asked me to assure the
distinguished commission that he takes extremely seriously his responsibility
and duty in this highly sensitive situation.
Armenia is a member of Council of Europe, and as such is under jurisdiction of
the European Court of Human Rights. We very well understandable, Mr. Chairman,
that most of the cases in this very sensitive matter will end up in the
European Court of Human Rights.
And the prosecutor general told me he will do everything in his power not to
become one who would be recognized by such a distinguished court as someone who
was anything less than scrupulously fair in defending the right of his
compatriots to express their political views.
He also knows that there have been looting, riots, private and public vehicles,
including ambulances that were set on fire, and it seems the evidence points to
the fact that these actions were orchestrated.
It is his duty to make sure that justice is done and that those who were
involved in criminal activities are held accountable. Otherwise, this
precedent of political violence can repeat itself not only in Armenia and not
only now.
We do think, however, that the legal investigations alone are not sufficient,
because the questions that concern our society are much deeper and wider. They
have to do with the wider context of our democratic tradition.
Our people want to know how we might have responded more constructively,
differently, to the challenge that we faced. To answer that question, we plan
to hold a nonpartisan political inquiry into the situation parallel to the
legal one. It probably will take the form of a natal parliamentary commission
to look into the circumstances of the tragic events.
However, because President Ter-Petrossian's constituency is not represented in
parliament, we think of doing it in a wider format, so that they can also
participate and contribute to this investigation.
As a matter of fact, the government of Armenia has already formally asked the
OSCE and United Nations to provide experts, ballistic experts, and those who
are other experts, who would be able to help us identify the visual materials
that exist and the causes of deaths of people who died in this tragic event.
We would also want to ask for a wider expertise assistance on the modus
operandi of the police in similar situations in general and in future, if they
occur.
Unfortunately, I was informed today that OSCE and U.N. put down these requests,
saying that it is out of their mandate. I would like to repeat that request
now here, and we want to also raise this in Council of Europe, because we do
think that international expertise can assist a lot such an independent
investigation. And it's a must to raise the level of trust towards this
process.
Now, to do all this effectively, there is a need for a dialogue in the society,
and we very well recognize that. And that is what the newly elected president
is seeking to bring about.
Since February 26th in his public remarks and through internal political
channels, he has many times signaled the message of a sincere dialogue to the
opposition. And we are happy to witness that most of opposition groups have
responded responsibly to this offer.
Four out of five parliamentary factions in the Republic of Armenia have now
joined in a wide coalition to move Armenia forward and to make it a better
place for everyone.
Now, sadly, part of the opposition, which is mobilized by Ter-Petrossian,
rejects this offer. Someone, who unfortunately in his presidential tenure
labeled his own opposition "fascists," which is recorded in the report of this
very commission after the 1996 presidential elections, and in whose term in
office banned the country's most traditional and historic political party, who
closed most of the opposition media, held three-year protracted trials on his
key political opponents, that same person is now rejecting an offer of a
dialogue.
He, whose election has been by far worse than that of the most recent
elections, is today challenging the legitimacy of President Sargsyan. He first
claims that he has won before the voting day. Two weeks before elections, he
has announced that he has already been elected, and the voting is a formality.
And if the result in the votes is different, he said, it means the elections
were rigged.
Before the voting even started, he announced a post-election victory or protest
rally, which was held the next day after the elections. And at that rally he
claims that he had 65 percent of votes and said he will not leave the Opera
Square until he is taken by people to the presidential palace.
He started to promulgate presidential orders and tried to draw up the military
forces, the army, into political battle.
Mr. Chairman, an ex-commander in chief, ex-president of the country, stood up
in a public rally and said that the army is with us. He said two deputy
ministers of defense have joined our ranks, and army is with us.
We felt it was very dangerous, and we felt that it was very much affecting
internal political process in Armenia. When OSCE international observation
mission, as Secretary Bryza mentioned, said the elections were mostly in line
with the standard, he said, "They are naive."
