UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI COMMISSION) HOLDS HEARING :
Human Rights, Civil Society, and Democratic Governance in Russia: Current
Situation and Prospects for the Future
FEBRUARY 8, 2006
COMMISSIONERS:
U.S. SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR GORDON H. SMITH (R-OR)
U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD BURR (R-NC)
U.S. SENATOR DAVID VITTER (R-LA)
U.S. SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD (D-CT)
U.S. SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)
VACANT
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF (R-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH R. PITTS (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE PENCE (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN L. CARDIN (D-MD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER (D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ALCEE L. HASTINGS (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE MCINTYRE (D-NC)
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
DANIEL FRIED,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BARRY LOWENKRON,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ALLISON GILL,
DIRECTOR,
MOSCOW OFFICE,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
ANDREW KUCHINS,
RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM,
SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
NICOLAI PETRO,
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY,
SENIOR VISITING FELLOW,
HUDSON INSTITUTE
NATALIA BOURJAILY,
VICE PRESIDENT FOR NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES,
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW
The hearing was held at 3:08 p.m. in Room 226, Dirksen Senate
Office Building, Washington, D.C., Senator Brownback
moderating.
[*]
BROWNBACK: The hearing will come to order.
I welcome everybody today to the hearing on Russia that's being held by the
Helsinki Commission. This is the latest of
several hearings on the subject of human rights, civil society, and democratic
governance in Russia under the Putin administration.
As per the commission's mandate, we will examine today how Russia is complying
with the core principles of the Helsinki
Accords and subsequent OSCE documents.
This hearing is being held at a time when many are deeply concerned by the
downward trajectory of civil liberties and
democratic governance under the Putin presidency. We intend to examine today
some of the more recent events that have exacerbated
this situation.
There's no question that there are many countries in the world where the human
rights situation is much worse. But unlike
Russia, those countries are not longstanding members of the OSCE, the Council
of Europe, and the G-8.
Given Russia's desire to play a constructive role on the world stage, the Putin
administration will have to decide whether
it intends to play by the rules that Russia adopted as governing principles for
its own government and its civic institutions.
Russia will have to demonstrate beyond rhetoric that it is committed to
democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law.
That will mean, of course, competitive challenges to the existing power
structure. It will mean allowing and promoting an
open and pluralistic power center. And it will mean listening to the wisdom
and wishes of the Russian people, not the other way
around.
These were the animating aspirations of the Russian people when they
courageously gained their independence and became free
from the communist leaders and their system. Instead, Russia today has simply
become a stagnant autocracy, living on receipts from
energy resources and cozying up to repressive, if not lethal, regimes from
around the world.
In the last few weeks, we have seen a spy scandal in Moscow, in which the
Russian security services alleged that certain
Russian NGOs are linked to alleged British intelligence activities. This
smacks of tactics from the communist Brezhnev era and is
clearly an attempt to justify recent promulgation of legislation that would
restrict Russian and foreign NGO activity.
NGO activity is at the heart of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki
Accords, the right to know one's right and act
upon them. The NGOs are the little battalions that empower the citizenry to
participate actively in the political process on a
day-to-day basis, keeping government open and responsive to its people.
Today we will hear from administration witnesses who will discuss the response
by the United States to the challenges faced
by NGOs and to the overall decline in human rights protection in Russia today.
We will also hear from a panel of experts who have been extensively engaged in
these areas.
There is considerably more cooperation in the past between the United States
and Russia in areas of mutual interest, such as
security and economics, and the world today is safer and better for it. But
the question remains: Is Russia ultimately a reliable
partner?
It is an important question, and we hope to find some answers today, because
the implications of President Putin's policies
extend well beyond Russia's borders. How Russia acts and how the West responds
send important signals to dictators in Belarus and
in Uzbekistan, and even to Iran, where Russia and the West are intimately
involved in trying to resolve tension over its nuclear
ambitions.
Earlier today, I spoke by phone to one of those in Russia who was not silent
back in the 1970s when she fought for freedom
and certainly would not be silent today. In fact, I asked Ludmilla Alexeeva if
it would be wise for me to mention at this hearing
today that we talked. After all, it is her organization, the Moscow Helsinki
Group, that is being accused by Russian authorities of
spying.
In the kind of spirit that has characterized her lifelong commitment to human
rights, she said to me, "What can the
authorities do that they haven't done already?"
I look forward to the statement of our witnesses. I have some questions to
follow. And I want to applaud those NGOs in
Russia and particularly those in Moscow.
And as I spoke with her, I said: It's relatively easy for me in Washington to
talk about the need for human rights than
individuals would be able to freely express themselves in Russia. It's quite
another thing for somebody in Moscow and an NGO to do
the same.
And I applaud her efforts. I applaud what she stands for. It reminds me of --
I was at the Coretta Scott King funeral
yesterday. And it's one thing to talk about it now; it's another thing to walk
on the bridge in Selma going to Montgomery, as they
did and as she has done in Russia.
I look forward to the testimony.
Congressman Cardin, if you have an opening statement?
CARDIN: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I sat right behind you yesterday at the Coretta Scott King funeral in Georgia.
And you're absolutely right to make that
analogy. We were challenged then yesterday to make sure that we carry on the
torch, carry on the work, what we do.
And I think, in some way, the work of our Helsinki Commission does that. So
I'm very proud to be part of the Helsinki
Commission and the U.S. participation in the OSCE.
I just want to concur in your opening statement -- I'll ask that my entire
statement be made part of the record, but...
BROWNBACK: Without objection.
CARDIN: Thank you. I'm very troubled to see that Russia, the Kremlin, appears
to use whatever means in order to stifle
dissent, that Mr. Putin might make some flying statements about respect for
civil liberties or democracy, but then you take a look
at his actions and they're extremely troublesome.
His attacks on the NGOs has all of us concerned. And I must tell you, I am
very troubled as to whether Russia is complying
with their commitments given under the Helsinki Accords.
So I think this hearing is particularly appropriate. Russia is a very
important player internationally on the issues that
you mentioned. And we need to be able to do everything we can to work with
Russia in order to advance these mutual interests.
But it is our responsibility as the Helsinki Commission to make sure that
they're adhering to the Helsinki commitments. And
quite frankly, I have major reservations as to whether in fact they are doing
that.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
BROWNBACK: Thank you, Congressman Cardin.
I'm pleased to have our first panel of two assistant secretaries from the State
Department. The State Department's been
quite outspoken about the need for Russia to adhere to its Helsinki commitments
and for the benefit to Russia to move forward in its
human rights.
Daniel Fried is the assistant secretary of state at the Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs. And prior to the
appointment to this post, Ambassador Fried served as special assistant to the
president, senior director for European and Eurasian
affairs at the National Security Council. He served as principal deputy
special adviser to the secretary of state for the New
Independent States and was our ambassador to Poland from November of '97 until
May of 2000.
Our other witness is Barry F. Lowenkron. He's the assistant secretary of state
for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor. Prior to his appointment, he served as principal deputy director of
policy planning for the Department of State. He's
held a variety of positions in the intelligence community, including national
intelligence officer for Europe and special assistant
to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us today. And I don't know if you
have selected an order that you would like to
go in.
Dr. Lowenkron?
LOWENKRON: Chairman Brownback, Congressman Cardin, let me begin by expressing
my appreciation for the commission's
pioneering work promoting respect for human rights and democratic principles
throughout the Helsinki signatory states.
I have a more detailed written statement, which, with your permission, I'd like
to submit for the record.
BROWNBACK: It will be in the record.
LOWENKRON: Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to share my thoughts about the Russian
Federation's new NGO legislation, the
trajectory of democracy and civil society in Russia, and the way forward.
The United States values a strong relationship with Russia. As President Bush
has said, it is in our interest that Russia
be a strong and valuable partner with the United States, but that we understand
that, in the 21st century, strong countries are
built by developing strong democracies.
A flourishing civil society is essential to reaching democratic goals. The
Bush administration shares the commission's
concern that civil society in Russia is under increasing pressure. Raids on
NGO offices, registration problems, visa problems for
foreign NGOs, and intimidation of NGO leaders and staff have had a chilling
effect.
Secretary Rice asked me to deliver a clear message to the Russia government
about our deepening concerns for NGOs. I
visited Moscow January 17th through the 19th. Upon arrival, I was greeted with
the news that the NGO law, quietly signed on January
10th by President Putin, had been published that very morning.
Over the next two days, I met with Russian- and U.S.-based NGOs, including, Mr.
Chairman, with Ludmilla Alexeeva herself. I
met with Duma committee chairpersons, officials from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the human rights ombudsman, the chair of the
presidential human rights council, and representatives of independent media.
