UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI COMMISSION) HOLDS BRIEFING: SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
COMMISSIONERS:
U.S. SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR GORDON H. SMITH (R-OR)
U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD BURR (R-NC)
U.S. SENATOR DAVID VITTER (R-LA)
U.S. SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD (D-CT)
U.S. SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)
VACANT
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF (R-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH R. PITTS (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE PENCE (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN L. CARDIN (D-MD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER (D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ALCEE L. HASTINGS (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE MCINTYRE (D-NC)
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
RICHARD BOUCHER,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
DR. STEVEN BLANK,
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE,
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
DR. MARTHA OLCOTT,
SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
DR. S. FREDERICK STARR,
SCHOOL FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
The briefing was held at 3:07 p.m. in Room 538 Dirksen Senate
Office Building,
Washington, D.C., Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), Chairman, moderating.
[*]
BROWNBACK: The hearing will come to order. Thank you all for joining me this
afternoon. I
welcome you to the commission's hearing on the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
Since its inception five years ago, the SCO has been touted by its members,
Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as a multilateral security
organization. The
SCO's members, which have endured terrorist attacks, have sought to develop a
unified approach to
combating terrorism. The member states have demonstrated a long-term
commitment to the war on terror
with the U.S. in this regard.
The organization's focus has also expanded over time to include military
security, economic
development, trade and cultural exchanges.
The United States is not a member of the organization and has not been invited
to participate
in its workings. On the other hand, Mongolia, Pakistan, India and even Iran --
the world's foremost
state sponsor of terrorism, I might note -- are already observers. Iran is
seeking full membership.
Furthermore, the SCO summit in July 2005 called on Washington to set a deadline
for the
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, reinforcing a
suspicion that one of the
SCO's underlying purposes is to weaken American influence in the region.
Perhaps most relevant to this commission are the worrying implications of the
SCO for
democratization and human rights in Central Asia. I raised this point with the
OSCE's chair in
office earlier this year when he testified before the commission.
The Central Asian states are all members of the OSCE and have assumed extensive
commitments
under the OSCE's human dimension. In 1991, all OSCE states accepted that these
commitments, quote,
"are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and
do not belong
exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned."
By contrast, the guiding principles of the SCO's work is, quote,
"non-interference in the
internal affairs of sovereign states," end of quote, and the SCO has vocally
opposed the exportation
of democracy. In a glaring challenge to the aspirations of the region's people
for freedom and
representative government, the SCO's executive secretary has been quoted as
saying, "The time for
color revolutions in Central Asia is gone."
In fact, Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, has sought to use participation
in the SCO as
a way to overcome isolation and a criticism has experienced over the Andijan
massacre and its failure
to cooperate in an international investigation of the incident.
A further rise in SCO influence can only encourage the governments of Central
Asia in more
repressive and less reformist policies that will contribute to the growth of
regional extremism and
the terrorism that the SCO was founded to combat.
The United States has a vital interest in the transition of the Central Asian
states to
democracy and market economies. The region is critical in our war on
terrorism. We've encouraged
these states to move in the direction of reform and to adopt open energy and
economic policies that
support their independence and long-term stability.
Along with Senators Kyl and Hutchison, I have introduced a bill in Congress to
follow up on
the original Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999. This legislation articulates a
strong commitment to the
region and urges the development of close U.S. political, economic and security
ties with these
countries. It would recognize the historic relationship among them and,
through U.S. engagement,
encourage their long-standing traditions of moderate Islam and tolerance.
I look forward to hearing from our panelists today on whether the rise of the
SCO is
compatible with these goals and what the motivations are of its principal
members in setting up this
organization.
I'm pleased on our first panel is the honorable Richard A. Boucher, assistant
secretary of
state. He is the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian
affairs. He previously
served as the Department of State's spokesman or deputy spokesman under six
different secretaries of
state and has served as chief of mission twice. October '93 to 1996, he was
U.S. ambassador to
Cyprus. He was head of the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong as the consul
general and as a senior
foreign services officer with the rank of career minister.
Mr. Boucher, it's a delight to have you here today. I look forward to your
statement, and I
look forward to a discussion with you in a candid forum and format on what we
anticipate the SCO is
all about and what it's going to do. Good to have you here.
BOUCHER: Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Chairman, I want to start off by thanking you for inviting me here today to
discuss this
topic of human rights in Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
and the other
relationships and organizations that affect it. I've prepared a much longer
written statement, and
I'd like to ask that that be entered into the record.
BROWNBACK: Without objection.
BOUCHER: Let me speak briefly then, and we'll go onto whatever questions are
on your mind.
As you know, Central Asia is strategically important region. It's going
through a period of
very tremendous change. Secretary Rice has articulated a clear vision for
Central Asia, and we're
working with the states in the region to try to carry it out. Simply put,
above everything else in
this region, we put Central Asians at the center of our policy.
Our policy is firmly based on the premise that the nations of Central Asia are
sovereign and
independent states with whom we need to maintain relations on a broad range of
issues. Our overall
goal is simple: to support the development of sovereign, stable, democratic
nations that are
integrated into the world economy, cooperate with one another, the United
States and our partners to
advance regional stability.
Real stability, we believe, requires citizens to have a stake in their
government. Long-term
stability comes from a process of democratic change, and our job is to help the
countries of Central
Asia develop their own democracies, as they seek their security and develop
their economies. All
three elements work together.
Central Asian republics are members of several regional organizations whose aim
is to provide
multilateral security and economic coordination. We believe that cooperation
among the Central Asian
states with all of their states can be useful via multilateral organizations
that address the
concerns of all the member states.
You invited me here today to discuss specifically the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. I'd
note that, in its early years, the so-called Shanghai Five focused on resolving
border disputes among
the members and, in fact, did some good work on that score. Today, Shanghai
Cooperation Organization
still has the potential to advance regional trade and economic development, but
we believe that it
needs to be an engine for cooperation and equal partnership among the five
sovereign states of
Central Asia.
It should not be a vehicle for exclusion or for domination by its larger
members. We have
problems when it takes excursions into more political areas, like telling the
states of the region
what they can and cannot do with third countries, like ourselves. And we have
problems when they
seek security cooperation on a no-questions-asked basis. We would hope to see
the organization
develop in a way that supports broader regional stability and prosperity and
focuses its energy on
economic development, not on geopolitical statements.