When these observers, having carefully studied the irregularities, reaffirmed
their findings and said they are not naive, he said then, "Well, you are
bribed." He went so far as to claim that he had seen copies of paychecks, and
the head of OSCE mission was given 20,000 euros to give a positive assessment
of elections in Armenia, which was an absolutely unacceptable attitude toward
this international observation team.
Then he said that if the constitutional court does not rule in his favor, it
means the court is corrupt. Your Excellencies, seven out of nine judges of the
constitutional court of Armenia have been appointed in his tenure of
presidency.
And when in the beginning of the campaign, former President Ter-Petrossian was
asked, "Do you think you have won '96 presidential elections?" he said, "Of
course, because the constitutional court has said I have won, so I have won."
It was the same constitutional court with almost the same composition of
justices.
Sir, Armenia needs, and the Armenian government encourages, a strong
opposition. We need an opposition which will hold our government accountable
and represent a true and constructive alternative to Armenian voters.
We need an opposition that will make us work 24 hours a day, seven days a week,
not one that polarizes for the sake of polarization or that resorts to threats,
violence and extra-constitutional means.
While we realize that heavy burdens rest on the government, our opposition,
too, must realize that it is irresponsible to provoke domestic crisis in the
float and unrealistic hope that the international community will simply and
automatically side up with it because Armenia is a transitional country, where
by default it is accepted to believe that in such countries opposition is
usually democratic and positive, as the government is authoritative and
repressive, which is a fallacy.
It was after President Ter-Petrossian's resignation in 1998 that Armenia met
the Council of Europe standards and got accession, dramatically increasing its
role with NATO, contributing its share to the international peace and security,
signed a very ambitious action plan with the European neighborhood policy with
the European Union.
We are today ranked by the World Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street
Journal as the 28th most liberal economy in the world among all nations of the
world. It was after his rule that banned political parties were re-opened and
political prisoners released.
It was after his that local self-administration was empowered and schools were
put under elected governing councils, which we believe is a very important
element of grass root democracy.
Mr. Chairman, as opposite to parliamentary elections, in presidential ones the
winner takes it all. That is the political tradition.
Ter-Petrossian has opted not to participate in the parliamentary elections in
May 2007 and lost the presidential ones. And still the new president,
President Sargsyan, is ready to work with the political constituents mobilized
by Ter-Petrossian.
But to be effective, this work has to begin with out pre-conditions, without
blackmail and without personal attacks. It should above all be an effort of
two statesmen concerned about the future of their nation.
Thank you very much.
GRIGORIAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, ladies and gentlemen,
first allow me to express my gratitude for organizing these hearings. Their
importance and urgency cannot be over estimated. The crisis in Armenia deepens
with every passing day.
The urgency cannot be over estimated also, given the relative indifference with
which the strangulation of democracy in Armenia has been met in the West, and
particularly in European institutions up to recently.
That indifference and the readiness to tolerate the intolerable in the case of
our country has been perhaps the most frustrating development for those of us
who until recently had few doubts about the West's commitment to democracy.
Things seem to be changing somewhat, evidenced by the draft resolution of the
monitoring commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
These hearings are also a step in the right direction.
I deal with the larger number of issues in my written statement, but for the
sake of brevity, I'm going to concentrate on only two issues in my oral
presentation. First, what exactly what has happened in Armenia? And second,
how do we resolve the current crisis?
I'm sure I will have an opportunity to comment on the other issues raised in my
written statement during the question and answer period.
So what happened in Armenia? On February 20th, 2008, the central electoral
commission of Armenia released the preliminary results of the presidential
elections, declaring Serzh Sargsyan the winner with 52.8 percent of the vote.
The OSCE election observer mission initially rubber stamped this declaration by
stating in its preliminary report that the election in Armenia was administered
mostly in line with the country's international commitments, which was then
followed by congratulatory statements from EU's foreign policy high
representative and the European commissioner for external relations.
Such statements usually placate skeptical voters, since these institutions and
the individuals working for them enjoy a reputation for impartiality and
commitment to the rule of law and democracy.
The obviousness and the sheer volume of the violations, however, convinced the
people of Armenia that it is their view of their institutions that needs to be
revised, and not their skepticism about the claim of victory by the
administration's candidate.