Although some of the more problematic elements were removed in the legislative
process -- and I would add in part due to
concerns expressed by the United States, by European allies, and by Russian and
foreign NGOs -- key problems remain.
Many provisions of the legislation are vague. What constitutes a threat to
Russian sovereignty or extremist activity is not
defined. NGOs' financial records as well as comment and planned activities are
subject to examination.
Officials could order an NGO to cease funding a program, to cease funding an
individual, or to shut down completely.
Religious groups that receive foreign funding may be subject to review,
taxation and special registration considerations.
The authorities have broad discretion to implement the new law. While punitive
measures would be subject to court approval,
this could entail lengthy, expensive litigation that could cripple an NGO.
We have already registered our concerns at the OSCE Permanent Council on
January 26th, when Ambassador Finley said that the
law does not appear to meet OSCE commitments in the Copenhagen and Moscow
documents.
The new law will go into effect in April; already there are ominous signs. As
justification for the new law, President
Putin and other officials cited the spy rock case, following allegations by the
FSB that British spies had been funding Russian
NGOs.
On January 24th, the Duma passed a resolution calling upon the committee on
security to direct the FSB to report on
political parties and organizations that receive foreign funding.
On January 27th, the Ministry of Justice announced they were seeking to revoke
the registration of the Russian Human Rights
Research Center, an umbrella organization that includes the Moscow Helsinki
Group, for allegedly failing to provide required
documentation about its activities.
On February 3rd, the executive director of the Russian-Chechen Friendship
Society received a two-year suspended sentence and
four years of probation for inciting ethnic hatred for publishing statements by
Chechen separatist leaders. This conviction follows
a series of repressive actions against the society.
And just yesterday in his speech to the board of the FSB, President Putin said
the following regarding NGOs. Quote, "The
task that stands before the special services and all law enforcement agencies
consists in creating the necessary conditions so that
these organizations can operate efficiently. But at the same time, you must
protect society from any attempts by foreign states to
use these organizations for interfering in Russia's internal affairs."
These and other developments, Mr. Chairman, suggest that the Russian government
harbors a deep mistrust of civil society,
and especially of organizations that receive foreign funding and are engaged in
politically sensitive activities, like human rights
monitoring.
Several Russian officials and lawmakers asserted to me that the law is
necessary to clamp down on terrorist activity and
money laundering. But what came through from further discussion was their deep
suspicion that Western states had manipulated
election outcomes in Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere by funding NGO activity.
They see our promotion of democracy as part of a zero-sum game of geopolitical
influence. I emphasized repeatedly that they
were fundamentally mistaken about what happened in Ukraine and Georgia.
Our NGO funding and activities there were fully in keeping with OSCE and other
international standards and practices. Our
assistance is designed to help ensure that elections are free and fair, not to
pick winners or losers.
Whenever NGOs are under siege, democracy is undermined. As I told my Russian
interlocutors, NGOs can support governments,
they can criticize governments, but NGOs should never be treated as enemies of
governments.
The NGO law is just one element of a broader pattern of restricting the space
for independent views, consistent with the
apparent aim of President Putin to concentrate power in the Kremlin and direct
democracy from the top down.
To those ends, the Kremlin has abolished direct elections of governors in favor
of presidential nomination. This system in
the current Russian context, where checks and balances are weak at best, limits
government accountability to voters while further
concentrating power in the executive branch.
Electoral and political party law amendments billed as intended to strengthen
nationwide political parties in the longer
term could nonetheless reduce the ability of opposition parties to compete in
elections. There have been harassments and
prosecutions of rivals.
Let me be clear. Our concern is not whether this or that oligarch gains or
loses power, but whether the Russian government
is selectively enforcing the law as a political weapon.
Cases such as those of Mikhail Trepashkin, Valentin Danilov and others also
raise concerns about the political nature of
prosecutions, respect for human rights, and the independence of the judiciary.
The Kremlin also has acted to limit critical voices in the media. The
government has decreased the diversity of the
broadcast media, particularly television, the main source of news for the
majority of Russians.
All independent, nationwide television stations have been taken over either by
the state or by state-friendly organizations.
Due to government pressure on the media, self-censorship remains a serious
problem.
Mr. Chairman, though the current trajectory is discouraging, President Bush and
Secretary Rice remain firmly committed to
Russia's democratic development. With Congress's help, you will continue
robust and open support for programs fostering civil
society, for free, fair, transparent and competitive elections, and democratic
governance.
And we will continue to work with other democracies to send a strong message:
that we expect Russia to respect fundamental
freedoms of expression, association and assembly.
Mr. Chairman, a personal observation, if I may. Assistant Secretary Fried and
I have been colleagues for decades. We
served together in the State Department during the dark days of Solidarity's
repression. We also served together later on, when the
darkness began to lift in the Gorbachev years, leading to the end of the Cold
War.
As discouraging as the current trends may seem, today's Russia is not the
Soviet Union. The space for individual freedoms
is immeasurably larger today than anyone could have imagined in Soviet days.
We work in partnership with Russia, but partners who
respect one another should speak frankly to each other when they disagree.
The path to democracy is seldom linear; we must not give up on democracy in
Russia or break faith with the NGOs working,
despite setbacks, to realize democracy's promise.
My DRL team and I look forward to working closely with you, and the members of
the commission, and your expert commission
staff.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the commission for its
far-reaching contributions to the cause of human
rights and democracy. Thank you.
BROWNBACK: Thank you. That was an excellent statement, and I particularly
appreciate the last thought of that, as well.
I remember traveling in the Soviet Union years ago as a young man, and the
oppressiveness and then the shift. But still it
is something we should speak candidly, and I think it clearly in the best
future interest of Russia that we speak, as well.
Mr. Fried?
FRIED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cardin, for your leadership in
organizing today's meeting.
I'm honored to be with you today to discuss Russia's efforts at sustaining its
democratic and human rights reforms and to
discuss the state of democracy and human rights in Russia and U.S.-Russian
relations.
I associate myself with everything that my colleague and old friend, Barry
Lowenkron, has said in outlining the challenges
Russia faces in realizing its potential to become a modern democracy and to
meet its international commitments on human rights.
Russia's path toward internal reform and the development of democracy is at the
heart of its relationship with the world,
including the United States. We cannot and we do not separate Russia's
internal development from Russia's external relations,
including with us.
The United States seeks a robust partnership with Russia that strengthens our
cooperation in as many areas as possible on
issues that matter to us and where our interests coincide; at the same time, as
friends, we cannot and do not avoid frank
discussions about the areas where we disagree.
The United States has at various times in the past had a principally
adversarial relationship with Russia or, especially
since 1991, sought to build partnerships on the basis of underlying values
which we assumed were shared.
What is called for now in our relations with Russia is an approach that could
be described as constructive cooperation
wherever possible to address the common threats and challenges facing us, while
being realistic and candid about those areas where
we disagree and particularly where our values diverge.
Allow me to review briefly both sets of issues which characterize this
important and often challenging relationship.
The United States and Russia share a broad strategic agenda that has produced a
number of important successes since 2001
that have advanced our national security and foreign policy interests.
And, Mr. Chairman, you referred to some of these in the statement you made at
the beginning.
These successes demonstrate the importance of our relations with Russia. Let
me cite a few examples. The U.S.-Russia
Working Group on Counterterrorism, now led on the U.S. side by Undersecretary
Nick Burns, has provided a critical channel for
dialogue and cooperation with Russia on counterterrorism for 5 1/2 years.
Ongoing cooperation on nonproliferation of conventional arms and WMDs,
counter-narcotics, and cooperative threat reduction
efforts, including the redirection of the work on chemical and biological
weapons expects, has allowed us to address these critical
global threats.
We're pursuing vital and energetic cooperation on anti-money-laundering
initiatives. We're making progress towards
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict, thanks in large measure to
the helpful role played by Russia.
We're collaborating well in the Balkans, despite some differences of initial
assumptions, including by working together in
the contact group on the final settlement for Kosovo's future status.
We're cooperating well on Afghanistan, in which Russia, as the largest
creditor, recently announced its attention to forgive
100 percent of Afghanistan's debt within the context of the (inaudible) on
Iraqi reconstruction, and most recently on Iran.
Though we have not always seen eye-to-eye with Russia on how to proceed in
Iran, recent Russian efforts, especially the
Russian decision to support referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council, have
been constructive. We will continue to cooperate
closely to advance a shared objective that Iran not achieve the capability to
develop nuclear weapons.
There exists considerable potential for greater progress in these and other
areas where we share overlapping interests.