I'd note that, in addition to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, we
believe the
Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community
should also be much more
transparent in how they intend to achieve their stated goals. Like the
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, these other two organizations seem to be sort on a
no-question-asked membership basis,
as well. There's no criteria for human rights standards or other
participation, and there's no
effort within the organizations to achieve more stable government or political
reform.
So the question in the end becomes: Are they there to strengthen the
independence and the
sovereignty of states, give them a better foundation for their future, or are
they there as a way of
outside powers trying to exercise some control over what goes on in the region?
And when they slip
into that latter mode, we think that's not good for the region, and that's what
we've seen happen in
a few areas.
As we have tried to build new economic links and other ties between Central
Asian nations and
South Asia, we've also tried to strengthen the multilateral ties that the
nations of Central Asia
have already developed to the West. So I'd note that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, NATO,
is very involved in this region, and especially for the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in
Europe is very involved, and the European Union is involved, as well.
All of these organizations, while they might focus on economics or military
security or
reforms of various kinds, they all have a basic structure that involves all
three elements of a good,
stable future for these countries, security, economics, and democracy, and
political reform.
All five Central Asian republics are participating states in the OSCE, and they
host field
missions from the OSCE. And as this committee knows very well, the OSCE is a
tremendous asset and
platform for cooperation on security, economic and environmental development,
and especially
democratization and human rights.
We believe that NATO plays an important role in maintaining and strengthening
relations, both
among the Central Asian nations and between them in the outside world. And
NATO's Partnership for
Peace program has enhanced security capabilities and readiness in the region,
so we offer enormous
support, not only to the individual nations, in terms of their reform programs,
but we consistently
support the OSCE, and NATO, and some of the other organizations that try to
bring this integrated
approach and focus on the Central Asian nations themselves.
We're promoting multiple linkages to the world for the countries of the region.
We think
that countries should never be left with one option, with one market, one
trading partner, or one
vital interest structure link. More choices for them means more independence
for them, and more
independence means more ability to exercise their own sovereignty, and that's
our goal for the
countries of Central Asia.
We'll continue to pursue to it by working with the countries individually and
with the
multilateral organizations that share our goals in the region.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to talk about this
important
region, and now I'd be glad to take your questions.
BROWNBACK: Thanks, Mr. Boucher.
What's been the SCO's impact, in terms of human rights observation in Central
Asia? Has it
had an impact on human rights efforts in Central Asia?
BOUCHER: I think the first thing to note is the organization doesn't take up
human rights
questions itself, and that is probably our big criticism of Shanghai
Cooperation in the human rights
field, that there's no effort at all to match economic agreements, border
agreements, security
cooperation, counterterrorism efforts with any standards of human rights or
even, I suppose, what we
would say is sort of understanding of the political environment in which those
things have to
operate.
And so it's kind of, as I said, no-questions-asked cooperation in these fields.
And that in
itself is not helpful to bring a balanced development in the region.
As far as observers, I can't remember if they've actually sent observers to
specific
elections, but some of these countries have observed each other's elections.
And despite the fact
that in some of them there have been big problems, they've been very quick to
approve, and that
certainly gives a bit of refuge to people who otherwise in the international
arena haven't met what
one would call basic standards for a decent election.
BROWNBACK: What about the SCO has vocally opposed to exportation of democracy?
What do you
make of that statement?
BOUCHER: Well, exactly. I mean, their doctrine of non-interference is sort of
--
cooperation without any questions is one that we don't think is helpful to the
region. It doesn't
help things move forward. And while they have many times assured us that, you
know, our cooperation
is not directed as any third country, that was the standard talking point when
I went and talked to
people in the region.
I went to Beijing in August and was talking to the Chinese, as well as I went
to the
headquarters of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And, you know, their
own consistent talking
point was, "This is not directed at any third parties," but it is directed.
I'd say, in some ways,
it's sort of insulating these countries from any criticism or any objective
scrutiny from outside,
and that doesn't help these countries in the end.
BROWNBACK: And so it's to form protection for countries within it so that they
don't feel as
much pressure to democratize or have human rights?
BOUCHER: I think it allows them -- it gives them a club to go to, and be happy
with each
other, and not face any criticism, and therefore maybe lessen the pressure that
can be brought on
them from outside.
BROWNBACK: Is there an intent here to build a broader coalition of people
opposed to
democracy, the expansion of human rights?
BOUCHER: I don't think so. One of the interesting things in this region is,
everywhere you
go, people will claim that they have a strong human rights agenda. I was in
Uzbekistan last month,
and President Karimov pointed very proudly to the statements that he had made
in the past on human
rights, including some that he'd made with us. And I said, "Well, that's
great, but you haven't
implemented any of this."
But everywhere in the region, they know that political reform and human rights
is on their
agenda. Some find various excuses; some find various different ways of doing
it. But the kind of
pressure that we bring and the kind of pressure that the OSCE brings, the kind
of pressure that
relations with the Europeans, or Japan, or others bring, they don't feel it
when they're inside these
other organizations, when they're meeting with their collective security
counterparts or their
Shanghai Cooperation counterparts.
And so I think that lessens to some extent the desire of people to see them get
on with that
agenda and actually implement it.
BROWNBACK: Is this an effort by the Chinese in particular to get a leg up on
us
economically, by not asking any questions about democracy or human rights?
BOUCHER: I don't think so, I mean, to get a leg up on us. I think China is
pursuing its
economic interests in the region, not necessarily against us, but it's pursuing
its own economic
interests in the region. And China has a habit of not asking any questions
about democracy and human
rights.
They accept dealing with all sorts of regimes, without any questions. They
look for, as they
say, stability above all. And when I talk to the Chinese about this, you know,
I argue very strongly
with everybody that, for the long term, the only true stability is democratic
stability. The only
way to ensure the continuation of independence and sovereignty of your country
is to build
institutions that will last for a long time, build institutions that are
inclusive, build
institutions that allow people who have grievances to express them peacefully,
and give people a
peaceful role in a political process.
And that's something that, you know, we try to carry forward everywhere we go,
that building
democratic institutions is the way to ensure stability and the way to ensure
sovereignty and
independence.
BROWNBACK: What about the executive secretary of the SCO has been quoted as
saying, "The
time for color revolutions in Central Asia is gone"?
BOUCHER: Well, I think that's -- I didn't see that precise remark. You know,
frankly, it's
one based on the desire to insulate, you know, what we were talking about
before, to insulate their
regimes from any sort of criticism or change.