Albeit late, the position of the OSCE observer mission began to change and move
closer to the Armenian public's view, as well as closer to the reality of what
had transpired on election day. The interim report released on March 7th
depicted a picture which was far less congratulatory and which left no doubt
about the scale of falsifications.
The report documents large-scale intimidation of voters and opposition's
representatives, violations of vote counting procedures and ballot stuffing.
The indirect evidence of fraud is even more interesting in this report.
We learn from it, for example, that counting was observed in 111 precincts.
Seventeen of them, which is more than 15 percent, were assessed to be bad or
very bad.
Even if this number has a 5 percent sampling error, and only 10 percent of the
precincts in the country as a whole have had a similar quality of vote
counting, it is hard to be confident in the central electoral commission's
announcement of a first-round victory for Serzh Sargsyan, because the 50
percent barrier between the first round was cleared by no more than 48,000
votes.
The numbers actually become more suspect, the more of that report we read. We
learn that 95 precincts had a voter turnout exceeding 90 percent. But 44 out
of these 95 had a voter turnout exceeding 95 percent, and higher turnouts were
perfectly correlated with higher numbers for Serzh Sargsyan.
In one precinct 100.36 percent of the eligible voters turned out to vote. One
only wishes that Jon Stewart would be commenting on Armenian elections as well.
What we should also remember is that the falsification of the elections did not
start on February 19th, 2008. It had started much earlier when the
Kocharian-Sargsyan regime decided to turn the Armenian television into a
propaganda tool of Soviet vintage and to make it impossible for the opposition
to get access to it.
We should remember in addition that Serzh Sargsyan chose not to resign from the
post of prime minister during the campaign, which is a violation of the
constitution, unless the prime minister is also the acting president.
We should remember finally that the constitutional courts held hearings to
consider the appeals of two opposition candidates during the state of
emergency, which severely undermines the authority of that ruling.
Now let us consider the events of March 1st, when the regime attacked the
peaceful protesters without even issuing a warning. I will not recount the
whole story, since it has been done extensively elsewhere. What I will do
instead is pose a few questions in response to the regime's claim that it
prevented a coup d'etat and that it only used force in response to violence
initiated by the protesters.
Why have the police arrested so few of those who participated in the looting
and rioting? Why has no investigation been launched into the killings of the
protesters on March 1st? Indeed, why did Kocharian, the outgoing president,
promise that there would be no investigation into the actions of the police
that day?
Why was the police so intent on confiscating old video and photo equipment from
journalists or anybody who happened to be documenting what was happening on
that day? How can one explain the footage of men dressed in civilian clothes,
receiving weapons from officers of the Armenian army?
Many other questions like this can be asked, but I think even these hitherto
unanswered ones make the regime's claims look suspect, to put it mildly.
But we do not insist on being the final arbiter on the matter. What we do
insist on is an independent international investigation of the events of March
1st. Establishing the fact is critical, and if the regime is as confident in
its interpretation of the event as we are in ours, then it has no reason to
oppose the idea.
Let me turn now to the Armenian opposition's views on how to get out of this
impasse.
In its otherwise very good recent report, International Crisis Group urges the
Armenian opposition to engage in negotiations with the government without any
preliminary conditions, implying that we bear at least some responsibility for
the current state of affairs, for the deadlock.
The regime also blames the situation on our radicalism and intransigence,
trying very hard at the same time to convince the international community that
it is seeking negotiations, reconciliation, reduction of tensions and other
good things.
Let us look at the record. The regime declared the end of the state of
emergency on March 20th, but the streets are still full of riot police, and
people are being arrested for not more than taking a stroll down Northern
Avenue, as Mr. Bryza has pointed out.
The regime claims to seek dialogue, but it has arrested over 145 people, most
of them on trumped-up charges. It claims to have lifted the restrictions on
free speech, but it orders the tax police to check the books of oppositional
newspapers.
It speaks of removing the wall of mistrust, but the outgoing president promises
that there will be no investigation into the actions of the police, which is
not only a violation of elementary norms of due process, but also a sadistic
attempt to humiliate an entire nation.