These areas include, among others, Russia's WTO accession, where we are making
progress in concert with other WTO members,
cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council, where we have also made progress in
developing NATO's military relations with Russia, but
where potential is far from realized.
Greater integration of Russia with the international community is in everyone's
interest, though of course it brings with it
obligations and responsibilities.
A second area, Mr. Chairman, is areas of concern, where we -- and we are
concerned by Russia's policy in some areas,
especially regarding Russia's relations with many of the nations of Eastern
Europe and Eurasian and, as my colleague said, Russia's
backsliding on democracy.
It is in these areas especially where we continue to address our concerns
clearly and directly to our Russian friends in a
spirit of respect and candor.
Russia's relations with Eurasian and Eastern European countries present us with
opportunities and challenges, particularly
in the wake of the transformational developments that have unfolded in Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Partly as a result of these
events, many Russians now view U.S. involvement in the region with growing
wariness and, quite frankly, increasingly in zero-sum
terms.
On visits to Moscow, one can sense Russian public and official concern about
the prospect of more so-called colored
revolutions and the fear that these would undermine regional stability and
Russia's security and economic interests.
This Russian view of American policy toward the region is misplaced. The
United States does not regard this region as a
venue for competition, nor do we believe the U.S. and Russian interests are in
conflict there. We believe it is in Russia's
interests, as well as our own, to have stable and prospering democracies
developing on its borders, which would naturally lead to
these countries maintaining good ties with Russia.
Failed states and authoritarian regimes, which alienate their own people, along
Russia's periphery do nothing for regional
stability, security or prosperity; indeed, such states are a threat to regional
stability.
It would surely be better for Central Asia and Eastern Europe if Uzbekistan and
Belarus, for example, were moving in a
reformist rather than increasingly repressive direction. The United States
certainly supports economic and political reforms in
these countries, and we would hope that Russia would, as well.
The recent gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, in which Gazprom reduced the
flow temporarily to Ukraine on New Year's
Day, raised questions about Russia's intentions and created a climate of
mistrust.
As Secretary Rice noted recently, Russia needs to demonstrate that it is
prepared to act as an energy supplier in a
responsible way. This includes greater transparency and openness, not using
energy resources as a political tool, and structuring
contracts in ways that do not foster corruption but transparency.
Transparency in the energy sector is needed from other countries in the region,
too. In addition, persistent tensions with
Georgia and recent Russian suggestions that the unfolding process for
resolution of Kosovo status could set principles and
precedents for resolution of frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova have
raised questions about Russia's commitment to the
territorial integrity of these countries.
It does not, frankly, make sense for Russia to support separatist regimes in
the breakaway Georgian provinces of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. This leads to the very instability that concerns Russia.
A successful, reforming, stable Georgia ought to be
in Russia's interests.
A failed Georgia -- and the prospect of a failed Georgia was very real before
the Rose Revolution of 2003 -- could likely
become a haven for more and more aggressive organized crime and terrorists that
could directly threaten Russia.
The United States has and will continue to encourage Russia and Georgia to work
together to advance solutions to these
frozen conflicts in ways that respect the territorial integrity of Georgia and
the legitimate interests of the people of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
Assistant Secretary Lowenkron has shared with you our ongoing humanitarian and
human rights concerns, and as well as
concerns about terrorism in Chechnya and in the North Caucasus. The situation
in Chechnya has been for some time one of the
principle sources of instability, abuses and violence elsewhere in the North
Caucasus, a development in no one's interest.
President Putin, in his press conference last week, said, "Today the situations
in some other regions of the North Caucasus
concern us even more than that in Chechnya."
We continue to look for ways to support an end to the humanitarian crisis, and
a genuine political dialogue in Chechnya,
which are critical to bringing lasting stability, are respecting the
territorial integrity of Russia. We hope that last November's
parliamentary election in Chechnya could be a step in that direction.
In particular, we're looking at new ways to expand our assistance programs in
the region and at other ways to reduce the
sources of violence and instability; ultimately, however, it is the Russian
government that must develop new ways for addressing
problems in the region. We are prepared to be a partner with them and the
peoples of the region in that process.
The lack of progress on the development of democracy in Russia is another area
of concern for the United States that my
colleague has addressed. The United States supports the objective of Russia's
development into a strong, prosperous, democratic
country.
It is in that spirit that we press Russian officials at all levels, publicly
and privately, and speak to Russian civil
society about the importance of human rights and democracy.
As friends, we are frank in our meetings, making clear that a commitment to
shared values, most importantly those of
democracy and human rights, is the foundation for a successful relationship.
As Secretary Rice said in Moscow in May 2005, "For the U.S.-Russia relationship
to deepen and for Russia to gain its full
potential, there needs to be greater democratic development."
This has been an uneven process in Russia. As Barry Lowenkron has said, Russia
is not the Soviet Union. The country has
experienced great change in the past 15 years, including progress toward
respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Regrettably, recent developments suggest that the Russian government's
commitment to internationally recognized human
rights, including democratic norms, media freedom, and the rule of law has
deteriorated. The NGO legislation signed into law and
the charges made against NGOs in connection with the alleged spying cases are
recent examples.
In response to these problems, the United States is engaged in active efforts
to support Russia's transition, over the
medium to long term, into a genuine democratic state, with features common to
all democracies.
We are working with our European partners to deliver a consistent message to
the Russian government to live up to its
international commitments to democracy and human rights and to help Russians,
including those representing Russian civil society, in
exercising those rights.
And engaging the Russian government in supporting civil society, we hope to:
promote free and fair elections; broaden
access to information; strengthen judicial integrity and independence;
eliminate corruption and increase transparency; foster
greater capacity for citizens to hold their government accountable; maintain
lifelines of support to key human rights groups;
increase exchanges in both directions; and provide Russia's youth with
opportunities to learn democratic skills and values.
As the secretary said recently in response to a question at Georgetown
University, "We will work with those in Russia who
from below are pressuring for a democratic path. And that means non-government
organizations. It means university people. It
means all of the Russians who themselves want a more democratic future."
The secretary also noted that we need to keep open for Russia a path toward the
democratic West.
As Russia begins its work as chairman of the G-8, we are committed to
supporting Russia in advancing its proposed agenda
dealing with energy security, infectious disease, and education, as well as
continuing G-8 priorities, such as counter-proliferation
and counterterrorism.
But as the secretary said on January 18th at Georgetown, referring to Russia's
chairmanship of the G-8 this year, "Certain
obligations and certain expectations come with being the chair of an
organization that is avowedly of industrialized democracies."
And so we will encourage the Russian government to demonstrate to its G-8
partners and the world its commitment to the
values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, common to all
industrialized democracies through practical and real
progress.
Mr. Chairman, in his September 2005 speech before the United Nations, President
Bush said, "The work of democracy is larger
than holding a fair election; it requires building the institutions that
sustain freedom."
"Democratic nations uphold the rule of law, impose limits on the power of the
state. Democratic nations protect private
property, free speech, and religious expression. Democratic nations grow in
strength because they reward and respect the creative
gifts of their people. And democratic nations contribute to peace and
stability, because they seek national greatness in the
achievements of their citizens, not the conquest of their neighbors."
Clearly, Russia has much more to do in these areas to fully secure the benefits
of democracy for its people. We will
continue to work with Russia to advance democracy and, when necessary, in a
constructive spirit, to bring shortcomings and concerns
to their attention.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cardin, for your attention and this
opportunity.
BROWNBACK: Thank you, gentlemen both. Appreciate it very much.
We've got a time clock. We're turn it at seven minutes, and we might bounce
back and forth on a question session. If we
don't, then somebody -- let me know when that time period's up so we can move
forward.
Gentlemen, I want to both thank you in the outset for your careers given to
this region of the world. I too quickly
introduced you, but each of you has had a long and distinguished career in
dealing with Eastern Europe, Russia, the former Soviet
Union, the region. And I deeply appreciate what you've done.
And I hope you have some sense of pride, too, of what you've seen taking place,
what you've been a part of. And yet what
we're seeing right now is a regression from that, and so it troubles all of us
when that takes place.
Mr. Lowenkron, let me ask you first. I take it from what you're getting from
the Russians is the lesson they got out of
these different color revolutions is destroy these smaller organizations before
they get you, is what the lesson that they've
learned, and that's why they're going at them. Is that accurate?
LOWENKRON: It's accurate in the context of a fundamental misreading on their
part of what happened in these elections. In
their view -- I'll put it bluntly -- American money beat Russian money, and
American money was quicker and more clever, because they
used NGOs.