But it's also kind of a smear on the United States, because we're not out there
trying to
overthrow governments or, you know, sponsor color revolutions everywhere we go.
We're trying to
support and promote democratic change wherever it exists and to build a stable
basis for the future
for these countries, in terms of security, in terms of economic cooperation,
and in terms of
democratic reform.
So, you know, he's first of all arguing against a false target and, second of
all, it's
really a non-sequitur. The process of reform in these countries, the process
of building an
independent and sovereign state requires progress in all these areas.
BROWNBACK: I look at this, and I just have a lot of questions that really come
to mind quite
quickly about the intent of the people, particularly the larger countries
involved in this.
And maybe it's based on a background of inexperience, but particularly, like in
Africa, I've
traveled a great deal in Central Asia. I've traveled in Africa. And a lot of
my experience in
Africa has been a lot of Chinese investment and money pouring in, with many
rogue regimes and no
questions asked.
As a matter of fact, many times the rougher the regime, the more their pariah
status with the
rest of the world, the more Chinese investment is there. It's a place that we
won't go because of
genocide in Darfur or other places throughout Africa, and there's extensive
Chinese investment. It's
almost a business plan, it seems to be, that it's followed.
Are we seeing that being replicated in Central Asia to some degree?
BOUCHER: Sure. They're looking for oil; they're looking for resources;
they're looking
for...
BROWNBACK: No questions asked?
BOUCHER: ... no questions asked, yes. That's the way the Chinese do things
around the
world, as you yourself have seen.
BROWNBACK: When you press the Chinese officials about this, how do they
respond? I mean,
here...
BOUCHER: I mean, first of all, China, because it's so fearful of people
telling them what to
do, takes a very rigid line on not telling others what to do. Second of all,
they're looking to
cooperate with other countries for the sake of resources and economic growth.
They need the oil.
They need the raw materials.
They need the trade and transport routes, and so that's their first goal, and
that's pretty
much the basis of their cooperation in this region. They have new rail lines
with Kazakhstan; they
have new pipelines with Kazakhstan. They're looking at road and rail links
with others. They're
looking at the possibility of gas pipelines from Central Asia.
To some extent, this helps the countries in the region. I mean, I have to say,
if the goal
is really to give them multiple outlets and multiple pipelines, then having the
China option, as well
as having the Caspian option, as well as having the options of sending things
to the south, these are
all good. All the infrastructure that was built in the Soviet period,
obviously, led back up into
Russia, and these countries are still very heavily dependent on Russia.
And the more options they have, including the China option, probably the better
it is for
each of these countries, to be able to decide on their own which is best, and
which way they want to
go, and how they can exercise their sovereignty and maintain their independence
by having more
choices. But, at the same time, I say that in itself does not lead to
political reform. They need
to consider what the long-term stability of their nation requires.
BROWNBACK: Doesn't it even slow political reform?
BOUCHER: I guess the answer would be: Compared to what? If it would slow --
it would
certainly slow political reform if their only option was to cooperate with
Europe and the West. But
since right now their only option is Russia for many of them, the fact of
adding more options with
China, and with Europe, and with NATO and the OSCE actually probably stimulates
a bit more openness
and cooperation.
BROWNBACK: You think President Karimov's participation in the SCO has
stimulated human
rights and democracy building in Uzbekistan?
BOUCHER: No, absolutely not. No, absolutely not. He's been very impervious
to influence,
shall we say, more than anybody else...
BROWNBACK: It seems like it buttresses his efforts and it gives him a club to
go to, and
market to a substantial size to participate in, and no pressure.
BOUCHER: Sure.
BROWNBACK: No questions asked.
BOUCHER: Sure.
BROWNBACK: And there it would seem like it would be a classic case of really
slowing down
the process.
BOUCHER: I can't disagree with you, sir. I guess the only thing I'd say is
slowing -- you
know, what are his other options? If he didn't have Shanghai Cooperation
Organization club to hang
around in, he'd probably be hanging out in Moscow. I'm not sure that would
make his policy any
different. Right now, he does both.
BROWNBACK: Has the U.S. sought membership in the SCO?
BOUCHER: No, we haven't, sir.
BROWNBACK: Why would the SCO object to U.S. participation or wider, say, South
Korean,
Japanese participation? Have you thought of that?
BOUCHER: I don't know that they would. They might. They might find a reason,
even though
theoretically it's open to others.
We have not sought participation, I think, for two reasons. One is the purely
practical and
small, well, specific reason that their rules are such that they require
participation by observers
at the same level as the level of the meetings.
So if you had a summit meeting in the United States that wanted to go in
observer, in theory,
it would have to be George Bush, President Bush, sitting at a table off to the
side with a few other
countries watching the proceedings. And that generally is not very productive
for the United States
to take a role like that. That's what their own internal rules require.
But the second, I think, is a bigger picture, and that is that, in terms of our
cooperation
with the region, we don't think this is a particularly helpful organization.
It's certainly not one
that we would want to back, or sponsor, or promote in any way. We think our
money, our energy, our
time is better invested in working with the individual countries and working
with the organizations
that take a broader view, the NATO, the OSCE, the European Union, other
partners, Japan, working with
them in the region, people who are interested in all aspects of cooperation in
that region.
BROWNBACK: What do the Kazakhs say to you as to why they are a member of this
organization
and seek to be actively participating in the OSCE?
BOUCHER: I think it probably applies to all the states in the region that
they're members of
this partly because of geography, partly because when it started out it was a
useful vehicle for
solving some of the border problems and working on customs and economic issues,
partly because they
do want the cooperation on security and counterterrorism.
The attitude is sort of, the more you can do in that area, the better. So
they're looking at
it from their point of view and finding some benefits for their development,
for their security, for
their economic relations with neighboring countries.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe, of course, takes a
broader view, a
more well-balanced view, where it is security, economics and democratization,
three baskets that OSCE
has. And their interest in OSCE is to show, to get some recognition from other
countries that they
have some achievements in those areas.
BROWNBACK: So a member of the Hudson Institute, Chris Brown, has termed the
SCO, quote, "the
most dangerous organization that the American people have never heard of." A
pretty strong
statement. He calls it or suggests it's more than an economic organization.
He sees it as a
potential Eurasian Warsaw Pact. What do you think of those concerns?