Now, we understand that we have to negotiate with the regime, even if we do not
and will not accept its legitimacy. Negotiating while the regime is behaving
in this manner, however, will not be negotiations, but surrender to brutality.
And that we are not going to do.
If the regime is sincerely interested in negotiating, it has to meet our
minimum and more than reasonable demand that all political prisoners be
released and the riot police returned to their barracks. We will begin
negotiating after that.
That would be a good start, but any further dialogue will be doomed, if the
regime refuses to allow an international investigation into the events of March
1st and if it refuses to repeal the newly adopted constitutional amendment to
the law on conducting meetings, assembles, rallies and demonstrations.
I am happy to hear that it is being reconsidered now.
We also cannot tolerate any longer the Orwellian state of our information
market. The regime will have to grant a broadcasting license to the
independent A1+ channel and stop harassing the independent Gala station. In
fact, speaking of ongoing compromises and good gestures, I found out that the
Gala has been shut down recently -- yesterday, I believe. A1+ has been shut
down for several years now.
Only after these steps are taken, a process of negotiations to get the country
out of the current crisis can begin in earnest. I would like to emphasize,
however, that we and the large army of ordinary Armenians supporting us will
not engage in negotiations only to get tactical concessions from the regime.
They must come to terms with the idea that dismantling of the current
kleptocratic system, which has been the central theme of our campaign, will
have to be the purpose of these negotiations in one way or another, or the
negotiations will have no purpose.
Unfortunately, we're not optimistic about the regime's willingness to engage in
such a dialogue. The regime, in our view, has a different goal. It intends to
break the will of our citizenry and turn it into a scared, amorphous mass that
would never be able to call its rulers to account.
The question, then, is can a lawful and peaceful political struggle bear fruit?
The ultimate responsibility in answering this question lies with the people of
Armenia and the regime that currently governs it.
We believe, however, that the U.S. and other Western democracies have their
share of responsibility in helping Armenia answer that question affirmatively.
At the very least, they should be cognizant of the weight of their assessments
and words. At the very best, they should unequivocally side with freedom
against tyranny, and these are precisely the two sides in Armenia's struggle.
Thank you very much.
HASTINGS: Gentlemen, I very much appreciate both your testimonies.
Congressman Smith was late for an appointment, and that's the reason that he
left. And he wished to extend to you that he would like very much to have been
able to ask some questions.
Because of the delicacy of the matter, my inclination is to submit to both of
you and to your respective alliances questions in writing, for fear of
exacerbating the very obviously complicated and protracted situation.
It may not sound relevant, nor was it in preparation for this hearing, that I
read two books that interested me about Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey. One
was Middlesex and the other The Bastard of Istanbul. If anyone has not read
them, then I suggest to you they are good reading, and notwithstanding
ideological beliefs.
Let me just pose to you the awesomeness of the responsibilities of those of us
here in Congress have and how it is that sometimes well-intentioned people in
countries on both sides, or on all sides, find it difficult when we do not take
sides. And when you take sides, it seems that you agitate and aggravate the
situation a great deal more.
And as one who has visited Yerevan and Baku, as a person that has worked now
for nine years on the subject of Nagorno-Karabakh, I personally find it
frustrating that the citizens in both countries and the leaders of both
countries expect -- and I'm speaking for myself, no one else -- each time I
meet with the leadership.
And I have in my capacity as president of the parliamentary association. I was
the lead election observer for the OSCE in Azerbaijan, and I have been in that
region in the Caucasus with the greatest hope that the people will lift
themselves up.
I use sometimes in this forum the fact that in America I grew up, having been
born in 1936, in the halcyon days of segregation in this country. And little
would it have it been expected that a child that had hand-me-down books, rode a
school bus 30 miles each way, did not have libraries or cafeterias, past three
white high schools on my way to school, would have an opportunity to eventually
become a judge and a congressperson and to go on and become the only American
to serve as the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
That took a lot of patience. And that took a lot of give and take. And
somewhere along the line, people of reason, people of enlightenment, people who
-- and I suggest both of you that are in this room -- all love Armenia, all
want to see success.