One Russian once told me that we refer to what happened in the Orange
Revolution as our 9/11. And I spend conversation
after conversation...
BROWNBACK: Explain that to me. Why is this a 9/11?
LOWENKRON: It's a 9/11, because it was a wake-up call. It was a wake-up call
to Russia that said that the United States,
the West, the United States had found a very clever tactic to advance what they
call a geopolitical gain to continue to weaken
Russia and to advance Western interests in the region.
And the tactic was not the military; the tactic was money funneled through
nongovernmental organizations. And I had spent a
great deal of time disabusing them of that notion, telling them, as the
secretary said, democracy cannot be imposed.
What we do is, in a very transparent way and with full adherence to OSCE
principles, we support those indigenous voices that
want help to have a level playing field when it comes to elections.
I would hasten to add that, of all the rhetoric and all the speeches that have
come out of Moscow on this issue, personally
speaking the one that I found was the most damning was the one in which
President Putin said he who pays the piper calls the tune,
because it sets in motion this mindset American money is paying the piper and
so the tune is anti-Russian, pro-U.S., pro-West.
BROWNBACK: And so the key is to shut the outside money from coming into any
NGO organizations, and therefore they will win
election after election?
LOWENKRON: The key is, as far as they believe, is to ensure that they can see
every dime, every dollar, every euro, every
bit of currency that comes into Russia, every single program, and that they
have the right to question the ends of these -- the
objectives of these funds, they have the right to tell Russian NGOs, "You are
not allowed to participate in this political
activity."
And they have broad categories, such as threats to the sovereignty of Russia or
to its culture or extremist activity, to
shut it down. And it's for this purpose that they're hiring nearly 1,000
individuals who are going to work in the Ministry of
Justice to scrub all of the NGOs.
One Russian official said: Take heart of the fact that, at the end of the day,
this organization will be inefficient. But
my response was, as inefficient as it is, it will bollix up the work of NGOs
and it will cast a pall and create a chilling
environment for their work.
BROWNBACK: So is this -- and either gentleman -- is this just simply an
organization, a political structure, a political
power structure in search of maintaining its own power now that we're seeing
operating in Russia?
LOWENKRON: Well, Mr. Chairman, in my view what it is, it's at the core a sense
that democracy can be imposed from the top.
So President Putin and the presidential administration can say, "These are good
NGOs; these are bad NGOs. This is the proper civil
society; this is civil society beyond the pale."
They've even created structures that will give them, quote, unquote,
"constructive criticism." So it's a fundamental
misreading of how democracies nourish, nurture, sustain and protect fundamental
freedoms.
BROWNBACK: Mr. Fried?
FRIED: I think also that the Russians have a misperception of what it would
mean to have more successfully reforming
democratic neighbors. Many Russians seem to look upon the prospect of
democratic nations on their borders with concern, as if this
would mean...
BROWNBACK: Many Russians, you're not talking about Russian officials? You're
talking about the Russian people.
FRIED: Russian officials and some Russians in the media. And I don't know
what category to put that in.
BROWNBACK: But what about the Russian public? Are you saying the Russian
public?
FRIED: That's an interesting question. And there are indications that the
Russian public has come to associate events like
the Orange Revolution with the weakening of Russian power, that it isn't just
officialdom, that people are responding to what they
hear in the official media.
And it may be Russians -- it's not for me to speak for them, but it seems to me
that there is a sense in Russia that they
have been weakened and that somehow the democratic transformations that started
in Eastern Europe in 1989 and have continued
throughout Eurasia have weakened Russia
Instead of giving Russia great opportunities to shed itself of the communist
legacy and join Europe and the West as a
successful democracy, these changes have weakened Russia. And therefore, many
Russians look upon these changes in zero-sum terms; a
gain for democracy must be a defeat for Russia.
That is a fundamental -- in my view, that is a fundamentally wrong assessment.
I think it is certainly in Russia's
interests to have successful reforming countries on its borders, but many
Russians don't see it that way.
And in this, I regret that the Russian government is creating the impression
that having democratic and reformist
governments in Ukraine and Georgia is somehow inimical to Russia's interests.
I believe it is not.
BROWNBACK: So that somehow it's better what is happening in Uzbekistan than
what is happening in the Ukraine?
FRIED: I don't want to speak too much for the Russians, but I noted with some
dismay that Russia appeared to be very
supportive of Karimov after the shootings in Andijan and after the wave of
repression in Uzbekistan that accompanied and followed
those shootings.
I certainly think it would be better for Russia were Uzbekistan moving in a
reformist direction. I think repression in
Uzbekistan will ultimately lead to the very instability Russia worries about,
whereas reform, economic and political, will lead to
lasting stability.
I think reform and democracy in Eurasia is in Russia's interests. I regret
that not all -- I regret that many in Russia
don't seem to see it that way.
BROWNBACK: Congressman Cardin?
CARDIN: Let me follow up this line on the NGOs, because I think this is very,
very disturbing. It seems like Russia is
interpreting the threat to Russian sovereignty or extreme activity as
supporting interests that are against the elections of the
current regime more so than anything else. So it really seems very
frightening.
And the concerns about extremist activities or about spying, et cetera, appears
from what you're saying to be ways to
justify internationally their strategies to stop NGOs from operating
independently within the Russian Federation.
And I think this directly is in violation of the Helsinki Accords. I asked
staff to give me the section, and principle
seven is the right to know one's rights and act upon them. And this has been
used to allow NGOs to operate within the member states
of the OSCE. So it seems to me that this is a clear violation.
And I just want to get your views on it. And if you agree, then it seems to
me, Mr. Chairman, we might want to see,
particularly in the parliamentary assembly, raising these issues in order to
try to elevate corrective action within the Russian
Federation.
LOWENKRON: Just the other day, President Putin made a statement about the OSCE
which I found distressing, because it gives
us all a sense for the magnitude of the problem. He said, and I quote, "It is
completely wrong in our opinion to make the OSCE a
warder keeping guard over the post-Soviet space. It has not been formed for
this purpose."
Now, I enjoy history, but I do not appreciate revisiting history that's already
been settled. And OSCE and CSCE have roots
that go back to when we began our government careers.
And what happens in these countries is a legitimate issue for OSCE members to
raise. I recall the debates on whether or not
to allow, at that time, the Soviet Union to have an OSCE or a CSCE conference
on the human dimension in Moscow, which then happened
in 1991 by Russia.
Well, they made commitments in 1990 in Copenhagen and in 1991 at Moscow,
commitments to honor the freedom of NGOs, the right
to assemble, the right to establish contacts and connections with foreign NGOs,
the right to solicit funding, and the right to
advance these democratic principles.
And so I do think, as Ambassador Finley pointed out, that this NGO law stands
in contrast to the spirit, if not to the
actual letter, of these various documents.
And what we will do, what Ambassador Burns will do in Moscow is doing what we
will do here, is, as the Russian government
proceeds to implement this law, we will have to pay very close attention to
ensure that it is transparent, that it is fair, and when
issues come up that highlight whether or not it's capriciously applied or used
as a political weapon, we absolutely have to raise
it.
CARDIN: Let me just point out, this is not the first OSCE issue we're having
with Russia within the last year or so. Their
response on election monitoring has been very, very distressing.
The way that they've gone about negotiating the adoption of budgets within the
OSCE is very upsetting, and the list goes on,
and on, and on. And every time we seem to be getting progress, it's Russia
standing out there causing us a real problem.
And I do think we need to develop strategies that use our bilateral
opportunities to stress the importance of the OSCE
process with Russia. And Russia wants to become a democratic state. Then
living up to its commitments within OSCE and stop
badmouthing an organization that has the credibility on these subjects would be
very helpful to the Russian Federation, and working
constructively.
We all understand trying to negotiate from strength in your relationship with
other countries, but I think the way the
Russian Federation is going about it within the OSCE is very counterproductive.
And I would hope that we would use our
opportunities in our bilateral and other regional organizations to strengthen
our resolve within OSCE.
FRIED: Congressman, I agree. And I'd like to say that we have done exactly
that. We're working bilaterally with the
Russians and enjoyed a measure of success, at least as judged by the relatively
better OSCE ministerial in Ljubljana last December.
Relatively better, that is better than the previous one in Sofia or the one in
Maastricht the year before.
We did defend the rights and prerogatives of ODIHR, the OSCE's election
monitoring outfit. We defended them successfully,
and we've made very clear to the Russians that we would so.
By working with our allies and by being straightforward with the Russians, we
managed to have a better outcome than many
expected. We will have to continue to work with the Russians and with our
allies to see to it that OSCE's ability to carry out its
core functions, among which is election monitoring, is maintained.