BOUCHER: I don't see it. I don't really see it that way. The Warsaw Pact was
an instrument
of direct control by the Soviet Union, in places where they had troops, where
they had security
services, where they had direct control, really, over many of these nations,
and sometimes intervened
forcefully to maintain it.
The countries of Central Asia have more options and they have more
opportunities. And to
some extent, they can get out of any organization what they want to. And the
more opportunities they
have, to the north, the south, the east, and the west, the more organizations
they can participate
in, the more options they have.
And it makes it harder for any one organization to try to control them. It
makes it harder
for any one organization to have the domination that the Warsaw Pact had over
Eastern Europe.
BROWNBACK: It seems to me that this is one that bears very close watching, the
SCO,
particularly in some of these, it looks like to me, incendiary statements that
their leadership has
made against exportation of democracy, no more color revolutions, this sort of
no-questions-asked
association.
The operational techniques that have been used, particularly by the Chinese to
secure more
resources and ask no questions or not push at all about human rights or
democracy, I think this is
one that we ought to be very concerned and watching quite closely as what its
trajectory is and what
it's headed towards, to where it might look not as difficult right now, but
that it could take a very
aggressive trajectory against our interests and against the spread of human
rights and democracy.
BOUCHER: I agree with you, sir. I mean, we have watched this organization
very closely. We
watch all the multilateral cooperation in this region. Again, our emphasis is
on trying to encourage
cooperation in this region, trying to help them with their, you know, customs
efforts, with their
mutual reinforcing economic efforts, with security cooperation, and other
things, as well as
political reform and movement towards democracy in the region.
So we watch all the organizations that are involved in one way or the other.
We don't find
Shanghai Cooperation at this stage, given the things they've gotten into,
particularly in the last
two years, to make that big of a contribution to this. And we've been very
careful in watching it
and raising it. We talk about it with the countries of the region. We raise
our concerns with
countries outside the region.
I think, you know, Iranian participation is quite a problem. And certainly, if
you look at
the meeting this year, that Iran probably detracted from the meeting and the
quality of the
organization rather than added anything by showing up. So we do raise this
regularly with countries;
we watch it closely. And we will watch its evolution as it goes forward.
But I'm not sure I agree with some of the statements you were quoting from
others, but we do
watch it very carefully.
BROWNBACK: And, well, thank you. Thank you for your presentation and your
comments here
today. I appreciate very much your attendance.
BOUCHER: Thank you very much, Senator. Pleasure to be with you.
BROWNBACK: We'll call up the second panel.
Sean Roberts is a Central Asian affairs fellow at Georgetown University Center
for Eurasian,
Russian and East European Studies. He's also the author of a Web site on
political and social
economic developments in Central Asia. He's been living on and off in Central
Asia since 1989. And
when he was an exchange student at Tashkent State University, an expert on
history and culture of
some of the people in that region. He speaks fluent Russian and other
languages.
Dr. Martha Brill Olcott has testified before in front of the commission. A
senior associate
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, one of the world's foremost
experts on Central
Asia, also a professor of political science at Colgate University. Co-directs
the Carnegie Moscow
Center's Project on Ethnicity and Politics in the former Soviet Union. Has
written extensively on
the region.
And the final one on the second panel, Dr. Steven J. Black, Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S.
Army War College. He's an expert on the Soviet bloc and post-Soviet world.
He's editor "Imperial
Decline: Russia's Changing Position in Asia," co-editor of "Soviet Military
and the Future," and the
author of "The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of
Nationalities." He's written many
articles and conference papers on Russian Commonwealth of Independent States
and Eastern European
security issues.
We're delighted to have this panel with us today. Your full statement will be
included into
the record.
Dr. Roberts, we'll start with you.
ROBERTS: Thank you very much for inviting me today to speak to you about the
Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and its impact on U.S. interests in Central Asia.
When the Shanghai Five group first met in 1996, few people foresaw that this
loose alliance
between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be what it
is today. The turning
point in the organization's development took place in 2001, when the loosely
aligned Shanghai Five
group reformed itself into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or the SCO,
and took on Uzbekistan
as an additional member.
Since 2001, the SCO has gradually built an alternative universe to the Western
military,
political and economic alliances that has sought partnership with the Central
Asian states. While
the military potential of the SCO may be at some point an issue for the U.S.,
much more important
today are the political and economic counterbalances that the SCO presents to
U.S. interests in
Central Asia.
And it may be the political counterbalance of the SCO alliance to U.S.
interests in the
region as an alternative to the OSCE that is most critical, since this is the
aspect of the
organization that gives its ideological glue.
By the choice of its name alone, it is clear that the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization was
created in 2001 at least in part as a conscious counterbalance to the
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, or the OSCE. Its challenge to the OSCE, however, became
much clearer with the
SCO's decision to sponsor an election-monitoring delegation to the 2005
Kyrgyzstan parliamentary
election. This event signaled a serious shift in the activities of the SCO and
particularly China,
with regards to its involvement in Central Asia's internal political
development.
Since 2005, this trend has become more visible in the activities of the SCO and
in its public
statements. While the alliance continues to promote military, trade and
security cooperation among
its member states, it now articulates its geopolitical stance as an
organization that is protecting
the region from external political influences. In essence, the SCO has
positioned itself as the
protector of the sovereignties of the Central Asian states from foreign
interference in internal
affairs.
In doing so, it is creating various regional support mechanisms that can exist
in economic,
security and military development, without the commitments to democratic reform
that being a member
of the OSCE entails. Such a situation creates a serious threat to the
observation of human rights
and the development of democratic governance in Central Asia, as well as to the
general raison d'etre
of the OSCE.
But the question remains as to when the desire for an alternative to the OSCE
began in the
region and why. And, more specifically, why do the Central Asian states now,
in contrast to the
early 1990s, perceive of the U.S. and its European allies as equal or perhaps
even larger threats to
their sovereignty and independence than China and Russia?
In general, there are three events that have contributed to the situation.
First, in 1999
and 2000, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all held
parliamentary and presidential
elections. None of those elections were recognized as free and fair by the
OSCE, nor by the United
States. The failure of this election cycle to meet international standards
understandably led to
significant bad international press concerning the efforts of the Central Asian
states to develop
democracy.