This institution that I serve in bases itself on the art of compromise. By and
large, it becomes more and more difficult when the pressures are brought to
bear by each side on issues that we really do not have clarity about.
Let me just cite without asking a question. What would be hard questions for
both of you?
As you well know, Mr. Sargsyan, on April 9th the European Union called for the
full restoration of political rights in Armenia and noted, as you pointed out
in your testimony, that the Venice Commission and ODHIR concluded that the
amendments adopted on March 17th to the law on conducting meetings, assemblies,
rallies and demonstrations unacceptably restrict further the right of assembly
in a significant fashion.
In President Sargsyan's inaugural address, he spoke of the need for
limitations. I'm not clear, and as a lawyer, I wonder what limitations of
fundamental rights did he have in mind? And how, then, do you proceed to have
overall liberal democracy, if you're going to restrict a democracy?
And in all fairness to Armenia, the debate is going on in America, centered
around yet another kind of law dealing with the intervention of the government
into fundamental rights of citizens as it pertains to gathering information to
fight terrorism.
So we are kind of constrained by our own circumstances as to openness and the
balance that's needed between the executive and the people.
Now, if I were to turn to you, Mr. Grigorian, and leave you with hard questions
that I'm not asking you to answer today, I followed pretty carefully, as did
the outstanding staff here at the Helsinki Commission, as I know you know that
Matt Bryza and others at the State Department did, the aftermath of the
elections, particularly the events of March 1st and the run-up to the election.
All of us note that Mr. Ter-Petrossian and his followers complained bitterly
about Mr. Kocharian and Sargsyan and accused them of rigging elections and
authoritarianism and corruption.
Now, one need not live but just a little while to remember the 1996 election,
and the acknowledgement of the then internal minister that the election results
were rigged, which by any logic would question the moral authority of Mr.
Petrossian to raise question about rigged elections.
I don't want to be critical of my own government. I said humorously, but
meaningly, that I come from Florida. And it's very difficult to accept
election results that took place. All of the things that most of you saw and
heard -- the hanging chads and the butterfly ballots -- that was in the
constituency that I represent.
But to turn again to you, if you have proof that people are political
prisoners, then that proof needs to be put forward. And if you would but just
tell Mr. Petrossian for me, when he accuses people of murder, you full well
ought to be able to back up what you are saying.
And then, if I turn to you, Mr. Sargsyan, and you tell me there are no
political prisoners, then I will tell you that you're out of your ever-loving
mind, because there are. And Matt Bryza only in diplo-terms brought it to bear
in calling for the release.
A good starting point for any kind of relief for everybody is to release
anybody that was put in jail because they protested. You're looking at one
that went to jail 13 times in his life protesting. And I know what it means to
be behind bars and being wrongfully held because my rights were denied.
Now, all of you all need to get grown up and make Armenia whole. That's what
needs to happen. It doesn't need American intervention or European
intervention. What it needs is Armenian citizens to come to terms with their
own reality and to move your nation forward.
And then it makes it much easier, then, for me and others who will argue for
appropriations for infrastructure and for economic development and for all of
those things, if we know that human rights are protected, if we know that civil
liberties are protected, if we know that media rights are protected.
We'll leave with that in the hopes that one of the things that I'm fond of
saying at the conclusion of speeches -- and I didn't mean to come here this
way, but I listened to the two of you, and I know that you have supporters in
each of you and others, all who I believe genuinely love their country, and I
thought it best that I not try to get into gamesmanship with you or got you or
permit either of you to go the route of gotcha.
And how I conclude many of my speeches that are very forthright -- and a lot of
people don't like it in my constituency and among those that are in my race and
whatever when I tell them the truth -- what I've said to you I mean heartfelt.
I will work hard, as I have, to try to help Armenia. But I'm not so sure that
I will do it from either of your vantage points. I will do it from an Armenian
vantage point, not from the vantage point of one side against another side.
All of you have good points, and all of you have bad points. So if I've
offended you, it's deliberate.
The hearing is concluded.
(APPLAUSE)
Whereupon the hearing ended at 3:52 p.m.
END
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