CARDIN: We've all had discussions with the chair in office. We've had
discussions with the staff at OSCE, and we're sure
we're not violating any confidences to say that this is shared not just by the
United States but by the member states of OSCE.
So I think we can get support from the countries that participate in OSCE to
really hold Russia to making progress. And it
may be that a way to do it is exactly what you are suggesting, in the way they
implement this law, to work with the Russian
authority, to make sure there's transparency.
I think transparency is going to be the key. And not that there is reason to
be optimistic that they'll use an open
process, but that probably is our best strategy at this particular moment,
unless you have other strategies that we could be hopeful
about.
LOWENKRON: Congressmen, if I could just add two things. First of all, we will
also rely on the help of our allies and
friends. Chancellor Merkel made a very strong statement publicly in support of
NGOs when she was in Moscow before I arrived.
And my second point is the voice of the Congress, working with the Duma and the
leadership in the Duma, to explain -- to
work with them and say: This is what NGOs do, and NGOs are not the front lines
of a campaign to undermine Russia's fundamental
interests. I think that's critical.
CARDIN: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BROWNBACK: Should we be backing away from meetings that Russia is hosting, as
the chair of the G-8, as a statement of our
displeasure with what the trajectory of what Russia is on, gentlemen?
FRIED: I don't think so, Mr. Chairman. I think that we should work with the
Russians, cooperating where we can and
speaking frankly about problems where we see them. I appreciate that many
thoughtful, serious people have raised questions of the
kind you've just raised.
But the question, it seems to me, is not one that we should debate ourselves
but a question we should put to the Russians.
That is to say, what kind of G-8 summit do they want to have this coming
summer? What do they want the world to see? What kind of
impression do they want to make?
Russia is going to be in the spotlight because of its presidency this year of
the G-8. What do they want the world to take
away from it? This is for them to decide, because it is they who will either
answer to the world for the problems or help put
together a summit which successfully addresses a lot of these problems.
BROWNBACK: Is there something we will raise at the G-8 this summer, if the
trajectory we're on continues?
FRIED: I think that our dialogue about democracy is going to continue with the
Russians. And I think that they understand
perfectly well that the world is going to be watching how they implement their
commitments to democracy and the rule of law. I
don't think there's any question about that.
BROWNBACK: I would note to both of you, I've traveled this region extensively,
for as far as the former Soviet Union,
Central Asian region, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. I've been to Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan.
And my experience in that region is that these NGOs, they're the seed of the
expansion of freedom for the people. They're
the seed. And I could have told you five years ago which ones of these
countries would act this way now and which ones wouldn't, by
whether there was any seed there.
And there was seed in Georgia, and there wasn't in Uzbekistan. And you could
pretty easily see it. I'd go and travel, and
I'd ask to meet with NGOs and groups. And you would see a bunch of them in
Georgia, and you would see zero in Uzbekistan.
And freedom can't grow in a vacuum, and it doesn't grow overnight. It needs
fertile field and it needs seed. And these
private NGO groups, many of them very small, operating off of very small
budgets, but were nonetheless a conscience of the people
and towards the nation. And they're allowed to flourish.
My real problem here is, is I think the Russian government sees it the same
way, so they're taking the seed out of the
ground. And that is the wrong way to progress as a civil society, and as a
democracy, and as a country, for its own future, because
I believe strongly that Georgia and Ukraine are on a far better trajectory to
grow as nations than where Uzbekistan is right now.
And for the good of the people, I think you can easily see that this is the
case. And certainly, for the course of history,
I think you can easily see that this is a better course to go.
And I really fear for Russia itself, that it's pulling its very seed out, that
it's going to -- that would cause it to
prosper and to progress as a great nation, continue as a great nation in the
future, if they do this.
I really think they're reading this situation wrong and are doing it in harm to
themselves. I couldn't agree with you more
that this is not a zero-sum game whatsoever; this is in their own best
interest. But we will see how they proceed.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. And as I mentioned, thank you for your
distinguished careers and commitments to the
expansion of freedom and the service of mankind.
We have a second panel of experts that I'll call forward.
Natalia Bourjaily is vice president for the Newly Independent States at the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law,
ICNL. ICNL promotes the legal framework for the freedom of association in
civil society worldwide.
Allison Gill is the director of the Moscow Office for Human Rights Watch.
Before taking her present position, she was a
researcher at the Human Rights Watch office in Uzbekistan. Prior to her
position in the former Soviet Union, Ms. Gill worked with
the International Rescue Committee in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
We'll also hear from Andrew Kuchins. He's returned to Russia to the Russia and
Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. After a 2 1/2 year stint as director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center.
Nicolai Petro is a professor of political science at the University of Rhode
Island. He's served as special assistant for
policy in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs at the U.S. Department of State,
and as temporary political attache at the U.S. embassy
in Moscow.
And Andrei Piontkovsky, doctor, visiting senior fellow at the Hudson Institute
in Washington, D.C., and executive director
of the Strategic Studies Center in Moscow. He's a weekly columnist at the
Novaya Gazetta newspaper in Moscow, and his commentary
can be heard regularly on BBC World Service and National Public Radio.
This is quite a distinguished panel. I'm delighted to have all of you present
and here with us.
I am going to run the time clock, if I could, at a five-minute basis to -- what
I would prefer each of you to do would be to
-- we will take all of your written testimony into the record, and to summarize
the points that you would like to have made.
It's not a hard time on five minutes. We can go over some, but I would like to
get mostly a summary so we can go through a
depth of questions. And your full testimony will be included in the record.
And let's see, we will start -- I believe we've got on the record, Ms.
Bourjaily, that we would start with you, if that's
OK.
BOURJAILY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the commission for this opportunity. I would also like
to thank the commission, the State Department,
the USAID, and our courageous Russian NGOs who have been working with us on NGO
law.
I understand that other panelists will provide with background on democratic
developments in Russia. I have been asked to
focus on NGO law.
We're currently in the process of finalizing the comprehensive analysis of the
NGO law. But this afternoon, I would like to
address only four key issues: its extensive reporting requirements for all
NGOs; excessive governmental control over activities of
NGOs; broad list of reasons for denial of registration of NGOs; and also,
issues of monitoring and implementation.
Let me take next three minutes to explain.
The new law requires all NGOs to report on intended use of money, how you use
the money, and also on beneficiaries. Then
your reporting requirements are going to affect not only human rights groups
but all NGOs, if you imagine abused women seeking
assistance from NGOs knowing that these NGOs will have to provide their name to
the government authorities.
And yet, if NGOs fail to provide the required information, they can be
terminated.
To make matters worse, the government can prohibit funding of any activities
for very broad reasons, for example, if they
can see that activities are contradictory or a threat for Russia's cultural
heritage or unique character.
Second, the government has overly broad authority to control NGOs. Using but
one example, government officials can
participate in any internal meeting or event conducted by an NGO.
BROWNBACK: They can participate in any meeting under this law?
BOURJAILY: They have authority. They can decide in which meeting to
participate, and they have the right to participate in
any internal meeting or event.
Suppose, for example, a Russian NGO wants to plan next advocacy campaign. The
government can sit in the planning meeting.
That's making it virtually impossible to carry over the activities. And this
is the definite intrusion of the government into their
private space.
The Council of Europe, in its opinion on the draft NGO law, has stated that
government has only authority to review
activities and to request documents when there's valid reason exist to believe
that the NGO in question does not comply with
existing legislation. And this recommendation clearly has not been met in the
adopted law.
Third, denials of registration. There's a broad list of reasons which are not
very well-defined. Some of these reasons are
if the goals of established of the following NGO are contradictory to or create
a threat to unique character, cultural heritage, and
national interest of the Russian Federation.
That's the same argument I had presented earlier in regards to reporting
requirements. And my colleagues and I are still in
the process of trying to interpret, trying to define what these terms actually
mean.
The fourth and the last issue is monitoring and implementation. Some have
asked: Why are we concerned about the law, even
though it's not yet been enforced? The first reason is that several provisions
in this law are raising red flags.
ICNL has been assisting with the NGO legislation in over 90 countries, and
several countries have used very similar
provisions, misusing, abusing them to restrain civil society.
That said, this will be my last point. I agree that it is important to monitor
the implementation of the law. Some have
told us that the law will not have negative effect on Russian civil society.
Let's see. Indeed, we call upon Russian government to establish a joint
nonpartisan body which would include all interested
parties to monitor the implementation of the new law. And perhaps there will
be no problems with it, and perhaps there will be
problems. And then we will see how the Russian government is going to deal
with this problem.