This situation one might say ended the honeymoon of Western engagement in
Central Asia. It
was shortly after this election cycle that the Shanghai Five group became
solidified into the more
formal Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The second event was the establishment of U.S. military bases in Central Asia
shortly after
September 11, 2001. While there was tacit agreement among all parties that the
U.S. and its
coalition needed the use of bases to establish control over the disorder in
Afghanistan, there had
always been and remains distrust of the intentions of the U.S. in establishing
those bases.
Third, in the last three years, there has developed a general fear of U.S.
political
intentions in Central Asia regarding the concept of regime change. This fear
is propelled by a
conflation of the United States' articulation of the goals of the global war on
terror, in terms of a
freedom agenda of bringing democracy to the world, and the belief that the U.S.
was intimately
involved in the developments of the so-called colored revolutions in Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan,
as well as the Andijan protests of May 2005.
The member states of the SCO, with perhaps the exception of Kyrgyzstan,
generally see the
colored revolutions of recent years, along with the campaigns in Afghanistan
and Iraq, as parts of a
unified U.S. foreign policy to selectively force regime change around the world
in the name of
democracy. As long as such a perception exists, the SCO is likely to be an
attractive counterbalance
to the OSCE and U.S. interests in the region for the Central Asian states.
There are, however, some internal dynamics within the SCO that can limit its
ability to
present a long-term challenge to U.S. interests and to the OSCE in the region.
The Central Asian
member states of the SCO continue to see the advantage of engagement with the
U.S., recognizing that
Russia and China could also pose significant threats to their independence and
sovereignty.
Along these lines, Kazakhstan may be in a position to play a pivotal role in
how the SCO
positions itself, vis-a-vis the U.S. and the OSCE. Kazakhstan is the only
Central Asian country
whose economic power allows it to be a significant international investor and
to play an important
role in the development of the other Central Asian states.
In this context, Kazakhstan seeks a wide range of international partners and
often wishes to
exert its independence from Russian and Chinese political and economic
influence. Furthermore, while
Kazakhstan seeks to control public political competition and continues to be
reluctant to implement
free and fair elections, the country's growing middle class has Western
sensibilities that will
eventually seek the reforms that are aligned with the country's commitments to
the OSCE.
In this context, it is vital for the U.S. and the OSCE to find new means for
engaging the
Central Asian states on long-term democratic reforms in a way that is not seen
as threatening the
sovereignty and independence of these states in the short term. In order to do
so, however, the
fears of colored revolutions in these countries must be replaced by a true
sense of mutually
beneficial partnership that involves the collaborative efforts of the U.S. and
the OSCE to build free
markets and democratic governance in the region over the long term.
Such an approach should not be confused with being soft on democracy, as Ariel
Cohn (ph)
recently suggests. The U.S. and the OSCE need to talk tough about democracy
with Central Asian
leaders but also do so realistically, respectfully, and with the assurances
that they are committed
to long-term engagement.
It should be remembered that the fear of U.S. democracy promotion that is
prevalent among
Central Asia's leaders is not as much a reaction against the idea of political
reform as it is a
suspicion that the freedom agenda presently promoted by the U.S. abroad is
actually a smokescreen for
ulterior motives. In order to refute such ideas, the U.S. needs to demonstrate
to the Central Asian
leadership that its interest in promoting political reform throughout the
region have nothing to do
with forcing regime change in the short term and everything to do with ensuring
the long-term
sustainability of the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states.
If the U.S. can regain the trust of the Central Asian states in this regard,
the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization will likely cease to be a serious threat to our
interests in the region.
Thank you very much.
BROWNBACK: Thanks, Mr. Roberts.
Dr. Olcott?
OLCOTT: Thank you.
BROWNBACK: Good to have you back.
OLCOTT: Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear once again before
you today. I
have a longer testimony, which I've submitted to the record.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is becoming increasingly more active in
Central Asia.
Although it is not clear what the final shape of this organization will take,
either in terms of its
membership or in terms of its mission, right now though I believe that,
rhetoric not withstanding,
that SCO is little more than a discussion forum for a group of states with
shared borders or nearly
shared borders, as in the case of Uzbekistan.
And it is unclear to me whether the efforts at institution-building of this
organization will
be any more successful than those of the rather ill-fated CIS, the Commonwealth
of Independent
States. Today, I don't believe that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
poses any direct threat to
U.S. interests in Central Asia or in the region more generally, although I
grant that its annual
meetings, most particularly since 2005, have become an opportunity for member
states and for
observers to vent their frustration with the U.S.
I also believe that the timetable for possible expansion of this organization
is uncertain,
but I certainly feel that it is unlikely to come anytime soon. And I think
it's important to
remember that observer states in the organization have a very limited range of
activities that they
can participate in. And so much of the bluster comes from the observer
nations, like Iran, at
general meetings.
Moreover, I believe that the expanded mission for the SCO becomes less viable
if the
membership of the organization expanded. This is something that the membership
in general is well
aware of, and this is one reason why the Chinese in particular have privately
resisted any proposal
to increase any of the observer nations to full member station. A decision to
increase membership
would need to be consensual, and Chinese authorities have sent strong signals
to suggest that the
organization cannot be expanded until its final mission is clarified and made
operational.
I believe that, although the SCO have made commitments to view security threats
to one as a
form of threat to all, they lack the capacity to respond to these threats in
any sort of concerted
fashion. And for the foreseeable future it is hard for me to imagine China
becoming an equal
security partner of any of the Central Asian states or of Russia. Suspicion of
China simply runs too
deep.
So furthermore I believe the capacity of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
to be a
security organization with a mission anywhere analogous to NATO further
diminishes if the SCO takes
on new members. I also believe that Russia itself is against the expanding of
the security mission
of the SCO, because it works against bilateral Russian efforts and multilateral
efforts of Russia
with the Central Asian states.
The economic mission of the organization also remains somewhat ill-defined.
And the fact
that China and Kyrgyzstan are both WTO members and that Kazakhstan and Russia
also have WTO ambitions
-- Kazakhstan in particular is moving towards WTO membership -- I think will
impede the SCO from
emerging as any sort of competitive, exclusive regional trade organization.
That not withstanding, SCO member states are likely to become important
economic partners of
each other, especially in the area of energy. Russia and China are to some
degree competitors for
Central Asian oil and gas reserves, but both realize that the SCO and the
partial pooling of their
efforts could work to their individual advantage. However, the mutual
advantage that the SCO
provides in the area of energy really begins to seriously diminish if it admits
other large oil and
gas competing producing states, like Iran, or other states with large markets,
competing markets for
energy, like India.