Thank you.
BROWNBACK: Thank you very much.
Ms. Gill?
GILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Russia's NGO law follows moves in other countries in the region to restrict or
tightly regulate civil society, which have in
turn come in the wake of the colored revolutions throughout the region.
Many now wonder what impact the Russian law will have in practice. I would
like to look back, in a way, and offer a glimpse
of how similar regulations have been put into practice in Uzbekistan, where
regulations have been used to silence civil society.
The law should also be set in a broader Russian context, so, time permitting, I
would like to look at how the law is just
the latest piece of the Kremlin's agenda to dismantle or control all
institutions that check or balance the government's power.
Although the new Russian NGO law does not come into effect until April, we
don't have to look far to see the possible
implications of such restrictions on NGOs.
I come to my work in our Moscow office after two years of working in
Uzbekistan; I'm afraid my experience there is going to
be all too relevant. Uzbekistan bears the dubious distinction of being at the
vanguard of efforts to stifle civil society in the
region.
To be sure, there are very important differences between Uzbekistan and Russia:
their governments, their level of
oppression, their civil societies. But the Uzbek experience offers us specific
and relevant examples of how an NGO law that
purports to merely regulate NGOs can, in fact, be used to punish and control
them.
Whereas the Kremlin's moves to remove checks and balances to its power are
more recent, in Uzbekistan the government has a
long record of formal and informal censorship of the media, intimidating
independent activists, restricting public demonstrations,
and banning political parties that are not loyal to the government.
The regulations in Uzbekistan were changed in broad terms in late 2003. And
they granted the Ministry of Justice broad
authority to make registration decisions, and they gave the ministry sole power
to decide whether an organization's activities
correspond to the goals outlined in the organization's own charter, which
essentially gave the ministry an effective veto over
activities and organizations that they find undesirable.
Other regulations require international NGOs to receive advanced permission for
all their activities from the ministry and,
like the Russian law, allow ministry officials to attend all NGO events.
In addition, the government imposed complicated regulations for banking and
financial operations, and gave oversight of
grants from international NGOs to local Uzbek partners to a secret government
commission.
Although the Uzbek government made assurances that these regulations would not
affect international NGO operations, the
assurances were quickly proven empty.
I'd like to highlight just a few examples of how administrative regulations
that could appear benign on their face were used
as a backbone of a government campaign to silence the NGO sector in Uzbekistan.
And I should note at the outset that, as far as
this campaign involves international as opposed to local NGOs, U.S. NGOs have
been the main target so far of the Uzbek government.
The first test of the new Uzbek regulations occurred in March 2004, several
months after Georgia's Rose Revolution. At that
time, the Uzbek government refused to reregister the Open Society Institute for
renting an office space without the proper zoning
permits and other allegations, including damaging the country's image in the
international sphere.
Since then, the government has conducted extensive, time-consuming audits of
most major international organizations
operating in the country. After the completion of each audit, the ministry
issues findings of all violations of the laws and, if
the government is unhappy with the organization's efforts to correct the
violations, it can sue in the courts for suspension or
liquidation of the organization.
The audits demand significant time and resources in order to prepare and
respond adequately. They can drag on for months,
leaving organizations unsure of their fate, complicating decisions about
staffing and whether to invest further program resources in
the country, and paralyzing the organization's substantive work.
Although the regulations on their face appear to be benign administrative rules
that should not affect NGOs' primary work,
their arbitrary punitive implementation has produced a stranglehold on civil
society.
Never mind that the government's venue of choice, the Uzbek civil courts, have
no jurisdiction over these disputes or that,
in some cases, the government prepares its court case before even receiving a
response from the organizations about any efforts to
correct violations, in a system where checks and balances have been dismantled
or indeed never existed, and in an atmosphere of
clear government animosity toward civil society, the government wins every time.
Just running through a few examples. In the past year in Uzbekistan, the
government has liquidated Internews Network, a
media support organization funded by the U.S., for, among other reasons,
failure to register changing its logo and have appropriate
licenses for some of its programs. Two local staff of Internews were convicted
of related criminal charges.
On the basis of complaints from the Ministry of Justice, the Uzbek courts
ordered the suspension of IREX, an educational
exchange organization, and Freedom House, a human rights organization, for
providing Internet services without a license and failure
to receive permission from the Ministry of Justice before conducting internal
meetings or trainings.
Again, the Ministry of Justice has requested the Uzbek prosecutor's office to
open criminal investigations at staff who work
at these organizations.
The picture for local organizations is at once more simple and even more dire.
The government just denies registrations to
groups it finds threatening or forces registered groups to close.
I would like to emphasize that, in Uzbekistan, the regulations for the most
part read well on paper and thorough formal
safeguards are in place: The Ministry of Justice must provide written
explanations for its decisions within reasonable time
periods; organizations are granted 30 days to correct violations after
receiving warnings; and the ministry's decisions to deny
registration or take other action may be appealed in the courts.
However, again, in a system of unchecked government power, these safeguards are
rendered meaningless.
I'll end there. And the rest of my testimony's in writing.
BROWNBACK: Yes, thank you. And I appreciate those thoughts from your
experience in Uzbekistan.
Mr. Kuchins?
KUCHINS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address the
commission on this important topic today.
As you mentioned, I've just returned from a 2 1/2 year stint in Moscow, where I
was the director of the Carnegie Moscow
Center, a leading and very pivotal NGO in Russia. My tenure in Moscow began
with the Yukos affair, and it concluded with the battle
over the recently signed legislation regulating NGOs in Russia.
BROWNBACK: I'm glad to get you out of there.
KUCHINS: It feels good to be back in from the cold. My friends joke with me
that, "Andy, you know, since you arrived in
Moscow, you know, democracy and civil society, things haven't been going very
well."
(LAUGHTER)
For the record, I accept the correlation, but I do not take any responsibility
for causation.
(LAUGHTER)
For those of us concerned about civil society and democratic governance,
there's no question in my mind that the trend in
the last few years has been in the wrong direction. And, unfortunately, I do
not expect that to change in the near future.
We now have a lot of data to help answer the famous question: Who is Mr.
Putin? And while Mr. Putin continuously claims to
support civil society and democracy, virtually all the evidence of the past six
years speaks to the contrary.
It's true that he inherited at best a very weakly institutionalized system of
democratic governance. But as weak and
deformed as Russian democracy was during the Yeltsin period, there were
competitive and pluralistic aspects to it that could have
been nurtured and strengthened.
Instead, President Putin has consistently and systematically eliminated
competition among independent, contending political
forces and centralized more and more political authority in the office of the
presidential administration. If Mr. Putin does
believe in democratic governance as he contends, he has a very odd way of
expressing it, it seems to me.
Now, supporters of Mr. Putin argue that many of the measures he has initiated
in recent years are not undemocratic; in a
number of cases, in and of themselves, that's true.
But what cannot be denied, in my view, is that the net result of these and
other measures is that the hyper-presidential
system consolidated during Mr. Putin's presidency has nearly virtually
eliminated all existing and potential independent centers of
power or, as we like to say, checks and balances.
The form of democracy is there, but the essential content of pluralism and
competition are not.
Why is the near-term outlook, in my view, bleak? I think the answer is pretty
simple: Mr. Putin, as he has stated on a
number of occasions, including last week's lengthy press conference, believes
that highly centralized political authority, something
he once described as part of Russia's DNA, is most appreciate for Russia's
current stage of social, economic and political
development. Anything else, in his view, as well as that of his closest
advisers, supposedly risk anarchy, even state collapse.
With a constitutionally mandated transfer of power scheduled for 2008, Mr.
Putin and his team do not want to leave anything
to chance. And the inability of the Kuchma administration to successfully
manage the Ukrainian presidential election at the end of
2004 in Ukraine, resulting the so-called Orange Revolution, deeply shook the
Kremlin, which had invested tremendous political and
financial resources into the election of its favored candidate, Mr. Yanukovych.
This event further alerted the Kremlin leadership, already inclined to
centralize and control as much as possible, to the
danger of allowing civil society, particularly organizations supported by
foreign financing, to play a role in national politics.
It was the view that foreign-supported NGOs that played a key role in rallying
Yushchenko supporters and eventually
overturning the presidential elections in Ukraine. This only strengthened the
view of the Putin administration that it needed to
further weaken civil society in Russia to ensure that nothing of this nature
could happen in 2008.
In my view, the chances of any colored revolution taking place in Russia in the
upcoming electoral cycle are slim to none.
But the prevailing mentality in the Kremlin is that nothing can be left to
chance. That is the inspiration for the new legislation
regulating NGOs that Mr. Putin signed last month.
It's true that the final legislation is a considerable improvement on the
initial draft law, but the key is that what really
matters is how it's going to be implemented, as has already been discussed.
And as with the selective application of law in the
Yukos case, we can expect that the new NGO law will be very selectively applied
to shut down NGOs considered against the interests
of the Kremlin.
The legislation will also likely push organizations to further self-censor
their statements and activities.
So today we are face to face with a very negative trend for democracy and civil
society in Russia, and this trend is
accelerating precisely as Russia takes over the chair of the G-8 and soon the
Council of Europe in May. This is a double irony.
Membership criteria were bent in both institutions to let Russia in. The
calculation was that, through membership, Russia
could be socialized to take measures to strengthen its adherence to democratic
values and practice and respect for human rights.
At the risk of sounding like one of those old Sovietologist dogs that Mr. Putin
referred to in his press conference last
week, Russia simply does not meet the criteria, to the extent that such
criteria exists for membership in the G-8.
It's obviously not a mature democracy, but rather an increasingly authoritarian
state with only the trappings of democracy.
Still, I do not advocate throwing Russia out of the G-8 or boycotting the St.
Petersburg meeting.
But for me, if the first draft of the NGO legislation had been passed, that
would have been the final blow. Of course, I
had rather sort of a personal interest there.
I think Mr. Putin understood this risk, and he pulled back from the brink. But
we should expect that the Kremlin will
continue to test the limits as we approach the 2008 elections in Russia.
The U.S. needs to clarify where the red lines are with Russia, and I admit
that's easier said than done. If you'll allow me
one other minute, I might say a couple of things...
BROWNBACK: Please.
KUCHINS: ... about what the Russians refer as "schtudelet," (ph) what is to be
done.
There is clearly no magic bullet in our policy toolkit for the promotion of
democracy, civil society, and human rights in
Russia. And just as obviously, our leverage today with Russia is far less than
the 1990s, when the Russian economy was weak.
Nevertheless, I think there are some things that we can do. When Russian
democracy, civil society, and human rights are
being attacked, this is clearly not the time to reduce U.S. government, as well
as private funding, for these goals.
And I acknowledge that, although dependence on foreign funding is a real
problem for Russian NGOs, and particularly human
rights NGOs, the U.S. government and major U.S. private foundations should
quickly make a statement by significantly increasing
their support for these essential organizations in 2006 and beyond.
Secondly, I think we need to increase our support for a variety of exchange
programs that strengthen the connectivity of our
two societies. The most important area is in education, from high school to
graduate programs. From the standpoint of democracy
assistance, I think you get the greatest long-term benefit, with support from
more Russian youth, to have the opportunity to live
and study in the U.S.
Finally, a word about our public voice. This is clearly important. First, we
must ensure, of course, that we keep our own
democratic and human rights house in order, to ensure that we maintain our
moral authority to speak on these issues.
And, secondly, we must consistently apply the same standards to Russia as we do
to other countries to ensure that we neither
understate nor overstate the problem.
Balancing public criticism by high-level U.S. government officials with
backchannel efforts to lobby the Russian government
will always present challenges. And while it's important that the U.S.
government speak forthrightly at the highest levels about
the deficiencies in Russian democracy where it sees them and policies toward
civil society and human rights, this must be carefully
calibrated in order to avoid the impression of piling on.
A final comment, though, is that, given the importance of Russia for U.S.
foreign policy interests, I think there's no other
country in the world, which if you looked at some of the key interests of the
United States, has the potential to thwart or to
promote those interests, I think we need to pay more attention to that.
And one way of doing it is for a major policy address by a high-level
government official, preferably the president. Such a
speech would force the U.S. policymaking apparatus to focus on the importance
of the challenges Russia presents and to state as
clearly as possible the essence of our goal.
As an outside observer, I sense there's some cognitive dissonance or tension
within the U.S. government between those
concerned with the dangers of democratic backsliding and its implications for
Russian foreign policy with those more inclined to
emphasize how we advance our security and economic interests with Moscow.
It's incumbent upon us, I think, to synthesize these idealist and realist
inclinations into a coherent policy strategy.
Russia's future remains too important for our near- and long-term interests to
shirk such an effort, and it's essential that our
friends and colleagues in Russia understand this.
Thank you very much.
BROWNBACK: Thank you.
Dr. Petro?
PETRO: (OFF-MIKE)
BROWNBACK: Thank you very much, as well.
Mr. Piontkovsky, please?
PIONTKOVSKY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The most statistic presented just now by my esteemed colleague is correct, but
there is an old saying that there are lies,
outrageous lies, and statistics.
I comment one the one remark that only handful of media institution are
controlled by state. Yes, only handful. But this
handful is three national state TV channels who are the only source of
information for 90 percent of the Russian citizens and on
which we'll never, never hear any criticism of Mr. Putin.
But I would like to devote the very limited time I have for very important
question you, Mr. Chairman, asked Assistant
Secretary Daniel Fried. Russians, or Russian officials, or Russian elite are
indulging in anti-Western and anti-American
perceptions and sentiments.
It's a very important question for the future of our relationship. The Russian
security experts are firmly convinced that,
in this very dangerous 21st century, the basic strategic geopolitical interest
of Russia coincide, rather than contradict each
other, whether you mean the challenges of Islamic radicalism or a rising China.
That's why I am more troubled, not by the fact whether our government, elected
or appointed by Mr. Putin, but this growing
anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in our foreign policy rhetoric and
sometimes in our foreign policy action.
Until recently, all opinion polls demonstrated that these sentiments, as in
many other countries, these anti-American
sentiments are more characteristic for (inaudible) of political elite, those
people who buy the very -- sending their children to
study at American universities, their wives to give birth in American clinics,
and have their accounts in American banks.
But approximately from late 2004, the massive indoctrination by these handful
of media (inaudible) of ideas, of perceptions
of Western America as a enemy (inaudible) these feelings are penetrated deeply
into Russian public consciousness and
unconsciousness.
Unfortunately, this campaign was unleashed by famous statements of Mr. Putin in
address to the nation after this one. The
enormous gap between Putin of 2001, who appeared on TV (inaudible) of the
(inaudible) and said, "Americans, we are with you," and
Putin on TV screens in September 2004 who said -- I quote (inaudible)
literally, because it's very important -- that, "Islamic
terrorists, they are just instruments. They are instruments in the hands of
more dangerous, more powerful, more traditional enemies
of Russia who still perceive nuclear Russia as a threat and try to weaken and
dismantle it."
The worst thing of all, I suspect, that Putin sincerely believes in it, that
it's not just rhetoric for internal political
consumption. And this is a very serious problem for our relationship.
As all of the panelists, I'm strongly against canceling of G-8 meeting in
Petersburg, especially because I think the
potential of this institution is not used enough for raising very frank
questions.
Both in Russian political elite and Mr. Putin personally, in spite all of the
anti-American perceptions, appreciate very
strongly Russian membership in this group.
And may I finish with one suggestion for President Bush as a member of this G-8
crop? Many (inaudible) have said that it's
necessary to (inaudible) this meeting frank question, like it's customary among
friends. The (inaudible) question (inaudible) do
you really believe that I am sending terrorists to kill your children?
If it's misunderstanding, please explain to your people, and please, your spin
doctors on TV, stop propagating this vision
and this perception of America, the power behind the Islamic terrorists
attacking Russia, and let's concentrate on these very
important security challenges we both share.
But if not, if you really -- if you do believe and they think, in this case,
what we are doing here and at other (inaudible)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BROWNBACK: Thank you.
And I want to thank all the panelists for the thoughtful comments that you put
forward here. Russia's central for us, the
OSCE, because of what it does is it sends a signal to a lot of the -- it sends
a signal to the rest of the OSCE countries of what
you can get away with or what you can't get away with.
And so what happens there we find will have iterations in various countries
throughout the region, and so it's very
important that we shine a spotlight on it.
Mr. Kuchins, you most recently came back from -- or maybe (inaudible) region,
but you were there for a couple of years. It
seems like we've been on a steady deterioration line for the past couple of
years, and I've been puzzled.
Do the Russian people, do they support this? Dr. Petro, I would gather, would
say, yes, that they do. And yet I'm putting
it in the framework of if this happens here, if you've got a more centralized
media, if you've got less freedoms that are taking
place, if you see less organizations that most of the people here would say,
"Now, wait a minute. This is not going the right
direction, and I don't support the government doing this."
Are we not seeing that take place in Russia? Are the people saying that and we
don't hear it? What's been the reaction of
the people?