I would like to turn to three points before I run out of time and then a
conclusion. First
of all, energy. I would argue that China's priority, as we've talked about,
vis-a-vis the Central
Asian states, lies not with the SCO but with increasing its ownership of oil
and gas assets in
Central Asia. As I will return in the conclusion, as I talk about in my
testimony, this is something
that need not be of direct or indirect threat to the U.S.
The Chinese expects the SCO to help with energy security. OK, domestic
politics -- again,
you know, I'm going to run out of time. I think this question has come up, the
question on human
rights.
I would say that the Chinese have little interest in the domestic politics of
the Central
Asian regimes, except as they relate to the treatment of ethnic minorities,
Chinese ethnic
minorities, the Uyghurs in particular. And this is the one place where the
Chinese government has
placed very serious pressure on the Central Asian states to restrict the
political rights and to
outlaw particular Uyghurs groups, OK?
I would say that Beijing is not encouraging the Central Asian states to be
autocratic, and
they wouldn't break ties with any of these regimes if they became democratic,
but like the rest of
the SCO member states, the leadership in Beijing -- and this is really what I'd
like to emphasize --
believe that security threats come from groups with alien -- and I would read
extremist -- ideologies
and are not produced as a result of the domestic and, in particular, of the
human rights abuses of
the governments themselves.
And this really is where I think the SCO and the OSCE really differ, in the
evaluation of
what constitutes threat, domestic threat, and what produces domestic threat.
And I will come back to
that in another second, in the conclusion.
Finally, I'd like to say just a word or two about Russia and the SCO. The
increased
visibility of the SCO provides a useful buffer for the Central Asian states to
use in trying to
balance Russia and Chinese influence in the region. One Central Asian foreign
minister once noted
that the biggest advantage that his country gets from membership in the SCO --
and this is off the
record -- was that they used it to oppose Moscow.
When there was a position that there had been a clash at bilateral meetings,
they would bring
it before the SCO if there was any evidence at all that China would take the
opposing view, that it
served as a great discussion place to neutralize some of Russia's concerned.
I feel it's very important to note that the security goals of Russia and the
SCO do not fully
overlap, and Russia itself would be very uncomfortable with
intelligence-sharing between the Central
Asian states and Beijing, if all the SCO members would just share intelligence.
I'm sure some
limited intelligence-sharing goes on, but not the kind of intelligence-sharing
that goes on between
Russia and the Central Asian states.
I'd like to make for my last minute some concluding comments. The existence of
the SCO, I
would argue, will never serve U.S. interests but it need not directly hinder
them. It's easy to
criticize the SCO as a union of non-democratic states, but I would argue that
these states are not
bound together by their common interests in keeping member states from becoming
democracies.
They are bound together by a shared set of security interests and a shared set
of perceived
risk. Unfortunately, they understand the roots of these risks in ways that are
impeding the
advancement of a democratic process of most of these states.
I think that China's role in the energy sector can be quite positive.
Secretary Boucher said
some of that; I'd happily to go back to that in the question period.
But I think that it is not in U.S. interests to try and create chasms in the
relationship
between the Central Asian states and China, that Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in
particular understand that
there's no way that the fate of their countries can be fully separated from
that of China.
For now, at least, China is behaving responsibly in Central Asia, but I think
that the U.S.
goal -- that Beijing sees the organization as a way to parry Russian influence
and, even if only
indirectly, to keep these states from becoming exclusively European in outlook.
The U.S. goal should
be to ensure these states be Euro-Pacific in outlook and find more ways to
engage with them in trying
to achieve what we hope are our shared European -- and by this I mean the
shared OSCE democratic
values.
Thank you.
BROWNBACK: Thank you, Dr. Olcott. I look forward to further discussion in our
question-and-answer period.
Dr. Blank?
BLANK: Thank you, Senator Brownback.
I'd like to speak today about the relationship between China and SCO, which
raises many
questions about Chinese policy and the SCO, which is a work in progress. As
Dr. Olcott testified, it
has not yet found or crystallized its final mission and, for that matter, even
its final membership.
And it remains to be seen where it's going to go.
But it is no doubt that China sees the SCO as its main instrument for
countering the United
States on a multilateral basis in Central Asia today. And this realization
started with the original
Shanghai Five in 1996. There is some evidence that the conclusion of the
border treaties then was
due to the decision by China to move to multilateralism against American
foreign policy, as shown
then in the Taiwan crisis.
Since then, what has become the most striking fact about the SCO is that it's a
platform for
all of the local governments, including Moscow and Beijing, to state firmly
that Washington should
not interfere in their domestic arrangements.
This pervasive fear about American calls for democratization or alleged outside
American
agitators, like the Open Society Institute or the CIA, are somehow conniving to
launch revolutions in
Central Asia may be misguided and false, because they are not doing so, but it
is nonetheless widely
believed. And in the absence of any countervailing public information policy
by the U.S., it has
become an article of faith among elites in Central Asia, China and Russia that
the United States is
involved in trying to revolutionize Central Asia. And this has contributed in
no small measure to
our setbacks over there.
At the same time, both China and Russia realize full well just how fragile not
only the
Central Asian governments are but their own governments are, because of their
democracy deficits, and
as a result they continue to stoke these fires in order to wage what might be
considered an
ideological counter-campaign against the United States.
So, in other words, the great game in Central Asia is not just about
geostrategic or energy
access; it also is about political and ideological values, such as
democratization. But we are not
trying to overthrow governments in Central Asia, as Assistant Secretary Boucher
pointed out.
Nonetheless, in the absence of any coherent statements to the contrary, this is
still
believed widely throughout Central Asia and allows Beijing and Moscow ample
scope to influence
governments which are very concerned about their own internal and external
security and which,
therefore, as Dr. Olcott said, find the SCO very palatable for their objectives.
We also can see that there is an identity in Russo-Chinese approaches to world
politics which
is not necessarily shared by the other members of the SCO and which leads them
to try and drive the
SCO in ways against American foreign policy objectives, not just in Central
Asia, but in Asia more
generally. It's no sign of this -- no sign that, say, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan
are really concerned
about the Korean issue or that they share Moscow and Beijing's view on Iranian
proliferation.
Nonetheless, it is not as vital an issue to them as it is to Russia and China.
And as a
result, these issues prop up in the agenda of the discussions there.
At the same time, China views the United States military presence, as well as
its ideological
presence in Central Asia, as a source of strategic encirclement and has tried
very hard to put
pressure on both Kyrgyzstan and supported Uzbekistan last year in getting them
to push us out. Were
it not for the Taliban offensives this year, I suspect that we would be under
much greater pressure
in Kyrgyzstan than was the case and we would be under much greater pressure to
get out of there than
proved to be the case.
Furthermore, China, as Russian sources have pointed out, is trying to project
its military
power into Central Asia. The minute we were removed from the scene in
Uzbekistan, Beijing made
inquiries as to whether or not it could move into Karshi-Khanabad, and the
Russians promptly stopped
it, which shows you that the Sino-Russian rivalry in Central Asia still exists
alongside of the talk
about partnership.
And to the extent that the United States is not a factor in the Central Asian
issue, you will
see tensions arising, not just among Russia and China, but between the smaller
states, as well as
Russia and China. And, again, Dr. Olcott pointed that out in her testimony.
There are also differences between them as to where this organization is going
to go. Russia
flirted with the idea of it being a military organization. The Chinese have
come out openly against
the idea of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization being a military bloc,
because that would violate
one of the fundamental principles of Chinese military power and foreign policy,
that is no membership
in military blocs.
At the same time, China sees the SCO as a template of the future organization
of Asia against
the American alliance system and is in favor of a kind of concept of
multilateralism from which the
United States is excluded. It also has used the SCO as the platform by which
to conduct military
exercises, either bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan and just recently Tajikistan, or
with Russia, or with
all the members together.
Ostensibly, these are anti-terrorist operations, but the exercises last year
with Russia,
which took place on China's coast in Shandong Peninsula, were widely regarded
as being anti-Taiwan
and, for that matter, anti-American, with regard to the Korean theater, in
their orientation, even
though they were conducted under the SCO's auspices.
What all this shows is that the SCO is a work in progress. Its final
destination, its final
membership have not been settled. As a matter of fact, its membership is open
to some dispute. It's
very unlikely that anybody really wants Iran to become a member of the SCO,
because that would entail
an obligation to defend Iran. And everybody in this game knows that Iran is
playing with fire and
they're not being entirely responsible actor, insofar as playing with fire is
concerned, and they do
not want to have to be called to defend Iran, lest the United States strike at
it because of its
proliferation.
China also is committed to bilateral deals with various Central Asian
governments, most
recently Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, in the energy sphere and is
enhancing its trade
relationships with all the governments in Central Asia on a bilateral as well
as multilateral basis.
Whereas President Putin has called recently for it to become a networking
organization for Asia or an
energy club, it remains to be seen exactly if that's going to happen, if that's
going to command
support from the other members, and whether or not it's actually going to
materialize.
So, in conclusion, I would say that this is an organization whose orientation
is to a
significant degree anti-American but shows very little capability of developing
into an anti-NATO or
an anti-OSCE. Even though it may try to develop into that kind of operation,
there are two many
fissures and too may crises which the SCO cannot address in its present form.
And while we need to keep a close eye on it and work against its attempts to
suppress calls
for democratization and genuine liberalization in Central Asia, it is not going
to be the answer to
Central Asia's very crowded security agenda.
Thank you.
BROWNBACK: Thank you, Dr. Blank.
Dr. Blank, you noted that there was a military exercise done under the auspices
of SCO or
just SCO members?
BLANK: There have been several military exercises, going back, I believe, to
2002. There
have been bilateral Chinese exercises with Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and, I believe,
2003. There was just a
recent one that concluded last week with Tajikistan.
There was an anti-terrorist operation in both Central Asia and China, which
embraced all the
members of the organization, in 2004, I believe. And last year, there was a
major division-size
operation involving combined joint arms with Russia, which was allegedly
conducted under the auspices
of the SCO, but which was billed as an anti-terrorist operation. But if you
look at it closely, it
involved every kind of conceivable theater, conventional operation, amphibious
operations, paratroop
landings, and the like, leading observers to speculate it was aimed either at
Taiwan or at Korea,
despite the fact that it was billed as an SCO operation.
BROWNBACK: Do we have any recent history of Russia and China doing military
exercises like
this outside of an SCO organization umbrella?
BLANK: There had been smaller scale naval exercises between Russia and China
about five or
six years ago, before the SCO formally became a security agency, at the time
when it was basically a
discussion club and a border-monitoring or confidence-building operation.
The 2005 exercises were significant as a new departure. The earlier operations
were
multilateral or involved China and a Central Asian government, Russia exercises
with Central Asian
states, under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is its attempt
to build a military
organization to defend against threats in Central Asia.
So last year's operations were the first of their Russo-Chinese type. And more
are
scheduled, I believe, for this year and next year, which may also involve India.
BROWNBACK: Doesn't that raise your awareness on this issue quite
significantly, when you
talk about -- I don't know if it was quite you or Dr. Olcott or others, talking
about the lack of
ability of China and Russia to be able to cooperate or the Russians wanting it
to be a military
organization, but the Chinese not wanting it to be a military cooperation
organization, and yet
you're seeing these exercises happen at pretty significant levels?
BLANK: Yes, that does raise a flag. But the point is that the Chinese still
say this is not
going to be a military organization, and it is still clear to me that this is a
work in progress.
This is a debate that has not yet been resolved in favor of the SCO becoming a
trade- and
economic-security-providing organization or a hard security organization.
And the membership has not yet -- the smaller states have not yet stated their
position. It
is, I think, a significant point that they did -- Russia and China did carry
out this kind of
operation in 2005 and that we may see something like it again. But it is not
clear what the next
operations are going to look like, so we cannot say in advance what they
represent.
However, it does suggest to me an attempt to create a deeper political and
military alliance
against U.S. interests, not only in Central Asia, but perhaps in East Asia, as
well.
BROWNBACK: That seems to me to be pretty significant.
BLANK: I agree it's significant, but we haven't seen any follow-up as to what
that may mean
for the future. It certainly does not mean that if -- let's say, for example,
there was a scenario
involving Taiwan that the Russian army would get involved in that.
(CROSSTALK)
BLANK: On the other hand, Korea is an area where both Russia and China have
vital interests,
as is in Central Asia. So conceivably, if some sort of major crisis developed
in either of those two
theaters, we could see perhaps joint operations or joint action or the threat
even of joint action by
them, but that's only a hypothetical possibility. And we don't know for sure
what's going to come
out as a result of that.