KUCHINS: It's a perplexing paradox of Russia. As Dr. Petro suggested, Mr.
Putin is popular. He's genuinely popular. And
there are understandable reasons for why he's popular.
Since he's been president, the Russian economy has been growing robustly. His
image as a leader is one that garners respect
in the world. Russia is clearly viewed to be on the rise. And there are other
reasons for that.
The Russian people, we have to keep in mind, you know, what they experienced in
the last 15 years or so: the collapse of
the Soviet Union; your status being diminished from that of a superpower to
initially a state that is disdained in the world; power
plummeting very, very quickly; state authority over many institutions
collapsing.
And at the same -- and this is at the precise time when Russia begins its
experiment with democracy. So I'm afraid that, in
the minds of a lot of the Russian people, the democracy has been associated
with anarchy, state collapse, humiliation of the Russian
people, et cetera. That's a very unfortunate legacy that we have to deal with.
There's a major study at the University of Michigan called -- it's a study on
world value systems. And Russians come out
more or less at the median, the global median in their support of democracy.
So I don't think that the Russian people are fundamentally not supportive of
democracy, but I think that it's not such a
high priority right now for the Russian people.
BROWNBACK: And the hierarchical needs?
KUCHINS: The hierarchical needs. There's economic recovery. There's building
wealth. There's getting rich. And at least
for the time being, it seems to me that the Russian people are ready to trade
off, to some extent, a truncation of political
liberties and the organizational liberties...
BROWNBACK: If that's what it takes to grow the economy?
KUCHINS: To grow the economy and as long as their personal liberties are
maintained. I think it's very true that Russia
today is freer probably than at any time it has been in its history, from the
standpoint of individual freedoms, people's freedom to
start businesses, to make wealth, to travel, et cetera. That's the priority
right now.
Now, the question is, for me, at one time do these political liberties, which
have been shrunken -- I don't think you can
make any -- there's not like there's any argument there -- at one point does
that possibly, you know, come into conflict with
individual liberties?
The other thing that gives me hope, somewhat, for the future -- and, again, I'm
not very optimistic in the near term for
Russian democracy, and it's related to this point -- that is that the middle
class is growing. It's been growing steadily. Incomes
are growing.
And I think, in the longer term, a larger middle class that has investments in
property, that wants to defend those
investments in property, that's where you're going to see, I think, more of the
demand for less corrupt, more transparent, more
effective state institutions.
There have been some improvements in the legal system, as Dr. Petro suggested.
But the demand has to come from below, and
so far it's not really there. And unfortunately my disappointment with Mr.
Putin, especially in the last couple of years, is that
his administration has not been really doing that much, in my view, to
encourage that. And I'll stop there.
PETRO: Mr. Chairman?
BROWNBACK: Dr. Petro?
PETRO: (OFF-MIKE) I agree with much of what Dr. Kuchins said. But I think one
of the sources of misunderstanding or
(OFF-MIKE) is over the role that the state plays in promoting stability,
including democratic stability.
And democracy in the abstract is something we can philosophize about. But
democratic stability is filtered through the
institutions of the state, which means it has to have parameters, it has to
have definition.
And I think that there is more faith in the institutions of the state than we
commonly give -- Russians have more faith in
the institutions or that they are developing that faith than we have, frankly,
than we have faith in Russian government
institutions.
And I think that's a fundamental divide.
BROWNBACK: Mr. Petro, I want to ask -- a statement was made that 90 percent of
the media that the people receive is run by
the state. Is that correct?
PETRO: No. It refers to national television programming. But if you take
into account all the sources of information that
an individual has at their disposal, which I assume when we're speaking about
media it would have to include television, radio, the
press that one could get, the Internet, and -- well, those are the main sources
-- the availability of information is, well,
certainly for people in big cities, limitless.
Television, however, is basically state television on the three major national
channels, not regional channels, which differ
from region to region. In some regions, like my region, the region I'm most
familiar with, in Novgorod (ph), there are five local
regional channels. In Yekaterinburg, the third-largest city, there are 25
regional channels. So it differs and depends.
BROWNBACK: But CBS, NBC, ABC and FOX, the equivalents would be run by the
state, the national network media? Is that
correct?
PETRO: Yes. Well, when you say "run," there's a corporation that is part of
the management process. I don't get the sense
-- and perhaps others can correct me -- that there is that kind of direct --
there's no state agency that runs, except for RTR.
But there is essentially a management structure and a corporate body of
shareholders that run the different television
programming, television companies.
BROWNBACK: Mister...
PIONTKOVSKY: About managing (inaudible) the dismantling of NTV station was a
very good lesson for most TV journalists, and
self-censorship in these three main channel is working more efficiently than
any official censorship now.
BROWNBACK: That's what it strikes me as taking place.
Ms. Bourjaily, I want to -- and I want to also -- Ms. Gill, your experience is
instructive, as well. You are concerned
about the nature of the law that has passed on NGOs. Have you seen NGOs
operate differently now since the passage of the law, in
anticipation of its enforcement, in anticipation of what may follow?
BOURJAILY: No, I do not. The only difference I see, and that basically
throughout the sector, the NGO sector in Russia,
that they are (inaudible) they are meeting, they are debating on what
appropriate or how much information they will be willing to
disclose to the government.
And that's the major difference. The law is not in effect yet.
BROWNBACK: So they are debating what they're going to have to do, in
anticipation of this, but the enforcement provisions
haven't taken place yet?
BOURJAILY: Yes. And also, quite a few groups are very much concerned about
the implementation. And I do know that there
are quite specific discussions on the ground on how to set up some body which
is going to monitor the implementation of the law.
BROWNBACK: I have to tell you, when I would hear about this, and read about
it, and look at it, and experience in the
region, this really struck me as a regime attempting to preserve itself. And
just, OK -- and the way to do this is to hold fair
elections but ahead of time clear the playing field off, so it all looks good,
clean and fair when we have the actual vote taking
place, but ahead of time -- you know, I'm going to tie your legs together, I'm
going to tie your arms together, and then we'll have
race, that it's setting that up.
And it's a much more sophisticated technique to be able to say, "I've got a
democracy," but this was not a fair operation in
moving it forward. I mean, that's what it struck me as at the time when I read
about it.
And it didn't puzzle me, because you can kind of see, well, you know, generally
politicians are into self-preservation, and
groups are, as well. Being a politician, I understand self-preservation, but
it's not good for a system, it's not good for a
country, and it's not good for competition taking place.
Am I seeing the situation wrong?
BOURJAILY: Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. As I mentioned in my presentation,
there are quite a few provisions in the new
law which raise red flags. And the same or very similar provisions have been
misused and abused by other countries.
So, again, we'll only see, and the best way to reevaluate or evaluate the
situation is based on the facts on how the law
will actually be implemented. But there's a threat, and I think that I share
your understanding of the situation.
BROWNBACK: Mr. Kuchins, you mentioned ways we should progress and proceed
forward. All of you, I gather, suggest we don't
boycott the G-8 meeting, that that's not the way to go in this process, unless
somebody here disagrees with that.
Does anybody else have specific suggestions to the U.S. government, to the
Congress of what we should be doing in sending a
clear message to Russia about dismay on what's taking place and the removal and
the limitations of NGOs?
Ms. Gill, did you have...
GILL: I would highlight the fact that, because the law is not yet in force,
and because some of the specific provisions of
the law will only be later clarified when implementing regulations are passed,
that the time to act is absolutely now, perhaps to be
able to head off some of the worst-case scenarios.
The U.S. needs to have a coordinated strategy, I would suggest, with its
European allies. I think it's pretty clear that,
in some ways, this law is directed against U.S. influence and investment in
monies in NGOs. So this is not a time to let Russia
divide its allies.
The U.S. and Europe should speak with one voice. They should speak loudly and
clearly to President Putin that this issue
will not go away, this issue will not fall from the agenda. I think he perhaps
hopes that, after an initial outcry, the law will be
allowed to take sort of its effects under the radar.
And I would emphasize what my colleague has pointed out as some of the law's
most pernicious provisions, and most of the
work should be geared toward repealing those provisions or softening them,
particularly the reporting provisions.
BROWNBACK: OK. I thank you all very much. If you have other thoughts you'd
like for us to consider or to put forward, I'd
appreciate that a great deal. And I appreciate your expertise, appreciate your
thoughts on this.
And I appreciate your commitment to democracy building and civil society. It
is key. It is critical. And what happens in
Russia will be a model for much of the rest of the world, whether good or evil.
We need it to progress in the right direction.
Thank you very much. The hearing's adjourned.
Whereupon the hearing ended at 4:56 p.m.
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