In the meantime, though, it's very clear that there are divergences between
Moscow and
Beijing, with regard to the future orientation of the SCO.
BROWNBACK: Which there have been for years and years differences between
Moscow and Beijing,
going back to many years, in different times. But it sounds like some of those
are being overcome...
BLANK: Well, they're being overcome...
BROWNBACK: ... by common desires here in the region or common desires to
offset U.S.
influence.
BLANK: Well, it's our policies that drive them together. And, you know, we
have to examine
why they're being driven together, and what the consequences of that are, and
what we can do about
it, so as to prevent what could develop into a full-fledged strategic
partnership.
BROWNBACK: What policies on our part would you change to prevent them from
being driven
together?
BLANK: Well, it's not up to me to change U.S. policy, but it's very clear that
they take
exception to what they believe to be our unilateralism and disregard for their
interests, for
example, in going to war with Iraq without going through the final U.N.
approval stage, or
disregarding their interests in Iraq.
They certainly do not approve of our efforts to tie what they see as regime
change to
nonproliferation in both Iran and North Korea. And what certainly exercises
them the most is the
combination of what they believe is American efforts to spread democratization
in the former Soviet
Union, at the same time as we are building military bases in and around the
former Soviet Union,
which they both regard as strategic encirclement and as a kind of ideological
campaign against the
stability and integrity of their governments or of their vital interests.
BROWNBACK: Dr. Olcott, I always appreciate your opinion and thoughts. I
gather from your
comments you really don't have a lot of concern about this SCO, what it's doing
or what it's likely
to do?
OLCOTT: I don't have concern about the SCO. I accept a lot of what Steve has
said. I mean,
there's actually a huge amount of overlap between our positions.
I think that -- I'm trying to think of how to put it -- I don't think the
structure of the
SCO is going to turn into a structure that is used to successfully destabilize
the U.S. position in
Central Asia. I mean, I think what Steve said about the Russo-Chinese military
activities are really
interesting, and I wonder whether that would have been possible in Central
Asia, you know, that this
was not a theater of operations that Russia has a large military presence in.
And I think that the SCO plays a very important role in Russia for groups that
want closer
cooperation between the Russian and Chinese military to conceal some of what
they're doing, because
Russian policy, Russian public opinion is still very, very strongly
anti-Chinese. And this creates
an umbrella for that.
I think that the concern that we should have is what I tried to allude to in
the testimony,
that we understand risk in very different ways than they understand risk. And
that really is our
burden, if you like. We have to get these states to understand that their
policies are putting their
stability at risk and that the SCO is not meeting their security burden, that
it's not the ideologies
that create the risk, but the policies of governments take the presence of
ideologies and make them
much more dangerous, as catalysts.
No one talks about Great Britain falling apart because there were the threat of
Islamic
terrorism on U.K. soil. But when you go to Central Asia, you have other fears,
because the
governments themselves are destabilizing their own situation. I think the
danger that the SCO has is
that it creates an atmosphere where people just reinforce each other's
prejudices, and it's that,
these prejudices, are what are hampering the U.S. effort to spread our
policies.
One thing I'd like to very briefly say that I really disagree with Dr. Blank
on, is I've had
the opportunity to spend a lot of time with some of the Chinese advisers to the
SCO over the past
seven or eight months, in various settings, in China, in Central Asia. And I
find that where they
disagree with us is the question of what constitutes stability and
destabilizing. But they're really
much more interested in balance in the region than in excluding the U.S.
So I don't think the U.S. military bases -- rhetoric at some of these meetings
notwithstanding -- become the real point where we disagree with China on
policies in Central Asia. I
think where we have not managed to convince the Chinese is that our
understanding of what's creating
security risk there is really what's at stake, that they're making the
situation more unstable, not
less unstable, by their policies. So it's not the SCO, but the mindsets that I
think we need to do
battle with.
BROWNBACK: Dr. Roberts, you've spent quite a bit of time in Uzbekistan, a
student and other
times.
ROBERTS: Also in Kazakhstan, as well.
BROWNBACK: My experience in that region, but particularly in Uzbekistan, with
the leadership
that's there, is that they are deeply concerned about Islamic fundamentalism
spreading and taking
over. And what they kind of look for, at least the leadership looks for,
probably more than
anything, is somebody to be able to, no matter what, back them whenever or if
some sort of threat
starts to mount up in any form.
And you saw the very aggressive position that they took when there was a
perceived threat
that comes on forward. Is that what they get out of this SCO organization,
that if an Islamic
fundamentalist threat mounts up, that Chinese and Russian troops, if it becomes
serious enough, will
be present?
ROBERTS: Well, I think that that's what they think they get. I agree with
Professor Olcott
that it's a question as to whether Russian or Chinese troops, for example, are
enough to deal with a
problem of fundamentalism in Uzbekistan, when you have a country that's not
very effectively
governed.
But certainly they perceive of working with the Russians and Chinese through
the SCO as more
comfortable than working with, say, the OSCE on terrorism, because they feel
that the OSCE is trying
to undermine their authority through democratization, which is also why I was
bringing up this issue
that I think one policy the U.S. has to seriously consider is the way we're
going about
democratization.
And actually, it's not as much the approach, because I actually was working in
USAID on and
off for the last eight or nine years in Central Asia doing democratization
work. And the approach
has not changed, but the way it's perceived has changed, partly because of
other things that have
happened in the world. As Dr. Blank mentioned, the Central Asian leadership
definitely perceives of
our campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as being somehow linked to assumed
involvement of the U.S. in
these colored revolutions, in Ukraine, Georgia, in Kyrgyzstan.
They see this as all a large kind of plan to take selected moves for regime
change that
benefit U.S. interests. And part of the problem is they don't really believe
that we're doing this
-- first of all, they believe that we're doing it conspiratorially, but they
don't believe we're
doing it ideologically for democracy. They believe we're doing it for our own
interests and we're
just using democracy as an excuse.
BROWNBACK: Well, I appreciate very much your thoughts on this. I think this
one bears
watching really quite closely and intensely and one that could develop quickly,
as well. But I
appreciate your thoughts, appreciate your expert advice and opinion on this.
And we'll continue to
look and listen to what people have to say about this group and how it develops
further.
Thank you all for coming. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon the briefing ended at 04:15 p.m.]
END
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